1 00:00:00,050 --> 00:00:03,029 Odds are you’re going to get malware at some point. 2 00:00:03,349 --> 00:00:07,329 The only question is whether it takes out one computer or your whole site. 3 00:00:07,690 --> 00:00:12,600 In this episode, Prasanna, my co-author Dr. Mike Saylor, and I talk about how 4 00:00:12,600 --> 00:00:17,129 network segmentation best practices can minimize the impact of an attack. 5 00:00:17,440 --> 00:00:22,159 We cover VLANs and microsegmentation using a great analogy of a hotel. 6 00:00:22,459 --> 00:00:25,829 We talk about starting with your crown jewels first, and why you 7 00:00:25,829 --> 00:00:28,290 have to document every single rule. 8 00:00:28,629 --> 00:00:32,299 There’s also a great story about me losing my mind once at a client 9 00:00:32,540 --> 00:00:34,470 - caused by network segmentation. 10 00:00:34,640 --> 00:00:37,729 If this is your first time watching or listening to me, I’m 11 00:00:37,729 --> 00:00:40,969 W. Curtis Preston, AKA Mr. Backup. 12 00:00:41,429 --> 00:00:46,810 I’ve been obsessing over backup, recovery, and now cyber recovery for over 30 years. 13 00:00:47,259 --> 00:00:49,219 If that’s your bag, then I’m your guy. 14 00:00:49,700 --> 00:00:52,629 You’re not going to find anyone that cares about it more than me. 15 00:00:53,099 --> 00:00:57,330 Ever since 1993 when I had to tell my boss that there were no backups 16 00:00:57,330 --> 00:00:58,910 of the database we just lost. 17 00:00:59,560 --> 00:01:03,260 Now I’ve written Five O’Reilly books, a blog and a podcast. 18 00:01:03,670 --> 00:01:08,200 Here we turn unappreciated admins into cyber recovery heroes. 19 00:01:08,649 --> 00:01:10,579 This is the backup wrap up. 20 00:01:26,583 --> 00:01:28,523 Hi, and welcome to The Backup Wrap Up. 21 00:01:28,523 --> 00:01:31,843 I'm your host, W. Curtis Preston, AKA Mr. Backup. 22 00:01:31,843 --> 00:01:37,723 And first of all, I have with me my real estate non-advisor Prasanna Malaiyandi. 23 00:01:37,723 --> 00:01:38,583 How's it going, Prasanna? 24 00:01:39,434 --> 00:01:40,194 Good, Curtis. 25 00:01:40,204 --> 00:01:46,014 So I think, the typical Indian fashion is anytime you have any money, you should 26 00:01:46,014 --> 00:01:48,054 buy gold and you should buy real estate. 27 00:01:48,084 --> 00:01:52,014 Nothing else matters, but just buy those two things and you'll be set for life 28 00:01:53,533 --> 00:01:53,983 I see. 29 00:01:54,313 --> 00:01:58,443 I am looking at real estate in one of the most expensive places to buy real estate. 30 00:01:59,153 --> 00:02:00,763 I think I have an interesting take on it. 31 00:02:00,773 --> 00:02:01,233 I'm not going 32 00:02:01,272 --> 00:02:01,602 Yeah 33 00:02:01,763 --> 00:02:05,553 but I, I have a interesting MO, would you not agree? 34 00:02:06,116 --> 00:02:06,536 Oh yeah. 35 00:02:06,536 --> 00:02:07,136 No, totally. 36 00:02:07,799 --> 00:02:12,829 are very like, I don't, I… Creative I think. 37 00:02:13,039 --> 00:02:13,709 No, creative. 38 00:02:13,759 --> 00:02:17,349 Creative in like what you look for and all the rest. 39 00:02:17,369 --> 00:02:19,369 Entrepreneurial, so 40 00:02:19,477 --> 00:02:19,957 I try. 41 00:02:21,157 --> 00:02:26,407 And speaking of entrepreneurs, we have Dr. Mike Saylor, my co-author on the book. 42 00:02:26,417 --> 00:02:28,107 Welcome to the show again, Mike 43 00:02:29,637 --> 00:02:30,057 Hey everybody. 44 00:02:30,147 --> 00:02:31,047 Thanks for having me again 45 00:02:31,189 --> 00:02:35,239 We're gonna have to get you like a room, like a, a spot on the couch or something. 46 00:02:36,209 --> 00:02:38,389 all the rooms here, all the rooms here are gone. 47 00:02:38,589 --> 00:02:39,679 but we'll do that. 48 00:02:41,579 --> 00:02:45,769 we're gonna go back in time to, a hundred, hundred years ago, back 49 00:02:45,779 --> 00:02:50,419 when I was working at a particular client at, the turn of the century. 50 00:02:52,079 --> 00:02:52,469 And 51 00:02:52,477 --> 00:02:53,547 Back in the day 52 00:02:53,639 --> 00:02:59,509 back then that at the time I had never seen, and we're now going 53 00:02:59,509 --> 00:03:01,069 to talk about it in this episode. 54 00:03:01,069 --> 00:03:05,139 I think it's now becoming more commonplace, and for those of you that, 55 00:03:05,499 --> 00:03:08,929 you're like, "What's he talking about?" What I'm talking about is it was the 56 00:03:08,929 --> 00:03:16,559 first time I'd ever gone to a large company that had firewalls inside, right? 57 00:03:16,569 --> 00:03:20,019 E- everywhere I had ever worked, the firewall, it was a hard, crunchy 58 00:03:20,029 --> 00:03:22,349 exterior, soft, chewy interior, right? 59 00:03:22,619 --> 00:03:25,509 that, that was, once you were inside, you were good, right? 60 00:03:25,519 --> 00:03:29,949 That was the way… I worked my, I cut my teeth at a $35 billion credit card 61 00:03:29,949 --> 00:03:35,179 corporation not that long before this, and there was nothing on the inside, right? 62 00:03:35,209 --> 00:03:38,129 Other than, usernames and passwords, but there was nothing 63 00:03:38,129 --> 00:03:39,419 that was blocking traffic. 64 00:03:40,755 --> 00:03:43,225 Was that before PCI compliance and all the rest? 65 00:03:44,009 --> 00:03:44,309 What? 66 00:03:44,329 --> 00:03:44,929 Yeah. 67 00:03:45,499 --> 00:03:46,459 no, I don't think so. 68 00:03:47,371 --> 00:03:48,281 Okay, just checking. 69 00:03:48,459 --> 00:03:48,619 I don't 70 00:03:48,751 --> 00:03:49,431 Just checking 71 00:03:49,489 --> 00:03:50,149 we'd have to Google 72 00:03:50,501 --> 00:03:51,071 Yeah. 73 00:03:51,081 --> 00:03:54,221 PCI didn't come out until just after, 2000, 74 00:03:54,275 --> 00:03:55,175 Yeah, yeah. 75 00:03:55,265 --> 00:03:57,935 So the answer is yes, that was before PCI compliance. 76 00:03:57,971 --> 00:03:58,301 Okay 77 00:03:58,475 --> 00:04:02,055 But, this particular company had a lot of, a lot of personal information and 78 00:04:02,055 --> 00:04:06,605 they were basically saying… They were a company that I think of companies 79 00:04:06,665 --> 00:04:09,875 would say this today, but they were the first company that I worked with 80 00:04:09,885 --> 00:04:16,955 where they basically said, "IT is our product." "IT is not the thing that we do 81 00:04:16,955 --> 00:04:19,625 to make our product with, the security. 82 00:04:19,925 --> 00:04:25,765 If our security fails, the type of data that we store, our business is out of 83 00:04:25,775 --> 00:04:30,845 business." And so they were like, "That just can't happen," and so they did the 84 00:04:30,845 --> 00:04:32,355 kind of thing that we're talking about. 85 00:04:32,355 --> 00:04:35,705 And of course, what we're talking about is network segmentation 86 00:04:36,129 --> 00:04:38,749 As you were talking, I was trying to be like, "What is he going to be talking 87 00:04:38,749 --> 00:04:42,559 about?" I was like, "That was not on my bingo card networks segmentation 88 00:04:43,605 --> 00:04:49,075 So basically, the whole point here, and when Mike and I wrote the book, I 89 00:04:49,075 --> 00:04:51,855 think the basic premise of the book was 90 00:04:52,385 --> 00:04:53,955 you're probably gonna get ransomware. 91 00:04:54,085 --> 00:04:57,745 That would be Learning Ransomware Response and Recovery over this 92 00:04:57,745 --> 00:05:01,095 shoulder over here, and for those of you watching on YouTube, available 93 00:05:01,095 --> 00:05:03,195 at, bookstores, available near you. 94 00:05:03,205 --> 00:05:07,505 My latest book, fifth book actually, and, the first one where I brought 95 00:05:07,505 --> 00:05:11,775 on a co-author, and, and that's how Mike and I got to know each other. 96 00:05:12,105 --> 00:05:15,325 and interestingly enough, we have never actually met, for those 97 00:05:15,505 --> 00:05:16,775 of you that don't know that. 98 00:05:17,275 --> 00:05:19,615 Mike and I have never physically met in person. 99 00:05:19,845 --> 00:05:22,225 We have always seen each other like this and during a bunch 100 00:05:22,225 --> 00:05:23,685 of Zoom meetings with O'Reilly. 101 00:05:24,905 --> 00:05:28,065 but we worked on a book, and the idea of the book was that 102 00:05:28,265 --> 00:05:31,125 you should assume breach, right? 103 00:05:31,155 --> 00:05:34,415 Assume that you're going to get ransomware, right? 104 00:05:34,415 --> 00:05:35,805 or some other type of malware. 105 00:05:35,805 --> 00:05:38,655 It doesn't have to be ransomware, but, we focused on ransomware. 106 00:05:39,405 --> 00:05:45,155 And if you're going to assume that, one of the things that we were saying was you 107 00:05:45,155 --> 00:05:49,255 want, if you're gonna assume it's going to get inside, you want to do whatever 108 00:05:49,255 --> 00:05:52,895 you can to reduce the blast radius. 109 00:05:52,895 --> 00:05:54,155 What do we mean by that, Prasanna? 110 00:05:55,881 --> 00:05:59,671 When something gets in, how many things does it take out? 111 00:06:00,391 --> 00:06:06,251 So if it gets in via an employee laptop, does it take out your servers, your main 112 00:06:06,251 --> 00:06:08,351 production applications, everything else? 113 00:06:09,021 --> 00:06:10,501 And that's kind of the blast radius 114 00:06:11,577 --> 00:06:11,887 Yeah. 115 00:06:11,937 --> 00:06:14,767 And of course that term comes from, bombs and such, right? 116 00:06:14,949 --> 00:06:15,789 Going boom 117 00:06:16,567 --> 00:06:17,617 yeah, going boom. 118 00:06:17,667 --> 00:06:18,697 And it's gonna go boom. 119 00:06:18,697 --> 00:06:24,097 The question is, does it, is it a plop or is it a, does it take out, company, right? 120 00:06:24,353 --> 00:06:28,833 so is it like what we're about to talk about is similar to, you know in the 121 00:06:28,833 --> 00:06:31,993 movies where a grenade gets tossed in and you have the one guy being like, "Oh, 122 00:06:31,993 --> 00:06:34,083 no," and then he jumps up on the grenade? 123 00:06:34,673 --> 00:06:37,123 Is what we're talking about similar to that? 124 00:06:37,343 --> 00:06:39,753 That's a very sad story, but yes. 125 00:06:41,643 --> 00:06:44,583 That would, that is one way to reduce the blast radius. 126 00:06:44,783 --> 00:06:48,053 I will say it's, it's effective. 127 00:06:48,473 --> 00:06:52,123 and there are people throughout history that have done that, and they deserve all 128 00:06:52,123 --> 00:06:54,597 of the credit and goes to those people. 129 00:06:54,807 --> 00:06:59,717 but what we're, I think what we're trying to say here is that you shouldn't 130 00:06:59,727 --> 00:07:04,057 have, like again, to continue with the grenade analogy, you shouldn't have 131 00:07:04,057 --> 00:07:08,947 your entire platoon in one building with no walls between them, right? 132 00:07:08,977 --> 00:07:11,817 And one grenade just takes them out, right? 133 00:07:11,877 --> 00:07:13,617 that, how's that for the analogy, Mike? 134 00:07:15,061 --> 00:07:15,531 Pretty good 135 00:07:17,597 --> 00:07:17,897 Bless you 136 00:07:17,909 --> 00:07:20,609 I know you, you talk a lot about, we d- you know, we often, we use 137 00:07:20,609 --> 00:07:22,749 analogies of of houses and things. 138 00:07:23,019 --> 00:07:25,009 how would you put this in a house analogy? 139 00:07:26,903 --> 00:07:27,973 it's very similar. 140 00:07:28,033 --> 00:07:30,663 y- you want walls, you want other doors. 141 00:07:30,953 --> 00:07:33,523 And to your point about having interior firewalls, you can 142 00:07:33,523 --> 00:07:34,753 have interior… we do, right? 143 00:07:34,753 --> 00:07:36,083 You have locks on your bathroom. 144 00:07:36,563 --> 00:07:39,133 Some of us have locks on our bedrooms and our closets. 145 00:07:39,233 --> 00:07:39,953 same principle. 146 00:07:40,193 --> 00:07:45,393 Limit access to different of your environment that not everybody needs 147 00:07:45,423 --> 00:07:50,443 or should have access to or can be walled off, when there's a threat 148 00:07:50,987 --> 00:07:52,547 Can I just mention something? 149 00:07:52,557 --> 00:07:55,297 And it's might seem like a non sequitur, but it's not. 150 00:07:55,867 --> 00:08:00,277 I was, randomly shown YouTube videos over the weekend, and it's about, 151 00:08:00,357 --> 00:08:02,367 houses that are supposed to be safe. 152 00:08:02,417 --> 00:08:05,517 And so they talk about, perimeter defenses, and, they were showing, 153 00:08:05,517 --> 00:08:10,477 an interior safe core, like you were talking about, Mike, like with 600 154 00:08:10,497 --> 00:08:13,587 pound solid steel doors that you can… 155 00:08:13,597 --> 00:08:18,137 with five bedrooms inside and supplies and everything else, so in case someone 156 00:08:18,137 --> 00:08:22,227 makes it past the outside perimeter, you're safe in the interior, and you 157 00:08:22,227 --> 00:08:23,187 don't have to worry about things. 158 00:08:23,187 --> 00:08:25,747 And I was like, "Wow, that's pretty impressive." 159 00:08:26,457 --> 00:08:26,597 And 160 00:08:26,597 --> 00:08:27,487 was also $15 million. 161 00:08:27,547 --> 00:08:30,337 that… Yeah, we're gonna bring that into the discussion. 162 00:08:30,337 --> 00:08:33,727 I'm glad you brought that up, Prasanna, 'cause we're gonna, gonna 163 00:08:33,937 --> 00:08:37,917 remind me, hopefully, by the end of this episode that I like that topic 164 00:08:37,927 --> 00:08:40,167 or I like that analogy, quite a bit. 165 00:08:41,597 --> 00:08:42,667 let me just look back here. 166 00:08:42,757 --> 00:08:47,227 so opposite of what we're talking about, Mike, is a flat network. 167 00:08:47,237 --> 00:08:48,657 You wanna talk about what that is? 168 00:08:51,215 --> 00:08:55,455 It's like a, imagine a, a bicycle wheel, a hub and spoke. 169 00:08:56,135 --> 00:08:59,595 So all of your core stuff is in the middle, and it connects 170 00:08:59,615 --> 00:09:03,205 to everything, printers and workstations, and they can all talk. 171 00:09:03,905 --> 00:09:09,315 And, it's easy to conceptualize that as just your office building. 172 00:09:09,995 --> 00:09:14,405 but I've assessed billion-dollar organizations that have offices in 173 00:09:14,435 --> 00:09:18,495 casinos and convention centers and high-rise buildings all over the 174 00:09:18,495 --> 00:09:20,755 world, and it's a flat network. 175 00:09:20,765 --> 00:09:23,255 From anywhere in the world, it could… you can ping the server 176 00:09:23,255 --> 00:09:28,615 in the data center, and from a conference hall, from wherever. 177 00:09:28,685 --> 00:09:31,025 It's completely flat, unrestricted, 178 00:09:31,715 --> 00:09:33,075 W- why is that, Mike? 179 00:09:33,305 --> 00:09:36,845 it seems to go against so many things we've talked about before and we will 180 00:09:36,845 --> 00:09:41,455 be talking about in the podcast, but is it just easier to do it that way? 181 00:09:42,281 --> 00:09:44,351 Absolutely easier, right? 182 00:09:44,431 --> 00:09:48,641 so there's so many things that can contribute to poor network architecture. 183 00:09:48,641 --> 00:09:52,471 One of them is laziness, or incompetence. 184 00:09:52,541 --> 00:09:53,651 Another one is budget. 185 00:09:53,711 --> 00:09:57,471 And so a lot of times we give the IT guys so much crap for, "Why did you build it 186 00:09:57,471 --> 00:09:59,021 this way?" And they're like, "Hey, I know. 187 00:09:59,371 --> 00:10:00,301 I know it's bad." 188 00:10:00,311 --> 00:10:05,161 But, they didn't give me budget to buy a new router or one that's 189 00:10:05,161 --> 00:10:08,881 capable of VLANs or whatever it was. 190 00:10:08,891 --> 00:10:10,021 Sometimes it's budget. 191 00:10:10,031 --> 00:10:13,841 Sometimes it was management that made that decision, and IT guys just get the brunt 192 00:10:13,841 --> 00:10:16,541 of it it looks bad and it's all technical 193 00:10:18,363 --> 00:10:23,493 Mike, you already brought up the term of VLANs, and we, I just, during, we took a 194 00:10:23,493 --> 00:10:27,833 little bit of a break during which we had a number of, episodes, and one of the ones 195 00:10:27,833 --> 00:10:32,673 that got the most traffic was the one that we talked about, network segmentation. 196 00:10:32,723 --> 00:10:38,383 And, we talked about VLANs, and, the… not sure everybody really 197 00:10:38,383 --> 00:10:42,463 understands if you're not a network person, again, re- realizing that we're 198 00:10:43,543 --> 00:10:47,813 reaching people that are maybe backup oriented, maybe cy- even cyber oriented, 199 00:10:47,823 --> 00:10:49,233 but they're not network oriented. 200 00:10:49,583 --> 00:10:53,363 do you wanna dive into, what we're talking about from a VLAN perspective? 201 00:10:54,735 --> 00:10:54,965 Sure. 202 00:10:55,065 --> 00:10:59,995 and I like to come up with analogies that, are relatable, and I'm trying to… I'm 203 00:10:59,995 --> 00:11:01,805 buying time here to come up with one. 204 00:11:02,175 --> 00:11:02,925 Hotels. 205 00:11:03,265 --> 00:11:08,615 So think of a, a hotel where you've had to use your room key in the elevator, right? 206 00:11:08,615 --> 00:11:12,065 So there's hotels where you can get in and push any button regardless of what 207 00:11:12,065 --> 00:11:17,265 floor your room is on, and then there's hotels where you get in and you have to 208 00:11:17,575 --> 00:11:23,675 use your room key, and the floor that you select is restricted to the room key. 209 00:11:25,075 --> 00:11:26,795 So that's similar to a VLAN. 210 00:11:26,805 --> 00:11:31,875 So physically, we've built this hotel with floors one through, let's just say 211 00:11:31,975 --> 00:11:37,355 one through 10, so that's the physical architecture, and part of that physical 212 00:11:37,355 --> 00:11:40,075 architecture is the security of each room. 213 00:11:40,235 --> 00:11:42,965 I have to have the key to get into my room as well. 214 00:11:43,655 --> 00:11:47,555 So if you think of the hotel where you can go to any floor without 215 00:11:47,565 --> 00:11:49,195 having to use your room key, 216 00:11:49,505 --> 00:11:54,985 You have the potential to segment that network so that based on the access in my 217 00:11:54,985 --> 00:11:57,685 room key, that dictates where I can go. 218 00:11:59,285 --> 00:12:05,965 You can then further segment or restrict access in this network, in this hotel 219 00:12:05,975 --> 00:12:10,875 by saying, "You can only go to the floor in this building or that part 220 00:12:10,875 --> 00:12:15,955 of this network based on the access on your card or your credentials, your 221 00:12:15,955 --> 00:12:17,675 login credentials," as an example. 222 00:12:18,475 --> 00:12:19,935 So that's more virtual. 223 00:12:20,425 --> 00:12:23,845 So it's not physical restricted, although elevator, but 224 00:12:23,855 --> 00:12:25,355 elevator goes to every floor. 225 00:12:26,425 --> 00:12:31,755 Virtually, I'm segmenting this hotel by access privileges, 226 00:12:32,035 --> 00:12:33,355 and that's what a VLAN does. 227 00:12:33,365 --> 00:12:38,195 So on a… Imagine, imagine the network hardware or the switch as 228 00:12:38,195 --> 00:12:42,135 the building itself, and there's all these different places you can 229 00:12:42,145 --> 00:12:44,665 plug stuff into this network switch. 230 00:12:44,675 --> 00:12:50,805 those would be the different floors So when you log into the interface of this 231 00:12:50,805 --> 00:12:56,435 switch, you can draw a box around the, the places you plug stuff in and say, 232 00:12:56,435 --> 00:13:03,835 "I want this to be floor two." And only with access to floor two can access 233 00:13:03,835 --> 00:13:10,035 floor two, and possibly even things on floor two, like the janitor closet. 234 00:13:10,415 --> 00:13:13,095 Like I can get to my room on floor two, but my badge doesn't 235 00:13:13,095 --> 00:13:14,375 work on the janitor closet. 236 00:13:14,735 --> 00:13:18,265 So you can further restrict things inside of VLAN as well. 237 00:13:19,175 --> 00:13:22,665 But in essence, does that resonate with you guys as far 238 00:13:22,715 --> 00:13:28,135 We want to even evolve past, sort of basic VLANs, which are typically port-based, 239 00:13:28,445 --> 00:13:32,885 and then go to micro-segmentation, which is more, application-based, and 240 00:13:32,885 --> 00:13:36,965 purpose-based, which I think you were, again, going with that analogy, you 241 00:13:36,965 --> 00:13:42,035 were going with you have a guest in the hotel, you have a food person, right? 242 00:13:42,045 --> 00:13:44,365 You have a maintenance person. 243 00:13:44,685 --> 00:13:47,405 You have a, an administrative person. 244 00:13:47,745 --> 00:13:50,255 You may even have a vendor, right? 245 00:13:50,265 --> 00:13:55,865 That it's able to go to certain things at certain times, and I think that's 246 00:13:55,935 --> 00:14:01,325 closer to the idea of micro-segmentation, where we're able to say not just these 247 00:14:01,335 --> 00:14:05,335 ports, 'Cause I know we can say this VLAN are on these ports, and this VLAN 248 00:14:05,335 --> 00:14:09,625 are on these ports, but I like the idea, the, the key card analogy that you said. 249 00:14:09,625 --> 00:14:14,225 So imagine if literally every single door, and probably, like, when I'm thinking 250 00:14:14,235 --> 00:14:18,985 about this, this is probably very close to the way things are in a big hotel, that 251 00:14:18,995 --> 00:14:26,025 literally every single door has a key card entry, then you can dynamically allocate, 252 00:14:26,235 --> 00:14:34,105 people's in that segment of the hotel, and that, again, that segment is very virtual. 253 00:14:34,105 --> 00:14:38,815 It ha- it has to do with your purpose and not necessarily based on your location. 254 00:14:39,185 --> 00:14:41,935 although that's where it starts because we're gonna do this, this 255 00:14:42,015 --> 00:14:45,625 segmenting inside this hotel, right? 256 00:14:45,735 --> 00:14:50,145 but then you can further subdivide it out based on what you are here to do, 257 00:14:51,225 --> 00:14:55,055 I actually really like the analogy, Mike, 'cause it makes a lot of sense. 258 00:14:55,155 --> 00:14:58,815 and I'm gonna ask this every single time you bring up a technology thing, 259 00:14:58,815 --> 00:15:00,605 and please don't say it depends. 260 00:15:00,995 --> 00:15:04,855 But one question is, this is all great, especially when you get 261 00:15:04,855 --> 00:15:08,735 down to micro-segmentation, 'cause you can really secure devices. 262 00:15:08,895 --> 00:15:14,355 And with v- VLANs, you can also ensure, as an example, that floor two can't make 263 00:15:14,355 --> 00:15:18,345 it down to floor three, but it's o- or up to floor three, but it's okay for 264 00:15:18,345 --> 00:15:21,645 floor four to maybe go down to floor three because that's where the gym 265 00:15:21,645 --> 00:15:25,755 is, or for f- everyone to have access to the lobby, to the ground floor. 266 00:15:27,385 --> 00:15:31,205 This is all great, but when you start to get very complicated 267 00:15:31,205 --> 00:15:37,715 micro-segmentation and VLANs and everything else, it becomes a nightmare 268 00:15:37,715 --> 00:15:40,145 from, a management perspective. 269 00:15:40,145 --> 00:15:42,365 So at home I run multiple networks. 270 00:15:42,365 --> 00:15:46,425 I have a VLAN, multiple VLANs, and just, organizing devices, dealing 271 00:15:46,425 --> 00:15:49,735 with firewall rules, everything else like that across my environment, 272 00:15:50,255 --> 00:15:52,305 and mine's a very simple network. 273 00:15:52,725 --> 00:15:54,925 Of course, I make it complicated, but that's just how I am. 274 00:15:55,335 --> 00:15:58,405 I'm just imagining, Curtis's example he brought up at the beginning, right? 275 00:15:58,405 --> 00:16:02,265 That very large financial company he used to work at, right? 276 00:16:03,195 --> 00:16:10,625 And how they would go about managing VLANs and micro-segmentation across thousands, 277 00:16:10,645 --> 00:16:12,655 hundreds of thousands of devices 278 00:16:15,150 --> 00:16:18,940 It is a lot of overhead, and one of the reasons, another one of the reasons 279 00:16:18,940 --> 00:16:23,580 that you may see a flat network is that there used to be some level of comple- 280 00:16:23,670 --> 00:16:30,310 complexity and technical, confusion, and we'll call it that, when, a new IT 281 00:16:30,320 --> 00:16:36,250 engineer comes in, and that beautifully designed architecture of all these VLANs 282 00:16:36,250 --> 00:16:39,310 and micro-segmentation was not documented. 283 00:16:40,660 --> 00:16:44,660 And so the new guy comes in with zero turnover, zero ramp-up time, 284 00:16:44,710 --> 00:16:48,330 and n- things start breaking or he doesn't know how it's built. 285 00:16:48,600 --> 00:16:50,990 So he's gotta tear all that stuff down and start over. 286 00:16:51,880 --> 00:16:57,340 You can figure some of that out based on the type of technology you have, 287 00:16:57,340 --> 00:17:00,990 but it takes time, and, in a lot of organizations we don't have bandwidth, 288 00:17:01,030 --> 00:17:02,430 and we need bandwidth to do stuff like… 289 00:17:02,440 --> 00:17:06,750 So I have seen that, where it becomes flat in order to start over. 290 00:17:07,250 --> 00:17:10,640 a- and one of the critical points I'll make about this, and hopefully you 291 00:17:10,640 --> 00:17:14,470 both practice this in your segmented environment, is you have to document it. 292 00:17:14,910 --> 00:17:21,190 You have a diagram, you have ports, you've got screenshots of your VLAN 293 00:17:21,200 --> 00:17:24,320 interface, you've got, a printout of the configuration and your 294 00:17:24,320 --> 00:17:26,580 rules, most importantly your rules. 295 00:17:27,580 --> 00:17:30,850 a- so that if something does break, or if you need someone to come 296 00:17:30,850 --> 00:17:33,200 and help you, it's documented. 297 00:17:33,200 --> 00:17:34,340 It's easier to see on paper. 298 00:17:35,050 --> 00:17:39,430 I'll add to that then that, a- and one of the things I wanna add 299 00:17:39,430 --> 00:17:43,090 to the analogy in this discussion is that, a- and you mentioned it, 300 00:17:43,090 --> 00:17:45,080 it's dynamic or it can be dynamic. 301 00:17:45,380 --> 00:17:50,360 Even though I've set this floor or these rooms as part of this VLAN, because it's 302 00:17:50,360 --> 00:17:53,280 virtual, I don't have to go run new cable. 303 00:17:53,440 --> 00:17:56,070 I can just go into the interface and pretty much drag and 304 00:17:56,070 --> 00:17:58,190 drop, this port or that room. 305 00:17:58,210 --> 00:18:00,670 I want it now to belong to this other VLAN. 306 00:18:01,560 --> 00:18:06,330 m- having those, that virtual segmentation makes it much easier to ma- to manage. 307 00:18:07,450 --> 00:18:12,160 and then the last thing I'll mention is, there's multiple parts 308 00:18:12,180 --> 00:18:14,850 to make this work effectively. 309 00:18:15,340 --> 00:18:17,230 There's the architecture obviously. 310 00:18:17,700 --> 00:18:22,900 There's the documentation, then there's the acc- and very often network 311 00:18:22,900 --> 00:18:28,070 architecture and access control are different stakeholders, different SMEs. 312 00:18:28,990 --> 00:18:32,960 making sure that the communication is there so that when either one of 313 00:18:32,960 --> 00:18:38,600 them get, an objective to say, this VLAN's gotta change or this access has 314 00:18:38,600 --> 00:18:42,190 to change, they still have to be able to collaborate and make that work. 315 00:18:42,894 --> 00:18:45,564 So absolutely, it can get complicated pretty quick 316 00:18:45,984 --> 00:18:49,124 Yeah, and like anything else that we've talked about, and that we'll 317 00:18:49,124 --> 00:18:53,224 talk about on this show, the b- the bigger the environment is, the more, 318 00:18:53,934 --> 00:18:57,464 A, it has to start with from on high. 319 00:18:57,464 --> 00:19:00,414 It has to be empowered from on high, right? 320 00:19:00,414 --> 00:19:04,744 Because you're gonna, you're gonna trip over a few, electrical cords and unplug 321 00:19:04,744 --> 00:19:06,454 some stuff once in a while, right? 322 00:19:06,454 --> 00:19:07,344 you start doing this. 323 00:19:07,344 --> 00:19:09,154 But that's, I'd say, the number one. 324 00:19:09,154 --> 00:19:12,814 And then number two, it's got to start with an inventory, right? 325 00:19:12,824 --> 00:19:15,374 Because we first have to know everything that we have. 326 00:19:15,714 --> 00:19:19,964 and then, then we n- we start grouping that inventory together, right? 327 00:19:19,984 --> 00:19:22,124 And we start observing the inventory. 328 00:19:22,124 --> 00:19:26,504 We start observing how, these workloads interact with each other, and then we 329 00:19:26,504 --> 00:19:29,034 start tagging those workloads, right? 330 00:19:29,074 --> 00:19:32,794 now how you do tagging and then how you use those tags is gonna 331 00:19:32,804 --> 00:19:36,034 be incredibly different based on whether or not we're talking about 332 00:19:36,034 --> 00:19:37,714 a traditional on-prem workload. 333 00:19:37,944 --> 00:19:39,884 Are we talking about, containers? 334 00:19:40,174 --> 00:19:43,084 are we talking about a purely cloud-based workload? 335 00:19:43,404 --> 00:19:47,364 How you use, how you implement those tags and then how you use those tags 336 00:19:47,364 --> 00:19:48,834 are gonna be incredibly different. 337 00:19:49,494 --> 00:19:54,624 I think that's probably, once you have… Again, it, we say it like, 338 00:19:54,654 --> 00:19:57,884 "Oh, yeah, just go inventory." I understand that the bigger you 339 00:19:57,884 --> 00:20:01,014 are, the bigger of a pain this is. 340 00:20:01,874 --> 00:20:06,944 But as I've often said, any good security plan is usually a pain, right? 341 00:20:07,291 --> 00:20:09,931 I like, Curtis, how you approached that, like getting the 342 00:20:09,931 --> 00:20:11,411 inventory and walking through. 343 00:20:12,221 --> 00:20:16,861 But I think another thing to also mention is you don't have to deploy your 344 00:20:16,861 --> 00:20:20,801 entire VLAN infrastructure in one go. 345 00:20:20,831 --> 00:20:24,381 You could say, "Here are the critical applications," or maybe, 346 00:20:24,381 --> 00:20:27,091 "Here are the risky devices. 347 00:20:27,141 --> 00:20:32,081 Let me segment those off first, and then I can slowly roll out everything 348 00:20:32,081 --> 00:20:37,031 else and have a prioritized plan for how to approach this," rather than 349 00:20:37,031 --> 00:20:40,861 saying, "I need to destroy everything and rebuild everything in a day." 350 00:20:41,001 --> 00:20:43,451 There's a lot of variety in segmentation, and it comes 351 00:20:43,491 --> 00:20:45,191 down to what's your objective? 352 00:20:46,071 --> 00:20:52,901 so a lot of organizations simply segment, public areas, conference rooms, lobby from 353 00:20:52,931 --> 00:20:55,211 production areas or normal user areas. 354 00:20:55,671 --> 00:20:59,781 They segment production from test so that things that happen 355 00:20:59,781 --> 00:21:00,951 in a test environment don't… 356 00:21:01,171 --> 00:21:03,511 So it's being done to some degree. 357 00:21:03,981 --> 00:21:08,951 just how do we take that, somebody's doing it, somebody's capable and knowledgeable 358 00:21:08,951 --> 00:21:11,631 and skilled in creating these segments. 359 00:21:12,081 --> 00:21:15,951 It just takes a strategy to roll that out in more meaningful ways 360 00:21:16,787 --> 00:21:20,527 Yeah, and also, you talk about the way that this is already being done. 361 00:21:20,577 --> 00:21:25,047 I'm sure that it's very common for when b- people are given a laptop, 362 00:21:25,057 --> 00:21:29,227 for example, that automatically gets put into a segment, right? 363 00:21:29,267 --> 00:21:32,897 And then you're… And the same thing is, and I think the more modern of 364 00:21:32,897 --> 00:21:38,987 an environment you have, the more virtualized, the more cloudy, if I 365 00:21:39,437 --> 00:21:44,227 could- the cloudier you are and the more virtualized you are, the more used to 366 00:21:44,227 --> 00:21:47,667 tags you, you are at this point, right? 367 00:21:47,667 --> 00:21:52,697 We didn't really do tags, at least not when I was doing physical servers, right? 368 00:21:52,757 --> 00:21:58,317 and I- it doesn't, it's not so strongly encouraged as it is in the 369 00:21:58,317 --> 00:22:00,017 virtualized world and the cloud world. 370 00:22:00,017 --> 00:22:01,887 It's oh, what is the tag for this environment? 371 00:22:02,117 --> 00:22:05,607 And you can automatically create those tags, right? 372 00:22:05,607 --> 00:22:09,227 You automatically create an Oracle tag, you automatically create an application 373 00:22:09,227 --> 00:22:12,077 tag, a laptop tag, a whatever tag. 374 00:22:12,237 --> 00:22:16,807 And so you could end up having these segments already, you're just not, you 375 00:22:16,817 --> 00:22:22,997 haven't yet gone to the next level, which is policy, And we say, "Okay, now that 376 00:22:23,047 --> 00:22:27,347 we have everything tagged, or at least we think we have everything tagged," or to 377 00:22:27,347 --> 00:22:29,697 go with you, Prasanna, I completely agree. 378 00:22:29,827 --> 00:22:34,187 We think we have the important critical, y- workloads tagged. 379 00:22:34,617 --> 00:22:39,177 Let's see if we can enact a policy where that, let's cl- let's cr- 380 00:22:39,187 --> 00:22:40,927 start creating the allow rules. 381 00:22:40,927 --> 00:22:44,847 Okay, the, all of the ones with this tag can all talk to each other, but 382 00:22:44,847 --> 00:22:49,017 they're not allowed to talk to the ones with this tag, the laptop tag, right? 383 00:22:49,297 --> 00:22:56,007 and then you go, the big thing is when you start doing the deny, and, but 384 00:22:56,613 --> 00:22:58,133 Mike, I just wanna get your take on that. 385 00:22:58,513 --> 00:23:02,893 My understanding is typically with firewalls and VLAN segmentation, by 386 00:23:02,903 --> 00:23:08,063 default usually things are denied unless you allow explicit access. 387 00:23:08,333 --> 00:23:10,883 I think it changes from vendor to vendor, but I think that's 388 00:23:10,893 --> 00:23:12,543 usually the best practice, right? 389 00:23:16,265 --> 00:23:16,355 So in North America it's denied by default. 390 00:23:16,355 --> 00:23:17,915 In South America it's allowed, but I'm 391 00:23:18,003 --> 00:23:18,423 A dum- 392 00:23:18,435 --> 00:23:19,335 It's 'cause, things… 393 00:23:19,363 --> 00:23:20,693 You almost had me there, Mike. 394 00:23:21,805 --> 00:23:24,265 wherever it flows the other way when you flush the toilet. 395 00:23:26,535 --> 00:23:30,185 it truly, I'm, I have to say it this time, it depends. 396 00:23:31,095 --> 00:23:31,775 It does. 397 00:23:32,065 --> 00:23:32,645 But once you, 398 00:23:32,753 --> 00:23:33,483 firewalls will 399 00:23:33,585 --> 00:23:37,675 if you have decided to have a flat network for whatever reason, you've 400 00:23:37,675 --> 00:23:39,365 turned off that default deny. 401 00:23:40,625 --> 00:23:40,945 Yeah. 402 00:23:41,345 --> 00:23:41,785 You have. 403 00:23:42,535 --> 00:23:44,545 you've got a rule that sits on top of it, 404 00:23:44,617 --> 00:23:45,007 Yeah. 405 00:23:46,037 --> 00:23:47,547 Deny, deny, deny. 406 00:23:47,787 --> 00:23:49,617 It's a double negative, which is a positive 407 00:23:49,905 --> 00:23:52,495 Allow all, and if that doesn't work, then deny. 408 00:23:52,535 --> 00:23:52,995 But yeah. 409 00:23:53,749 --> 00:23:54,149 Yeah. 410 00:23:54,369 --> 00:23:58,929 It's the chmod 777 for the old, Unix, people on, on the thing. 411 00:24:00,649 --> 00:24:05,669 the I do wanna go back to the thing that you said earlier, the 412 00:24:05,669 --> 00:24:08,139 idea of the, this panic room. 413 00:24:08,899 --> 00:24:12,589 I do think that, and it's very similar, it's related to what you said just a 414 00:24:12,589 --> 00:24:18,739 few minutes ago, and that is we really need to figure out the workloads that 415 00:24:18,739 --> 00:24:27,159 either, A, are super critical from a business operating perspective, right? 416 00:24:27,159 --> 00:24:30,839 Meaning what… these are typically gonna be workloads that we're going to 417 00:24:30,849 --> 00:24:33,409 have very tight RPOs and RTOs, right? 418 00:24:33,409 --> 00:24:36,169 That's recovery point objective and recovery time objective. 419 00:24:36,509 --> 00:24:40,349 If you're not familiar with those terms, go search on our episodes, that 420 00:24:40,349 --> 00:24:42,109 we fully define those terms, right? 421 00:24:42,439 --> 00:24:48,239 So they have very tight RPOs and RTOs, and so these are ones where the 422 00:24:48,239 --> 00:24:52,839 business can't d- can't do without them for very long periods of times. 423 00:24:53,239 --> 00:24:56,099 These would be the ones where we start putting them in the panic room. 424 00:24:56,189 --> 00:24:59,579 These are the ones that we start saying, "Okay, we really have to wall these 425 00:24:59,579 --> 00:25:05,579 off, from, as much as possible." And then to that, I would add not so much 426 00:25:06,049 --> 00:25:10,669 business critical from a money-making standpoint, but business critical 427 00:25:10,679 --> 00:25:15,979 from a, it would re- it would be really bad if this information got out 428 00:25:16,517 --> 00:25:17,407 Was it emails? 429 00:25:18,799 --> 00:25:19,509 email Y- 430 00:25:20,067 --> 00:25:22,557 I was going to the Sony hack from years ago. 431 00:25:22,597 --> 00:25:24,217 That's literally what went in my mind. 432 00:25:24,349 --> 00:25:24,749 right? 433 00:25:24,839 --> 00:25:28,559 yeah, the informa- this is your, your corporate secrets, your… F- both 434 00:25:28,559 --> 00:25:32,989 corporate secrets from a, meetings you really would not rather have public, 435 00:25:32,989 --> 00:25:37,269 like what happened with the Sony hack, and then, also just your corporate IP, 436 00:25:37,279 --> 00:25:39,129 your intellectual property, getting out. 437 00:25:39,599 --> 00:25:44,299 So starting there, you do have to be careful, right? 438 00:25:44,299 --> 00:25:49,409 Because you're also messing with the crown jewels, so you don't wanna mess those up. 439 00:25:51,089 --> 00:25:54,019 but what do you think about that idea, Mike, of starting at the core there? 440 00:25:55,731 --> 00:25:56,911 I think it's a great idea. 441 00:25:57,031 --> 00:25:58,741 so especially in a large environment. 442 00:25:58,791 --> 00:26:03,171 In a smaller environment, it's very easy to go this and this, can and 443 00:26:03,181 --> 00:26:07,041 shouldn't and, I can s- I can see the important stuff from here, right? 444 00:26:07,041 --> 00:26:10,761 So but in a larger environment, especially multiple locations, 445 00:26:10,761 --> 00:26:16,591 multiple floors, multiple departments, you're gonna start fighting politics 446 00:26:16,801 --> 00:26:19,351 with, for access, defining access. 447 00:26:19,731 --> 00:26:23,791 So it's much easier in my experience, to start with the 448 00:26:23,791 --> 00:26:25,521 crown jewels and work your way out. 449 00:26:26,311 --> 00:26:27,511 is it that you care about? 450 00:26:27,541 --> 00:26:29,691 And it could be m- obviously more than one thing. 451 00:26:29,731 --> 00:26:34,381 It could… Is it your enterprise, your ERP, your financial system? 452 00:26:34,391 --> 00:26:39,711 Is it, We have a client that does, a lot of crash testing, and their intellectual 453 00:26:39,711 --> 00:26:44,661 property is all the video and telemetry from the sensors in the crash test. 454 00:26:45,021 --> 00:26:48,121 They manufacture other stuff, but this is their crown jewel. 455 00:26:48,121 --> 00:26:50,801 This is what makes them who they are. 456 00:26:51,441 --> 00:26:54,041 so it's this, maybe priority one. 457 00:26:54,181 --> 00:26:56,421 Some manufacturing, priority two. 458 00:26:56,571 --> 00:27:00,011 something else, intellectual… design drawings, intellectual 459 00:27:00,011 --> 00:27:02,071 property type stuff is three. 460 00:27:02,821 --> 00:27:05,831 now you've identified all your really important stuff that you 461 00:27:05,831 --> 00:27:10,151 care about that's gonna keep the lights on and, the business moving. 462 00:27:11,381 --> 00:27:16,621 For each one of those, who needs acs- access to it, daytime, normal 463 00:27:16,621 --> 00:27:18,361 behavior, let's baseline all that. 464 00:27:18,801 --> 00:27:20,131 How's it being used? 465 00:27:20,141 --> 00:27:21,071 What's normal? 466 00:27:21,831 --> 00:27:22,831 it being backed up? 467 00:27:23,151 --> 00:27:25,471 'Cause it's not just who's accessing it day to day. 468 00:27:25,471 --> 00:27:28,841 Where's that data going it's getting archived? 469 00:27:29,741 --> 00:27:35,241 what's our disaster recovery plan for that thing and all the stuff that supports it? 470 00:27:35,251 --> 00:27:36,681 'Cause that's gonna go into segmentation. 471 00:27:36,951 --> 00:27:40,251 'Cause if you have a, a, a disaster and we've gotta rebuild that somewhere 472 00:27:40,251 --> 00:27:45,261 else, you also have to rebuild all that access stuff somewhere else, that goes 473 00:27:45,261 --> 00:27:46,841 back to that stuff being documented. 474 00:27:46,861 --> 00:27:51,431 But absolutely, start at the core, work your way out, and then fight those 475 00:27:51,441 --> 00:27:53,111 battles and they're political battles. 476 00:27:53,111 --> 00:27:57,481 On, on… As you do that, as, as your circles, your concentric circles of 477 00:27:57,481 --> 00:28:01,681 security grow, your onion, you're gonna, you're gonna run into these 478 00:28:02,281 --> 00:28:05,241 political battles of, "I needed access to that." Really, why? 479 00:28:05,271 --> 00:28:08,791 'Cause it doesn't support any of the use cases that we've identified or defined. 480 00:28:08,801 --> 00:28:10,771 And so do we need an exception for that? 481 00:28:10,771 --> 00:28:13,961 Do we need to pivot or redefine? 482 00:28:14,901 --> 00:28:18,491 and I- in my opinion, that's a, an amazing way to start. 483 00:28:18,737 --> 00:28:23,917 Mike, one of the things you mentioned is you said, I think you said 484 00:28:23,917 --> 00:28:27,107 something along the lines of, yeah, identify like what's important 485 00:28:27,127 --> 00:28:28,677 and then start figuring that out. 486 00:28:29,847 --> 00:28:33,577 But as an IT guy, I- or network guy, I'm not the one who's 487 00:28:33,577 --> 00:28:34,617 figuring that out, right? 488 00:28:34,647 --> 00:28:36,727 I… that's not my decision, right? 489 00:28:37,797 --> 00:28:38,837 It should not be your decision 490 00:28:41,727 --> 00:28:45,967 guy's decision of what the RTO and RPO are, right? 491 00:28:46,127 --> 00:28:47,897 Abso- or the, yeah, absolutely. 492 00:28:48,017 --> 00:28:50,447 Everything's data and architecture to us. 493 00:28:50,447 --> 00:28:52,287 we can tell you the value of that thing. 494 00:28:52,777 --> 00:28:54,797 We can tell you the value of a DLT tape. 495 00:28:54,827 --> 00:28:59,067 We can value the value of a firewall or how much it's gonna cost to 496 00:28:59,067 --> 00:29:01,607 run 100 yards of ethernet cable. 497 00:29:01,897 --> 00:29:03,327 we can tell you all those things. 498 00:29:03,367 --> 00:29:07,517 We cannot tell you the value of the stuff that traverses it or is stored 499 00:29:07,517 --> 00:29:10,647 on it or is being used by the business. 500 00:29:10,657 --> 00:29:15,837 That we're not that, I'm not gonna say we're not that smart, but we, our f- 501 00:29:16,327 --> 00:29:19,757 we don't have the bandwidth to consume that or to be concerned with that. 502 00:29:20,071 --> 00:29:20,311 It's, 503 00:29:20,337 --> 00:29:21,107 the business. 504 00:29:21,321 --> 00:29:23,131 it's not your role, right? 505 00:29:23,337 --> 00:29:23,627 nope, 506 00:29:23,841 --> 00:29:23,911 Yeah 507 00:29:24,607 --> 00:29:25,427 it's not your lane. 508 00:29:25,547 --> 00:29:28,997 And there's an exercise called a business impact analysis that can be done. 509 00:29:29,047 --> 00:29:31,897 it's fairly concise and it's impact. 510 00:29:31,957 --> 00:29:34,777 it's similar to a risk assessment where we just go talk to the, 511 00:29:35,707 --> 00:29:39,467 y- the key stakeholders that are driving critical business functions. 512 00:29:39,887 --> 00:29:45,257 "Tell me what you do here. Tell me what data and information, your role requires." 513 00:29:45,587 --> 00:29:49,257 We talk about the technology that, that's required to support that role, 514 00:29:49,437 --> 00:29:51,137 but we also talk about contingencies. 515 00:29:51,147 --> 00:29:53,317 Like what would you do if your computer's not available? 516 00:29:53,327 --> 00:29:54,637 How would you continue doing your job? 517 00:29:54,957 --> 00:29:59,657 Anyway, long story short, that BIA would identify key stakeholders, critical 518 00:29:59,857 --> 00:30:04,477 processes and procedures, all the stuff that those jobs require or lean on. 519 00:30:05,547 --> 00:30:09,477 gonna point you, if not identifying it directly what your crown jewels are, it's 520 00:30:09,477 --> 00:30:10,827 gonna really point you in that direction. 521 00:30:10,827 --> 00:30:14,747 You're gonna see a lot of commonality, that could help you identify those things 522 00:30:15,561 --> 00:30:19,171 Mike, I, I didn't hear anything you said after DLT tape 523 00:30:21,681 --> 00:30:23,911 You started droo- I saw some drool coming out of your mouth 524 00:30:24,127 --> 00:30:29,287 you… I was like, "Man, Mike is dating himself there." 525 00:30:29,301 --> 00:30:29,881 Time Track, 526 00:30:30,127 --> 00:30:30,397 It… 527 00:30:30,401 --> 00:30:31,581 I didn't wanna go that far back 528 00:30:32,757 --> 00:30:34,137 gracious, DLT. 529 00:30:34,557 --> 00:30:37,477 haven't thought about DLT in a minute, as the kids say. 530 00:30:38,151 --> 00:30:42,411 So Curtis, for you, I'm surprised… So I know we're 531 00:30:42,411 --> 00:30:43,831 talking about network segmentation. 532 00:30:43,831 --> 00:30:47,271 I'm surprised you have not brought up the story where you wanted 533 00:30:47,271 --> 00:30:50,691 to bash your head into the wall because of network segmentation 534 00:30:52,031 --> 00:30:53,471 You mean from that same client? 535 00:30:55,207 --> 00:30:55,537 Yep. 536 00:30:55,591 --> 00:30:56,531 that's the same one, yeah. 537 00:30:56,727 --> 00:30:57,077 Yep. 538 00:30:57,641 --> 00:31:03,561 y- it, it can… th- this is, this is like a, this is like a how 539 00:31:03,561 --> 00:31:05,401 not to do kind of thing, right? 540 00:31:05,401 --> 00:31:11,141 So the, the, this company that I talked about was very segmented off, 541 00:31:11,561 --> 00:31:16,921 and, one of the only application that needed to talk to every other 542 00:31:16,921 --> 00:31:20,651 application was my application, right? 543 00:31:21,071 --> 00:31:21,651 Backup. 544 00:31:22,921 --> 00:31:29,381 so I broke every segmentation, system that they had because I need… the, 545 00:31:29,401 --> 00:31:33,321 the idea of having a single server that could talk to every other server 546 00:31:33,331 --> 00:31:35,331 just basically blew their minds. 547 00:31:35,771 --> 00:31:40,891 And so they kept trying to, wall me off, and they kept doing it via ports. 548 00:31:41,141 --> 00:31:43,821 They kept seeing if they could figure out what ports, And a- 549 00:31:43,851 --> 00:31:45,101 at this point it was NetBackup. 550 00:31:45,121 --> 00:31:46,781 What ports was NetBackup using? 551 00:31:47,111 --> 00:31:49,731 And they'd say, "We figured it out." And then they would… And then I'd 552 00:31:49,731 --> 00:31:52,661 come to work the next day, and I'd find out that the backups all failed 553 00:31:52,671 --> 00:31:54,571 because they had blocked it off, right? 554 00:31:55,691 --> 00:32:00,121 and then it w- it was the, the final night of the fin- it was Y2K. 555 00:32:00,161 --> 00:32:01,111 Y2K was coming. 556 00:32:01,611 --> 00:32:06,211 And, it was the, it was after code, the code, freeze. 557 00:32:06,561 --> 00:32:08,911 So I was like, "Okay, so no more stuff," and everything. 558 00:32:08,911 --> 00:32:11,951 And I was there at 10 o'clock at night, 'cause that's when I 559 00:32:11,951 --> 00:32:13,221 was doing a lot of this work. 560 00:32:14,471 --> 00:32:21,061 And, I went to go run the backups, and they hung, and I lost my mind. 561 00:32:21,131 --> 00:32:25,351 And I started screaming out a blue streak, because I thought I was alone 562 00:32:25,351 --> 00:32:28,571 in the building, and thought I could get away with it, and, turns out I was not. 563 00:32:28,601 --> 00:32:31,971 And the guy that I was reporting to was there, and he stuck his head out 564 00:32:31,971 --> 00:32:34,471 and asked me if I was, like losing it. 565 00:32:34,911 --> 00:32:39,001 And I was just like, the network, the security with the 566 00:32:41,581 --> 00:32:45,061 and the da- da-da." And he's like, "I got it." 567 00:32:47,081 --> 00:32:47,631 Yeah. 568 00:32:48,171 --> 00:32:50,721 So you can step on some people. 569 00:32:51,181 --> 00:32:53,961 Try not to do that, or try to do that as little as possible, 570 00:32:53,961 --> 00:32:55,241 but, leave that up to Mike. 571 00:32:55,261 --> 00:32:59,759 Let Mike step on people I just, something tells me he could do that. 572 00:33:00,489 --> 00:33:01,739 the, I- so here's the thing. 573 00:33:01,809 --> 00:33:08,859 What we're basically saying is first off, the idea is, is monitor traffic, 574 00:33:08,889 --> 00:33:12,829 look at traffic that's going from VLAN to VLAN, see what's, happening. 575 00:33:13,199 --> 00:33:18,549 I do… If you have a VLAN for the backup, especially if you have a separate 576 00:33:18,549 --> 00:33:24,549 network for the backup system, quarantine that off as much as possible, right? 577 00:33:24,599 --> 00:33:28,549 especially things like, authentication and authorization so that you don't 578 00:33:28,549 --> 00:33:32,059 have, we talk about this with, with, active directory, right? 579 00:33:32,369 --> 00:33:36,759 where you don't want that to, if your primary active directory is compromised, 580 00:33:36,799 --> 00:33:40,149 you don't want that to bleed over into the, into the backup system. 581 00:33:40,459 --> 00:33:44,009 And then as we've already talked, l- look at the high value targets, look at 582 00:33:44,019 --> 00:33:48,769 the, the ones that are both h- valuable from a business perspective in terms 583 00:33:48,769 --> 00:33:53,129 of keeping the, the lights on, and then also in terms of the data that you 584 00:33:53,129 --> 00:33:57,029 really wouldn't wanna get out, and that's where you should start this process. 585 00:33:57,069 --> 00:34:01,479 And then Google VLANs and micro-segmentation for whatever 586 00:34:01,499 --> 00:34:04,659 type of environment you have, right? 587 00:34:04,679 --> 00:34:09,969 The three big ones being traditional infrastructure, say highly virtualized, 588 00:34:09,969 --> 00:34:11,729 but maybe I'll say f- I say four. 589 00:34:11,969 --> 00:34:15,539 So a highly virtualized but physical infrastructure, then we start 590 00:34:15,539 --> 00:34:19,199 talking about, containers and modern workloads, and then we talk about 591 00:34:19,199 --> 00:34:21,379 a highly cloud, based environment. 592 00:34:21,419 --> 00:34:25,989 And then, how do I do micro-segmentation in a cloud-based environment or 593 00:34:25,989 --> 00:34:28,809 whatever it is you have, and learn that. 594 00:34:28,809 --> 00:34:31,449 'Cause we can't cover all of that in, in an episode like this. 595 00:34:31,469 --> 00:34:34,909 We're just trying to, we're just trying to seed you, give you ideas. 596 00:34:35,009 --> 00:34:36,339 any final thoughts on that? 597 00:34:36,339 --> 00:34:37,429 I'll start with you, Prasanna. 598 00:34:39,349 --> 00:34:41,799 No, I think people should be using VLANs. 599 00:34:42,105 --> 00:34:42,125 the 600 00:34:42,449 --> 00:34:46,569 Just be careful when people start complaining because your firewall rules 601 00:34:46,569 --> 00:34:48,359 blocked off access that they used to have 602 00:34:49,721 --> 00:34:50,071 Yeah. 603 00:34:50,991 --> 00:34:51,611 How about you, Mike? 604 00:34:53,493 --> 00:34:54,013 Agreed. 605 00:34:54,113 --> 00:34:58,503 VLANing is, it's a pretty simple skill to learn. 606 00:34:58,563 --> 00:35:03,373 a lot of the te- technologies out there today, the interface is very intuitive, 607 00:35:04,343 --> 00:35:05,963 but it does take some strategy. 608 00:35:06,073 --> 00:35:08,173 don't go log in and just start doing stuff. 609 00:35:08,893 --> 00:35:10,353 it out on paper first. 610 00:35:10,773 --> 00:35:14,913 Really think through how I want to segment stuff, even at home. 611 00:35:15,183 --> 00:35:18,063 seg- create a, a guest wireless network. 612 00:35:18,323 --> 00:35:19,583 That's a great way to start. 613 00:35:21,123 --> 00:35:25,453 I have camera- I have, internet-connected cameras that are on a different segment 614 00:35:25,483 --> 00:35:27,553 in my home, including… I've got two. 615 00:35:27,553 --> 00:35:29,483 I've got the house, and I've got the chicken coop. 616 00:35:29,953 --> 00:35:33,243 so the chickens are on their own segment because it's, much 617 00:35:33,253 --> 00:35:34,263 further away from the house. 618 00:35:34,263 --> 00:35:36,833 If it gets compromised, then it's on its own segment. 619 00:35:37,413 --> 00:35:42,883 a- and it doesn't hurt anything to play with it, at home, 'cause you can undo it. 620 00:35:44,653 --> 00:35:46,983 Just put some thought to it before you start messing with it, 621 00:35:47,269 --> 00:35:47,629 you could, 622 00:35:47,673 --> 00:35:48,203 easy to do 623 00:35:48,349 --> 00:35:52,379 you can undo it, Mike, until someone in the household complains that 624 00:35:52,379 --> 00:35:56,429 the internet's down or they're not able to stream to the Apple TV 625 00:35:56,429 --> 00:35:58,489 from their phone or whatever it is. 626 00:35:58,499 --> 00:36:00,129 So just be careful with that too. 627 00:36:01,265 --> 00:36:01,365 Yeah. 628 00:36:02,235 --> 00:36:02,575 All right, 629 00:36:02,631 --> 00:36:03,461 tell you a, a 630 00:36:03,535 --> 00:36:03,775 Go ahead 631 00:36:04,211 --> 00:36:05,761 real quick practical story. 632 00:36:05,771 --> 00:36:09,511 So my, my oldest, this was years ago when she was in high school. 633 00:36:10,101 --> 00:36:14,031 she would wait till 10, 10 o'clock midnight to get on 634 00:36:14,031 --> 00:36:15,451 the internet with her friends. 635 00:36:15,881 --> 00:36:20,141 And though she was upstairs, it was right above our room, and so we could hear her. 636 00:36:20,801 --> 00:36:24,591 and so I put her on her own network segment, and then I assigned, 637 00:36:24,901 --> 00:36:26,501 time restrictions to that segment. 638 00:36:28,341 --> 00:36:29,871 So just letting you know. 639 00:36:29,911 --> 00:36:30,551 that's one 640 00:36:31,359 --> 00:36:31,649 Herc? 641 00:36:32,901 --> 00:36:34,291 Me- mean daddy. 642 00:36:34,721 --> 00:36:35,251 all right. 643 00:36:35,421 --> 00:36:38,821 And with that, I will say thank you for listening and thank 644 00:36:38,831 --> 00:36:40,081 you for you two coming on. 645 00:36:40,931 --> 00:36:42,021 that is a wrap 646 00:36:48,834 --> 00:36:53,536 The Backup Wrap Up is written, recorded, and produced by me, W. Curtis Preston. 647 00:36:54,103 --> 00:36:58,872 If you need backup or DR consulting, content generation, or expert witness 648 00:36:58,876 --> 00:37:01,476 work, check out backupcentral.com. 649 00:37:02,180 --> 00:37:05,371 You can also find links for my O'Reilly books on the same website. 650 00:37:05,970 --> 00:37:09,948 Remember, this is an independent podcast, and any opinions that 651 00:37:09,948 --> 00:37:13,926 you hear are those of the speaker and not necessarily an employer. 652 00:37:14,791 --> 00:37:15,568 Thanks for listening