Hello listeners.

Welcome to an emergency episode of the Jacob Shapiro podcast.

We are gonna have a couple episodes today.

The first is the short mini episode with Hamidreza Azizi.

He has been on the podcast before.

Um, he is a leading researcher and expert on Iran and Iranian security.

Thank you to him for making the time.

Um, this is a short 30 minute episode.

We'll have come Ron on in a bit.

Cousin Marco and I are doing an episode over on geopolitical cousins.

I may have more after that.

I'm going after some Israeli security analysts too.

Um, and it sounds like this is not gonna be a 24 hour thing, it sounds

like this is gonna be a many weeks long thing depend depending on how things.

Escalate from here.

So I'll do my best to keep you abreast and to bring you some perspectives.

Um, take care of the people that you loved.

Cheers and see you out there.

Alright, well let's just start with the basics.

Uh, so we're recording Friday morning, uh, here in the United States.

It's 9 32 Central Time.

Uh, we're gonna.

We're not gonna sit on this content listeners.

We'll push stuff out as we go, but even then, probably some things

will be overtaken by events.

Um, but we've got our first expert on this morning.

Um, Reza good, good to see you.

Thank you for making the time.

Um.

Let, let's start at the very simplest level.

Like what, what are your first reactions to what's happened over the last 24 hours?

I, I can tell you, I personally was pretty surprised.

I put a note on our internal research platform yesterday that this seems

to be escalating quickly, but I, I wasn't thinking quite that quickly.

So your first reactions I.

Hi, good morning.

Thank you for having me.

It's a pleasure to, uh, join you again.

Uh, maybe not in a very good or pleasant time.

Uh, so yeah, you're right.

I mean, it was also quite shocking to me.

Uh, we could already see, uh, signs of a perfect storm gathering,

but again, uh, and still.

Um, you know, reports about, uh, the, um, upcoming nuclear negotiations

between Iran and the United States in Oman, uh, scheduled for Sunday

and, and, and things like that.

That would be, uh, that could be seen as some, uh, you know,

assurances that at least.

Uh, in the, in a, a few days, uh, time window, there won't be any, uh, major

escalation, but, uh, here we are.

And, um, um, I think it was also quite striking to, uh,

the Iranian government as well.

Uh.

Uh, I can imagine and one would expect them to, uh, be quite

prepared, especially after all that happens, uh, to their allies in the

so-called access of resistance over the past year, and also did for TA

attacks, uh, the latest, uh, round of Israeli attacks on Iranian proper.

Uh, in October.

So given all that, uh, they must have been prepared.

But then, uh, we, uh, can see, uh, the scope of damage, both in terms of the, uh,

you know, kind of, uh, uh, the number of high ranking, uh, military commanders, uh,

killed in the, in, in the Israeli strikes.

And also, uh, the scope of the, the geographical scope

actually of the Israeli reach to.

Military sites.

And, and this raises, uh, significant questions about, uh, the, uh,

proper, uh, planning or kind of, uh, proper, uh, understanding actually

of what might come and, uh, how uh, they should be prepared for that.

It seems, at least from the initial damage, like you

said, that um, I mean maybe Iran was prepared, but it seems like Israel was

really able to neutralize air defense.

I mean, it, it seems like, you know, Israel, I, I won't say have, has

control over Iranian skies, but Israel's talking about a two week long operation.

Um, yeah, I was actually chatting with some of my fellow researchers

after the first reports of attacks.

We were like, ah, this is kind of timid.

And then no, Netanyahu comes out and then it's a second wave, and then it's a.

Third wave, but then you're starting to get reports about,

about some of the damage.

How can Iran respond?

I think that's the big question here.

I saw some initial reports that maybe there were some drones that were fired,

um, towards Israel, or sent towards Israel and Israel's already shot them down.

Um, do you think that sort of Iran just sort of has to take the

punch or, or is there going to be some kind of meaningful response

that they can engage in right now?

'cause right now it seems like Israel has control over the situation.

Yeah, it seems very much so.

And uh, the thing is that, uh, air defense was already, and for a long time, the

weakest part in the, uh, overall, uh, map of Iranian, uh, kind of, uh, uh, military

infrastructure and, and military doctrine.

Uh, that was why actually.

Uh, they started working on, uh, this concept of forward defense

in the first place, you know, to, uh, basically compensate for, uh,

the lack of effective air defense.

And on that, uh, we should also, uh, uh, note that, uh, one element

is, uh, the kind of, uh, technology deficit, especially comparatively

speaking, you know, when it comes to.

Uh, what Israel has, for example, or other Iranian adversaries,

um, have in the region.

And the other one is of course about the vast geography, uh, uh, of Iran.

You know, so it's, uh, uh, quite difficult to have, uh,

proper air defense for all that.

So anyway, that was why they worked with, uh, non-state actors to,

uh, extend the geography of their, uh, defense and deterrents, uh,

far beyond the Iranian border.

So what happened over the past few months?

I mean, technically.

Uh, over the course of the war in Gaza and beyond, was that, uh, that

kind of, uh, forward defense, the.

A strategic depth of, of Iran, as they call it, uh, started to shrink.

And to the extent that, uh, you know, it was only Iraq and Yemen remaining.

And even on that, you know, there were serious, uh, doubts about the

extent to which they could engage.

Um, so.

Uh, that's why we see what we see because, uh, already in October, end of October,

the Israeli strikes, uh, they, uh, successfully neutralized, uh, parts of

the actually, uh, some key parts of the, uh, Iranian air defense, which were, uh.

Uh, the Russian made S3 hundreds and also some others.

Uh, so there was already this gap, and now it seems that, uh, in the, in the,

in the past month, despite, uh, a lot of efforts that, uh, we could see, they were

not really able to, uh, close that gap.

And together with, as I said, uh, the lack of proper.

Allied support in the region in terms of non safe allies and proxies.

Uh, they are in this, uh, kind of very, uh, uh, difficult situation.

So that's about, uh, the defense part on the oftens.

Uh, we can also, I mean, there is this, uh, kind of direct connection

between these two because, uh, uh, as far as I could tell, uh, there

were at least three phases in this.

Uh, in, in, in what seems to be actually the first round, only the

first round of Israeli attacks, as they say it's going to be, uh, to continue.

So there were three phases.

Uh, the first phase was, uh, seemed, I mean, they, they, they happened, uh,

more or less simultaneously, but I. Uh, or we can say maybe three main pillars.

So one was, uh, neutralizing, uh, Iranian, uh, military commanders, uh, together

with some, uh, nuclear scientists.

Uh, so in a sense, uh, trying to paralyze uh, strategic decision making on the top.

So this is quite reminiscent of what happened in Lebanon,

for example, with Hezbollah.

Uh, the top, uh, uh, Hezbollah, uh, commander structure.

Then, uh, the second pillar, or the second, uh, phase was, uh, to target, um,

uh, the, uh, military, uh, basically the, uh, uh, some of the, uh, missile bases and

also, uh, some on the ground, uh, nuclear facilities in this case, specifically

in Naans, uh, in, in central Iran.

Uh, so, uh.

The, the, the attacks on these have been ongoing.

Uh, I mean, last time we checked, uh, um, you know, kind of an hour

ago or so, it was still ongoing.

Uh, so it seems that, uh, to, to, to me, it seems like one of the reasons that,

uh, Iran has not responded yet, because one can imagine that they, uh, they

must have already had, uh, some plans ready for, uh, for retaliation, right?

Uh, so this kind of lack of.

Uh, or the loss of better to say, uh, top military command in, in charge of,

uh, decision making for retaliation.

And, uh, the damages that might have caused.

We still don't know the details to the missile, uh, basis might have caused this.

And the third and final so far, uh, the third pillar or third phase, uh, of this.

Uh, which is again, still seems to be ongoing, is, uh, to target what

has, what is left of Iran's air defense, especially concentrating

on, uh, western areas of Iran.

We saw frequent attacks on, on Tabriz, for example, on, uh, nausea.

Uh, a, um, uh, airb base, uh, in Hamadan, all located in.

Western Iran, northwest and west.

Uh, so on that, it seems that, uh, uh, there is an atom to kind of clear

the way for, uh, for future strikes, probably, uh, deeper inside the country.

Uh, probably, uh, with kind of, uh, more direct engagement

of Israeli, uh, airplanes, uh, kind of fighters that, sorry.

Uh.

Uh, uh, within the Iranian aerospace or things like that.

So, uh, this all has complicated Iranian response as far as I can tell.

Yeah.

Um, you mentioned the proxies.

So at least in Israeli media, I don't know how much credence to give this,

uh, is reporting that has Hezbollah is saying they're not going to strike Israel.

Um, which is, I mean, shocking.

If that's true, who knows if it's true or if the Israeli media's trying to

shape the, the, the media ecosystem.

You mentioned the Houthis.

They successfully stood up to some United States airstrikes, you know, a

couple weeks, months ago to, uh, the surprise of President Donald Trump who

said he's had some kind of deal with the Houthis to not attack American interests.

Um, obviously the Assad regime is gone and probably the elimination of Syrian

air defense, as we talked about on this podcast a couple weeks ago, has

something to do with the ease with which Israel has done some of these things.

Um.

Are there any proxies left?

Are there any left standing?

Do the Houthis like have a renewed campaign in them for the Persian Gulf?

And I guess that also gets into the question of where do you think

the United States' role in this?

Because at least last night when I went to sleep, Marco Rubio was

putting out statements saying.

US has nothing to do with this.

This is Israel alone.

Like we urge all sides to calm down.

And you wake up this morning and you've got Trump ranting on truth

social that this is a beautiful attack.

And like, you know, I, I gave them a chance they can still come to the table

and you've got, you know, sources in both Axios, the Wall Street Journal saying yes.

Not only did the United States.

States know the United States intentionally made it seem like nothing

was happening in order to lull the Iranians into a false sense of security.

Um, so do you think that the United States becomes involved in the Iranian reaction?

Is Iran so weakened or chasten that it's not gonna go after us

Assets, like, help us think about the proxies and, and the US here.

'cause this obviously goes, goes to more than just Israel and Iran.

I think this question actually lies in the heart of the Iranian

calculations right now because, uh, you know, whether or not to, uh, include the

United States in a potential response, uh, might be, um, might make the whole

situation quite different in terms of.

Uh, the consequences.

Let, let's just start with this last point you made about, uh,

you know, kind of whether or not the United States was involved.

I would say, I mean, in terms of, uh, the thinking and perception on the Iranian

side, no matter what Trump says, what rub says, what are the contradictions, it is

perceived and presented as a, a deception.

Strategy, uh, deliberately, uh, uh, uh, kind of designed and, uh, conducted by

the United States and Israel, uh, in order to, uh, uh, make sure that Iran,

uh, would be, uh, more or less unprepared for, uh, uh, for, for an Israeli attack.

You know, and there are actually, uh, some, uh, cases that.

Uh, the Iran expert community, for example, already before all this

happened would refer to warning about this potential scenario.

For example, uh, they would mention, uh, Stein, the former, um, uh, US

representative for, uh, for the Middle East going to Lebanon, negotiating

the ceasefire deal and the other day.

Some top Hezbollah, uh, leadership, you know, being assassinated by Israel.

So they were already warning about that, and now they say, look, this

is exactly what we were warning about and that now this is happening.

Uh, so, uh, on the Iranian side, this is, this is important in terms of, uh.

Their calculation of where we are, where we are, we are in a situation that, uh,

again, in their perception, we are in a situation that there is a coordinated,

uh, plan by the United States and Israel against us, uh, in which, of course,

the United States, uh, still has a lot to offer, which it has not, uh, you

know, uh, uh, brought on the table yet in terms of, uh, active participation.

Uh, so the question would be first, uh, is, uh.

Is it logical at this stage to escalate against the United States

and invite an even stronger response?

Why the United States and Israel?

And the second question, which would kind of answer the first

one as well, is that, um.

What would happen if we don't escalate?

Is it not going to happen anyway?

Is is it not that, uh, you know, at, at some point the United States will

come in after, uh, you know, the air, uh, defense, uh, I mean, kind of

Iranian, uh, aerospace is clear, uh, and so on, that they would come in.

Using their bunker busters, uh, to, uh, kind of, uh, you know,

destroy what is left of, of Iranian nuclear, uh, uh, facilities.

So I think this is again, one of the complexities that has, if

not paralyzed, actually delayed.

I. The decision making on, um, on the Iranian side.

So here we can say, uh, we can kind of a bit, uh, more clearly or with

more clarity, speak about, uh, the potential options that Iran may have.

So first of all, as I said, we still don't know how much damage has been

inflicted to, uh, the Iranian, uh, uh, uh, missile, uh, silos and, and,

uh, kind of missile missile stockpile.

Uh, even if we consider that, uh, there's a. Uh, the damage is not high.

Uh, then, uh, you know, uh, it would be a matter of whether Iran can

sustain a, a campaign of weeks of, for example, um, uh, continuous, um,

massive, uh, missile strikes against, uh, the United States, how big the

stockpile is, you know, uh, and here.

Uh, comes, uh, the US factor because, uh, as far as I know, at least

before the October 7th, and I don't still see any sign of, uh, an actual

revision of that military strategy.

So the traditional thinking in the Iranian, uh, uh, uh, military, uh.

Uh, circles has been that whatever happens, whether it is war

initiated by Israel or the United States, we'll uh, respond to both.

And that response would involve, uh, the US base in Iraq, but also

around the Persian Gulf, uh, in Kuwait, in Qatar, in in Bahrain.

So now the question, apart from how you the US will respond, is that

first, how is, uh, the situation, I mean, how this is going to.

B, in terms of implications for, uh, for Iranian allies in those countries, you

know, uh, given all the, uh, domestic resistance against this quote unquote

resistance supported by, uh, Iran, you know, and here comes, I mean, I, I I would

say, uh, there could be some, at least some level of credibility in the reports

that the, uh, that Hezbollah doesn't want to engage because the costs, uh, for

Hezbollah domestically would be so huge.

In a situation that it is quite weak.

And the same goes for, uh, uh, for the Iraqis, you know, and, uh, if

they want to escalate Iran itself, if, if they want to escalate against,

uh, against the US spaces in, uh, around the Gulf for example, then uh,

uh, the question would be, uh, so.

How would those countries react?

So Iran tried hard, uh, to have their support and uh, it worked

a lot on this approachment with Saudi Arabia, with other countries.

So it would evaporate, uh, overnight if Iran decides to, to do that.

And finally, on the HSIs, I think they are already at full capacity in

terms of, uh, uh, what they can do.

And, uh, it is not going to have a strategic impact on, uh, on

Israel and on top of all this.

We shouldn't forget, uh, the elephant in the room.

Israel is a nuclear armed state.

So, uh, this is, uh, what, uh, matters, uh, more than, uh, many people may think.

Right?

So, um, uh, if Iran response in a way that, um.

You know, there is a kind of significant, uh, human casualties or so on.

Uh, is it not going to be the case?

Is it not a plausible scenario after all Israel has done in the region?

Uh, trying to assert the assumption that we, we, we, we have no red lines,

cannot be, cannot, cannot, cannot this be the case that, uh, you know,

they may even resort to some sort of a nuclear escalation against Iran.

So it's much more complex than, uh, just, uh, uh.

Kind of, uh, how to say material, uh, capabilities that Iran might have.

Mm-hmm.

And it, it, it doesn't sound based on what you're saying, that

Iran has a whole lot of cards.

Maybe they have something up their sleeve once they get together, but it seems like

they're in a pretty difficult position.

Um, I know you've got a lot going on, so I'll, I'll get you

outta here on this last question.

Um, to me at least, analytically the biggest.

I mean, there are so many questions about this and so much of what we know

is probably gonna change over time.

Like these initial reports are really, um, it's hard to parse through.

So I'm cognizant of not wanting to get too far down with the information that we

do have, but, um, at least analytically, it's unclear to me at least whether this

is an attack against Iran's nuclear.

I. Capability, including the human capital around it.

You sort of talked about some of the scientists that were assassinated, you

know, folks that were associated with the negotiation process on the nuclear deal,

you know, generals, things like that.

But then also, you know, there's also a, a take forming out there,

which is, well, no, this is actually maybe an attempt at regime change.

Um, and if you listen to Netanyahu's seven minute speech last night, he talked

about how this is, you know, we, we have no problem with the Iranian people.

We want the Iranian people to rise up against.

Tyranny and this, this government that we don't like.

Um, and, you know, assertions that well if they can get, you know, the head

of the IRGC and if they can get all of these special negotiators does is hamdi.

Next on the assassination list, is there a second wave where they

start going after the president?

Or the supreme leader himself.

Um, does that destabilize the situation?

Is it already destabilized because younger cadres in the IRGC or the military are

seeing Iranian weakness and wanting to respond and are less conservative than

maybe some of their former leaders Were.

And just with what we know so far, and I know it's imperfect,

like how do you see that?

Do you think that's what Israel's pushing for?

Do you think they have a chance?

Are you concerned about the fate of the Supreme leader and what

happens to, to Iran if Israel's able to pull some of these things off?

I mean, these are questions I couldn't have imagined asking

24 hours ago, but here we are.

Yeah, yeah, absolutely.

I mean, um, so.

I think, uh, the way that, uh, Israel conducted the, I mean, apart from the, uh,

the actual damage and, and, uh, how it is already impacted, it has already impacted,

uh, Iran's military and, and, uh, potentially also nuclear infrastructure.

There's a clear, uh, strategic messaging here, you know.

For example, IIR Ji, the commander of the IRG Air Space Force,

which who was also killed.

Uh, he is said to, um, have been in a meeting with like 20 other commanders

of, of the same force, uh, in a, um, you know, eligibly safe place.

So the message.

Of, uh, targeting all these individuals without difficulty is that the only

reason that Harmony is still alive, that we is, that we didn't want to kill him.

Uh, so that is the, uh, source of, uh, signal that you, you can get, uh, from,

um, uh, between the lines actually.

So yeah, the method, I mean, uh, the signal that we can get from kind of.

Uh, this bet, uh, between the lines, uh, signaling is that, uh, we can reach

wherever we want, uh, uh, in Iran.

And this is kind of, this is already huge in terms of, uh, how it is

impacting the mindset of, uh, the regime loyalists actually, uh, in

Iran who were, as I said, already calling for a significant overhaul,

a kind of, you know, fundamental.

Rethinking of Iranian, uh, uh, military strategy.

Uh, those were the same people who were, uh, calling for an immediate

withdrawal from the NPT and, uh, building a nuclear weapon.

And by the way, this goes back to your, uh, uh, to our, uh, uh,

pri to the previous point that we discussed in terms of Iran's option.

So this might still be on the table and even, uh, uh, kind of, uh.

More serious than, uh, than before, you know, leaving N pt,

uh, start working on, uh, kind of weaponizing the nuclear program.

It may take a, a long time, you know, under, uh, continued, uh, airstrike.

But, uh, this, this, uh, can be, uh, one way of.

Actually, uh, when I think of how, uh, how would, uh, kind of manage this despite

all the complexities that I said, all the questions that they need to answer before,

uh, doing something, um, ironically, this might be, uh, the least, uh, costly

option at this moment because, you know.

Uh, it somehow it could potentially reduce the risk of an immediate,

uh, escalation involving the United States, uh, buying some time at the

same time, uh, working on, uh, what you can consider as, uh, the ultimate

deterrence against, uh, against Israel, which is, uh, which is nuclear program.

So, uh, this is a very serious option and I think, uh, and I can imagine

that, uh, Kini is under pressure now more than before by people around him.

Uh, to authorize this and, uh, of course we don't know, uh, to what

extent, uh, they have already made progress in actual weaponization.

You know, with Udia, it's not just about uranium enrichment,

it's about delivery systems.

It's about all this, uh, like nuclear war has, uh, et cetera, et cetera.

Uh, but then that can be one way of mitigating this, uh, whole.

Uh, kind of risk of the situation, but in any case, look, uh, you

mentioned Naton Young, for example.

Uh, and, uh, we've seen a very sophisticated and, and coordinated,

uh, psychological, uh, campaign at the same time as this military

campaign is, is going on using social media, losing official channels,

using Persian speaking media.

Um, to transmit this message to the Iranian public that we actually are,

uh, we are not at war, uh, with you.

We are at war with, uh, uh, a system, with a regime, which is, uh, kind of,

which has been cruel to you as well.

Uh, so we actually have a common enemy, and believe me, uh, there are people

who, I mean, what I can, what I can get from, uh, you know, uh, surfing, uh,

through social media, from talking to people in Iran, there's a kind of dual.

Uh, emotions.

You know, uh, on one hand I could say many people, uh, are not really, uh, how to

say, uh, uh, upset about, uh, some IRGC Commander, even the top IRGC commander

being assassinated because they see them complicit in, in, in killing, uh, uh,

young people, uh, protestors, et cetera.

But on the other hand, there's a huge concern.

There's huge worry, uh, for example.

Uh, uh, when it comes to, uh, potential further effects on nuclear installations,

about, uh, the kind of radiation and so on, uh, to what extent Israel is

going to move forward, uh, uh, targets, uh, civilian infrastructure, economic

infrastructure, how it's going to impact their lives, uh, in the longer term.

So.

I can see, uh, and, and hear, uh, my, my answer to the last part of

your question, which is actually, uh, the first point you asked about in

terms of, uh, uh, the actual impact.

So.

I think, um, it is, uh, the kind of, uh, a gamble I would say, uh, uh, by Israel

counting on this, uh, growing gap, uh, between a state and society, uh, in Iran

and trying to, uh, kind of, uh, uh, uh, increased pressure on, uh, the Islamic

Republic, uh, uh, from both fronts.

But the thing is that, I mean, two, uh, two, two challenges to this strategy.

At least two challenges.

First.

Uh, it can backfire in the sense that, uh, more civilian casualties,

especially in the expected, uh, um, you know, uh, future rounds of

attacks can change the public mood.

And believe me, I'm an Iranian.

I can tell you that, uh, uh, Iranian people are very emotional and,

uh, it can change really overnight in terms of how they think,

how, how they see the situation.

And, uh, it's still difficult to speak of.

Uh.

Rally around the flag effects, but, uh, it is not, uh, it

cannot be totally ruled out.

So this is one thing.

And second, exactly, because the Islamic Republic sees this pressure from both

sides, and this has been a scenario.

They, they, they try to, uh, uh, avoid for a long, long time.

Uh, it may actually push them toward the extreme because, uh, what option

is left for you, uh, externally.

Uh, one can imagine, okay, this can be, uh, sold by Iran going to the

table as President Trump has suggested, again, surrendering everything.

And this time I would say it's not just about Iran, not enriching

uranium, but also, you know, the whole missile program, the wrong program,

et cetera, regional, uh, in order to stop the attacks if you can stop it.

But then what kind of image, uh, it would, uh, project, uh, uh, domestically.

Uh, so by.

Uh, surrendering in, in, in, in, uh, one front.

Like, uh, I mean, what they, they can see as, as capitulation on one front.

Uh, you already, uh, lose the, the second front as well.

So this is what they, uh, what what can call if they can.

Uh, you know, uh, rethink.

I mean, if, if they can, uh, gather what is left of, of their, uh,

strategic decision making and decide what they want to do, they may escalate

actually on both fronts in terms of, uh, securitization of domestic sphere

and also, uh, doubling down on, on, on the, uh, external side, which would.

Involved, uh, going for a nuclear weapon.

As I said,

Hamza, I know we're not gonna have answers here.

We're mostly providing questions and frameworks, but thank you for

coming on and I hope that, um.

Well, I don't know what I hope for, but I, I know that I hope that you will

come back on in a couple more days as some of the dust settles and we try

and analyze some of what's happening.

But in the meantime, thank you for being generous with your time

and your perspective and, um, you know, we'll see you soon.

Always a

pleasure.

Thank you for having me.

Yeah.

Have a great day.

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