Hello listeners.
Welcome to another episode of the Jacob Shapiro podcast.
Back on the podcast is fan favorite and one of my personal favorites, Kamran bha.
from The New Lines Institute, I brought Kamran in, not just to talk about the
Middle East, but specifically to give a Pakistani perspective on what's
going on between India and Pakistan.
Still have a couple more voices that are gonna come on.
last week I thought.
something was imminent and it's still imminent, which tells you that
things haven't happened, but Cran does a good job of giving us a sober
perspective on that and some other things happening in the Middle East.
we recorded Tuesday, May 6th, around 2:00 PM Central.
This will be out quick, but if anything happens between now and
when you listen to this podcast.
That's why.
Otherwise, you can email me at jacob@jacobshapiro.com.
As always, if you have any questions, comments, concerns, book
recommendations, et cetera, take care of the people that you love.
Cheers, and see you out there.
All right, come on.
It is.
Tuesday May 6th.
It's 2:08 PM Central time.
we are not gonna sit on this episode very long 'cause I don't know how
long this episode's gonna stay current with the way things are going.
we've got Pakistan and India still threatening each other with war.
We've got, potential US Iran negotiations.
We've got Israel threatening to basically take over the Gaza Strip.
We've got the Houthis sending missiles to Tel Aviv airport and Israel responding.
we've got developments in Syria.
We've got spicy things according to you happening with
Turkey and the United States.
so no shortage of things to talk about, and you can take it to the
wider angle if you want, but I did, we had an Indian analyst on the podcast
last week, and I know you're not a Pakistani analyst, but you are Pakistani,
or at least come from Pakistan.
and if memory Serves was born there.
Was born there and if memory serves family from the Kashmir area.
Am I right?
Did I remember that correctly?
Yeah, we were one of those, the forefathers lived
there for about a century.
Okay, there you go.
So I, at least wanted to start by asking you what your take is on
the sudden uptick in, I don't know, tensions, aggressiveness, potential
war between Pakistan and India.
And then we can dive into all of these other earthquakes happening
throughout, our favorite and most stable region of the world.
but, start off by telling me from your point of view, What is going on?
what happened in Kashmir?
Who are the people that are behind this?
is it a, I've seen some Pakistani say it's an Indian false flag
operation to get the US on their side.
it's, it seems very mysterious, so help us make, make sense of it all.
let me start from where you left off.
The US is already on India's side.
So they don't need to get India.
India doesn't need to get the US on their side.
And the reason for that is India is part of the bigger strategic objective
of the United States when it comes to meeting the challenge of China.
India obviously has the role to play in maritime spaces, the
Pacific, but those are like.
Future effects.
They, those are not going to materialize anytime soon.
So those are future planning.
But well before that, in the current moment where you have a tariff trade
war going on and reaching boiling point, you want, the United States wants to
reduce exposure dependency on China when it comes to manufacturing and imports.
So the hope is that, or the hope has been that India would
be one of those destinations we saw in the last couple of weeks.
Apple announced that by 2026, I don't remember who was the beginning
or the end, that they will shift a sizable amount of their manufacturing.
to, India.
Whether that happens or not remains to be seen, but I wanted to flag that as an
example of, the broader dynamics that are happening from an Indian point of view.
This is all great.
And today, just today, the IMF announced that this year, I'm not sure at,
what point I didn't read the details.
India will overtake the Japan as the fourth largest economy of the world.
So they're going from five to four and they're aiming for three.
They know that the jump from replacing China is gonna take a long, time.
'cause of the variance between the two economies is just so massive.
So that's the Indian goal.
In other words, India wants to play major league global level,
geoeconomics, geotech, geopolitics, however you wanna describe it.
and it sees the current moment of US China thing hitting up as a moment
in which it can assert itself.
Now this is the backdrop in which you have this attack on April 22nd, in
the Indian controlled Kash town of be.
To your listeners.
I just wanna say I use the word controlled because I also say Pakistani controlled.
I just don't want to get into, the semantics of occupation
and non-occupational.
So control is a neutral word anyway, so the attack takes place and I.
There aren't a whole lot of suspects.
Okay.
Let's just be honest.
Okay?
Do, and I was on a Pakistani television show this morning and I knowing, how I
would be savaged and whatnot, I still took the, liberty of trying to explain this.
And I said, look, I. Whether it's non-state actors in Pakistan doing
it on their own without official sanction, whether it was elements of
the Pakistan state running their own little operation in, concert with
the non-state actors, the proxies, these Islamist militants, or whether
this was an officially commissioned strike, or hit, doesn't matter.
The point is there, the origin of these attacks historically.
Has been from Pakistan.
And so this idea of a false flag operation, I get it.
Why?
That's the Pakistani narrative.
Do I agree with it?
No.
so the Indians are looking at this and saying, okay, that there
are two things that they see.
One is that.
We're trying to play a major league and we're still being sucked into
this old rivalry within, Pakistan that we are trying to leave behind.
That's one perspective in India, but because of nationalism, religious
nationalism and Pakistan has become this emotional thing in India over the years.
your reason tells you don't be distracted.
Okay?
This is gonna happen.
You are gonna do your little thing, but don't make this the focus
point or the focal point of your efforts on the foreign policy front.
'cause it could distract you from the bigger goal.
And I think this is what the vice president, if I had to guess,
probably said, to his, counterparts and people he met in India that.
We get it, that this is happening, but do what you have to do,
but keep your eye on the ball.
this is distraction.
and there's much more to be achieved.
Look at the current moment, and we know you want it.
So I think the American challenge is how to take the Indian imperative and say,
okay, we'll do both at the same time.
The reason why both cannot happen.
Because if, and there's another element to it.
The other element is since 2016 under this Prime Minister Renda Modi, India
moved from this idea that we will threaten military action but will not cross the
border and do, strikes inside Pakistan.
So you remember, you and I, think at the time were.
FI think, when the, 2016, special Forces operation was mounted,
it was called Surgical Strikes.
Pakistanis denied it.
They called it firing across the border.
My suspicion is that there were some forces that went across the border,
short-lived operation, quick and dirty.
You hit and you basically, withdraw all back.
That set up an expectation that, hey.
That's the dividing line between the Indian response to
Pakistan based, militant attacks in Kashmir and India proper.
And so there's a whole history, and I don't want to get into that,
but that was the turning point.
Now, what that did was that okay, the next time this
happens, we have to do something.
Vigor.
So this was like a, if this was like a ho a pen trick,
next time it happened to vigor.
And that's what happened in 2019 when we had the suicide
bombing of the Paramilitary Forces Bus in Obama, in Kashmir.
We had the Indians for the first time since the 1971 war,
this side to do airstrikes.
And not just in Pakistani controlled Kashmir, but Pakistan.
in the town of Balakot, which is in, the Northwestern province called the
Dominated, majority, majority, province.
Anyway, so what the Pakistanis did is they retaliated, by striking,
at a brigade headquarters on the Indian side of the line of control.
Now, that led to a dog fight.
The Indians at Pakistanis were able to shoot down and make 21.
The pilot was captured.
We were given tea and sent back home.
That was it.
So we haven't had anything since 2019 February.
And then in 20 19th of August, the Indians decided that, you know what?
One of the ways to solve this problem is to end the autonomous status of
Kashmir that we're in control of.
Mind you, there is the Pakistani control Kashmir, and there are good chunks
of Kashmir that are Chinese control.
So this is a complicated battle space.
so what they did is the area that they controlled, they basically divided it up.
A, they took away the autonomous status of the old state of Jamin Kashmir B.
They divided it up into two.
Federally administered Union territories, one J and K, the Jamin Kashmir, the
other Lada, Laak being ethnically different, religiously different than
j and K, which is Muslim majority.
LADA is also on the Chinese border, not on the Pakistani side of border.
So they did that.
That created more tensions between India and Pakistan.
Nothing happened.
but the Indians thought that they had solved this problem.
They, there was a massive security crackdown and, normalization had
begun over the past year or so.
There was covid in between.
So all sorts of things were going on.
Finally, you, think from the point of view of the Modi government, Hey,
we think we've, got a handle on this now, and then this thing happens.
So now the question is, okay, last time you did airstrikes,
what are you gonna do this time?
And there's a public expectation and there is also that sort of strategic expectation
where adversaries lock themselves into, a spiral, no, escalating spiral.
So this is why I think, we're now more than 12 days past, the attack
from, April 22nd, I say 12 days.
Because the last time this happened with the airstrike that I just mentioned,
that was 12 days after the attack.
So this time we're seeing all sorts of activity.
There's missile test firing out in the Arabian Sea.
There's Air Force, drills taking place in,
Southeast, Southwestern part of India.
Near the Pakistani border today, there are drills taking place in the
desert province, or state of Stan.
There's a lot of mobilization happening, and plus there's civil
defense drills happening in case.
The Indian struck and the Pakistanis did strikes on the other side.
The other words, I think both sides are preparing for something they,
I know I've taken a lot of time, but I just wanted to set the stage.
thank you for laying out the context, but it, leads directly to, a question that
I don't understand, which is, so what was the motive behind the attack itself?
Do you think it was just a couple of randos?
is there any reason that Pakistan wants to drag India back in?
I, don't really understand the motive on Pakistan's side behind
wanting to do this now of all times,
you and I are not fans of randomness, so I wouldn't go to go into that.
Look.
there's a context here, and this is a context that is, it's not
something that I came up with.
It's.
Being said in both countries or being talked about the, there is
this view that the Pakistanis had to come out and retaliate for a number
of things that have been happening.
and this is just think of it as an imperative and, without getting into
whether, the normative side of things, I'm just looking at it empirical.
So what has been happening?
the backdrop to this is the Pakistanis believe, that the insurgency that
is picking up steam in Stan inside pa, in Western Pakistan and the
Taliban insurgency that also is picking up steam simultaneously, is
being backed by Indian intelligence.
That is something we haven't seen any evidence of that, the Pakistanis
have not provided evidence, but they keep talking about it.
the Indians have been talking about how they have been, they support or should
support or would support, the Baloche.
They don't say they support the TTP, but.
There is some warming of relationships between India and the
Taliban government in Afghanistan.
So the Pakistanis use that to have, say, look, they, it is through this
medium, this channel that the Indians are actually also fueling the Taliban
rebellion as well in the northwest.
On top of that, you've had I would say at least a half a dozen unusual targeted
assassinations of militant leaders from various Kashmiri groups on Pakistani sort.
And they have been blamed on, again, on Indian intelligence.
And there's a lot that's written out there for the listeners who
want to get deeper into this.
So you can just Google or use chat CPT.
but there is enough material out there.
This is the logic in which,
for those who say that Pakistan had to strike back, these
are the sort of the buildup.
So the, Pakistanis were getting hit and they needed to basically say, Hey, if
you hurt us in this area, then we can hurt you here, knock it off, or whatever.
And so there is that narrative that's floating out there now, is it true?
what is the evidence?
no, this is in the realm of sort of speculation or, inferring based
on rumor intelligence, if you will.
So beyond that, I don't know how else to explain it.
why there, there's another thing that I wanna mention is.
In 2021 then Army Chief.
This was when Imran Han was Prime Minister, then Army Chief, general
Kammer Bais said, Hey, you know what?
We want to end this nonsense with India.
we have to deal with our Western flank.
This was well before the Taliban took over, a Afghanistan and the US withdrew.
They were seeing that coming and they said, Hey.
we don't have any interest in, firing up anything with India.
let's just keep it cool there so we can focus on the Western plank.
So he went out and he established a ceasefire on the
line of control in early 2021.
It held, he also tried to improve relations.
There were discussions that, or at least there were reports that.
perhaps the Prime Minister of India could come on a visit to Pakistan.
and, but those, all, the, government of Prime Minister, Imran Han
did not want any part of it.
So they quashed it, and that thing didn't go anywhere, but the ceasefire held.
And so from the Pakistani point of view.
They say, Hey, we haven't done anything and we, have no interest.
We have problems.
we have an economic, financial meltdown.
We have political instability of unprecedented proportions,
so on and so forth.
And so we have no reason to do this.
but there is this backdrop that we need to factor in, which is the
targeted assassination of multiple militant liters, on Pakistani soil.
The latest incident, which was the, hijacking of a train by Balo rebels that
was carrying, troops and their families from one part of Bastan together called,
it was called the Jaffa Express, and was, there was a hostage situation.
there were, lots of casualties and fatalities.
and that was, that happened only a few months ago.
And After that the Pakistani, state came out and said, Hey, and this
is from the official spokesperson of the military that we're gonna
ch change the rules of the game.
So a lot of people cite that and say, this is what they meant by changing
the rules of the game, is that they are going back to this militancy
in Kashmir, if that makes sense.
Yeah, it makes sense.
so before we get into regional context and how this connects to the big web of things
that are happening everywhere, else, what do you think is gonna happen next?
Do you think this is gonna be a relatively contained escalation and that India will
just do what it has to do in order to try and reestablish some level of deterrence?
Are you concerned about a bigger conflagration, like
on, on the level of previous.
even India, Pakistan wars are relatively small compared to most wars.
But are we talking about one of the three wars that have happened in recent history?
Like how, worried are you about what's gonna happen next?
I think that it all depends on what kind of, kinetic action.
The Indian state, they, as I said earlier, they've locked themselves
into a situation where they can't do what they did last time.
So you go back to your point about insurance.
insurance was established, but then it fell apart.
So how you reestablish insurance, logic says you have to do
something where you raise the cost.
So what is it that you can do that is more painful on the Pakistani side
without triggering a counterstrike?
So in other words, let's say the Indians hit and they hit relatively hard.
The Pakistanis will hit back.
And the, and Indians understand that.
And you see this, in, in some of the more, if you will, sophisticated talk shows.
otherwise Indian media is as jingoistic as Pakistani, if not more.
but the point is that you can see Indian analysts talking about
this, that look, if you strike big, then they can strike back at you.
Then, so where do we go?
So are we then compelled to hit that again?
In other words, how many rounds are we looking at before we end it or
this thing escalates out of control?
So that is the fear right now.
And, I don't think, hey, if it happens like an hour after we record
this, then you know I'm wrong.
But.
The fact that it hasn't happened so far, and we're day 13, I'm pretty
sure, on the math about that.
but if it hasn't happened so far, it means the Indians are trying to calibrate
something that will be substantive, but not break the norm, if you will.
And so I don't have a model for you and that I can't say, Hey,
this is what it's gonna look like.
What, how do you rate the importance of the suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty?
Do you feel like that is a big deal, little deal, or no deal?
that is a big deal because, that treaty is from 60 19 60.
It was, the world, Bank got involved.
Basically played a role in getting that treaty off the ground and
the treaty has held, yes, there's been noise made, in recent years
it's not working for Pakistan.
There needs to be renegotiation.
It's not working for India, so on and so forth.
But it's hell all throughout, all the tensions, all the wars,
65 War, 71 War, 99 Cargill War, and then all the flashpoints that
have occurred, 2001 two, 2008 by attacks, et cetera, et cetera.
The Indians have never said, Hey, let's tamper with the in this Waters treaty.
This is unprecedented.
And obviously, This isn't okay, we're just gonna stop the water of Pakistan.
It's leverage.
It's trying to gain leverage and to force Pakistan into, a certain behavior.
so the question is, will this lead to a renegotiation at some
point when things calm down?
Or is this something that's going to linger on and could actually become
like a catalyst for more confrontation?
Because the Pakistani see this as okay, and they've said it, this is like a
tantamount to a declaration of war.
and so
it's not really clear where they're gonna go.
there is the issue of, okay, are you gonna build dams and what, can
you tamper with the water supply?
Do you really want to go there?
What happens and everybody's operating from a worst case scenario.
So this is, this further makes this moment very different than everything
we've seen in recent memoral.
Yeah.
if you were advising the Pakistani government, what would you tell them?
Oh, please.
What can I say that, I would basically say, look,
there are always back channels, I'm told, and this is what we've learned.
There are always back channels.
So go through one of them and stop this from blowing up beyond what it already is.
So is can they do that?
Can the Pakistanis actually say, okay.
Let me use my call.
By the way, the, director general of military operations, on both
sides had their call a few days ago.
the readout to the media was that this was about, keeping things calm on the LOC.
Indian Indians told the Pakistanis stop firing or something like that, but there
was a call, and that's an official call.
So if there's an official call at a military level, then you would think that.
Back channels are easier to operate is, they're secret.
Nobody knows about them.
You can discuss things without having to go to the media.
Maybe you can, do something there.
I don't know.
I think we're, significantly up an escalatory ladder that
it becomes difficult to climb down, but not impossible.
I don't know.
By all accounts, Pakistanis are bracing for incoming, and I don't know if
anything can be done before that.
I think that there, there is this round that perhaps has to happen.
I, never say that it's a hundred percent inevitable, but I think where things
are, we should be looking at some form of kinetic action and hoping that.
It'll remain confined within certain parameters from
where you can go back to the.
Negotiating, take
one.
Underplayed.
Part of this, I think is, the role of Bangladesh and Bangladesh, India
relations have not been great of late.
is there any opportunity for Pakistan to reach out to Bangladesh
to try, I'm really stretching here.
I'm just trying to think of worst case scenarios.
But should India be worried about that?
Is there a world in which India finds itself surrounded on both sides, or
at least has two fronts going on?
I'm really stretching.
I know, but I'm, just trying to get the sense of where.
Bangladesh is here.
no, you're not actually stretching.
but I would reframe the question and say, could there be some Chinese
assistance to Pakistan in the case of some escalation Bangladesh itself?
Yes.
It's the Pro India government of the former Prime Minister.
She Hasina Isan.
And this new military led setup is.
Definitely gravitating more towards China.
That's very public.
and there are significant, signs of a realignment with Pakistan.
but what can they do?
Do they want, they're in a, they're in a transition themselves.
and so they.
They need to stabilize things on the home front.
I don't think Bangladesh will get involved.
The question is, what will the Chinese do?
The reason I say that is because while the Chinese don't want to,
see this thing get out of hand, but there isn't an interest here that
if your Chinese, if you're a Chinese strategic thinker and you're looking
at this and saying, okay, this is the.
Main ally of the US and the, if it is bogged down in South Asia,
then it can't be an ally to the us.
So how do we get that going?
there are risks involved.
There is also the fact that since 2020, the Indian and the Chinese
have sparred on their border.
Since then, the Indians have been, thinking about a two
front problem for themselves.
Both the, line of control in Kashmir with Pakistan and the line of actual
control, which runs from Kashmir all the way to the border with
Neba, traversing to Nepal, andan.
It's a long border.
and From the Indian point of view, they have to factor in that if they
go too big, then the Chinese could intervene in some shape or form.
you as a military strategist, you're sitting in your deli.
It's not possible for you to ignore that, however remote it
might be, whatever calculus you, you do that has to be factored in.
Now you may decide, I, We're not gonna let it go that far or we're prepared for it.
Whatever the scenario is, they have to factor in the Chinese and
the two front war because, in this piece of geopolitical real estate,
it's not just India and Pakistan.
The Chinese are stakeholders as well.
So there you have it.
What realistically do you think China's gonna do though?
I would think that they wouldn't want any kind of conflict here.
They don't want any kind of conflict, but.
What they want.
It's, one thing, but what is it that they will be forced to do?
Should an Indian, should India do something significant because
they're, this is their ally.
Pakistan is their ally.
Now there are problems between Pakistan and China and many problems.
But you, if you are aspiring to be great power and you're telling
Pakistan that, Hey, you didn't get much from the us, if you align with us.
It's about Chinese credibility as well.
and so China can just sit back and say, oh, they're fighting again.
they have to do something.
There's, will they provide assistance of some form?
I don't know.
it's, again, EI think the ball is in the Indian Cork.
Everything depends on what the Indians do.
This thing didn't play out in many rounds in 2019, but I'm sure the Chinese were
watching that dog fight very closely, between Indian and Pakistani warplanes,
even if it was just for, a couple of days.
And, but it's not something that the Indians are oh, it's
happening in some remote corner.
No, it's not.
here you have your ally and your biggest regional adversary, going at it.
So you can't be I. Neutral.
All right.
you're actually making me feel better kamran.
'cause it, it sounds to me like all signs point towards deescalation.
So unless, I'm reading you wrong, you have your choice from the menu.
Would you like to talk Iran?
Would you like to talk Israel and Gaza?
Would you like to talk Yemens, Syria, Turkey?
What is your pleasure?
I think that they're all part of a threat, a singular threat.
We can talk about all of them and as part of a a, fabric that he called
the Middle East, I. And it is not really in a good shape, but yeah,
it's all part of the same logic.
wh which part of the, thread do you wanna begin with?
Do you wanna begin with US Iran, potential nuclear deal coming?
Do you wanna deal with Yeah, let's start in Israel, or let's
start there and, let's connect it to the Houthis because today, just a short
while ago, sitting with the Canadian Prime Minister, the president said that
he's got word that the hooky do not want.
To be bombed and we will stop bombing them because they have
promised to no longer attack ships.
So that's a huge thing that just came out.
So no longer to attack ships, they're just gonna bomb Tel Aviv airport and
President Trump's gonna be cool with that.
And that's the wrinkle and that
is the question.
And so I saw on Twitter, somewhere that, the report is that the Israelis
were not taken into conference.
They didn't know about this until they found out about it.
From the media.
So it wasn't like, there wasn't a discussion according to this report.
And this report comes from Bar who's a pretty legit journalist.
he's, high caliber.
So, I'm taking it seriously.
and so I think that, look, we've had three rounds of conversations
between the president's Envoy, Steve Whitcoff, and the arrangements.
I think one of them, with the exception of one, all of the
rounds have taken place in ban.
A fourth one is due this Sunday.
I can't imagine they're just talking nukes and I can't imagine that
they're talking to the Iranians.
And then this Houthi thing comes out from nowhere.
The Houthis are proxies of Iranians.
And this had to factor in into the conversation because this isn't
just about nukes, this is about Iran's ability to, do ingress into
the Arab Bowl and, destabilize it.
And a key tool, especially after the massive hit that Hezbollah took,
last year, and the collapse of the.
This is probably the sharpest tool, or most potent tool in the Iranian, arsenal.
and therefore you have to have a conversation on the Houthis.
And the Houthis are being, were being bombed.
I. For many, days consistently by the, by US forces.
And yesterday they struck at, Aviv Airport, and then the
Israelis conducted a strike.
So you can't not talk.
you, those are not separate things.
So I, if there is a deal that's happening, it's part of a broader conversation
with the Iranians, and saying, okay.
while we're discussing nukes, you, this has to, we have to solve this.
and so I think there, I think that there is an, a conversation
underway that is very serious.
The big question about the Iranian nuclear negotiations is that, is this
just going to be a little more than J-C-P-O-A, the Obama nuclear deal?
I have a hard time believing that I don't think that this president
can settle down on, okay, let's just put some bells and whistles on the
same old deal and call it different.
I think it's gonna be subsequently different.
but, and, there's an opportunity to extract a bigger concession because of
how desperate the ivanian situation is.
they've lost the Levant.
They're defensive posture in, in Iraq.
Their most lethal ally, the Houthis are getting bombed.
their economy isn't, tatters.
They're going, they're approaching a political transition, which
will, in my view, is gonna be a systemic tra transition.
They need to sort this thing out.
They need some sanctions, respite before.
the funeral proce procession of Haman is taken out.
because think about it, if you are the Iranian regime and the supreme leader
has passed away, and obviously this is, there's gonna be a lot of public,
ceremony, if you will, for a lack of better term public mourning.
That's an opportunity for anybody who wants to come out and use
that moment to do protests.
I've been told that they're really worried about that.
So they wanna be able to improve the public situation much,
sooner than that before they get, they're deep into that position.
You can't game this out 'cause someone somewhere in Tehran knows, what is the
true status of the old man's health.
But, you have to assume that he's 86 and He's not gonna be
around for Bob, so whatever.
So I don't know how much time they have, but it, the clock is ticking.
So they have a situation where they need sanctions relief, they need a deal.
What are they willing to give up?
And I'm not saying they're going to just say, Hey, mothball our
nuclear program and we're gonna do like a Gadda and Libya 2003.
No, they're not gonna do that.
But they, that's why I don't think it's just going to be J-C-P-O-A plus something.
I think it's going to be a bit more substantive.
Can we get a deal on the, ballistic missiles?
I don't know.
I haven't seen a whole lot on it.
but this thing from the president saying the Houthis are ready to call
it quits and throw in the towel,
Makes me hopeful that, that there is some progression going on, but
there will be something substantive.
Now, how do you balance that with Saudi imperatives, Turkish imperatives, and
Israeli imperatives more importantly?
That's the big key because I think there are separate deals
and arrangements taking place.
just yesterday we had the news that, the president came out and, tweeted.
About how great his conversation was with the Turkish, president, aan.
And they talked about the Ukraine war, Gaza, Syria.
so there's that thing happening.
There's an Iranian conversation happening.
There is also a, an understanding with Saudi, the president is
about to go to Saudi on his first ever trip, and then there's ga.
I don't think, the US ever wanted to take over Gaza.
I think it was designed to put pressure on the Arab states
to own the Palestinian issue.
I think what's going on is the US and this is where the Abraham Accord framework
comes in, is that you guys need to sort this out, this Palestinian issue, we
can't give you a two-state solution.
It's not even possible.
But it's not our problem.
This is your problem.
You, need to own it.
You've never owned it.
You've always said the White House will do something and put pressure
on Israel and bring it to the table.
And at some point when you know things are right, stars aligned,
we're gonna get a two state solution.
that hasn't happened.
It's not gonna happen.
that moment has come and gone and it was a while back.
So when, how you move forward, you say, okay.
We get rid, they're gonna get rid of Hamas.
Now, Saudi Arabia, you need to work with UAE, Egypt and Jordan to come up
with a plan for a post-conflict Gaza.
'cause otherwise, the only other option is the Israelis have to occupy it,
indefinitely.
And so I think that.
Is being discussed behind the scenes.
We have had some indication with proposals from, the Egyptians and
the, and others that were neither here nor there about what their plan is.
But I can't imagine that the, United States wants to pull back and it's
just gonna let the Gaza thing fester.
And so if you connect everything together, I think there are
multiple deals in the making.
That are part of a broader strategy of the United States
to keep this place from further deterioration, if that makes sense.
Sort of.
But the strategy feels like how to get outta Dodge, isn't the idea to pull
back completely so that you can focus on the South China Sea and other areas?
Or do you think that the Trump administration is invested in
having an American presence in the region for the long haul?
Ideally, I think they'd like to be able to withdraw.
and because if you look at the grand strategy, and this isn't something that
is just, this White House is strategy.
This has been in the making since the, early days of the Obama
administration where, the US is saying, regional actors should take lead.
We don't need to do the heavy lifting.
No more boots on the ground.
obviously this was in the backdrop of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars
and the lessons learned from that.
But I think what this White House has done is said Russia is not a problem for us.
Russia could not conquer all of Ukraine.
Europe is much more prosperous.
Let them take the lead.
We'll still be there.
We're not doing the heavy lifting, but I. This is the reality for that theater.
East Asia, you don't have a nato, you don't have an EU equivalent.
You have allies, you have South Koreans, the Japanese, the Philippines, you know
the Taiwan and Australia and New Zealand, and you're trying to rope in India, what
is now called the in, but you don't have an architecture and it's maritime space.
And I think.
What the United States is moving towards is we don't wanna get involved
in land conflicts and we'll keep an eye on the oceans 'cause we are,
native to both the two big oceans.
And that's part of our national security strategy.
So we'll deal with that.
And China, will also come at it through the tariffs and the
geo-economic angle as well.
and in the Middle East, the problem is you don't have.
You don't have a, you have a very fragile situation.
You don't, you have regional actors, but their interests run, at cross purposes.
They want it out.
So the Saudis and the, all things being equal, the Saudis and the
Israelis should have cut a deal a long time ago, before October 7th.
But the, you can't have that because, or you couldn't have
that before October 7th, because,
They needed something, the Saudis to say, Hey, we haven't thrown the Palestinian
under the bus to embrace Israel.
They were talking about that when October 7th happened, October 7th completely
blew everything out of the water.
And now you have a situation where, it's even more difficult.
And so there is that, and this is the most, if you will.
Friendly relationship or least hostile relationship between
the Saudis and the Israelis.
If you look at NDA other relationship, Turkey versus Israel and Syria,
Turkey versus Iran, Iran versus Israel, Iran versus Saudi,
they're all very adversarial.
And so that region that we called Middle East.
Is therefore not conducive in the current moment for the strategy of well let the
regional actors, figure it out and we'll.
Operate from behind the scenes.
I think the US will continue to have to do some heavy lifting.
Does that mean that it's going to be militarily involved heavily?
No, it doesn't have to be.
I'm not saying we're pulling the fifth fleet out of Bahrain.
I'm just saying, the aircraft carriers will keep coming and going.
The carrier strike groups there will, the facilities that exist will stay there.
We're, I think we're ready to say, Syria seems to have a logic
now, so we don't need to be there.
Iraq, we don't want to be there.
And so if we can read something on the, with the Iranians on that, and that's
also part of the conversation with Iran, then maybe you know, these troops that
are here and there because those were placed because of the war against isis.
That's over with.
And so now you have a new dynamic.
So can these players, can.
Israel and Turkey deconflicted, Syria.
do we need to be there to keep them apart?
I don't think so, but we do need to be there diplomatic and use our sort
of relationship play referee that doesn't require military presence.
So that's, my thinking.
All right.
Camran, I could talk to you forever, but let's get you outta here on this
last question 'cause we've danced all around it and talked about
everything that's around it, but.
Yeah, the Assad regime fell only what, six months ago.
and then we've had, Israel being very aggressive on the Syrian border seizing
towns thing, like things like that.
We've had the Syrian Kurds basically give up some measure of their autonomy,
their sovereignty, in order not to get, not to piss off the Turks and
have the Turks rolling through.
and otherwise, there was that first batch of violence after
the fall of Assad, but it.
Syria has seemed eerily quiet to me thus far.
and in some ways it is the linchpin of the entire region.
So get us outta here on thinking about Syria in the context of
everything that you're talking about.
It seems to be like the place where everybody's gonna compete, but, I'll,
let you have the final word on it.
Syria from an Israeli point of view is the Northern flank.
you now have the makings of a state that is Sunni Islamist,
if you will, And so that's not good from an Israeli perspective.
Israel has not had to deal with strong states in the Arab
world for a very long time.
Egypt was taken off the board with the Camp David Accords.
Syria was weak and Lebanon was a mess, and the Iranian were playing there and.
There was this unstated, if you will, understanding with the Assad
regime that, Hey, we don't want you.
We don't want you gone.
You don't want to piss us off.
Just keep Hezbollah in check.
That continued until the Arab Spring uprising, when the Assad regime
went from actually being dominant in the Levan, became dependent on Iran
and Hezbollah for its own survival.
So that threw out that.
Prior, if you will, arrangement.
Jordan has always had an unstated understanding with, with, Israel.
Syria is now changing.
There's going to be a new Syria and you don't know where it's going.
and it has a big backer called Turkey.
so in many waves.
Pushing Iran out of the Levant has had an unintended consequence of Turkey
becoming the dominant tower there.
So I think what's gonna happen in Syria is what the Israelis and
the Turks agree on or disagree on.
So I think that's where it is.
As far, the, as far as Saudi Arabia is concerned, I think that they
will have to find a way to work, and I think they all already are.
You can see it from the fact that the new Syrian president, Ahad Al Shara.
His first visit outside his country after becoming president was to Saudi Arabia.
and so I think there's an understanding between the Saudis
and the Turks as to where to go.
but the Saudis are an economic power.
They're not a military power.
The Turks are a military power, and, they have aspirations in the
full classic sense of being a great,
How does that work with Israel?
Can they reach a modest NDI for the short term?
those are things that we should be watching, and yes, Syria
is going to be important.
but I still think that the Saudis have to figure out the Palestinian
issue in order for them to be at ease.
They can't, the Saudis wish that there wasn't this problem that they had to deal.
they're probably very, Annoyed that the United States is not taking ownership of
this issue and saying you deal with it.
but this is a new reality that they will have to adjust.
Yeah.
I, don't think there are many things in the world I'm more cynical about
than the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
and it seems to me that the Israelis will do whatever they're gonna do
with Gaza and that the rest of the.
Middle East will, I don't know, pay lip service to it, but that
nobody's really gonna care.
but maybe that's too cynical.
all of these conflicts, Israel, Palestine, Kashmir between India and
Pakistan, it's just we'll probably be here in 10 years speaking about the
very same issues, don't you think?
Hopefully not.
I wanted to end
on an optimistic note.
If you have one, please share it.
But it's hard to find.
I guess the optimistic note is that, we are probably gonna get
an Iran US deal of some sort.
It does seem like that is the future of that.
And if the, Olympians are, not busy crashing against each other than maybe
the smaller countries and smaller peoples in between them aren't gonna get crushed.
But as for the proximate conflicts themselves, I, it's
pretty hard to be optimistic.
No.
It is hard to be optimistic.
It's just that,
I feel like people have to get tired of onsets for so long, And,
I'm, I, remain optimistic about the human averseness to suffering.
but then again, there's the other part of the human condition, which are called.
The propensity to conflict.
So we'll see.
I hope.
I just hope we're not talking about these things in 10 years.
Yeah, unfortunately, I hope
we're talking about different things, have different problems.
Yeah.
I hope we're talking about how Saudi Arabia has transformed into
a liberal democracy in the middle of the desert and Neo is doing
everything and, everything is fine.
But, I don't know.
That feels
intelligence is running the place.
Alright, thanks Kamran.
It's always great to see you.
All right.
Cheers.
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