1 00:00:01,440 --> 00:00:06,634 That's the kind of shock that reminds me of some of the past energy 2 00:00:06,634 --> 00:00:10,715 supply shocks, or some steel shocks, or cotton, on these essential 3 00:00:10,715 --> 00:00:14,054 products, the supply disruption of which can really have 4 00:00:14,054 --> 00:00:17,022 spillover effects into other parts of the economy. 5 00:00:20,480 --> 00:00:31,496 Welcome to Top Traders Unplugged. In markets success doesn’t 6 00:00:31,496 --> 00:00:43,736 come from predicting what happens next, it comes from being 7 00:00:43,736 --> 00:00:51,080 prepared for what you can’t predict. In each episode we go deep 8 00:00:23,702 --> 00:00:29,609 with some of the world’s most thoughtful minds in investing, economics, 9 00:00:29,609 --> 00:00:35,516 and beyond to understand how they think, how they prepare, and 10 00:00:35,516 --> 00:00:40,886 how they decide, and the experiences that shaped how they 11 00:00:40,886 --> 00:00:46,256 see the world. No noise, no short-cuts, just real conversations 12 00:00:46,256 --> 00:00:51,089 to help you think better and invest with confidence. 13 00:00:53,820 --> 00:01:03,920 Welcome, everyone, to Top Traders Unplugged. My name is Kevin 14 00:01:03,920 --> 00:01:17,050 Coldiron, and I'm host of the Ideas Lab series where we talk with 15 00:01:17,050 --> 00:01:28,160 authors of new books that help us understand the global economy. 16 00:01:28,160 --> 00:01:39,270 Okay, so think about these ideas. Economic busts do not follow 17 00:01:39,270 --> 00:01:49,370 economic booms. Economic expansions do not simply die of old 18 00:01:49,370 --> 00:01:59,470 age. And recessions don't cleanse the system of previous excess. 19 00:00:53,820 --> 00:01:12,070 If you find those ideas surprising, well, stay tuned because 20 00:01:12,070 --> 00:01:32,145 our guest today is going to explain why, after studying four 21 00:01:32,145 --> 00:01:50,395 centuries of data, he believes all those conclusions are correct. 22 00:01:50,395 --> 00:01:59,520 Our guest is Tyler Goodspeed. Tyler is the Chief Economist of ExxonMobil, 23 00:01:04,040 --> 00:01:20,100 and previously he chaired the Council of Economic Advisors in the 24 00:01:20,100 --> 00:01:34,700 first Trump administration. And he's joining us today to talk 25 00:01:34,700 --> 00:01:47,840 about his fascinating new book, Recession: The Real Reasons 26 00:01:47,840 --> 00:01:59,520 Economies Shrink and What to Do About It. Tyler, thanks for joining 27 00:01:20,100 --> 00:01:59,520 us and welcome to the show. 28 00:02:00,160 --> 00:02:01,600 Thanks. Great to be with you, Kevin. 29 00:02:02,560 --> 00:02:07,656 Okay, so I want to start off with a couple just sort of background 30 00:02:07,656 --> 00:02:11,296 questions. I mean, in the book, you work through explanations 31 00:02:11,296 --> 00:02:15,300 for what causes recessions. You explain the logic, and then you 32 00:02:15,300 --> 00:02:18,576 provide evidence to show mostly that the explanations we've 33 00:02:18,576 --> 00:02:23,308 been given don't work. But I guess my question is, did you go 34 00:02:23,308 --> 00:02:27,312 into the project thinking, hey, I really would like to just 35 00:02:27,312 --> 00:02:30,952 kind of systematically go through and test all these ideas 36 00:02:30,952 --> 00:02:36,048 and see if they really hold, or was it more, I don't think these 37 00:02:36,048 --> 00:02:40,780 ideas are correct based on my own work and my own experience, and 38 00:02:40,780 --> 00:02:45,512 I want to provide a way to convince others that that's the case? 39 00:02:47,290 --> 00:03:03,108 So, part of me had a contrarian motivation but, to be 40 00:03:03,108 --> 00:03:20,364 honest, when I first started the project, it was in the aftermath 41 00:03:20,364 --> 00:03:36,182 of the 2020 pandemic recession that we'd all just experienced, which 42 00:03:36,182 --> 00:03:50,562 was one of the sharpest, deepest, albeit also shortest recessions 43 00:03:50,562 --> 00:04:07,818 in US and, indeed, UK history. And I began the project thinking 44 00:04:07,818 --> 00:04:13,570 that recession was unique. That unlike in, say, 2008, this was 45 00:03:03,187 --> 00:03:32,710 sort of the narrative in my mind. Unlike in 2008, there had been 46 00:03:32,710 --> 00:03:57,691 no great excess, no imbalance, no misallocation that needed to be 47 00:03:57,691 --> 00:04:13,588 remedied. This was a purely exogenous shock. And as I got further 48 00:02:51,690 --> 00:03:02,250 into the project, the more I realized that while the 2020 pandemic 49 00:03:02,250 --> 00:03:11,050 recession (like, in fact, every recession) was unique, it actually 50 00:03:11,050 --> 00:03:19,850 wasn't as dissimilar as I thought. Because when I extended 51 00:03:19,850 --> 00:03:31,290 the sample, so to speak, from not just the United States, but also 52 00:03:31,290 --> 00:03:40,970 to the United Kingdom, and extended the sample back in time 53 00:03:40,970 --> 00:03:51,530 all the way to 1700, the more I realized that actually, typically, 54 00:03:51,530 --> 00:04:03,850 there is no error or excess or misallocation at the end of an economic 55 00:04:03,850 --> 00:04:12,650 expansion to which recession is the inevitable or even necessary 56 00:04:12,650 --> 00:04:13,530 remedy. 57 00:04:14,590 --> 00:04:19,210 Okay, so you were… I guess you kind of… Did you start the project 58 00:04:19,210 --> 00:04:23,500 with an idea that you were going to do that level of historic 59 00:04:23,500 --> 00:04:27,130 research, or was it really more initially focused on what happened 60 00:04:27,130 --> 00:04:30,430 during the pandemic and then you kind of expanded it? 61 00:04:32,270 --> 00:04:36,866 It started with a set of questions to which I realized the 62 00:04:36,866 --> 00:04:41,079 12 US recessions, since 1945, were inadequate to the task because 63 00:04:41,079 --> 00:04:44,909 most analysis of economic recessions is confined to the 12 64 00:04:44,909 --> 00:04:49,505 US recessions since 1945, for the simple reason that it was only 65 00:04:49,505 --> 00:04:53,335 after about 1947 that the relevant data became readily available 66 00:04:53,335 --> 00:04:57,165 at quarterly or monthly frequency. But the reality is, you 67 00:04:57,165 --> 00:05:01,378 think that with quarterly or monthly data, you have all these 68 00:05:01,378 --> 00:05:04,825 statistical degrees of freedom, but you really only have 69 00:05:04,825 --> 00:05:09,421 12. And not to sound too much like an econometrician, but with 70 00:05:09,421 --> 00:05:12,868 the slope and intercepts, you've already chewed through two 71 00:05:12,868 --> 00:05:14,783 of those degrees of freedom. 72 00:05:15,570 --> 00:05:19,494 Yeah, that was going to be my second question, really, which is 73 00:05:19,494 --> 00:05:22,764 the research challenges seem pretty tricky to me. Right? Because 74 00:05:22,764 --> 00:05:27,669 as you say, the sample size is small. If we go back to 1970s, there's 75 00:05:27,669 --> 00:05:31,920 only been five recessions in the US in over half a century. And 76 00:05:31,920 --> 00:05:35,190 you mentioned the famous Tolstoy quote, right? All happy families 77 00:05:35,190 --> 00:05:39,114 are alike, but each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way. 78 00:05:39,114 --> 00:05:43,038 And your take is that, well, each recession is unhappy in its 79 00:05:43,038 --> 00:05:46,962 own way. So, those are pretty big challenges to me. Right? One, 80 00:05:46,962 --> 00:05:50,886 you don't have that many data points. There's not that many recessions 81 00:05:50,886 --> 00:05:55,464 to look at. And all the data points you have, or the data points 82 00:05:55,464 --> 00:05:59,388 that you do have, seem really different. So, could you just sort 83 00:05:59,388 --> 00:06:03,312 of elaborate a little bit on how you thought about dealing with 84 00:06:03,312 --> 00:06:04,620 those problems, those challenges? 85 00:06:05,130 --> 00:06:14,633 So, one of the ways I dealt with the challenge was to simply 86 00:06:14,633 --> 00:06:21,212 extend the standard recession chronology for the United States 87 00:06:21,212 --> 00:06:29,984 back in time all the way to 1700. So, fortunately, the National 88 00:06:29,984 --> 00:06:37,294 Bureau of Economic Research has a series at quarterly frequency 89 00:06:37,294 --> 00:06:46,797 going back to 1854 and then an annual frequency back to 1790. Other 90 00:06:46,797 --> 00:06:52,645 scholars, your colleague at Berkeley, Christina Romer, Davis, 91 00:06:52,645 --> 00:06:59,224 did a very good alternative recession chronology because the 92 00:06:59,224 --> 00:07:07,265 NBER series tends to overstate the frequency and duration of pre-1927 93 00:07:07,265 --> 00:07:17,499 US recessions. And then I did a lot of work to extend the chronology 94 00:07:17,499 --> 00:07:22,616 back to 1700 using Colonial American statistics. And then also 95 00:06:08,652 --> 00:06:21,566 I extended the sample across the Atlantic to the United Kingdom. 96 00:06:21,566 --> 00:06:35,654 And what's interesting there is that here you have two very large 97 00:06:35,654 --> 00:06:46,220 advanced economies that have long been deeply financially and 98 00:06:46,220 --> 00:06:54,438 economically integrated, similar legal institutions. And yet 99 00:06:54,438 --> 00:07:06,178 when I compared the two, despite all those similarities, despite 100 00:07:06,178 --> 00:07:15,570 that integration, they've actually had very dissimilar recessionary 101 00:07:15,570 --> 00:07:22,614 experiences over the past 200 years. 102 00:07:23,610 --> 00:07:44,358 Yeah, that was surprising to me how the level of correlation between 103 00:07:44,358 --> 00:08:05,106 the timings and the length of the recessions in those two economies. 104 00:08:05,106 --> 00:08:25,854 And maybe we can talk more about that as we go along. So really 105 00:07:26,050 --> 00:07:43,130 what you are doing in the book is each chapter is kind of starting 106 00:07:43,130 --> 00:07:56,550 off with an explanation for what causes recessions or the drivers, 107 00:07:56,550 --> 00:08:08,750 the reasons we experience recessions. And then you say, okay, 108 00:08:08,750 --> 00:08:25,830 well, let's take a look at the data and see if that holds up. And 109 00:07:24,474 --> 00:07:33,978 the first idea that you test is pretty straightforward. It's really, 110 00:07:33,978 --> 00:07:41,754 does the duration of an economic expansion influence the 111 00:07:41,754 --> 00:07:51,258 chances of recession and its severity? And you say that you're 112 00:07:51,258 --> 00:08:00,762 testing kind of a Dorian Gray explanation versus Peter Pan. So, 113 00:08:00,762 --> 00:08:09,402 I know those are pretty technical terms. Maybe you could 114 00:08:09,402 --> 00:08:21,498 just explain what you mean by them and then tell us what you found 115 00:08:21,498 --> 00:08:25,818 when you looked at that. 116 00:08:26,930 --> 00:08:36,930 Yeah, so under the boom/bust view of economic fluctuations, we 117 00:08:36,930 --> 00:08:47,930 should expect to observe that as economic expansions age, the imbalances, 118 00:08:47,930 --> 00:08:54,930 the excesses, the misallocations, accumulate such that 119 00:08:54,930 --> 00:09:03,930 the probability that the expansion dies in recession increases 120 00:09:03,930 --> 00:09:17,930 the longer it's been going on. And what I find, using the 132 recessions 121 00:09:17,930 --> 00:09:31,930 in my sample, both UK and US recessions, what I find is that actually 122 00:09:31,930 --> 00:09:43,930 economic expansions have never died of old age on either side of 123 00:09:43,930 --> 00:09:54,930 the Atlantic either before or after 1945. And the literary analogies 124 00:09:54,930 --> 00:10:08,930 I compare this to are Peter Pan. So, Peter Pan, as we know, he 125 00:10:08,930 --> 00:10:22,930 never grows old, but he can die. And if he loses a battle with 126 00:10:22,930 --> 00:10:27,930 Captain Hook, he will die. In another view of economic fluctuations 127 00:08:35,786 --> 00:08:53,498 is what I describe as the picture of Dorian Gray, that while 128 00:08:53,498 --> 00:09:09,734 Dorian Gray the person seems to be eternally youthful, to all 129 00:09:09,734 --> 00:09:24,494 outward appearances everything is fine, hidden away in an attic. 130 00:09:24,494 --> 00:09:40,730 The picture of Dorian Gray bears all the blemishes and disfigurements 131 00:09:40,730 --> 00:09:56,966 of each hedonistic excess until the whole rotten item can only 132 00:09:56,966 --> 00:10:13,202 be restored to its youthful beauty by execution at the hands 133 00:10:13,202 --> 00:10:27,962 of a very instrument of one of those hedonistic excesses. So, the 134 00:08:32,194 --> 00:09:01,146 picture of Dorian Gray view of economic fluctuations is very much 135 00:09:01,146 --> 00:09:30,098 in keeping with the boom/bust view, whereas the Peter Pan view 136 00:09:30,098 --> 00:09:56,418 of economic fluctuations is in keeping with, no, sometimes these 137 00:09:56,418 --> 00:10:22,738 expansions that never grow old, just history or misfortune happens 138 00:10:22,738 --> 00:10:28,002 upon them. 139 00:10:30,570 --> 00:10:37,230 Tell us how you went about examining that and drawing the conclusions 140 00:10:37,230 --> 00:10:44,445 that in the end it's really the Peter Pan view that's more correct. 141 00:10:44,460 --> 00:10:58,150 Yeah. So, there are statistical tools that you can use 142 00:10:58,150 --> 00:11:15,947 to estimate the probability of death as a function of the age of 143 00:11:15,947 --> 00:11:29,637 an economic expansion. And, statistically, I found that an economic 144 00:11:29,637 --> 00:11:46,065 expansion on either side of the Atlantic is no more likely to 145 00:11:46,065 --> 00:12:02,493 die in its 10th year as in its first or second year. Now, some earlier 146 00:10:47,460 --> 00:10:57,460 researchers in the 1990s, Diebold and Rudebusch, did find that 147 00:10:57,460 --> 00:11:08,460 already and confirmed that already. But they seem to find that 148 00:11:08,460 --> 00:11:19,460 the same was not true of pre-1945 US expansions, that earlier 149 00:11:19,460 --> 00:11:32,460 expansions seemed to die of old age. But when I used the improved 150 00:11:32,460 --> 00:11:42,460 recession chronologies at Davis and Romer, I found that, in 151 00:11:42,460 --> 00:11:53,460 fact, US economic expansions have never died of old age. And, 152 00:11:53,460 --> 00:12:02,460 indeed, the same is true for the United Kingdom. But what is interesting 153 00:10:49,336 --> 00:11:02,745 is that the same is not true of recessions. So, statistically, 154 00:11:02,745 --> 00:11:18,592 recessions do die of old age and always have. And in fact, the 155 00:11:18,592 --> 00:11:32,001 single strongest predictor of whether a recession is going to end 156 00:11:32,001 --> 00:11:49,067 in the next quarter or the next year is simply how old the recession 157 00:11:49,067 --> 00:12:02,476 is. And that is true both since 1945 and before 1945. 158 00:12:04,691 --> 00:12:13,268 Yeah, that's interesting. I mean, there's pretty clear differences 159 00:12:13,268 --> 00:12:23,751 in terms of returns to say, equities and bonds and recessions 160 00:12:23,751 --> 00:12:37,093 and in expansions. And so, it struck me that we spent a lot of 161 00:12:37,093 --> 00:12:49,482 time kind of trying to predict whether you're going to go from expansion 162 00:12:49,482 --> 00:13:01,871 to a recession, but maybe the juice is really, once you're in recession, 163 00:13:01,871 --> 00:13:15,213 to build a model of when you're going to get out of it. Although 164 00:13:15,213 --> 00:13:25,696 again, the number of data points there is pretty small, so 165 00:13:25,696 --> 00:13:38,085 it might not be that useful. (That's not part of your book. That's 166 00:13:38,085 --> 00:13:47,615 me just kind of thinking with my investor hat on.) But let's talk 167 00:12:07,028 --> 00:12:15,597 about… So, that's one idea that you tested. And then there's 168 00:12:15,597 --> 00:12:23,387 multiple other ones. Chapter three and chapter four were similar 169 00:12:23,387 --> 00:12:34,293 in that you're kind of looking at, I guess what I would call, an 170 00:12:34,293 --> 00:12:43,641 over investment story. In the one case that you're sort of looking, 171 00:12:43,641 --> 00:12:50,652 I think in particular, at infrastructure investment like railroads, 172 00:12:50,652 --> 00:12:59,221 and in another, you're looking at building stock. And again, the 173 00:12:59,221 --> 00:13:07,011 idea is that you get, essentially, too much capital invested 174 00:13:07,011 --> 00:13:15,580 either in, like I said, in infrastructure or in buildings. And 175 00:13:15,580 --> 00:13:24,149 that leads, eventually, to a big correction. So, you get this 176 00:13:24,149 --> 00:13:33,497 kind of oscillation above and below trend. And tell us about why 177 00:13:33,497 --> 00:13:42,066 you wanted to test those ideas, why you thought they were 178 00:13:42,066 --> 00:13:47,519 important to test, and what you found. 179 00:13:49,561 --> 00:14:13,332 One of the most common features of the boom/bust view of 180 00:14:13,332 --> 00:14:32,781 economic fluctuations is that there's information in the height 181 00:14:32,781 --> 00:14:56,552 of an economic expansion that can tell you something about the 182 00:14:56,552 --> 00:15:18,162 probability and the depth of the subsequent recession. And so, 183 00:15:18,162 --> 00:15:41,933 height can be measured in different ways. One could be just 184 00:15:41,933 --> 00:16:03,543 a cumulative increase in, say, GDP, or consumption, or investment, 185 00:16:03,543 --> 00:16:10,026 or bank lending. It can also be a physical measure. There are 186 00:14:04,258 --> 00:14:17,322 some who suggest that skyscraper records, new skyscraper 187 00:14:17,322 --> 00:14:33,652 height records tend to correlate with the onset of deep 188 00:14:33,652 --> 00:14:51,615 recessions. And so, I test, in these chapters, whether higher, faster, 189 00:14:51,615 --> 00:15:04,679 longer economic expansions precede deeper, faster, longer economic 190 00:15:04,679 --> 00:15:24,275 recessions. And the answer is no. There is simply nothing, no informational 191 00:15:24,275 --> 00:15:42,238 content in the height, speed or duration of an economic expansion 192 00:15:42,238 --> 00:15:58,568 that can tell you anything about the depth, speed, duration 193 00:15:58,568 --> 00:16:09,999 or even probability of the subsequent recession. And that finding 194 00:13:54,241 --> 00:14:09,841 is consistent with an older model of economic fluctuations that 195 00:14:09,841 --> 00:14:20,761 contrasts to that oscillationist view you described, 196 00:14:20,761 --> 00:14:36,361 that economic fluctuations are not about an economy rising above 197 00:14:36,361 --> 00:14:50,401 trend or rising above potential, and then enduring the 198 00:14:50,401 --> 00:15:01,321 inevitable correction, the negative deviation that corrects 199 00:15:01,321 --> 00:15:15,361 for that. Rather, economic fluctuations are about an economy 200 00:15:15,361 --> 00:15:32,521 that's growing pretty close to its potential, pretty close to its 201 00:15:32,521 --> 00:15:49,681 long run trend, and then it endures adverse shocks. It temporarily 202 00:15:49,681 --> 00:16:02,161 deviates from trend, negatively deviates from trend, and 203 00:16:02,161 --> 00:16:09,961 then recovers back to trend. And so, while there's nothing in 204 00:13:59,137 --> 00:14:16,693 the height, the speed or the duration of an economic expansion 205 00:14:16,693 --> 00:14:34,249 that can tell you anything about the depth, speed or duration 206 00:14:34,249 --> 00:14:50,209 of the subsequent recession, there is information in the depth 207 00:14:50,209 --> 00:15:09,361 and speed of a recession that can predict the height and speed 208 00:15:09,361 --> 00:15:26,917 of the subsequent recovery. So, as I put it, economic expansions 209 00:15:26,917 --> 00:15:46,069 adhere to Newton's third law of motion, that to every action there's 210 00:15:46,069 --> 00:15:58,837 an equal and opposite reaction, whereas economic recessions 211 00:15:58,837 --> 00:16:10,009 are perennial violators of Newton's third law. 212 00:16:11,391 --> 00:16:23,977 Yeah. And that seems to me, I mean, I think that, from my perspective, 213 00:16:23,977 --> 00:16:36,563 that was kind of one of the core takeaways from the book. I think 214 00:16:36,563 --> 00:16:46,452 you call it the pluck model versus the oscillation model. And 215 00:16:46,452 --> 00:16:55,442 essentially, if you're trying to visualize it, you can imagine 216 00:16:55,442 --> 00:17:04,432 a long-term trend with occasional falls below and then catch 217 00:17:04,432 --> 00:17:05,331 up. And it struck me that's really, really important if that 218 00:16:20,381 --> 00:16:29,371 idea is true, because it suggests that the important things 219 00:16:29,371 --> 00:16:39,260 for government policy are, one, making sure that trend is as 220 00:16:39,260 --> 00:16:49,149 strong as it can be, number one, the long-term trend. Number 221 00:16:49,149 --> 00:16:59,937 two, don't do anything to screw up the recovery back to the 222 00:16:59,937 --> 00:17:05,331 trend. Would you agree with that? 223 00:17:05,841 --> 00:17:14,395 I would because at the end of the day, though it’s kind of odd 224 00:17:14,395 --> 00:17:22,338 for a book about recessions to conclude in this way. In the book, 225 00:17:22,338 --> 00:17:30,892 I conclude that at the end of the day, we probably ought to be 226 00:17:30,892 --> 00:17:37,613 at least as worried about economic expansions as we are about 227 00:17:37,613 --> 00:17:43,723 economic recessions. Because the majority of the years in which 228 00:17:43,723 --> 00:17:49,222 economies expand ultimately matters more for long run economic 229 00:17:49,222 --> 00:17:55,332 prosperity than the minority of years in which they contract. 230 00:17:55,332 --> 00:18:03,275 I mean, the UK has had many fewer recessions over the past 200 231 00:18:03,275 --> 00:18:11,218 years in the United States, but the UK is also, and has long 232 00:18:11,218 --> 00:18:13,662 been, about 30% poorer. And so, insofar as recessions are about 233 00:17:12,729 --> 00:17:22,569 adverse shocks that we could neither fully anticipate nor effectively 234 00:17:22,569 --> 00:17:31,425 hedge against, that probably ought to caution policymakers against 235 00:17:31,425 --> 00:17:40,281 presuming that they can medicate or otherwise sedate economic 236 00:17:40,281 --> 00:17:52,089 expansions that at the end of the day die healthy and innocent 237 00:17:52,089 --> 00:18:02,913 in the mistaken belief that doing so will prevent recession because 238 00:18:02,913 --> 00:18:11,769 recessions will continue to happen, because history will continue 239 00:18:11,769 --> 00:18:13,737 to happen. 240 00:18:14,731 --> 00:18:21,283 Does that mean that you are not a believer in the Fed kind of 241 00:18:21,283 --> 00:18:25,963 adjusting interest rates and credit conditions based on its view 242 00:18:25,963 --> 00:18:32,515 of the economy that we should be, I don't know, I mean, given what 243 00:18:32,515 --> 00:18:36,727 you're saying, should monetary policy be almost programmatic or 244 00:18:36,727 --> 00:18:42,811 rule based in some way, not trying to adjust for a business cycle 245 00:18:42,811 --> 00:18:45,619 that you say really isn't there? 246 00:18:46,401 --> 00:18:54,167 I think there is a large literature that would support that 247 00:18:54,167 --> 00:19:04,051 conclusion. In terms of what I find in the book, I think it would 248 00:19:04,051 --> 00:19:11,111 suggest that maybe monetary policy doesn't matter quite as much 249 00:19:11,111 --> 00:19:20,289 as we tend to think. Because if you think about all the institutional 250 00:19:20,289 --> 00:19:27,349 changes in monetary policy regimes over the past four centuries, 251 00:19:27,349 --> 00:19:36,527 what really is amazing is that, I find in the book, the depth 252 00:19:36,527 --> 00:19:43,587 and duration of recessions has been remarkably constant across time 253 00:19:43,587 --> 00:19:52,059 - remarkably constant across time going all the way back to 1700. 254 00:18:46,401 --> 00:18:56,852 And while macroeconomic volatility within cycle, macroeconomic 255 00:18:56,852 --> 00:19:08,796 volatility for GDP, for consumption, for investment, for 256 00:19:08,796 --> 00:19:23,726 bank lending, has declined since 1945, it's actually only declined 257 00:19:23,726 --> 00:19:38,656 to levels that prevailed before 1914. So, the real outlier 258 00:19:38,656 --> 00:19:52,093 was the incredibly Marshall period between 1914 and 1945. 259 00:19:53,231 --> 00:19:58,082 That really surprised me that conclusion too, because I guess I 260 00:19:58,082 --> 00:20:02,492 had this notion that the economic cycle was quite volatile, 261 00:20:02,492 --> 00:20:07,784 especially when we didn't have a central bank before 1913. I guess 262 00:20:07,784 --> 00:20:13,517 my read of economic history was that we had a lot more frequent 263 00:20:13,517 --> 00:20:17,927 recessions. But you're saying that's not the case, that economic 264 00:20:17,927 --> 00:20:20,572 volatility now is consistent with back then. 265 00:20:20,573 --> 00:20:20,650 Well, great question. So, there are two things. One is, yes, 266 00:20:20,650 --> 00:20:20,727 the periods of positive growth were more volatile because you have 267 00:20:20,727 --> 00:20:20,797 a more agricultural economy and then a more manufacturing based 268 00:20:20,797 --> 00:20:20,867 economy. So, you have more volatility within the periods of 269 00:20:20,867 --> 00:20:20,930 positive growth. But within each succession of expansion and 270 00:20:20,930 --> 00:20:20,993 contraction, that volatility of negative and positive was statistically 271 00:20:20,993 --> 00:20:21,042 no greater before 1914 than post 1945. In terms of recession 272 00:20:20,593 --> 00:20:20,633 frequency, yes, you are absolutely correct that recessions 273 00:20:20,633 --> 00:20:20,693 have become less frequent over time in both the United States and 274 00:20:20,693 --> 00:20:20,733 the United Kingdom. What's interesting is that, statistically, 275 00:20:20,733 --> 00:20:20,788 there are no breakpoints at specific points in time, toward fewer 276 00:20:20,788 --> 00:20:20,818 recessions, toward longer-lived expansions. You can 277 00:20:20,818 --> 00:20:20,868 test for 1913 with the establishment of the Federal Reserve. 278 00:20:20,868 --> 00:20:20,928 You can test for 1946 with the establishment of the Beveridge reforms 279 00:20:20,928 --> 00:20:20,983 in the United Kingdom. And you cannot reject the null hypothesis 280 00:20:20,983 --> 00:20:21,003 of no trend break. There's possibly one exception, and that 281 00:20:20,633 --> 00:20:20,753 is 1785 in the United States, a break toward longer-lived US economic 282 00:20:20,753 --> 00:20:20,853 expansions. And you can think about some recent institutional changes 283 00:20:20,853 --> 00:20:20,973 that had happened just before 1785, as the United States left behind 284 00:20:20,973 --> 00:20:21,043 a lot of colonial era armed conflict. 285 00:21:58,751 --> 00:22:16,195 Yeah, I want to come back to that point right there. I think essentially 286 00:22:16,195 --> 00:22:31,147 what you're saying, if I'm right, is that there's been a kind 287 00:22:31,147 --> 00:22:43,607 of a general long-term trend toward longer expansions and less 288 00:22:43,607 --> 00:22:58,559 volatility. And I want to come back to a potential explanation of 289 00:22:58,559 --> 00:23:14,757 that. But before that I did want to circle back to one other 290 00:23:14,757 --> 00:23:28,463 reason for oscillations, which you reject, but which I think is 291 00:23:28,463 --> 00:23:37,185 important enough that we should talk about. So, you talk about 292 00:22:03,611 --> 00:22:13,331 infrastructure investment and building investment and there's also 293 00:22:13,331 --> 00:22:27,911 just kind of credit growth. And there's a famous book by Carmen 294 00:22:27,911 --> 00:22:41,276 Reinhart and Ken Rogoff, This Time Is Different, which you talk 295 00:22:41,276 --> 00:22:54,641 about in your book, where they say, hey, recoveries following financial 296 00:22:54,641 --> 00:23:08,006 crises are particularly slow. And I think the implication is that, 297 00:23:08,006 --> 00:23:22,586 hey, you have got to be careful to not allow the economy 298 00:23:22,586 --> 00:23:37,166 to get into a situation where you have a big financial crash. And 299 00:22:00,419 --> 00:22:18,767 you kind of dispute that conclusion. You say there's no real 300 00:22:18,767 --> 00:22:35,447 statistical evidence that that's the case. And I note that 301 00:22:35,447 --> 00:22:57,131 Ken Rogoff also wrote you a nice note on your book jacket, so 302 00:22:57,131 --> 00:23:17,147 I assume he's read that. But I'm curious, why are your results 303 00:23:17,147 --> 00:23:33,827 different? And tell us why they're different and let's start 304 00:23:33,827 --> 00:23:37,163 with that. 305 00:23:37,201 --> 00:23:58,924 Yeah. So, first of all, when it comes to plucking, one of the 306 00:23:58,924 --> 00:24:18,976 variables I test is bank credit. And I find that the height 307 00:24:18,976 --> 00:24:40,699 and speed of the increase in bank credit and the volume of bank 308 00:24:40,699 --> 00:25:00,751 credit over the course of US and UK economic expansions does not 309 00:25:00,751 --> 00:25:20,803 explain variation in the depth or speed of the contraction in bank 310 00:25:20,803 --> 00:25:35,842 credit during the subsequent recession. Now that's on average, 311 00:25:35,842 --> 00:25:52,552 I mean, statistical regression is about averages. So, there could 312 00:25:52,552 --> 00:26:10,933 be… there's going to be a distribution there. So that's one 313 00:26:10,933 --> 00:26:12,604 finding. The other statistical test I conduct is to test whether 314 00:23:52,741 --> 00:24:12,943 the height or the speed of a recovery is slower from a recession 315 00:24:12,943 --> 00:24:26,929 if that recession was coincident with a financial crisis. 316 00:24:26,929 --> 00:24:47,131 And I measure financial crises in two ways. One, using just a binary 317 00:24:47,131 --> 00:25:02,671 indicator variable that was developed by my former Oxford colleague 318 00:25:02,671 --> 00:25:16,657 Stephen Broadberry and co-authors. So, they coded up all 319 00:25:16,657 --> 00:25:32,197 UK recessions as to whether they involved a financial crisis 320 00:25:32,197 --> 00:25:52,399 or not. And the other way I proxy for financial crisis is to 321 00:25:52,399 --> 00:26:09,493 just include the volume of the contraction in bank credit during 322 00:26:09,493 --> 00:26:12,601 that recession. And in either case, I find that the speed of economic 323 00:23:56,627 --> 00:24:16,053 recoveries for the United Kingdom going all the way back to 324 00:24:16,053 --> 00:24:35,479 1700 is no different if that recession involved a financial crisis 325 00:24:35,479 --> 00:25:00,203 or not. And then when it comes to the United States, it was actually 326 00:25:00,203 --> 00:25:19,629 research by a professor at Rutgers, Mike Bordo, who found, looking 327 00:25:19,629 --> 00:25:42,587 all the way back to the 1880s in the United States, that economic 328 00:25:42,587 --> 00:26:02,013 recoveries were no slower in the United States if a recession 329 00:26:02,013 --> 00:26:12,609 was coincident with a financial crisis. So, how do I square 330 00:23:45,646 --> 00:24:07,603 that with the work of Reinhart and Rogoff for whom I have enormous 331 00:24:07,603 --> 00:24:26,182 respect? I think they're looking at a broader set of countries. 332 00:24:26,182 --> 00:24:46,450 I'm looking at just the United States and the United Kingdom. And 333 00:24:46,450 --> 00:25:10,096 if one is looking at a broader set of countries, I think that there 334 00:25:10,096 --> 00:25:28,675 might be a lot of other correlates with why those countries 335 00:25:28,675 --> 00:25:42,187 were having economic recessions that were coincident with 336 00:25:42,187 --> 00:25:57,388 financial crises. And those other correlates could be correlated 337 00:25:57,388 --> 00:26:12,589 with the speed, the pace of the subsequent recoveries. 338 00:26:13,661 --> 00:26:17,896 Have you talked to Ken Rogoff about your results versus his? 339 00:26:18,971 --> 00:26:24,570 We have, yeah. And it's still something we're comparing notes on. 340 00:26:30,091 --> 00:26:34,524 The other thing I think that people naturally would be interested 341 00:26:34,524 --> 00:26:38,957 in and you address is energy supply shocks. Energy, some people 342 00:26:38,957 --> 00:26:43,390 would argue is kind of like the fundamental currency of economics, 343 00:26:43,390 --> 00:26:48,629 right? We have to use energy to make stuff. And when there's shocks 344 00:26:48,629 --> 00:26:53,465 to the availability and the price of that, it makes sense that 345 00:26:53,465 --> 00:26:57,495 would be a trigger of recessions. You looked at energy 346 00:26:57,495 --> 00:27:02,331 shocks going all the way back to when people were burning peat 347 00:27:02,331 --> 00:27:07,570 for home heating. You looked at coal, oil. What did you find in 348 00:27:07,570 --> 00:27:11,600 terms of the impact of energy supply shocks on recessions? 349 00:27:12,871 --> 00:27:30,883 Great question. So, I should specify that the book and my remarks… 350 00:27:30,883 --> 00:27:47,394 the book was written entirely in my personal capacity. My remarks 351 00:27:47,394 --> 00:28:03,905 are entirely in my personal capacity. And actually, most of the 352 00:28:03,905 --> 00:28:18,915 research preceded me starting my current role. This result surprised 353 00:28:18,915 --> 00:28:35,426 me because I wasn't familiar either with the frequency of energy 354 00:28:35,426 --> 00:28:51,937 supply shocks, particularly in the United States over the past century, 355 00:28:51,937 --> 00:29:12,951 in terms of oil. I mean, if you look back since 1945, oil shocks, 356 00:29:12,951 --> 00:29:29,462 they were major contributors to US recessions in 1948, ‘53, ‘57, 357 00:29:29,462 --> 00:29:45,973 ‘70, ‘73, ‘80, ‘81, ‘90, and underappreciated in 2001 and 2008. 358 00:27:12,871 --> 00:27:31,656 But if you go back farther in time, then industrial action on both 359 00:27:31,656 --> 00:27:48,996 sides of the Atlantic in the essential coal industry was a perennial 360 00:27:48,996 --> 00:28:06,336 contributor to recessions. And then as you just noted, if you go 361 00:28:06,336 --> 00:28:20,786 even further back in time, adverse harvest shocks were effectively 362 00:28:20,786 --> 00:28:35,236 energy supply shocks because provender, animal feed, was the primary 363 00:28:35,236 --> 00:28:49,686 fuel for the primary source of ground transportation, namely animal 364 00:28:49,686 --> 00:29:05,581 draft power. And also, when you had adverse winter weather, in 365 00:29:05,581 --> 00:29:20,031 particular, in the United Kingdom, it would destroy the supply 366 00:29:20,031 --> 00:29:34,481 of peat. And peat was regularly combusted to provide not 367 00:29:34,481 --> 00:29:46,041 only residential heating, but also industrial power generation. 368 00:27:12,871 --> 00:27:34,741 And I think this speaks to the fact that there are sort of two different 369 00:27:34,741 --> 00:27:47,863 types of shocks, of recessionary shocks. You can either 370 00:27:47,863 --> 00:28:03,901 have big macro shocks that affect all sectors of the economy 371 00:28:03,901 --> 00:28:14,107 roughly equally, roughly contemporaneously. So, for example, 372 00:28:14,107 --> 00:28:31,603 a pandemic. But at least as important, and actually I find in 373 00:28:31,603 --> 00:28:46,183 the book, even more important, are sector-specific shocks that maybe 374 00:28:46,183 --> 00:29:02,221 only directly impact one or two sectors, but those sectors have 375 00:29:02,221 --> 00:29:21,175 very high linkages to the rest of the economy. And over a near-term 376 00:29:21,175 --> 00:29:35,755 time horizon, so say 12 months, it's just very difficult 377 00:29:35,755 --> 00:29:45,961 for households and businesses to find substitutes. So that's why 378 00:27:27,232 --> 00:28:15,102 energy has been a perennial contributor to recessions on both 379 00:28:15,102 --> 00:29:17,333 sides of the Atlantic. But if you go back farther in time, another 380 00:29:17,333 --> 00:29:46,055 example would be cotton harvest shocks. 381 00:29:47,981 --> 00:30:03,241 And so, I mean, that also seemed to me to be a quite important 382 00:30:03,241 --> 00:30:16,321 conclusion to the book because you said right at the beginning that, 383 00:30:16,321 --> 00:30:28,311 hey, if you actually look at the correlation of recessions in 384 00:30:28,311 --> 00:30:42,481 the UK and the US, they're not as correlated as one might expect, 385 00:30:42,481 --> 00:30:55,561 given that they're two kind of open economies with very tight trade 386 00:30:55,561 --> 00:30:58,831 and financial linkages. And it seemed to me that part of the reason 387 00:29:59,781 --> 00:30:13,941 was that the way… basically, if you think of economies as like 388 00:30:13,941 --> 00:30:23,381 portfolios that have different sector compositions, different stock 389 00:30:23,381 --> 00:30:32,821 compositions, basically shocks propagate their way through those 390 00:30:32,821 --> 00:30:43,441 economies in different ways. They're insulated to different types 391 00:30:43,441 --> 00:30:58,781 of shocks. So that, I guess number one is that kind of correct? 392 00:29:47,981 --> 00:30:06,402 Number two, does that make the job of, say, someone like you less 393 00:30:06,402 --> 00:30:20,572 about forecasting a recession and more about saying, hey, this 394 00:30:20,572 --> 00:30:37,576 is the kind of shock that we're exposed to, as an economy, 395 00:30:37,576 --> 00:30:54,580 given its construction, and this is the kind of shock that we're 396 00:30:54,580 --> 00:30:58,831 more insulated against? 397 00:30:58,831 --> 00:31:26,885 Yeah. So, you touch upon two of the reasons why the United Kingdom 398 00:31:26,885 --> 00:31:48,465 was historically much less recession prone than the United States. 399 00:31:48,465 --> 00:32:12,203 Under the boom/bust view, one would think, well, maybe Brits are 400 00:32:12,203 --> 00:32:35,941 just less prone to mania and panic than are Americans. They're 401 00:32:35,941 --> 00:32:59,679 more excitable counterparts here in the US. But really, the main 402 00:32:59,679 --> 00:33:12,627 reasons are really much more prosaic. So, for one, since 1826, 403 00:31:09,796 --> 00:31:36,112 in the United Kingdom, you had a nationwide system of branch banking. 404 00:31:36,112 --> 00:32:02,428 And yes, if you think about a national economy, the economy of 405 00:32:02,428 --> 00:32:24,358 a big, widely diversified economy, akin to a large diversified 406 00:32:24,358 --> 00:32:50,674 portfolio, then weakness in one sector or one region can be offset 407 00:32:50,674 --> 00:33:12,604 by strength and resilience in other sectors and other regions. 408 00:30:58,831 --> 00:31:23,911 In contrast, for most of US history, right up until the 1980s, 409 00:31:23,911 --> 00:31:51,081 not only could you not operate a bank across state lines, you couldn't 410 00:31:51,081 --> 00:32:16,161 even operate more than one bank branch within a state. And what 411 00:32:16,161 --> 00:32:41,241 that meant was that we had tens of thousands of tiny, undercapitalized, 412 00:32:41,241 --> 00:32:57,961 under diversified financial institutions that would amplify and 413 00:32:57,961 --> 00:33:12,591 propagate adverse shocks when they would occur. The second reason 414 00:31:02,413 --> 00:31:13,159 that the United Kingdom was historically less recession prone 415 00:31:13,159 --> 00:31:27,487 than the United States was that a lot of the post-World War 416 00:31:27,487 --> 00:31:41,815 II US recessions, as I noted earlier, were oil related. ‘48, ‘53, 417 00:31:41,815 --> 00:31:54,949 ‘57, ‘70. And during that time, up until the ‘73 recession, 418 00:31:54,949 --> 00:32:10,471 the UK economy was just much less impacted by oil shocks for the 419 00:32:10,471 --> 00:32:23,605 simple reason that they were still a very coal intensive economy. 420 00:32:23,605 --> 00:32:34,351 And for somewhat idiosyncratic historical reasons, they went from 421 00:32:34,351 --> 00:32:48,679 1926 to 1972 without a single official coal strike. So, the United 422 00:32:48,679 --> 00:33:01,813 Kingdom emerged from a very severe post war recession in 1947. 423 00:33:01,813 --> 00:33:12,559 It wasn't until 1973 that they had another recession. 424 00:33:14,471 --> 00:33:19,268 Although that recession was extremely severe. Right? They had 425 00:33:19,268 --> 00:33:25,664 to go to the IMF for a bailout, if I remember correctly. 426 00:33:25,671 --> 00:33:31,053 That was a nasty period. And I can't remember the IMF bailout came 427 00:33:31,053 --> 00:33:35,193 during the recession or a little bit after, but certainly, 428 00:33:35,193 --> 00:33:39,747 yeah, very much related. And yes, they had to limit workdays. 429 00:33:39,747 --> 00:33:45,543 There was the Arab oil embargo and then there was a major coal strike. 430 00:33:45,543 --> 00:33:50,097 And the Prime Minister, Ted Heath, decided to call an election 431 00:33:50,097 --> 00:33:55,065 and the slogan of his campaign was Who Governs Britain? And the 432 00:33:55,065 --> 00:33:58,791 answer of the British electorate was not Ted Heath. 433 00:34:01,420 --> 00:35:31,428 You got to be careful with those slogans. Okay, so, I guess 434 00:34:08,764 --> 00:34:30,796 we mentioned this earlier that it does appear that the length between 435 00:34:30,796 --> 00:34:52,828 recessions maybe has gone up in the post-World War II era. But 436 00:34:52,828 --> 00:35:14,860 you say it's really been more kind of a long-term trend across 437 00:35:14,860 --> 00:35:31,384 economies, a very long-term trend towards smoother economic growth. 438 00:34:01,420 --> 00:34:15,820 And the natural thought that I had was, well, that's because the 439 00:34:15,820 --> 00:34:29,020 government is much bigger and the government has the ability to 440 00:34:29,020 --> 00:34:43,420 spend when other sectors are saving. So, the classic kind of Keynesian 441 00:34:43,420 --> 00:35:00,220 offset. And so, it functions as a kind of, you call it a buffer. 442 00:35:00,220 --> 00:35:17,020 I like to think of it as like an insurance provider. And you kind 443 00:35:17,020 --> 00:35:31,420 of analyze that in a chapter that you call firefighters and arsonists. 444 00:34:01,420 --> 00:34:21,734 And I think you were a little kind of skeptical of that view in 445 00:34:21,734 --> 00:34:39,146 the end that you didn't really find that the government's role was 446 00:34:39,146 --> 00:34:58,009 a big driver, and the reason that we've got these kinds of longer 447 00:34:58,009 --> 00:35:16,872 expansions, if I'm correct. If not, let me know, but tell me how 448 00:35:16,872 --> 00:35:31,382 you went and thought about that and tested those ideas. 449 00:35:32,711 --> 00:36:17,651 Yeah, so, because that was one of my priors as well, that the intervention, 450 00:36:17,651 --> 00:36:43,331 the rise of a more interventionist countercyclical state, 451 00:36:43,331 --> 00:37:15,431 that we might expect to smooth fluctuations in economic activity 452 00:37:15,431 --> 00:37:50,741 over time. There are a number of testable hypotheses that this 453 00:37:50,741 --> 00:38:16,421 hypothesis would generate - that view would generate. So, for 454 00:35:37,019 --> 00:35:58,559 one thing, we should expect trend breaks, at specific points 455 00:35:58,559 --> 00:36:20,099 in time, when there were discontinuous increases in the role 456 00:36:20,099 --> 00:36:39,485 of the state, the countercyclical role of the state. 457 00:36:39,485 --> 00:37:03,179 So, for example, during the 1930s, maybe during the 1960s with 458 00:37:03,179 --> 00:37:29,027 the Great Society, I noted in 1946 with the Beveridge reforms in 459 00:37:29,027 --> 00:37:48,413 the United Kingdom. But statistically there are no clear 460 00:37:48,413 --> 00:38:07,799 break points toward longer lived economic expansions on either 461 00:38:07,799 --> 00:38:16,415 side of the Atlantic. And another thing that we would expect 462 00:35:49,084 --> 00:36:12,474 to observe would be that recession depth should have declined 463 00:36:12,474 --> 00:36:38,203 over time, and in particular over the past hundred years with 464 00:36:38,203 --> 00:37:03,932 the rise of a more interventionist state. But as I noted, 465 00:37:03,932 --> 00:37:24,983 recession depth has been remarkably constant over time. Statistically, 466 00:37:24,983 --> 00:37:50,712 it's been no different since 1945 versus before. And if anything, 467 00:37:50,712 --> 00:38:14,102 UK recessions have actually been living longer since 1945 than 468 00:38:14,102 --> 00:38:16,441 before. So, that's the other one to test, not just depth but also 469 00:36:32,255 --> 00:37:26,837 the duration of recessions. So that, yeah, neither depth nor duration 470 00:37:26,837 --> 00:38:06,533 of recessions has been significantly different since 1945 471 00:38:06,533 --> 00:38:16,457 versus before. Now,I should note, is not an argument for inaction 472 00:35:52,358 --> 00:36:18,554 because, while it may be the case that economies, in the aggregate, 473 00:36:18,554 --> 00:36:33,835 recover from recessionary shocks, that doesn't necessarily 474 00:36:33,835 --> 00:36:55,665 mean that every individual, every household does. And I make 475 00:36:55,665 --> 00:37:19,678 this point in the book. I think there's a strong normative 476 00:37:19,678 --> 00:37:43,691 case to be made for the provision of relief where relief 477 00:37:43,691 --> 00:38:09,887 is needed. And, in my view, that's where the income and employment 478 00:38:09,887 --> 00:38:16,436 loss is greatest. And fortunately, we do now have infrastructure 479 00:35:55,181 --> 00:36:27,281 in place through unemployment insurance to target that relief where 480 00:36:27,281 --> 00:37:09,011 it is needed. And I think there's a compelling case to be made 481 00:37:09,011 --> 00:37:44,321 for having higher replacement rates, for example, when in a high 482 00:37:44,321 --> 00:38:16,421 unemployment context. We saw that during the 2020 pandemic recession. 483 00:35:32,711 --> 00:36:30,503 But yeah, though the rise of a more interventionist state does not 484 00:36:30,503 --> 00:37:18,663 appear to have affected the frequency of recessions nor their 485 00:37:18,663 --> 00:38:06,823 depth, nor their duration, that is not necessarily an argument 486 00:38:06,823 --> 00:38:16,455 for inaction. 487 00:38:18,371 --> 00:38:29,369 Toward the end of the book you sort of go through an examination 488 00:38:29,369 --> 00:38:39,521 of, I guess, the notion that recessions are a cleansing of the 489 00:38:39,521 --> 00:38:49,673 rottenness of the system. Right? To go forward we need to get 490 00:38:49,673 --> 00:39:01,517 rid of the excesses of the past. Or if you're going to be nerdier 491 00:39:01,517 --> 00:39:09,131 about it, do recessions serve a growth enhancing, reallocative 492 00:39:09,131 --> 00:39:09,977 purpose? And I think a lot of people hold that view that there's 493 00:38:30,059 --> 00:38:39,799 creative destruction, this notion that we kind of almost have 494 00:38:39,799 --> 00:38:53,435 to… we deserve a recession in some sense. And can you tell us about 495 00:38:53,435 --> 00:39:07,071 how you examined whether that was the case or not and why you concluded 496 00:39:07,071 --> 00:39:09,993 that wasn't true? 497 00:39:10,031 --> 00:39:13,279 Yeah. And so, I should begin by noting that I wanted it to be 498 00:39:13,279 --> 00:39:13,511 true. 499 00:39:15,591 --> 00:39:16,951 Why did you want it to be true? 500 00:39:17,271 --> 00:39:31,536 Because recessions are painful, they can be traumatic, they 501 00:39:31,536 --> 00:39:53,726 hurt a lot of people. So, one kind of wants to believe that at 502 00:39:53,726 --> 00:40:14,331 least it was for something. But what I find is that, while there 503 00:40:14,331 --> 00:40:30,181 is a large literature that demonstrates that so called creative 504 00:40:30,181 --> 00:40:46,031 destruction, I mean the movement of people and capital from 505 00:40:46,031 --> 00:40:58,711 less efficient to more efficient firms, often involving 506 00:40:58,711 --> 00:41:12,976 the failure of those less efficient enterprises, that view 507 00:41:12,976 --> 00:41:27,241 of creative destruction is important for long-term growth. However, 508 00:41:27,241 --> 00:41:43,091 I find that process is impaired rather than enhanced by 509 00:41:43,091 --> 00:41:44,676 recessions. So, for example, I find that research and development 510 00:39:41,391 --> 00:40:13,551 is, I hate to use the word cyclical, but research and development 511 00:40:13,551 --> 00:40:40,351 is pro cyclical. So, it rises more during economic expansions, 512 00:40:40,351 --> 00:41:04,471 and then falls during economic recessions. Recessions are rampant 513 00:41:04,471 --> 00:41:23,231 age discriminators. They discriminate against younger workers. 514 00:41:23,231 --> 00:41:44,671 They discriminate against younger, often more dynamic firms. 515 00:39:17,271 --> 00:39:34,379 Also, one thing I find in the book, and there's a large literature 516 00:39:34,379 --> 00:39:50,171 supporting this, is that one of the key mechanisms by which people 517 00:39:50,171 --> 00:40:02,015 and capital resources move from less efficient enterprises to 518 00:40:02,015 --> 00:40:16,491 more efficient enterprises is by quitting one job and being hired 519 00:40:16,491 --> 00:40:30,967 by another job that's a better match, that's more productive. And 520 00:40:30,967 --> 00:40:42,811 that whole ladder, that whole productivity ladder just collapses 521 00:40:42,811 --> 00:40:52,023 during economic recessions. Because quitting plummets because 522 00:40:52,023 --> 00:41:07,815 no one dares to leave the job, and hiring plummets because firms 523 00:41:07,815 --> 00:41:23,607 don't dare to take on new workers. And so, you usually have 524 00:41:23,607 --> 00:41:35,451 this period of poor quality employer/employee matches that follows 525 00:41:35,451 --> 00:41:44,663 during and immediate aftermath of a recession. The other way I test 526 00:39:25,941 --> 00:39:46,749 this is to simply ask, well, okay, if there is reallocation that's 527 00:39:46,749 --> 00:40:04,089 taking place, then we should expect to observe the allocation 528 00:40:04,089 --> 00:40:21,429 of people and output across sectors to look fundamentally different 529 00:40:21,429 --> 00:40:43,971 at the end of a recovery versus how it would have looked had 530 00:40:43,971 --> 00:40:57,843 the economy continued uninterrupted along long run trends. 531 00:40:57,843 --> 00:41:16,917 And what I find is that typically the economy, the allocation 532 00:41:16,917 --> 00:41:39,459 looks pretty darn similar to how it would have looked had it continued 533 00:41:39,459 --> 00:41:44,661 uninterrupted along trend. 534 00:41:45,911 --> 00:41:49,750 Yeah, those were fascinating sections of the book. And the story 535 00:41:49,750 --> 00:41:53,240 about the inefficiency of the matching of jobs really resonated 536 00:41:53,240 --> 00:41:57,428 with me. I remember I was running my business back, right after 537 00:41:57,428 --> 00:42:01,267 the financial crisis, and we were looking to hire someone, and 538 00:42:01,267 --> 00:42:06,153 we thought it was a good job in kind of accounting, and we couldn't 539 00:42:06,153 --> 00:42:10,690 get anyone. And a friend of mine who was a recruiter says, well, 540 00:42:10,690 --> 00:42:15,227 anyone who's got a job right now is not leaving. So, the only 541 00:42:15,227 --> 00:42:19,415 people that you're going to be able to interview are the people 542 00:42:19,415 --> 00:42:23,603 that you really wouldn't want to hire. And then also your point 543 00:42:23,603 --> 00:42:27,791 that the firms that tend to go under in recessions are younger, 544 00:42:27,791 --> 00:42:31,630 arguably are the ones that have the potential to change that 545 00:42:31,630 --> 00:42:35,469 structure of the economy. Had they survived, maybe they would be 546 00:42:35,469 --> 00:42:39,308 able to take business away from an incumbent. So, it's almost 547 00:42:39,308 --> 00:42:43,496 like the counter argument could be made that it leads to stagnation. 548 00:42:45,361 --> 00:42:49,156 And also, often those younger firms, they don't have physical capital 549 00:42:49,156 --> 00:42:52,951 that they can pledge as collateral. It's hard for them to 550 00:42:52,951 --> 00:42:57,091 get a bank loan because they don't have a long credit history. 551 00:42:57,091 --> 00:43:00,886 So, that's why I say, yeah, recessions are often rampant age 552 00:43:00,886 --> 00:43:01,231 discriminators. 553 00:43:04,231 --> 00:43:14,419 I want to… There are a couple semi-unrelated questions, but I thought 554 00:43:14,419 --> 00:43:25,456 we could talk about them as we kind of conclude here. But you've 555 00:43:25,456 --> 00:43:34,795 included the UK in your analysis. I know you've also studied 556 00:43:34,795 --> 00:43:44,134 there and worked there. And the pluck view of economic recessions, 557 00:43:44,134 --> 00:43:53,473 that you're suggesting, fits the data. So, kind of a long-term 558 00:43:53,473 --> 00:44:01,963 trend, occasional recessions, deviate from the trend and then you 559 00:44:01,963 --> 00:44:13,000 go back to it. That has not really mapped onto what has happened 560 00:44:13,000 --> 00:44:16,396 in the UK post-2008. There's been a lot written about that. You 561 00:43:11,023 --> 00:43:22,060 can see graphs of the pre-2008 trend growth in the UK and we've 562 00:43:22,060 --> 00:43:32,248 never got back there. And so, my question is… Well, you actually 563 00:43:32,248 --> 00:43:40,738 offer quite an interesting explanation in the book, one that, 564 00:43:40,738 --> 00:43:50,077 honestly, I hadn't heard before and I thought that made a 565 00:43:50,077 --> 00:44:01,114 lot of sense. But can you sort of talk about the UK's experience 566 00:44:01,114 --> 00:44:11,302 and then maybe talk us through that explanation that you gave for 567 00:44:11,302 --> 00:44:16,396 why there hasn't been that recovery? 568 00:44:17,391 --> 00:44:32,381 Yeah, great, and great question. And it relates to what 569 00:44:32,381 --> 00:44:50,369 we were talking about earlier with respect to what are some of 570 00:44:50,369 --> 00:45:03,860 the implications for policymakers in terms of first doing 571 00:45:03,860 --> 00:45:21,848 no harm. So, you're absolutely right that there was both a level 572 00:45:21,848 --> 00:45:38,337 effect for the UK economy during 2008, 2009 and a subsequent 573 00:45:38,337 --> 00:45:57,824 rate of change effect, that not only did the UK incur this drop 574 00:45:57,824 --> 00:46:14,313 in economic output, but then the subsequent rate of growth was 575 00:46:14,313 --> 00:46:32,301 slower than the pre-2008 trend. And this was one of the few 576 00:46:32,301 --> 00:46:48,790 exceptions to the overall pattern over the past three and a 577 00:46:48,790 --> 00:46:54,786 half centuries of plucking. And the explanation I give in the 578 00:44:31,895 --> 00:44:52,615 book, and I've actually, outside the book, done some additional 579 00:44:52,615 --> 00:45:09,191 statistical econometric analysis of this, that after 2008, 580 00:45:09,191 --> 00:45:34,055 2009, there was a policy regime change on both sides of the 581 00:45:34,055 --> 00:45:52,703 Atlantic in that we policymakers mandated that our economies 582 00:45:52,703 --> 00:46:15,495 produce with less of a critical input for which only over 583 00:46:15,495 --> 00:46:34,143 any economically meaningful time horizon is just very difficult 584 00:46:34,143 --> 00:46:52,791 for households and businesses to find substitutes, namely bank 585 00:46:52,791 --> 00:46:54,863 credit. Now that had a much bigger impact, with liquidity coverage 586 00:44:31,081 --> 00:44:42,033 ratios, and supplemental leverage ratios, and additional tiered 587 00:44:42,033 --> 00:44:54,354 capital requirements, and stress testing, and all of these 588 00:44:54,354 --> 00:45:05,306 measures that effectively induced a substitution of lending 589 00:45:05,306 --> 00:45:20,365 to the public sector for lending to the private sector. Now 590 00:45:20,365 --> 00:45:36,793 this had a much bigger, more persistent impact in the United Kingdom 591 00:45:36,793 --> 00:45:53,221 than in the United States for two reasons. First, the United Kingdom 592 00:45:53,221 --> 00:46:06,911 was historically much more reliant on bank credit for external 593 00:46:06,911 --> 00:46:19,232 financing businesses, whereas in the United States we've always 594 00:46:19,232 --> 00:46:32,922 long had a robust ecosystem of venture capital, private equity, 595 00:46:32,922 --> 00:46:47,981 also, it's still a legacy of those thousands of regional banks 596 00:46:47,981 --> 00:46:54,826 that engage in relationship lending. But the second reason is 597 00:44:28,636 --> 00:44:57,873 the UK was always going to be more impacted by a persistent policy 598 00:44:57,873 --> 00:45:22,612 shock to banking. The second reason is that, for historical reasons, 599 00:45:22,612 --> 00:45:49,600 the United Kingdom has long had fewer banks that are on average 600 00:45:49,600 --> 00:46:18,837 bigger. And so, they were all more likely to be treated by the 601 00:46:18,837 --> 00:46:43,576 post-2009 policy regime. And so, I think it's a reminder that 602 00:46:43,576 --> 00:46:54,821 no policy is without trade-offs. 603 00:46:56,742 --> 00:47:11,792 Do you think that is… I mean, I can think of two explanations for 604 00:47:11,792 --> 00:47:24,692 that policy change. Number one, I think the obvious one is looking 605 00:47:24,692 --> 00:47:36,517 back and they're like, well hey, the banks caused this. They 606 00:47:36,517 --> 00:47:41,892 were the over-leveraged, undercapitalized, under-regulated, 607 00:47:41,892 --> 00:47:52,642 etc. So, we're going to tighten things up. That's one. The 608 00:46:57,441 --> 00:47:05,130 other one, maybe slightly more cynical, but I personally think longer-term 609 00:47:05,130 --> 00:47:11,421 is more important is governments are running huge deficits 610 00:47:11,421 --> 00:47:21,207 with no end in sight. And so, they need buyers of the debt. And 611 00:47:21,207 --> 00:47:28,896 so, it's like, hey, let's change the rules to basically, if 612 00:47:28,896 --> 00:47:38,682 not force banks to buy the debt, kind of force them by the back 613 00:47:38,682 --> 00:47:47,070 door. So, it's almost a form of financial repression. Do you have 614 00:47:47,070 --> 00:47:52,662 a personal view on either of those explanations? 615 00:47:53,712 --> 00:48:16,995 I think they're both plausible. Whether it was deliberate 616 00:48:16,995 --> 00:48:42,865 or subconscious. I mean it did effectively resemble financial repression. 617 00:48:42,865 --> 00:49:06,148 I mean you're forcing financial institutions to hold more 618 00:49:06,148 --> 00:49:37,192 of your sovereign debt. That looks an awful lot like how both 619 00:49:37,192 --> 00:50:10,823 the UK and the United States got out of high debt burdens after 620 00:50:10,823 --> 00:50:18,584 World War II. But also, I think one thing that I find in the 621 00:48:12,676 --> 00:48:29,916 book is that these narratives, these very morally laden narratives 622 00:48:29,916 --> 00:48:45,432 about economic fluctuations set in quite early, whether it's 623 00:48:45,432 --> 00:49:02,672 1857, 1772, 1873, 1929 and 2008. The narrative, the parables 624 00:49:02,672 --> 00:49:21,636 of, there's a villain, there are heroes. Ben Bernanke, Hank Paulson, 625 00:49:21,636 --> 00:49:35,428 Tim Geithner, describe themselves as firefighters. And then 626 00:49:35,428 --> 00:49:50,944 there's resolution, because no economic recession has ever been 627 00:49:50,944 --> 00:50:08,184 infinitely lived, has never been immortal. So, they have all 628 00:50:08,184 --> 00:50:18,528 the essential ingredients of a parable. But, as I also demonstrate 629 00:48:01,757 --> 00:48:19,456 in the book, typically the reality is more prosaic. So, the 630 00:48:19,456 --> 00:48:43,591 highest ever price of a barrel of oil or a gallon of gas was not 631 00:48:43,591 --> 00:49:04,508 during the Arab oil embargo of 1973, or the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 632 00:49:04,508 --> 00:49:27,034 in 1990. It was in June 2008. In fact, the price of energy, overall, 633 00:49:27,034 --> 00:49:46,342 has never been higher in the United States since 1945 than it 634 00:49:46,342 --> 00:50:07,259 was in the summer of 2008 due to a number of coincident shocks 635 00:50:07,259 --> 00:50:18,522 to both energy supply and energy demand. The result of which 636 00:48:02,624 --> 00:48:27,132 was that by summer of 2008, the average American household was 637 00:48:27,132 --> 00:48:53,868 having to spend $2,000 more per year on energy goods and services, 638 00:48:53,868 --> 00:49:18,376 and they'd been having to spend just a couple years prior. 639 00:49:18,376 --> 00:49:42,884 And when you think about it, typically about half of American 640 00:49:42,884 --> 00:50:07,392 households have no savings after tax. And these are not easy 641 00:50:07,392 --> 00:50:18,532 expenditures on which to economize. You're talking commuting 642 00:48:01,203 --> 00:48:28,670 to work, dropping your kids off at school, heating and cooling 643 00:48:28,670 --> 00:49:01,131 your home, putting food on the table, because food is a very energy-intensive 644 00:49:01,131 --> 00:49:23,604 commodity product. So, in that context, under those constraints, 645 00:49:23,604 --> 00:49:48,574 by summer 2008, about 5% of American homeowners were seriously 646 00:49:48,574 --> 00:50:18,538 delinquent on their mortgage. And the rest, as they say, is history. 647 00:50:20,752 --> 00:50:38,968 Yeah, and that's a narrative that is not quite forgotten, but 648 00:50:38,968 --> 00:50:57,184 close to being forgotten. And I remember that very well. There's 649 00:50:57,184 --> 00:51:18,712 this notion of peak oil, that the world was running out and prices 650 00:51:18,712 --> 00:51:33,616 might get to $200 a barrel or even more. In the end, I think you 651 00:50:24,064 --> 00:50:30,136 kind of say, well, we should probably imagine ourselves as enrolled 652 00:50:30,136 --> 00:50:36,760 in a kind of negative economic lottery, which, in other words, if 653 00:50:36,760 --> 00:50:43,936 you imagine rolling a series of dice and if enough of the dice 654 00:50:43,936 --> 00:50:51,664 come up, recession or shock (I suppose is a better way to put it), 655 00:50:51,664 --> 00:50:57,736 then you're going to have recession. And you say that feels 656 00:50:57,736 --> 00:51:03,808 a bit disheartening because there's no… it is a random process. 657 00:51:03,808 --> 00:51:10,984 But you say, on the other hand, we have to remember that a 658 00:51:10,984 --> 00:51:19,264 lot of those dice have to come up red for us really to hit recession. 659 00:51:19,264 --> 00:51:24,232 The economy is actually remarkably robust. It's not just 660 00:51:24,232 --> 00:51:30,856 a shock. You need multiple shocks hitting at the same time and 661 00:51:30,856 --> 00:51:33,616 probably of a different nature. 662 00:51:34,352 --> 00:51:58,040 Yeah, so, one of the starkest ironies that I encountered when researching 663 00:51:58,040 --> 00:52:19,754 the book was that while all these eminent Western European and 664 00:52:19,754 --> 00:52:41,468 American economists, in the 1920s and 1930s, were trying to develop 665 00:52:41,468 --> 00:52:59,234 theories of the endogenous or self-generating business cycle, it 666 00:52:59,234 --> 00:53:17,000 was actually a Soviet economist in Moscow, Eugen Slutsky, 667 00:53:17,000 --> 00:53:36,740 who took a bunch of old Imperial Russian lottery tickets 668 00:53:36,740 --> 00:54:00,428 and created a moving sum series of the numbers in the lottery 669 00:54:00,428 --> 00:54:20,168 tickets. And that series mapped almost perfectly onto an index 670 00:54:20,168 --> 00:54:39,908 of British business conditions over a near half century period. 671 00:51:34,352 --> 00:51:54,416 And what that demonstrated was that the summation of chance or random 672 00:51:54,416 --> 00:52:11,136 causes can generate what looks like cyclical behavior, even though 673 00:52:11,136 --> 00:52:29,528 the underlying data generating process is in fact random. Now, that 674 00:52:29,528 --> 00:52:49,592 doesn't mean that we should just throw our hands up in desperation 675 00:52:49,592 --> 00:53:02,968 or in frustration that recessions are unforecastable and 676 00:53:02,968 --> 00:53:18,016 unpredictable, which I demonstrate in the book, that recessions 677 00:53:18,016 --> 00:53:33,064 are unforecastable and unpredictable, but what we can do 678 00:53:33,064 --> 00:53:53,128 is look at, as you know, the kinds of shocks that historically 679 00:53:53,128 --> 00:54:09,848 contributed to recessions. And to think about, okay, well, conditional 680 00:54:09,848 --> 00:54:28,240 on what I've seen in recent months or recent quarters, would 681 00:54:28,240 --> 00:54:39,944 I raise or lower the unconditional probability? So, in 682 00:51:37,886 --> 00:51:57,323 the past century there's been about, in any given year there's 683 00:51:57,323 --> 00:52:18,527 been about a 1 in 100 chance of pandemic related recession. In 684 00:52:18,527 --> 00:52:41,498 any given year, in the United States, there's been about a 1 in 685 00:52:41,498 --> 00:52:59,168 10 chance of an energy related recession, although that probability 686 00:52:59,168 --> 00:53:20,372 has been going down. And in any given year there's been about 687 00:53:20,372 --> 00:53:43,343 a 1 in 50 chance of a credit controls related recession. And so, 688 00:53:43,343 --> 00:53:59,246 you can subjectively ask yourself, okay, conditional on what 689 00:53:59,246 --> 00:54:20,450 I've just observed, do I think the probability in the next year 690 00:54:20,450 --> 00:54:39,887 is going to be higher or lower than that unconditional probability? 691 00:51:34,352 --> 00:51:49,942 And then in terms of your observation about being enrolled 692 00:51:49,942 --> 00:52:05,532 in this negative lottery, which can be kind of depressing, 693 00:52:05,532 --> 00:52:22,681 but I actually end on the optimistic finding that we talked 694 00:52:22,681 --> 00:52:39,830 about earlier, which is that we've been getting better as households, 695 00:52:39,830 --> 00:52:55,420 as businesses, as investors, we've been getting better at absorbing 696 00:52:55,420 --> 00:53:11,010 the kinds of shocks that historically tended to generate recessions. 697 00:53:11,010 --> 00:53:29,718 And I think a lot of that is diversification. So, our banking 698 00:53:29,718 --> 00:53:43,749 systems, generally, are more diversified than they were previously 699 00:53:43,749 --> 00:53:59,339 in earlier periods. And our energy systems are more diversified, 700 00:53:59,339 --> 00:54:18,047 both across fuels and within fuels. And this is a long process 701 00:54:18,047 --> 00:54:38,314 that, as I note, has been going on since 1700 and I'm sure 702 00:54:38,314 --> 00:54:39,873 before. 703 00:54:41,472 --> 00:54:58,720 Yeah, I don't know if you're familiar with Nassim Taleb's first 704 00:54:58,720 --> 00:55:15,968 book, which was called Fooled by Randomness, but your book reminded 705 00:55:15,968 --> 00:55:36,352 me a lot of that because his basic idea was, hey, we're programmed 706 00:55:36,352 --> 00:55:55,168 to see patterns and sequences that are random. And it was very 707 00:55:55,168 --> 00:56:10,848 statistically focused. And yours is, it's a different book but 708 00:56:10,848 --> 00:56:21,824 essentially the underlying theme is similar. Right? There's 709 00:54:42,970 --> 00:55:02,444 this randomness that we have this kind of need to assign a narrative 710 00:55:02,444 --> 00:55:24,914 to and we might be better off, or we would be better off just appreciating 711 00:55:24,914 --> 00:55:41,392 some of the key findings you talked about. Focus on long-term 712 00:55:41,392 --> 00:55:59,368 economic growth, focus on not screwing up the rebound and in making 713 00:55:59,368 --> 00:56:20,340 the economy as robust as it can to absorb as many shocks as it 714 00:56:20,340 --> 00:56:21,838 can. I'm going to ask you a potentially unfair question to end 715 00:54:49,711 --> 00:54:57,950 it up. But since you mentioned that, maybe what economists should 716 00:54:57,950 --> 00:55:08,436 be focusing on now is kind of looking at what shocks have hit the 717 00:55:08,436 --> 00:55:16,675 economy and what that says for their ability to withstand future 718 00:55:16,675 --> 00:55:27,910 shocks. I mean, if we look at the US economy now, we have had some 719 00:55:27,910 --> 00:55:36,898 shocks in the last 18 months. We've had the imposition of tariffs, 720 00:55:36,898 --> 00:55:45,886 although that's changed up and down. We've had the oil shock with 721 00:55:45,886 --> 00:55:55,623 the Iran war. What does that tell you about the types of shocks 722 00:55:55,623 --> 00:56:03,113 that might be particularly dangerous now given what we've just 723 00:56:03,113 --> 00:56:12,101 experienced in the last 18 months? Or do you find that those 724 00:56:12,101 --> 00:56:20,340 shocks, maybe, aren't that meaningful? I mean, how are you thinking 725 00:56:20,340 --> 00:56:21,838 about it? 726 00:56:22,892 --> 00:56:48,272 So, I was concerned at the start of the Iran conflict because 727 00:56:48,272 --> 00:57:11,537 it seemed, to me, reminiscent of the 1973 recession, during the 728 00:57:11,537 --> 00:57:34,802 Arab oil embargo, in the sense that there were physical barrels 729 00:57:34,802 --> 00:57:58,067 and physical cubic feet that were not flowing into global markets. 730 00:57:58,067 --> 00:58:23,447 And if the conflict were to have persisted at the intensity of 731 00:58:23,447 --> 00:58:48,827 say, March, April, it's hard for me to see the global economy 732 00:58:48,827 --> 00:59:05,747 or the US economy not having incurred recession. But I think, 733 00:56:29,078 --> 00:56:51,760 also, we learned over the past few months the differences between 734 00:56:51,760 --> 00:57:18,566 2026 and 1973. So, a dollar of economic output is, today, much less 735 00:57:18,566 --> 00:57:30,938 energy-intensive generally, and oil-intensive specifically, than 736 00:57:30,938 --> 00:57:57,744 it was in 1973. Non-core OPEC supply is both greater as a share 737 00:57:57,744 --> 00:58:22,488 of the global market and also it's more elastic, it's more responsive. 738 00:58:22,488 --> 00:58:49,294 We also have a more diverse energy stack into 2026 than in 1973. 739 00:58:49,294 --> 00:59:05,790 And we also learned lessons from the 1970s. And so, across most 740 00:56:28,708 --> 00:56:38,886 advanced economies, we maintain strategic petroleum reserves 741 00:56:38,886 --> 00:56:54,880 as sort of a hedge against these kinds of supply disruptions. 742 00:56:54,880 --> 00:57:09,420 So, there are similarities, but also some key differences, which 743 00:57:09,420 --> 00:57:29,776 is why I think we've seen a lot of resilience over the past few 744 00:57:29,776 --> 00:57:48,678 months. In terms of potential shocks that the book has led me to 745 00:57:48,678 --> 00:58:03,218 consider, that maybe others aren't as concerned about, but probably 746 00:58:03,218 --> 00:58:22,120 should be, I found that a lot of recessions are related to sector-specific 747 00:58:22,120 --> 00:58:38,114 shocks, to specific sectors that are both highly linked to the 748 00:58:38,114 --> 00:58:55,562 rest of the economy and that the output of which is difficult 749 00:58:55,562 --> 00:59:05,740 for households and businesses to find substitutes. So, right now 750 00:56:29,408 --> 00:56:53,300 we have on hold the threat of imposition of export restrictions 751 00:56:53,300 --> 00:57:17,192 on rare earth elements from the People's Republic of China. I 752 00:57:17,192 --> 00:57:36,740 mean, that's currently deferred until the autumn. But that's 753 00:57:36,740 --> 00:58:07,148 the kind of shock that reminds me of some of the past energy supply 754 00:58:07,148 --> 00:58:31,040 shocks, or some steel shocks, or cotton, on these essential products, 755 00:58:31,040 --> 00:58:52,760 the supply disruption of which can really have spillover effects 756 00:58:52,760 --> 00:59:05,792 into other parts of the economy. 757 00:59:05,792 --> 00:59:09,482 Great. Well, I appreciate the thoughts on the current situation 758 00:59:09,482 --> 00:59:13,910 and very much appreciate you writing the book and taking the time 759 00:59:13,910 --> 00:59:19,076 to come and talk to us about it on the show. So, Tyler, thanks 760 00:59:19,076 --> 00:59:23,135 so much for your time today and thanks for joining us. 761 00:59:23,642 --> 00:59:25,882 Thanks for having me on, Kevin, great talking with you. 762 00:59:27,282 --> 00:59:30,442 Okay. The book is called Recession: The Real Reasons Economies 763 00:59:30,442 --> 00:59:34,234 Shrink and What to Do About It. And it's full of fascinating 764 00:59:34,234 --> 00:59:37,394 stories, great graphics, data. I guarantee we've only just scratched 765 00:59:37,394 --> 00:59:41,818 the surface, so please make sure you go out and get a copy and 766 00:59:41,818 --> 00:59:45,610 follow Tyler's work because I think you can tell from today's conversation 767 00:59:45,610 --> 00:59:49,086 many of these ideas are not being discussed on mainstream media. 768 00:59:49,086 --> 00:59:53,194 So, for all of us here at Top Traders Unplugged, thanks for listening 769 00:59:53,194 --> 00:59:55,090 and we'll see you next time. 770 00:59:57,532 --> 01:01:30,597 Thanks for listening to Top Traders Unplugged. If you feel you 771 01:00:02,848 --> 01:00:16,138 learned something of value from today's episode, the best way 772 01:00:16,138 --> 01:00:33,415 to stay updated is to go on over to your favorite podcast platform 773 01:00:33,415 --> 01:00:52,021 and follow the show so that you'll be sure to get all the new 774 01:00:52,021 --> 01:01:05,311 episodes as they're released. We have some amazing guests lined 775 01:01:05,311 --> 01:01:22,588 up for you. And to ensure our show continues to grow, please leave 776 01:01:22,588 --> 01:01:30,562 us an honest rating and review. It only takes a minute, and 777 01:00:18,214 --> 01:01:06,472 it takes the best way to show us you love the podcast. We'll see 778 01:01:06,472 --> 01:01:30,601 you next time on Top Traders Unplugged. This podcast expresses 779 01:00:03,472 --> 01:00:29,212 the views of its hosts and the guests appearing on the podcast as 780 01:00:29,212 --> 01:00:54,952 of the date of its recording, and such views are subject to change 781 01:00:54,952 --> 01:01:16,732 without notice. Top Traders Unplugged do not have any duty or 782 01:01:16,732 --> 01:01:30,592 obligation to update the information contained herein. Furthermore, 783 00:59:59,802 --> 01:00:22,502 Top Traders Unplugged make no representation to its accuracy and 784 01:00:22,502 --> 01:00:47,472 it shall not be assumed that past investment performance is an 785 01:00:47,472 --> 01:01:10,172 indication of future results. Moreover, wherever there is a potential 786 01:01:10,172 --> 01:01:30,602 for profit, there is also the possibility of loss. This content 787 01:00:07,872 --> 01:00:54,402 is made available for educational purposes only and should 788 01:00:54,402 --> 01:01:30,592 not be used for any other purpose. The information contained 789 01:00:05,287 --> 01:00:33,722 in this podcast does not constitute and should not be construed 790 01:00:33,722 --> 01:01:04,742 as investment advice or an offer to sell or a solicitation to 791 01:01:04,742 --> 01:01:30,592 buy any securities or related financial instruments in any jurisdiction. 792 00:59:57,532 --> 01:00:14,675 Certain information contained herein concerning economic trends 793 01:00:14,675 --> 01:00:39,165 and performance is based on or derived from information provided 794 01:00:39,165 --> 01:01:01,206 by independent third party sources. Top Traders Unplugged may 795 01:01:01,206 --> 01:01:25,696 believe that the sources from which such information are obtained 796 01:01:25,696 --> 01:01:30,594 are reliable. However, Top Traders Unplugged cannot guarantee 797 01:00:14,980 --> 01:00:41,152 the accuracy of such information and has not independently 798 01:00:41,152 --> 01:01:04,416 verified the accuracy or completeness of such information 799 01:01:04,416 --> 01:01:30,588 or the assumptions on which such information is based. This podcast, 800 01:00:03,348 --> 01:00:29,520 including the information contained herein, may not be reproduced, 801 01:00:29,520 --> 01:01:04,416 copied, republished or posted in whole or in part in any form, 802 01:01:04,416 --> 01:01:30,588 without the prior written consent of Top Traders Unplugged.