1 00:00:07,280 --> 00:00:12,040 So it's one of the core issues if you're a short seller and you 2 00:00:12,040 --> 00:00:16,640 want to be able to analyze the actual business prospects. So if 3 00:00:16,640 --> 00:00:19,280 you understand the business model, you really have to understand 4 00:00:19,280 --> 00:00:23,640 the business itself. You have to understand the competition, you 5 00:00:23,640 --> 00:00:27,550 have to understand the customers. We always had somebody 6 00:00:27,550 --> 00:00:32,510 on the ground, we knocked on doors, we talked to customers, we 7 00:00:32,510 --> 00:00:36,390 talked to competitors. We were trying to understand what the real 8 00:00:36,390 --> 00:00:42,150 market was and whether it approached what the bulls in a certain 9 00:00:42,150 --> 00:00:43,830 idea thought. 10 00:00:45,990 --> 00:00:50,190 Imagine spending an hour with the world's greatest traders. Imagine 11 00:00:50,190 --> 00:00:52,910 learning from their experiences, their successes and 12 00:00:52,910 --> 00:00:58,450 their failures. Imagine no more. Welcome to Top Trader Unplugged, 13 00:00:58,450 --> 00:01:01,450 the place where you can learn from the best hedge fund managers 14 00:01:01,450 --> 00:01:04,770 in the world so you can take your manager, due diligence or investment 15 00:01:04,930 --> 00:01:08,690 career to the next level. Before we begin today's conversation, 16 00:01:08,770 --> 00:01:12,090 remember to keep two things in mind. All the discussion we'll have 17 00:01:12,090 --> 00:01:15,410 about investment performance is about the past. And past performance 18 00:01:15,570 --> 00:01:19,230 does not guarantee or even infer anything about future performance. 19 00:01:19,230 --> 00:01:22,450 Also understand that there's a significant risk of financial loss 20 00:01:22,450 --> 00:01:25,250 with all investment strategies. And you need to request 21 00:01:25,250 --> 00:01:28,530 and understand the specific risks from the investment manager 22 00:01:28,530 --> 00:01:32,070 about their product before you make investment decisions. Here's 23 00:01:32,070 --> 00:01:35,950 your host, veteran hedge fund manager, Niels Kaastrup-Larsen. 24 00:01:41,230 --> 00:01:44,990 For me, the best part of my podcasting journey has been the opportunity 25 00:01:44,990 --> 00:01:48,430 to speak to a huge range of extraordinary people from all around 26 00:01:48,430 --> 00:01:52,110 the world. In this series, I have invited one of them, namely 27 00:01:52,110 --> 00:01:55,150 Kevin Coldiron, to host a series of in depth conversations 28 00:01:55,770 --> 00:01:59,770 to help uncover and explain new ideas to make you a better investor. 29 00:02:00,410 --> 00:02:03,530 In the series, Kevin will be speaking to authors of new books 30 00:02:03,530 --> 00:02:06,970 and research papers to better understand the global economy and 31 00:02:06,970 --> 00:02:10,690 the dynamics that shape it so that we can all successfully navigate 32 00:02:10,690 --> 00:02:15,530 the challenges within it. And with that, please welcome Kevin Coldiron. 33 00:02:18,330 --> 00:02:23,010 Okay, thanks Niels and welcome everyone to the Ideas Lab podcast 34 00:02:23,010 --> 00:02:26,810 series here on Top Traders Unplugged. Our guest today is Mark 35 00:02:26,810 --> 00:02:30,710 Roberts. Mark is the founder of Off Wall Street Consulting Group 36 00:02:30,950 --> 00:02:33,950 where he was a pioneer in providing short selling research 37 00:02:33,950 --> 00:02:38,750 to hedge funds. On May 6, 2001, off Wall street published a 38 00:02:38,750 --> 00:02:42,430 report on Enron questioning their business model and recommending 39 00:02:42,430 --> 00:02:46,510 selling the shares which at that time were trading at $60. Seven 40 00:02:46,510 --> 00:02:49,310 months later in early December, Enron became the largest 41 00:02:49,310 --> 00:02:53,710 bankruptcy in U.S. corporate history. Up until that point, Mark's 42 00:02:53,710 --> 00:02:58,030 firm became synonymous on Wall street for superior and exacting 43 00:02:58,030 --> 00:03:03,630 research. Enron was far from a one off though. Over off Wall Street's 44 00:03:03,630 --> 00:03:07,390 30 plus year history, they put out over 600 recommendations with 45 00:03:07,390 --> 00:03:10,310 over 70% of them being successful. And that, I can tell 46 00:03:10,310 --> 00:03:15,190 you, is an absolutely phenomenal record. Mark sold his 47 00:03:15,190 --> 00:03:18,990 business to his colleagues in 2021, and he's here today to talk 48 00:03:18,990 --> 00:03:23,550 about his new book, just out last week, called Off Wall Street, 49 00:03:24,140 --> 00:03:27,980 how to Win at Short Selling by Betting against the Crowd. Mark, 50 00:03:28,300 --> 00:03:30,980 it's a, it's a real honor to have you as a guest today. Thanks 51 00:03:30,980 --> 00:03:32,460 so much for joining us. 52 00:03:33,420 --> 00:03:35,100 Thank you for having me, Kevin. 53 00:03:35,820 --> 00:03:40,780 So your path to Wall street was pretty unconventional. You have 54 00:03:40,780 --> 00:03:45,580 a master's degree in French literature, and at the age of 39, 55 00:03:45,580 --> 00:03:48,580 you were living in New York City, I believe, clutching, collecting, 56 00:03:48,580 --> 00:03:53,740 photography, and never had never owned a stock or a bond. And 57 00:03:53,740 --> 00:03:57,560 so I know it's probably a bit unfair to ask you to condense 39 58 00:03:57,560 --> 00:04:01,120 years of your life into a short description, but I could you 59 00:04:01,120 --> 00:04:04,520 tell us, start off by telling us a little bit about your pre investment 60 00:04:05,000 --> 00:04:05,400 life? 61 00:04:07,640 --> 00:04:14,840 Sure. I went to high school in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and I had 62 00:04:14,840 --> 00:04:22,220 already early on in high school I had gotten interested in, 63 00:04:22,370 --> 00:04:29,810 in, in French, the French language and, and literature. My, 64 00:04:30,130 --> 00:04:37,450 my parents never went to college. My dad was a sergeant in 65 00:04:37,450 --> 00:04:42,610 the army during the Second World War, and my mom's family couldn't 66 00:04:42,610 --> 00:04:48,210 afford to send her to college, so they were very interested in getting 67 00:04:48,210 --> 00:04:54,200 me a great education. So I got interested in French in high school. 68 00:04:54,680 --> 00:05:00,920 And one of my classmates fathers was a professor at Harvard 69 00:05:00,920 --> 00:05:08,160 University, and he taught French civilization. And he kind 70 00:05:08,160 --> 00:05:13,800 of took me under his wing and brought me to France with a study 71 00:05:13,800 --> 00:05:17,410 group from Harvard when I was still in high school. And I became 72 00:05:17,410 --> 00:05:23,450 very interested in France and French literature. And when I went 73 00:05:23,450 --> 00:05:30,650 to college at Swarthmore, the year that John Kennedy was assassinated, 74 00:05:30,650 --> 00:05:38,930 actually, I started studying French literature and art history 75 00:05:38,930 --> 00:05:44,820 mainly. I had a wonderful mentor at, at Swarthmore named David 76 00:05:44,820 --> 00:05:53,180 Kuhn, who was an amazing poet himself. And I graduated from Swarthmore 77 00:05:53,180 --> 00:05:58,100 and went on to University of California, Berkeley, where I studied 78 00:05:58,100 --> 00:06:03,700 art history for a year and then took a master's degree in French 79 00:06:03,700 --> 00:06:10,990 literature and was offered a. I positioned as an associate professor 80 00:06:10,990 --> 00:06:18,830 at the University of British Columbia to teach and work on a PhD. 81 00:06:19,070 --> 00:06:27,470 I turned that down. I enjoyed some hippie years until I couldn't 82 00:06:27,470 --> 00:06:33,230 figure out what I really wanted to do. I made my way back 83 00:06:33,230 --> 00:06:39,780 to Boston and joined a family business, one that had been started 84 00:06:39,780 --> 00:06:48,580 by my grandfather. And after a very short period of time, I found 85 00:06:48,580 --> 00:06:52,620 myself running that business. It was very unsophisticated. It was 86 00:06:52,620 --> 00:06:58,700 a large steel service center in Everett, Massachusetts, right 87 00:06:58,700 --> 00:07:07,460 next to Teddy Peanutbutter that was in the mid-70s. By 1980, 88 00:07:09,700 --> 00:07:14,180 interest rates had skyrocketed. Construction, which 89 00:07:14,180 --> 00:07:18,380 was our business, had slowed to a crawl. We owed the bank a lot 90 00:07:18,380 --> 00:07:26,840 of money, and we started to lose money. And I sold the. The steel 91 00:07:26,840 --> 00:07:33,960 business and walked away before it would. It would turn into 92 00:07:33,960 --> 00:07:40,120 a bankruptcy. And that was my first short sale. I think I saw that 93 00:07:40,120 --> 00:07:40,600 in your book. 94 00:07:40,600 --> 00:07:44,680 I had to chuckle. How did you. How did you convince someone to buy 95 00:07:44,840 --> 00:07:47,000 the business from you if it was failing? 96 00:07:47,560 --> 00:07:52,000 Well, we had a. We had a lot of very valuable assets. And so it 97 00:07:52,000 --> 00:07:57,610 was really an asset sale, not a sale of the business itself. We 98 00:07:57,610 --> 00:08:02,970 had a very valuable piece of property. We had a fleet of trucks. 99 00:08:03,210 --> 00:08:09,810 We even had a locomotive. We had a big inventory of steel, and 100 00:08:09,810 --> 00:08:15,690 all of that was quite valuable. So it was really an asset 101 00:08:15,690 --> 00:08:20,170 sale, not a sale of the business operation. 102 00:08:21,870 --> 00:08:25,710 Just a quick question about your experience at Berkeley before. 103 00:08:26,110 --> 00:08:30,710 Before we go on. You said you. In the book, you said you lived the 104 00:08:30,710 --> 00:08:37,070 life of a hippie, and I wondered if that gave you a kind 105 00:08:37,070 --> 00:08:41,270 of, I don't know, skepticism about stories you were being told. 106 00:08:41,270 --> 00:08:44,750 Because, I mean, that's kind of like the ethos of that time, right? 107 00:08:44,750 --> 00:08:48,270 Is that, hey, we're not buying into the conventional narrative about 108 00:08:49,000 --> 00:08:52,640 State of the Country. And it just struck me that in some sense 109 00:08:52,640 --> 00:08:56,880 that skepticism is kind of necessary to be a successful short 110 00:08:56,880 --> 00:09:01,000 seller. So I was kind of curious if you. If you thought that 111 00:09:01,080 --> 00:09:06,200 kind of way of thinking in Berkeley translated later to your. 112 00:09:06,200 --> 00:09:07,480 To your Wall street career. 113 00:09:08,520 --> 00:09:15,220 Yeah, absolutely. I think actually my skepticism started when 114 00:09:15,220 --> 00:09:19,340 I was in college. It was during the Vietnam War. And I think 115 00:09:19,340 --> 00:09:25,340 a lot of us who were in college during the Vietnam War were 116 00:09:25,340 --> 00:09:28,620 questioning a lot of things about what was going on in the country. 117 00:09:32,460 --> 00:09:37,580 I wasn't particularly political. I was always more of an 118 00:09:37,580 --> 00:09:44,570 outside observer. But a lot of my friends were in the sds. The Students 119 00:09:44,570 --> 00:09:53,050 for Democratic Society were quite radical. I think it was actually 120 00:09:53,130 --> 00:09:59,370 started there, where I started to question things about what the 121 00:09:59,370 --> 00:10:06,090 future might hold for me. And then I think it continued on at Berkeley. 122 00:10:06,490 --> 00:10:11,750 In fact, it's why I went to California. I really wanted to be 123 00:10:11,750 --> 00:10:16,710 part of the scene in San Francisco. I wanted to see what was 124 00:10:16,710 --> 00:10:21,430 going on, and that's why I went out there, as opposed to, like, 125 00:10:21,750 --> 00:10:29,270 going to NYU or something like that. So it was really a journey 126 00:10:30,390 --> 00:10:36,840 for me, as start of a journey to figure out who I was. It took 127 00:10:36,840 --> 00:10:44,480 me a very long time, and I think it's a lifelong search. I did 128 00:10:44,480 --> 00:10:50,760 find a career that I loved. And that really suited my personality 129 00:10:50,760 --> 00:11:00,400 perfectly. I was very lucky. I think luck and perseverance and looking 130 00:11:00,400 --> 00:11:07,130 around, experiencing different things is really a necessary thing 131 00:11:07,370 --> 00:11:09,210 for most people, not for everybody. 132 00:11:10,410 --> 00:11:14,010 Maybe we can fast forward a little bit. So you sold the family 133 00:11:14,010 --> 00:11:21,610 business and I know you went on to get involved in selling franchises. 134 00:11:22,330 --> 00:11:29,280 And then later after that you were actually hired by Fidelity's 135 00:11:29,280 --> 00:11:36,480 broker Jarm to do research. And eventually you I guess got fired 136 00:11:36,480 --> 00:11:40,920 by that from that job or, or the, the, the, that side of the business 137 00:11:40,920 --> 00:11:44,720 was closed down. It was closed down because of people lynch didn't, 138 00:11:44,720 --> 00:11:48,480 didn't want to, didn't want it going on. And for those of younger 139 00:11:49,120 --> 00:11:52,880 listeners, Peter lynch is, you know, certainly from our generation, 140 00:11:52,880 --> 00:11:56,070 probably the most famous or one of the most famous and successful 141 00:11:56,070 --> 00:11:58,870 mutual fund managers out there. He ran the Magellan Fund at 142 00:11:58,870 --> 00:12:02,750 Fidelity. Very, very, very influential person on Wall Street. 143 00:12:02,750 --> 00:12:05,310 So wondering if maybe you could tell us a little bit about 144 00:12:05,550 --> 00:12:09,430 that experience at Fidelity, because I believe that ended up kind 145 00:12:09,430 --> 00:12:13,230 of was the beginning of the step toward founding off Wall Street. 146 00:12:14,510 --> 00:12:20,790 Right. Well, my first job was in New York City. I convinced Mark 147 00:12:20,790 --> 00:12:27,150 Boyer at Boyer Asset Management to hire me as an analyst. 148 00:12:27,310 --> 00:12:34,030 Even though I had absolutely no business education and I had never 149 00:12:34,030 --> 00:12:37,949 done a job like that. I wasn't asking for a lot of money. I was 150 00:12:38,030 --> 00:12:42,630 looking for the experience. So I did spend a year at Boyer Asset 151 00:12:42,630 --> 00:12:48,550 Management writing up sort of asset heavy long ideas. And then 152 00:12:48,630 --> 00:12:57,110 I, I left New York and moved back to Boston and I was, I was attempting 153 00:12:57,510 --> 00:13:02,750 to manage my own money. And that's when the, and, and that was 154 00:13:02,750 --> 00:13:07,230 in 1987 and the market crashed. And I realized I didn't 155 00:13:07,230 --> 00:13:11,230 really know anything at all because I was totally baffled by 156 00:13:11,230 --> 00:13:14,630 what was going on. And that's when I decided to look for a job. 157 00:13:15,840 --> 00:13:21,800 I was very lucky. I met a guy at Fidelity, John o', Brien, who 158 00:13:21,800 --> 00:13:28,000 took a chance and hired me. Fidelity was starting as part of 159 00:13:29,600 --> 00:13:33,520 National Financial, the brokerage arm of Fidelity. They were 160 00:13:33,520 --> 00:13:38,600 trying to create some sell side research to sell to institutional 161 00:13:38,600 --> 00:13:44,780 investors. And I was the first analyst hired to sort of start that 162 00:13:44,780 --> 00:13:51,340 research department. And so what happened was that I was building 163 00:13:51,340 --> 00:13:57,140 a research department and we were using the label Fidelity, but 164 00:13:57,140 --> 00:14:01,220 it was really under the aegis of National Financial, which is part 165 00:14:01,220 --> 00:14:06,660 of Fidelity. And I was calling companies and doing research, all 166 00:14:06,660 --> 00:14:13,910 Wong ideas. And Peter lynch got, got wind of it and was afraid 167 00:14:13,910 --> 00:14:18,390 that I would call companies that he wanted to talk to and they 168 00:14:18,710 --> 00:14:23,949 would not give me the information that he could ordinarily 169 00:14:23,949 --> 00:14:27,030 get in it. But Then they wouldn't give it to him either because 170 00:14:27,030 --> 00:14:30,590 they were afraid that I might publish something that they didn't 171 00:14:30,590 --> 00:14:36,250 want published. So, so he shut that, he shut down that effort. He 172 00:14:36,250 --> 00:14:39,290 just, you know, he said, well, you know, we just aren't going to 173 00:14:39,290 --> 00:14:45,970 do that. And so I was out of a job. But while I was there, I had 174 00:14:45,970 --> 00:14:55,690 started to sell ideas to hedge funds. I didn't write anything up, 175 00:14:55,770 --> 00:15:03,280 but I had some short ideas. I'm sure your listeners will probably 176 00:15:03,280 --> 00:15:09,360 not remember Silk Warehouse, which sold most of its silk flowers 177 00:15:09,360 --> 00:15:13,480 at Michael's. It was kind of a great short idea that I developed 178 00:15:14,280 --> 00:15:21,720 while I was at Fidelity, sort of for the hedge funds. So what happened 179 00:15:21,720 --> 00:15:27,240 was I realized then that it was a whole new market. The FESPEC 180 00:15:27,650 --> 00:15:34,930 brothers were very active and getting well known and nobody was 181 00:15:34,930 --> 00:15:41,570 providing research to short sellers. Fidelity was a great place 182 00:15:42,370 --> 00:15:48,770 to sell research to short sellers because the national financial 183 00:15:49,890 --> 00:15:55,360 arm of Fidelity did 30 or 40% of Fidelity's trading. So the stock 184 00:15:55,360 --> 00:16:01,800 borrow was very, very good. So it was very convenient. And today 185 00:16:02,520 --> 00:16:08,880 Fidelity has a great stock borrow program. So when that effort 186 00:16:08,880 --> 00:16:14,600 ended and Peter lynch terminated it, I had already been 187 00:16:14,600 --> 00:16:19,360 thinking about this new development that I was seeing. Hedge 188 00:16:19,360 --> 00:16:25,650 funds. In those days, a big hedge fund was 300 million in assets. 189 00:16:27,490 --> 00:16:33,170 Essex, for example, in Boston, run by Joe McNay, had about 300 million. 190 00:16:33,170 --> 00:16:37,730 And the Clintons were invested there. And that was a big hedge fund. 191 00:16:38,770 --> 00:16:41,170 So it was a different world. 192 00:16:41,810 --> 00:16:46,450 What are we talking about here? Is this early 90s or late 80s? 193 00:16:48,330 --> 00:16:51,568 This is in 1990. 194 00:16:51,772 --> 00:16:52,690 1990. 195 00:16:52,690 --> 00:17:02,166 Okay, right. So I actually left Fidelity on December 31, 18, 196 00:17:02,365 --> 00:17:09,890 19, 1989. And I spent four months on a contract basis working 197 00:17:09,890 --> 00:17:17,660 at Baupost. At that time, Seth Klarman was alone with only two analysts 198 00:17:18,380 --> 00:17:24,540 operating out of a. A building in, on Brattle street in Cambridge. 199 00:17:25,180 --> 00:17:34,860 And I went and went to work for Seth Klarman as a. On a contract 200 00:17:35,020 --> 00:17:40,180 basis. And while I was there, I was trying to figure out how to 201 00:17:40,180 --> 00:17:46,220 start my own business providing short ideas to hedge funds. 202 00:17:48,140 --> 00:17:51,180 Somehow I came up with the name off Wall street, which I thought 203 00:17:51,180 --> 00:18:02,540 was very snappy. And I also came up with my first idea. I had 204 00:18:02,780 --> 00:18:09,060 earlier in the early 80s, built the largest chain of software 205 00:18:09,060 --> 00:18:14,900 retail franchises in the country under contract with Ashton 206 00:18:14,900 --> 00:18:24,180 Tate, the founders of DB2, the database program. And so I had a 207 00:18:24,180 --> 00:18:32,790 lot of experience with franchising. And I noticed that TCBY 208 00:18:33,030 --> 00:18:42,950 Enterprises was doing very well, but I had my doubts about it. 209 00:18:43,350 --> 00:18:49,470 I started to do some research and I found that there was a whole 210 00:18:49,470 --> 00:18:58,580 army of very, very unhappy franchisees who were being dealt 211 00:18:58,580 --> 00:19:03,340 with very unfairly by the franchisor. And I became very. 212 00:19:04,300 --> 00:19:07,900 That's the yogurt, right? The country's best yogurt. Frozen yogurt. 213 00:19:09,660 --> 00:19:19,260 Exactly. Out of. Out of Little Rock, Arkansas. Just as an aside, 214 00:19:20,380 --> 00:19:25,150 Hillary Clinton was on the board of TCBY at the time when she 215 00:19:25,150 --> 00:19:31,150 was a lawyer at Rose Partners and she was drawing about a million 216 00:19:31,150 --> 00:19:37,830 dollars a year from the company. But anyway, I started to 217 00:19:37,990 --> 00:19:45,670 pursue TCBY as an idea. I was very friendly with the franchisees. 218 00:19:48,390 --> 00:19:53,430 I went to the weddings of franchisees in Kalamazoo, Michigan. 219 00:19:54,070 --> 00:19:58,990 You know, I showed up unwelcome at the franchise at the 220 00:19:58,990 --> 00:20:06,230 franchise convention in Texas. And finally I wrote up. My first 221 00:20:06,390 --> 00:20:15,990 idea was on May 1, 1990, and it was called TCBY is in deep yogurt. 222 00:20:17,590 --> 00:20:23,050 At that time, of course, 1990, you could only publish in print. 223 00:20:23,050 --> 00:20:30,650 There was no fax modem, there was no Internet. I printed these 224 00:20:30,650 --> 00:20:37,450 things up in a very New Yorker like style with cartoons and all 225 00:20:37,450 --> 00:20:47,740 sorts of wonderful things. And I published that first piece in 1990. 226 00:20:47,740 --> 00:20:51,780 And that started off Wall Street. Off Wall Street. I soon realized 227 00:20:51,780 --> 00:20:57,340 that my business model wasn't going to work. I was trying to sell 228 00:20:57,340 --> 00:21:05,100 copies for $5,000 or whatever. I could get $10,000, but I had to 229 00:21:05,100 --> 00:21:14,940 spend too much time at marketing. So I, I was fortunate 230 00:21:14,940 --> 00:21:19,900 enough to convince two hedge fund managers to put me on a retainer 231 00:21:20,700 --> 00:21:28,780 that had $36,000 a year each. And so I was in the black right away. 232 00:21:30,780 --> 00:21:32,700 And that was the start of off Wall Street. 233 00:21:35,131 --> 00:21:38,971 I had a couple questions about that. Number one is, I think I started 234 00:21:39,701 --> 00:21:43,541 my first hedge fund that would have been late 1990s and not too 235 00:21:43,541 --> 00:21:48,101 long after. And at the time there were hedge fund managers that 236 00:21:48,101 --> 00:21:52,501 were called dedicated short sellers. So they literally just own, 237 00:21:53,061 --> 00:21:58,381 they only short sold stocks. And they were typically a small part 238 00:21:58,381 --> 00:22:01,101 of an investor's portfolio. But they were there, they played 239 00:22:01,101 --> 00:22:06,871 a role. Why didn't you set yourself up in that capacity? You 240 00:22:06,871 --> 00:22:10,591 know, why not start a fund? Why start a research business? 241 00:22:12,511 --> 00:22:19,951 Well, the reason, the main reason was that there was nobody 242 00:22:19,951 --> 00:22:23,831 selling research and there were a lot of very good fund managers 243 00:22:23,831 --> 00:22:28,631 who had a lot more experience than I did investing. I, I had, I 244 00:22:28,631 --> 00:22:33,881 had definitely not proven myself to be a great investor. I 245 00:22:33,881 --> 00:22:42,161 lost money in the crash of 87. I was kind of lucky. I lost a lot 246 00:22:42,161 --> 00:22:47,641 of my equity portfolio. But I happened to be long New Zealand bonds. 247 00:22:47,641 --> 00:22:51,521 I made a lot of money being long New Zealand bonds because the 248 00:22:51,521 --> 00:22:57,281 dollar crashed. But that was Just by luck. So I definitely was 249 00:22:57,281 --> 00:23:02,951 not in any position to manage money. I actually am managing money 250 00:23:02,951 --> 00:23:08,031 now for the first time, some of my own money, but I never managed 251 00:23:08,031 --> 00:23:14,391 money. You know, when you go into business, you, I mean, you'd 252 00:23:14,391 --> 00:23:20,911 rather be alone, have no competition, and fill a need that 253 00:23:20,911 --> 00:23:26,871 you see that nobody else has filled. The research model is a very 254 00:23:26,871 --> 00:23:30,991 different kind of business model. It's a discounted cash flow 255 00:23:31,311 --> 00:23:38,671 kind of model where you don't live every year by your P and L. 256 00:23:39,710 --> 00:23:44,831 So I think I enjoyed that kind of business model for a long time. 257 00:23:46,191 --> 00:23:53,831 I had a very stable client base and very steady and growing 258 00:23:53,831 --> 00:24:00,991 income. So I think that kind of model is a lot more stable if 259 00:24:00,991 --> 00:24:05,750 you produce good work than actual hedge fund model. 260 00:24:07,271 --> 00:24:10,311 Do you think that, I mean, there were a good explanation, I 261 00:24:10,311 --> 00:24:15,231 think in chapter eight about the logic of your business model. 262 00:24:15,231 --> 00:24:18,231 The fact that the compensation arrangements for analysts at hedge 263 00:24:18,231 --> 00:24:23,091 funds were tied to the profits generated by the analyst ideas, which 264 00:24:23,091 --> 00:24:27,291 meant that most analysts would prefer to be on the long side. You 265 00:24:27,291 --> 00:24:31,331 know, the long side analysts actually have an easier job because, 266 00:24:32,211 --> 00:24:35,811 you know, all the research on the street is really geared, or almost 267 00:24:35,811 --> 00:24:39,331 all of it's geared toward, toward longs. And so that there was 268 00:24:39,331 --> 00:24:43,611 a rule, you know, like you said, I guess a niche, an opportunity 269 00:24:43,611 --> 00:24:48,351 for short research. And I'm curious, do you think that still 270 00:24:48,351 --> 00:24:53,391 the case or has there been a structural change such that, you 271 00:24:53,391 --> 00:24:56,911 know, you know, off Wall street, you know, if you were starting 272 00:24:56,911 --> 00:25:00,071 today, wouldn't. It wouldn't get off the ground as easily. 273 00:25:01,991 --> 00:25:08,631 I don't think it's changed at all. The I still am in touch with 274 00:25:08,631 --> 00:25:16,761 a lot of people in hedge fund land and, and the dedicated short 275 00:25:16,761 --> 00:25:30,161 sellers in funds are generally the least well rewarded and many 276 00:25:30,161 --> 00:25:33,361 of them would like to move on and be able to do long and short. 277 00:25:33,841 --> 00:25:38,961 Some of them get stuck in the position and actually leave the industry. 278 00:25:40,151 --> 00:25:46,271 I know several people who've done that. So no, I don't think the 279 00:25:46,271 --> 00:25:49,751 situation has changed at all. 280 00:25:51,591 --> 00:25:55,350 We could talk a little bit about just different aspects of short 281 00:25:55,350 --> 00:25:59,511 selling, but one thing I really enjoyed about your book was 282 00:26:01,351 --> 00:26:04,671 throughout it, you have comments from people that have worked 283 00:26:04,671 --> 00:26:09,911 for you or that you've worked with, and they talk about the experience 284 00:26:09,991 --> 00:26:13,491 of interviewing with you and working with you and what they liked 285 00:26:13,491 --> 00:26:19,131 about Off Wall street, what they Learned. And Britt McLoy was 286 00:26:19,131 --> 00:26:23,731 one that I noted. And you know, what he talked about was the 287 00:26:23,731 --> 00:26:29,931 fact that in his previous roles he had very little time to 288 00:26:29,931 --> 00:26:33,571 do the kind of deep level of thinking that was necessary. Whereas 289 00:26:33,571 --> 00:26:38,611 at Off Wall street, basically, he required the analyst to produce 290 00:26:38,691 --> 00:26:43,711 four short ideas per year and that they could spend many months 291 00:26:43,711 --> 00:26:50,471 working on a company. And I thought about that, and we've had 292 00:26:50,551 --> 00:26:55,511 Annie Duke on the show, the former world broker champion, and 293 00:26:55,511 --> 00:26:59,671 she's written a book called Quit. And her view is that some of 294 00:26:59,671 --> 00:27:03,311 the best investors are good quitters. And it's very difficult 295 00:27:03,311 --> 00:27:07,751 for people to get around this kind of sunk cost fallacy. I've already 296 00:27:07,751 --> 00:27:10,511 spent so much time and resources on something, I got to 297 00:27:10,511 --> 00:27:14,771 keep going. So I thought about that. With your for short ideas, 298 00:27:14,771 --> 00:27:18,851 you have analysts working for months and months and months on an 299 00:27:18,851 --> 00:27:24,011 idea. How did you come up with, you know, how. How would you 300 00:27:24,011 --> 00:27:27,411 decide whether to pull the plug on one of those ideas? And was 301 00:27:27,411 --> 00:27:29,771 there resistance from the analysts? You know, just give me 302 00:27:29,771 --> 00:27:33,971 another couple of weeks and I'll. I'll, I'll find out more information. 303 00:27:34,371 --> 00:27:35,651 How would you manage that? 304 00:27:37,411 --> 00:27:43,501 Well, it's a good question. Of course, when you're given three months 305 00:27:43,501 --> 00:27:48,861 to publish one idea, you also have the opportunity to cycle through 306 00:27:49,101 --> 00:27:55,141 several ideas before you finally land on one. So we might 307 00:27:55,141 --> 00:28:01,261 cycle through several ideas and then decide that we were hitting 308 00:28:01,501 --> 00:28:08,611 a proverbial brick wall and abandon it and go on. But basically 309 00:28:09,891 --> 00:28:19,371 all these research projects were collaborations. And so every 310 00:28:19,371 --> 00:28:26,931 step of the way, I would collaborate with the analyst on an 311 00:28:26,931 --> 00:28:33,731 idea that I had mostly generated, although as the analysts 312 00:28:33,731 --> 00:28:38,481 themselves matured, they would start to develop their own ideas. 313 00:28:39,281 --> 00:28:44,001 So, of course, we would try to make a decision as soon as possible 314 00:28:44,481 --> 00:28:48,041 because we didn't want to waste too much time on an idea that 315 00:28:48,041 --> 00:28:52,881 wasn't going to work out. But I think starting off with the right 316 00:28:52,881 --> 00:29:01,051 parameters and having a good instinct about what businesses work 317 00:29:01,371 --> 00:29:06,891 and what business models work and what business models won't work 318 00:29:07,131 --> 00:29:11,771 is a good starting point. So you sort of start off with your gut, 319 00:29:12,251 --> 00:29:19,451 you know, with your instinct. And I developed a very good instinct. 320 00:29:19,611 --> 00:29:23,771 You know, I had been in business. Most analysts have never 321 00:29:24,091 --> 00:29:28,301 run businesses. I had run several businesses by then, and I 322 00:29:28,301 --> 00:29:37,421 kind of, I knew to expect the unexpected, which is, I think, something 323 00:29:37,421 --> 00:29:47,021 that people who go into finance are not prepared for. The 324 00:29:47,021 --> 00:29:54,191 unexpected. I always expected the unexpected. So that's how it 325 00:29:54,191 --> 00:29:58,911 worked. We would work on an idea. We would decide as quickly 326 00:29:58,911 --> 00:30:03,751 as we could whether we had a go or a no go. And if it was a go, 327 00:30:03,911 --> 00:30:07,591 we spent a lot of time to make sure it was right before we published. 328 00:30:07,831 --> 00:30:10,551 And if it was a no go, we'd go on to the next thing. 329 00:30:12,151 --> 00:30:17,231 You mentioned business model. And that comes up a couple times 330 00:30:17,231 --> 00:30:23,541 in your book. One of your former employees talks about that 331 00:30:24,421 --> 00:30:28,101 you don't short a stock because they have questionable accounting. 332 00:30:28,421 --> 00:30:31,781 They have questionable accounting because the business model 333 00:30:31,781 --> 00:30:36,021 isn't sustainable, and it's forcing them to do that. And I think 334 00:30:36,821 --> 00:30:42,101 that played out in the Enron case. Perhaps maybe you could illustrate 335 00:30:42,101 --> 00:30:47,891 that idea with Enron. Talk about how, because other people had 336 00:30:47,891 --> 00:30:50,371 talked about Enron's kind of questionable accounting, but it was 337 00:30:50,371 --> 00:30:54,931 really you guys that pointed out the, you know, the fact that 338 00:30:54,931 --> 00:30:58,011 the business model wasn't gonna. Wasn't sustainable. 339 00:31:00,651 --> 00:31:07,331 Right. Well, I will say that accounting problems are a symptom. 340 00:31:07,331 --> 00:31:14,311 They're not a disease. They're the symptoms of a. Of a problem. 341 00:31:15,031 --> 00:31:20,151 Usually they're used to hide the inadequacy of the business model. 342 00:31:22,551 --> 00:31:26,391 So the real secret to understanding a business is not to 343 00:31:26,391 --> 00:31:30,431 be able to identify accounting problems, which, by the way, have 344 00:31:30,431 --> 00:31:35,551 gotten nothing but worse over the years. Now people look at adjusted 345 00:31:35,551 --> 00:31:39,511 EBITDA as if it were GAP ebitda. They don't even talk about 346 00:31:39,511 --> 00:31:45,611 GAP EBITDA anymore. So things have progressed to a kind of an absurd 347 00:31:46,651 --> 00:31:53,531 stage. But it's always business model problems that bring 348 00:31:53,531 --> 00:32:00,411 a company down. Generally speaking, many investors are led 349 00:32:00,411 --> 00:32:08,831 to believe that the horizon and the available market for a business 350 00:32:08,831 --> 00:32:14,431 is much greater than it is in reality. That's one thing that is 351 00:32:14,431 --> 00:32:20,511 very important to understand when you're doing research. Companies 352 00:32:20,591 --> 00:32:26,591 that have very, very high valuations and have high multiples 353 00:32:27,311 --> 00:32:33,271 are predicting a very long Runway of sales growth, which also 354 00:32:33,271 --> 00:32:42,381 implies a very big market. Usually in some cases, that's obviously 355 00:32:42,381 --> 00:32:47,741 true, and in many cases it's not. But it takes a lot of work to 356 00:32:48,381 --> 00:32:53,981 discover that the market is actually much smaller than the street 357 00:32:54,221 --> 00:32:59,221 analysts and the company would lead you to believe. So it's one 358 00:32:59,221 --> 00:33:04,841 of the core issues if you're a short seller and you want to be able 359 00:33:04,841 --> 00:33:09,641 to analyze the actual business prospects. So if you understand the 360 00:33:09,641 --> 00:33:12,921 business model, you really have to understand the business itself. 361 00:33:12,921 --> 00:33:16,481 You have to understand the competition, you have to understand 362 00:33:16,561 --> 00:33:21,561 the customers. We always had somebody on the ground. We knocked 363 00:33:21,561 --> 00:33:25,841 on doors, we talked to our customers, we talked to competitors. 364 00:33:26,001 --> 00:33:29,811 We were trying to understand what the real market was and whether 365 00:33:29,811 --> 00:33:36,091 it approached what the bulls in a certain idea thought. 366 00:33:37,131 --> 00:33:40,731 You do talk a lot about that in the book, about having field researchers 367 00:33:40,731 --> 00:33:46,891 who drove all around the country. Is that still important? 368 00:33:47,051 --> 00:33:51,451 Is that even possible for some of the tech companies that are trading 369 00:33:51,451 --> 00:33:54,691 on these extraordinary valuations? Can you do field research 370 00:33:54,691 --> 00:33:58,591 on those guys? There's a And if so, how is it maybe different 371 00:33:58,591 --> 00:34:03,551 than you know, on kind of older economy type of companies? 372 00:34:03,951 --> 00:34:10,031 Yeah, well, it is quite different. And of course the sources 373 00:34:10,271 --> 00:34:19,511 of information have exploded with AI and satellites looking at 374 00:34:19,511 --> 00:34:26,471 parking lots and credit card data being sold and things like that, 375 00:34:26,471 --> 00:34:32,551 which never, which didn't exist for most of my career. Those 376 00:34:32,551 --> 00:34:39,191 things, those things didn't exist. So yes, there is a lot of 377 00:34:39,191 --> 00:34:44,551 data that are available to analysts now that they can pay for. 378 00:34:45,031 --> 00:34:49,511 You know, there's these professional interviewing services 379 00:34:50,541 --> 00:34:57,261 that sell interviews, there's satellite parking lot readers, there's 380 00:34:57,581 --> 00:35:00,781 data readers, there's all kinds of things that didn't exist. 381 00:35:02,061 --> 00:35:10,141 But I still think that you can't replace talking to customers. 382 00:35:11,101 --> 00:35:14,941 If you can talk to them, you can't always talk to them. 383 00:35:20,991 --> 00:35:26,591 So when, when you thought about a short, did you start with 384 00:35:26,591 --> 00:35:32,111 the accounting and valuation and say, okay, hey this is, you know, 385 00:35:34,031 --> 00:35:37,951 like you say, a symptom, let's go see if there's disease and then 386 00:35:37,951 --> 00:35:43,391 kind of work your way down? Or did you, was it just kind of noticing, 387 00:35:43,791 --> 00:35:46,511 you know, a business model and thinking oh that, that's, that's 388 00:35:46,511 --> 00:35:47,071 questionable. 389 00:35:49,021 --> 00:35:54,221 It's a, kind of a, kind of a top down thing. For me, my preferred 390 00:35:54,221 --> 00:36:03,060 way is to look at companies that are very expensive, have very 391 00:36:03,060 --> 00:36:10,541 high multiples, where expectations are very high and where 392 00:36:11,901 --> 00:36:19,801 the business model just on a gut basis, you think maybe it won't 393 00:36:19,801 --> 00:36:24,561 be able to produce those kinds of results. So there are certain 394 00:36:25,121 --> 00:36:32,041 kinds of companies that make more sense than others. I mean biotech 395 00:36:32,041 --> 00:36:37,841 and software companies are certainly a lot harder to analyze 396 00:36:38,481 --> 00:36:44,141 than companies with field operations. Industrial companies, 397 00:36:44,381 --> 00:36:53,061 retailers, those are the companies that are easier to do the 398 00:36:53,061 --> 00:36:58,341 research on. So I think you start by finding companies that are 399 00:36:58,341 --> 00:37:03,901 highly valued, whose business model is analyzable and where you 400 00:37:03,901 --> 00:37:09,251 think maybe that business model may not be able to produce 401 00:37:09,251 --> 00:37:13,731 the kind of results that are built in to the valuation. That's 402 00:37:13,731 --> 00:37:20,171 kind of where you start. As you work down, you'll find most often 403 00:37:20,571 --> 00:37:25,611 you'll find a lot of accounting tricks and problems that 404 00:37:25,611 --> 00:37:33,751 are also meant to support that idea that there's a vast market out 405 00:37:33,751 --> 00:37:38,151 there that this company can take advantage of. So in the early 406 00:37:38,231 --> 00:37:44,351 stages it makes the profits look much higher with questionable 407 00:37:44,351 --> 00:37:50,751 accounting. And that's what excites the crowd. You always are 408 00:37:50,751 --> 00:37:56,071 looking for an excited crowd out there driving these valuations 409 00:37:56,471 --> 00:38:02,241 and not too many and not too many skeptics. 410 00:38:05,201 --> 00:38:10,161 Amy Wilson was another person that you quote in the book and she, 411 00:38:11,201 --> 00:38:16,921 she said, you know, you short bad management teams and that you 412 00:38:16,921 --> 00:38:21,081 Know if they will either use sports analogies or quote Yorgi Berra, 413 00:38:21,081 --> 00:38:24,601 then that's on their earnings calls. That's initially a short that 414 00:38:24,601 --> 00:38:31,981 made me laugh. But how much research do you do? The, the actual 415 00:38:31,981 --> 00:38:36,461 people that are running it and the. I don't know, how do I put this? 416 00:38:36,461 --> 00:38:40,901 Maybe the. Their assessment of their integrity, their background, 417 00:38:40,901 --> 00:38:44,741 etc. So you know, you've got the business model, but then you 418 00:38:44,741 --> 00:38:48,741 also have the people who are executing the business model. You 419 00:38:48,741 --> 00:38:51,781 know, are both those equally weighted or how did you think about 420 00:38:51,781 --> 00:38:52,141 that? 421 00:38:53,421 --> 00:38:58,141 Of course you're very interested in management and the 422 00:38:58,141 --> 00:39:04,221 language that they use. I think I talk about the use of language 423 00:39:04,221 --> 00:39:10,661 in the book, analyzing conference calls. How much hyperbole 424 00:39:10,901 --> 00:39:15,941 is there in the presentation. Also, you do want to look at the 425 00:39:16,261 --> 00:39:21,381 background of the managers. It matters whether they're founders 426 00:39:21,381 --> 00:39:27,821 or whether they're hired hands. Usually the hired hands are 427 00:39:27,821 --> 00:39:34,341 very professional marketers and presenters and more prone to 428 00:39:35,141 --> 00:39:40,341 be presenting a false narrative than the founder, I think, 429 00:39:41,221 --> 00:39:46,981 although some founders are also very clever. So yes, you certainly 430 00:39:48,101 --> 00:39:54,631 want to do everything possible to understand the integrity of the 431 00:39:54,631 --> 00:39:59,591 management. Many managers and especially of overvalued companies 432 00:40:00,151 --> 00:40:07,031 are aligned. I think it's pretty obvious. And their presentations 433 00:40:07,511 --> 00:40:11,511 are hyperbolic and I think that's always a red flag. 434 00:40:12,951 --> 00:40:18,431 How much does timing come into your thinking process? Right, so 435 00:40:18,431 --> 00:40:21,791 okay, we can go, we can do the check, checklist. They go Dodger 436 00:40:21,791 --> 00:40:25,471 accounting. Their high valuation business model is not sustainable. 437 00:40:25,471 --> 00:40:30,871 Their management is, you know, suspect. And all that stuff can go 438 00:40:30,871 --> 00:40:35,951 on for years. And you know, so how, how can you figure that out? 439 00:40:35,951 --> 00:40:40,071 I mean, you, you talk about, in the, in your book, you say that 440 00:40:40,071 --> 00:40:42,871 one of your favorite books was written by a friend of yours, David 441 00:40:42,871 --> 00:40:47,231 Einhorn. His. A very famous and successful hedge fund manager. 442 00:40:47,231 --> 00:40:52,431 And I, I had to chuckle because that's also his book, which 443 00:40:52,431 --> 00:40:58,991 I believe is foring some of the people all the time. And that's 444 00:40:58,991 --> 00:41:02,631 if, if I have a student recommend or ask for a recommendation, 445 00:41:02,631 --> 00:41:05,831 I always recommend that book. And the reason I recommend it is 446 00:41:06,391 --> 00:41:11,231 because it shows the absolute level of persistence and diligence 447 00:41:11,231 --> 00:41:15,431 that you have to go through to be successful. And he describes this 448 00:41:15,431 --> 00:41:20,411 kind of position that he had in a financial company that went 449 00:41:20,411 --> 00:41:27,291 on for years. And you know, obviously he could, I guess, do that 450 00:41:27,291 --> 00:41:30,971 as someone running his own firm. But for someone like you, or 451 00:41:30,971 --> 00:41:36,491 for most of us being short of stock for years until it finally 452 00:41:36,491 --> 00:41:42,131 works out and it is pretty tricky. So how did timing kind of 453 00:41:42,541 --> 00:41:44,381 feature into your thought process? 454 00:41:45,821 --> 00:41:53,661 Picking a top is really Almost impossible. You can get lucky. But 455 00:41:55,181 --> 00:42:01,181 when a valuation is extremely stretched, we know that it can get 456 00:42:01,181 --> 00:42:10,551 more stretched. So I do think that you are trying to short stocks 457 00:42:10,551 --> 00:42:15,271 at what you think are maximum valuations. It doesn't always work 458 00:42:15,271 --> 00:42:20,111 out that way. So you have two choices. You can either stick with 459 00:42:20,111 --> 00:42:25,711 it for a very long time, as I have done on many occasions, or you 460 00:42:25,711 --> 00:42:31,431 can cut your losses and you probably never come back. But at 461 00:42:31,431 --> 00:42:35,841 least you put the idea out there and other people might follow 462 00:42:35,841 --> 00:42:39,481 it. So it's certainly one of the hardest things in short selling 463 00:42:39,881 --> 00:42:49,321 is trying to get the timing right. So hopefully, since as a research 464 00:42:49,481 --> 00:42:55,321 company, we're not managing money, our customers are portfolio 465 00:42:55,321 --> 00:43:00,761 managers and they understand how to size these kinds of things. 466 00:43:01,511 --> 00:43:09,431 And hopefully when a stock is very high, but can still go a lot 467 00:43:09,431 --> 00:43:15,151 higher, they have sized appropriately so that they won't 468 00:43:15,151 --> 00:43:22,631 get too burned. But yes, it's certainly a problem and one that 469 00:43:23,991 --> 00:43:27,731 I face managing my own portfolio, which has a lot of short 470 00:43:27,731 --> 00:43:32,491 ideas in it. It's sort of interesting because Katherine Staley 471 00:43:32,811 --> 00:43:42,331 wrote the definitive book on short selling in 1996, and she actually 472 00:43:42,650 --> 00:43:47,171 talks about one of my short ideas that I had put out, I think, 473 00:43:47,171 --> 00:43:56,611 in 1991 and had gone up, up a great deal before it collapsed about 474 00:43:56,611 --> 00:44:01,931 five years later. And she writes about this as a kind of a 475 00:44:03,931 --> 00:44:09,491 cautionary tale. Even though I got the story right, my timing was 476 00:44:09,491 --> 00:44:15,931 terrible. And so, yeah, I mean, it goes along with the territory. 477 00:44:16,971 --> 00:44:21,411 The markets can stay, what does it stay, irrational longer than 478 00:44:21,411 --> 00:44:25,311 you can stay solvent? I think some version of that is. Is the famous 479 00:44:25,311 --> 00:44:31,151 quote, do you think that issue has become more. Do you think that's 480 00:44:31,151 --> 00:44:36,871 become more of a problem recently with the flood of money 481 00:44:36,871 --> 00:44:40,911 coming into passive funds? So there's just this kind of fire hose 482 00:44:40,911 --> 00:44:45,071 of liquidity that you're going into the long side that you're fighting 483 00:44:45,071 --> 00:44:49,271 against. And then layered on top of that, you've had some of these 484 00:44:50,311 --> 00:44:53,951 almost like there's always been short squeezes. That's always 485 00:44:53,951 --> 00:44:56,931 been part of every market. But you've got these kind of coordinated 486 00:44:56,931 --> 00:45:00,251 attacks that we saw with, you know, game stocks, some of these 487 00:45:00,251 --> 00:45:03,931 men's stocks, where even retail investors look for stocks 488 00:45:03,931 --> 00:45:07,171 with high short interest and then try to squeeze them out of positions 489 00:45:07,811 --> 00:45:13,091 and did so successfully. Do you see that as, you know, making 490 00:45:13,091 --> 00:45:16,331 life for short sellers even more challenging now than say, you 491 00:45:16,331 --> 00:45:17,251 know, 20 years ago? 492 00:45:18,851 --> 00:45:26,141 I, I think that the passive funds and the volatility dampening 493 00:45:26,461 --> 00:45:34,861 strategies that are being used today by quant funds have dampened 494 00:45:35,981 --> 00:45:43,021 the volatility in the short ideas. And so you're very dependent 495 00:45:43,581 --> 00:45:50,541 on events, earnings calls, earnings events, generally speaking, 496 00:45:51,661 --> 00:45:59,421 as catalysts. So yes, I do think that the volatility is less. 497 00:45:59,901 --> 00:46:05,941 There's more liquidity that drives these things, but really there 498 00:46:05,941 --> 00:46:10,221 are more opportunities as a result. Also, there are more stocks 499 00:46:10,301 --> 00:46:17,271 that are outrageously valued. I think so. I think there are, there 500 00:46:17,271 --> 00:46:24,751 are more possibilities, but it has become a harder game. So I think 501 00:46:24,831 --> 00:46:30,671 now you have to take into account the fundamentals, technicals, 502 00:46:32,190 --> 00:46:36,471 and the market mood and what's going on in the market before you 503 00:46:36,471 --> 00:46:41,911 really want to enter a short position. And then I think you really 504 00:46:41,911 --> 00:46:43,631 have to be careful about sizing. 505 00:46:44,731 --> 00:46:47,811 Is short selling something that, you know, people are listening 506 00:46:47,811 --> 00:46:51,451 to this podcast, A lot of them manage their own money. Is that something 507 00:46:51,451 --> 00:46:56,411 that individuals can do or is it something that is best loved to 508 00:46:56,811 --> 00:47:00,171 professionals given the fact that, you know, obviously there's 509 00:47:00,171 --> 00:47:04,091 potential for infinite loss? But not only that, there's just, 510 00:47:04,091 --> 00:47:09,411 you know, the timing is so. Is so tricky. How do you think about 511 00:47:09,411 --> 00:47:09,691 that? 512 00:47:13,041 --> 00:47:18,081 I don't advise individuals to do short selling unless they have 513 00:47:18,081 --> 00:47:21,561 plenty of time on their hands and can do a lot of research on their 514 00:47:21,561 --> 00:47:26,160 own. Generally speaking, individuals who are in the market 515 00:47:26,881 --> 00:47:29,521 because they aren't professionals, they're professionals 516 00:47:29,521 --> 00:47:34,321 at doing something else and they don't have the time to really 517 00:47:34,561 --> 00:47:40,431 understand the companies that they might be interested in selling 518 00:47:40,431 --> 00:47:44,751 short. It takes a really deep knowledge, a deep understanding, 519 00:47:45,151 --> 00:47:52,031 and a. And a great deal of watching and waiting to be a good 520 00:47:52,031 --> 00:47:58,431 short seller. So I do think it's best left to professionals unless 521 00:47:58,511 --> 00:48:03,671 you have a lot of time on your hands and you know what you're doing. 522 00:48:06,151 --> 00:48:12,391 So I do not recommend short selling for unsophisticated individuals. 523 00:48:13,831 --> 00:48:18,231 On the other issue that you raised about these meme stocks and 524 00:48:19,111 --> 00:48:24,311 stocks that get manipulated, that's the danger of not being a 525 00:48:24,311 --> 00:48:30,931 sophisticated short seller. Retail shorts get into crowded shorts. 526 00:48:31,011 --> 00:48:34,611 It's all they hear about. It's all they know. It's what you know. 527 00:48:34,611 --> 00:48:38,371 So they, so they go after the stocks that everybody is going after. 528 00:48:38,771 --> 00:48:44,811 And, and it's a, you know, makes them obvious prey, you know, 529 00:48:44,811 --> 00:48:52,131 or sophisticated operators. I never get involved with names that 530 00:48:52,931 --> 00:48:59,761 people are. Are short. Generally speaking, anything as popular 531 00:48:59,921 --> 00:49:06,161 as a short, I advise people to avoid like the plague. You don't 532 00:49:06,161 --> 00:49:11,961 want to follow the crowd that is short. You want to follow the 533 00:49:11,961 --> 00:49:13,121 crowd that is long. 534 00:49:14,081 --> 00:49:18,361 You say a couple times, I think in the book that sometimes 535 00:49:18,361 --> 00:49:22,471 the best place to look for future, I think you say 10 baggers 536 00:49:22,471 --> 00:49:26,271 or stocks that are Going to do great on the long side is by looking 537 00:49:26,271 --> 00:49:31,431 for short sale candidates. And can you give us an example of that? 538 00:49:31,431 --> 00:49:34,071 If you can explain what you mean and give us an example of that. 539 00:49:34,951 --> 00:49:40,951 Since one of the ways to find shorts is to look at very, very highly 540 00:49:40,951 --> 00:49:46,881 valued stocks, you may discover that a stock that you would 541 00:49:46,881 --> 00:49:52,241 consider as a short actually that the price is justified. And 542 00:49:52,241 --> 00:49:59,441 especially if that stock has a, has a slip and gets hammered and 543 00:49:59,921 --> 00:50:05,721 declines substantially, which happens when a stock has a very high 544 00:50:05,721 --> 00:50:10,041 valuation. It'll be very volatile. I mean, if you're right 545 00:50:10,041 --> 00:50:13,241 about a stock fundamentally that's what you're looking for as 546 00:50:13,241 --> 00:50:18,721 a short. But if you're wrong fundamentally, it also gives you 547 00:50:19,041 --> 00:50:23,361 an opportunity, if that happens to a good long idea, to buy 548 00:50:23,361 --> 00:50:23,681 it. 549 00:50:25,121 --> 00:50:28,041 Is there an example? I think you talked about Priceline in the 550 00:50:28,041 --> 00:50:32,401 book. Can you maybe just give us a little more color on how that 551 00:50:32,401 --> 00:50:32,881 might work? 552 00:50:33,761 --> 00:50:38,401 I don't remember Priceline so well. I remember aol, for example. 553 00:50:39,931 --> 00:50:46,251 We got short AOL in the early days based on valuation and accounting. 554 00:50:46,811 --> 00:50:55,691 We didn't understand how big the market really was. When the accounting 555 00:50:55,931 --> 00:51:03,371 did get questioned, basically for the same reason that we were 556 00:51:03,371 --> 00:51:08,271 short, which was the, which was the amortization of customer 557 00:51:08,271 --> 00:51:16,551 acquisition costs. The stock did have a good decline, but it was 558 00:51:16,551 --> 00:51:17,991 actually a buying opportunity. 559 00:51:20,391 --> 00:51:23,751 And it was a buying opportunity because you realized 560 00:51:23,751 --> 00:51:26,991 that the market was actually much bigger than you kind of had 561 00:51:26,991 --> 00:51:28,231 thought when you started the research. 562 00:51:28,631 --> 00:51:29,671 Yes, exactly. 563 00:51:29,831 --> 00:51:34,361 I got you, I got you. Maybe just in the last few minutes, I'd 564 00:51:34,361 --> 00:51:40,321 be interested to get your take on how the world looks now or how 565 00:51:40,321 --> 00:51:45,881 the market looks now to you versus the early 2000s when you really 566 00:51:45,881 --> 00:51:52,841 became, at least on Wall Street, a household name. We've got 567 00:51:53,001 --> 00:51:57,401 the aggregate valuation of the market at levels that's comparable 568 00:51:57,401 --> 00:52:04,751 to the dot com bubble. And a lot of that's being driven by a capex 569 00:52:04,751 --> 00:52:08,431 cycle or Capex spending by tech companies, which was very much 570 00:52:08,431 --> 00:52:13,391 the case in the dot com era. We've just had Michael Burry of the 571 00:52:13,871 --> 00:52:17,991 big short fame close his hedge fund in November, kind of throw up 572 00:52:17,991 --> 00:52:23,791 his hands. And in 2020 we had Julian Robertson, who was a very 573 00:52:23,791 --> 00:52:27,031 famous hedge fund manager, close to high ground management in 574 00:52:27,031 --> 00:52:32,521 2020, saying, hey, the market's, the market's kind of irrational. 575 00:52:33,401 --> 00:52:36,121 How do you compute it to situations in your own mind? I'm 576 00:52:36,121 --> 00:52:38,401 not asking for any predictions or anything like that, but I'm just 577 00:52:38,401 --> 00:52:42,401 like, when you sit back, look at your experience, look at the markets, 578 00:52:42,401 --> 00:52:45,241 how do you think of the two? How do you compare the two situations? 579 00:52:46,681 --> 00:52:51,961 I think on a valuation basis you're quite right, they are very 580 00:52:52,121 --> 00:52:59,651 similar. We're in very similar ranges on valuation and enthusiasm. 581 00:52:59,971 --> 00:53:05,171 I think the big difference is the role of passive. Number one, 582 00:53:06,051 --> 00:53:12,691 the constant flows into passive funds which are kind of coming 583 00:53:12,771 --> 00:53:18,891 on a steady basis and support the market. The other big change 584 00:53:18,891 --> 00:53:27,061 I think is the government is a much more liable to intervene in 585 00:53:27,061 --> 00:53:33,741 markets because in the United States especially, the market is 586 00:53:34,061 --> 00:53:43,381 the economy. So the government can't allow the market to cycle as 587 00:53:43,381 --> 00:53:49,821 easily on its own as it used to. There's a lot of government innovation 588 00:53:51,111 --> 00:53:55,271 intervention. The government has hurt the buyer of last resort, 589 00:53:55,351 --> 00:53:59,551 the provider of liquidity of last resort. They don't want the 590 00:53:59,551 --> 00:54:05,671 market to go down. That's not to say it won't happen, but I think 591 00:54:05,671 --> 00:54:10,311 it's going to be most, most of the declines are going to be very 592 00:54:10,311 --> 00:54:18,161 tempered by the large passive funds and the government, which I 593 00:54:18,161 --> 00:54:25,481 think is different from about the year 2001, 2002. 594 00:54:28,232 --> 00:54:32,192 One last question, just kind of following up from that. You have 595 00:54:32,192 --> 00:54:35,352 a website where you give an overview of your personal investment 596 00:54:35,512 --> 00:54:40,912 strategy and you talk about that having three components, basically 597 00:54:40,912 --> 00:54:45,952 a market neutral basket of stocks. So by market neutral, the 598 00:54:45,952 --> 00:54:50,812 dollar value of the longs and the shorts are roughly in syn. The 599 00:54:50,812 --> 00:54:55,572 second is a kind of a long term position in natural resources, 600 00:54:56,452 --> 00:55:00,012 agricultural commodities, using futures and options. And then 601 00:55:00,012 --> 00:55:04,252 the third strategy is a long volatility portfolio, basically a 602 00:55:04,252 --> 00:55:09,252 hedge against a big market decline. So when I kind of look through 603 00:55:09,252 --> 00:55:14,132 those three things, what I don't see in any of that is a long 604 00:55:14,292 --> 00:55:19,012 position in equities, any exposure to equities. And so my question 605 00:55:19,012 --> 00:55:22,382 is, given what you just said about the, you know, the fact that 606 00:55:22,382 --> 00:55:25,062 the market, the government's likely to support the market, that 607 00:55:25,062 --> 00:55:28,582 there's passive funds supporting the market, why don't 608 00:55:28,582 --> 00:55:32,262 you have any net long exposure to equities or do you have that somewhere 609 00:55:32,262 --> 00:55:35,422 else and this is just more of a tactical approach? 610 00:55:35,982 --> 00:55:41,502 No, actually the, the hedge fund that I manage, my own macro 611 00:55:42,142 --> 00:55:51,242 long short hedge fund, for most of this year it was 2 to 1 long 612 00:55:51,242 --> 00:55:59,322 to short equities. It also had some ETFs and some rates, but mostly 613 00:56:00,282 --> 00:56:06,442 US and foreign equities. So for about two thirds of the year 614 00:56:06,442 --> 00:56:12,522 I ran it at 2 to 1 long to short and then the last third of 615 00:56:12,522 --> 00:56:19,342 the year I ran it at a 3 to 2 ratio. So it was not a market neutral 616 00:56:20,542 --> 00:56:26,462 fund. I do invest in long ideas. Some of them are pretty high 617 00:56:26,462 --> 00:56:32,182 flyers. And I think it was a large part of the reason that the 618 00:56:32,182 --> 00:56:38,142 portfolio performed very well this year, even though it was also 619 00:56:39,592 --> 00:56:48,952 extremely defensive and unlevered. So that's actually something 620 00:56:48,952 --> 00:56:53,592 that I've enjoyed a great deal because when I published research 621 00:56:53,672 --> 00:56:59,552 I never could take positions. My position was always that I didn't 622 00:56:59,552 --> 00:57:05,752 want to have any conflict of interest. And so I never managed 623 00:57:05,752 --> 00:57:10,212 money. So this is a great experience for me. It's something 624 00:57:10,212 --> 00:57:14,612 I always wanted to do. So it was not market neutral as far as 625 00:57:14,612 --> 00:57:20,052 the other two components are concerned. The long volatility strategy 626 00:57:20,772 --> 00:57:29,172 is discretionary in that it's not always on. It's only on when 627 00:57:29,172 --> 00:57:34,202 I think that we have an opportunity to get a, at least a 628 00:57:34,202 --> 00:57:41,682 5% decline in the market. So that's pretty hard to predict. But, 629 00:57:41,682 --> 00:57:45,962 but that's what that particular strategy is for. And we 630 00:57:45,962 --> 00:57:54,042 use, we use options on the s and P500. And then the, the third 631 00:57:54,042 --> 00:58:00,562 strategy that I'm, that I'm, that I'm working on is very interesting 632 00:58:00,562 --> 00:58:08,682 because I believe that over time that commodities have not attracted 633 00:58:09,962 --> 00:58:16,602 recently the amount of capital that they have traditionally attracted 634 00:58:16,922 --> 00:58:24,002 as a part of the investment landscape. And I do think that if 635 00:58:24,002 --> 00:58:28,622 the market struggles and I believe it will struggle to go higher, 636 00:58:30,942 --> 00:58:34,022 I don't expect the market to go much higher. I'm not going to 637 00:58:34,022 --> 00:58:38,422 predict that it's going to crash, but I do think it'll struggle 638 00:58:38,422 --> 00:58:42,782 quite a bit to provide long term returns. I do think more money 639 00:58:43,182 --> 00:58:48,182 will flow into commodities which have been very undervalued 640 00:58:48,182 --> 00:58:54,152 and which have been very depressed. So the commodity strategy 641 00:58:55,192 --> 00:59:00,552 is what I call a warehousing strategy where we use a combination 642 00:59:01,432 --> 00:59:08,232 of options and options on futures. When we trade around positions, 643 00:59:08,472 --> 00:59:14,232 we try to lower the cost of carry of these futures positions. 644 00:59:14,792 --> 00:59:20,282 I'm aided in this by a fellow named Hari Krishnan who's a wonderful 645 00:59:20,522 --> 00:59:26,362 smart options trader and who advises me on structuring these trades. 646 00:59:27,882 --> 00:59:32,842 And actually we've been very successful this year in particular 647 00:59:33,642 --> 00:59:39,042 with this strategy. The hedge funds I ran this last year was up 648 00:59:39,042 --> 00:59:43,322 about 26% and on a risk adjusted basis. That was really good. 649 00:59:43,322 --> 00:59:47,882 And then. And the commodity strategy I think is up about 20%. 650 00:59:48,842 --> 00:59:53,242 Oh, that's excellent results. And I know Hari as well. He's a very 651 00:59:53,242 --> 00:59:58,402 smart guy and he's written a couple books and he's been a guest 652 00:59:58,402 --> 01:00:02,642 speaker in my class. So if you're out there, Hari Krishna, look 653 01:00:02,642 --> 01:00:07,562 him up. He's smart, interesting and always kind of challenging. 654 01:00:07,962 --> 01:00:12,142 A challenging guy has challenging investment ideas. Well, 655 01:00:12,142 --> 01:00:17,382 Mark, I think that's a good place to wrap it up for today. Thanks 656 01:00:17,382 --> 01:00:23,502 so much for joining us, taking the time and good luck with the film 657 01:00:23,502 --> 01:00:25,142 going forward and good luck with the book. 658 01:00:26,262 --> 01:00:29,822 Thank you very much. Kevin. I appreciate your having me on. This 659 01:00:29,822 --> 01:00:34,702 is my first podcast ever. I've made very few appearances. I always 660 01:00:34,702 --> 01:00:39,342 believed in letting the work speak for itself and I didn't have 661 01:00:39,342 --> 01:00:45,982 to go out and tout my work. So I appreciate having a platform now 662 01:00:46,462 --> 01:00:50,982 to speak a bit and also to present the book that comes out in 663 01:00:50,982 --> 01:00:51,502 February. 664 01:00:52,142 --> 01:00:56,382 Well, it's been our honor to have you and this is a great book. 665 01:00:57,582 --> 01:01:01,182 Hopefully this conversation has given you a taste for it, but 666 01:01:01,182 --> 01:01:05,622 it really is just a taste. So there's a lot of great stories. There's 667 01:01:05,622 --> 01:01:09,582 Wall street history in there. There's lessons that we can all, 668 01:01:10,442 --> 01:01:14,682 whether we're short sellers or not. So it's just, it's just a fun, 669 01:01:14,762 --> 01:01:19,122 challenging and challenging route and we can learn a lot. So 670 01:01:19,122 --> 01:01:23,642 it's called Off Wall street how to Win at Short Selling by Putting 671 01:01:23,642 --> 01:01:27,082 against the Crowd. It's just been released, so please make sure 672 01:01:27,242 --> 01:01:30,842 go out and get a copy because I think you can tell from what we've 673 01:01:30,842 --> 01:01:36,002 been discussing here a lot of the ideas you won't find on mainstream. 674 01:01:37,352 --> 01:01:42,152 So with that, thank you all for listening and for all of us here 675 01:01:42,152 --> 01:01:45,032 at Top Traders Unplugged, we'll see you next time. 676 01:01:46,152 --> 01:01:49,472 Thanks for listening to Top Traders Unplugged. If you feel you 677 01:01:49,472 --> 01:01:52,432 learned something of value from today's episode, the best way 678 01:01:52,432 --> 01:01:55,792 to stay updated is to go on over to itunes and subscribe to the 679 01:01:55,792 --> 01:01:59,072 show so that you'll be sure to get all the new episodes as they're 680 01:01:59,072 --> 01:02:02,202 released. We have some amazing guests lined up for for you. And 681 01:02:02,202 --> 01:02:05,442 to ensure our show continues to grow, please leave us an honest 682 01:02:05,442 --> 01:02:08,442 rating and review in itunes. It only takes a minute and it's the 683 01:02:08,442 --> 01:02:11,762 best way to show us you love the podcast. We'll see you next time 684 01:02:11,762 --> 01:02:13,362 on Top Traders Unplugged.