Suburban Eastern Australia, an environment that has, over

time, evolved some extraordinarily unique groups of homosapiens.

But today, we observe a small tribe akin to a group of meerkats that

gather together atop a small mound to watch, question, and discuss the

current events of their city, their country, and their world at large.

Let's listen keenly and observe this group fondly known as the

Iron Fist and the Velvet Glove.

Hello and welcome back to Ear Listener.

This is episode 431 of the Iron Fist and the Velvet Glove podcast.

Last week I said we'd be back with the normal panel discussion

and that's not the case.

It's another special episode.

It's myself, Trevor, the Iron Fist and a special guest, uh, I'd like you to

meet dear listener is Cameron Leckie.

Welcome aboard the podcast, Cameron.

Thanks for having me.

Yes, dear listener.

So Cameron is a, um, husband, father, stepfather, and a

retired army officer and veteran.

And he's been quite prolific in writing articles in the John

Menendee blog and posting tweets.

Um, and I happen to agree with virtually everything he writes.

And, it's all along the lines of, we're making big mistakes with our defence

decisions and our foreign policy and, uh, he too has issues with the, the US

Empire, so I thought we'd get Cameron on and he and I could agree with each

other for a good hour as we moan about the state of the world and wish it

was, wish everybody agreed with us.

But, um, if you're in the chat room, say hello, ask some questions

if you've got any, we'll try to incorporate them if we can.

So, Cameron, why don't you just kick off with, sort of, uh, who you

are and what your experience was in the, in the military and, um, that

might add some sort of context to, to how you think about the world.

Sure.

No worries.

Thanks, Trevor.

Um, before I get going, I don't normally look like this.

It's just, I had a skin cancer cut out on Friday, so it'll be, uh, it'll be off

in a week or so, but I'll get into it.

Um, yeah, so I joined the army, uh, straight out of high school.

So, you know, did year 12 and six weeks later, or.

Eight weeks later, I was in the Army, went to the Defence Force Academy, uh,

in Canberra, three years there and then a year at Duntroon, um, doing officer

training, graduated as a lieutenant and, you know, then there you are on

your way into your military career.

And I guess when I joined, um, I'd always wanted to join the Army.

It's the only thing I'd really ever wanted to do.

Did you have

a military in the family?

Did your dad have

one?

Yeah, my father was conscripted He didn't go to Vietnam, but he served,

um, I think well over 30 years in the Army, um, Citizen's Military

Force and then the Army Reserve.

Um, uh, and he's still involved in military history, um, in

his battalion down in Ballarat.

Um, and yeah, my grandfather was in World War II.

He was actually in Ambon, um, and was on one of the last

planes that flew out of Ambon.

before the Japanese captured it.

Uh, and if you know your military history, you know that about half

of those soldiers who were captured lost their lives in captivity.

So, um, like it's a bit lucky to actually get back to Darwin.

Um, unlike a lot of the people in Hong Kong.

Was that

Singapore or?

Ah, Ambon's an island in now Indonesia.

Um, so.

We had a number of Italians on small islands like Timor, um, Ambon,

there's one other I can't remember, but they, you know, small force and

the Japanese overwhelmed them all.

I never had a chance.

You know, that's the decisions that were made at the time

and ended up a lot of people

dying.

Just as a matter of interest, my father lied about his age so he could

get into the Second World War and was shipped off, arrived in Singapore

just in time for the surrender, found himself in Changi Prison and went on

the Burma Railway, did the whole thing.

So, one of the very lucky few to survive that, yeah.

Yeah, it's, um, incredible, isn't it, to think an underage person,

um, would get themselves into that situation, but, uh, clearly survived.

Yes, yeah.

Unlike so many others.

Yeah, so I guess, um, You know, it's funny how your perception of things changes

when you're young, like, um, all I wanted to do when I was young is go to war.

Like, I thought, you know, prove yourself and, and all that sort of stuff.

And now I can't think of anything worse.

Um, and not that, I mean, I've been on operations.

I went over to East Timor, um, in 1999, went to the Solomon

Islands for a while in 2003.

I also went to, um, Uh, Sumatra in Indonesia after the tsunami.

So, um, Banda Archo and that, and, you know, I guess as you grow up and you

mature and you see a few things, you start to realize that war's not a great thing.

Um, it's not a game.

Um, and the reasons we go to war are also increasingly questionable.

And I guess as I, as I grew up, um, it took me a while, a bit of a slow

learner maybe, but first half of my military career, I was thinking,

you know, we're the good guys.

Um, You know, I'm doing this for the right reasons, and then the second half of my

career I started to question things until by the time I got out I was thinking we're

heading in totally the wrong direction.

Were there any particular moments that caused you to switch across?

Um, I'm not sure.

I mean, it's a pretty good process, I guess.

Like, I could have gone to Iraq.

I got a post out of my job early because of personal circumstances.

And if I had stayed where I was, I would have been in Iraq.

Um, and I wouldn't have given it a second thought.

Um, I would have been actually quite excited about it.

Um, because I think, you know, most soldiers when they get the opportunity

in the Australian Army to deploy, they generally, at least on their

first trip, Pretty excited about it.

Um, we train, spend all that time to do the business, and I guess you think,

um, aid that, you know, chance to do the business, as well as I guess that

those early days, you sort of think you're doing it for a good reason.

Um, so I think probably as things unfold in Iraq and that, that probably, um, You

know, questions started to be raised.

Where are the weapons of mass destruction?

And, you know,

what's their long term plan?

What are we doing there?

And you see the, um, you know, the brutality of what's occurring in places

like Fallujah and stuff like that.

Um, I was, I was posted at Canungra at the officer training wing there for

four years, and we had people come and give talks about their experiences.

And some of them had been in, um, in Iraq.

And, you know, I remember one guy in particular who's, he was just a mess,

um, He had been posted with the Marine Corps in Iraq and some of the stories

he told like it was you know, just horrendous what he'd been through.

Um, yeah, so I guess all these things just start opening up your eyes a little bit.

Um, and they were happy for

him to talk in that way.

I

didn't want to censor that

viewpoint.

Um, well, I don't think he was necessarily.

It wasn't political by any means.

It was just him retelling his, um, his story.

But, you know, it's like pretty, um, you could tell he was a mess, um, on

the inside and, you know, several people like that who you can just see in mental

health and PTSD and similar issues, um, it just mounts and builds over time.

Um, and you start to get this picture of, of what's going on and

then you start reading more widely.

As well about events, um, going on in the world, like what happened in

Libya and, and, and NATO's involvement, like, you know, I guess it's a

little sort of, um, a warning bell in what happened in Ukraine in 2014.

That's probably a pretty significant moment.

Um, I mean, it just seems so full on and particularly, you know, MH17

being shot down, the media coverage, um, and the anti Russia slant on the

whole events just seems so full on.

And I thought, you know, when it's so over the top, the coverage, you

start thinking, well, if it's, what, why is it, why is it like that?

You know, I guess you start reading and listening and searching

for information a bit wider.

So what year did

you leave the Defence Force?

Uh, 2019 I think was my last year.

Um,

2018's my last year of work and I was on leave until I discharged in 2019.

Um, yeah, so, you know, it's a gradual process, but yeah, by those last

few years I was, um, I was thinking, yeah, we're, we're well and truly.

We're not doing what we're saying we're doing.

We're not doing it, you know, for democracy and freedom and, and all

those sort of catch cries which grow up, get rolled out every

time we deploy troops overseas.

Um, I'd pretty, pretty well come to the conclusion that the only reason we

did what we were doing was to support the alliance with the United States,

with the United States, which in effect was really just supporting an

empire which, um, is as brutal as any empire that's ever existed, I'd argue.

And could you feel that you could talk to any of your fellow

officers, frankly, about these things?

Or did you have to keep it all close to your

chest?

No, I, um, in one on one or small group discussions or whatever,

I think a lot of people sort of agree, or, um, to an extent.

Um, uh, but I guess a lot of people in the military aren't particularly political.

Um, just want to go about doing their job.

Um, and you know, I guess just accept the world is for what it is.

Um, Um, and I guess I got to the point though where I was thinking

like, you know, if, if I was told I had to deploy somewhere, I was at the

point where I was thinking, well, I don't necessarily know if I could.

And once you get to that point, um, you're probably time to leave

the military because, um, you know, when you sign up, that's when you

commit to supporting whatever the government tells you to support.

And once you start thinking, well, I can't do that anymore, it was time to leave.

Any inkling as to whether in the very upper echelons, of the Defence

Force, that any of the, I don't know, Admirals or whatever they're called

up there, Generals, whether they, Any inkling from you as to whether any of

them understand any of this or whether they've succumbed to the propaganda

and they're all the way with LBJ?

Yeah, I think, um, to get to that level, you need to be

committed to the cause, so to speak.

Um, and, um, Yeah, I think, I think there's probably few, few people

in the military who have sort of gone the direction I have, who, um,

in, in seeing the alliance and that has, has been the opposite of our

national, uh, national interest.

Um, And, you know, certainly you'd get cut down pretty quickly at that level.

You would, you would, your prospects for future promotion and that would be gone.

So, you know, very, I think, you know, it's not necessarily censorship per

se, but it's more self censorship that, you know, there's no point in,

In raising uncomfortable issues, um, or asking awkward questions if you want

to continue up the, um, you know, up to the clamoring heights of the general.

So I think, you know, sort of all my self selects for people who are,

you know, believers in the cause.

Um, I guess just one little anecdote, not related to the, um, to the Alliance

per se, but one of my last jobs I was doing training development on a new

piece of equipment that Defence was developing and I'd been working on it

for six months or 12 months, best part of a year I guess, and I knew it was a

pretty ordinary bit of kit, a lemon, and I'd done all the training development,

developed the training package, helped deliver the um, the first training

for this piece of equipment, and the soldiers could tell straight up it was a

piece of, Um, I just called it a lemon.

Yep.

Um, and, you know, we provide feedback, et cetera.

And then the next year I started my new job and the general who was in charge of

that piece of kit, um, came to our unit.

We had a bit of a, um, dog and pony show as we call them.

So all the, all the.

Troops were out, had all our equipment set up, and he'd come around and,

you know, they'd brief on whatever.

And he's talking about his brand new bit of kit, how it's going to solve all these

problems, how great it's going to be.

And this is the bit of kit I've been working on, and it was

a, you know, it was a lemon.

Um, and it just, I sort of just clicked on my brain and think, well, there's

only two things that happened here.

He's, um, he's telling porcupines and, um, And that or everyone up to his level

or below his level when getting briefed on it and said, yeah, it's all good.

It's all good.

It's all good.

It's all good.

So by the time that gets to the top, it's, yeah, we've met all the requirements.

It's a good piece of kit, you know, and the troops will get

it and be able to do their job.

But, you know, it just sort of shows how, um, defense doesn't encourage

people to, uh, You know, I think too far left or right of what's

expected or to, you know, bad news doesn't go very well up the chain.

So sort of people sort of

Hmm.

I mean, all large organisations have an element of groupthink that goes on where

it's difficult for people to pop their head above the parapet and disagree.

But the military just takes that to another level, doesn't it?

Where obeying orders and discipline is, um, is just accentuates

that groupthink problem.

You know, I think, um, I mean, it's a known problem and like,

uh, one of the, we have a planning process in the Army called the Military

Appreciation Process, which is a deliberate planning process, um, which

I've, you know, used throughout my career, trained people on it, etc.

And it's a known problem.

And, you know, the idea is that you get people to, you know, It'll take the

other side or that, but I guess just, um, day to day and cultural wise, um, when

you're talking about things which are fairly outside of the bounds, I guess,

of normal behavior, you know, questioning the fundamental, um, of our defence

policy, which is the alliance with the United States, that's sort of, yeah, it's

quite, um, yeah, it's sort of outside of that realm, I guess, where, where the,

where people are willing to question.

And you think, I guess it's intertwined, intertwined, the Australian Defence

Force and the United States are like, um, very inextricably linked.

And I mean, I was posted to an artillery regiment in Townsville

for a couple of years and we went to Shoalwater Bay for one exercise.

Um, and we had to, you know, do a form to request the, our Air Force

or Australian Air Force to get a couple of F 18s to come into a strike

mission like 48 hours in advance.

Um, You know, through all their planning cycles, and then we had the

Americans with an aircraft carrier sitting off the coast, and they had

a guy there, it was just like, oh, we've got another two planes, we've got

another two planes, and we cannot keep up with actually allocating the planes

to our, the, um, forward observers who are coordinating all the fire.

So it just gives a, um, you know, the sheer power that the United States has.

Yeah, and still has to a large extent.

Um, when you look at our military capability, you can see why people

also get, I guess, sucked into it.

Like, um, you know, how you see all this military power and capacity to do things,

and we haven't got anywhere near that.

So I guess, you know, you can see how people get wrapped up,

think, well, you know, having the Americans on side is a good thing.

Yes.

Yeah.

Um, so, you know, having a sort of devil's advocate would

be great in a meeting to say.

You know, on the flip side, if we look at it this way, maybe

it's not such a good idea.

Clearly there was no devil's advocate in the room when Orcus

was being discussed or when, when Morrison came up with that idea.

So, so, you know, what are your thoughts on Orcus and And, uh, sort of, it's a

closer alliance, I guess, with the U.

S.

and the, and the U.

K.

in terms of, you know, the main feature of it is the supply of, of submarines.

And Cameron, we've been doing this podcast for nine years or something,

and almost from the first episode, I've been talking about submarines.

And because it's just been one crazy decision after another.

Um, initially we had Abbott looking at the Japanese subs off the shelf, which

seemed at the time and with hindsight, probably not a bad option if you're

going to be getting submarines, certainly better than a lot of the others.

And then we had this absurd decision to get the French to

take the nuclear submarines.

and strip out the nuclear powered component and make them diesel powered.

And virtually every expert on submarine technology was saying it was fraught with

danger, it was the most difficult thing you could possibly contemplate to change

the sort of drive system of a submarine.

And, um, and then that all got blown out of the water and, um, Morrison gave

McCrine eventually the bad news and we swiped over to the American version,

and in short, dear listener, my view of submarines is, if they're defensive,

which we would hope that's what they are, to defend Australian territory, you want

them small and as silent as possible, lurking off the Australian coast and ready

to attack something that doesn't exist.

that's attacking us, as opposed to these larger submarines which seem to

be designed to sail all the way over to China and start attacking China.

It seems to be how they, um, what their purpose is.

So, you know, what's, what's your view on the whole submarine

debacle over the, over the time?

Um, this is a debacle.

I don't think it's really actually about the submarines at its core.

Um, I guess we can get to that, um, in due course, but, uh,

my, my take on, on where, you know, history runs in cycles,

um, and empires run in cycles.

And I think, you know, the, the U S empire obviously took over the British, um,

after World War II, um, had a competitor in the Soviet Union that ended in sort of

1990, and then we had the unipolar moment.

And to be honest, the United States botched it completely.

They could have maintained their number one position in the world for a very

long time if they had just, you know, been a little bit clever about, um,

their relationships with other countries and not needing to dominate them.

So as a result, you know, the, um, you know, Iraq, Afghanistan,

the war in Ukraine, etc.

These are all, um, markers of imperial decline.

Um, and, um, I think we're well past the peak.

It's now on the downhill trajectory.

Um, and there's desperation.

There's desperation in, uh, the U.

S.

Um, there was a, the China, the U.

S.

ambassador to China said the other day, you know, summed up, we can't afford

to be second or we won't be second.

And that's what, you know, that's what a lot of this is about, is desperation.

You don't say that if you're on top, you don't need to.

Um, but they're trying to.

You know, from the US perspective, want to reclaim their number one

spot, which I think is impossible.

Um, uh, and then you have the British, um, in on this, who are once grand imperial

power, who can't quite get over the fact they're no longer the Empire, so they're

on the coattails of the United States.

And then you have good old Australia, who obviously formed from, um,

Since the Whitefellas came with the British settlement, we've always

had an Imperial Overlord, whether that's the Britain to start off

with, or since World War II, the US.

So, nobody in alive in Australia knows of an Australia that's actually, you know,

not had that Imperial Master to a British.

Um, look after us as if we know looking after.

So I think there's, um, desperation and I really think that's a key

driver in why we have orcas, um, is that, um, so empires could collapse

from the periphery to the core.

Um, and so like you say, Turkey, you might have seen, they're looking at

joining BRIC, so, you know, Turkey's part of NATO, et cetera, whatever, well,

you know, that's, they're now moving, starting to move in another orbit.

As, as things unfold and the US imperial system starts to crack, um, you

know, that starts on the peripheries.

And I guess Australia is part of the core of that empire.

We're desperate, um, not for any good reason other than, you know, we think

that our security and our pro, well, not our prosperity, but our security

is wrapped up with the United States.

And I really think AUKUS is a, um, is a symptom of that desperation.

And so I guess from the US perspective.

You know, there's so much stuff that keeps dribbling out about all the

capacity issues with building submarines and, um, you know, being able to

maintain their own fleet, et cetera.

I think that's the little candy being dropped in front of Australia

to say, you know, get involved.

And our politicians, um, have, have, you know, taken that to, grabbed it.

Um, but I really think the most important part of AUKUS from the U.

S.

perspective is the the access and the basing rights that U.

S.

military has in Australia.

Um, which scares the life out of me because if, um, if, and I, I'm more

leaning to the position of when war breaks out with China, and in my view

will be triggered not by China but by the United States, I That means we'll be used

as a launching pad, um, for that war.

Um, and I don't think we can win it.

And even if we did win the war, um, I don't think there'd be any

benefit to Australia given, you know, China's relationship from

a trading perspective with us.

Um, and it also makes us a target.

Um, so it's like a lose lose situation we've got ourselves into.

Um, and then you can add another lose there about all the money we're

spending on submarines, which may not and probably won't, I don't think

they will, to be honest, be delivered.

Um, so we're handing over billions of dollars for something that will probably

never eventuate, um, but could actually, you know, bring Australia to its knees.

And I can't think of anything more serious, um, miscalculation than that.

So the nuclear subs were just a little shiny trinket to wave in front of

Morrison to sort of Just as a cheap way to get us locked in even more with the US.

And they're such a long term investment, I struggle to use

the word, but a commitment.

Such a long term commitment that once you commit to this, you're really locked

in for decades with this sort of stuff.

Um, so I can see from the US point of view that, uh, it was good for them.

I can see from the UK point of view, That they got to sell some technology

and either Rolls Royce or Boeing or somebody over there managed to get some

money, uh, to sort of be part of this.

I just, I just, and I can see how Morrison was so stupid and so, Such a lapdog to U.

S.

interests that he would fall for anything.

The part that is particularly disappointing is that Anthony Albanese,

while in opposition, with a couple of his senior leaders, was told

about the AUKUS proposal by Morrison in confidence, and, and within 24

hours, Albanese said, Yes, we agree to this, we give bipartisan support.

On something as significant as that, And he was proud of the fact that he could

make that decision in under 24 hours.

That's the part that's just so disappointing that that

could happen like that.

Yep, you've hit the nail on the head and I, I don't

think it's, um, the original decision obviously as an outsider.

I don't think there's anything else other than not presenting itself

as a target from which it could be wedged by, by the Liberals, um.

I think that's what it's all about.

And of course, now that they're committed, um, you know, it'll

require change in leadership to, um, to send it on another direction.

They've committed to it.

And of course, you know, politically untenable to say, oh no, it was

a bad deal or, um, or whatever.

So I think, I think this will run to failure.

The submarines will run to failure in the next election cycle or two,

maybe three as, um, you know, we have new leadership or new parties

taking over the reins of power.

Um, and I mean, cause you just say there's this constant trickle of

information, which just highlighting what a flawed proposal it is.

Um, and sooner or later, those and the costs, of course, um, those things will,

will come to the floor and, and when the people who've made the decision are far

enough in history Um, as far as leadership goes, things will change, but, um,

we'll have wasted an awful lot of money.

And you're right, we, as you mentioned, the other, other submarines, um, and I

met several commentators such as Hugh White have mentioned, you know, we could

have a fleet of 20 or 40 submarines for a fraction of the cost of what

these are going to cost us and actually be more useful to Australia's needs.

Uh, but I guess the political environment is such that, um,

you know, we need a change of leadership for a change of direction

before it runs to failure, which.

That's, that's where we'll end up.

Well, well I think of it just, just manning submarines.

It seems like it's difficult to find people to be willing to be submariners.

Funnily enough, people don't wanna be locked up in a little tin can for a

months on end underwater with a bunch of smelly submariners for company.

Yeah.

Is what's your perspective on, on recruiting people for jobs like this?

Yeah, well, I mean, it's a long, it's a long issue.

I mean, part of that, um, there's an article in the conversation today

about, um, recruiting and I think have been researched, made commissioned by

defense, but I missed the important point as far as I'm concerned is that

that's the link between what our national strategy is, defense strategy and

our alliance with the United States.

And, you know, Um, what that is doing to people's willingness to join the military.

Cause I think there's a link there, but I'm getting back to that.

Um, I haven't been to a submarine, but I've been to one of our amphibious ships.

And when they lock you down, they lock you down.

And if something hits that ship, you're in an awful lot of trouble.

So I can understand, um, You know, hats off to people willing to do that sort

of work, but obviously there's only a small number of people who are, um, in,

I guess, in, in the best of times, um, and, um, given, I mean, all the rhetoric,

um, which I guess to some extent, Well, at least parts of the government, I

think, I think there's some conflict between defence and foreign affairs

on, you know, the whole China thing.

Um, but you know, I guess the, the gist of the rhetoric in this country

is, you know, it's very anti China.

Um, we, Never hear a good news story.

It's always a negative story about China, often exaggerated, et cetera.

So I have all these, um, beating the war drums, so to speak, like the Red

Scare thing that was on last, last year.

Um, and talk about these submarines, which you don't have to be a genius

to think, well, they're only going to be used off the coast of China.

And, um, I've got to say that, that might be quite discouraging for a lot

of people thinking you're going to send us to China and we're going to, um,

you know, fire a few missiles there and then hope to get back to Australia.

Um, you know, I don't think that's going to happen.

Um, so it's not surprising at all, um, that they're having issues with

recruitment and I can't see that changing, uh, you know, in Australia.

Just

circling back to that decision by Morrison and his handful of confidants

to agree to AUKUS within 24 hours.

There's obviously no thought amongst that group where they have an

understanding that the world has changed from a unipolar, American hegemon to

a multipolar world, even if they had an, a proper understanding of that.

Um, even with the fear of being wedged by Murdoch papers over not

supporting a defense initiative, they just couldn't have countenance it.

But I, I just don't think.

There is an understanding in that group at all that the world has changed, that

America is on the slide, that there's now BRICS, um, led by China, and all the ducks

are in a row for, for those countries to charge on further and be successful.

It's too late, America can't stop them, and so, so that, there's

no understanding in that group that the hegemon days are over.

And then there's just also, there's obviously an acceptance by this

group of the, of the bogeyman China story, and accepting that.

America, uh, the Chinese are these bad guys who are just itching to, to

invade us given half an opportunity.

They seem to have swallowed that line as well.

Yeah.

Um, once again, I guess this is where we agree with each other all the time,

but, um, I think we're stuck in an idea as in the decision makers are

in an ideology as I spoke about the military, how, you know, you don't get

too far up the greasy pile without, um, you know, having a certain worldview.

I don't think it's any different in, in politics.

Um, and also, you know, the, the media doesn't help, um, at all.

So, I mean, there's that, intermingling of, you know, politics, power,

um, and then, you know, foreign interference or influence, um,

from our, um, you know, our allies.

Um, and I guess I went to the mid, uh, I can't remember what it's called, but in

Tenterfield there's a Museum of Australian Democracy or something like that.

And you can see, uh, it's got the posters of the Yellow Peril.

back from, you know, early in the 20th century and that.

So I guess there's that underlying fear of the Asiatics, um, that

still exists in this country.

So I guess when, when you, when you tick on that, that underlying, um, concern,

um, you know, that, that, that comes out and I think that's part of it as well.

Um, so it doesn't take a lot when you have Constant repetition, you know, look at

Russia, look at Iran, look at, um, China.

How often in our media do you see anything positive reported on those countries?

Never.

Okay.

Obviously, you know, they're not always doing good things, they're not always

doing bad things, but there's no balance.

Whereas the US or the UK that can do horrendous things and they

get a, a, um, free, free pass.

A free pass in the media.

So that's how propaganda works.

That's the most effective form of propaganda is just to repeat

that same mantra and that shapes people's perceptions.

And like the Low Institutes had, um, does their annual annual poll

that's just come out recently.

And you know, once again, sort of shows.

Well, it shows a rising distrust of the U.

S., but also that fear of China.

To me, all that shows is that when you have an effective, um, information

operation aimed at demonizing a country which the political and

the media, uh, are behind, you can influence people's perceptions.

And I think that's been very successful, um, in that, in that path.

Um, and so now we've created this, it's almost, it's become

a self fulfilling prophecy.

Um, um, Which would almost be a joke when you think how, um, if we're gonna

make China an enemy or a potential adversary, you might wanna have

the military force to back it up

So we're creating this boogie man who we could get in a war with and which

we're in no position to fight a war with, um, in any way, shape or form.

It's like quite crazy.

Yeah.

There was some article, I think it was John OU blog or somewhere

it was talking about, um.

Uh, in the Senate Estimates, they've talked about just what our naval capacity

is and the total likely combat capability, um, available, uh, over the next few years

is two Collins submarines, two air warfare destroyers, and four ANZAC frigates.

Um, that's all we've got in the Navy that, uh, we can rustle together.

Uh, the former Senator Rex Patrick put that together, I think

it was on Michael West, um, media.

Um, that's right.

And, I mean, those ships would not survive, uh, well, the ships above,

above the sea surface, on the sea surface, they would not survive.

very long at all in the South China Sea or anywhere in that, that area.

The subs, you know, their survivability would be greater, but so, which

effectively means we have no combat power to actually take a war to China.

So it's, it's, it's farcical to think that we would be

involved in something like that.

given our lack of capability.

And I mean, was it Keating, I think, said throwing matchsticks or

whatever at the, um, um, toothpicks at the mountain or something.

It's like,

you

know, you got to laugh because it's almost ludicrous.

But yet we've got ourselves so wound up as in our, you know, the, the elites

in our sort of security class, um, so wound up about the China That's right.

Um, Which, I'd like to look at empirical evidence, and China hasn't

been in a conflict since 1979.

Uh, that's two years after I was born.

You look at the list where the U.

S.

has been involved and, you know, you need several sheets of paper

to write all the interventions out.

So I don't see the Chinese all of a sudden after lifting all these people out of

poverty, all of a sudden they say, all right, now we're, now we've got ourselves

to the world's biggest economy and, um, we're going to start invading countries.

When you've got to that point by not invading countries, it

doesn't make any sense to me.

But particularly if you want something, it's just

cheaper and easier to buy it.

If, if China wants our iron ore, it's just way easier to just hand over a cheque

and, and buy the iron ore rather than the angst of trying to take it by force.

So.

Yes.

And, um, I mean, this is a sort of, um, I guess we don't want to make

things too simple, but I mean, you're, you're a hundred percent right.

Like, you know, China wants our products, you know, raw materials, so they can

send them back to us, um, so they can end up in Bunnings or Kmart or something.

It's like, what benefit is there in having a conflict, uh, with a country like

Australia, which is providing in what they need, so that they can sell it back to us?

Like, um, and if I was, if I was a Chinese, you know, military planner,

and I wanted to harm Australia, the last thing I would do is invade.

Like, um, there's so many other ways that China could damage us.

Um, you know, most of our fuel, our liquid fuel, crosses us, you know,

South China Sea, that part of the world,

you know, they

can stop it at its source and, and our country, our economy and

slavery would grind to a halt within, you know, a matter of a week or two.

Um, and that would be far more cost effective than actually fighting a war.

So it's like, not only are we You know, ramping ourselves up for something we

can't win, but we're also, you know, fighting, you know, building capabilities

that are not actually going to be useful in, in how the enemy, if, if we think

China's going to be the enemy, which I don't, how they might fight at that war.

So, um,

So Cameron, you and I can see this as clear as day, these mistakes that

we're making that are just so obvious.

Hitching our wagon to the U.

S.

empire, which is committing all sorts of problems around the world.

It's a declining empire.

It's the wrong side to be on if you're looking to the future.

The facts are just there everywhere.

Um, But, our political leaders, our defence leaders, aren't about to

change, it seems, the trajectory.

It just doesn't seem to be any inclination at all.

Maybe the Greens?

Um, but how do we change this?

Because, I guess it's a combination of propaganda from mainstream media, And

with luck, mainstream media, it's power declines over time as newspaper sales

decline and young people just don't watch television, the nightly news or

things like that, so there's sort of a natural depreciation of the power of the

mainstream media, um, but gee there's some entrenched power benefits there,

like we've got politicians who are basically Minister for Defence one week.

They lose an election, they take 12 months off and then they appear on

the board of Raytheon or some other U.

S.

arms manufacturer or, or they're in some deal.

Um, it's in the interest of, of these people to, to buddy up with,

with defense contractors and others and American military people.

It's hard to keep those tentacles out of our political system.

So even if the people who are in power.

have not been indoctrinated by the propaganda.

There's these other, you know, career prospects and trinkets and

boards and lobbying and other things that get offered in front of them

that compromise their integrity and head us in this same direction.

Um, let's deal with the, um, propaganda of the general public first off.

Um, you know, I love what you're doing with, you know, articles in the John

Menendee blog and, and, you know, the things that you're doing on Twitter.

Um,

What other sources do you see as independent media that you could

mention or what are your thoughts there?

Yeah, the, um, well, I think it's pretty clear that the, the

readership of, I guess, our, I call it legacy media is, is declining, um,

and I, I can only see that increasing because, um, you know, it's becoming

more and more obvious to more and more people that a lot of what they're, you

know, They're spruiking his propaganda.

Um, and I guess, you know, we come to the point where, you know,

they're talking, no one's listening.

And I think once we reach that point, um, and I don't think that's necessarily far

off, um, we'll see some, see some changes.

Um, I think it's important, uh, to do, you know, what you're doing, what I'm

trying to do is to, um, you know, write, think, talk about it, engage people, um,

I think there's a lot of people who think along similar lines, give or take, and

they agree with everything, but they can see we're going in the right direction.

So there's a constituency there who want change and see the

need to change, but we're not.

politically organized, I guess, um, at the moment.

Um, but I think that that's, that's coming.

Um, I guess it's, you know, you still need the mechanisms and, and whatever,

but I guess that's what I'm trying to do through writing, um, and, you know,

tweeting and speaking to people like you, Trevor, is to try and, you know, Get

people thinking I guess a lot of people can sort of see little bits and pieces

That's what I'm trying to do is just draw a lot of these bits and pieces together

Put it together in a package so that it's um, you know People can can get it

and once once I mean once people get it I think it's because you know It's a lot

easier to convince someone or something when it's close to the truth But when

when like many of them Um, the, uh, narratives, and I think the media, most

of our media is now narrative managers.

When they're trying to manage a narrative, and that narrative is

getting further and further away from reality, you know, they're, you

know, they're at a point where their ability to maintain that narrative

is sort of reaching an end point.

So I think we're well and truly there, and Ukraine has certainly accelerated that

process, as is what's happening in Gaza.

So I guess, um, That's, uh, an element of it.

Are you one of those

people at a barbecue?

Do you talk about these things in social circles?

Um,

a little, not a lot.

I, um, I do most of my, you know, I write for John Maynard Doon, I've been

published a few other places and I tweet, but I sort of keep it there because

Does your wife kick you under the table if you're, you know, at a

dinner party and you start talking about the evil American Empire?

Does she just tell you to shut up?

There's limits about how much of this stuff, um, and I need a

break too every now and then, because, you know, it can get a bit full on,

but I guess I pick and choose, um.

I guess you sort of sound people out and sometimes it's worth

following up, other times not.

Because I guess, I think you have to be in a certain spot.

Now, I know in my own experience how long it took me to go from being, you know,

all the way up to USA, thinking we're the good guys doing good things, through to

almost the opposite end of that spectrum.

It took me years.

So you can't take someone who is a true believer now, or just believe

Accept what they see from our politicians and media, and take them

to the point, you know, where I'm at.

So, you know, you have to, I guess, judge, um, judge that.

But, I mean, events are, um, I mean, what's happening in Gaza, I think, is just

There any moral legitimacy that Western governments did have, which I think was

pretty slim, I think it's been blown out of the water with what's happening in Gaza

and our, our government's reaction to it.

So, um, and once, once, um, you know, organizations, governments

that start losing all their moral power or moral, sorry, legitimacy,

um, You know, you're getting to the point where change can, can occur.

So I guess from that perspective, um, I'm a little bit hopeful that, uh,

the next election or that, I think we might, you know, hopefully be surge in

independence, uh, other parties, other than the, the coalition and labor.

But what, what do you

read or, or listen to that you find particularly valuable,

uh,

information?

Uh, yeah.

So I, I read, Like our legacy media, so primarily ABC because it's our

ABC and the taxpayer funds it.

So I feel I have a right to criticize it when it does a poor job and things

such as, um, the Lowery Institute and the Australian Strategic Policy

Institute, even though that makes my blood boil more often than not.

So you subscribe

to their newsletters and stuff, do you?

I

don't subscribe, but I do go and read regularly, but that's, that's so I

get, you know, my Um, you know what the narrative is that's being sold to us.

That's what I use those sources for.

And then I have a whole bunch of other sources.

Um, so the Duran is fantastic.

So Alex and Alex at the Duran, um, I listen to them a lot.

Um, there's a bunch of good, um, podcasts.

I'm judging it, I can't say his name, Nia Politano in, um, I probably

mispronounced that, in the U.

S.

He has some great interviews, um, uh, you know, some great, um, um, regulars on.

Um.

Who else?

Neutrality Studies, Dialogue Works, um, I listen to Jeffrey Sachs, um

Yeah, Jeffrey Sachs is very good.

Yeah, and, um, I listen to Miersheimer, John Miersheimer.

He's I agree with a lot of his stuff, but I think he's got this anti China

thing in his head, which, um, I don't agree with, but he's still, I think in

a lot of things he's, he's perceptive.

Um, you know, there's guys like Cyrus Jansen, uh, Jansen, who, um, you know,

was in China and is now in, back in the US, but he's very good on China.

Jerry Gray, who's in China, good on China.

Um, Andy Boren, like there's a whole bunch of people, um.

Yeah, they're sort of Twitter type people, aren't they?

Are they blog writers?

Uh, most of them

are on YouTube.

Um, they're not hard to find via Twitter, you'll find them and

then, um, you know, on YouTube.

Um, who else?

Um, Moon of Alabama is a good blog.

Um, he sort of covers sort of one issue per day.

Um, but he goes into a great deal of depth and finds lots of information

which Because he spends so much time just focusing on an issue.

You know, he finds information and package that up in a way that, you

know, cuts through the narratives of whatever the issue of the day is.

So

how many hours a week are you spending just reading and

looking at stuff, do you reckon?

Too much.

I'd say I get up fairly early, so I do a lot of my reading in the morning,

um, so, but I probably spend one to two hours a day, um, on average, I'd say.

Sometimes I give myself a break, sometimes I'll do more, but, um,

yeah, that's probably about, about it.

But I, I, I tend to focus, um, on issues that, um, I think are important, um, and

also something that I, I know something about, um, which you've got, you've got to

start somewhere, but I noticed when I was in Defence that the reporting on Defence

of issues with defense and my knowledge of defense didn't align, like, you know,

so you can see that well, yeah, they're sensationalizing that, not saying defense

is perfect by any means, but you can just tell that, um, you know, you'd have an

understanding of an issue, then see how it's reported in the media and know that

there was quite, um, quite a difference.

Yeah.

And I think that's the same with, You know, any of the, you know, I guess the

big ones I've been focusing on, you know, Russia, the Ukraine war and also China.

Um, and I, you know, I think I have a reasonable understanding of the issues

and complexities and the history and that of those sort of, um, events.

And I know how many, you know, porcupines were getting told, um,

you know, such as it was unprovoked.

How many times you've heard that about the, the, um,

Russia's operations in Ukraine.

Um, so I, I have an understanding of those, and then you think, well, if I know

how big the porcupines are being told on those issues are, if we go and apply them

to every other sort of story, I start with a great deal of scepticism as to whatever

the narrative is about, about an issue.

Um, And I guess, you know, I, um, you know, fill, fill me once,

um, you know, shame on, shame on

you.

Fill me twice.

Yeah.

Shame on me.

Yeah.

Yeah.

And

I, I think I'm going through, I guess what, what triggered

that for me, um, was the, um, in 2018, the DOMA chemical weapons.

Incident or alleged chemical weapons assault.

Do you remember that?

Was this like they found a missile, um, lying in a building and obviously

planted there or something like that?

It was, yeah, yeah.

A whole bits of evidence that strongly indicated that this was a complete setup.

That's right.

And then, then you had the, the OPCW.

So, After this happened, of course, the British, French and US fired

missiles at Syria before the OPCW, so the Organisation for the Prohibition

of Chemical Weapons had a chance to get their investigators in there.

Um, so that already reacted.

Um, and then you have Robert Fiske, the late Robert Fiske, the British

journalist was in there and, you know, could find no evidence of there

being a chemical weapons attack.

Um, and then, you know, the OPCW inspectors go in there and they write

their reports and they suggest that, you know, it was a staged, And then

you, um, have the OPCW rewriting the report and the whistleblower's

coming out and that's Aaron Matta.

He's another good journalist worth following who's gone through this in

forensic detail and you can just tell that they've Manipulated, um, the report

to suit their outcome, being that the Syrian government was responsible when

it looks like the White Helmets and the other, uh, moderate rebels or terrorists,

we call them moderate rebels, but a normal person might call them a terrorist,

were responsible for that, um, attack.

Um, so I guess that's not really, that wasn't the tipping point per se.

The tipping point for me was, That even though there was credible witnesses,

as in the investigators from the OPCW who even went to the United

Nations Security Council and presented there on their findings, even though

there was all this, um, reliable evidence, whether it's 100 percent

correct or not is not, not the point.

But it just got ignored.

So in our media, it was ignored.

And that was a tipping point for me because I realized, hang on,

this is not a lack of knowledge.

Um, I know because I wrote a complaint to the ABC to which I didn't reply.

Um, it wasn't a lack of knowledge.

It was a deliberate decision not to cover an incident because by

covering it, it would expose.

The wrongdoing of, um, you know, the United States, um, and

Britain, our allies in AUKUS.

Um, and I guess that was a tipping point for me, realizing, you

know, we're deliberately being manipulated to think certain things.

Up until that point, I mean, I even wrote an article for Aspie once, um, and sent it

in after the Novichok poisoning, thinking they were, you know, interested in Honest

and, and, uh, after Michael Shoebridge wrote an article, which was just so

full of so many, you know, untruths.

Um, and the editor said, I'm not going to publish, but we've noted the issues

and I've spoken to the author about it.

Um, but you know, they obviously didn't publish it.

This is when I thought they are an honest sort of organization.

Yeah, so this is all about 2017 18, when I just came, finally came to the

conclusion, realised, oh hang on, this isn't about a lack of information or

ignorance, this is a deliberate, um, you know, this is deliberate to manage

the narrative, to keep us thinking, as in the population thinking a certain

way, so that our government and the government of our LROs can get away

with doing some horrendous things.

Hmm.

You know, unfortunately, I think it takes a disaster for, we're soft.

We've had it very good for a very long time, and it's easy just to not worry

about these things and just continue on with our, our upper middle class western

lifestyles, and It really just takes sometimes a disaster to get people to

stop and to question some of these things.

I don't see it happening without that to some extent.

I think, I think there'll only be significant change when there's a result

of significant pain, unfortunately.

And I, um, I tend to agree with you.

Um, and this is like the, the people who, um, who are doing us a disservice.

No favours as far as where they're positioning Australia.

They're working 365 days of the year to further their cause.

Um, and you know, the, the, uh, little plebs like me, uh, and you were trying

to, you know, change the conversation or steer us in a slightly different

direction where, you know, we're doing this in our one or two hours a day when

we've got time and, and we're disorganised and that, and I guess, um, I can see at

some point there's going to be a crisis.

Um, um, what that looks like, you know, I can't make predictions cause it could come

in many different ways, shapes or forms.

But I guess that's why I think is we need to have an alternate vision

for how, how this country can run.

Um, you know, who we are aligned with, uh, why we're aligned with people, um, how

we deal with our international relations.

I think we should follow the foreign policy of Vietnam.

No foreign military forces, um, on their soil.

Uh, no alliances.

and no getting up on, you know, one country against another.

Like, what is wrong with that as a basis of a foreign policy, particularly

for a country like Australia, which is, you know, our geography means

we're in an awfully good situation.

So, um, I guess that's, you know, that's where, where I'm thinking.

So we need to get organized.

So when the crisis does happen, there is an alternative.

You know, and a thoughtful alternative that can be sold to, uh, the people.

Because I like to think we're in a democracy and what people

think actually matters still.

Uh,

yeah, I think that's where we need to get to.

Um, I think one thing we do have on our side though, is the Chinese and the

Russians, they're playing the long game.

They can see where things are heading.

And to be honest, I think if we can survive the next two or three years

without a conflict between China and Australia, or China and the US involving

Australia, I think Um, it'll be such overwhelming evidence and obvious to

everyone that the US is a mere shell of itself and it can't take down

China without destroying itself, um, and there's hopefully enough rational

people in the United States in the positions of power to see that as well.

That we might just get to the point where we can say, righto,

we tried to defeat you, we lost.

We now realize that we need to actually work with you and come

up with a modus for Vendee as to how we can, you know, get along.

Don't have to like each other, but get along.

I think at that point we might be all right, but I think the next two to

three years could be quite perilous.

Um, You know, you can see, I mean, how much, um, belligerence there is

towards Russia and towards China and how restrained their responses are.

It's because they're playing the long game and they can see the writing on

the wall, and the rest of the world can too, hence why so many countries are

joining BRICS, um, are lining up to join BRICS and who aren't being badgered,

and, you know, following, the US says you shall put sanctions on Russia.

And they're saying, uh, hang on, no we're not.

Because we're gonna buy wheat or oil or something like that from Russia, why

we're going to disadvantage ourselves.

So I think we're really in that sort of Phase change, and it could go a couple

of ways, and one way is conflict war and, you know, up to and including nuclear war.

Um, I'd suggest that's the path we want to avoid versus a world where we said,

righto, it's best to get along rather than, you know, fight to the death.

Traditionally, the U.

S.

exercised economic power when it wanted to sort of, um, uh, change countries.

So they'd get the IMF and the World Bank involved, make loans that the

countries couldn't pay back, and, uh, introduce sort of neoliberal policies

where they had to basically sell off their public infrastructure and allow

foreign, um, multinationals to come in and buy that infrastructure and

at the same time remove all tariffs.

And that, that crippled a lot of small countries and kept them

subservient as basically, you know, agricultural banana republics.

And if that didn't work and there was a recalcitrant sort of dictator

or a recalcitrant, uh, a democratic leader, um, They would then go for,

um, a sanctions and the resulting economic woe would be enough that

they could perhaps ferment a false opposition and have a sort of organise

a colour revolution aided by the CIO.

And if that didn't work, Then they would assassinate the leader, and

if that didn't work, they'd invade.

And, uh, you know, China is too big and too strong for any of that to work.

They refused IMF World Bank intervention, and they refused to allow US

multinationals to come in and, and buy up.

And that's what's, you know, part of the problem is American companies

look at China and think how much money they could make if they could

get in there, as they normally do on, on the terms they normally get.

So The, the other thing is that, here's a thought experiment for you Cameron, is my

prediction is that it will be the collapse of the US dollar that triggers the,

the obvious collapse of the US empire.

And this is really accelerating along now with the BRICS group

agreeing to do all sorts of deals.

in their local currencies.

And the US dollar for so many decades was basically supported by Saudi

Arabia, where the US said, um, here's the deal, you can keep selling oil

around the world, but every barrel that you sell has to be in US dollars.

And that, and that provided a, a backing for the US dollar, that it was

always equivalent to several, you know, whatever number of barrels of oil.

So that, um, power of the US dollar as the world's default currency

is disappearing very rapidly.

And that, when that, when that finishes.

People don't need US dollars because they don't buy stuff from the US.

And when the dollar collapses to where it should be, things will get really

expensive in America and that will really be the sort of economic chaos.

And here's the thought experiment part, Cameron.

The union breaks up.

People in America, they've got, um, you know, in the flyover states, they're

a different group to the people in the East and the West and sort of.

urban populations.

They don't have a lot in common, these people.

The real issue down the track will be, how does the world deal with the

breakup of the USA as it just collapses into, um, ruins, while it still has

all of these nuclear weapons and these, and this military hardware?

That, that's going to be the question is how to, how to manage that, that

without those guys committing some sort of crazy suicide with the rest of

the planet as they, as they break up.

I think that's where the danger is.

Yeah, um, it's interesting you raise that because in 20, I think

it was 2018, I submitted a paper to the Australian Defence Force journal,

basically on the, uh, surmise of the US dollar and the impacts that would have.

Um, funnily enough, it didn't get published.

So,

um, yeah, well, this, I'd go back to some of it.

I mean, what?

Yeah, once, once the world doesn't need US dollars, um, obviously the US model is,

you know, what's already on borrowed time.

Um, um, and so I think the scenario layer is pretty, um, a likely outcome.

Possibly.

Possible.

Well, yeah.

Um, And I think this is why, you know, to go back to my comment on Russia

and China, um, and the rest, you know, the rest of the major powers,

I think they can see this happening, um, and they could, but they're not

doing anything quickly, um, so I think they're, they're taking their time.

It's almost boring, like, you know, you look at what Russia is doing in Ukraine.

Like, um, you know, there's no, it's just grinding them down.

It's, you know, boring in a ways.

And, you know, another day we'll send another, you know, X number of glide

bombs and thousands of shells and, you know, kill X number of Ukrainians and

we'll create that day after day after day.

And I think it's the same if we look at the.

You know, the geo economics and that it's, we take our time, we talk, we negotiate,

we come up with mutually beneficial deals and that might take years, but we

get to that point and then we have it and it's just sort of slowly by slowly.

So I think that's part of their strategy to manage the decline of

the US is not to just, you know, you know, we've got the balloon, the big

bubble that's the US debt and popping it, which would be catastrophic.

Um, for a lot of countries, not all countries, but a lot of countries,

um, I think they're, they're managing the decline of the United States.

Um, and I guess, um, in a lot of ways, we probably should be thankful that they

are because it could be quite traumatic.

And they

must be just looking at us, shaking their heads and going, you idiots.

Yeah.

Well, I have a, I have a friend, um, Warwick Powell, who, you

know, we, um, You know, we're friends, um, and we go back and forth on Twitter

and share each other's stuff and that.

Um, but he, he travels to China quite a lot.

Um, and, and basically, um, my understanding is that the Chinese

see us as being, you know, we're in a situation where we're doing all

that can be expected because of where we're located within the alliance

and our history and stuff like that.

So I guess the Chinese are being a little bit, um, You know, forgiving of

us because they know our circumstances.

I guess this is another way of looking at, um, you know, the managed decline

of a system because at some point, um, I think, you know, as things break up

in Australia, we'll be sitting here like a shag on a rock saying, maybe

it's a good idea that we, uh, you know, we make, make good with the Chinese

and ASEAN and, um, you know, BRICS doesn't sound like that bad of an idea.

We could probably benefit from that rather than fighting it.

Um, and yeah, so 10 years, 20 years or something like that in the future.

Um, you know, we could be, see ourselves in very different circumstances,

which I think would be

great.

Yeah.

Well, we certainly live in interesting times.

It's not every day that the most powerful empire the world has ever

seen really peaks and declines, uh, in front of our very eyes, which

is, is kind of what's happened here.

So.

And I, uh, yeah, I was too young, really, to really grasp what the

collapse of the Soviet Union was all about, um, so in some ways, yeah, it's

actually a privilege to be able to live through such a momentous time, um, but,

you know, it's also a dangerous time, so.

Well, this seems like a reasonable place to finish

off, Cameron, as we've agreed.

As we've done what we threatened to do, which was agree with each other

for 60 minutes, but that's okay because there's plenty of people

out there to disagree with, so it's just nice to have an agreeable chat.

So, um, so it's been fun, Cameron.

So, um, basically keep up the good work with your articles, with

the John Menendee blog and your tweeting and your other stuff.

And thanks for what you're doing.

Keep up the good work is all I can say.

No worries, thanks Trevor, and thanks for the opportunity to

have a chat, because this is, you know, this is really important stuff.

Yep, no worries.

Alright, dear listener, next week I will be back for sure with Scott and

Joe on the panel talking about all sorts of things, so we'll talk to you then.

Bye for now.