1 00:00:01,120 --> 00:00:08,400 Kevin Warsh is right to say, what are we doing with this balance 2 00:00:08,400 --> 00:00:15,120 sheet? Why can't we ever shrink it ever again? Are we stuck 3 00:00:15,120 --> 00:00:20,160 forever with the ample reserves regime? Those are really 4 00:00:20,160 --> 00:00:21,280 good questions. And in the past, recent past, when the Fed has 5 00:00:06,030 --> 00:00:11,431 done these policy reviews, it has absolutely failed to ask really 6 00:00:11,431 --> 00:00:16,832 hard questions about what its tools are and whether they're working. 7 00:00:16,832 --> 00:00:21,251 I think it's important that we're having that process. 8 00:00:24,080 --> 00:00:35,069 Welcome to Top Traders Unplugged. In markets success doesn’t 9 00:00:35,069 --> 00:00:47,279 come from predicting what happens next, it comes from being 10 00:00:47,279 --> 00:00:54,605 prepared for what you can’t predict. In each episode we go deep 11 00:00:27,290 --> 00:00:33,175 with some of the world’s most thoughtful minds in investing, economics, 12 00:00:33,175 --> 00:00:39,060 and beyond to understand how they think, how they prepare, and 13 00:00:39,060 --> 00:00:44,410 how they decide, and the experiences that shaped how they 14 00:00:44,410 --> 00:00:49,760 see the world. No noise, no short-cuts, just real conversations 15 00:00:49,760 --> 00:00:54,575 to help you think better and invest with confidence. 16 00:00:57,590 --> 00:01:03,376 Welcome back to Top Traders Unplugged. My name is Alan Dunne 17 00:01:03,376 --> 00:01:09,162 and today I'm delighted to be joined by Brendan Greeley. Brendan 18 00:01:09,162 --> 00:01:15,474 is the author of a new book called The Almighty Dollar, Five 19 00:01:15,474 --> 00:01:21,260 Hundred Years of the World's Most Powerful Money. He is currently 20 00:01:21,260 --> 00:01:26,520 completing a PhD at Princeton University specializing in the history 21 00:01:26,520 --> 00:01:28,624 of money and finance. He was previously a financial journalist 22 00:01:01,472 --> 00:01:07,942 for 20 years at Bloomberg Businessweek and the Economist, and 23 00:01:07,942 --> 00:01:16,353 he was US Economics editor at the FT, and he continues to write 24 00:01:16,353 --> 00:01:25,411 a column for the FT. Brendan, great to see you. Great to have you 25 00:01:25,411 --> 00:01:28,646 on. How are you doing? 26 00:01:29,000 --> 00:01:31,398 Good morning. I'm doing all right. Thanks for having me in. 27 00:01:31,800 --> 00:01:35,188 Well, I mentioned you've written a new book called The Almighty 28 00:01:35,188 --> 00:01:38,268 Dollar, which is a really fascinating, history of the dollar 29 00:01:38,268 --> 00:01:42,580 and we'll definitely get into that. But we do like to get a sense 30 00:01:42,580 --> 00:01:45,968 of our guests' background and how they got interested in economics, 31 00:01:45,968 --> 00:01:49,664 finance, money, all of that. So, how did you stumble into economics? 32 00:01:50,430 --> 00:02:27,796 I did in fact stumble into it. That's the exact right verb. I was 33 00:02:27,796 --> 00:02:54,486 a German literature major in college, a completely useless degree 34 00:02:54,486 --> 00:03:26,514 which prepared me to make very little money as a German translator. 35 00:03:26,514 --> 00:03:58,542 And then I became a journalist and, right after the financial crisis, 36 00:03:58,542 --> 00:04:33,239 I realized that there was a niche in my own publication (at the 37 00:04:33,239 --> 00:05:02,598 time I was at Business Week) where nobody was covering economic 38 00:05:02,598 --> 00:05:39,964 theory and there was a lot going on. There were a lot of things 39 00:05:39,964 --> 00:06:11,992 that had been missed, as we know, in the financial crisis by 40 00:06:11,992 --> 00:06:36,013 the economists who were in charge of America's economy. There's 41 00:01:56,921 --> 00:03:01,831 an absolute iron grip that economists have over politics in 42 00:03:01,831 --> 00:04:19,723 America and they were having, I think, they were having to Come 43 00:04:19,723 --> 00:05:44,106 to Jesus over what they had missed and what needed to be done. 44 00:05:44,106 --> 00:06:36,034 And that was a lot of fun reporting. I got to talk to people 45 00:02:02,004 --> 00:02:25,152 at the Fed about how you set up a macro-prudential crisis facility, 46 00:02:25,152 --> 00:02:52,158 meaning how do you set up a group of people within the Fed that 47 00:02:52,158 --> 00:03:13,377 worry about a financial crisis that continues to be relevant when 48 00:03:13,377 --> 00:03:38,454 there has been no financial crisis in the last 10 years. I talked 49 00:03:38,454 --> 00:04:03,531 to the Fed also about figuring out how to integrate money and banking 50 00:04:03,531 --> 00:04:26,679 back into economic models. And this is something that I think is 51 00:04:26,679 --> 00:04:47,898 a real challenge right now for economists still, today, which is 52 00:04:47,898 --> 00:05:09,117 they have these black box models where you put in employment 53 00:05:09,117 --> 00:05:32,265 and interest rates on one end and get inflation out the other, 54 00:05:32,265 --> 00:05:53,484 or any of those three variables. And there's lots of things 55 00:05:53,484 --> 00:06:16,632 that can go into that. They talk about forward guidance and various 56 00:06:16,632 --> 00:06:35,922 ways in which the Fed has of influencing that model. But the basic 57 00:02:00,276 --> 00:02:39,660 model doesn't really want to look at money and banking we know 58 00:02:39,660 --> 00:03:12,480 the money we have, in a developed industrial economy, comes 59 00:03:12,480 --> 00:03:48,582 from banks. When banks make new loans, those new loans create 60 00:03:48,582 --> 00:04:24,684 new deposits. Those new deposits are new dollars or new Euros. 61 00:04:24,684 --> 00:05:04,068 And that seems like a really important part of the economy. And 62 00:05:04,068 --> 00:05:43,452 particularly for the Fed, which is a bank which is in charge 63 00:05:43,452 --> 00:06:26,118 of our money, and they need to understand that and model that. And 64 00:06:26,118 --> 00:06:35,964 they just don't. You know, since the early 1980s, they've really 65 00:02:35,230 --> 00:03:25,630 abandoned the approach of thinking about the production of 66 00:03:25,630 --> 00:04:21,630 money, different kinds of money: what's M1, what's M2, how 67 00:04:21,630 --> 00:05:28,830 many M's are there? They just don't think about that, Anyway. That's 68 00:05:28,830 --> 00:06:30,430 not the way economists think. They've really walked away from that 69 00:06:30,430 --> 00:06:36,030 approach. They walked away from that approach because they couldn't 70 00:02:29,373 --> 00:03:25,624 figure out how to create one big model of the entire economy using 71 00:03:25,624 --> 00:04:17,548 the money supply. But I think they missed something when they walked 72 00:04:17,548 --> 00:05:09,472 away from that. There are lots of little components of the money 73 00:05:09,472 --> 00:05:57,069 supply. There are different kinds of M's. And the Fed doesn't 74 00:05:57,069 --> 00:06:36,012 really think about the different kinds of M's anymore. So, 75 00:01:56,030 --> 00:03:03,230 I did that kind of reporting, and I thought that was fascinating. 76 00:03:03,230 --> 00:04:04,830 And I eventually ended up being the Fed reporter at BusinessWeek, 77 00:04:04,830 --> 00:04:55,230 and Bloomberg, and then, eventually, for the Financial Times 78 00:04:55,230 --> 00:06:13,630 as well. And I love looking at the Fed's balance sheet. I love looking 79 00:06:13,630 --> 00:06:36,030 at the Fed's tools. The Fed doesn't really like to talk about 80 00:02:47,550 --> 00:04:20,370 its tools. It likes to talk about policy. Are we going to ease 81 00:04:20,370 --> 00:05:38,910 or tighten? And that stuff's important. But how they ease and 82 00:05:38,910 --> 00:06:36,030 how they tighten is really important as well. And so I ended 83 00:02:04,194 --> 00:02:48,927 up being in a position to write this book because I was doing 84 00:02:48,927 --> 00:03:33,660 things like looking at QE and trying to figure out how it worked. 85 00:03:33,660 --> 00:04:14,952 It's actually really hard to figure out how QE works and whether 86 00:04:14,952 --> 00:04:52,803 it works. And I'm not completely certain that the Fed is 87 00:04:52,803 --> 00:05:34,095 sure that it knows how QE works. And I think sometimes the 88 00:05:34,095 --> 00:06:15,387 Fed thinks, well, as long as we don't do anything overtly political, 89 00:06:15,387 --> 00:06:36,033 then we can't get in trouble. So, buying a bunch of treasuries 90 00:02:25,398 --> 00:03:29,506 to them feels like it's not overtly political. It doesn't help 91 00:03:29,506 --> 00:04:51,098 one party or the other. And so that's a thing that they can do. 92 00:04:51,098 --> 00:05:55,206 But just because you can do something doesn't mean you should 93 00:05:55,206 --> 00:06:36,002 do it, because it might not work. And I'm not convinced, for 94 00:02:07,635 --> 00:02:42,045 example, that QE is doing anything, say, other than raising 95 00:02:42,045 --> 00:03:19,896 the value of existing assets, which is an intensely political act. 96 00:03:19,896 --> 00:04:08,070 So, it was a result of that reporting that put me in a frame 97 00:04:08,070 --> 00:04:52,803 of mind to really think hard about how does the Fed work? How 98 00:04:52,803 --> 00:05:30,654 do we actually manufacture money in America? I was much more 99 00:05:30,654 --> 00:06:11,946 interested in all of those tools than I was in predicting the 100 00:06:11,946 --> 00:06:36,033 Fed's reaction function to various economic stimuli. And I think 101 00:02:01,413 --> 00:02:49,006 now, that I've gone back to school to study the history of finance, 102 00:02:49,006 --> 00:03:32,938 I'm completely ruined as a Fed reporter because one of your jobs 103 00:03:32,938 --> 00:04:27,853 as a Fed reporter is to sit in that room, when they give the press 104 00:04:27,853 --> 00:05:04,463 conference, and ask very important questions of the Fed chair. 105 00:05:04,463 --> 00:05:59,378 And I think at this point, if it were my turn to ask a question, 106 00:05:59,378 --> 00:06:35,988 I would just say, what are we even doing here? And I don't think 107 00:02:53,898 --> 00:05:32,568 that would be a very productive question for my employer 108 00:05:32,568 --> 00:06:36,036 or for the Fed. So, that's how I arrived at where I am today is 109 00:03:01,831 --> 00:04:06,741 thinking, structurally, about how the Fed works, how banks create 110 00:04:06,741 --> 00:05:24,633 money, how those things work together, and how that's not in any 111 00:05:24,633 --> 00:06:23,052 way reflected in academic research or federal monetary policy 112 00:06:23,052 --> 00:06:36,034 in America. 113 00:06:36,610 --> 00:06:39,650 Interesting. And I mean, you've touched on the fact you're 114 00:06:39,650 --> 00:06:43,298 doing your PhD at Princeton at the moment on finance money history. 115 00:06:43,298 --> 00:06:47,554 I think you're four or five years into it now. So, has that experience 116 00:06:47,554 --> 00:06:50,290 changed your perspective on… Obviously, it's changed your perspective, 117 00:06:50,290 --> 00:06:53,634 a little bit, on your profession, it sounds like, but I 118 00:06:53,634 --> 00:06:56,370 mean, on economics more generally. Or what insights would 119 00:06:56,370 --> 00:07:00,018 you say have come from that kind of intensive period of review 120 00:07:00,018 --> 00:07:00,930 of economic history? 121 00:07:01,330 --> 00:07:42,182 I mean, first of all, Alan, it's just really fun to read a bunch 122 00:07:42,182 --> 00:08:20,116 of books for a while, and check out of what you're doing, and 123 00:08:20,116 --> 00:09:00,968 just learn a bunch of stuff. I was doing a project with a 27-year-old 124 00:09:00,968 --> 00:09:30,148 grad student, my cohort (they're all 20 years younger than 125 00:09:30,148 --> 00:10:08,082 I am), and at one point he said, can you believe you're doing 126 00:10:08,082 --> 00:10:46,016 homework again? And I said, I can't believe I get to do homework. 127 00:10:46,016 --> 00:11:03,524 This is fun, this is great. But I think that I was exposed to 128 00:07:40,090 --> 00:08:33,385 a couple of historians who've really helped me think both about 129 00:08:33,385 --> 00:09:41,215 how I write history, but how I think about what the Fed does today. 130 00:09:41,215 --> 00:10:19,975 Importantly, my advisor, Harold James, really thinks about 131 00:10:19,975 --> 00:11:03,580 finance. He's a financial historian, not an economic historian. 132 00:07:01,330 --> 00:07:35,440 And that may sound like a distinction without a difference, 133 00:07:35,440 --> 00:08:12,961 but the difference is he really forced me to think structurally 134 00:08:12,961 --> 00:08:47,071 about how all of these historic devices worked. How did 135 00:08:47,071 --> 00:09:24,592 a bill of exchange actually work? It's actually really hard to 136 00:09:24,592 --> 00:10:12,346 understand a bill of exchange. For me, I had to get pieces of paper, 137 00:10:12,346 --> 00:10:56,689 write them out, and then sort of pass them back and forth across 138 00:10:56,689 --> 00:11:03,511 the table. And now, when I teach students how bills of exchange 139 00:07:56,380 --> 00:08:51,430 work, this is technology that's been around since the 14th 140 00:08:51,430 --> 00:09:51,985 century and endured until the 20th century. It's a very difficult 141 00:09:51,985 --> 00:10:52,540 challenge to actually send value across an ocean from one place 142 00:10:52,540 --> 00:11:03,550 to another. I would actually divide up my students into two halves 143 00:07:25,080 --> 00:08:00,705 of the room. There would be a Florence side of the room and a London 144 00:08:00,705 --> 00:08:33,955 side of the room. And I had them all write out bills of exchange 145 00:08:33,955 --> 00:09:04,830 and ship them across the room, back and forth, to sort of figure 146 00:09:04,830 --> 00:09:40,455 out like, what was it, how do you write it, how do you sell it, 147 00:09:40,455 --> 00:10:11,330 what's on it? And that's sort of work, actually forced me to structurally 148 00:10:11,330 --> 00:10:35,080 understand things rather than say, ‘there were bills of exchange, 149 00:10:35,080 --> 00:11:03,580 they move value’, has really helped me think about how money works. 150 00:07:01,330 --> 00:07:37,663 Now, there's another historian who's been really influential. Her 151 00:07:37,663 --> 00:08:26,107 name is Rebecca Spang. She wrote a beautiful book, that I would 152 00:08:26,107 --> 00:09:14,551 recommend to anyone, called Stuff and Money in the Time of the 153 00:09:14,551 --> 00:09:46,847 French Revolution. And she asked really difficult questions 154 00:09:46,847 --> 00:10:27,217 about how money literally works. So, when you say somebody 155 00:10:27,217 --> 00:11:03,550 in Paris paid for something, what does that mean? Like literally, 156 00:07:07,790 --> 00:07:49,780 what did they hand across the barrel head, how did they pay for 157 00:07:49,780 --> 00:08:38,230 it? Was it coins? And it turns out it wasn't coins. It was a lot 158 00:08:38,230 --> 00:09:16,990 of it was just oral credit. People just remember what you owed 159 00:09:16,990 --> 00:09:58,980 them, and at some point over the course of the year, when you 160 00:09:58,980 --> 00:10:40,970 had cash, you would settle up. That turns out, actually, to be how 161 00:10:40,970 --> 00:11:03,580 money works in a lot of places. And so, you know, I liked 162 00:07:18,226 --> 00:07:54,834 that book so much, I got in touch with Rebecca Spang, and we 163 00:07:54,834 --> 00:08:37,074 talk a lot now. And we both agree that what we work on is something 164 00:08:37,074 --> 00:09:10,866 we're calling low finance – like, how do people pay each other? 165 00:09:10,866 --> 00:09:44,658 Turns out there's a lot of ledgers, there's a lot of temporary 166 00:09:44,658 --> 00:10:12,818 credit, there's a lot of handwritten promissory notes in history. 167 00:10:12,818 --> 00:10:49,426 There are a lot of tokens that are produced by shops that allow 168 00:10:49,426 --> 00:11:03,506 you to make small change. All of this sits underneath of the big 169 00:07:23,602 --> 00:07:45,874 finance of banknotes or Federal Reserve notes, eventually. 170 00:07:45,874 --> 00:08:16,498 There's a long process through which America figured out how it 171 00:08:16,498 --> 00:08:52,690 is that we use things to pay each other now. That historical process 172 00:08:52,690 --> 00:09:23,314 is really informative and it helps me be pretty disciplined, I 173 00:09:23,314 --> 00:09:56,722 think, in thinking about how do payments work now? I think in 174 00:09:56,722 --> 00:10:18,994 America we're awful at payments. And Europeans complain 175 00:10:18,994 --> 00:10:49,618 about that when they come over. They realize that, like in 176 00:10:49,618 --> 00:11:03,538 America, we still write checks. Yesterday, I was in the archives 177 00:07:25,960 --> 00:08:11,115 of the American Numismatic Society, and I found a check that 178 00:08:11,115 --> 00:08:56,270 was written against the cashier of the Bank of North America 179 00:08:56,270 --> 00:09:45,530 in 1792. Alan, nothing has changed. I took a picture of it, 180 00:09:45,530 --> 00:10:38,895 I put it online. Nothing about the format of a check has changed 181 00:10:38,895 --> 00:11:03,525 in America. We still write them. I mean, and we can go into 182 00:07:20,818 --> 00:07:48,658 the policy reasons. My argument is we should pay attention 183 00:07:48,658 --> 00:08:24,850 to low finance because it's how all of us make small loans. It's 184 00:08:24,850 --> 00:08:58,258 how all of us access liquidity. It's how all of us… It 185 00:08:58,258 --> 00:09:28,882 really governs our daily lives in a way that's incredibly important 186 00:09:28,882 --> 00:09:56,722 for policymakers, and they just don't think about it. Payments 187 00:09:56,722 --> 00:10:30,130 is a backwater at the Fed. It's the assignment you get when 188 00:10:30,130 --> 00:11:03,538 you don't get to do the big, fun, important, macho, macro stuff. 189 00:11:04,780 --> 00:11:08,771 Well, interesting. I mean, it is one of the themes of your book 190 00:11:08,771 --> 00:11:12,762 as well, kind of. You don't call it low finance. I mean, you 191 00:11:12,762 --> 00:11:16,753 talk like big money or small money. I think a different term for 192 00:11:16,753 --> 00:11:21,358 it. But it is kind of a thread that runs through it. So, maybe talk 193 00:11:21,358 --> 00:11:25,656 to us a bit. The book, obviously you took it on as a project. 194 00:11:25,656 --> 00:11:29,340 I think as you got into the project, you probably learned some 195 00:11:29,340 --> 00:11:32,717 things that impacted the direction. And so, what was, I guess, 196 00:11:32,717 --> 00:11:36,708 the big surprise? What was the big insight you were trying to illustrate 197 00:11:36,708 --> 00:11:37,629 writing the book? 198 00:11:38,030 --> 00:12:11,560 I think the value… You always have to ask yourself, why am I writing 199 00:12:11,560 --> 00:12:40,300 this book and not somebody else? What am I offering here? I 200 00:12:40,300 --> 00:13:09,040 Think what I offered in the book, and what informed my approach 201 00:13:09,040 --> 00:13:40,175 is, I was learning to be an historian over the course of writing 202 00:13:40,175 --> 00:14:13,705 the book, but had worked as a policy reporter. And one of the things 203 00:14:13,705 --> 00:14:37,655 that I think historians do, particularly about money, maybe about 204 00:14:37,655 --> 00:15:01,605 other things, is that they assume that modernity changed everything. 205 00:15:01,605 --> 00:15:35,135 And I was at a conference once and I heard a historian say (we're 206 00:15:35,135 --> 00:16:03,875 talking about small change), well, you know, then we got the Federal 207 00:16:03,875 --> 00:16:32,615 Reserve, and that fixed all that. And I was sitting there, as 208 00:16:32,615 --> 00:16:54,170 a recent former Federal Reserve reporter, thinking, no, we 209 00:16:54,170 --> 00:17:08,540 absolutely did not. The Fed didn't. I mean, there are lots of 210 00:12:03,140 --> 00:12:49,175 challenges. The Fed's a great institution, but there are lots of 211 00:12:49,175 --> 00:13:43,580 challenges that it has failed to fix. And it allowed me to see 212 00:13:43,580 --> 00:14:29,615 that I think that there are continuities between the way money 213 00:14:29,615 --> 00:15:24,020 worked in the 1520s, when this book starts, and the way it works 214 00:15:24,020 --> 00:16:14,240 now in the 2020s, where we are today. Most significant among them, 215 00:16:14,240 --> 00:17:08,645 as you bring up, is the idea of big money and little money. So, 216 00:11:44,917 --> 00:12:53,787 numismatists, people who study coins, know from mint records that 217 00:12:53,787 --> 00:14:02,657 there's a fundamental challenge in minting that is as old 218 00:14:02,657 --> 00:15:18,414 as minting, which is small coins are more expensive to produce 219 00:15:18,414 --> 00:16:54,832 than big coins. And the reason is you have to hammer out a small 220 00:16:54,832 --> 00:17:08,606 coin. Literally. You know, until the 19th century, you would 221 00:12:13,766 --> 00:13:16,304 stick a die on a stump, the obverse die, and then you would stick 222 00:13:16,304 --> 00:14:18,842 the little chunk of metal on top of it, and then you would stick 223 00:14:18,842 --> 00:15:21,380 the reverse die on top of that. Then you would sit on top of 224 00:15:21,380 --> 00:16:19,451 the whole thing and you would whack it with a hammer. That's an 225 00:16:19,451 --> 00:17:04,121 industrial process, it’s very difficult to do, it takes skilled 226 00:17:04,121 --> 00:17:08,588 labor. Crucially, every coin needed one whack, which meant that 227 00:12:24,515 --> 00:13:26,495 per unit of value, large coins are much cheaper to produce than 228 00:13:26,495 --> 00:14:28,475 small coins because you have many fewer whacks, a lot less skilled 229 00:14:28,475 --> 00:15:14,960 labor. And so, that has informed minting policy, honestly, 230 00:15:14,960 --> 00:16:22,105 since the first electrum coins in what we now think of as Greece, 231 00:16:22,105 --> 00:17:08,590 and I don't think that challenge has gone away. So, we refer 232 00:11:49,430 --> 00:12:38,830 to that as brassage cost. This is the cost of production for minting. 233 00:12:38,830 --> 00:13:28,230 We now, of course, don't make money with coins. Coins are a very 234 00:13:28,230 --> 00:14:06,230 insignificant part of our monetary system. We make it through 235 00:14:06,230 --> 00:14:44,230 banks. However, bank loans have the exact same challenge as 236 00:14:44,230 --> 00:15:22,230 minting. It's just as expensive to underwrite a small loan 237 00:15:22,230 --> 00:16:15,430 as it is to underwrite a large loan. You’ve got the same back office 238 00:16:15,430 --> 00:17:01,030 costs, no matter what, but your profits are much higher on the 239 00:17:01,030 --> 00:17:08,630 big loan. And for the exact same reasons as mints preferred to 240 00:12:58,660 --> 00:14:35,416 make big coins, banks now prefer to deal with high value depositors, 241 00:14:35,416 --> 00:15:47,983 high value borrowers, high value transfers. They're much better 242 00:15:47,983 --> 00:17:08,613 profit centers than small banking. This is a real challenge. 243 00:11:38,030 --> 00:12:21,626 You know, in America we have a much bigger network of community 244 00:12:21,626 --> 00:13:01,589 banks than we do in other countries. But we're still uniquely 245 00:13:01,589 --> 00:13:37,919 bad in America at getting people into the financial system, 246 00:13:37,919 --> 00:14:21,515 getting them into the banking system. We have a lot of families 247 00:14:21,515 --> 00:15:01,478 in America that don't even have bank accounts. And the reason 248 00:15:01,478 --> 00:15:52,340 why is that banks make it very difficult to be a depositor and a 249 00:15:52,340 --> 00:16:39,569 borrower if you don't have a lot of money. They just don't want 250 00:16:39,569 --> 00:17:08,633 to deal with small loans and small deposits. So, my argument, 251 00:11:49,979 --> 00:12:37,775 in the book, is the central challenge of money has not changed 252 00:12:37,775 --> 00:13:25,571 brassage costs are still high for small loans, for banks, the way 253 00:13:25,571 --> 00:14:17,350 they were for small coins, for mints. And I think that those challenges 254 00:14:17,350 --> 00:15:05,146 we're still stuck with now. And so, one thread that runs through 255 00:15:05,146 --> 00:15:52,942 the book is often the way normal people buy and sell things 256 00:15:52,942 --> 00:16:32,772 (so not merchants, but just sort of people buying groceries, 257 00:16:32,772 --> 00:17:08,619 coffee, beef) have problems coming up with the money. And when 258 00:11:44,776 --> 00:12:28,625 I say coming up with the money, I don't mean coming up with 259 00:12:28,625 --> 00:13:02,355 the value or the wealth, literally figuring out the physical 260 00:13:02,355 --> 00:13:39,458 means or the credit of just making basic transactions. And I 261 00:13:39,458 --> 00:14:16,561 think that what we find is, century after century, people make 262 00:14:16,561 --> 00:14:57,037 up their own money. So, you can tell them, this gold standard 263 00:14:57,037 --> 00:15:44,259 is very good for you. It keeps money sound. But people kind of don't 264 00:15:44,259 --> 00:16:14,616 care. And when things go pear-shaped, they don't appreciate 265 00:16:14,616 --> 00:16:48,346 the value of the gold standard, which is generating inflation. 266 00:16:48,346 --> 00:17:08,584 They just make their own money. And often it's very creative 267 00:12:00,985 --> 00:12:46,895 money that works financially. It's not just randomly printed, printing 268 00:12:46,895 --> 00:13:46,578 up tickets and saying poof, this is money. A lot of times, you 269 00:13:46,578 --> 00:14:32,488 know, there were hard times money during financial crises in 270 00:14:32,488 --> 00:15:32,171 the 19th century in America, a lot of cities printed up their own 271 00:15:32,171 --> 00:16:18,081 dollar notes during the Depression. In America. This is really 272 00:16:18,081 --> 00:17:03,991 recent, within the last hundred years people have been doing 273 00:17:03,991 --> 00:17:08,582 this. And so, people will make up their own money, at their own 274 00:12:24,158 --> 00:13:10,286 level to work no matter what you do at the large international 275 00:13:10,286 --> 00:13:48,726 policy level. And I think that's really important. We need 276 00:13:48,726 --> 00:14:38,698 to pay more attention to that. So, I think the one single thing, 277 00:14:38,698 --> 00:15:36,358 if I had any to sort of say with the book, it's that the central 278 00:15:36,358 --> 00:16:18,642 challenge of the dollar has not changed for 500 years, which 279 00:16:18,642 --> 00:17:00,926 is that big money dollars work. Small money dollars are always 280 00:17:00,926 --> 00:17:08,614 a challenge. And this comes from an insight from, as you point 281 00:12:18,840 --> 00:13:03,731 out, Carlo Cipolla. He was an Italian medievalist who was looking 282 00:13:03,731 --> 00:13:48,622 at medieval money and pointed out exactly what I just explained 283 00:13:48,622 --> 00:14:37,594 to you. The brassage costs are higher on small coins. So, mints 284 00:14:37,594 --> 00:15:30,647 prefer to make big coins. I read that and I thought, that's the 285 00:15:30,647 --> 00:16:23,700 Fed. That's policy now. That felt very familiar to me as a contemporary 286 00:16:23,700 --> 00:17:08,591 policy writer, in addition to somebody who's trained as a historian. 287 00:17:10,601 --> 00:17:14,605 Well, obviously the book does go into all of that about the kind 288 00:17:14,605 --> 00:17:18,917 of big money, small money, and how the uses of money and use of 289 00:17:18,917 --> 00:17:22,305 ledgers, etc. But it is primarily about the US dollar. And 290 00:17:22,305 --> 00:17:26,001 I suppose the interesting feature of the story is how the dollar 291 00:17:26,001 --> 00:17:30,005 came along before the US as a country came along. So, it wasn't 292 00:17:30,005 --> 00:17:34,317 as if they, on day one said, we're going to have a currency called 293 00:17:34,317 --> 00:17:37,705 the dollar. The US adopted what was already a global currency. 294 00:17:37,705 --> 00:17:42,017 So maybe give us a quick sense on that evolution of the dollar prior 295 00:17:42,017 --> 00:17:43,865 to the founding of the US. 296 00:17:44,141 --> 00:18:44,117 Yeah, Alexander Hamilton, the father of American finance, called 297 00:18:44,117 --> 00:20:17,413 it the ancient dollar. It was very clear to him that it was an 298 00:20:17,413 --> 00:21:50,709 old coin, it was an old idea at the founding of America. I think 299 00:21:50,709 --> 00:23:17,341 one of the things that we learn in school about money is that 300 00:23:17,341 --> 00:24:03,989 there's this implicit assumption of sovereignty, monetary 301 00:24:03,989 --> 00:25:03,965 sovereignty. There's a lot of handwaving around the definition 302 00:25:03,965 --> 00:26:23,933 of this, but basically it's the control a country has over its 303 00:26:23,933 --> 00:26:37,261 own money. So, the assumption is new country, new money. When you 304 00:19:14,501 --> 00:21:02,933 look at the founding of America, you end up with a problem 305 00:21:02,933 --> 00:23:00,401 which is that there was a new country, they had some measure of 306 00:23:00,401 --> 00:24:21,725 political sovereignty, but then they chose as their currency 307 00:24:21,725 --> 00:26:01,121 what was essentially a Spanish coin from Mexican and Bolivian silver 308 00:26:01,121 --> 00:26:37,265 with a German name. You know, we would have expected that they 309 00:18:36,149 --> 00:19:34,658 would have called their currency the Washington, but they 310 00:19:34,658 --> 00:20:52,670 didn't. They called it the dollar. And I don't think that they 311 00:20:52,670 --> 00:22:04,181 borrowed a word from the German. They borrowed a money. They 312 00:22:04,181 --> 00:23:09,191 basically adopted an existing currency zone that was defined by 313 00:23:09,191 --> 00:24:33,704 a huge silver coin that, at the time, was minted by mints in 314 00:24:33,704 --> 00:25:45,215 the Spanish Empire, in Mexico City, and at Potosi, where there 315 00:25:45,215 --> 00:26:37,223 were silver lodes in what is now Bolivia. When I pulled on that 316 00:18:08,596 --> 00:19:12,179 thread, I ended up literally at the bottom of a Czech silver mine 317 00:19:12,179 --> 00:20:10,871 trying to figure out where this came from. And so, the word 318 00:20:10,871 --> 00:21:14,454 dollar comes from a valley in what is now the Czech Republic that 319 00:21:14,454 --> 00:22:18,037 was settled by… So, the valley had silver in it. The person who 320 00:22:18,037 --> 00:23:06,947 claimed ownership of the valley, who didn't even have real 321 00:23:06,947 --> 00:24:20,312 ownership of the valley, was a sort of a local Count. He was a real 322 00:24:20,312 --> 00:25:19,004 dirt bag. Stefan Schlick is often sort of written down as the 323 00:25:19,004 --> 00:26:27,478 father of the dollar. And it turns out he just was never in control 324 00:26:27,478 --> 00:26:37,260 of anything. He kind of owned the property in entirety with his 325 00:18:47,611 --> 00:19:57,428 brothers and several of his cousins and just decided, well, once 326 00:19:57,428 --> 00:21:19,939 they discovered silver, that he was going to be the lord of the 327 00:21:19,939 --> 00:22:42,450 valleys. So, the problem with silver in the ground is that it doesn't 328 00:22:42,450 --> 00:23:52,267 become silver in your hand without a bunch of really expensive 329 00:23:52,267 --> 00:25:02,084 industrial processes. And this was true in the 16th century, as 330 00:25:02,084 --> 00:26:18,248 it is today. And so, he realized that he needed capital and 331 00:26:18,248 --> 00:26:37,289 he needed expertise. So, he brought Saxon investors and Saxon 332 00:18:16,033 --> 00:19:06,149 miners over the mountains to this valley in Bohemia to illegally 333 00:19:06,149 --> 00:20:00,821 mine and refine silver. They named the valley in their own language, 334 00:20:00,821 --> 00:20:46,381 Joachimsthaler, the Valley of St. Joachim. The silver that came 335 00:20:46,381 --> 00:21:45,609 out of that valley was never meant to be coins. So, usually, and 336 00:21:45,609 --> 00:22:31,169 particularly at the time, there was one centralized mint in 337 00:22:31,169 --> 00:23:30,397 Krusne hory, in Bohemia. And it was a way that the king could 338 00:23:30,397 --> 00:24:29,625 claim his own share of the silver and the nobles, who had always 339 00:24:29,625 --> 00:25:24,297 lent money to the king, could immediately then get paid back. The 340 00:25:24,297 --> 00:26:28,081 mint was not a way to create coins necessarily was a way to control 341 00:26:28,081 --> 00:26:37,193 the silver. But one thing that the mint did, the sort of standard 342 00:20:10,749 --> 00:22:50,685 centralized mint in Bohemia, was it created lots of big and small 343 00:22:50,685 --> 00:25:30,621 money - the full range of coins that everybody would need for 344 00:25:30,621 --> 00:26:37,261 small transactions and big transactions. This mint, in Joachimsthaler, 345 00:18:06,589 --> 00:19:13,933 because it was kind of a wildcat mint, it was outside the 346 00:19:13,933 --> 00:20:21,277 Bohemian system and it was illegal. And for a while nobody knew 347 00:20:21,277 --> 00:21:28,621 what was going on. Eventually what they did was they just created 348 00:21:28,621 --> 00:22:41,577 high value silver coins that had one job only, which was to pay 349 00:22:41,577 --> 00:23:48,921 dividends to the Saxon silver investors. If you were a Saxon silver 350 00:23:48,921 --> 00:24:50,653 investor, you expected your mining company to work in a certain 351 00:24:50,653 --> 00:25:57,997 way. That's the way it already worked in Saxony. That's the way 352 00:25:57,997 --> 00:26:37,281 they did it in Joachimsthaler as well. So, you’ve got this big 353 00:18:27,136 --> 00:20:18,923 silver coin as your dividend. It was a very high value coin. It 354 00:20:18,923 --> 00:22:02,111 was worth like a week of labor, and I calculated 21 pounds 355 00:22:02,111 --> 00:23:53,898 of bacon. It was sort of not something that you could hand over 356 00:23:53,898 --> 00:25:54,284 a counter for some bread. It was really a big coin. In fact, I 357 00:25:54,284 --> 00:26:37,279 have one in my bag. When I was talking to Peter Vorel, who's a Czech 358 00:19:03,711 --> 00:20:39,195 historian, who's done a lot of the legal archival research in early 359 00:20:39,195 --> 00:22:22,636 Joachimsthaler, that I leaned on in the book, he gave me a full 360 00:22:22,636 --> 00:23:50,163 silver copy of one of these original dividend coins. And I'm 361 00:23:50,163 --> 00:25:41,561 going to drop it on the desk. Here it goes, right. It doesn't ring, 362 00:25:41,561 --> 00:26:37,260 it clanks. Right? It's a heavy coin. And so, because the mine only 363 00:18:17,813 --> 00:19:02,709 produced dividends, you had this incredibly high-volume flood 364 00:19:02,709 --> 00:20:15,665 of these big coins and they became useful as money for just merchants. 365 00:20:15,665 --> 00:21:23,009 So, you get, very early on, these coins are flooding up through 366 00:21:23,009 --> 00:22:24,741 Leipzig and into the Baltic with trade. They're passing by Sweden 367 00:22:24,741 --> 00:23:32,085 and Denmark. You get copies in Sweden and Denmark of this coin. 368 00:23:32,085 --> 00:24:33,817 Because it came out of the valley of Joachimsthaler. It was 369 00:24:33,817 --> 00:25:35,549 called the Joachim’s Thaler. And then you get thaler in German, 370 00:25:35,549 --> 00:26:37,281 and then eventually daalder in Dutch, and then dollar in America. 371 00:17:44,141 --> 00:19:39,124 So, as German cities, Hamburg, Lubeck, are copying this, it gets 372 00:19:39,124 --> 00:21:55,013 copied in the Netherlands as well. And then it ends up in London. 373 00:21:55,013 --> 00:23:49,996 So within, well less than a century, Shakespeare in two plays 374 00:23:49,996 --> 00:25:55,432 mentions dollars. He mentions it in a Tempest and he mentions it 375 00:25:55,432 --> 00:26:37,244 in the Scottish play. And so, to me, that says that this thing 376 00:19:11,378 --> 00:20:58,001 called the dollar, which sat well outside of the English monetary 377 00:20:58,001 --> 00:22:34,931 system of pound, shillings and pence, was familiar to groundlings 378 00:22:34,931 --> 00:24:40,940 at the Globe Theater. They knew that it was a big silver coin 379 00:24:40,940 --> 00:26:27,563 that came from the Low Countries for English wool and English 380 00:26:27,563 --> 00:26:37,256 cloth. So this coin spread because it was never meant to be 381 00:19:28,861 --> 00:21:23,101 local money. It was always meant to be a dividend for investors 382 00:21:23,101 --> 00:23:45,901 which made it very valuable as as what we think of now as high powered 383 00:23:45,901 --> 00:25:40,141 money, or what Carlo Chipola called big money. It was money for 384 00:25:40,141 --> 00:26:37,261 merchants, for settling long distance trade. And so, when the 385 00:18:23,633 --> 00:19:52,490 Spanish discovered that they had silver, first through plunder 386 00:19:52,490 --> 00:21:50,966 in Mexico, Charles V, the Holy Roman Empire emperor, you know, in 387 00:21:50,966 --> 00:23:29,696 charge of Castile, but also brand new viceroyalties in Latin 388 00:23:29,696 --> 00:25:28,172 America, realized that even though he was emperor of all he surveyed, 389 00:25:28,172 --> 00:26:37,283 he could not control the silver markets. And so if he was 390 00:18:10,021 --> 00:19:01,781 going to sell his silver through Antwerp to the Portuguese, 391 00:19:01,781 --> 00:20:19,421 who were bringing it to India and China, he had to put it in the 392 00:20:19,421 --> 00:21:11,181 exact same form that those silver merchants in Antwerp were 393 00:21:11,181 --> 00:22:13,293 already familiar with, which was this big silver coin that a century 394 00:22:13,293 --> 00:23:15,405 earlier had come out of a valley in Bohemia. So even Charles 395 00:23:15,405 --> 00:24:27,869 V had to figure out how to hack his own monetary system to create 396 00:24:27,869 --> 00:25:35,157 something called a Real de a Ocho, a piece of eight. An eight 397 00:25:35,157 --> 00:26:37,269 real piece. But what it really was a copy of this coin. Chipola 398 00:17:49,367 --> 00:18:52,079 said, with big money there tends to be one dominant form of 399 00:18:52,079 --> 00:19:54,791 money, and a lot of other monies are, what he called, more 400 00:19:54,791 --> 00:20:47,051 or less faithful copies of that dominant money. So, Charles 401 00:20:47,051 --> 00:22:00,215 V had to create a more or less faithful copy of the Joachim’s Thaler, 402 00:22:00,215 --> 00:23:08,153 which had become by then the thaler, or the dollar, in order to 403 00:23:08,153 --> 00:24:05,639 get his silver into global markets. Again, very clear to the 404 00:24:05,639 --> 00:25:03,125 English what this is, his son, Philip II, continued minting dollars 405 00:25:03,125 --> 00:26:16,289 in even greater volume. And we get in the 1570s a mention in English 406 00:26:16,289 --> 00:26:37,193 of a Phillips dollar. So, this thing arrives, it's gone through 407 00:18:58,782 --> 00:20:45,412 this tortured path. It's silver that's coming out of this 408 00:20:45,412 --> 00:22:00,053 incredibly repressive forced-labor mining system in Bolivia. 409 00:22:00,053 --> 00:24:08,009 But it eventually gets minted by the Spanish. And when it arrives 410 00:24:08,009 --> 00:26:26,628 in England, they immediately see it for what it is, which is a 411 00:26:26,628 --> 00:26:37,291 dollar. So, by the end of that century, you have colonies in America 412 00:18:45,065 --> 00:19:40,912 that are on the edge of this vast international trading system 413 00:19:40,912 --> 00:20:41,836 in dollars. It's both in the Atlantic and in the Pacific economy. 414 00:20:41,836 --> 00:21:32,606 And the dollar becomes the dominant form of useful currency 415 00:21:32,606 --> 00:22:43,684 in America as well. So, by the time of the founders, you end up 416 00:22:43,684 --> 00:23:34,454 with this system where they're takers of foreign money. They're 417 00:23:34,454 --> 00:24:25,224 not producing domestic money. There's no domestic gold or silver. 418 00:24:25,224 --> 00:25:26,148 In America they don't even have any until the 1830s in Georgia, 419 00:25:26,148 --> 00:26:16,918 and then eventually, of course, the great gold strikes in 420 00:26:16,918 --> 00:26:37,226 California in the 1850s. So, America adopted an existing global 421 00:18:20,909 --> 00:19:28,317 monetary zone. They did not create their own dollar zone. And 422 00:19:28,317 --> 00:20:41,853 so that, to me, is incredibly important because what it says, to 423 00:20:41,853 --> 00:21:43,133 me, is sovereignty is overrated, or rather, it's very important 424 00:21:43,133 --> 00:22:44,413 but we tend to assume sovereignty. When, in fact, monetary 425 00:22:44,413 --> 00:24:04,077 sovereignty has to be fought for. You have to figure out how to 426 00:24:04,077 --> 00:25:11,485 take a currency and domesticate it and make sure it works 427 00:25:11,485 --> 00:26:18,893 for everybody. I don't think that process was complete with a 428 00:26:18,893 --> 00:26:37,277 dollar until 1932. We can talk about the transition from this silver 429 00:18:30,725 --> 00:19:38,013 dollar to bank money, but, you know, there are a lot of stumbles 430 00:19:38,013 --> 00:20:40,125 along the way, a lot of financial crises, a lot of experimental 431 00:20:40,125 --> 00:21:42,237 regulation to figure out how to create the system we have now. 432 00:21:42,237 --> 00:22:44,349 That silver dollar from Mexico was current as money in America until 433 00:22:44,349 --> 00:23:46,461 the 1850s. There was no moment where America said, we're on our 434 00:23:46,461 --> 00:24:58,925 own time for our own money. It was a long process of adopting this 435 00:24:58,925 --> 00:25:55,861 foreign money and then figuring out how you use banks to 436 00:25:55,861 --> 00:26:37,269 produce your own money that's reliable for everybody. 437 00:26:42,011 --> 00:26:45,597 As you're talking about, you know, the money for merchants versus 438 00:26:45,597 --> 00:26:48,531 money for everybody else. Obviously, there are those parallels 439 00:26:48,531 --> 00:26:52,769 with the use of the dollar at the moment in the global systems. 440 00:26:52,769 --> 00:26:56,681 So, the dollar is the reserve currency. So, obviously, we can get 441 00:26:56,681 --> 00:27:00,919 into the euro dollar market in a moment, but it's used widely amongst 442 00:27:00,919 --> 00:27:04,831 merchants. But at the same time, it is the currency of day-to-day 443 00:27:04,831 --> 00:27:09,069 transactions in the US as well. So, I guess, is that part of 444 00:27:09,069 --> 00:27:12,655 your point, that dual role creates some tensions or some interesting 445 00:27:12,655 --> 00:27:13,307 trade-offs maybe? 446 00:27:13,361 --> 00:27:21,991 Yeah, absolutely. I think you're right. Everyone else in the 447 00:27:21,991 --> 00:27:32,347 world has a dual currency, just not the United States. You know, 448 00:27:32,347 --> 00:27:40,977 it's. I think it's really convenient. You know, Europeans and 449 00:27:40,977 --> 00:27:49,607 Chinese politicians often complain about the power of the dollar. 450 00:27:49,607 --> 00:28:00,826 And I think there are problems with the system. But I also think 451 00:28:00,826 --> 00:28:09,456 it's kind of convenient to have your domestic monetary policy, 452 00:28:09,456 --> 00:28:18,949 where you can manage things for yourself, and then this offshore 453 00:28:18,949 --> 00:28:27,579 system of dollars that you're not necessarily in control of. But 454 00:27:14,469 --> 00:27:28,873 for the Germans, for example, in the ‘60s and ‘70s, it was really 455 00:27:28,873 --> 00:27:41,061 handy to keep German wealth offshore in this dollar system so 456 00:27:41,061 --> 00:27:54,357 that it didn't come home and cause inflation, and deal with this, 457 00:27:54,357 --> 00:28:06,545 and disrupt this model that Germany had of low wage/high value 458 00:28:06,545 --> 00:28:18,733 machine exports. And so, I think the dollar system is really 459 00:28:18,733 --> 00:28:27,597 useful right now for a lot of people. I think it's good to have 460 00:27:20,111 --> 00:27:29,111 a global currency, an international currency that's used 461 00:27:29,111 --> 00:27:35,861 for international transactions, that's reliable for 462 00:27:35,861 --> 00:27:45,986 everybody, that's got a predictable value, that works for 463 00:27:45,986 --> 00:27:59,486 merchants. But also, this more flexible system at home of a different 464 00:27:59,486 --> 00:28:12,986 kind of money that works for people making purchases at the grocery 465 00:28:12,986 --> 00:28:25,361 store. These are two different kinds of monetary system and always 466 00:28:25,361 --> 00:28:27,611 have been. 467 00:28:28,091 --> 00:28:38,497 Let's take a step back and talk about that. Obviously, what 468 00:28:38,497 --> 00:28:50,795 is interesting… You wrote an article in the FT a couple of months 469 00:28:50,795 --> 00:29:03,093 ago about that there's no such thing as a petrodollar (is what it 470 00:29:03,093 --> 00:29:13,499 was called), but it was about the petrodollars, but also about 471 00:29:13,499 --> 00:29:24,851 the evolution of the euro dollar market. And in it you mentioned 472 00:29:24,851 --> 00:29:34,311 how there's US$14 trillion in offshore dollars and US$19 trillion 473 00:29:34,311 --> 00:29:37,149 in domestic dollars. So, the size of the US external dollar market 474 00:28:37,100 --> 00:28:49,112 is nearly as big as the domestic market, which is a fascinating 475 00:28:49,112 --> 00:29:01,124 statistic. And obviously, I mean there was a whole bunch of different 476 00:29:01,124 --> 00:29:11,134 factors that came together to, I suppose, initiate the development 477 00:29:11,134 --> 00:29:21,144 of the euro/dollar market. With kind of tacit approval from 478 00:29:21,144 --> 00:29:34,157 both the US and Europeans. But now it exerts a huge influence on 479 00:29:34,157 --> 00:29:37,160 the global market. And I guess the point of your article was that 480 00:28:42,191 --> 00:28:57,701 it's getting stronger amid all the talk of the dollar's potential 481 00:28:57,701 --> 00:29:10,391 demise, that stability, and the dominance, and the influence 482 00:29:10,391 --> 00:29:30,131 of the euro dollar market is as great now as it's ever been. Is 483 00:29:30,131 --> 00:29:37,181 that fair to say so? 484 00:29:37,341 --> 00:29:45,669 So, I think this is another inheritance that we have from economists 485 00:29:45,669 --> 00:29:53,303 that makes it difficult to understand policy now. So, when we 486 00:29:53,303 --> 00:30:01,631 learn that money is fiat, it makes us incurious about how it's 487 00:30:01,631 --> 00:30:08,571 actually produced. So, you know, the basic ‘just so’ story, 488 00:30:08,571 --> 00:30:15,511 and all histories are, in some ways, a simplified model. The basic 489 00:29:38,417 --> 00:29:44,335 ‘just so’ story that we learned about money, again, if we 490 00:29:44,335 --> 00:29:51,329 took a macro class, or a micro class for that matter, in college, 491 00:29:51,329 --> 00:29:58,323 you know, money used to be silver and gold, and then it became 492 00:29:58,323 --> 00:30:05,317 paper, and then we took silver and gold away, and now it's fiat. 493 00:30:05,317 --> 00:30:12,311 It's Latin for ‘let it be done’. If the state says this is 494 00:30:12,311 --> 00:30:15,539 money and then it's money. Poof. 495 00:30:16,741 --> 00:31:02,881 I think that betrays a profound lack of curiosity about 496 00:31:02,881 --> 00:31:53,635 how money is actually produced. When we look into how money 497 00:31:53,635 --> 00:32:49,003 works, and how it's actually produced, I think we're able to see 498 00:32:49,003 --> 00:33:48,985 things that are hard to see with a framework of fiat. And the 499 00:33:48,985 --> 00:34:44,353 most important part of that is, you know, what you just brought 500 00:34:44,353 --> 00:34:53,581 up, Euro/dollars. So, in America, we obviously transitioned 501 00:30:31,705 --> 00:31:01,633 away from the system of using foreign silver coins. And what we 502 00:31:01,633 --> 00:31:31,561 did was we chartered a bunch of banks. The constitution said individual 503 00:31:31,561 --> 00:31:58,995 states can't make their own money, so, the states chartered banks 504 00:31:58,995 --> 00:32:36,405 to do it for them. A bank note is essentially just a piece of paper 505 00:32:36,405 --> 00:33:08,827 that says, you know, the bank is giving you a loan that's giving 506 00:33:08,827 --> 00:33:43,743 you a loan in the form of paper that you can spend as currency 507 00:33:43,743 --> 00:34:18,659 rather than silver or gold. It took a long time to make this model 508 00:34:18,659 --> 00:34:48,587 work, but by the 1950s, of course, in America, this model is 509 00:34:48,587 --> 00:34:53,575 pretty reliable. Not only is it reliable, it's the sort of only 510 00:31:27,721 --> 00:32:38,701 reliable large industrial economy left in the world. Not only 511 00:32:38,701 --> 00:34:03,877 that, gold is still important at this point in the financial system 512 00:34:03,877 --> 00:34:53,563 and America's got 60% of the gold. It turns out though, that the 513 00:30:34,039 --> 00:31:02,869 first thing that happened is that American deposits became useful 514 00:31:02,869 --> 00:31:34,582 for people abroad. What we would have predicted in the system, 515 00:31:34,582 --> 00:32:06,295 and what economists thought was going to happen, is that foreigners 516 00:32:06,295 --> 00:32:40,891 were going to sell things to America, which they started to do 517 00:32:40,891 --> 00:33:18,370 again in the late ‘50s and early’ 60s. And then they would earn 518 00:33:18,370 --> 00:33:50,083 American bank deposits as payment for that. And then they would 519 00:33:50,083 --> 00:34:24,679 present those bank deposits at the Fed which would go through a 520 00:34:24,679 --> 00:34:53,509 process that would eventually give them gold from Fort Knox. That 521 00:30:21,597 --> 00:31:15,013 didn't happen. They were really confused about it at the time. 522 00:31:15,013 --> 00:32:13,285 And so, we've got this record of the Fed sending researchers over 523 00:32:13,285 --> 00:33:21,269 to London to try and ask like, what are you doing with these deposits? 524 00:33:21,269 --> 00:34:14,685 And they're coming back and they're telling the Fed, you're not 525 00:34:14,685 --> 00:34:53,533 going to believe what they're doing over there. What they were 526 00:30:25,867 --> 00:30:59,329 doing was just trading claims on American deposits. If you had 527 00:30:59,329 --> 00:31:35,833 access to deposits in America, you could sell that to somebody else 528 00:31:35,833 --> 00:32:18,421 in London who could then use it as cash. And so this system was 529 00:32:18,421 --> 00:32:45,799 really convenient, as we talked about, for other countries, 530 00:32:45,799 --> 00:33:22,303 it was convenient for Germany so it could continue its export model. 531 00:33:22,303 --> 00:33:49,681 It's really convenient for America because nobody was showing 532 00:33:49,681 --> 00:34:32,269 up at the front door of Fort Knox and asking for gold, or far 533 00:34:32,269 --> 00:34:53,563 fewer people than would have been otherwise. Then a crazy thing 534 00:30:29,321 --> 00:31:07,061 happened and again, the Fed had to send people over to London 535 00:31:07,061 --> 00:31:44,801 to figure this out, which is that banks in London start making 536 00:31:44,801 --> 00:32:22,541 their own dollars. If you believe in the fiat system, you cannot, 537 00:32:22,541 --> 00:33:00,281 you do not have an explanation for how this happens. What's going 538 00:33:00,281 --> 00:33:34,876 on, and Milton Friedman pointed this out in the late ‘60s, 539 00:33:34,876 --> 00:34:12,616 is banks were marking up their own ledgers with brand new loans, 540 00:34:12,616 --> 00:34:47,211 brand new deposits denominated in dollars, and they were doing this 541 00:34:47,211 --> 00:34:53,501 in London. So you have a dollar denominated banking system 542 00:31:09,469 --> 00:32:08,788 anchored to deposits in American banks that's creating brand 543 00:32:08,788 --> 00:33:27,880 new dollars that are outside the reach of the treasury or the 544 00:33:27,880 --> 00:34:33,790 Fed or anyone. It's this dollar system that defines global 545 00:34:33,790 --> 00:34:53,563 trade, I think. If you believe in fiat, then you believe that money 546 00:31:06,171 --> 00:31:55,601 is, you know, a collective social institution, which it surely 547 00:31:55,601 --> 00:32:54,917 is, but the details matter. And you sort of believe that. We're 548 00:32:54,917 --> 00:33:54,233 not quite sure why it is that everybody uses dollars, but everybody 549 00:33:54,233 --> 00:34:53,549 got into the habit of using dollars. So now everybody has to. 550 00:30:16,741 --> 00:30:43,218 I think a much more compelling description, a much more compelling 551 00:30:43,218 --> 00:31:07,288 story, is that once banks developed this offshore dollar system, 552 00:31:07,288 --> 00:31:36,172 it worked and it still works today. This is the challenge. If 553 00:31:36,172 --> 00:32:07,463 you're going to settle trade, you need a short term bank loan to 554 00:32:07,463 --> 00:32:38,754 buy your inventory so that, you know, while it's on a ship moving 555 00:32:38,754 --> 00:33:07,638 to somewhere else, you can have access to cash right now. That's 556 00:33:07,638 --> 00:33:31,708 all happening in dollars. That's all happening with bank loans 557 00:33:31,708 --> 00:33:58,185 in dollars inside this global dollar system that has slowly been 558 00:33:58,185 --> 00:34:29,476 figured out over the course of the last 50 years. It’s very difficult 559 00:34:29,476 --> 00:34:53,546 to imagine what replaces that or how it gets replaced. Again, it's 560 00:30:23,493 --> 00:31:04,005 not a perfect system. There are lots of drawbacks to this system. 561 00:31:04,005 --> 00:31:41,141 I'm just talking about these institutions are very deep, and the 562 00:31:41,141 --> 00:32:18,277 way international trade works right now is you need a short-term 563 00:32:18,277 --> 00:32:58,789 dollar loan. And banks in China are doing this as well. You 564 00:32:58,789 --> 00:33:29,173 know, we've seen growth in euro/dollars, meaning offshore dollars, 565 00:33:29,173 --> 00:34:09,685 in China over the last several years in addition to other places 566 00:34:09,685 --> 00:34:46,821 in the world. When you look at those numbers, they're continuing 567 00:34:46,821 --> 00:34:53,573 to grow. So, when we worry about the loss of dollar dominance, 568 00:30:58,681 --> 00:31:53,203 we have to look at the dominant form of dollars in the world. 569 00:31:53,203 --> 00:32:35,143 It's euro/dollars. And man, that doesn't seem to be decreasing. 570 00:32:35,143 --> 00:33:17,083 And so, we should ask ourselves why isn't it decreasing? 571 00:33:17,083 --> 00:34:07,411 It can't be because everybody in the world is under a collective 572 00:34:07,411 --> 00:34:53,545 delusion. It must be useful for them, it must be working. 573 00:34:55,021 --> 00:34:59,041 And is that just a network effect at this age? Obviously, there 574 00:34:59,041 --> 00:35:03,061 are various reasons why it's come into existence. But I mean the 575 00:35:03,061 --> 00:35:07,081 point you make in the book is it's not necessarily just underpinned 576 00:35:07,081 --> 00:35:10,431 by US military might, which other commentators have made that 577 00:35:10,431 --> 00:35:14,116 point. Why does the dollar mean… obviously it's here now, so 578 00:35:14,116 --> 00:35:17,131 everybody uses it, but what is it underpinned by? 579 00:35:17,751 --> 00:36:09,244 I think if you just say it's a network effect, then you realize, 580 00:36:09,244 --> 00:36:52,815 then you think of it as fragile. You realize that everybody 581 00:36:52,815 --> 00:37:44,308 sort of agreed to do this, and then you think transition away from 582 00:37:44,308 --> 00:38:19,957 the dollar is just a collective action problem. Everybody 583 00:38:19,957 --> 00:38:47,684 has to agree to use something else. I think there are three things 584 00:35:32,061 --> 00:35:58,296 that anchor the value and the use of the dollar internationally 585 00:35:58,296 --> 00:36:24,531 right now. The first is America really went through a ton 586 00:36:24,531 --> 00:36:50,766 of financial crises and a ton of experimental regulation to figure 587 00:36:50,766 --> 00:37:21,771 out how to get all of its banks to insure their deposits. So, 588 00:37:21,771 --> 00:37:48,006 we come out of the Great Depression with a national federal 589 00:37:48,006 --> 00:38:09,471 deposit insurance scheme. Nobody else has this. There's no 590 00:38:09,471 --> 00:38:26,166 European wide, Eurozone deposit insurance. Every country 591 00:38:26,166 --> 00:38:47,631 is responsible for their own deposits on their own. So that means 592 00:35:27,747 --> 00:35:57,735 there's this vast pool of safe, regulated, insured deposits. 593 00:35:57,735 --> 00:36:34,387 It's just incomparable still today to what anybody else has in 594 00:36:34,387 --> 00:37:17,703 the world. In addition to that you have the Fed figuring out slowly, 595 00:37:17,703 --> 00:37:57,687 over the course of the ‘70s and ‘80s, and then implementing it 596 00:37:57,687 --> 00:38:41,003 in the 2000s and 2020s. It offers what it calls… what we call 597 00:38:41,003 --> 00:38:47,667 swap lines. This is just short-term loans that the Fed makes 598 00:35:46,821 --> 00:36:22,351 to other central banks. Those other central banks then make short-term 599 00:36:22,351 --> 00:36:57,881 loans, in dollars, to their own commercial banks to rescue them 600 00:36:57,881 --> 00:37:36,641 in a crisis. After the crisis, this whole thing gets unwound and 601 00:37:36,641 --> 00:38:18,631 the swap lines go back down to zero. This is an incredibly effective 602 00:38:18,631 --> 00:38:47,701 way to make sure that dollars always have value. There are yuan 603 00:35:34,773 --> 00:36:31,513 denominated swap lines the People's Bank of China offers. They're 604 00:36:31,513 --> 00:37:39,601 not nearly in the volume that the Fed offers. And other countries 605 00:37:39,601 --> 00:38:42,015 have come to realize that those swap lines come with strings 606 00:38:42,015 --> 00:38:47,689 attached. If we're looking at sort of the three legs of the stool 607 00:35:59,739 --> 00:36:38,228 that give the dollar value, there's this vast pool of insured 608 00:36:38,228 --> 00:37:16,717 deposits, there's swap lines, and then the third thing is hard 609 00:37:16,717 --> 00:37:48,208 to define. That's just institutional quality in the United 610 00:37:48,208 --> 00:38:30,196 States. We do have pretty good bank regulation. I have some notes, 611 00:38:30,196 --> 00:38:47,691 but it kind of works. And so, if we worry about the dollar, we 612 00:35:49,773 --> 00:36:25,353 need to worry about these three things. There doesn't seem 613 00:36:25,353 --> 00:37:04,491 to be a challenge to deposit insurance, although I worry about 614 00:37:04,491 --> 00:37:43,629 stable coins because it's basically a form of bank dollar that 615 00:37:43,629 --> 00:38:29,883 does not have insurance. So as stable coins grow, I think we might 616 00:38:29,883 --> 00:38:47,673 see a challenge to that. I think the more likely outcome is 617 00:35:43,532 --> 00:36:24,045 that we'll get a crash in stablecoin value, and they'll be 618 00:36:24,045 --> 00:37:04,558 brought into the regulatory fold a little more tightly, and stablecoin 619 00:37:04,558 --> 00:37:45,071 providers will have to pay for deposit insurance because we just 620 00:37:45,071 --> 00:38:21,901 can't have people running around with things they claim to 621 00:38:21,901 --> 00:38:47,682 be dollars that are not absolutely secure. Kevin Warsh, at 622 00:35:26,496 --> 00:36:04,391 the Fed, has made some noises that he would like to take another 623 00:36:04,391 --> 00:36:45,201 look at the swap lines. So, he has said in testimony and then in 624 00:36:45,201 --> 00:37:20,181 follow up letters to the Democrats in the Senate that he believes 625 00:37:20,181 --> 00:37:49,331 that domestic monetary policy should be independent from the treasury 626 00:37:49,331 --> 00:38:27,226 of the White House. But that's not true once you cross the border. 627 00:38:27,226 --> 00:38:47,631 So, that international policy should be coordinated. So, we could 628 00:35:24,990 --> 00:35:49,120 see, though he has not explicitly threatened this, we could 629 00:35:49,120 --> 00:36:18,076 see a world in which dollar denominated swap lines from the Fed 630 00:36:18,076 --> 00:36:37,380 have political consequences. They come with strings attached. 631 00:36:37,380 --> 00:37:06,336 To have access to them, you need to be doing something America 632 00:37:06,336 --> 00:37:37,705 likes. Whereas, in the past, all you had to be was a responsible 633 00:37:37,705 --> 00:38:04,248 central bank. If the Fed had good relationships with your central 634 00:38:04,248 --> 00:38:33,204 bank, then you could get dollars in a crisis. And those swap 635 00:38:33,204 --> 00:38:47,682 lines tended to expand during crises. It's a pretty good system 636 00:35:52,741 --> 00:36:55,723 and it doesn't have any political strings attached. They 637 00:36:55,723 --> 00:38:12,701 are not carrying out American policy. They are rescuing the global 638 00:38:12,701 --> 00:38:47,691 dollar system, which is interesting. 639 00:38:47,941 --> 00:38:54,185 Yeah, I was just going to say, in terms of the swap lines, obviously 640 00:38:54,185 --> 00:38:58,645 it's been the crisis periods where we've seen the implementation 641 00:38:58,645 --> 00:39:04,889 extension of the swap line, so 2008 and then again 2020. So, I mean, 642 00:39:04,889 --> 00:39:08,457 those episodes have highlighted, I guess, this vulnerability 643 00:39:08,457 --> 00:39:13,809 of this global system with Euro dollars, where there are a lot 644 00:39:13,809 --> 00:39:18,269 of entities with dollar liabilities outside the US. So, in 645 00:39:18,269 --> 00:39:22,729 times of stress, when people are scrambling for dollars, there 646 00:39:22,729 --> 00:39:28,973 is this spike in the value and this kind of scramble to get dollar 647 00:39:28,973 --> 00:39:29,419 liquidity. So, in the absence of the swap lines, it does create 648 00:39:01,790 --> 00:39:14,380 potential conditions which could be, I guess, harmful for the 649 00:39:14,380 --> 00:39:28,229 US, so that's why they provided swap lines in the first 650 00:39:28,229 --> 00:39:29,488 place. 651 00:39:29,491 --> 00:39:37,671 Yeah, absolutely. Their reasoning for that is that if the 652 00:39:37,671 --> 00:39:44,215 global economy collapses, surely the American economy will 653 00:39:44,215 --> 00:39:53,213 too. I'll buy it. But they're not carrying out American policy 654 00:39:53,213 --> 00:40:03,847 in the sense that… So, the treasury also has its own swap lines 655 00:40:03,847 --> 00:40:09,573 distinct from the Federal Reserve swap lines. And Scott Bessent 656 00:39:32,575 --> 00:39:45,939 has made very clear that he's going to use those swap lines for 657 00:39:45,939 --> 00:39:57,247 political purposes. He's going to dangle them for Argentina to sort 658 00:39:57,247 --> 00:40:07,527 of encourage Argentinians to carry out policies that are friendly 659 00:40:07,527 --> 00:40:09,583 to America. That's not been how the Fed worked in the past. They 660 00:39:40,799 --> 00:39:52,107 basically just said, if you've got dollars, we're going to make 661 00:39:52,107 --> 00:40:04,443 you whole on your dollars, so long as you're a responsible economy 662 00:40:04,443 --> 00:40:09,583 with a responsible central bank. 663 00:40:10,071 --> 00:40:13,527 I mean, you talk about the strings, and I think the treasury 664 00:40:13,527 --> 00:40:16,983 with the swap with Argentina, I think came from the treasury, not 665 00:40:16,983 --> 00:40:21,015 the Fed. So is that… I mean, is strings attached, is this as consistent 666 00:40:21,015 --> 00:40:24,471 with a more fragmented world where you have a dollar block, maybe 667 00:40:24,471 --> 00:40:28,503 a yuan block? Is that just the direction of travel or how do you 668 00:40:28,503 --> 00:40:29,079 see it? 669 00:40:29,451 --> 00:40:55,542 Yeah, I think it's possible. I don't want to say this is immediately 670 00:40:55,542 --> 00:41:15,612 happening, but if we actually follow this logic, it's possible 671 00:41:15,612 --> 00:41:37,689 that countries may need to decide, in the future, whose strings 672 00:41:37,689 --> 00:42:03,780 do I prefer, the PBOCs or the Fed’s strings? If indeed the swap 673 00:42:03,780 --> 00:42:25,857 lines become politicized, as we fear they could be, but don't 674 00:42:25,857 --> 00:42:49,941 yet know that they will be? Yeah, I think countries would have 675 00:42:49,941 --> 00:43:18,039 to decide in a way that I don't think they have to decide right 676 00:43:18,039 --> 00:43:44,130 now. But I think the other pillar in the value of the dollar 677 00:43:44,130 --> 00:44:02,193 is just the general institutional quality of the United 678 00:44:02,193 --> 00:44:22,263 States. I think there are some questions there right now. The problem 679 00:40:35,061 --> 00:41:11,526 with that one is that it's really hard to define. We can walk 680 00:41:11,526 --> 00:41:39,576 through deposit insurance, we can walk through swap lines. These 681 00:41:39,576 --> 00:42:07,626 are very specific financial arrangements that do not rely on 682 00:42:07,626 --> 00:42:35,676 a network effect. They are arrangements that help us explain 683 00:42:35,676 --> 00:43:06,531 why people make rational choices to use the dollar and not 684 00:43:06,531 --> 00:43:34,581 just out of habit. The institutional question, I don't know, 685 00:43:34,581 --> 00:44:16,656 I can't define it for you. I mean, I can define it, but I can't 686 00:44:16,656 --> 00:44:22,266 measure it. But I think that there is some question abroad about 687 00:41:02,241 --> 00:41:31,752 the quality of American institutions. So far really doesn’t 688 00:41:31,752 --> 00:42:17,658 seem to have done that much damage to the global use of the dollar. 689 00:42:17,658 --> 00:42:53,727 So, it seems like people abroad are looking at the quality 690 00:42:53,727 --> 00:43:26,517 of American bank regulation and the reliability of those swap 691 00:43:26,517 --> 00:44:02,586 lines before they're looking at sort of the general quality of 692 00:44:02,586 --> 00:44:22,260 the institutions of the United States. I've been telling people 693 00:40:39,683 --> 00:41:10,379 recently. we can't think of the dollar as a referendum on the 694 00:41:10,379 --> 00:41:38,517 United States. Like, people are mad at the United States, but 695 00:41:38,517 --> 00:42:04,097 they're still gritting their teeth and using the dollar. There's 696 00:42:04,097 --> 00:42:37,351 got to be reasons why. Again, I don't say that, as an American, 697 00:42:37,351 --> 00:43:08,047 I don't say that with, you know, with disdain. I can understand 698 00:43:08,047 --> 00:43:36,185 the frustration that people have, but I just think that we've 699 00:43:36,185 --> 00:44:09,439 got to get away from this idea that people use the dollar because 700 00:44:09,439 --> 00:44:22,229 they love and trust America. It turns out that people abroad… 701 00:40:51,627 --> 00:41:32,283 You know, when you travel abroad as American, people will tell 702 00:41:32,283 --> 00:42:12,939 you what they feel about America. And it has changed. You 703 00:42:12,939 --> 00:42:57,291 know, I was an exchange student in rural Germany in the 1990s. 704 00:42:57,291 --> 00:43:34,251 They loved Americans. Could not get enough of Americans. So, 705 00:43:34,251 --> 00:44:14,907 happy to talk to me. That's definitely changed wherever I go 706 00:44:14,907 --> 00:44:22,299 in Europe. And yet the dollar system endures. And I think we have 707 00:41:16,014 --> 00:42:11,043 to figure out why. And I think it's those other two pillars; the 708 00:42:11,043 --> 00:42:53,373 reliability of American bank deposits and these swap lines. I 709 00:42:53,373 --> 00:43:44,169 also think that, over the last 50 years, America has become really 710 00:43:44,169 --> 00:44:22,266 good at connecting investors to projects that need investment. 711 00:40:29,451 --> 00:40:58,887 You know, there's this old historian's joke about how Rome disappeared 712 00:40:58,887 --> 00:41:28,323 and all that was left was a church. England's empire disappeared 713 00:41:28,323 --> 00:42:03,111 and all that was left was the Bank of England. It's possible, though 714 00:42:03,111 --> 00:42:35,223 I am not predicting it, that if America, in its current shape, 715 00:42:35,223 --> 00:43:07,335 ceases to exist, we could still have the New York capital markets. 716 00:43:07,335 --> 00:43:39,447 People come from all over the world to raise money in dollars, 717 00:43:39,447 --> 00:44:14,235 and people come from all over the world with wealth to invest their 718 00:44:14,235 --> 00:44:22,263 money in dollars. So, there's a lot of basic understanding and 719 00:40:49,475 --> 00:41:19,511 knowing by doing that happens in New York to, you know, generate 720 00:41:19,511 --> 00:41:47,044 dollar denominated assets that people can invest in. And one of 721 00:41:47,044 --> 00:42:17,080 the reasons why the euro dollar system was so strong in the 722 00:42:17,080 --> 00:42:47,116 ‘60s and ‘70s was that there was this leftover knowledge in London, 723 00:42:47,116 --> 00:43:19,655 in the City of London, in doing exactly that. And so, you have 724 00:43:19,655 --> 00:43:47,188 these two historical financial centers that are used to doing this, 725 00:43:47,188 --> 00:44:17,224 that continue to do it today, you know, produce all this value 726 00:44:17,224 --> 00:44:22,230 in dollars. And so, I think one other thing that you'd have to 727 00:40:57,908 --> 00:41:23,778 recreate somewhere else is, you know, what's the Chinese financial 728 00:41:23,778 --> 00:41:49,648 center that can take absolutely anything and turn it into 729 00:41:49,648 --> 00:42:20,692 a yuan denominated asset? You know, I teach at Princeton now, my 730 00:42:20,692 --> 00:42:49,149 students are headed to Wall Street every year. That's their job, 731 00:42:49,149 --> 00:43:17,606 generate dollar denominated assets. And I try, you know, to grab 732 00:43:17,606 --> 00:43:51,237 them by the shoulders on their way out the door and say briefly, 733 00:43:51,237 --> 00:44:17,107 like, please don't cause a financial crisis, but like that's 734 00:44:17,107 --> 00:44:22,281 where headed. 735 00:44:23,372 --> 00:44:32,000 Maybe just transitioning, I mean, but to a related point, I mean, 736 00:44:32,000 --> 00:44:41,347 you've been talking about the, you know, the role of the Fed in 737 00:44:41,347 --> 00:44:50,694 all of this, so, swap lines… But you know, taking a step back, 738 00:44:50,694 --> 00:44:58,603 obviously you've covered the Fed for 20 years as a journalist. 739 00:44:58,603 --> 00:45:07,231 But you know, I mean, what people forget, I guess, about central 740 00:45:07,231 --> 00:45:15,859 banks is that they are banks like every other bank, you know, 741 00:45:15,859 --> 00:45:23,768 and that's part of the history. Like, the Bank of England 742 00:45:23,768 --> 00:45:32,396 was a commercial bank too, and then it was a special commercial 743 00:45:32,396 --> 00:45:35,991 bank financing the wars, etc.. And the Fed, effectively, is similar 744 00:44:29,108 --> 00:44:41,536 in that it is a bank like any other, but with special characteristics 745 00:44:41,536 --> 00:44:52,052 and qualities. But it's evolved as well over time. And I 746 00:44:52,052 --> 00:45:03,524 guess that's been part of the Warsh concern about maybe Fed overreach, 747 00:45:03,524 --> 00:45:14,996 etc. We had QE and, obviously, we kind of expressed some skepticism 748 00:45:14,996 --> 00:45:28,380 of QE. And then in Covid we had the Fed extending that to credit 749 00:45:28,380 --> 00:45:36,028 markets and considering a wider range of purchases. So, what's 750 00:44:27,526 --> 00:44:50,373 your perspective on the Fed now? I mean, are you sympathetic 751 00:44:50,373 --> 00:45:17,374 to that idea of Fed overreach that Warsh talks about, or do you 752 00:45:17,374 --> 00:45:36,067 think they've been successful in managing a complex system? 753 00:45:36,632 --> 00:46:21,716 Yeah, I think it's really important to think of the Fed as 754 00:46:21,716 --> 00:47:06,800 a bank, and central banks as banks. When we talk about policy, 755 00:47:06,800 --> 00:47:48,127 often we sort of get abstracted into the Fed is raising 756 00:47:48,127 --> 00:48:29,454 or lowering interest rates. What the Fed is actually doing is 757 00:48:29,454 --> 00:49:14,538 putting things on its balance sheet or selling things off of its 758 00:49:14,538 --> 00:49:48,351 balance sheet. And so that's a really flexible tool. And the tool 759 00:45:44,840 --> 00:46:20,408 of a central bank has changed over time. The model of all modern 760 00:46:20,408 --> 00:46:53,240 central banks is the Bank of England. It was a commercial bank 761 00:46:53,240 --> 00:47:20,600 that was chartered to help prosecute the war against France. 762 00:47:20,600 --> 00:47:53,432 That was its job. Now that's obviously not its job anymore, but 763 00:47:53,432 --> 00:48:23,528 relatively recently the Fed decided that its job was to help 764 00:48:23,528 --> 00:48:53,624 prosecute the war against the Germans. The Fed, you know, bought 765 00:48:53,624 --> 00:49:26,456 federal debt to keep the price of debt down. That was explicitly 766 00:49:26,456 --> 00:49:48,344 understood that was its job during the war. And then it stopped 767 00:45:53,412 --> 00:46:35,362 after that and declared its independence. But you know, conditions 768 00:46:35,362 --> 00:47:17,312 change, things happen, and our central bank should be responsive 769 00:47:17,312 --> 00:48:07,652 to the needs of a democracy. So, I absolutely agree with central 770 00:48:07,652 --> 00:48:53,797 bank independence that on a day-to-day basis you should be free 771 00:48:53,797 --> 00:49:44,137 to make your own decisions as a central banker, free from party 772 00:49:44,137 --> 00:49:48,332 politics. However, the central bank is a bank that's chartered by, 773 00:46:39,562 --> 00:47:55,078 in America's case, Congress. And if we want to change the goal 774 00:47:55,078 --> 00:49:10,594 of the central bank, the mission of the central bank, we should 775 00:49:10,594 --> 00:49:48,352 have the right to do that. I think it's interesting that Congress 776 00:45:57,608 --> 00:46:43,056 decided, in the 1970s, that the Fed's job is not just to manage 777 00:46:43,056 --> 00:47:21,512 full employment and stable prices, but part of that is also 778 00:47:21,512 --> 00:47:56,472 that it's supposed to help grow monetary and credit aggregates 779 00:47:56,472 --> 00:48:27,936 in a way that increases productivity. It's just forgotten 780 00:48:27,936 --> 00:49:09,888 about that. It doesn't like that's part of its job because that 781 00:49:09,888 --> 00:49:48,344 part of its job means that it needs to show discretion. Which kinds 782 00:45:45,464 --> 00:46:25,208 of monetary and credit aggregates are the more important 783 00:46:25,208 --> 00:47:04,952 ones, which ones create productivity, which ones don't, that's 784 00:47:04,952 --> 00:48:06,776 a lot of decision making and it's a lot of politics. And the Fed 785 00:48:06,776 --> 00:49:04,184 doesn't want to be a part of it. And they basically just decided 786 00:49:04,184 --> 00:49:48,344 we're not going to do that. And so, they don't. So, the Fed makes 787 00:46:07,140 --> 00:47:46,291 up its own homework. It grades itself on its own homework. And then 788 00:47:46,291 --> 00:49:25,442 shows up at Congress twice a year and says, look, didn't we do 789 00:49:25,442 --> 00:49:48,323 a good job? So, I think that… For example, if Congress wanted to 790 00:46:03,402 --> 00:46:35,526 say, the Fed has to help finance the green transition, I don't 791 00:46:35,526 --> 00:47:10,327 have any problem with that. There are a lot of central bank purists 792 00:47:10,327 --> 00:47:47,805 who will say that's not the job of a central bank. And my answer 793 00:47:47,805 --> 00:48:27,960 is, look, none of this was the job of the central bank. We had to 794 00:48:27,960 --> 00:49:02,761 invent central banks to do jobs that we needed them to do and 795 00:49:02,761 --> 00:49:32,208 then we change those jobs periodically, and maybe this is a 796 00:49:32,208 --> 00:49:48,270 job we need it to do. I'm sure you have listeners who are busy looking 797 00:46:08,537 --> 00:47:05,257 up my email to yell at me now, but I think it is important to think 798 00:47:05,257 --> 00:47:54,887 of the central bank as a bank, and to think about that balance sheet 799 00:47:54,887 --> 00:48:40,972 structurally and what it can do. And I think the Fed has gotten 800 00:48:40,972 --> 00:49:27,057 out of the habit of thinking that it's a balance sheet that can 801 00:49:27,057 --> 00:49:48,327 do anything other than buy treasuries. And I think the utter 802 00:45:56,607 --> 00:46:36,557 reluctance by the Fed to ever contemplate buying anything other 803 00:46:36,557 --> 00:47:16,507 than treasuries is a profound failure of imagination. Because in 804 00:47:16,507 --> 00:48:08,442 a crisis they sure do jump in and save markets, but they won't 805 00:48:08,442 --> 00:48:56,382 do that during normal times. We just don't think of that. And 806 00:48:56,382 --> 00:49:44,322 I don't think that's a legal challenge. I think that's a philosophical 807 00:49:44,322 --> 00:49:48,317 challenge. So, the Fed would need the cooperation with the Treasury 808 00:46:15,352 --> 00:46:50,200 to buy anything other than agency securities and treasuries. 809 00:46:50,200 --> 00:47:40,536 Congress would need to give the Fed a new job. Stuff would need 810 00:47:40,536 --> 00:48:27,000 to happen. But the barrier to that is this rock solid assumption 811 00:48:27,000 --> 00:49:09,592 that we've inherited from economists that the Fed has one job, 812 00:49:09,592 --> 00:49:48,312 we have perfected the job, it cannot develop any farther. And we 813 00:45:44,034 --> 00:46:24,745 can't ever stray from this single job of pushing one interest 814 00:46:24,745 --> 00:47:05,456 rate up and down to influence inflation and employment. I think 815 00:47:05,456 --> 00:47:42,466 we need to think really structurally about what those tools 816 00:47:42,466 --> 00:48:23,177 are, whether they're working (they aren't right now, by the way), 817 00:48:23,177 --> 00:49:07,589 and then what they could do, potentially, in the future. And to 818 00:49:07,589 --> 00:49:48,300 do that, we have to think of central banks as banks. 819 00:49:49,872 --> 00:49:53,834 It sounds like all of that is up for review now, based on everything 820 00:49:53,834 --> 00:49:57,230 we heard from Kevin Warsh and his various task forces, etc. So, 821 00:49:57,230 --> 00:50:01,192 I mean, do you think we are on the cusp of a potentially different 822 00:50:01,192 --> 00:50:03,456 looking Fed for the next number of years? 823 00:50:03,662 --> 00:50:22,382 Yeah, absolutely. Look, I think Kevin Warsh is right about 824 00:50:22,382 --> 00:50:39,230 QE. The Federal Reserve decided, after the financial crisis, 825 00:50:39,230 --> 00:51:07,310 that it was going to do what it had failed to do in the 1920s. 826 00:51:07,310 --> 00:51:26,030 Ben Bernanke, famously, is a financial historian. He, of course, 827 00:51:26,030 --> 00:51:50,366 knew that Milton Friedman had accused the Fed in the 1920s or in 828 00:51:50,366 --> 00:52:12,830 the 1930s of failing to buy a bunch of treasuries and increase 829 00:52:12,830 --> 00:52:37,166 the money supply. And he said, well, I'll be damned if I'll fail 830 00:52:37,166 --> 00:52:54,014 to do that this time. So, he did it. I also think that just buying 831 00:50:13,214 --> 00:50:29,134 a lot of treasuries is politically convenient for the Fed, 832 00:50:29,134 --> 00:50:48,238 which is they can't get in trouble doing it because it doesn't 833 00:50:48,238 --> 00:51:05,750 favor one political party or another. It does, of course, have 834 00:51:05,750 --> 00:51:16,894 massive distributional consequences, because if you have 835 00:51:16,894 --> 00:51:34,406 existing assets that become more valuable when the Fed buys a 836 00:51:34,406 --> 00:51:55,102 bunch of treasuries. But they do that not because it is the most 837 00:51:55,102 --> 00:52:15,798 effective thing to do, but because it is a thing that they can 838 00:52:15,798 --> 00:52:34,902 do that they don't think they'll get in trouble for. The Fed 839 00:52:34,902 --> 00:52:54,006 is unwilling to take any risks that will get it in trouble. And 840 00:50:07,366 --> 00:50:51,814 so, I think that QE is a default policy that doesn't really 841 00:50:51,814 --> 00:51:36,262 work that well. It basically, it pushes up the value of existing 842 00:51:36,262 --> 00:52:17,006 assets. That's all it does. It makes wealthy people wealthier. I'm 843 00:52:17,006 --> 00:52:54,046 not sure that's a policy goal we want in America. And so, the Fed 844 00:50:11,406 --> 00:50:34,638 could have, and it had the legal authority to, during the financial 845 00:50:34,638 --> 00:50:55,934 crisis, buy a bunch of mortgages, but that would have been 846 00:50:55,934 --> 00:51:19,166 a lot of fiddly, boring work. It would have had to renegotiate 847 00:51:19,166 --> 00:51:42,398 these mortgages with people one by one. It would have had to 848 00:51:42,398 --> 00:52:05,630 have hired the administrative staff to do that, but it would have 849 00:52:05,630 --> 00:52:30,798 been effective. And instead, what we got was a lot of people turned 850 00:52:30,798 --> 00:52:50,158 out of their homes, which is incredibly politically scarring and 851 00:52:50,158 --> 00:52:54,030 economically scarring. So, I think when you cover the Fed, it's 852 00:50:32,057 --> 00:51:09,917 very easy to be captured by the Fed. Fed, they're lovely people. 853 00:51:09,917 --> 00:51:44,622 They all have PhDs. They clearly want what's best for America. 854 00:51:44,622 --> 00:52:16,172 And if you've covered Washington, D.C. you will know that 855 00:52:16,172 --> 00:52:54,032 all three of those traits are rare, particularly in one human being. 856 00:50:03,662 --> 00:50:32,702 So, it's easy to sort of, when you cover the Fed, want them to flourish, 857 00:50:32,702 --> 00:50:53,998 fail to be critical enough of what they're doing, precisely because 858 00:50:53,998 --> 00:51:17,230 they're such lovely people and smart people. But I think that we 859 00:51:17,230 --> 00:51:40,462 have to think really hard and critically about how the Fed failed 860 00:51:40,462 --> 00:52:03,694 to use its balance sheet in the financial crisis to do something 861 00:52:03,694 --> 00:52:23,054 that would have been really effective and instead did something, 862 00:52:23,054 --> 00:52:44,350 buy treasuries, which was, I think, explicitly a choice to prevent 863 00:52:44,350 --> 00:52:54,030 them from getting in trouble. And I'm not sure why the balance 864 00:50:17,060 --> 00:50:41,942 sheet is so large. I think it's large out of habit. It's very 865 00:50:41,942 --> 00:51:01,082 difficult to actually make the balance sheet smaller once banks 866 00:51:01,082 --> 00:51:25,964 get used to having the balance sheet that big. Once banks get used 867 00:51:25,964 --> 00:51:45,104 to having that much in reserves rattling around. And so, 868 00:51:45,104 --> 00:52:09,986 Kevin Warsh is right to say, what are we doing with this balance 869 00:52:09,986 --> 00:52:32,954 sheet? Why can't we ever shrink it ever again? Are we stuck 870 00:52:32,954 --> 00:52:50,180 forever with the ample reserves regime? Those are really 871 00:52:50,180 --> 00:52:54,008 good questions. And in the past, recent past, when the Fed has 872 00:50:45,212 --> 00:51:30,917 done these policy reviews, it has absolutely failed to ask really 873 00:51:30,917 --> 00:52:16,622 hard questions about what its tools are and whether they're working. 874 00:52:16,622 --> 00:52:54,017 I think it's important that we're having that process. 875 00:52:55,412 --> 00:52:58,481 Okay. Okay. Interesting stuff. We're just up against time. We do 876 00:52:58,481 --> 00:53:02,387 like to ask our guests, before we wrap up, for any advice for people 877 00:53:02,387 --> 00:53:05,177 who are looking to learn more about economics, economic history 878 00:53:05,177 --> 00:53:08,246 in your case, or things you've read, things you've done. Obviously, 879 00:53:08,246 --> 00:53:11,873 you've gone back and done a Ph.D. so you've had that luxury of, 880 00:53:11,873 --> 00:53:15,779 as you say, reading a lot of books and stuff. Any advice for people 881 00:53:15,779 --> 00:53:18,011 who are interested in economics and economic history? 882 00:53:18,042 --> 00:53:21,042 Yeah, there's a book I always recommend, which I think I mentioned 883 00:53:21,042 --> 00:53:23,792 earlier, which is Rebecca Spang's Stuff and Money in the Time 884 00:53:23,792 --> 00:53:26,542 of the French Revolution. You may not think you're interested in 885 00:53:26,542 --> 00:53:29,292 the French Revolution, but just the process of trying as hard 886 00:53:29,292 --> 00:53:32,292 as you can to figure out exactly how people paid each other 887 00:53:32,292 --> 00:53:35,042 and then exactly how people manufactured money is a really interesting 888 00:53:35,042 --> 00:53:36,542 exercise and a really valuable one. 889 00:53:38,312 --> 00:53:38,752 Very good. 890 00:53:38,752 --> 00:53:41,002 I mean, absolutely read that book. That's my one recommendation 891 00:53:41,002 --> 00:53:41,902 I give to everyone. 892 00:53:43,512 --> 00:53:47,560 Good stuff. Well, great to have you on, Brendan, and fascinating 893 00:53:47,560 --> 00:53:51,976 to hear about the evolution of the dollar. And obviously if people 894 00:53:51,976 --> 00:53:56,392 are interested, they can go and find your book. It's called The 895 00:53:56,392 --> 00:54:00,072 Almighty Dollar 500 Years Of The World's Most Powerful Money, 896 00:54:00,072 --> 00:54:04,488 which I'm reading myself at the moment, and it's a great read. 897 00:54:04,488 --> 00:54:07,800 And obviously you're at Princeton University at the moment, 898 00:54:07,800 --> 00:54:11,480 so I guess we'll hear more from you over time. But from all 899 00:53:47,511 --> 00:54:02,174 of us here at Top Traders Unplugged, thanks for tuning in. 900 00:54:02,174 --> 00:54:11,505 We'll be back soon with more content. 901 00:54:14,082 --> 00:55:47,077 Thanks for listening to Top Traders Unplugged. 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