1 00:00:09,280 --> 00:00:12,777 Find a way to develop your own voice in this respect, because there 2 00:00:12,777 --> 00:00:16,543 will be many jobs you do where no one cares about that voice. And 3 00:00:16,543 --> 00:00:19,771 that's fine, because that is a necessary rite of passage, I'd say. 4 00:00:19,771 --> 00:00:22,999 But do develop that voice, because there will come a time when 5 00:00:22,999 --> 00:00:26,765 that voice will be needed in terms of you leading a unit, or you 6 00:00:26,765 --> 00:00:30,262 having to get on CNBC, or you being asked to do something, and 7 00:00:30,262 --> 00:00:34,028 you should be the person that can say yes to that because you have 8 00:00:34,028 --> 00:00:34,835 something to say. 9 00:00:36,990 --> 00:00:45,750 Imagine spending an hour with the world's greatest traders. Imagine 10 00:00:45,750 --> 00:00:51,882 learning from their experiences, their successes and 11 00:00:51,882 --> 00:01:00,642 their failures. Imagine no more welcome to Top Traders Unplugged, 12 00:01:00,642 --> 00:01:11,154 the place where you can learn from the best hedge fund managers 13 00:01:11,154 --> 00:01:22,542 in the world so you can take your manager due diligence or investment 14 00:01:22,542 --> 00:01:26,922 career to the next level. Beforewe begin today's conversation, 15 00:00:40,035 --> 00:00:47,343 remember to keep two things in mind, all the discussion we'll have 16 00:00:47,343 --> 00:00:53,433 about investment performance is about the past and past performance 17 00:00:53,433 --> 00:00:59,523 does not guarantee or even infer anything about future performance. 18 00:00:59,523 --> 00:01:05,613 Also understand that there's a significant risk of financial loss 19 00:01:05,613 --> 00:01:12,312 with all investment strategies and you need to request and understand 20 00:01:12,312 --> 00:01:18,402 the specific risks from the investment manager about their product 21 00:01:18,402 --> 00:01:23,883 before you make investment decisions. Here's your host, veteran 22 00:01:23,883 --> 00:01:26,928 hedge fund manager Niels Kaastrup-Larsen. 23 00:01:32,550 --> 00:01:39,980 Welcome and welcome back to another conversation in our series 24 00:01:39,980 --> 00:01:48,153 of episodes that focuses on markets and investing from a global 25 00:01:48,153 --> 00:01:57,069 macro perspective. This is a series that I not only find incredibly 26 00:01:57,069 --> 00:02:03,013 interesting as well as intellectually challenging, but also 27 00:02:03,013 --> 00:02:11,929 very important given where we are in the global economy and the 28 00:02:11,929 --> 00:02:13,415 geopolitical cycle. Wewant to dig deep into the minds of some of 29 00:01:41,031 --> 00:01:49,512 the most prominent experts to help us better understand what this 30 00:01:49,512 --> 00:01:57,993 new global macro-driven world may look like. We want to explore 31 00:01:57,993 --> 00:02:06,474 their perspectives on a host of game changing issues and hopefully 32 00:02:06,474 --> 00:02:13,413 dig out nuances in their work through meaningful conversations. 33 00:01:32,550 --> 00:02:13,438 Pleaseenjoy today's episode hosted by Alan Dunne. 34 00:02:16,720 --> 00:02:33,430 Thanks for the introduction, Niels. Today I'm delighted to be 35 00:02:33,430 --> 00:02:50,140 joined by Aoifinn Devitt. Aoifinn is Managing Director of Global 36 00:02:50,140 --> 00:02:55,153 Wealth at Monetta. Monettais a US$43 billion, US registered investment 37 00:02:20,656 --> 00:02:24,592 advisor which provides investment advice to family offices 38 00:02:24,592 --> 00:02:28,036 and high-net-worth individuals. Aoifinn has been in 39 00:02:28,036 --> 00:02:33,940 the markets many years now, at this stage, an extensive career as 40 00:02:33,940 --> 00:02:40,336 a CIO at the public pension side and at the RIA side. Earlier 41 00:02:40,336 --> 00:02:46,240 in her career she had her own hedge fund investment advisory business 42 00:02:46,240 --> 00:02:52,144 Clontarf Capital and she has her own podcast as well. So Aoifinn, 43 00:02:52,144 --> 00:02:55,096 great to have you on today. 44 00:02:55,890 --> 00:02:57,970 Thank you very much. Thank you for Inviting me. 45 00:02:58,130 --> 00:03:02,303 Not at all. So, you'll be a pro at this, given your extensive 46 00:03:02,303 --> 00:03:04,871 podcasting experience. So, delighted to have the opportunity 47 00:03:04,871 --> 00:03:09,044 to chat and give a sense of your background. But we always like 48 00:03:09,044 --> 00:03:12,575 to hear how you got interested in economics, markets, and investing 49 00:03:12,575 --> 00:03:13,859 in the first place. 50 00:03:14,690 --> 00:03:33,644 Yes, well, I actually started out as a lawyer. I studied law at 51 00:03:33,644 --> 00:03:49,682 Trinity and loved everything about the old history nature of the 52 00:03:49,682 --> 00:04:04,262 case law, loved the writing, just loved the intellectual challenge 53 00:04:04,262 --> 00:04:23,216 of that. And I certainly saw myself as having a career in law, 54 00:04:23,216 --> 00:04:42,170 but my first entry point into law was as a corporate lawyer in 55 00:04:42,170 --> 00:04:48,002 a New York firm. So,having all of that adjacent work, around 56 00:03:27,346 --> 00:03:44,748 the workings and plumbings of commerce and finance, made me very 57 00:03:44,748 --> 00:04:05,314 hungry to get to know what that plumbing was all about and actually 58 00:04:05,314 --> 00:04:25,880 to make the leap over into finance. So, I spent four years working 59 00:04:25,880 --> 00:04:46,446 as a corporate lawyer, two years in New York, two years in Hong 60 00:04:46,446 --> 00:04:48,028 Kong. Thatreally, I think, moved from the zone of using precedence 61 00:03:27,208 --> 00:03:40,864 for everything, which was the case in New York. There was always 62 00:03:40,864 --> 00:03:52,244 a contract that had been written previously, that you could 63 00:03:52,244 --> 00:04:03,624 draw upon, to really being, I'd say, quite entrepreneurial in 64 00:04:03,624 --> 00:04:15,004 Asia because there generally was not a precedent for anything. 65 00:04:15,004 --> 00:04:27,522 So, there had to be kind of drafting from fundamental bottom-up 66 00:04:27,522 --> 00:04:42,316 principles when it came to some of the work I was doing with 67 00:04:42,316 --> 00:04:48,006 companies across Indonesia, Singapore, etc. So,I got really 68 00:03:21,126 --> 00:03:38,825 into the coalface of finance then, and that was what prompted 69 00:03:38,825 --> 00:04:04,569 me to make the leap, which I did have to do via an MBA. When I 70 00:04:04,569 --> 00:04:25,486 say, “have to do”, it was tremendous fun at INSEAD and a very 71 00:04:25,486 --> 00:04:44,794 broad and rich experience. And I still have many, many friends from 72 00:04:44,794 --> 00:04:48,012 that year. ButI'd say it was easier not to be pigeonholed as a 73 00:03:39,578 --> 00:04:00,318 lawyer with legal capability or in house counsel, having done 74 00:04:00,318 --> 00:04:23,132 the broader MBA. I started in investment banking and then investment 75 00:04:23,132 --> 00:04:48,020 consulting. And that's how I made my way to the allocator side. 76 00:04:49,080 --> 00:04:53,328 Good stuff, as you say. You've done the full gamut from investment 77 00:04:53,328 --> 00:04:56,868 consulting to hedge fund advisory. And you've been, I suppose, 78 00:04:56,868 --> 00:05:01,470 on the public side as well as on kind of the high-net-worth. I 79 00:05:01,470 --> 00:05:05,010 mean, taking that as maybe the starting point, obviously you've 80 00:05:05,010 --> 00:05:08,550 built portfolios, done asset allocation for a range of different 81 00:05:08,550 --> 00:05:12,798 types of portfolios. I mean, how does that influence how you think 82 00:05:12,798 --> 00:05:15,630 about portfolio constructions now in your current role? 83 00:05:16,490 --> 00:05:34,118 It's interesting. When I made the move to private wealth, I expected 84 00:05:34,118 --> 00:05:50,277 to be really entering a very different world, a very different 85 00:05:50,277 --> 00:06:07,905 set of instruments, set of even language being used. And I will 86 00:06:07,905 --> 00:06:24,064 be honest, I had low expectations just in terms of the 87 00:06:24,064 --> 00:06:41,692 type of products that would be available, the higher fees that we'd 88 00:06:41,692 --> 00:07:00,789 be paying, and perhaps I was expecting to be dumbed down to, a 89 00:07:00,789 --> 00:07:18,417 lot of the time, by product providers because that was my experience. 90 00:07:18,417 --> 00:07:34,576 There would be one set of materials for the institutional investors 91 00:07:34,576 --> 00:07:50,735 and another set for the retail investors or the high-net-worth investors. 92 00:05:16,490 --> 00:05:49,310 Myexperience was actually quite different. I found that there 93 00:05:49,310 --> 00:06:18,848 are many similarities in how institutions and individuals approach 94 00:06:18,848 --> 00:06:51,668 the investment puzzle. And there are some key differences as 95 00:06:51,668 --> 00:07:21,206 well. Obviously, the taxation consequences for an individual are 96 00:07:21,206 --> 00:07:50,744 different. So, we need to look at different paths. Butin terms 97 00:05:23,195 --> 00:05:43,310 of portfolio construction, we really start with resilience. You 98 00:05:43,310 --> 00:06:16,835 and I both grew up in Ireland, and I’d say in my case, I started 99 00:06:16,835 --> 00:06:45,890 in the ‘70s and it was not a flourishing nation at that time. 100 00:06:45,890 --> 00:07:14,945 I think we were definitely not a wealthy country. And I think that 101 00:07:14,945 --> 00:07:35,060 does affect the psychology with which you approach investing. 102 00:07:35,060 --> 00:07:50,705 For me it's about capital preservation, resilience. It'snot 103 00:05:20,774 --> 00:05:50,762 to the point of having no risk on the portfolio, but it is about 104 00:05:50,762 --> 00:06:16,466 having a fairly low tolerance for loss. And having started in the 105 00:06:16,466 --> 00:06:33,602 institutional investing arena at Cambridge Associates, that was 106 00:06:33,602 --> 00:06:52,880 often charities endowments. Again, perhaps they had a spending 107 00:06:52,880 --> 00:07:16,442 policy and they were being well funded from their donors, but 108 00:07:16,442 --> 00:07:42,146 they still certainly wanted to be there in perpetuity. So, we have 109 00:07:42,146 --> 00:07:50,714 to think about preservation. Inpublic funds that has always been 110 00:05:31,281 --> 00:05:52,411 top of mind, has been preserving this essential fund for 111 00:05:52,411 --> 00:06:13,541 beneficiaries down the line. And when it comes to individuals, 112 00:06:13,541 --> 00:06:34,671 we're really speaking about the same thing. It's about resilience 113 00:06:34,671 --> 00:07:00,027 preservation. There may not be the same, say, active need for investment 114 00:07:00,027 --> 00:07:21,157 income from a high-net-worth individual. They may have other sources 115 00:07:21,157 --> 00:07:48,626 of income. They may not have to run their portfolio for cash flow, 116 00:07:48,626 --> 00:07:50,739 necessarily. Thatwas something we did have to do in many 117 00:05:37,910 --> 00:06:03,614 of the public funds that I worked with, and, I think increasingly, 118 00:06:03,614 --> 00:06:31,460 public funds will have to do, is have a cash flow component of 119 00:06:31,460 --> 00:06:52,880 that portfolio. That's a little less the case for individual 120 00:06:52,880 --> 00:07:12,158 high-net-worth. And equally individuals are often going to have 121 00:07:12,158 --> 00:07:35,720 their own proclivities in terms of what they want to invest 122 00:07:35,720 --> 00:07:50,714 in or don't want to invest in. Youmay find 80-year-olds who never 123 00:05:38,012 --> 00:06:24,643 want to invest in a bond again, or you may find somebody else 124 00:06:24,643 --> 00:07:11,274 for whom impact and purpose is at the forefront. So, a very diverse 125 00:07:11,274 --> 00:07:50,731 basket, I'd say, of objectives in the work I do now. 126 00:07:51,070 --> 00:07:54,550 So, is it fair to say, I mean, we're seeing the institutionalization 127 00:07:54,550 --> 00:07:58,030 of private wealth, or would that be too far to describe it? 128 00:07:58,670 --> 00:08:06,260 I'd say to a degree where, if institutionalization means the entering 129 00:08:06,260 --> 00:08:13,160 of offerings that have been available to institutions for some 130 00:08:13,160 --> 00:08:20,750 time, I think that is certainly the case that's been grabbing 131 00:08:20,750 --> 00:08:28,340 headlines in terms of, say, the progress of private equity, private 132 00:08:28,340 --> 00:08:36,620 credit providers into that field. I'd say that is a vexed area 133 00:08:36,620 --> 00:08:46,280 that we can discuss in more detail in any way you like. But I'd 134 00:08:46,280 --> 00:08:53,870 say the timing is nothing if not awkward, certainly given how 135 00:08:53,870 --> 00:09:00,770 some of these strategies are performing just at this time. Wedo 136 00:08:00,348 --> 00:08:09,577 often not make the same mistakes, but we make different mistakes 137 00:08:09,577 --> 00:08:21,323 when we try to open up private markets to a broader set of stakeholders 138 00:08:21,323 --> 00:08:28,874 and potential investors. I would suggest there's some other 139 00:08:28,874 --> 00:08:37,264 mistakes being made right now. But in terms of institutionalization, 140 00:08:37,264 --> 00:08:47,332 if that means lower, fairer fees, I'd say we're at the beginnings 141 00:08:47,332 --> 00:08:59,078 of that. We're not at the end yet, but we certainly have seen signs 142 00:08:59,078 --> 00:09:00,756 of that. Andin terms of sophistication of that conversation, 143 00:08:16,422 --> 00:08:34,174 yes, there is a more sophisticated dialogue happening 144 00:08:34,174 --> 00:09:00,802 in private wealth and it's high time. And that's a good thing. 145 00:09:02,090 --> 00:09:08,054 Absolutely. So, as you say, I mean, we're at an interesting juncture 146 00:09:08,054 --> 00:09:13,024 here, both in terms of the alternative markets and alternative 147 00:09:13,024 --> 00:09:17,994 assets and how they're performing. But I guess more broadly, 148 00:09:17,994 --> 00:09:23,958 I mean, you talked about the 1970s, growing up in Ireland. And 149 00:09:23,958 --> 00:09:29,425 yeah, as you say, Ireland wasn't a wealthy place back then, 150 00:09:29,425 --> 00:09:35,389 but the world has been through many cycles since then. We've Obviously, 151 00:09:35,389 --> 00:09:41,353 in the 2000s, we had a global financial crisis. You know, after 152 00:09:41,353 --> 00:09:46,323 that, equities have pretty much been one way ever since. Atthe 153 00:09:03,670 --> 00:09:13,150 same time, you know, since COVID we've had the war in Ukraine. 154 00:09:13,150 --> 00:09:22,630 We're now in the midst of another war. It feels like we're 155 00:09:22,630 --> 00:09:30,530 into a new macro regime of greater volatility, more uncertainty. 156 00:09:30,530 --> 00:09:40,010 So how does all that come together in your thinking about asset 157 00:09:40,010 --> 00:09:46,330 allocation, looking ahead for the next few years? 158 00:09:47,060 --> 00:10:02,317 That's a great question. I'd say, again, getting back to history 159 00:10:02,317 --> 00:10:20,348 and how our psychology affects us, I think also we are shaped by 160 00:10:20,348 --> 00:10:35,605 our early formative career years. And I spent some of those 161 00:10:35,605 --> 00:10:50,862 years in emerging markets on the ground in Indonesia. I'd also, 162 00:10:50,862 --> 00:11:08,893 as a student, spent time in Moscow. And at both of those times, 163 00:11:08,893 --> 00:11:26,924 I felt it was something about, perhaps a magnetism that I seem to 164 00:11:26,924 --> 00:11:42,181 attract chaos in terms of the backdrop at these different places 165 00:11:42,181 --> 00:12:00,212 that I went to. There was chaos in Moscow when I was there. 166 00:12:00,212 --> 00:12:12,695 There was chaos in Jakarta when I was there. Andwhat I noticed 167 00:09:57,652 --> 00:10:24,132 was, there was always this divergence between the media soundbite 168 00:10:24,132 --> 00:10:55,908 around what was happening on the street and what I was seeing 169 00:10:55,908 --> 00:11:25,036 happening on the street. So, it was generally less extreme, less 170 00:11:25,036 --> 00:11:43,572 sensationalist, less noteworthy, the day-to-day life that 171 00:11:43,572 --> 00:12:12,700 I was experiencing. And that dichotomy has always sat with me. 172 00:09:47,060 --> 00:10:14,208 So,essentially it has always convinced me not to necessarily believe 173 00:10:14,208 --> 00:10:43,824 the hype, not to believe the extremes, to look for the detail, 174 00:10:43,824 --> 00:11:15,908 get on the ground, get the detail. That has informed how I think 175 00:11:15,908 --> 00:11:40,588 about many of these market highs, market lows, doomer scenarios, 176 00:11:40,588 --> 00:12:07,736 or some of the absolutist beliefs that often are attached to 177 00:12:07,736 --> 00:12:12,672 market prognostication. Soyes, how do I translate that into 178 00:10:01,996 --> 00:10:22,533 a portfolio context? Well, generally it's by trying not to be 179 00:10:22,533 --> 00:10:43,070 either too concentrated; not to become too thematic in a portfolio; 180 00:10:43,070 --> 00:11:01,740 to always maintain the kind of somewhat pedestrian, broad based 181 00:11:01,740 --> 00:11:26,011 exposures that are in place; to try to keep emotion out of the 182 00:11:26,011 --> 00:11:44,681 execution side; be steady; provide an even keel; and obviously 183 00:11:44,681 --> 00:12:05,218 always make sense of the complexity for clients, try to make 184 00:12:05,218 --> 00:12:12,686 sense of the complexity. That'sa lot of what I've been doing 185 00:10:04,444 --> 00:10:28,347 for 20 years is sitting with investment committees to really help 186 00:10:28,347 --> 00:10:50,077 them navigate this maelstrom of complexity jargon and, quite frankly, 187 00:10:50,077 --> 00:11:13,980 fearful news flow out there and help them translate that into 188 00:11:13,980 --> 00:11:35,710 their portfolio. And whether that's an individual or a pension 189 00:11:35,710 --> 00:12:08,305 fund panel of a public fund, I think there is a need to make sense 190 00:12:08,305 --> 00:12:12,651 of this. Interms of the asset allocation, so, that will clearly 191 00:10:13,060 --> 00:10:41,660 dictate quite a diverse, and again, getting back to the formative 192 00:10:41,660 --> 00:11:05,060 years, having started at Cambridge Associates, the kind of 193 00:11:05,060 --> 00:11:23,260 endowment style portfolio construction approach that rebalances 194 00:11:23,260 --> 00:11:51,860 often, that is as well diversified by sector, by cap size, 195 00:11:51,860 --> 00:12:12,660 by country, those are really in my DNA. 196 00:12:13,470 --> 00:12:17,930 Yeah, fair enough. I mean the endowment approach, endowment style 197 00:12:17,930 --> 00:12:23,282 approach, or the Yale model was much lauded for a long time. 198 00:12:23,282 --> 00:12:29,526 And I suppose, I don't know if it's fair to say it's coming under 199 00:12:29,526 --> 00:12:34,432 more criticism, certainly more scrutiny, as of late, in terms of 200 00:12:34,432 --> 00:12:38,446 actually what were the underlying drivers. I mean, there 201 00:12:38,446 --> 00:12:42,906 are a few different elements to that. Obviously, having alternatives 202 00:12:42,906 --> 00:12:47,812 and private markets was a key component, having an equity bias. 203 00:12:47,812 --> 00:12:52,330 And I guess all of that has served people well. Imean,I suppose 204 00:12:19,018 --> 00:12:37,049 from a kind of a high level, do you think that endowment model, 205 00:12:37,049 --> 00:12:52,306 that Yale model is still as compelling as it was before? 206 00:12:53,290 --> 00:13:06,660 I'd say, as a model in this kind of most base terms, every model 207 00:13:06,660 --> 00:13:18,120 deserves scrutiny. And yes, you always need to look at the unintended 208 00:13:18,120 --> 00:13:30,535 bets and perhaps the bets that are not being given credit that have 209 00:13:30,535 --> 00:13:41,040 been implicit in that, and where the returns have actually come 210 00:13:41,040 --> 00:13:53,455 from. I saw this quite acutely during the 2016 Brexit phase in the 211 00:13:53,455 --> 00:14:04,915 UK, many of the public funds had a windfall thanks to sterling 212 00:14:04,915 --> 00:14:15,420 weakening. That wasn't due to investment acumen, it was due to 213 00:14:15,420 --> 00:14:26,880 simply being in the right currency at the wrong time (arguably, 214 00:14:26,880 --> 00:14:37,385 for that currency), the right time for your portfolio. I'd say 215 00:14:37,385 --> 00:14:45,050 that it is important to always parse that. Idobelieve that diversification, 216 00:13:00,100 --> 00:13:16,444 in the endowment style, makes sense when you can tolerate the illiquidity 217 00:13:16,444 --> 00:13:31,426 and you have the knowledge, and the connections, and the access 218 00:13:31,426 --> 00:13:46,408 to get proper exposure. And those things are all critical. They're 219 00:13:46,408 --> 00:14:04,114 not a given. There are a select few that will have that kind 220 00:14:04,114 --> 00:14:19,096 of access and therefore the ability to build a portfolio that 221 00:14:19,096 --> 00:14:35,440 genuinely is in the top quartile and can stay there, as opposed 222 00:14:35,440 --> 00:14:44,974 to simply kind of a scattershot approach. So,I wouldn't 223 00:12:59,275 --> 00:13:21,220 say there's one-size-fits-all. I think we have to be very dynamic 224 00:13:21,220 --> 00:13:43,165 in terms of how we think different asset classes are going 225 00:13:43,165 --> 00:13:59,125 to evolve. For example, venture capital, private equity, 226 00:13:59,125 --> 00:14:23,065 these are clearly evolving. Do you want to be necessarily with the 227 00:14:23,065 --> 00:14:45,010 same players it would have been 15, 20 years ago? Doubtful. 228 00:12:53,290 --> 00:13:07,080 Sohaving that kind of open mind, but increasingly, especially 229 00:13:07,080 --> 00:13:23,628 as we see the contraction of public markets, there will be, I 230 00:13:23,628 --> 00:13:38,797 believe, a need to get exposure to private markets. I am 231 00:13:38,797 --> 00:13:53,966 passionate about the need to get money into local projects and 232 00:13:53,966 --> 00:14:10,514 to provide spark capital and fuel for some of the innovative ideas 233 00:14:10,514 --> 00:14:22,925 that are coming out of university pipelines, for example. 234 00:14:22,925 --> 00:14:39,473 And that will all have to be achieved through private means, private 235 00:14:39,473 --> 00:14:44,989 plumbing to get there. 236 00:14:46,170 --> 00:14:54,342 I mean, you touched on private markets. It's been a buzzword for 237 00:14:54,342 --> 00:15:02,514 a while and private credit in particular. And now, as we've come 238 00:15:02,514 --> 00:15:10,005 into this year, there has certainly been something of a change 239 00:15:10,005 --> 00:15:17,496 of sentiment around private credit. I mean, one thing that struck 240 00:15:17,496 --> 00:15:27,030 me is this idea that a lot of private credit had exposure, or still 241 00:15:27,030 --> 00:15:31,797 continued to have exposure, to software stocks. So,I mean, on the 242 00:14:49,135 --> 00:14:55,065 one hand, private credit could be positioned as an alternative, 243 00:14:55,065 --> 00:15:02,181 even as a diversifier to your equity bucket, but in reality, you're 244 00:15:02,181 --> 00:15:08,704 picking up exposure to kind of high growth equity type exposure. 245 00:15:08,704 --> 00:15:17,006 So how diversifying is it? I mean, if you were speaking to a public 246 00:15:17,006 --> 00:15:24,715 pension or a board, how would you be explaining how to think about 247 00:15:24,715 --> 00:15:30,645 the appropriate role of, say, something like private credit in 248 00:15:30,645 --> 00:15:31,831 a portfolio? 249 00:15:32,570 --> 00:16:08,089 Well, that's something I've been doing for many years, is using 250 00:16:08,089 --> 00:16:53,295 private credit and explaining it. And as I said, it has had a more 251 00:16:53,295 --> 00:17:19,127 critical role in some portfolios than others, according 252 00:17:19,127 --> 00:17:41,730 to the portfolio's need for cash flow. So,you always see credit, 253 00:15:42,205 --> 00:15:59,548 private credit, as a diversifier primarily. We would see 254 00:15:59,548 --> 00:16:22,672 credit as some form of a deflation hedge in a portfolio, not 255 00:16:22,672 --> 00:16:45,796 an inflation hedge which you have elsewhere. It is also a source 256 00:16:45,796 --> 00:17:08,920 of income. Importantly, in the case of private credit and that cash 257 00:17:08,920 --> 00:17:30,117 flow piece, which you need to offset, really, the total return 258 00:17:30,117 --> 00:17:41,679 orientation that a portfolio might have. Wealso see it as a way 259 00:15:43,203 --> 00:15:58,393 of getting exposure to investment skill, as it's true that 260 00:15:58,393 --> 00:16:15,102 there has been a tremendous amount of skill and alpha generation 261 00:16:15,102 --> 00:16:30,292 moving into the private segment, whether that's on the equity 262 00:16:30,292 --> 00:16:48,520 side or the credit side. So, getting exposure to this kind of 263 00:16:48,520 --> 00:17:03,710 esoteric strategies as well, whether that be just other contractual 264 00:17:03,710 --> 00:17:18,900 based cash flows that are credit, like structured credit, etc. 265 00:17:18,900 --> 00:17:35,609 You are getting exposure to that skill piece of the individual 266 00:17:35,609 --> 00:17:41,685 that is steering that. Thereobviously has to be the same 267 00:15:40,571 --> 00:15:53,144 principles applied to any new asset class in terms of diversification, 268 00:15:53,144 --> 00:16:03,431 ensuring that the basket is diversified, that you're diversified 269 00:16:03,431 --> 00:16:17,147 by manager that you trust, that you're in a manager that is 270 00:16:17,147 --> 00:16:27,434 taking the right precautions around due diligence, fraud, checks, 271 00:16:27,434 --> 00:16:42,293 etc. What we have seen, and I think this is where, again, formative 272 00:16:42,293 --> 00:16:56,009 years, having been at Goldman Sachs around 2000 and the kind of 273 00:16:56,009 --> 00:17:08,582 bursting of the TMT bubble, seeing a tremendous amount of business 274 00:17:08,582 --> 00:17:22,298 plans just go up in smoke in terms of their projections around 275 00:17:22,298 --> 00:17:31,442 customer retention, revenue growth, and margin expansion. This 276 00:17:31,442 --> 00:17:41,729 really just disintegrated rapidly in the course of days. So,when 277 00:15:34,984 --> 00:15:51,882 you know that a business model can go up in smoke like that, you 278 00:15:51,882 --> 00:16:02,745 always have to maintain that skepticism. And it's interesting 279 00:16:02,745 --> 00:16:18,436 because some of that kind of ‘drinking of Kool Aid’ or that ‘hype’ 280 00:16:18,436 --> 00:16:31,713 belief we tend to associate with equity and maybe private equity, 281 00:16:31,713 --> 00:16:44,990 public equity, we've seen it very clearly in the credit side, 282 00:16:44,990 --> 00:16:58,267 this type of business model. I've seen boutique gym chains being 283 00:16:58,267 --> 00:17:11,544 backed with private credit that I know myself were going out 284 00:17:11,544 --> 00:17:27,235 of business in my hometown. So, I think there has to be that 285 00:17:27,235 --> 00:17:41,719 kind of a reality check with a lot of private credit pieces. 286 00:17:42,700 --> 00:17:48,290 Good stuff. I mean, the other big theme that you read about so 287 00:17:48,290 --> 00:17:52,590 much in the asset allocation, and particularly the public space, 288 00:17:52,590 --> 00:17:56,890 is total portfolio approach and this shift away from strategic 289 00:17:56,890 --> 00:18:02,050 asset allocation to TPA and what that might mean. Is that something 290 00:18:02,050 --> 00:18:06,350 you're embracing? Do you think it's something very different to 291 00:18:06,350 --> 00:18:11,080 the old approach? And should investors be trying to emulate TPA, 292 00:18:11,080 --> 00:18:11,940 I guess? 293 00:18:13,020 --> 00:18:33,230 I suppose if TPA is a different approach, it's because 294 00:18:33,230 --> 00:18:57,482 it's addressing some of the problems that had arisen in the traditional 295 00:18:57,482 --> 00:19:15,671 asset allocation buckets. And those problems shouldn't have arisen, 296 00:19:15,671 --> 00:19:37,902 but they maybe came about because there was a siloed approach 297 00:19:37,902 --> 00:19:39,923 happening. WhenI worked as CIO at a public fund in Chicago, 298 00:18:22,876 --> 00:18:32,732 I was the one and only investment professional on that fund. 299 00:18:32,732 --> 00:18:43,484 I was the CIO and I was also the only investment professional. 300 00:18:43,484 --> 00:18:52,444 So, you have to, by definition, have a holistic approach 301 00:18:52,444 --> 00:19:04,092 when that is the case. There is no siloing, There is no being 302 00:19:04,092 --> 00:19:13,052 responsible just for your piece of the portfolio. You always 303 00:19:13,052 --> 00:19:22,908 have to think of the portfolio as an orchestra playing together, 304 00:19:22,908 --> 00:19:32,764 when the outcome is the goal and all the different instruments 305 00:19:32,764 --> 00:19:39,932 have to contribute to getting to that outcome. So,I would think 306 00:18:17,916 --> 00:18:30,156 that a holistic approach is something that any senior allocator 307 00:18:30,156 --> 00:18:44,844 should always have had. Whether you call it TPA or not, you 308 00:18:44,844 --> 00:19:03,204 always need to be thinking in that way. So, if it had kind of grown 309 00:19:03,204 --> 00:19:17,892 into a beast, in terms of asset allocation, that was not led 310 00:19:17,892 --> 00:19:32,580 to the wrong set of incentives and the lack of holistic thinking, 311 00:19:32,580 --> 00:19:39,950 then reverting to that is intuitive. Idothink it does involve, 312 00:18:20,922 --> 00:18:34,092 then, having to restructure, say, incentives and also even how 313 00:18:34,092 --> 00:18:45,945 governance works at these institutions. And that, for example, 314 00:18:45,945 --> 00:19:00,432 just looking at CalPERS and the changes there right now, the 315 00:19:00,432 --> 00:19:14,919 restructuring, a lot of that is brought about by really having 316 00:19:14,919 --> 00:19:33,357 to tame, let's say, the beast, if you call it that, which had developed 317 00:19:33,357 --> 00:19:39,942 with a traditional bucket model. 318 00:19:40,510 --> 00:19:43,840 Yeah, absolutely. It does sound more like addressing the problems 319 00:19:43,840 --> 00:19:48,169 of the past. But at the same time, is there something, do you 320 00:19:48,169 --> 00:19:51,499 think, for private wealth or individual investors to learn from 321 00:19:51,499 --> 00:19:54,829 the approach? Are there shortcomings in the kind of traditional 322 00:19:54,829 --> 00:19:58,492 approach, do you see, in private wealth that can learn something 323 00:19:58,492 --> 00:19:59,158 from TPA? 324 00:19:59,690 --> 00:20:12,570 I would say I've learned a lot from Brian Portnoy, who is the author 325 00:20:12,570 --> 00:20:24,530 of Shaping Wealth, and he speaks a lot about what is the goal? 326 00:20:24,530 --> 00:20:33,730 The goal is funded contentment. And that's a very holistic, 327 00:20:33,730 --> 00:20:46,610 basic goal that we all have. We want to fund our needs at certain 328 00:20:46,610 --> 00:20:47,530 points. So,if that is the ultimate goal, very few private wealth 329 00:20:08,919 --> 00:20:17,309 clients will ever be wondering about their individual buckets. They 330 00:20:17,309 --> 00:20:25,699 won't be obsessed with their bond exposure versus their equity 331 00:20:25,699 --> 00:20:33,250 exposure. They are wondering about the ultimate outcome. And, 332 00:20:33,250 --> 00:20:44,996 as Brian expresses it very well, am I going to be okay and will 333 00:20:44,996 --> 00:20:47,560 I have enough? Ithinkif we strip it back to that very basic 334 00:20:09,084 --> 00:20:19,332 need, and that's really what we are serving our clients. We are 335 00:20:19,332 --> 00:20:28,726 helping them ensure that they have enough and that they're going 336 00:20:28,726 --> 00:20:38,974 to be okay. And that's why we steer their portfolio through markets 337 00:20:38,974 --> 00:20:47,514 as we do. That's of course a total portfolio approach. 338 00:20:49,911 --> 00:20:58,689 I mean, one of the big topics, since we've had this move into this 339 00:20:58,689 --> 00:21:05,586 decade, and more volatility, and rising rates, has been a change 340 00:21:05,586 --> 00:21:11,229 in the correlation between bonds and equities. So, obviously 341 00:21:11,229 --> 00:21:18,126 with the 60/40 portfolio, the mainstay of many portfolios and many, 342 00:21:18,126 --> 00:21:25,023 kind of, I suppose, multi asset funds are basically a derivative 343 00:21:25,023 --> 00:21:27,531 of that 60/40 portfolio. Obviously,we had inflation in 2021, 344 00:20:54,819 --> 00:21:07,089 ‘22 for the first time in a long time, a shift in the bond equity 345 00:21:07,089 --> 00:21:16,905 correlation. A lot of people then saying, 60/40 is dead. We need 346 00:21:16,905 --> 00:21:25,903 a new model 40/30/30, or whatever it is. What's your perspective 347 00:21:25,903 --> 00:21:27,539 on that? 348 00:21:28,291 --> 00:21:34,960 Very interesting developments I suppose. And what I'm actually 349 00:21:34,960 --> 00:21:44,593 focusing on right now, when I look at bonds and equities, is I 350 00:21:44,593 --> 00:21:52,744 am somewhat perplexed by the ongoing low move index, the load 351 00:21:52,744 --> 00:22:00,154 set of volatility in fixed income compared with the increasing 352 00:22:00,154 --> 00:22:06,082 volatility we're seeing in equities, particularly as equities 353 00:22:06,082 --> 00:22:12,751 get more concentrated. We would have thought that traditionally 354 00:22:12,751 --> 00:22:21,643 bond investors are more of the concerned group and that might have 355 00:22:21,643 --> 00:22:29,794 more worry and more concern about say cracks emerging in the 356 00:22:29,794 --> 00:22:35,722 consumer confidence, in the consumer demand picture. Meanwhile, 357 00:22:35,722 --> 00:22:43,132 public fixed income, we're seeing this very low spreads, low 358 00:22:43,132 --> 00:22:51,283 volatility. So again, what is that saying about the behavior of 359 00:22:51,283 --> 00:23:00,175 bonds and equities? Maybe some of the stress in bonds has moved 360 00:23:00,175 --> 00:23:06,844 into the private credit arena, as you already mentioned. So,every 361 00:21:30,697 --> 00:21:43,930 set of asset classes needs to be re-thought, and re-analyzed, and 362 00:21:43,930 --> 00:21:55,960 re-underwritten, based on the changing macro backdrop as well as 363 00:21:55,960 --> 00:22:07,990 the changing investor sentiment and use case. So, I'd say 364 00:22:07,990 --> 00:22:21,223 the idea that bonds and equities are always a nice hedge, 365 00:22:21,223 --> 00:22:35,659 that probably is yesterday's news. And it has been so, I'd say, 366 00:22:35,659 --> 00:22:52,501 even going back to in the COVID era and in 2022 when we saw 367 00:22:52,501 --> 00:23:04,531 both operate in sync again and having catastrophic effects across 368 00:23:04,531 --> 00:23:06,937 many portfolios. So,I’d say we need to think about bonds, as 369 00:21:40,621 --> 00:21:52,951 I mentioned before, as a deflation hedge, some ballast, not 370 00:21:52,951 --> 00:22:07,747 a great source of income, but some income, but ultimately a diversifier, 371 00:22:07,747 --> 00:22:21,310 some risk, some protective effect in a portfolio, but not a 372 00:22:21,310 --> 00:22:32,407 great source of return equities, the return engine. But 373 00:22:32,407 --> 00:22:42,271 to think about ultimately diversifying that equity exposure 374 00:22:42,271 --> 00:22:54,601 so that you have a well-balanced portfolio that is resilient 375 00:22:54,601 --> 00:23:06,931 at its core, and all-weather, and firing on all cylinders. 376 00:23:07,671 --> 00:23:11,441 Yeah. And I mean, we had this kind of growth of bond alternative 377 00:23:11,441 --> 00:23:13,761 strategies, you know, I suppose pre-COVID, when interest 378 00:23:13,761 --> 00:23:16,951 rates were very low. And now investors are grappling with that 379 00:23:16,951 --> 00:23:20,431 view of, well, what should I have in my portfolio for diversification 380 00:23:20,431 --> 00:23:23,911 if bonds are going to be less reliable diversifiers, how do you 381 00:23:23,911 --> 00:23:24,781 think about that? 382 00:23:25,511 --> 00:23:44,205 Yes, we saw this at the Chicago Police. We did see a lot 383 00:23:44,205 --> 00:23:57,147 of those absolute return strategies really hit the skids, 384 00:23:57,147 --> 00:24:11,527 let's say, when really investors should have just been exposed 385 00:24:11,527 --> 00:24:27,345 to core fixed income. That would have been ultimately the best 386 00:24:27,345 --> 00:24:47,477 place to be, especially as we are in that kind of a downward interest 387 00:24:47,477 --> 00:24:50,353 rate cycle. So,I'd say that where we think about bonds is, be 388 00:23:42,176 --> 00:23:57,326 very wary of newfangled innovations when it comes to investing. 389 00:23:57,326 --> 00:24:17,021 We think about and I look across all sectors and look at where 390 00:24:17,021 --> 00:24:33,686 innovation is prized. And one of my personal interests is looking 391 00:24:33,686 --> 00:24:48,836 at psychological safety and how that leads to performance, innovation, 392 00:24:48,836 --> 00:24:50,351 etc. Andwhat I have found is that there really isn't a great demand 393 00:23:38,641 --> 00:23:47,731 for a huge amount of innovation within asset management. 394 00:23:47,731 --> 00:23:58,841 And probably rightly so, because we've seen so much of this 395 00:23:58,841 --> 00:24:09,951 innovation end in tears when it comes to new instruments, leverage, 396 00:24:09,951 --> 00:24:22,071 complexity, etc. So, when it comes to bonds, I am quite skeptical 397 00:24:22,071 --> 00:24:33,181 of some of the innovation. There's so little to be extracted, 398 00:24:33,181 --> 00:24:45,301 in many cases, through bond trading that, to get too cute about 399 00:24:45,301 --> 00:24:50,351 that can be a problem. Wheredo you get the diversification 400 00:23:34,139 --> 00:23:45,643 in the portfolio, therefore? Well, certainly across equities, 401 00:23:45,643 --> 00:24:01,461 there are many ways to get diversification even within an equity 402 00:24:01,461 --> 00:24:14,403 portfolio, but that's for the diversification into other alternatives, 403 00:24:14,403 --> 00:24:25,907 real estate, infrastructure, real assets, obviously bonds themselves, 404 00:24:25,907 --> 00:24:43,163 but you really get it across the whole portfolio. You don't rely 405 00:24:43,163 --> 00:24:50,353 on just bonds for that. 406 00:24:50,961 --> 00:25:01,365 Yeah, I mean, you've mentioned the role of bonds as a deflation 407 00:25:01,365 --> 00:25:10,902 hedge a couple of times, which is interesting because I haven't 408 00:25:10,902 --> 00:25:20,439 heard much about deflation for a while. Obviously, the last few 409 00:25:20,439 --> 00:25:30,843 years we had the inflation spike and then much more, I suppose, 410 00:25:30,843 --> 00:25:33,444 concern about that. Butwe've had, I suppose, a rapid progress 411 00:24:59,905 --> 00:25:14,439 on AI and a lot more debate around that. And we had recently 412 00:25:14,439 --> 00:25:26,737 this Citrini Report outlining a kind of a doomsday scenario, which 413 00:25:26,737 --> 00:25:33,445 was inherently quite a deflationary scenario. So,do you 414 00:24:53,859 --> 00:25:05,451 think this is something that is going to come under radar much 415 00:25:05,451 --> 00:25:13,179 more now, from a portfolio construction perspective, thinking 416 00:25:13,179 --> 00:25:23,805 about different possible views of the world, that maybe we could 417 00:25:23,805 --> 00:25:33,465 see strong disinflationary forces coming back in the years ahead? 418 00:25:34,271 --> 00:25:49,660 Yeah, that's the Interesting. I suppose that the toggle we've been 419 00:25:49,660 --> 00:26:03,650 doing between the deflationary thesis, which I always trace back 420 00:26:03,650 --> 00:26:19,039 to Cathie Wood and her innovation, and the idea that we 421 00:26:19,039 --> 00:26:35,827 are seeing this ultimate, this gig economy and how Moore's law and 422 00:26:35,827 --> 00:26:49,817 various other things are occurring in technology that is leading 423 00:26:49,817 --> 00:26:55,413 to this deflationary impact. And,certainly, we were seeing that, 424 00:25:42,383 --> 00:25:58,607 in effect, before COVID. And then we've had the COVID, we've had 425 00:25:58,607 --> 00:26:12,127 the tariffs, we've had supply chains, demand pull, inflation, all 426 00:26:12,127 --> 00:26:26,999 kinds of draws. And it's very complex, the inflation picture. And 427 00:26:26,999 --> 00:26:48,631 I think being able to parse it in a way that is going to give us 428 00:26:48,631 --> 00:26:55,421 one path is almost impossible. Ithinkthere will always be these 429 00:25:39,780 --> 00:25:48,437 competing forces. Some will come to the fore at different times. 430 00:25:48,437 --> 00:25:59,455 I have not been a believer in the thesis that tariffs are not inflationary 431 00:25:59,455 --> 00:26:08,112 because what I've seen, as the big unknown, is the transmission 432 00:26:08,112 --> 00:26:18,343 effect. So, we've had tariffs on the one hand, it isn't a switch 433 00:26:18,343 --> 00:26:25,426 that is flipped that ultimately leads to inflation down 434 00:26:25,426 --> 00:26:35,657 the line. There are going to be so many ways of cushioning that 435 00:26:35,657 --> 00:26:45,101 blow for the consumer until they ultimately have to pay the price 436 00:26:45,101 --> 00:26:55,332 that I don't think we can say that the transmission effect is instant. 437 00:25:34,271 --> 00:26:13,443 Soyes, I think we do need to look at both competing forces of 438 00:26:13,443 --> 00:26:44,221 inflation and deflation and to build a portfolio that has protections 439 00:26:44,221 --> 00:26:55,413 embedded against either scenario. 440 00:26:56,941 --> 00:27:06,533 Very good. I mean, we've talked about kind of the shifting 441 00:27:06,533 --> 00:27:16,125 macro regime. We've talked about 60/40. I mean, the other big 442 00:27:16,125 --> 00:27:26,589 topic that is put forward as a risk is concentration. We've got 443 00:27:26,589 --> 00:27:37,925 the US as an unusually large part of the global index. And then 444 00:27:37,925 --> 00:27:47,517 within the US, obviously, high concentration with the Mag 7 and 445 00:27:47,517 --> 00:27:51,877 the high growth technology stocks. Asyou say, often there's 446 00:26:59,771 --> 00:27:05,431 a lot of hysteria about things, but you don't necessarily 447 00:27:05,431 --> 00:27:11,657 get carried away with that. And there are conflicting views on 448 00:27:11,657 --> 00:27:19,581 this. On the one hand, people say the last time we saw this kind 449 00:27:19,581 --> 00:27:25,241 of concentration it ended badly. But equally, I was reading 450 00:27:25,241 --> 00:27:31,467 something that we saw this kind of concentration back in the 451 00:27:31,467 --> 00:27:37,693 early 1930s or something, if you had diversified, then it would 452 00:27:37,693 --> 00:27:44,485 have been a bad outcome. So how do you think about something 453 00:27:44,485 --> 00:27:51,843 that could be a risk but has maybe an economic rationale to it? 454 00:27:53,131 --> 00:28:13,943 Again, getting back to the mantra of places I've been trained, 455 00:28:13,943 --> 00:28:30,971 and Cambridge Associates, it was leverage and concentration. Those 456 00:28:30,971 --> 00:28:53,675 were the two big risk factors that were there just through every 457 00:28:53,675 --> 00:29:14,487 cycle. And I think people have added other abbreviations to that, 458 00:29:14,487 --> 00:29:39,083 but those two are just… And I will always have a structural bias 459 00:29:39,083 --> 00:29:56,111 personally against leverage because I've seen the dangers of 460 00:29:56,111 --> 00:30:13,139 how that can really amplify risk in a portfolio. Andwhen it 461 00:28:13,138 --> 00:29:19,828 comes to concentration, I mean some concentration is... We've seen 462 00:29:19,828 --> 00:30:13,180 some very successful managers with highly concentrated portfolios. 463 00:27:53,131 --> 00:28:35,921 Whenit is well managed, when that concentration, going in, has 464 00:28:35,921 --> 00:29:14,821 been knowingly undertaken and the due diligence has been done, 465 00:29:14,821 --> 00:30:09,281 that is a risk that has been conscious on the part of the portfolio 466 00:30:09,281 --> 00:30:13,171 manager. Whatis occurring in markets today is that equity markets, 467 00:28:16,471 --> 00:28:37,477 particularly US markets, have become so concentrated relative to 468 00:28:37,477 --> 00:29:03,151 the rest of the world that any mainstream allocator, say, outside 469 00:29:03,151 --> 00:29:33,493 the US, is probably not going to have a portfolio that looks anything 470 00:29:33,493 --> 00:29:54,499 like the benchmark that they're using. The benchmark will 471 00:29:54,499 --> 00:30:13,171 be more concentrated if it's market cap weighted. So,I think 472 00:27:57,505 --> 00:28:12,085 it’s about also questioning whether we're using the right benchmark 473 00:28:12,085 --> 00:28:26,665 and therefore penalizing managers in the wrong way. But when 474 00:28:26,665 --> 00:28:44,161 it comes to concentration, I believe that we have not fully underwritten 475 00:28:44,161 --> 00:28:58,741 what a current equity portfolio looks like given how we've 476 00:28:58,741 --> 00:29:16,237 had some extremely fast run ups in market caps of companies such 477 00:29:16,237 --> 00:29:33,733 as Nvidia, other members of the Mag 7. The fact that individual 478 00:29:33,733 --> 00:29:48,313 stocks like that now dwarf whole country indices is something 479 00:29:48,313 --> 00:30:05,809 that is just going to look very different according to how your 480 00:30:05,809 --> 00:30:13,099 equity portfolio is made up. Therewill be days when individual 481 00:28:00,019 --> 00:28:16,091 stocks fall by 10%. We've seen them fall by 20% just in the last 482 00:28:16,091 --> 00:28:28,719 cycle. And if you have a concentrated exposure to those names, 483 00:28:28,719 --> 00:28:41,347 you need to have a stronger stomach, essentially, for that equity 484 00:28:41,347 --> 00:28:53,975 portfolio. How do we address that in private wealth? We always 485 00:28:53,975 --> 00:29:07,751 dollar cost average into a portfolio. We don't try to be too 486 00:29:07,751 --> 00:29:18,083 tactical by timing markets. We will encourage diversification by 487 00:29:18,083 --> 00:29:29,563 cap size, by sector, by geography. That, at least, provides 488 00:29:29,563 --> 00:29:42,191 some kind of insulation from that sharp volatility. But we are 489 00:29:42,191 --> 00:29:53,671 coaching clients to expect their equity portfolio to look more 490 00:29:53,671 --> 00:30:05,151 volatile going forwards but also recognize that there are very 491 00:30:05,151 --> 00:30:13,187 few other places that they can be. 492 00:30:13,911 --> 00:30:17,214 Okay, interesting. So, it's not necessarily an argument against 493 00:30:17,214 --> 00:30:22,352 passive and, and for active. I mean, for a long time the view being 494 00:30:22,352 --> 00:30:26,022 advocated by private investors was don't look at active managers. 495 00:30:26,022 --> 00:30:29,692 The vast majority of active managers underperform and you can 496 00:30:29,692 --> 00:30:33,729 get a very strong and well diversified portfolio with a passive 497 00:30:33,729 --> 00:30:36,665 index. That mantra still holds do you think? 498 00:30:36,701 --> 00:30:40,914 Well, what we would be concerned about passive is that you're 499 00:30:40,914 --> 00:30:44,361 really getting exactly the exposure to this volatility that 500 00:30:44,361 --> 00:30:47,425 I mentioned because of the concentration. Essentially passive 501 00:30:47,425 --> 00:30:52,404 is going to be replicating the index. So, the concern it fits for… 502 00:30:52,431 --> 00:30:55,803 Are you saying just stick with the volatility? I mean, it's not 503 00:30:55,803 --> 00:30:59,175 necessarily a bad thing, but it's just going to be more volatile? 504 00:30:59,750 --> 00:31:12,878 No, we do think it is because the volatility is increasing. We 505 00:31:12,878 --> 00:31:24,912 think that needs to be rethought in terms of how equity 506 00:31:24,912 --> 00:31:36,946 markets are thought about. That could be a sizing factor. That 507 00:31:36,946 --> 00:31:48,980 doesn't necessarily have to mean you go from passive to active. 508 00:30:59,750 --> 00:31:49,001 Ialsowould share the skepticism around active management's 509 00:31:04,178 --> 00:31:08,114 ability to perform persistently and would suggest that 510 00:31:08,114 --> 00:31:13,526 it has become even more difficult to be an active manager 511 00:31:13,526 --> 00:31:17,954 today, particularly with this concentration. Again, maybe the benchmark 512 00:31:17,954 --> 00:31:24,350 is wrong, but equally, we do need to be even more assiduous about 513 00:31:24,350 --> 00:31:29,270 checking and verifying that active managers are in fact earning 514 00:31:29,270 --> 00:31:34,682 their fee, at a minimum, and earning their keep, otherwise, in 515 00:31:34,682 --> 00:31:40,586 a portfolio. So, we are even more assertive than others in terms 516 00:31:40,586 --> 00:31:45,998 of ensuring that active managers have a role. They do have 517 00:31:45,998 --> 00:31:48,950 a role, it's just not everywhere. 518 00:31:49,641 --> 00:31:53,641 Yeah, fair enough. I mean you touched on different benchmarks. 519 00:31:53,641 --> 00:31:58,041 What about different kind of factors or styles? I mean, without 520 00:31:58,041 --> 00:32:02,841 going into the hedge fund side or the alternatives, but even different 521 00:32:02,841 --> 00:32:06,441 style approaches, factor approaches in terms of quality, or 522 00:32:06,441 --> 00:32:11,241 value, etc. Are they kind of building blocks that you use and 523 00:32:11,241 --> 00:32:13,241 think about when building portfolios? 524 00:32:13,971 --> 00:32:22,386 I tend to think that those are somewhat artificial building blocks. 525 00:32:22,386 --> 00:32:30,801 We've seen them come out of the consulting vortex, I suppose, 526 00:32:30,801 --> 00:32:39,981 in the US and other consulting framework. And the issue with them 527 00:32:39,981 --> 00:32:51,456 is, when you look at a style map, you can see that a label, it 528 00:32:51,456 --> 00:32:59,871 needs to be dynamically updated from time to time and that 529 00:32:59,871 --> 00:33:10,581 a label no longer applies. So, if it gives some kind of false assurance 530 00:33:10,581 --> 00:33:18,231 of having a broad-based factory exposure, you can see that 531 00:33:18,231 --> 00:33:26,646 actually managers are kind of closet growth, or where they're supposed 532 00:33:26,646 --> 00:33:36,591 to be value, or their closet mid cap, or they're supposed to be 533 00:33:36,591 --> 00:33:46,536 small cap. So, I think it's very difficult to put a label on 534 00:33:46,536 --> 00:33:47,301 that. Idobelieve in having broad-based exposure across those 535 00:32:26,886 --> 00:32:39,801 factors, recognizing that individual stocks will move in and 536 00:32:39,801 --> 00:32:58,456 out of factor indices. I think it's critical to have the right benchmark 537 00:32:58,456 --> 00:33:14,241 as I mentioned, otherwise we will just have a manager constantly 538 00:33:14,241 --> 00:33:28,591 explaining how they diverge or they will either be congratulating 539 00:33:28,591 --> 00:33:40,071 themselves for outperforming a non-demanding benchmark if their 540 00:33:40,071 --> 00:33:47,246 portfolio actually looks somewhat different. So,again, some 541 00:32:18,027 --> 00:32:35,603 of these labels perhaps need a dusting off and a rethinking or redefining. 542 00:32:35,603 --> 00:32:49,123 But having a broad-based exposure, to me, means having broad-based 543 00:32:49,123 --> 00:33:02,643 exposure across those factors. That may mean that momentum factors 544 00:33:02,643 --> 00:33:20,219 in there for one time. And quality, again, a bit of a controversial 545 00:33:20,219 --> 00:33:36,443 topic. And to call anything quality - what is my definition of 546 00:33:36,443 --> 00:33:47,259 quality? What is the technical definition of quality? Andagain, 547 00:32:19,303 --> 00:32:51,295 is that going to be a disappointment if the client is actually 548 00:32:51,295 --> 00:33:17,955 looking at a headline index performance and finding that their 549 00:33:17,955 --> 00:33:44,615 quality portfolio has really been quite defensive and not particularly 550 00:33:44,615 --> 00:33:47,281 exciting. 551 00:33:52,181 --> 00:33:56,789 We touched a little bit on public versus private, but I mean, 552 00:33:56,789 --> 00:34:01,397 there is this kind of broader debate about the needs for alternative 553 00:34:01,397 --> 00:34:05,237 sources of return, whether that's public versus private or traditional 554 00:34:05,237 --> 00:34:09,077 versus alternative. You know, and sometimes these labels can be 555 00:34:09,077 --> 00:34:12,533 misconstrued. Something could be private, but it's not necessarily 556 00:34:12,533 --> 00:34:15,605 alternative or it's not necessarily diversifying. I mean, 557 00:34:15,605 --> 00:34:20,213 in terms of how you categorize and label asset classes or think 558 00:34:20,213 --> 00:34:24,821 about that, I mean, have you a framework? Is it public, private, 559 00:34:24,821 --> 00:34:27,125 is it traditional, non-traditional, alternative? What's 560 00:34:27,125 --> 00:34:31,733 your kind of lens for looking across the asset classes and categorizing 561 00:34:31,733 --> 00:34:32,117 them? 562 00:34:32,760 --> 00:34:52,810 We do use the traditional categories because that tends to 563 00:34:52,810 --> 00:35:16,870 be easiest to understand, it goes into a model, it looks nice 564 00:35:16,870 --> 00:35:38,925 in a pie chart. Otherwise, you'd have an infinite number of 565 00:35:38,925 --> 00:36:06,995 slices if you were to get down to the minutia. But I've always liked 566 00:36:06,995 --> 00:36:17,020 the outcome-based approach to investing. Notso much the risk budget, 567 00:34:44,346 --> 00:35:07,518 risk buckets, because again, I think risk is very difficult to define 568 00:35:07,518 --> 00:35:32,621 and definitively say this is that risk or this is going to be 569 00:35:32,621 --> 00:35:57,724 that risk. I think there are so many, really a matrix of risks, 570 00:35:57,724 --> 00:36:17,034 within any investment, so that that can be too artificial. Butin 571 00:34:35,104 --> 00:34:49,168 terms of outcome, what is the outcome? Again, this gets to the 572 00:34:49,168 --> 00:34:59,716 holistic total portfolio approach. If the outcome is resilience 573 00:34:59,716 --> 00:35:09,092 protection, capital protection, if the outcome is inflation 574 00:35:09,092 --> 00:35:21,984 participation, if the outcome is income, then you can deliver a 575 00:35:21,984 --> 00:35:34,876 portfolio according to those outcomes. So, yes, we would use the 576 00:35:34,876 --> 00:35:46,596 traditional buckets, but we will look underneath in terms of 577 00:35:46,596 --> 00:36:00,660 where is that source of return and where are we making unintended 578 00:36:00,660 --> 00:36:12,380 bets? Where are we actually maybe seeing some correlation that 579 00:36:12,380 --> 00:36:17,068 is not otherwise there? Wealways think about this propensity 580 00:34:45,276 --> 00:35:06,136 for volatility washing. I think it's been the popular term. 581 00:35:06,136 --> 00:35:29,082 The private assets have been seen as being almost insulated from 582 00:35:29,082 --> 00:35:49,942 volatility simply because they haven't been measured at the same 583 00:35:49,942 --> 00:36:14,974 timeframe as a public asset. We have to be very skeptical about 584 00:36:14,974 --> 00:36:17,060 that. AndI think having been in markets for many cycles, as I'm 585 00:34:46,668 --> 00:35:00,576 sure, those of us who've gotten to a certain age have been, 586 00:35:00,576 --> 00:35:12,166 we have I think already developed that kind of skepticism 587 00:35:12,166 --> 00:35:26,074 muscle or that ability to trust but verify when it comes to 588 00:35:26,074 --> 00:35:36,505 assertions of portfolio has been untainted by market developments 589 00:35:36,505 --> 00:35:51,572 or whatever. So, I think the ability to really dig into that and 590 00:35:51,572 --> 00:36:02,003 not necessarily take these assurances at face value, that's 591 00:36:02,003 --> 00:36:15,911 the critical piece of parsing what goes into a private or public 592 00:36:15,911 --> 00:36:17,070 portfolio. 593 00:36:17,711 --> 00:36:20,871 And is that outcome-based perspective, is that then apply to 594 00:36:20,871 --> 00:36:24,663 all of the individual asset classes in the sense that bonds are 595 00:36:24,663 --> 00:36:27,823 for income and for deflation protection, equities are for growth 596 00:36:27,823 --> 00:36:31,615 and private creditors for some other outcome? Is that how you think 597 00:36:31,615 --> 00:36:32,247 about it? 598 00:36:32,601 --> 00:36:36,501 That's at least how they are assigned in terms of outcome. But 599 00:36:36,501 --> 00:36:40,401 then, when we actually get to how are they actually behaving, that 600 00:36:40,401 --> 00:36:44,301 is a different part of the inquiry. So, we have to continuously 601 00:36:44,301 --> 00:36:47,226 re-underwrite or reaffirm that they are delivering that outcome. 602 00:36:47,226 --> 00:36:51,126 And we can see this right now with private credit, say, infrastructure, 603 00:36:51,126 --> 00:36:54,376 real estate not delivering perhaps the yield that they might 604 00:36:54,376 --> 00:36:57,951 have been designed to do. That will, then, necessitate either an 605 00:36:57,951 --> 00:37:01,201 increase or a reassignment within those buckets into maybe a 606 00:37:01,201 --> 00:37:04,126 distribution asset class or just thinking differently. So, obviously 607 00:37:04,126 --> 00:37:06,726 you set it, but you don't forget it. 608 00:37:07,751 --> 00:37:10,892 We've seen stronger performance from hedge funds in the 609 00:37:10,892 --> 00:37:15,429 last number of years. And I was just at a hedge fund conference, 610 00:37:15,429 --> 00:37:19,268 a lot of positivity around the space, people quite optimistic about 611 00:37:19,268 --> 00:37:23,456 the growth trajectory. But also, I guess, we're in a more volatile 612 00:37:23,456 --> 00:37:26,597 environment. There is more dispersion, there's more macro themes, 613 00:37:26,597 --> 00:37:29,738 so, in theory, more opportunities. I mean, would you 614 00:37:29,738 --> 00:37:33,577 share that perspective or where do you see hedge funds fitting 615 00:37:33,577 --> 00:37:34,275 in portfolios? 616 00:37:35,051 --> 00:37:46,775 I started my investment career working on hedge funds. So, I always 617 00:37:46,775 --> 00:38:01,430 like to say I've kind of seen the good, the bad and the ugly. I've 618 00:38:01,430 --> 00:38:13,154 seen them rise, for around about over 20 years, from being ‘must 619 00:38:13,154 --> 00:38:24,878 haves’ in a portfolio to being, I think, the source of some 620 00:38:24,878 --> 00:38:33,671 anxiety, pain, portfolio losses. I'd say memories are particularly 621 00:38:33,671 --> 00:38:46,372 long when it comes to hedge funds. And maybe it's that the label 622 00:38:46,372 --> 00:38:57,119 has never been shaken, the actual hedge fund label. Maybe that 623 00:38:57,119 --> 00:39:09,820 needs to go away and has needed to go away for many, many 624 00:39:09,820 --> 00:39:10,797 years. Butbecause the memories are long, I think you do 625 00:37:47,491 --> 00:37:59,931 find, particularly in private wealth, investors that have no interest 626 00:37:59,931 --> 00:38:14,859 in hedge fund exposure. Maybe because there was one or two black 627 00:38:14,859 --> 00:38:31,031 eyes suffered, whether it's in the ’07 - the Quant Crash, or there 628 00:38:31,031 --> 00:38:48,447 has been an illiquidity event, or a gating of a fund, and then high 629 00:38:48,447 --> 00:39:03,375 fees have eroded returns. So, I think that those memories are very 630 00:39:03,375 --> 00:39:10,839 long when it comes to individuals. Andwhen it comes to 631 00:37:41,521 --> 00:37:54,461 institutions, similarly, we've seen that bucket really go away or 632 00:37:54,461 --> 00:38:09,989 be dispersed elsewhere. And even if we look, and say, on the 633 00:38:09,989 --> 00:38:22,929 local authority side, and there are nine buckets that will 634 00:38:22,929 --> 00:38:37,163 be coming out of their new pooling initiatives, I don't see 635 00:38:37,163 --> 00:38:50,103 hedge funds where they naturally fit there. So, there will 636 00:38:50,103 --> 00:39:01,749 be, probably, scattered among whether it's absolute return funds 637 00:39:01,749 --> 00:39:10,807 or some of the private credit allocations. So,I say, are they 638 00:37:41,701 --> 00:38:00,321 coming back? Maybe. I'd say we have to look at them just as skeptically 639 00:38:00,321 --> 00:38:18,941 as ever in terms of do they earn their keep, where are the fees, 640 00:38:18,941 --> 00:38:32,241 where is there a mismatch between assets and liabilities? Will 641 00:38:32,241 --> 00:38:46,871 they deliver the liquidity they profess to? And I'd say there 642 00:38:46,871 --> 00:39:04,161 is a higher bar to clear now than ever because of these memories 643 00:39:04,161 --> 00:39:10,811 being long, as I mentioned. 644 00:39:11,571 --> 00:39:14,249 And when you say the label ‘hedge funds’, is that the idea that 645 00:39:14,249 --> 00:39:16,515 they are a hedge or what do you mean by that? 646 00:39:16,931 --> 00:39:23,729 Just the entire bucket of hedge funds, if anything, is classified 647 00:39:23,729 --> 00:39:31,763 as a hedge fund. An investor will say, well, I don't invest in 648 00:39:31,763 --> 00:39:38,561 hedge funds or I never invested in it, never again since 649 00:39:38,561 --> 00:39:39,179 ‘07. So,I say that type of a strategy, it's always been a questionable 650 00:39:23,665 --> 00:39:29,881 label that it has been really just an underlying who have very 651 00:39:29,881 --> 00:39:35,061 different strategies, all of whom have the same legal structure 652 00:39:35,061 --> 00:39:39,205 perhaps, same fee structure, but very different exposures. 653 00:39:40,331 --> 00:39:44,987 And I mean you've worked on the consulting side before and in 654 00:39:44,987 --> 00:39:48,867 the US at least, the consultants have been quite strong 655 00:39:48,867 --> 00:39:52,747 advocates for hedge fund strategies, for CTA, for macro. I 656 00:39:52,747 --> 00:39:57,015 mean, we've seen the growth of ideas like risk mitigation strategies. 657 00:39:57,015 --> 00:40:01,283 So, having a dedicated sleeve in your portfolio to mitigate risk, 658 00:40:01,283 --> 00:40:05,939 I guess for the more extreme outcomes in markets. You've had kind 659 00:40:05,939 --> 00:40:10,207 of labels: crisis risk, offset, all of this stuff. I mean 660 00:40:10,207 --> 00:40:13,699 it sounds like you are somewhat skeptical of that. 661 00:40:14,281 --> 00:40:28,891 It's funny, I haven't heard about those risk mitigation buckets 662 00:40:28,891 --> 00:40:47,884 now for I say probably close to 10 years. So that probably says 663 00:40:47,884 --> 00:41:05,416 how long I've been in this business. But I always laughed with 664 00:41:05,416 --> 00:41:21,487 them is they were really a combination of some treasuries, and 665 00:41:21,487 --> 00:41:44,863 some CTA type funds, and there was a lot of cash as well, if I recall. 666 00:41:44,863 --> 00:41:59,473 They were quite expensive solutions for what they were underneath. 667 00:40:14,281 --> 00:40:34,392 Andthen the ultimate question is, did they do what they said on 668 00:40:34,392 --> 00:40:54,503 the tin? Did they actually work well, in the case of a risk? 669 00:40:54,503 --> 00:41:13,067 And I think the answer was not always. So, they were profoundly 670 00:41:13,067 --> 00:41:30,084 disappointing, I'd say, as a general set of offerings. Yes, there 671 00:41:30,084 --> 00:41:48,648 were some that were exceptions and I believe some kinds of equity 672 00:41:48,648 --> 00:41:59,477 option strategies often rolled up into them. Andso, I'd say yes, 673 00:40:23,506 --> 00:40:43,801 I am skeptical of any kind of repackaging of solutions, whether 674 00:40:43,801 --> 00:41:02,251 it's portfolio insurance or anything else. I've also seen the 675 00:41:02,251 --> 00:41:20,701 same product be marketed under very different labels according to 676 00:41:20,701 --> 00:41:39,151 where the zeitgeist was moving, what was the next trendy 677 00:41:39,151 --> 00:41:59,446 thing. And again, that has to be a cause for skepticism. Andwhen 678 00:40:17,467 --> 00:40:36,583 it came to say a new asset class like digital assets, bitcoin, 679 00:40:36,583 --> 00:40:55,699 on the private wealth side, we were quite slow to ever recommend 680 00:40:55,699 --> 00:41:13,222 that. We were providing education, kind of a wait and see 681 00:41:13,222 --> 00:41:30,745 approach that might not have been popular with clients who wish 682 00:41:30,745 --> 00:41:49,861 to dabble in these. But the reason we could not recommend them 683 00:41:49,861 --> 00:41:59,419 was we could not analyze them. Ifwe don't know how an asset class 684 00:40:28,073 --> 00:40:47,037 like this is likely to perform in different scenarios, we cannot 685 00:40:47,037 --> 00:41:06,001 do scenario analysis. This cannot be part of our portfolio that 686 00:41:06,001 --> 00:41:26,689 we recommend. So, bitcoin, we've seen it move from, is it a 687 00:41:26,689 --> 00:41:50,825 diversifier of currency, is it a hedge, or is it just a very high-octane 688 00:41:50,825 --> 00:41:59,445 way to get risk on? 689 00:42:01,001 --> 00:42:07,913 Yeah, interesting. I mean, the other one that has come back, obviously, 690 00:42:07,913 --> 00:42:15,401 is gold. I mean, gold was in competition with bitcoin for a while, 691 00:42:15,401 --> 00:42:22,313 it felt like, on that kind of safe haven type asset. Obviously, 692 00:42:22,313 --> 00:42:29,801 gold has had a fantastic role for people of late. It's a great 693 00:42:29,801 --> 00:42:35,561 run. And commodities more generally, I guess, have become more 694 00:42:35,561 --> 00:42:36,137 interesting. Obviously,you've been in the market through the full 695 00:42:08,363 --> 00:42:15,725 cycles. You'll remember when commodities didn't appear in portfolios, 696 00:42:15,725 --> 00:42:24,723 then they did, then they didn't, and now they're coming back. 697 00:42:24,723 --> 00:42:33,721 So, gold and commodities, are they back as core allocations again, 698 00:42:33,721 --> 00:42:36,175 do you think? 699 00:42:36,661 --> 00:42:57,957 Again, that's the beauty of having many cycles. You have the 700 00:42:57,957 --> 00:43:17,317 same conversation of history not repeating but rhyming. And we've 701 00:43:17,317 --> 00:43:40,549 had this conversation 10 years ago, perhaps, about the use of commodities, 702 00:43:40,549 --> 00:44:03,781 20 years ago about the use of institutions and commodities. A couple 703 00:44:03,781 --> 00:44:27,013 of core truths have applied the entire time. One is that holding 704 00:44:27,013 --> 00:44:44,437 the physical is complicated, expensive, and not for everyone. 705 00:42:36,661 --> 00:43:07,321 Andsecond is this idea of the divorce perhaps between the underlying 706 00:43:07,321 --> 00:43:37,981 commodity prices and some of the stocks or the products that are 707 00:43:37,981 --> 00:44:08,641 tied to that. Sometimes there is a complete hand in hand correlation, 708 00:44:08,641 --> 00:44:36,746 other times there's a real dispersion and you don't know what 709 00:44:36,746 --> 00:44:44,451 you're necessarily getting. Ithinkthe idea of this being the 710 00:42:57,101 --> 00:43:22,651 inflation hedge has been a complex assertion. There has been, 711 00:43:22,651 --> 00:43:43,091 maybe, a steady state inflation hedge, normal inflationary 712 00:43:43,091 --> 00:44:03,531 times. There has been reasonable participation when it 713 00:44:03,531 --> 00:44:31,636 comes to the shock inflation, it hasn't protected that well. So, 714 00:44:31,636 --> 00:44:44,411 I think that that's another. Andnow gold, looking at the different 715 00:42:52,348 --> 00:43:12,517 factors driving gold, whether that's the technical factors, the 716 00:43:12,517 --> 00:43:34,927 Chinese retail buyer at the margin, central banks around the 717 00:43:34,927 --> 00:43:55,096 world, whether it's the concern around fiscal budget deficits 718 00:43:55,096 --> 00:44:21,988 and concern about that, that I'd say, that thesis for buying gold 719 00:44:21,988 --> 00:44:44,398 is a way to hedge the rest of the portfolio. Butagain, I suggest 720 00:42:43,961 --> 00:43:09,511 it is not done. It is done in a moderate way, that something like 721 00:43:09,511 --> 00:43:38,711 that is not more than 5% of a portfolio, that it is done in a diversified 722 00:43:38,711 --> 00:44:00,611 basket approach as opposed to the metal itself. And then when we 723 00:44:00,611 --> 00:44:20,686 go outside gold, that is in itself volatile, but also something 724 00:44:20,686 --> 00:44:44,411 like silver is far more volatile as we can see from the movements. 725 00:42:36,661 --> 00:43:09,997 Thisdefining year for metals, last year, well, it was really defined 726 00:43:09,997 --> 00:43:43,333 the beginning of this year by just how volatile those metals were. 727 00:43:43,333 --> 00:44:19,447 So again, I bet, knowing what you buy and knowing what you're getting 728 00:44:19,447 --> 00:44:44,451 into in terms of volatility, that's where that would… IthinkI'm 729 00:42:44,815 --> 00:43:14,713 quite comfortable owning, say, an equity manager that owns and some 730 00:43:14,713 --> 00:43:47,329 managers do this as part of their way to create a resilient, 731 00:43:47,329 --> 00:44:14,509 well diversified portfolio. But actual naked exposure to a commodity 732 00:44:14,509 --> 00:44:44,407 like that I think is probably too problematic for most investors. 733 00:44:45,731 --> 00:44:57,622 You've touched on kind of the long-term cycles, how they rhyme 734 00:44:57,622 --> 00:45:09,513 at times, how not, how we have these long-term trajectories for 735 00:45:09,513 --> 00:45:20,323 different asset classes and how, I guess, sentiment shifts over 736 00:45:20,323 --> 00:45:33,295 time as well. And even the regulators can, at times, on the 737 00:45:33,295 --> 00:45:43,024 pension side, encourage everybody into bonds. And it felt 738 00:45:43,024 --> 00:45:57,077 like that was of low yields. Now, the current thing is the UK 739 00:45:57,077 --> 00:46:07,887 encouraging people into private markets. In the US you have 740 00:46:07,887 --> 00:46:19,778 democratization of alts, and you wonder is this the right time 741 00:46:19,778 --> 00:46:24,102 for that as well? I'malso conscious that we've both been in 742 00:44:54,283 --> 00:45:08,180 markets for the same kind of period, three, three and a half decades. 743 00:45:08,180 --> 00:45:19,939 It's been the globalized world of equity markets. Okay, we've had 744 00:45:19,939 --> 00:45:31,698 bear markets, but, by and large, it's been a very favorable 745 00:45:31,698 --> 00:45:46,664 period that has gone on and on, and the last 15 years has been 746 00:45:46,664 --> 00:45:59,492 very favorable indeed. I mean, do you worry about that we could 747 00:45:59,492 --> 00:46:12,320 see a period, at some point, which seems hard to imagine, like 748 00:46:12,320 --> 00:46:24,079 a 15, 20 year period like 1966-82 or even the Depression? Peoplelook 749 00:44:48,131 --> 00:45:02,531 at history for these episodes and think that they are just things 750 00:45:02,531 --> 00:45:18,131 that happen in the past, won't be repeated. But as part of your 751 00:45:18,131 --> 00:45:26,531 portfolio construction process, when you're thinking about 752 00:45:26,531 --> 00:45:38,531 resilience, when you're thinking about all of that, how do 753 00:45:38,531 --> 00:45:51,731 you kind of balance that kind of perspective of staying grounded, 754 00:45:51,731 --> 00:46:07,331 don't overreact to the hype, but at the same time keep this risk 755 00:46:07,331 --> 00:46:21,731 in your mind that things might get bad beyond our expectations at 756 00:46:21,731 --> 00:46:24,131 some point? 757 00:46:24,631 --> 00:46:51,255 So, I firmly believe we need to look at the macro backdrop. We 758 00:46:51,255 --> 00:47:15,831 need to pay attention to the factors that are affecting the managers 759 00:47:15,831 --> 00:47:42,455 where we work. In terms of looking at recent, what are the key 760 00:47:42,455 --> 00:48:09,079 drivers of many market actors? We know that greed is a huge part 761 00:48:09,079 --> 00:48:33,655 of that. Looking at some of the behavioral biases that we actually 762 00:48:33,655 --> 00:48:52,087 think about are more relevant for individual clients sometimes, 763 00:48:52,087 --> 00:49:12,567 are actually very relevant at an institutional level because these 764 00:49:12,567 --> 00:49:26,903 behavioral biases are affecting the market actors. So,when 765 00:46:27,829 --> 00:46:47,017 we think about, as I said, greed, the incentives, the idea of 766 00:46:47,017 --> 00:47:07,804 recency bias - this bias that this can never happen to me, these 767 00:47:07,804 --> 00:47:25,393 are all the behavioral flaws that the financial actors, I think, 768 00:47:25,393 --> 00:47:47,779 are going to be riddled by. And we can see this in the recent 769 00:47:47,779 --> 00:48:06,967 book, 1929, where the focus was not only on the actors behind 770 00:48:06,967 --> 00:48:24,556 the crash, but also on their own kind of personality foibles, 771 00:48:24,556 --> 00:48:38,947 their insecurities, their desire. And we've seen this again 772 00:48:38,947 --> 00:48:54,937 in some of the political scandals, sort of embroiled many 773 00:48:54,937 --> 00:49:14,125 of the financial actors. These are driven by the desire to feel 774 00:49:14,125 --> 00:49:26,917 valued, the desire to feel that you belong. So,this is a little 775 00:46:36,946 --> 00:47:04,039 bit of a profound deviation into behavioral style, which I think 776 00:47:04,039 --> 00:47:38,521 is why we have to be very alert to being told what we want 777 00:47:38,521 --> 00:48:05,614 to hear as investors, because we are essentially being given a 778 00:48:05,614 --> 00:48:32,707 false assurance. So, if we can detect these false assurances, as 779 00:48:32,707 --> 00:49:04,726 investors, and be very alert to that, I think that's how we can 780 00:49:04,726 --> 00:49:26,893 let our portfolios operate without that degree of hype. Asto 781 00:46:27,829 --> 00:46:47,017 whether I am concerned about a portfolio hitting a very, very rough, 782 00:46:47,017 --> 00:47:07,804 bad patch, I don't believe we're headed to a big kind of 1929 783 00:47:07,804 --> 00:47:26,992 type depression style. I think we have now not only enough diversity 784 00:47:26,992 --> 00:47:46,180 in the underlying assets and asset classes we can invest in that 785 00:47:46,180 --> 00:48:05,368 there will be a way to generate some income with all of 786 00:48:05,368 --> 00:48:24,556 that. We know our portfolios are not all stacked on black. And, 787 00:48:24,556 --> 00:48:43,744 equally then, just in terms of the backdrop in which we operate, 788 00:48:43,744 --> 00:49:01,333 we know now, since the last crisis, that we have institutions 789 00:49:01,333 --> 00:49:20,521 that are ready, armed, and able to step in as shock absorbers 790 00:49:20,521 --> 00:49:26,917 and cushion those blows. So,I'm not confident that we will 791 00:46:58,210 --> 00:47:50,977 essentially avoid all damage and all market downturns, but I do 792 00:47:50,977 --> 00:48:43,744 believe that we have more of an orchestration behind the scenes 793 00:48:43,744 --> 00:49:26,917 to ensure that we don't hit something really devastating. Now,in 794 00:46:27,273 --> 00:46:44,446 terms of the Citrini Research, to bring that up, in terms of whether 795 00:46:44,446 --> 00:46:58,977 there could be that kind of a dystopian development, again, I'm 796 00:46:58,977 --> 00:47:16,150 not a believer in extremes and not a believer in doom cycles or 797 00:47:16,150 --> 00:47:29,360 in extreme positive or extreme negative. I think, actually, the 798 00:47:29,360 --> 00:47:46,533 hundreds of podcasts I've sat on the other side of the mic have 799 00:47:46,533 --> 00:48:02,385 really instilled that in me. Is just that real diversity of human 800 00:48:02,385 --> 00:48:16,916 experience, the diversity of highs and lows, the fact that they 801 00:48:16,916 --> 00:48:32,768 happen to everyone. That type of a normalization of a life, that 802 00:48:32,768 --> 00:48:53,904 is made up of highs and lows, has led me to be a lot more middle 803 00:48:53,904 --> 00:49:11,077 of the road, I suppose, in terms of how I see outcomes. And 804 00:49:11,077 --> 00:49:26,929 that's why a portfolio, I just tend not to get carried away. 805 00:49:28,141 --> 00:49:36,025 Yeah, fair enough. I mean, you touched on kind of behavioral challenges. 806 00:49:36,025 --> 00:49:43,252 You touched on kind of how various assets and strategies are 807 00:49:43,252 --> 00:49:47,194 represented and misrepresented. And obviously, if 808 00:49:47,194 --> 00:49:53,107 you're building portfolios, the asset allocation is only one 809 00:49:53,107 --> 00:50:00,991 part of the equation. Then you have to either buy securities or 810 00:50:00,991 --> 00:50:03,619 allocate to external managers. AndI know you had your own advisory 811 00:49:34,893 --> 00:49:42,489 business, earlier in your career, focused on manager selection, 812 00:49:42,489 --> 00:49:53,461 manager analysis. I mean, what do you think are the key, you know, 813 00:49:53,461 --> 00:50:00,213 challenges, behavioral challenges, I guess, when it comes 814 00:50:00,213 --> 00:50:03,589 to selecting external managers? 815 00:50:06,021 --> 00:50:25,807 Clearly, one has to look at all the usual metrics in terms of 816 00:50:25,807 --> 00:50:39,505 performance and analyze that. The key behavioral challenge with 817 00:50:39,505 --> 00:50:57,769 the manager is that one falls in love with the manager, metaphorically 818 00:50:57,769 --> 00:51:14,511 speaking, and doesn't want to… it's difficult to fire that manager. 819 00:51:14,511 --> 00:51:34,297 And that is, I think we know, well reported, is that it's easy, 820 00:51:34,297 --> 00:51:49,517 the hiring. It's the actual termination that is the challenging 821 00:51:49,517 --> 00:51:51,039 piece. Whetherthat's a desire or not to crystallize a loss, or 822 00:50:25,942 --> 00:50:47,674 to admit you were wrong, or just to have that conflict because 823 00:50:47,674 --> 00:51:03,973 there is some conflict inherent in a termination discussion. 824 00:51:03,973 --> 00:51:31,138 I'd say that that is a muscle that you build over time. And I think 825 00:51:31,138 --> 00:51:51,059 it's never easy. No one ever likes to be that manager. Butequally, 826 00:50:10,309 --> 00:50:33,893 if there is better dialogue from that manager from the outset, 827 00:50:33,893 --> 00:51:01,765 hopefully it won't come as such a shock if these kind of things 828 00:51:01,765 --> 00:51:23,205 are not cliff edge type divestitures, but they really are 829 00:51:23,205 --> 00:51:48,933 telegraphed well over time. So, I say that is the one behavioral 830 00:51:48,933 --> 00:51:51,077 side. Andanother thing is just not necessarily doing that piggybacking, 831 00:50:20,211 --> 00:50:32,982 which is, again, another dangerous behavioral thing, is believing 832 00:50:32,982 --> 00:50:51,429 that some other peer of yours has done the due diligence for you. 833 00:50:51,429 --> 00:51:08,457 When I started my consulting career, it was around about the time 834 00:51:08,457 --> 00:51:25,485 of Madoff, and actually I was the beneficiary of some quite broken, 835 00:51:25,485 --> 00:51:39,675 damaged portfolios that had been damaged by exposure to Madoff. 836 00:51:39,675 --> 00:51:51,027 And we were then charged with rehabilitating that. So,I suppose, 837 00:50:10,062 --> 00:50:27,573 in a kind of odd way, it became a winning strategy for me 838 00:50:27,573 --> 00:50:43,737 to kind of swoop in and help to repair portfolios. But clearly, 839 00:50:43,737 --> 00:50:58,554 the Madoff's problem was a piggybacking problem. It was a slipshod 840 00:50:58,554 --> 00:51:14,718 due diligence on the part of allocators. And that kind of slipshod 841 00:51:14,718 --> 00:51:26,841 due diligence is happening everywhere, not just by allocators, 842 00:51:26,841 --> 00:51:38,964 but particularly in the private credit sector. And that's 843 00:51:38,964 --> 00:51:51,087 where we're seeing the cockroaches emerge, as we're seeing. 844 00:51:51,731 --> 00:51:56,197 Yeah, interesting. I mean, it feels like the due diligence processes, 845 00:51:56,197 --> 00:52:00,257 the RFPs, they've become lengthier and lengthier, but at the 846 00:52:00,257 --> 00:52:05,535 same time, is it just… People still make errors or things get through. 847 00:52:05,535 --> 00:52:10,001 Is it just people ticking boxes, or processes are too rigid, 848 00:52:10,001 --> 00:52:15,279 or how do you kind of reconcile what seems to be even lengthier 849 00:52:15,279 --> 00:52:18,933 due diligence processes, but maybe delivering less true insight? 850 00:52:20,171 --> 00:52:46,230 It's interesting. It's maybe because I studied as a lawyer, but 851 00:52:46,230 --> 00:53:17,027 we in law, you have a case law, you'll always have the case 852 00:53:17,027 --> 00:53:45,455 note at the beginning, which will kind of shorten kind of the 853 00:53:45,455 --> 00:54:11,514 executive summary. Tell me what the bottom line is up front. 854 00:54:11,514 --> 00:54:44,680 Tell me what I need to know. And that has been, always, my preferred 855 00:54:44,680 --> 00:54:51,841 approach to communication. Ihavean aversion to data dumps which 856 00:52:43,059 --> 00:53:14,530 are perhaps decided to maybe provide security or to provide cover 857 00:53:14,530 --> 00:53:40,279 for recommendations, but ultimately tell us nothing at all. 858 00:53:40,279 --> 00:54:17,472 I also have an aversion to macro analysis that is kind of theoretical 859 00:54:17,472 --> 00:54:51,804 and academic in nature and has no actual relation to the portfolio. 860 00:52:20,171 --> 00:54:51,841 Ialwaysask the question, well, so what? You've told me all 861 00:52:35,087 --> 00:52:52,489 this, so what does that mean for my portfolio? Do I have too much 862 00:52:52,489 --> 00:53:08,648 US dollar exposure? Should I reduce that? Do I need to pivot towards 863 00:53:08,648 --> 00:53:19,835 more income, towards more inflation protection? This is the 864 00:53:19,835 --> 00:53:37,237 ‘so what’ that needs to be done. So, when it comes to due diligence, 865 00:53:37,237 --> 00:53:52,153 RFPs, I agree, I think that is getting completely out of control. 866 00:53:52,153 --> 00:54:07,069 Just as board packs equally have gotten out of control and taken 867 00:54:07,069 --> 00:54:24,471 on a life of their own as they reach the hundreds of pages. Ultimately 868 00:54:24,471 --> 00:54:41,873 this is now, with AI, probably going to get even worse. AI is generating 869 00:54:41,873 --> 00:54:51,817 the RFPs. AI is probably reading the RFPs. So,we're going 870 00:52:24,092 --> 00:52:37,162 to be in this loop of boilerplate to boilerplate, algorithm 871 00:52:37,162 --> 00:52:51,539 to algorithm, with no actual human in the loop, suggesting that 872 00:52:51,539 --> 00:53:11,144 maybe this is not exactly what I need to know. What I used to do 873 00:53:11,144 --> 00:53:28,135 at Chicago Police, as CIO, is I would create the RFPs with kind 874 00:53:28,135 --> 00:53:42,512 of, I wouldn't say they're Easter eggs hidden, but they were 875 00:53:42,512 --> 00:53:59,503 at least questions in the RFP that was very specific to our own 876 00:53:59,503 --> 00:54:13,880 situation because we had a fairly unique situation with a very 877 00:54:13,880 --> 00:54:28,257 low funding, poor cash flow situation there. I would say, well, 878 00:54:28,257 --> 00:54:45,248 how can we… Looking at the rest of our portfolio, why does your 879 00:54:45,248 --> 00:54:51,783 solution fit this in particular? Andthat I think was 880 00:52:26,761 --> 00:52:43,895 kind of a great way for me to separate wheat from chaff, because 881 00:52:43,895 --> 00:53:01,029 so few RFPs ever answered that question. Or if they did answer it, 882 00:53:01,029 --> 00:53:15,527 it was answered with more boilerplate. So, just a that little 883 00:53:15,527 --> 00:53:28,707 bit of effort upfront to actually address the client's actual 884 00:53:28,707 --> 00:53:47,159 problem, I think is probably just a little bit of a hint as to 885 00:53:47,159 --> 00:54:01,657 how to get through that process. But equally, and this is 886 00:54:01,657 --> 00:54:18,791 an issue for finding a job, it's an issue for finding a manager, 887 00:54:18,791 --> 00:54:33,289 the problem now with volume and with sifting through the volume. 888 00:54:33,289 --> 00:54:46,469 How is that going to be circumvented? Through building networks 889 00:54:46,469 --> 00:54:51,741 and cultivating that network. Ifyou're a manager with an allocator, 890 00:52:45,448 --> 00:53:25,169 way before you know what that allocator needs, and really being 891 00:53:25,169 --> 00:53:54,057 sensitive to solving that allocator's problem, making their 892 00:53:54,057 --> 00:54:33,778 life easier, making their job easier, and getting them to where 893 00:54:33,778 --> 00:54:51,833 they need to get to. 894 00:54:53,792 --> 00:55:04,432 Just before we wrap up and get towards the end, I wanted to get 895 00:55:04,432 --> 00:55:10,512 your perspective on kind of decision-making processes because 896 00:55:10,512 --> 00:55:19,632 I know you mentioned being the sole investment person in your own 897 00:55:19,632 --> 00:55:27,992 in Chicago, which makes things quite easy in some senses. There's 898 00:55:27,992 --> 00:55:33,312 no endless, I guess, debate and committees. Butequally you've 899 00:54:56,072 --> 00:55:04,432 been part of much bigger organizations and now, I guess, you 900 00:55:04,432 --> 00:55:11,272 observe how individual investors as well, or family offices 901 00:55:11,272 --> 00:55:18,872 and make decisions. I mean, what's the best optimal investment 902 00:55:18,872 --> 00:55:25,712 process, do you think, that harnesses collective wisdom, but 903 00:55:25,712 --> 00:55:33,312 kind of doesn't allow for a kind of group think? 904 00:55:34,352 --> 00:55:48,312 I suppose I would come back to investment committee construction 905 00:55:48,312 --> 00:56:02,272 and pension fund committee construction when it comes to decision 906 00:56:02,272 --> 00:56:16,232 making because that ultimately, if you have a well diversified, 907 00:56:16,232 --> 00:56:28,796 well trained committee, that will hopefully avoid groupthink in 908 00:56:28,796 --> 00:56:45,548 that case. I do think, when it comes to investment teams, having 909 00:56:45,548 --> 00:57:00,904 teams that have cycled through different areas and are not necessarily 910 00:57:00,904 --> 00:57:06,542 wedded to their own. Ithinklateral thinking is a great 911 00:55:40,673 --> 00:55:49,703 skill. That is where we will ultimately overcome the machines 912 00:55:49,703 --> 00:55:59,636 is with our ability to draw connections, to be creative. That's 913 00:55:59,636 --> 00:56:07,763 again, something that law really teaches you because you're 914 00:56:07,763 --> 00:56:15,890 applying case law in a different but analogous situation. 915 00:56:15,890 --> 00:56:25,823 So, you're not necessarily getting exactly the same set of facts. 916 00:56:25,823 --> 00:56:36,659 So, the ability, and this gets to, again, looking beneath the hood 917 00:56:36,659 --> 00:56:45,689 of strategies and finding, well, what is really driving that 918 00:56:45,689 --> 00:56:55,622 strategy. That is a form of lateral thinking because you may 919 00:56:55,622 --> 00:57:04,652 have to combine two disciplines in getting to the root 920 00:57:04,652 --> 00:57:06,458 of that. So,that decision making is key. Having the tools I 921 00:55:41,902 --> 00:55:50,207 mentioned before, around the ability to verify, to test your decisions. 922 00:55:50,207 --> 00:55:59,267 Somebody I love, who does this, Mark Steed. He's the CIO at 923 00:55:59,267 --> 00:56:06,062 the Arizona Public Fund Employees Scheme. He's been there 924 00:56:06,062 --> 00:56:15,122 for many years. He is a great, innovative thinker when it comes 925 00:56:15,122 --> 00:56:24,182 to getting his team to learn how to be better forecasters because 926 00:56:24,182 --> 00:56:31,732 he actually gathers, collates their forecasts, and then will go 927 00:56:31,732 --> 00:56:42,302 back to them at the end of a period with the outcomes and get 928 00:56:42,302 --> 00:56:51,362 them to verify whether those forecasts came to bed. I think that 929 00:56:51,362 --> 00:57:01,177 is the kind of training of that muscle so that we ensure that 930 00:57:01,177 --> 00:57:06,462 we become better risk takers, better forecasters. 931 00:57:07,742 --> 00:57:11,618 Very good. Well, we always like to ask our guests, before we 932 00:57:11,618 --> 00:57:14,848 wrap up, about their, I suppose, advice for people coming 933 00:57:14,848 --> 00:57:18,401 into investing and into the markets. Obviously, you had a background 934 00:57:18,401 --> 00:57:22,600 in law before you moved into doing an MBA and then into markets, 935 00:57:22,600 --> 00:57:25,830 which by all accounts, listening to you today, it feels 936 00:57:25,830 --> 00:57:30,675 like you feel the benefit of it. But if you were to kind of advise 937 00:57:30,675 --> 00:57:34,551 people who are starting off in their careers about things to do, 938 00:57:34,551 --> 00:57:36,812 things to read, what would it be? 939 00:57:37,872 --> 00:57:45,192 Well, first of all, don't overlook just how absolutely fascinating 940 00:57:45,192 --> 00:57:53,976 this field is. It is always changing. It is affecting our lives 941 00:57:53,976 --> 00:58:04,224 day to day, the prices we pay, the taxes we pay, and affecting the 942 00:58:04,224 --> 00:58:12,276 worries that we bear when we think about the current geopolitical 943 00:58:12,276 --> 00:58:20,328 scene. This is exercising every aspect of our life, and finance 944 00:58:20,328 --> 00:58:29,844 touches all of this. So, I'd say, you know, first of all, realize 945 00:58:29,844 --> 00:58:38,628 what you're missing if you don't know about it. And I think 946 00:58:38,628 --> 00:58:48,876 I didn't know about it as a law student. It didn't touch my life. 947 00:58:48,876 --> 00:58:57,660 It only entered my life when I started working in the corporate 948 00:58:57,660 --> 00:58:59,124 law field. So,anyone who's already kind of got onto that bandwagon 949 00:57:46,072 --> 00:57:55,092 and realized how interesting it is… I'd say keep reading, keep 950 00:57:55,092 --> 00:58:04,932 creating. And if you can't find a way to express yourself, find 951 00:58:04,932 --> 00:58:16,412 a way. Start a blog. Start a video platform. Find a way to develop 952 00:58:16,412 --> 00:58:25,432 your own voice in this respect, because there will be many 953 00:58:25,432 --> 00:58:36,092 jobs you do where no one cares about that voice. And that's fine 954 00:58:36,092 --> 00:58:45,932 because that is a necessary rite of passage, I'd say, in finance 955 00:58:45,932 --> 00:58:55,772 to go through the hoops of learning the skills and being an 956 00:58:55,772 --> 00:58:59,052 apprentice, learning from elsewhere. Butdo develop that voice 957 00:57:44,997 --> 00:58:03,522 too, because there will come a time when that voice will be needed 958 00:58:03,522 --> 00:58:23,472 in terms of you leading a unit, or you having to get on CNBC, 959 00:58:23,472 --> 00:58:40,572 or you being asked to do something, and you should be the 960 00:58:40,572 --> 00:58:57,672 person that can say yes to that because you have something to 961 00:58:57,672 --> 00:58:59,097 say. 962 00:58:59,782 --> 00:59:03,610 Very good. Well, you mentioned CNBC. I know you appear there from 963 00:59:03,610 --> 00:59:07,757 time to time so people can follow your work at Monetta and I 964 00:59:07,757 --> 00:59:11,585 guess on CNBC. And obviously you have your own 50 Faces podcast 965 00:59:11,585 --> 00:59:15,413 as well. So, Aoifinn, thanks very much for coming on today. It's 966 00:59:15,413 --> 00:59:19,879 been great speaking to you and from all of us here at Top Traders 967 00:59:19,879 --> 00:59:23,069 Unplugged, stay tuned for more content. We'll be back soon. 968 00:59:24,482 --> 00:59:27,386 Thanks for listening to Top Traders Unplugged. If you feel you 969 00:59:27,386 --> 00:59:30,026 learned something of value from today's episode, the best way 970 00:59:30,026 --> 00:59:33,722 to stay updated is to go on over to iTunes and subscribe to the 971 00:59:33,722 --> 00:59:37,418 show so that you'll be sure to get all the new episodes as they're 972 00:59:37,418 --> 00:59:40,850 released. We have some amazing guests lined up for you, and to ensure 973 00:59:40,850 --> 00:59:43,754 our show continues to grow, please leave us an honest rating 974 00:59:43,754 --> 00:59:47,186 and review in iTunes. It only takes a minute, and it's the best 975 00:59:47,186 --> 00:59:50,618 way to show us you love the podcast. We'll see you next time 976 00:59:50,618 --> 00:59:51,674 on Top Traders Unplugged.