1
00:00:01,134 --> 00:00:05,904
Half of a group of Michigan college
students plugged in a random USB

2
00:00:05,904 --> 00:00:09,804
drive that they found lying around,
some of them within minutes.

3
00:00:10,054 --> 00:00:12,564
If you're shocked as I was
by that story, then you're

4
00:00:12,564 --> 00:00:13,954
listening to the right episode.

5
00:00:14,534 --> 00:00:18,144
It's the fifth in our Encore series,
where we're bringing back an episode that

6
00:00:18,144 --> 00:00:20,074
listeners really seem to engage with.

7
00:00:20,634 --> 00:00:24,544
My co-host, Prasanna Malaiyandi,
and I, uh, sat down with Mark

8
00:00:24,544 --> 00:00:29,124
Schreiner, host of the SecureTalk
podcast, to talk cybersecurity

9
00:00:29,134 --> 00:00:31,304
best practices for individuals.

10
00:00:31,524 --> 00:00:34,254
Not the enterprise SOC stuff
that we normally talk about.

11
00:00:34,554 --> 00:00:37,214
Real, practical things that you
and your family should be doing.

12
00:00:37,924 --> 00:00:42,244
Things like multi-factor authentication,
phishing prevention, SIM swapping

13
00:00:42,244 --> 00:00:47,124
protection, password managers, and of
course, my favorite topic, backups.

14
00:00:48,824 --> 00:00:53,094
We landed on a phrase by the end of this
episode that summed up the whole thing,

15
00:00:53,234 --> 00:00:59,314
and that is, "Just do something." Don't
let perfect be the enemy of protected.

16
00:01:00,344 --> 00:01:03,324
By the way, if this is your first
time watching or listening to me, I'm

17
00:01:03,324 --> 00:01:05,854
W. Curtis Preston, AKA Mr. Backup.

18
00:01:06,264 --> 00:01:11,394
I've been obsessing over backup, recovery,
and now cyber recovery for over 30 years.

19
00:01:11,834 --> 00:01:15,074
If that's your bag, then I'm your guy
and you should probably subscribe.

20
00:01:15,434 --> 00:01:18,814
You're not gonna find anybody that
cares about that topic more than me.

21
00:01:19,414 --> 00:01:23,074
Ever since 1993 when I had to tell
my boss that there were no backups of

22
00:01:23,074 --> 00:01:24,724
the database that we had just lost.

23
00:01:25,214 --> 00:01:28,824
Now I've written five books,
a blog, and a podcast.

24
00:01:29,114 --> 00:01:32,854
Here we turn unappreciated admins
into cyber recovery heroes.

25
00:01:33,154 --> 00:01:35,034
This is the Backup Wrap-Up.

26
00:01:46,585 --> 00:01:47,935
hi and welcome to backup.

27
00:01:47,935 --> 00:01:49,135
Central's podcast.

28
00:01:49,135 --> 00:01:54,835
I'm your host, W Curtis Preston AKA Mr.
Backup and have with me, my close personal

29
00:01:54,835 --> 00:01:59,685
friend, but a guy who's impossible
to get an actual date with Prasanna

30
00:01:59,685 --> 00:02:01,465
Malaiyandi How's it going Prasanna

31
00:02:01,745 --> 00:02:03,515
oh, Curtis, I'm good.

32
00:02:03,625 --> 00:02:04,285
I'm talking about?

33
00:02:04,285 --> 00:02:04,735
Don't you.

34
00:02:04,805 --> 00:02:09,035
I know the fact that you came all the
way up to Santa Clara to visit the

35
00:02:09,035 --> 00:02:11,205
office and we didn't get a chance.

36
00:02:11,205 --> 00:02:11,505
to meet

37
00:02:12,475 --> 00:02:14,015
And how many times has that happened?

38
00:02:14,285 --> 00:02:14,915
Just saying,

39
00:02:15,465 --> 00:02:15,915
We didn't.

40
00:02:15,965 --> 00:02:16,175
no.

41
00:02:16,205 --> 00:02:20,315
I think last time you came up, we did meet
because remember we did the photo shoot.

42
00:02:21,315 --> 00:02:21,795
okay.

43
00:02:21,825 --> 00:02:22,035
All right.

44
00:02:22,035 --> 00:02:22,185
That

45
00:02:22,205 --> 00:02:22,585
Yes,

46
00:02:22,655 --> 00:02:23,895
The photo shoot doesn't count.

47
00:02:23,985 --> 00:02:24,615
it does.

48
00:02:25,275 --> 00:02:26,025
I think so.

49
00:02:27,195 --> 00:02:27,765
Okay.

50
00:02:27,945 --> 00:02:30,375
before we met twice, so

51
00:02:30,445 --> 00:02:31,145
I

52
00:02:31,275 --> 00:02:34,425
I get to carry over one of
those, but you were also busy.

53
00:02:34,455 --> 00:02:35,085
You were also,

54
00:02:35,085 --> 00:02:36,045
feeling a little butt hurt

55
00:02:36,705 --> 00:02:39,165
but you were also busy
with your dinners and.

56
00:02:39,230 --> 00:02:45,420
friend, by the way, my friend whose
wife isn't even in town, like who, who

57
00:02:45,420 --> 00:02:48,300
took priority over hanging out with me?

58
00:02:48,600 --> 00:02:55,080
What entity I want you to say
publicly, what entity took

59
00:02:55,080 --> 00:02:56,610
priority over, hanging out with me.

60
00:02:57,090 --> 00:02:57,810
The dog.

61
00:02:58,095 --> 00:02:58,785
The dog.

62
00:02:58,815 --> 00:02:59,295
Yeah.

63
00:02:59,535 --> 00:02:59,955
Yeah.

64
00:03:00,195 --> 00:03:02,805
The dog, you had something
to do with the dog.

65
00:03:03,165 --> 00:03:06,045
And so that was more important than
hanging out with me, but whatever,

66
00:03:06,120 --> 00:03:06,660
I love you.

67
00:03:07,215 --> 00:03:07,875
I'm clearly

68
00:03:07,905 --> 00:03:08,925
I love you, Curtis.

69
00:03:09,225 --> 00:03:09,975
I love you.

70
00:03:10,795 --> 00:03:11,605
whatever.

71
00:03:13,245 --> 00:03:13,785
All right.

72
00:03:13,785 --> 00:03:16,605
So our guest is like,
what have I wandered into,

73
00:03:17,040 --> 00:03:17,655
Exactly.

74
00:03:17,865 --> 00:03:17,985
Yeah.

75
00:03:19,300 --> 00:03:24,850
we actually have a, this is one of the
few times where I was on our guest's

76
00:03:24,850 --> 00:03:27,070
podcast and now he's on my podcast.

77
00:03:27,430 --> 00:03:31,210
Mark Shriner is the strategic
sales director for me, by the

78
00:03:31,210 --> 00:03:32,920
way, is it memo Q is that.

79
00:03:33,925 --> 00:03:34,315
perfect.

80
00:03:34,360 --> 00:03:34,660
Okay.

81
00:03:34,720 --> 00:03:35,050
Okay.

82
00:03:35,960 --> 00:03:39,670
Mark Shriner is the strategic sales
director for a memo Q a leading

83
00:03:39,670 --> 00:03:45,580
translation management system, a provider,
and the founder of host of the secure talk

84
00:03:45,580 --> 00:03:48,490
podcast, which is how we came to meet.

85
00:03:48,730 --> 00:03:53,230
I got to go over and talk about backups on
his podcast, and then he got to come here.

86
00:03:53,230 --> 00:03:56,890
He's now on my podcast
to talk about security.

87
00:03:57,350 --> 00:04:00,160
He graduated from Penn state
university with a bachelor's degree

88
00:04:00,160 --> 00:04:01,600
in liberal arts and sciences.

89
00:04:02,310 --> 00:04:06,900
2022, he completed Harvard cyber
security, managing risk in the

90
00:04:06,900 --> 00:04:09,420
information age, diploma program.

91
00:04:09,840 --> 00:04:12,080
So I'm fascinated.

92
00:04:12,180 --> 00:04:14,890
and by the way, welcome to
the podcast Mark Shriner

93
00:04:15,615 --> 00:04:16,275
Thank you, Curtis.

94
00:04:16,275 --> 00:04:17,115
And thank you persona.

95
00:04:17,175 --> 00:04:20,115
It's a actually, I've had fun watching
you guys with the intro there.

96
00:04:20,115 --> 00:04:22,005
You seem like an old married
couple or something too,

97
00:04:23,115 --> 00:04:25,335
We're an old, married couple
that never sees each other.

98
00:04:25,335 --> 00:04:25,455
I'm

99
00:04:25,470 --> 00:04:25,810
Yeah.

100
00:04:27,415 --> 00:04:30,025
cause Prasanna lives in
and you know what it is.

101
00:04:30,025 --> 00:04:31,075
It's a Santa Clara

102
00:04:31,175 --> 00:04:31,845
Prasanna

103
00:04:32,005 --> 00:04:32,365
Yeah.

104
00:04:32,605 --> 00:04:33,535
He lives in Santa Clara.

105
00:04:33,535 --> 00:04:36,685
I live in San Diego and you
live a little bit farther north,

106
00:04:36,685 --> 00:04:38,125
as I recall up in Seattle.

107
00:04:38,365 --> 00:04:38,845
Yes.

108
00:04:38,845 --> 00:04:39,115
Yes.

109
00:04:39,115 --> 00:04:40,945
And I'm envious of both of your weather.

110
00:04:41,205 --> 00:04:43,845
I actually, to be honest with you, I just
spent the last three months traveling

111
00:04:43,845 --> 00:04:49,685
between Arizona, St. George, Utah, Las
Vegas, and San Diego and Los Angeles

112
00:04:49,685 --> 00:04:52,715
all in that area for three months for
business and for some personal business.

113
00:04:53,705 --> 00:04:56,885
in three months we had
five cloudy, rainy days.

114
00:04:57,245 --> 00:04:59,915
And I got back here at the beginning
of may thinking like, Hey, it's

115
00:04:59,915 --> 00:05:01,535
safe to come back to Seattle wrong.

116
00:05:03,540 --> 00:05:04,680
Yeah, it's funny to see.

117
00:05:04,890 --> 00:05:09,210
Seattle is one of those places where,
when it is sunny, it is just one of

118
00:05:09,210 --> 00:05:10,710
the most beautiful places on earth.

119
00:05:10,710 --> 00:05:11,320
I remember.

120
00:05:11,460 --> 00:05:14,980
And I think I told you on when I
was on your podcast, that I did some

121
00:05:14,980 --> 00:05:19,630
work for Amazon back in 1998, I put
in for the record, I put it in their

122
00:05:19,630 --> 00:05:21,250
first enterprise wide backup system.

123
00:05:22,510 --> 00:05:24,460
I was there in the summer.

124
00:05:24,570 --> 00:05:28,830
And not a single cloudy
day for three months.

125
00:05:28,860 --> 00:05:31,200
And it was like I said to them,

126
00:05:31,210 --> 00:05:31,450
Yeah.

127
00:05:31,470 --> 00:05:35,940
going up to Mount Rainier and
going out on the sound and them

128
00:05:35,940 --> 00:05:38,880
throw the fish there it's a pike

129
00:05:39,040 --> 00:05:39,100
Yeah.

130
00:05:39,180 --> 00:05:42,180
market, of course, hanging
out at the bubble gum wall.

131
00:05:42,270 --> 00:05:43,830
I'm just saying, I like Seattle,

132
00:05:44,040 --> 00:05:44,220
Yeah.

133
00:05:44,250 --> 00:05:45,330
I went for a trip.

134
00:05:45,570 --> 00:05:45,780
Yeah.

135
00:05:45,780 --> 00:05:49,290
I went up for a trip, I think four
years ago around this time in may.

136
00:05:49,560 --> 00:05:52,380
And the weather was gorgeous,
like perfectly sunny And I was

137
00:05:52,380 --> 00:05:54,720
asking everyone, I was like, what
are you guys complaining about?

138
00:05:54,720 --> 00:05:55,680
The weather is gorgeous.

139
00:05:55,680 --> 00:05:58,590
They're like, you just ended up
being here on the perfect week.

140
00:05:59,570 --> 00:06:04,670
Yeah, in contrast right now in
Seattle or in San Diego, we are in

141
00:06:04,670 --> 00:06:06,740
the middle of what we call may gray.

142
00:06:06,980 --> 00:06:09,350
And then next, next
month will be June loom.

143
00:06:09,630 --> 00:06:13,020
this is the worst time of the
year to actually visit San Diego.

144
00:06:13,120 --> 00:06:17,330
you can get sunny days, but there
will be, multiple days in a row where

145
00:06:17,330 --> 00:06:18,920
it's just a hundred percent overcast.

146
00:06:19,330 --> 00:06:19,840
and.

147
00:06:19,870 --> 00:06:22,120
the fog that comes in or is
it just overcast and gray?

148
00:06:22,485 --> 00:06:24,045
It's overcast and gray.

149
00:06:24,075 --> 00:06:24,495
it's not.

150
00:06:24,495 --> 00:06:27,995
So the fog we call that the Marine
layer, the Marine layer generally

151
00:06:28,025 --> 00:06:30,365
burns off after around nine or 10.

152
00:06:30,365 --> 00:06:34,475
if you have a strong Marine layer and
it's just weird because there's no rain

153
00:06:34,475 --> 00:06:39,095
connected with it, it's just gloomy,
and, it just is what it is and, and I

154
00:06:39,360 --> 00:06:40,170
Seattle weather.

155
00:06:40,235 --> 00:06:41,975
They're like, yeah.

156
00:06:42,255 --> 00:06:42,605
and it just.

157
00:06:43,870 --> 00:06:44,540
people will come here.

158
00:06:44,570 --> 00:06:48,370
So I thought you guys were sunny I'm
like, to tell you it's may gray man.

159
00:06:48,640 --> 00:06:49,660
Welcome to San Diego.

160
00:06:49,710 --> 00:06:51,870
I've been in San Diego, it's
always been sunny and I come down

161
00:06:51,870 --> 00:06:52,770
there three or four times a year.

162
00:06:52,770 --> 00:06:55,950
I'll be there twice, this summer for
soccer, for my son's soccer tournaments.

163
00:06:56,910 --> 00:06:57,720
but I love it.

164
00:06:58,080 --> 00:07:02,320
I'm interesting, interested to
know, do you think that people.

165
00:07:03,715 --> 00:07:09,045
act and say, what were our personalities
different based upon the area and

166
00:07:09,145 --> 00:07:12,175
what I'm getting at is, so for
example, in San Diego, do you find

167
00:07:12,175 --> 00:07:16,375
that people are more or less outgoing
or Seattle or in Silicon valley?

168
00:07:16,375 --> 00:07:16,875
do you notice that.

169
00:07:17,835 --> 00:07:22,145
I think people are attracted to areas
based on, this is our great people

170
00:07:22,145 --> 00:07:24,035
made or they, born or whatever.

171
00:07:24,285 --> 00:07:27,465
same, I think that people are
certain types of people are

172
00:07:27,465 --> 00:07:28,995
attracted to certain types of areas.

173
00:07:29,915 --> 00:07:31,445
and I think people that are.

174
00:07:32,145 --> 00:07:35,625
That liked to be outside or attracted
to places where that's the case.

175
00:07:35,855 --> 00:07:36,125
Yeah.

176
00:07:36,285 --> 00:07:41,045
but people come here and they,
they actually, many people reject

177
00:07:41,225 --> 00:07:46,775
or they react quite negatively to
the intense brown that we have.

178
00:07:46,775 --> 00:07:48,505
It's guys, this is a desert.

179
00:07:48,935 --> 00:07:50,305
the only reason that.

180
00:07:51,415 --> 00:07:55,735
That we can occupy this world
is thanks to the Colorado river.

181
00:07:55,835 --> 00:07:56,675
You know what that right?

182
00:07:57,125 --> 00:07:59,525
The Colorado river and the LA aqueduct.

183
00:08:00,320 --> 00:08:03,120
that brings water over
from, those mountains.

184
00:08:03,550 --> 00:08:07,590
and, and now we finally have our
first, desalination plant in Carlsbad.

185
00:08:07,860 --> 00:08:13,920
It's applying 10% of San Diego water, it's
a desert, which means everything's brown.

186
00:08:13,920 --> 00:08:17,700
And anything that you see that's
green is either some type of cactus

187
00:08:18,060 --> 00:08:20,580
or it is being watered by someone,

188
00:08:20,965 --> 00:08:21,805
It's artificial.

189
00:08:22,350 --> 00:08:25,320
Or where it's artificial,
it's a cell phone tree.

190
00:08:25,500 --> 00:08:26,520
but yeah, I don't know.

191
00:08:26,520 --> 00:08:26,730
Yeah.

192
00:08:26,730 --> 00:08:27,150
I don't know.

193
00:08:27,150 --> 00:08:30,330
It's if you're a person who
hates a lot of songs, this would

194
00:08:30,330 --> 00:08:31,950
not be the place to be, right?

195
00:08:32,090 --> 00:08:34,220
are people that I've heard
of people that hate the sun.

196
00:08:34,460 --> 00:08:36,440
I think they're generally
called vampires, but no, sorry.

197
00:08:38,120 --> 00:08:38,300
No,

198
00:08:38,340 --> 00:08:39,960
This is not a time for vampires.

199
00:08:40,600 --> 00:08:41,770
it is very green up here.

200
00:08:41,770 --> 00:08:42,430
It's very nice.

201
00:08:42,590 --> 00:08:45,800
and it's interesting, you mentioned the
desalination plant because it's not just

202
00:08:45,800 --> 00:08:47,730
California that, has issues with water.

203
00:08:47,730 --> 00:08:49,410
It's the whole Southwest right now.

204
00:08:49,800 --> 00:08:53,790
And at some point, the Colorado river
is dwindling lake Powell, lake Mead.

205
00:08:53,820 --> 00:08:55,170
They're, their levels are going down

206
00:08:55,710 --> 00:08:56,550
It looks horrible yet.

207
00:08:56,550 --> 00:08:59,790
this is a kind of a borderline
national security issue.

208
00:09:00,130 --> 00:09:03,490
and then you think about the wildfires
because it's the dry dryness.

209
00:09:04,200 --> 00:09:07,110
Desalination plants probably can't
help with that, but they can help

210
00:09:07,110 --> 00:09:08,740
with some of the, lack of water.

211
00:09:09,610 --> 00:09:11,720
What are you, what are
your, how is it working?

212
00:09:11,720 --> 00:09:12,650
is it solar based?

213
00:09:12,650 --> 00:09:14,000
Is it what's how's it powered?

214
00:09:14,050 --> 00:09:15,580
and is it, is this

215
00:09:15,620 --> 00:09:19,640
Yeah, I think I don't know a lot
about it, about like how it works.

216
00:09:19,640 --> 00:09:21,860
I know it took 15 years to make it happen.

217
00:09:22,190 --> 00:09:24,590
And I know that generally speaking,
the environmentalist's aren't

218
00:09:24,590 --> 00:09:30,860
huge fans, and the current,
the next thing that is finally.

219
00:09:31,710 --> 00:09:35,090
Happening and, it's one of the, where
you just have to mentally get past it.

220
00:09:35,330 --> 00:09:38,420
It's a, unofficially
referred to as toilet to tap.

221
00:09:38,700 --> 00:09:39,900
that is what's happening.

222
00:09:39,930 --> 00:09:41,100
Finally in California.

223
00:09:41,100 --> 00:09:44,310
It's guys, we're not getting any
more water and it's really expensive

224
00:09:44,310 --> 00:09:45,390
to pull it out of the ocean.

225
00:09:45,390 --> 00:09:48,330
why don't we filter what we
already have, and that's starting

226
00:09:48,330 --> 00:09:49,530
to happen in these areas.

227
00:09:49,530 --> 00:09:50,100
So we'll see.

228
00:09:50,105 --> 00:09:53,365
in Singapore for four years in, in
Singapore is a big, they have no, none

229
00:09:53,365 --> 00:09:54,685
of their own water supplies there.

230
00:09:54,735 --> 00:09:54,985
They're

231
00:09:55,070 --> 00:09:55,430
Right.

232
00:09:55,465 --> 00:09:59,085
dependent upon, a pipeline
from Malaysia they have the.

233
00:10:00,090 --> 00:10:01,350
Toilet to tap plants.

234
00:10:01,440 --> 00:10:01,830
And,

235
00:10:01,865 --> 00:10:02,165
Yeah.

236
00:10:02,260 --> 00:10:04,990
you had the prime minister of Singapore
go over there and pour himself a glass of

237
00:10:04,990 --> 00:10:06,490
water and just drink it there on the spot.

238
00:10:06,820 --> 00:10:08,170
And I said, if it's good enough for him,

239
00:10:08,210 --> 00:10:08,540
Yep.

240
00:10:08,635 --> 00:10:08,995
Yeah.

241
00:10:09,100 --> 00:10:10,630
yeah, you don't want to think about it.

242
00:10:10,630 --> 00:10:11,110
Like you said, though.

243
00:10:11,470 --> 00:10:13,790
You don't want to think about
it, but, try not to, try not to,

244
00:10:15,470 --> 00:10:16,790
but, so I'm curious.

245
00:10:16,850 --> 00:10:21,370
So your, how did you,
drew you to cybersecurity?

246
00:10:23,075 --> 00:10:25,205
Well, a couple of different things.

247
00:10:25,205 --> 00:10:25,565
I think.

248
00:10:28,225 --> 00:10:36,475
in 2017 we were moving back from a nine
year stint in Asia, moving back to the

249
00:10:36,475 --> 00:10:39,385
states and a good friend of mine, had.

250
00:10:40,200 --> 00:10:42,490
A company that would be
with becoming a Microsoft

251
00:10:42,670 --> 00:10:44,080
cybersecurity compliance partner.

252
00:10:44,420 --> 00:10:46,430
he was looking for some help on
the business development side.

253
00:10:46,820 --> 00:10:48,350
And, and I started taking a look.

254
00:10:48,710 --> 00:10:53,320
The more I researched, the more interested
I became because, cybersecurity is

255
00:10:53,320 --> 00:10:55,150
something that can go a mile wide.

256
00:10:55,600 --> 00:10:56,750
and then also a mile deep

257
00:10:56,815 --> 00:10:56,875
Yeah.

258
00:10:56,990 --> 00:10:57,530
one of those things.

259
00:10:57,530 --> 00:11:03,480
If you want to talk about, pen testing,
backups, encryption, different, compliance

260
00:11:03,510 --> 00:11:08,120
organizations, you can just go in so many,
data loss prevention, endpoint protection.

261
00:11:08,120 --> 00:11:11,450
you can go so many different directions
and then each one of those, you can

262
00:11:11,450 --> 00:11:13,130
go down these super deep rabbit holes.

263
00:11:13,490 --> 00:11:15,020
And I like learning.

264
00:11:15,290 --> 00:11:20,930
The other thing I, that I find interesting
about cybersecurity back then, and now is.

265
00:11:21,915 --> 00:11:25,905
Before, I think we thought
that this is the cybersecurity.

266
00:11:25,905 --> 00:11:29,595
There was a couple of people in the
back, in the corner of the it department

267
00:11:29,595 --> 00:11:33,925
that their job is cybersecurity, but
everybody in an organization needs

268
00:11:33,925 --> 00:11:37,285
to have some type of awareness and
responsibility for security, but beyond.

269
00:11:37,285 --> 00:11:41,545
that as individuals and
consumers, we need to be aware

270
00:11:41,545 --> 00:11:43,135
of some security best practices.

271
00:11:43,135 --> 00:11:44,725
And so it affects everybody's life.

272
00:11:45,115 --> 00:11:48,005
And it's something that, 30 years
ago, nobody was talking about

273
00:11:48,005 --> 00:11:49,295
because there was no internet.

274
00:11:49,295 --> 00:11:50,585
And now it's

275
00:11:50,615 --> 00:11:50,765
Yeah.

276
00:11:51,245 --> 00:11:53,225
important with the internet,
social media, everything.

277
00:11:53,435 --> 00:11:54,335
I have three children.

278
00:11:54,820 --> 00:11:59,480
And they need to know some best practices
about, what does a phishing campaign

279
00:11:59,480 --> 00:12:01,160
look like or a phishing attack look like?

280
00:12:01,370 --> 00:12:03,430
What w how do they
protect their passwords?

281
00:12:03,610 --> 00:12:06,130
What should they shouldn't do with
their mobile devices, et cetera.

282
00:12:06,310 --> 00:12:07,420
So it affects everybody.

283
00:12:07,420 --> 00:12:14,030
And it's this like new field that
was created partially based upon the

284
00:12:14,030 --> 00:12:15,650
explosion of the internet in IOT.

285
00:12:15,950 --> 00:12:19,010
I think we're just getting started
in both in terms of understanding

286
00:12:19,030 --> 00:12:24,950
the threat landscape, but also the,
the best practices for prevention.

287
00:12:25,010 --> 00:12:25,700
Does that make sense?

288
00:12:26,560 --> 00:12:29,650
Do you see that a lot of this, I
know it's an interesting point.

289
00:12:29,650 --> 00:12:31,720
You made that it's rolling into consumers.

290
00:12:31,720 --> 00:12:33,610
Like everyone has to
start caring about this.

291
00:12:33,610 --> 00:12:34,510
Like every day.

292
00:12:35,200 --> 00:12:38,300
Do you start to find that's
actually happening or.

293
00:12:39,885 --> 00:12:42,495
Or are people yeah, that's just
something that a company has to

294
00:12:42,495 --> 00:12:46,825
worry about or a business has to
worry about, or like this large CEO

295
00:12:46,825 --> 00:12:48,225
has to worry about not necessarily.

296
00:12:49,650 --> 00:12:51,990
yeah, let me answer that
by backing up even farther.

297
00:12:51,990 --> 00:12:55,710
I think in companies right now, where
it used to be the perception of the.

298
00:12:56,485 --> 00:13:00,865
of the it teams or the, the CISO's
job there, is an a growing or

299
00:13:00,865 --> 00:13:03,445
increasing awareness that it's
everybody's responsibilities.

300
00:13:03,595 --> 00:13:07,275
And so you'll have not only do you
have structured educational, programs,

301
00:13:07,485 --> 00:13:10,035
but you'll have simulated phishing
campaigns and things like that.

302
00:13:10,035 --> 00:13:11,715
So go enterprise wide.

303
00:13:11,955 --> 00:13:16,035
And if you get the CEO and he clicks
on the wrong thing and boom, guess

304
00:13:16,035 --> 00:13:18,565
what you got to go to training
you're in a you're doing timeout.

305
00:13:18,905 --> 00:13:20,135
and companies try to make that.

306
00:13:20,850 --> 00:13:24,720
So in companies it's becoming, I guess
increasingly common for people to accept

307
00:13:24,720 --> 00:13:26,040
that everybody has a responsibility.

308
00:13:26,040 --> 00:13:29,100
If you find a thumb drive in the
parking lot, don't just walk in and

309
00:13:29,100 --> 00:13:30,450
stick it in your company's device.

310
00:13:30,450 --> 00:13:33,440
and sharing those stories, I remember
growing up and listening to my

311
00:13:33,450 --> 00:13:36,900
grandparents, tell stories about this
accident, that accident, this person who

312
00:13:36,900 --> 00:13:38,010
did something good, did something bad.

313
00:13:38,250 --> 00:13:39,780
And we learn from those stories.

314
00:13:40,110 --> 00:13:43,830
And I think when we share these
stories about hacks or, the famous

315
00:13:43,830 --> 00:13:46,380
story about somebody finding a thumb
drive and then putting it in their

316
00:13:46,380 --> 00:13:50,290
device and then, downloading some
malware inadvertently, learn from

317
00:13:50,290 --> 00:13:51,970
that and those stories are important.

318
00:13:52,300 --> 00:13:54,720
So that's one method
of, or one, data point.

319
00:13:55,480 --> 00:14:00,670
Come people in organizations are becoming
increasingly where individuals I think

320
00:14:00,700 --> 00:14:04,780
are also becoming extreme, increasingly
aware, let's start off with high net

321
00:14:04,780 --> 00:14:11,430
worth individuals, where they are very
much in the sites of, targeted phishing,

322
00:14:11,430 --> 00:14:12,630
spear, phishing campaigns, right?

323
00:14:12,930 --> 00:14:17,070
And so there are certain tools and
methods and processes out there to

324
00:14:17,070 --> 00:14:20,550
help these people at least become
aware of what's what the threat looks.

325
00:14:20,550 --> 00:14:25,395
like But beyond that, I think, just
the general public, if I look at

326
00:14:25,395 --> 00:14:31,315
my kids, are pretty suspicious and
cynical and almost jaded, in terms of

327
00:14:31,315 --> 00:14:32,515
look at this, they'll show me stuff.

328
00:14:32,545 --> 00:14:36,115
They're like, look at this, it's just,
and because it's obviously it's a scam.

329
00:14:36,535 --> 00:14:37,255
And so I think.

330
00:14:38,045 --> 00:14:41,705
people are becoming increasingly
aware at the same time you still hear

331
00:14:41,705 --> 00:14:46,645
of consumers every day, for example,
they're transferring money to a title

332
00:14:46,645 --> 00:14:50,975
agency and somebody spoofs the, the
address, that w where they're supposed to

333
00:14:50,975 --> 00:14:53,855
they're there, the account information,
that kind of stuff is happening in.

334
00:14:53,905 --> 00:14:55,075
yes and no, to answer

335
00:14:55,155 --> 00:14:55,395
Yeah.

336
00:14:55,615 --> 00:14:58,615
I think people are becoming more aware,
but there's, we have a long ways to go.

337
00:14:58,635 --> 00:14:59,025
Yeah.

338
00:14:59,265 --> 00:15:04,465
So that there was a study back in
2016, from the university of Michigan

339
00:15:05,125 --> 00:15:10,815
where they left a series of USB drives
that had an HTML there that if you

340
00:15:10,815 --> 00:15:12,735
open up an HTML, it had an image tag.

341
00:15:12,735 --> 00:15:17,555
So they were able to identify, how many
people actually clicked on the thing.

342
00:15:18,575 --> 00:15:21,695
do you suppose the percentage
was of the people that.

343
00:15:23,020 --> 00:15:25,420
university of Michigan,
that's a, that's what?

344
00:15:25,420 --> 00:15:26,050
big 10.

345
00:15:26,120 --> 00:15:31,150
those guys probably I'm west
coast, so I'm afraid to guess.

346
00:15:31,150 --> 00:15:31,930
W what was it?

347
00:15:32,335 --> 00:15:33,205
It was half,

348
00:15:33,550 --> 00:15:34,210
Wow.

349
00:15:34,660 --> 00:15:35,650
That was in what year?

350
00:15:36,475 --> 00:15:37,255
20

351
00:15:37,515 --> 00:15:38,085
Wow.

352
00:15:38,815 --> 00:15:42,625
USB drives around the Urbana
champagne CA these are college kids.

353
00:15:44,425 --> 00:15:45,085
These are,

354
00:15:45,490 --> 00:15:47,110
At the one of the best universities in the

355
00:15:47,415 --> 00:15:47,685
Yup.

356
00:15:48,745 --> 00:15:51,775
They said they found that 48%
of the drives are picked up

357
00:15:51,775 --> 00:15:53,095
and plugged into a computer.

358
00:15:53,305 --> 00:15:55,225
Some within minutes of being dropped.

359
00:15:57,160 --> 00:15:57,700
Yeah.

360
00:15:57,985 --> 00:15:58,915
Let's just, yeah.

361
00:15:58,965 --> 00:16:02,025
hopefully the situation or the
awareness is getting better.

362
00:16:02,245 --> 00:16:06,015
I look at little things like,
turning on MFA's or multi-factor

363
00:16:06,015 --> 00:16:11,495
authentication two factor authentications
for just any, obviously any bank

364
00:16:11,495 --> 00:16:15,305
accounts, but any of your online,
tools or apps, just turn it on,

365
00:16:15,465 --> 00:16:16,605
Yeah, exactly.

366
00:16:16,610 --> 00:16:17,270
a simple thing.

367
00:16:17,270 --> 00:16:18,950
That's going to stop 99%.

368
00:16:20,015 --> 00:16:21,395
But some people that, it's a hassle.

369
00:16:22,315 --> 00:16:22,735
Yeah.

370
00:16:22,775 --> 00:16:25,055
If you're, if your account
gets compromised, then

371
00:16:25,055 --> 00:16:26,135
that's going to be a hassle.

372
00:16:26,185 --> 00:16:26,425
Yeah.

373
00:16:26,465 --> 00:16:31,935
I've mentioned on this podcast a few
times that I went from being an MFA newb,

374
00:16:32,385 --> 00:16:35,235
I don't know, four or five years ago to.

375
00:16:36,395 --> 00:16:37,175
Slowly.

376
00:16:37,525 --> 00:16:39,835
and then it sorta, it
was a snowball situation.

377
00:16:39,835 --> 00:16:43,705
I ended up rolling MFA
anywhere it mattered.

378
00:16:43,865 --> 00:16:49,525
and the cause I have, oh
Lord, I have 800 accounts.

379
00:16:49,625 --> 00:16:49,715
Yeah.

380
00:16:50,350 --> 00:16:52,060
At, I'm not kidding.

381
00:16:52,060 --> 00:16:54,430
I have a password manager, so
I, I can pull it up and see it.

382
00:16:54,970 --> 00:16:59,240
And I have, just hundreds and
hundreds of accounts at random

383
00:16:59,570 --> 00:17:01,370
places where I don't ever.

384
00:17:01,450 --> 00:17:01,600
man?

385
00:17:01,975 --> 00:17:02,095
Hey,

386
00:17:02,300 --> 00:17:03,950
I just, it's just stuff.

387
00:17:04,010 --> 00:17:04,490
Anyway.

388
00:17:04,790 --> 00:17:05,720
Anyway, my point is.

389
00:17:05,800 --> 00:17:07,630
to tell me Curtis's into
some shady stuff, man.

390
00:17:07,630 --> 00:17:08,760
If he's got 800 accounts

391
00:17:09,675 --> 00:17:12,225
I just hope he talks about
his experience with MFA.

392
00:17:12,765 --> 00:17:13,155
Yeah.

393
00:17:13,305 --> 00:17:13,635
Yeah.

394
00:17:13,815 --> 00:17:14,385
The story.

395
00:17:14,775 --> 00:17:18,055
so I, don't my point of mentioning
how many accounts I have.

396
00:17:18,085 --> 00:17:22,255
I don't have on most of those.

397
00:17:22,255 --> 00:17:25,525
Because they're just stuff where I
don't, there's no information I'm just

398
00:17:26,125 --> 00:17:30,835
anyway, I did roll out MFA, everywhere.

399
00:17:30,865 --> 00:17:35,495
And I use Google authenticator and
wherever I could, because of what I knew

400
00:17:35,495 --> 00:17:37,565
about that using Google authenticator.

401
00:17:38,550 --> 00:17:43,440
text-based MFA and by the way, I
dunno, I'd like to come back to

402
00:17:43,440 --> 00:17:45,070
that idea, but here's what happened.

403
00:17:45,450 --> 00:17:48,300
I got a new phone locked
out of all my accounts.

404
00:17:49,710 --> 00:17:50,820
because I didn't know.

405
00:17:51,460 --> 00:17:53,050
I didn't know what I didn't know.

406
00:17:53,290 --> 00:17:59,580
And so I, I, when I re when I rolled
that out again, I switched to authy

407
00:17:59,930 --> 00:18:03,670
as an app, which allows you to
back up the stuff and try, anyway.

408
00:18:03,700 --> 00:18:03,910
Yeah.

409
00:18:03,920 --> 00:18:05,270
I'm a huge fan of MFA.

410
00:18:05,270 --> 00:18:10,010
and I've mentioned before that, I went
from being a newb to being very angry.

411
00:18:10,010 --> 00:18:12,980
If there's a, if there's a company
that I'm interacting with where

412
00:18:12,980 --> 00:18:14,990
things matter and they don't have.

413
00:18:16,000 --> 00:18:18,810
the authenticator style of, MFA.

414
00:18:19,070 --> 00:18:24,470
I do want to ask you this, and,
how much you know about why the

415
00:18:24,470 --> 00:18:31,310
text-based method of authentication
is bad, like sending an SMS message.

416
00:18:32,345 --> 00:18:33,785
I'm just going to take a shot of the dark.

417
00:18:33,785 --> 00:18:36,995
I'm just going to say that it
can be somehow intercepted and

418
00:18:36,995 --> 00:18:40,715
somebody could actually just use
it or somebody or you could, yeah.

419
00:18:40,765 --> 00:18:42,415
something, a derivative of that.

420
00:18:42,415 --> 00:18:42,865
But tell

421
00:18:42,985 --> 00:18:43,195
Yeah.

422
00:18:43,295 --> 00:18:43,565
Yeah.

423
00:18:43,765 --> 00:18:46,195
know what I, I was hoping,
what you knew more than I did,

424
00:18:46,455 --> 00:18:46,875
Yeah.

425
00:18:47,005 --> 00:18:47,725
because it's

426
00:18:47,815 --> 00:18:47,995
now,

427
00:18:48,145 --> 00:18:50,155
and Prasanna you're,
you're up on this stuff.

428
00:18:50,155 --> 00:18:54,235
So here's the thing I'm wondering
there's a company that offers

429
00:18:54,235 --> 00:18:56,965
multiple methods of authentication.

430
00:18:57,895 --> 00:19:03,005
my, my, my credit union, they have my
phone and, they, they use a, they have

431
00:19:03,005 --> 00:19:07,755
an authenticator method where you get,
you get the little six digit code.

432
00:19:07,905 --> 00:19:10,185
If you, pull up their app on your phone.

433
00:19:10,455 --> 00:19:11,415
I prefer that method.

434
00:19:11,415 --> 00:19:14,505
I use that method whenever I can,
but should I be bothered by the

435
00:19:14,505 --> 00:19:16,935
fact that they also support SMS?

436
00:19:17,625 --> 00:19:20,055
there's no way to disable
the fact that they have

437
00:19:20,605 --> 00:19:24,865
I would be a little worried just
because the number of SIM swap attacks

438
00:19:24,865 --> 00:19:28,225
that are happening these days, like
you hear it all the time when it comes

439
00:19:28,225 --> 00:19:31,885
to crypto, With all these acts where
someone SIM swaps with someone else

440
00:19:32,095 --> 00:19:35,665
gets the authenticator code, cleans out
their wallet, They're a Bitcoin wallet.

441
00:19:36,295 --> 00:19:38,515
So I think it is common.

442
00:19:38,675 --> 00:19:39,815
And even T-Mobile right.

443
00:19:39,815 --> 00:19:43,625
Was accused of allowing a
porting out of numbers as well.

444
00:19:43,625 --> 00:19:44,435
That's another thing that can.

445
00:19:45,715 --> 00:19:46,075
right.

446
00:19:47,155 --> 00:19:47,725
Yes.

447
00:19:47,830 --> 00:19:49,420
so you think I should be worried?

448
00:19:49,990 --> 00:19:51,190
I don't know what I could do.

449
00:19:51,595 --> 00:19:51,985
Yeah.

450
00:19:52,015 --> 00:19:56,695
And it also depends to what extent,
like some random person going after

451
00:19:56,695 --> 00:19:59,405
you specifically Curtis, right.

452
00:19:59,905 --> 00:19:59,995
I'm

453
00:19:59,995 --> 00:20:00,225
a

454
00:20:00,585 --> 00:20:01,345
big deal.

455
00:20:03,685 --> 00:20:04,345
exactly.

456
00:20:05,195 --> 00:20:09,785
But I think there are cases like if
you're a high net worth user or even

457
00:20:09,845 --> 00:20:12,665
you have sensitive data or things
like that, that you care about.

458
00:20:12,665 --> 00:20:16,835
That I think, yeah, you should
be worried about even email,

459
00:20:17,145 --> 00:20:18,555
Multi-factor authentication.

460
00:20:18,615 --> 00:20:20,025
Sometimes it's worrisome as well.

461
00:20:20,075 --> 00:20:22,955
It's things which you can't
completely secure on a.

462
00:20:24,810 --> 00:20:24,990
Yeah.

463
00:20:25,110 --> 00:20:25,560
I know.

464
00:20:25,850 --> 00:20:32,500
that most of the organizations that I'm
F MFA with, offer an option could be,

465
00:20:32,500 --> 00:20:36,360
for example, a token that you have, it
could be the authenticator app could be

466
00:20:36,360 --> 00:20:40,230
a text, could be an email and they offer
the consumer the choice at this point.

467
00:20:40,920 --> 00:20:44,110
probably just trying to make it easy
for somebody to opt in with something.

468
00:20:44,605 --> 00:20:47,095
But there are obviously some
that are more secure than others.

469
00:20:47,395 --> 00:20:52,285
And I spoke earlier about the awareness of
some consumers, especially high net worth

470
00:20:52,525 --> 00:20:55,015
individuals, becoming more cyber aware.

471
00:20:55,435 --> 00:20:58,555
And the specific attack that I was
thinking about is SIM swapping.

472
00:20:58,555 --> 00:21:01,755
And it's be, I, I know a gentleman
that's been, SIM swapped three times.

473
00:21:02,220 --> 00:21:05,650
and it's, he described it
as he was on an airplane.

474
00:21:05,650 --> 00:21:07,180
He got out the airplane,
his phone wouldn't work.

475
00:21:07,180 --> 00:21:09,430
And it is took him days
to get back online.

476
00:21:09,730 --> 00:21:13,670
It was maddening, scary, and
primarily done through social

477
00:21:13,670 --> 00:21:15,350
engineering where they contact the

478
00:21:15,825 --> 00:21:16,395
Provider.

479
00:21:16,485 --> 00:21:16,815
Yeah.

480
00:21:17,050 --> 00:21:21,460
and convince them that are you
and that you need a new SIM.

481
00:21:21,520 --> 00:21:22,710
And it's just that.

482
00:21:24,225 --> 00:21:24,495
Yeah.

483
00:21:24,525 --> 00:21:27,435
They made it so easy to
port numbers as well.

484
00:21:27,835 --> 00:21:30,805
that's also another common vector.

485
00:21:31,560 --> 00:21:32,700
What does that mean to port a number?

486
00:21:32,700 --> 00:21:34,020
Does that mean to change carriers?

487
00:21:34,145 --> 00:21:35,145
To change carriers

488
00:21:35,340 --> 00:21:35,790
Okay.

489
00:21:35,795 --> 00:21:39,725
And so basically instead of just doing a
SIM swap, they just pretend to be you and

490
00:21:39,765 --> 00:21:39,975
Yup.

491
00:21:40,075 --> 00:21:41,105
your number to another

492
00:21:41,445 --> 00:21:41,835
Yup.

493
00:21:41,920 --> 00:21:42,460
Wow.

494
00:21:43,795 --> 00:21:44,215
Yeah.

495
00:21:44,365 --> 00:21:45,115
That's not good.

496
00:21:45,500 --> 00:21:47,000
These bad guys are really bad mint.

497
00:21:48,410 --> 00:21:49,970
I think that's something we can all agree

498
00:21:50,295 --> 00:21:50,475
Yeah.

499
00:21:51,320 --> 00:21:56,360
yeah, so like I have multiple
accounts where, so goo like Gmail.

500
00:21:56,420 --> 00:21:56,750
Okay.

501
00:21:56,780 --> 00:21:57,440
Gmail.

502
00:21:57,710 --> 00:22:00,050
It's very specific on what authentication.

503
00:22:00,875 --> 00:22:04,535
Systems that you use and you
can disable ones that you

504
00:22:04,535 --> 00:22:06,005
don't want to use specifically.

505
00:22:06,005 --> 00:22:11,235
You can disable SMS authentication, but
my credit union, it supports all of them.

506
00:22:11,235 --> 00:22:15,315
And I suppose the only way to disable
SMS based authentication is to delete

507
00:22:15,315 --> 00:22:17,325
my cell phone from the account.

508
00:22:17,355 --> 00:22:18,715
But that's just weird,

509
00:22:18,785 --> 00:22:21,725
But change it to like a mobile
number or, sorry, to the home number,

510
00:22:23,595 --> 00:22:24,285
Yeah.

511
00:22:24,565 --> 00:22:26,385
allows you to say, is
this a cell phone or.

512
00:22:27,390 --> 00:22:28,890
Or a mo or a home number.

513
00:22:29,640 --> 00:22:32,340
I'm sure if you select a home
number, it won't send you SMS, but

514
00:22:32,525 --> 00:22:33,705
a ho what's a home number.

515
00:22:33,705 --> 00:22:33,755
a

516
00:22:33,755 --> 00:22:34,145
landline

517
00:22:34,860 --> 00:22:36,420
a landline and old school.

518
00:22:36,450 --> 00:22:40,490
I know I've seen places where it's is this
a home number or is this a cell phone?

519
00:22:42,735 --> 00:22:43,275
Interesting.

520
00:22:44,065 --> 00:22:49,995
so I'm curious, mark, what do you, if
you're, so I know, as a dedicated to

521
00:22:49,995 --> 00:22:54,115
backup, there's, I have my top five of
these are things and by the way, on your

522
00:22:54,115 --> 00:23:00,005
podcast, the first, like my biggest one,
you and I talked about was the idea that

523
00:23:00,065 --> 00:23:02,075
cloud stuff is automatically backed up.

524
00:23:02,345 --> 00:23:06,135
Which it isn't if somebody were to
say, what are the top five things

525
00:23:06,135 --> 00:23:11,185
that I need to be concerned about,
as a, either personally or it sounds

526
00:23:11,185 --> 00:23:12,655
like personally you're thinking MFA,

527
00:23:13,410 --> 00:23:13,590
Yeah.

528
00:23:13,785 --> 00:23:19,405
I would say that's just a best practice
personally or for companies and companies

529
00:23:19,405 --> 00:23:24,475
have a little bit more sophisticated
tools at their disposal, so they can push

530
00:23:24,475 --> 00:23:27,085
an MFA depending on, the user behavior.

531
00:23:27,085 --> 00:23:28,195
Are they logging in from.

532
00:23:29,235 --> 00:23:30,255
A new location.

533
00:23:30,255 --> 00:23:31,785
Are they logging in from another country?

534
00:23:31,785 --> 00:23:35,745
Is there some kind of
anomalous behavior, mark never

535
00:23:35,910 --> 00:23:36,030
Yes.

536
00:23:36,405 --> 00:23:41,275
these files now he's downloading gigs,
downloading gigabytes of finance records.

537
00:23:41,335 --> 00:23:43,345
I think we're gonna force an MFA on that.

538
00:23:43,395 --> 00:23:48,965
so I think MFA is a foundational thing,
for individuals or organizations.

539
00:23:49,700 --> 00:23:57,550
I think some other best practices for
individuals again, would be backup to

540
00:23:57,550 --> 00:23:59,380
ensure that your information is backed up.

541
00:23:59,410 --> 00:24:02,070
I don't know if you guys have
seen these, Mr. Backup gives me a

542
00:24:02,260 --> 00:24:02,620
Yeah.

543
00:24:02,970 --> 00:24:04,350
I'm very excited about that.

544
00:24:04,410 --> 00:24:04,740
from Mr.

545
00:24:04,770 --> 00:24:05,430
Very excited

546
00:24:05,430 --> 00:24:05,640
Backup

547
00:24:05,670 --> 00:24:06,000
that.

548
00:24:06,230 --> 00:24:10,670
the, you have, you guys get these
emails that say, Hey, I'm sorry to

549
00:24:10,670 --> 00:24:13,490
tell you, but I've been spying on
you for the last couple of months.

550
00:24:13,490 --> 00:24:17,810
And, and if you don't send this money
to whatever, I'm going to release this

551
00:24:17,810 --> 00:24:21,470
stuff, this, this thing of you going
into these inappropriate websites

552
00:24:21,740 --> 00:24:23,660
and they send these emails out to.

553
00:24:24,290 --> 00:24:27,650
Thousands of people and some people,
cause they know that some people will

554
00:24:27,650 --> 00:24:29,690
be like, oh my God, I should pay this.

555
00:24:29,865 --> 00:24:30,045
Yeah.

556
00:24:31,160 --> 00:24:31,440
you should.

557
00:24:31,470 --> 00:24:32,520
For one, if you get that email.

558
00:24:33,295 --> 00:24:35,215
Delete it, care what

559
00:24:35,305 --> 00:24:35,665
Right.

560
00:24:35,785 --> 00:24:35,935
through.

561
00:24:35,935 --> 00:24:39,485
It's just a, they're just phishing
and too, if you've got your stuff

562
00:24:39,515 --> 00:24:41,975
backed up, you don't have to worry
about anybody encrypting anything.

563
00:24:41,975 --> 00:24:44,465
Now, if they're going to release
stuff, that is another thing from

564
00:24:44,465 --> 00:24:47,705
malware is if they take your records,
even though you've backed them up.

565
00:24:48,415 --> 00:24:52,045
they're going to release something that
you don't want released to the public,

566
00:24:52,045 --> 00:24:56,315
that's a whole nother discussion, but
definitely you should back up, antivirus,

567
00:24:56,345 --> 00:24:58,735
running an antivirus is, super important.

568
00:24:59,045 --> 00:24:59,615
what else?

569
00:24:59,615 --> 00:25:00,335
as a consumer.

570
00:25:01,515 --> 00:25:03,105
being aware and pausing.

571
00:25:03,105 --> 00:25:07,875
When you see something that looks a
little off any time somebody says, Hey,

572
00:25:08,155 --> 00:25:09,475
there's a problem with your account.

573
00:25:09,475 --> 00:25:16,465
We need you to log in and can now just
stop or, oh, your order for $15,000 from

574
00:25:16,465 --> 00:25:18,705
Amazon is on its way, And you're like

575
00:25:18,835 --> 00:25:19,285
Yeah.

576
00:25:19,485 --> 00:25:20,475
out, dude, just,

577
00:25:20,615 --> 00:25:20,885
Yeah.

578
00:25:21,735 --> 00:25:23,375
if you didn't expect it don't click it

579
00:25:23,885 --> 00:25:24,785
Exactly.

580
00:25:24,785 --> 00:25:26,165
that's a perfect way to say it.

581
00:25:26,165 --> 00:25:26,635
I like that.

582
00:25:26,645 --> 00:25:27,185
Didn't expect it.

583
00:25:27,185 --> 00:25:27,725
Don't click it.

584
00:25:27,725 --> 00:25:32,865
And obviously you can, cause you can
look at the, the sender's real address

585
00:25:32,865 --> 00:25:34,365
and see, is this something real read?

586
00:25:34,365 --> 00:25:38,050
It is a lot of this stuff,
they've got shoddy grammar, fuzzy

587
00:25:38,050 --> 00:25:39,940
images, but people get worked up.

588
00:25:39,940 --> 00:25:43,980
yes, but I'm sure you've seen the ones
where you get an email from the CEO.

589
00:25:44,190 --> 00:25:44,640
Hey mark.

590
00:25:44,670 --> 00:25:47,650
I need you to run out and buy 50 gift
cards for target and send, it's happened

591
00:25:47,650 --> 00:25:52,420
to one of my boys, who was working as
an internship for the cybersecurity

592
00:25:52,420 --> 00:25:56,410
committee that I was working with
before, which the is Adaquest the CEO

593
00:25:56,410 --> 00:25:57,940
of Adaquest, his name is Hiram Machado.

594
00:25:58,960 --> 00:26:01,450
it was like my son's third
day into his internship.

595
00:26:01,450 --> 00:26:06,730
And he got an email saying, Hey,
Makai I need you to run out and buy,

596
00:26:06,780 --> 00:26:08,850
$500 worth of gift cards from target.

597
00:26:09,120 --> 00:26:12,300
And I need you to, once you have
that, just let me know, and I'll

598
00:26:12,300 --> 00:26:13,770
tell you what we're going to do
with them, but I need this for this

599
00:26:13,770 --> 00:26:14,880
event we're doing this afternoon.

600
00:26:15,690 --> 00:26:18,810
so Makai again, telling you the
kids are getting smarter these days.

601
00:26:19,200 --> 00:26:23,280
Hopefully not the ones in university
of Michigan, I guess that was 2016.

602
00:26:23,520 --> 00:26:25,500
he emailed me and he goes,
what should I do with that?

603
00:26:25,500 --> 00:26:26,250
And I said, send it.

604
00:26:26,490 --> 00:26:29,280
I said, we're going to use this
as a case study in a learning

605
00:26:29,280 --> 00:26:30,780
example, don't do anything with it.

606
00:26:30,780 --> 00:26:32,040
but yeah, I don't.

607
00:26:32,100 --> 00:26:33,480
what advice would you guys give.

608
00:26:34,780 --> 00:26:37,090
I mean stuff's all good.

609
00:26:37,090 --> 00:26:41,120
I think, the, you talked about
hovering over the site to see the site.

610
00:26:41,330 --> 00:26:43,050
What I generally say is if you.

611
00:26:43,050 --> 00:26:48,715
get an unexpected communication from
somebody you actually do business with.

612
00:26:48,715 --> 00:26:50,515
Because I get stuff like that.

613
00:26:50,515 --> 00:26:52,525
My Citibank card has been compromised.

614
00:26:52,555 --> 00:26:54,775
I'm like I haven't had a
Citibank card in 20 years.

615
00:26:54,775 --> 00:27:01,415
So I think I'm pretty good, but I get,
I've gotten phished from like PayPal,

616
00:27:01,545 --> 00:27:03,165
stuff like that or not from PayPal.

617
00:27:04,090 --> 00:27:05,650
as a PayPal based positioning,

618
00:27:05,675 --> 00:27:06,095
PayPal.

619
00:27:06,190 --> 00:27:11,620
bending, pretending to be PayPal,
is if you are actually concerned,

620
00:27:11,620 --> 00:27:17,830
if it sounds like something that,
that might be real, to paypal.com.

621
00:27:18,720 --> 00:27:24,000
interact in any way with that email, go
to PayPal.com or contact PayPal's phone

622
00:27:24,000 --> 00:27:26,630
number, not anything listed in that email.

623
00:27:27,050 --> 00:27:28,400
would, it's interesting though.

624
00:27:28,460 --> 00:27:31,760
There are times when I, in
fact, just a couple of days ago.

625
00:27:32,655 --> 00:27:36,645
I got contacted by a company
that I do business with.

626
00:27:38,235 --> 00:27:42,225
there was a credit card company and
they were like, we're such and such

627
00:27:42,225 --> 00:27:43,695
from such and such credit card company.

628
00:27:43,965 --> 00:27:46,455
And we want to call to verify charges.

629
00:27:47,515 --> 00:27:49,675
how about I freaking verify you?

630
00:27:49,755 --> 00:27:49,935
you're

631
00:27:50,035 --> 00:27:50,275
Yeah.

632
00:27:50,805 --> 00:27:51,315
nude

633
00:27:51,525 --> 00:27:51,945
Show me your

634
00:27:52,155 --> 00:27:55,035
me show, they will, we
want to authenticate.

635
00:27:55,305 --> 00:27:56,475
We want to authenticate you.

636
00:27:57,640 --> 00:28:01,090
before we talk to you about account,
I'm like, how do I authenticate you?

637
00:28:01,450 --> 00:28:04,720
Like, why do you people
still think this is like Lee?

638
00:28:04,750 --> 00:28:05,430
I will call.

639
00:28:05,440 --> 00:28:05,950
Thank you.

640
00:28:05,950 --> 00:28:06,880
Thank you for calling.

641
00:28:06,910 --> 00:28:10,510
I will call the 800 number on and
by the way, it was a real thing.

642
00:28:11,160 --> 00:28:15,420
I will call the 800 number on my credit
card and I will ask for the fraud

643
00:28:15,420 --> 00:28:16,950
department and it was real thing.

644
00:28:18,060 --> 00:28:20,970
Th that's annoying that happens,
because that is a phishing

645
00:28:21,010 --> 00:28:21,250
No.

646
00:28:21,630 --> 00:28:22,080
right?

647
00:28:22,240 --> 00:28:22,930
Absolutely.

648
00:28:23,680 --> 00:28:28,830
in people think that, all cyber
attacks are through email or somehow

649
00:28:28,830 --> 00:28:30,000
somebody is getting into your network.

650
00:28:30,360 --> 00:28:31,260
Some of them are just a phone

651
00:28:31,580 --> 00:28:31,850
Yeah.

652
00:28:31,860 --> 00:28:32,650
I've been called by.

653
00:28:33,405 --> 00:28:36,495
The IRS, the texts, whatever.

654
00:28:36,675 --> 00:28:38,115
And yeah, this Mr. Shriner.

655
00:28:38,145 --> 00:28:38,415
Yes.

656
00:28:38,685 --> 00:28:40,845
We have an urgent matter that
we need to talk to you about.

657
00:28:40,875 --> 00:28:42,925
really, and I, sometimes I
just where's this gonna go?

658
00:28:42,925 --> 00:28:45,775
Cause I know at one point they're
going to ask me for social

659
00:28:45,775 --> 00:28:46,855
security date of birth, blah, blah,

660
00:28:46,930 --> 00:28:47,230
Yeah.

661
00:28:47,245 --> 00:28:47,905
I'm like, okay.

662
00:28:47,905 --> 00:28:48,085
yeah.

663
00:28:48,215 --> 00:28:48,855
What's going on?

664
00:28:49,125 --> 00:28:51,225
They're like, before we can go any
further, we need to get some information.

665
00:28:52,000 --> 00:28:54,730
typically the smart ones, they
won't go right to social security.

666
00:28:54,970 --> 00:28:56,410
But just say they'll say,
I just want to confirm that

667
00:28:56,410 --> 00:28:57,430
your name is blah, blah, blah.

668
00:28:57,460 --> 00:28:58,000
They got your name.

669
00:28:58,050 --> 00:28:58,140
I'm

670
00:28:58,260 --> 00:28:58,530
Yeah.

671
00:28:58,600 --> 00:29:00,630
that's me and that you're living at.

672
00:29:00,730 --> 00:29:00,880
yeah.

673
00:29:00,880 --> 00:29:01,130
Yeah.

674
00:29:01,160 --> 00:29:03,140
And so now I'm starting
to respond to them.

675
00:29:03,190 --> 00:29:04,990
And then as sooner or
later they're like, okay.

676
00:29:04,990 --> 00:29:07,750
And then, can we give us the year
of your date of birth, and you're

677
00:29:07,750 --> 00:29:09,040
like, and they just start to

678
00:29:09,045 --> 00:29:09,255
Yeah.

679
00:29:09,370 --> 00:29:11,860
good ones, start to tease it out of
you because they're not gonna, if

680
00:29:11,860 --> 00:29:14,410
they come in first, first thing to ask
you is social security people like.

681
00:29:15,075 --> 00:29:18,485
But you down there and then,
they build a rapport and that's

682
00:29:18,545 --> 00:29:19,475
what they're all looking for.

683
00:29:19,540 --> 00:29:22,090
Yeah, it feels like they have
that information already.

684
00:29:22,090 --> 00:29:24,550
So it's okay, what's this one
more piece of information.

685
00:29:24,775 --> 00:29:25,075
fine.

686
00:29:25,240 --> 00:29:25,330
it.

687
00:29:25,330 --> 00:29:28,150
Just to verify that we're talking
to the right person, right?

688
00:29:28,445 --> 00:29:29,045
and it's funny.

689
00:29:29,045 --> 00:29:32,765
Cause I remember when my dad retired,
like he'd always get all these calls from.

690
00:29:33,435 --> 00:29:35,025
Scammers or salespeople.

691
00:29:35,025 --> 00:29:37,035
And I'd be like, you guys
should just chat with them.

692
00:29:37,035 --> 00:29:38,295
It's what do you have to lose?

693
00:29:38,505 --> 00:29:39,795
Just don't give them any information.

694
00:29:39,795 --> 00:29:41,715
But at least you're saying, yeah,

695
00:29:41,960 --> 00:29:42,350
to talk

696
00:29:42,405 --> 00:29:42,975
exactly.

697
00:29:43,065 --> 00:29:46,035
And at least you're saving someone
else from having to get a call.

698
00:29:46,035 --> 00:29:46,575
right?

699
00:29:46,975 --> 00:29:49,945
There's a, there's an
English dude that I've seen.

700
00:29:50,115 --> 00:29:54,955
He does videos where he interacts with
these folks and he like, he does talks

701
00:29:54,955 --> 00:29:56,575
where he talks about his interactions.

702
00:29:56,575 --> 00:29:56,935
Have you seen.

703
00:29:57,995 --> 00:29:59,375
I've seen stuff like that.

704
00:29:59,475 --> 00:29:59,925
yeah.

705
00:29:59,955 --> 00:30:02,945
I don't know if I've seen that specific
one, but yeah, where they just go and

706
00:30:02,945 --> 00:30:07,625
after a while the scammers, they were
getting really frustrated after a while.

707
00:30:07,835 --> 00:30:10,265
Cause they start to realize that
they're the ones getting scammed,

708
00:30:10,265 --> 00:30:10,735
yeah.

709
00:30:10,870 --> 00:30:11,050
Yeah.

710
00:30:11,050 --> 00:30:13,090
There's this one guy and
he's just really funny.

711
00:30:13,090 --> 00:30:14,680
And he does he doesn't like a talk

712
00:30:14,725 --> 00:30:14,965
Yeah.

713
00:30:15,620 --> 00:30:18,320
he does it on stage where he talks
about his interactions with these

714
00:30:18,320 --> 00:30:20,210
folks and it's just, he does it in a

715
00:30:20,215 --> 00:30:20,455
Yeah.

716
00:30:20,750 --> 00:30:21,050
way.

717
00:30:21,150 --> 00:30:23,650
So the phone calls,
Phone calls and emails.

718
00:30:23,800 --> 00:30:25,270
Don't click on the emails.

719
00:30:25,300 --> 00:30:28,300
Like just again, if you think
it's actually from PayPal,

720
00:30:28,540 --> 00:30:29,890
then go to paypal.com.

721
00:30:30,220 --> 00:30:31,630
Not anything with that.

722
00:30:31,750 --> 00:30:31,900
Go

723
00:30:32,105 --> 00:30:35,195
and one of the points mark made
earlier around social engineering,

724
00:30:35,735 --> 00:30:39,395
I think people also just, it should
just be careful what they post online.

725
00:30:40,175 --> 00:30:44,165
If you're like putting
Facebook messages or tweets,

726
00:30:44,215 --> 00:30:44,635
Hey,

727
00:30:44,645 --> 00:30:45,125
careful.

728
00:30:45,665 --> 00:30:45,935
Yeah.

729
00:30:46,645 --> 00:30:50,345
for a three week vacation
to The Bahamas, Yeah.

730
00:30:50,375 --> 00:30:50,765
Sorry.

731
00:30:50,790 --> 00:30:50,910
Yeah.

732
00:30:51,045 --> 00:30:51,295
Yeah, no.

733
00:30:51,295 --> 00:30:52,405
That's totally the case.

734
00:30:52,405 --> 00:30:53,175
Or it's oh yeah.

735
00:30:53,255 --> 00:30:56,155
Or you start inadvertently being
like, Hey, it's my birthday.

736
00:30:56,185 --> 00:30:58,795
Or it's oh, my mother is so and so right.

737
00:30:58,795 --> 00:31:01,045
And, or a favorite dog's name.

738
00:31:01,045 --> 00:31:04,825
And all the rest of this and people
can take that information and they

739
00:31:04,825 --> 00:31:07,705
could use it for social engineering
to extract other information from you.

740
00:31:11,170 --> 00:31:12,340
I know what your favorite dog's

741
00:31:12,495 --> 00:31:12,735
Yeah.

742
00:31:15,620 --> 00:31:18,050
I, because he was more important than me.

743
00:31:18,110 --> 00:31:18,740
I'm sorry, I'm

744
00:31:18,760 --> 00:31:19,390
Are you a little bit?

745
00:31:19,390 --> 00:31:19,750
Are you a

746
00:31:20,450 --> 00:31:21,830
I think he's really hurt, man.

747
00:31:22,230 --> 00:31:23,310
oh, it's okay.

748
00:31:23,870 --> 00:31:24,050
man.

749
00:31:25,940 --> 00:31:27,650
I went to il fornaio without you.

750
00:31:28,910 --> 00:31:29,150
That's

751
00:31:29,150 --> 00:31:29,960
some really good food.

752
00:31:30,650 --> 00:31:30,860
yeah.

753
00:31:30,860 --> 00:31:32,240
So what about companies?

754
00:31:32,240 --> 00:31:37,670
So we talked about, we talking about have
MFA, so there's two ways to about MFA.

755
00:31:37,910 --> 00:31:42,740
You should, as a company, be
offering MFA when people are

756
00:31:42,740 --> 00:31:44,480
interacting with your service online,

757
00:31:45,695 --> 00:31:45,845
Yeah.

758
00:31:45,900 --> 00:31:50,370
and then you should, as a company, I
like what you were talking about earlier.

759
00:31:51,205 --> 00:31:55,445
cause obviously, by the way, I haven't
thrown out our disclaimer, so Prasanna

760
00:31:55,445 --> 00:31:56,635
and I work for different companies.

761
00:31:56,635 --> 00:32:01,365
I work for Druva, he works for zoom and
this is not a podcast of either company

762
00:32:01,395 --> 00:32:04,305
and the opinions here are all ours.

763
00:32:04,635 --> 00:32:08,505
And, be sure to rate us by the way,
at a ratethispodcast.com/restore

764
00:32:08,955 --> 00:32:10,725
And then, if you want to come on.

765
00:32:11,420 --> 00:32:14,320
listen to me, complain to
Prasanna yourself life.

766
00:32:14,370 --> 00:32:15,150
you could

767
00:32:15,520 --> 00:32:15,740
do

768
00:32:15,920 --> 00:32:16,100
that

769
00:32:16,100 --> 00:32:16,380
We

770
00:32:16,745 --> 00:32:17,615
love guests.

771
00:32:18,470 --> 00:32:24,390
it just it on Twitter or
wcurtispreston@gmail with Druva for

772
00:32:24,390 --> 00:32:29,700
example, we've supported, third-party MFA
for awhile, and now we support native MFA.

773
00:32:30,140 --> 00:32:31,010
if you're a company.

774
00:32:31,690 --> 00:32:36,840
If you're a cloud company, or if
you're a company that has information

775
00:32:36,900 --> 00:32:40,320
that is important like that, and
people are logging into your system

776
00:32:40,320 --> 00:32:43,485
without MFA Then bad company.

777
00:32:43,535 --> 00:32:47,285
and it should also not be SMS based
authentication you should offer,

778
00:32:47,685 --> 00:32:54,275
authenticator method and, and I'm gonna
throw out, going to throw out, Don't be.

779
00:32:54,275 --> 00:33:00,765
a website that is hard to use a password
manager with, Don't be complaining

780
00:33:00,765 --> 00:33:02,385
about one or two of the character.

781
00:33:02,395 --> 00:33:06,025
The special characters that my
password manager came up with, or I

782
00:33:06,025 --> 00:33:07,555
had one this week that complained.

783
00:33:07,585 --> 00:33:09,505
They're like, Hey man,
your password's too long.

784
00:33:09,985 --> 00:33:10,195
It was

785
00:33:10,280 --> 00:33:10,490
Yes,

786
00:33:10,495 --> 00:33:11,155
characters.

787
00:33:12,265 --> 00:33:15,385
they said, you can use a maximum
17 characters and I'm like,

788
00:33:15,500 --> 00:33:16,850
17.

789
00:33:17,335 --> 00:33:18,235
Yeah, 17.

790
00:33:18,330 --> 00:33:19,440
That is so weird,

791
00:33:19,495 --> 00:33:24,155
and, the, So based on that, I
no longer interact with the IRS.

792
00:33:24,605 --> 00:33:25,385
I'm not.

793
00:33:27,170 --> 00:33:32,540
But I also want to go back to a point
mark made earlier, which was that MFA.

794
00:33:32,540 --> 00:33:34,040
I don't think solves everything.

795
00:33:34,040 --> 00:33:37,370
You still need those, especially as a
business, you still need those other

796
00:33:37,370 --> 00:33:39,710
things to look for anomalies, right?

797
00:33:39,740 --> 00:33:44,240
For look, to look at the behavior
of the user because MFA will protect

798
00:33:44,240 --> 00:33:47,300
you to a certain extent, but it's
not the only line of defense.

799
00:33:49,160 --> 00:33:49,430
Oh, yeah.

800
00:33:49,430 --> 00:33:53,985
at the corporate level again, The
complexity of the problem and the P the

801
00:33:53,985 --> 00:33:58,645
complexity of the solutions available
are much greater, at the corporate level.

802
00:33:58,645 --> 00:34:01,695
you have things like, device
management, for example, and these

803
00:34:01,695 --> 00:34:05,355
days everybody wants to BYOD but
you also have corporate devices.

804
00:34:05,455 --> 00:34:10,195
And, but on my B my own device, I'm going
to have access to company apps and data.

805
00:34:11,275 --> 00:34:12,475
How does the company manage that?

806
00:34:12,505 --> 00:34:17,515
there's mobile device management tools out
there that can, if I lose my phone, I can

807
00:34:17,515 --> 00:34:19,045
tell the company, Hey, I lost my phone.

808
00:34:19,045 --> 00:34:21,175
They can remote wipe their data.

809
00:34:21,515 --> 00:34:24,035
they can do remote
backups, all of that stuff.

810
00:34:24,115 --> 00:34:26,095
they can check for anamolous
behavior on a phone.

811
00:34:26,335 --> 00:34:29,175
Mark just logged in from Bellevue,
but he's also logging in.

812
00:34:29,175 --> 00:34:30,475
from Romania.

813
00:34:30,605 --> 00:34:31,475
Something's wrong here.

814
00:34:31,610 --> 00:34:31,850
Yup.

815
00:34:32,115 --> 00:34:35,345
yeah, that stuff and it's, depending
on the size and the shape of the

816
00:34:35,345 --> 00:34:39,105
organization, it can be, you have
SEIMs to monitor all types of

817
00:34:39,105 --> 00:34:40,695
activity to collect your logs.

818
00:34:41,115 --> 00:34:44,925
that's, again, it comes back to that
original point of why cybersecurity,

819
00:34:44,925 --> 00:34:47,565
cause it's such a broad field
and there's so many different.

820
00:34:47,565 --> 00:34:48,855
It's constantly evolving.

821
00:34:48,885 --> 00:34:50,025
it's pretty cool.

822
00:34:50,985 --> 00:34:51,495
Yeah.

823
00:34:51,575 --> 00:34:56,625
I'm curious what you think about, so
one of the things I'm pushing outside

824
00:34:56,625 --> 00:35:00,195
of the backup space, one of the
things that I'm pushing people to do

825
00:35:00,195 --> 00:35:05,805
or companies to do is to look into a
couple of different types of tools.

826
00:35:05,805 --> 00:35:11,185
One is we've had, we had somebody on here
from a company that does a DDI, right?

827
00:35:11,185 --> 00:35:13,245
So what did we decide that was DNS

828
00:35:13,435 --> 00:35:14,875
DHCP and IPAM.

829
00:35:14,955 --> 00:35:16,335
And IPAM Yeah.

830
00:35:16,905 --> 00:35:21,375
and so th that, those one group of tools,
which is they can do things of like,

831
00:35:21,705 --> 00:35:23,805
why is somebody going to this really?

832
00:35:23,805 --> 00:35:29,710
why is something looking at a
DNS address that is a. a DNS name

833
00:35:29,710 --> 00:35:33,370
that is like characters long,
and it doesn't make any sense.

834
00:35:33,370 --> 00:35:34,650
That, that is a,

835
00:35:34,760 --> 00:35:35,180
Sure

836
00:35:35,245 --> 00:35:38,575
ransomware thing, reaching
out for command and control.

837
00:35:38,735 --> 00:35:43,175
that's number one and number two,
the type of software or system or

838
00:35:43,235 --> 00:35:46,925
whatever that can identify data leaks.

839
00:35:46,985 --> 00:35:50,975
so that you it's there's a
general level of outgoing.

840
00:35:51,845 --> 00:35:57,065
traffic and then suddenly there's
this giant spike from Fred's desktop.

841
00:35:57,675 --> 00:35:58,815
that never happened before.

842
00:35:58,995 --> 00:35:59,985
And the

843
00:36:00,060 --> 00:36:00,690
Vacation.

844
00:36:01,515 --> 00:36:02,655
Fred's on vacation.

845
00:36:02,655 --> 00:36:05,625
Cause he posted on Facebook
that he's in Maui this week.

846
00:36:06,075 --> 00:36:08,415
and his laptops doing that.

847
00:36:08,715 --> 00:36:10,935
What do you think about
those two types of tools?

848
00:36:11,795 --> 00:36:17,365
I think, on the situation,
it's, every tool has its usage.

849
00:36:17,425 --> 00:36:20,095
And I think for most companies,
both of those make sense.

850
00:36:20,155 --> 00:36:24,565
for both those tools make sense for a lot
of companies and organizations out there.

851
00:36:25,525 --> 00:36:28,235
and guess the question, I, again, I'm.

852
00:36:28,235 --> 00:36:33,345
not Technical more at the kind
of higher level understanding

853
00:36:33,345 --> 00:36:36,855
what the, to understand, what the
problems are putting together.

854
00:36:36,855 --> 00:36:37,485
Some solutions.

855
00:36:37,485 --> 00:36:40,415
One of the challenges is that you
have so many different vendors

856
00:36:40,415 --> 00:36:41,555
of so many different tools.

857
00:36:41,555 --> 00:36:46,085
And so do you look for these
custom bespoke kind of solutions

858
00:36:46,085 --> 00:36:47,445
and tools, or do you work with.

859
00:36:47,755 --> 00:36:51,940
a Platform provider, for
example, Microsoft 365 has

860
00:36:51,940 --> 00:36:53,350
a lot of DLP tools in there.

861
00:36:53,350 --> 00:36:55,240
They have, advanced threat protection.

862
00:36:55,550 --> 00:37:00,110
they have antivirus, anomaly detection,
all of that's built in there.

863
00:37:00,150 --> 00:37:02,700
so do you, and then
device management as well.

864
00:37:03,180 --> 00:37:07,890
Or do you say no, we don't want to put
all of our eggs in the Microsoft basket

865
00:37:07,890 --> 00:37:09,450
and we want to go for best in breed.

866
00:37:09,870 --> 00:37:10,500
And I don't know.

867
00:37:10,550 --> 00:37:14,200
Prasanna like at, I don't know how much
you can talk about at Zoom but like, how

868
00:37:14,200 --> 00:37:19,130
do you guys decide, what kind of a tool
are you going to go with a, an integrated

869
00:37:19,250 --> 00:37:21,080
approach or do you look for best in breed?

870
00:37:21,735 --> 00:37:25,545
So I can't talk specifically
about Zoom but in general, right?

871
00:37:25,575 --> 00:37:26,715
I think it's going to come down to.

872
00:37:27,450 --> 00:37:30,780
The need for a tool, as
well as the expertise.

873
00:37:31,080 --> 00:37:34,320
If I'm looking at sort of small,
medium businesses where maybe they

874
00:37:34,320 --> 00:37:37,710
don't have specialized it admins, we
face the same thing in backup as well.

875
00:37:37,710 --> 00:37:39,900
There is no one who could
go learn everything and

876
00:37:39,900 --> 00:37:41,910
anything about security tools.

877
00:37:41,910 --> 00:37:44,970
And so you're going to probably
want a single tool that allows

878
00:37:44,970 --> 00:37:45,720
you to solve everything.

879
00:37:45,720 --> 00:37:46,560
Just like in backup.

880
00:37:46,560 --> 00:37:49,950
You have those issues as well, but
once you get to larger companies,

881
00:37:49,950 --> 00:37:52,440
or if you have specialized
problems, you might start to.

882
00:37:53,620 --> 00:37:55,150
rollout into, okay.

883
00:37:55,150 --> 00:37:59,410
I now need a specialized tool, a best of
breed tool because I have this special

884
00:37:59,410 --> 00:38:03,580
need, or I now have the skillsets to be
able to address some of these issues.

885
00:38:03,580 --> 00:38:07,330
And therefore I'm going to pick
different tools based on my needs.

886
00:38:07,810 --> 00:38:10,720
And I think it's hard to say
one is better than another.

887
00:38:10,930 --> 00:38:13,780
I think it depends on where you
are and what your needs are.

888
00:38:14,860 --> 00:38:15,950
Yeah, I would agree.

889
00:38:16,000 --> 00:38:19,990
and not just because I work for a SaaS
company, but I would agree that where

890
00:38:19,990 --> 00:38:25,930
there's a big business need, that you
have such as email, clearly a business

891
00:38:25,930 --> 00:38:32,520
need a need that every business has,
that if a SaaS solution is available

892
00:38:32,640 --> 00:38:37,920
and it's a well-known respected cetera
solution that you can vet out then.

893
00:38:38,780 --> 00:38:44,750
from a security basis, I would prefer
that over something that you're going

894
00:38:44,750 --> 00:38:50,780
to, let's say I would prefer Microsoft
365 over exchange on prem a heartbeat

895
00:38:51,200 --> 00:38:53,480
exchange on prem is harder to secure.

896
00:38:53,600 --> 00:38:54,650
It's harder to manage.

897
00:38:54,680 --> 00:38:56,600
So you've got to manage the system.

898
00:38:56,600 --> 00:38:59,720
You've got to manage the storage and then
you got to manage the backup of that.

899
00:38:59,720 --> 00:39:01,670
And then you gotta make sure
that backup gets off site.

900
00:39:02,840 --> 00:39:03,860
of that is easier.

901
00:39:03,860 --> 00:39:08,140
If you have Microsoft 365 now you
should be backing it up, right?

902
00:39:08,210 --> 00:39:09,620
Microsoft is not backing it up for you.

903
00:39:09,640 --> 00:39:13,300
That was what you and I talked on
your podcast, but there are services,

904
00:39:13,300 --> 00:39:17,200
that will back up, obviously Druva
offers one, but there are many

905
00:39:17,200 --> 00:39:19,720
companies that backup Microsoft 365.

906
00:39:20,410 --> 00:39:25,860
And so I think from a security basis,
as long as you vet the security vendor,

907
00:39:26,635 --> 00:39:31,285
look at, look for things like MFA, look
for things like, what their NDA situation

908
00:39:31,285 --> 00:39:34,765
is to cut the type of data that they
have, whether or not they share personal

909
00:39:34,765 --> 00:39:39,375
information, cause some, so many of
these SaaS vendors, that's actually

910
00:39:39,375 --> 00:39:44,195
their, their business model is they're
either cheap or free, and they make.

911
00:39:45,105 --> 00:39:49,005
You know their money with
using your personal data?

912
00:39:49,345 --> 00:39:50,395
that's, that's not what I'm

913
00:39:50,775 --> 00:39:51,045
Yep.

914
00:39:52,045 --> 00:39:52,405
No.

915
00:39:52,715 --> 00:39:53,495
it's interesting.

916
00:39:54,285 --> 00:40:00,980
when you talk about, tool selection,
I think another factor should be,

917
00:40:01,010 --> 00:40:03,050
do you have the in-house expertise?

918
00:40:03,430 --> 00:40:07,180
and if you don't, how
accessible is it on the market?

919
00:40:07,210 --> 00:40:10,600
Because right now, depending on
what tool you're trying to deploy,

920
00:40:10,710 --> 00:40:11,820
it could be very challenging.

921
00:40:11,820 --> 00:40:15,630
you can get a great deal and that's
interesting, cause it would be what

922
00:40:15,630 --> 00:40:16,440
people will start talking about.

923
00:40:16,440 --> 00:40:19,310
how much is this per seat or per
license One of the things that

924
00:40:19,310 --> 00:40:21,650
you have to look at is what are
your deployment costs going to be?

925
00:40:21,650 --> 00:40:23,690
And then what are your ongoing
maintenance costs going to be in

926
00:40:23,690 --> 00:40:26,080
terms of the expertise to manage that?

927
00:40:26,470 --> 00:40:31,390
And that's something that often
come into play until after the,

928
00:40:31,390 --> 00:40:31,510
Yeah.

929
00:40:31,515 --> 00:40:35,125
they focus on the technology,
or the vendor, but not on the

930
00:40:35,125 --> 00:40:36,775
total cost of the deployment.

931
00:40:37,105 --> 00:40:38,565
And, I would encourage everybody.

932
00:40:38,565 --> 00:40:38,965
to do that

933
00:40:38,965 --> 00:40:39,035
Yeah

934
00:40:39,285 --> 00:40:44,585
And also along with the deployment,
it's how flexible is it to change

935
00:40:44,645 --> 00:40:46,685
as your environment changes as well?

936
00:40:47,105 --> 00:40:49,985
I think some in some
tools are very static.

937
00:40:49,985 --> 00:40:53,675
It's easy to deploy the first time,
but anytime you add a new app or a new

938
00:40:53,675 --> 00:40:57,955
environment or something else, it becomes
very difficult Or it's time consuming

939
00:40:57,955 --> 00:41:01,465
to get it, to expand to now cover
that new workload, versus maybe it's

940
00:41:01,465 --> 00:41:04,495
better to get something that might be a
little bit more complex for the initial

941
00:41:04,495 --> 00:41:08,425
deployment, but like you said, ongoing
maintenance, ongoing monitoring, All

942
00:41:08,425 --> 00:41:10,285
the rest of that becomes a lot easier.

943
00:41:11,325 --> 00:41:11,595
Yeah,

944
00:41:11,770 --> 00:41:12,220
lots of sense.

945
00:41:12,435 --> 00:41:17,325
I think that's why from a security
basis, I'm a big fan of SaaS apps because

946
00:41:17,665 --> 00:41:19,555
you look at again in the backup space.

947
00:41:19,605 --> 00:41:23,715
if you're using an on-prem backup
software, you must be up to date.

948
00:41:24,380 --> 00:41:29,460
on what, you have both box, maybe
multiple boxes that are, you might have

949
00:41:29,460 --> 00:41:36,130
a server, you might have a storage array
and a. that you must be up to date on

950
00:41:36,130 --> 00:41:40,180
that operating system and protecting
that operation, securing it, doing

951
00:41:40,180 --> 00:41:43,810
all of those things, hope you have
MFA on that backup server, by the way.

952
00:41:44,240 --> 00:41:47,150
and then you've got the software, the
backup software that you have to stay

953
00:41:47,150 --> 00:41:52,910
up on and people are notoriously very
bad at upgrading their backup software

954
00:41:52,910 --> 00:41:58,880
that, the, we, we brought a guy over from
Veritas and he told us that their best.

955
00:41:59,750 --> 00:42:03,895
guess was that the average time
that customers took to upgrade

956
00:42:03,895 --> 00:42:05,845
their backup software was 18 months.

957
00:42:06,885 --> 00:42:08,115
If it works, don't touch it.

958
00:42:08,755 --> 00:42:09,175
what's that

959
00:42:09,285 --> 00:42:10,455
If it works, don't touch it.

960
00:42:10,495 --> 00:42:12,745
People are terrified of
upgrading their backup server.

961
00:42:12,745 --> 00:42:15,835
Cause it's the last line of
defense, but the problem is back up.

962
00:42:16,105 --> 00:42:19,655
The problem is that ransomware folks,
specifically the Conti group are

963
00:42:19,655 --> 00:42:22,115
specifically targeting backup servers.

964
00:42:23,195 --> 00:42:26,925
so not only is it, something
that, that needs to be protected.

965
00:42:26,955 --> 00:42:29,635
It is a, it is a direct attack point,

966
00:42:29,745 --> 00:42:32,535
I'm curious because we
touched on consumers before.

967
00:42:32,895 --> 00:42:37,515
what are your recommendations or
suggestions for just individuals, to, in

968
00:42:37,515 --> 00:42:39,295
terms of backing up their personal data.

969
00:42:40,055 --> 00:42:42,665
I'm going to sound like a broken
record, but SaaS backup, man,

970
00:42:42,905 --> 00:42:43,205
Okay.

971
00:42:43,235 --> 00:42:45,695
there are SaaS backup
Druva's not one of them.

972
00:42:46,055 --> 00:42:51,215
There are SaaS backup companies
that target consumers and you're,

973
00:42:51,215 --> 00:42:54,605
you're looking at 50 bucks
a year, that sort of thing.

974
00:42:54,685 --> 00:43:00,435
I, pay more than I would like to back up
my iPhone, like I pay for paid for iCloud.

975
00:43:00,675 --> 00:43:05,575
So that's, there's that, but there are
a number of services that will back up.

976
00:43:06,250 --> 00:43:07,780
What's important to you.

977
00:43:08,180 --> 00:43:11,950
and specifically if you've got
a, if you've got a laptop, and

978
00:43:12,100 --> 00:43:13,720
let's be honest, you got a laptop.

979
00:43:14,620 --> 00:43:15,320
it's.

980
00:43:15,510 --> 00:43:18,560
It's not that hard to get
that laptop backed up.

981
00:43:18,830 --> 00:43:21,830
I am not a fan of using.

982
00:43:22,445 --> 00:43:25,145
USB devices to backup the laptop.

983
00:43:25,985 --> 00:43:26,765
know it works.

984
00:43:26,795 --> 00:43:31,895
The problem is that USB devices generally
sitting right next to, or in the same

985
00:43:31,895 --> 00:43:36,515
bag that the laptop itself is you
get a theft, there goes your backup,

986
00:43:36,545 --> 00:43:38,075
you get a fire that goes your backup.

987
00:43:38,075 --> 00:43:41,045
So I much prefer for the same
reasons for the companies.

988
00:43:41,045 --> 00:43:46,205
I prefer a cloud-based system that will
backup the most important stuff for you.

989
00:43:46,635 --> 00:43:47,045
Right.

990
00:43:47,065 --> 00:43:49,055
I'll Disagree with Curtis here

991
00:43:49,575 --> 00:43:50,025
Okay,

992
00:43:50,135 --> 00:43:50,795
I am.

993
00:43:51,525 --> 00:43:51,975
here we go.

994
00:43:52,565 --> 00:43:54,655
I agree that to some extent, yes.

995
00:43:54,655 --> 00:43:56,155
SaaS based is good.

996
00:43:56,975 --> 00:43:58,885
I just muted your microphone Prasanna

997
00:44:01,225 --> 00:44:02,155
Thanks, Curtis.

998
00:44:04,685 --> 00:44:05,645
I've never done that.

999
00:44:05,645 --> 00:44:06,215
That was fun.

1000
00:44:06,595 --> 00:44:10,305
So I agree that there are certain
things that you do, you will, you

1001
00:44:10,315 --> 00:44:11,645
want to use a SaaS based service.

1002
00:44:11,645 --> 00:44:16,360
for But if you're not willing to
shell out, or if you don't think you

1003
00:44:16,360 --> 00:44:21,160
really need it, take at least what's
there with your existing, laptop, for

1004
00:44:21,160 --> 00:44:23,890
instance, if you have time machine, I
know Curtis, we've had the discussion

1005
00:44:23,890 --> 00:44:25,450
about time machine in the past.

1006
00:44:25,450 --> 00:44:29,020
You're not as thrilled about it,
but if you do have a mechanism,

1007
00:44:29,320 --> 00:44:30,860
use that mechanism rather than.

1008
00:44:30,860 --> 00:44:32,300
have nothing Right.

1009
00:44:32,300 --> 00:44:33,370
I'd rather have someone

1010
00:44:33,440 --> 00:44:34,010
Yeah.

1011
00:44:34,090 --> 00:44:38,710
something rather than being like, oh, do I
want to pay $50 a year or whatever it is?

1012
00:44:39,040 --> 00:44:39,280
Yes.

1013
00:44:39,280 --> 00:44:43,300
Those are better solutions, but
take what you have and just do.

1014
00:44:43,300 --> 00:44:44,660
something

1015
00:44:44,780 --> 00:44:46,845
Yeah, I'm not going to disagree with that.

1016
00:44:46,895 --> 00:44:52,265
the only thing I will say is that hard
drive that you, if you have the hard

1017
00:44:52,265 --> 00:44:55,025
drive already, I'm not saying it's bad.

1018
00:44:55,235 --> 00:44:59,445
I'm just saying you just need to think
about the fact that, that hard drive

1019
00:44:59,445 --> 00:45:01,525
is, it's so do things like rotate,

1020
00:45:01,605 --> 00:45:01,785
Yeah.

1021
00:45:01,795 --> 00:45:05,245
problem is you go buy You
go buy a modern hard drive.

1022
00:45:06,450 --> 00:45:08,170
to, to back up your system.

1023
00:45:08,200 --> 00:45:11,540
that's going to be a hundred bucks
plus, That's a couple of years of

1024
00:45:11,540 --> 00:45:12,830
the service that I'm talking about.

1025
00:45:14,270 --> 00:45:14,510
Yeah,

1026
00:45:14,520 --> 00:45:15,270
just saying,

1027
00:45:16,660 --> 00:45:17,260
I got it.

1028
00:45:17,290 --> 00:45:17,860
I got it.

1029
00:45:17,890 --> 00:45:18,130
Yeah.

1030
00:45:18,390 --> 00:45:20,980
I thought, I think the big
thing is just do something.

1031
00:45:21,040 --> 00:45:22,090
Don't do nothing.

1032
00:45:23,130 --> 00:45:23,490
Yeah,

1033
00:45:24,120 --> 00:45:27,300
I think we're saying that for, I
think that's our summary statement.

1034
00:45:27,330 --> 00:45:31,500
Maybe we'll make that the pilot title
of the podcast just do something.

1035
00:45:32,260 --> 00:45:35,650
the Nike thing, but just put,
just change it to something.

1036
00:45:38,015 --> 00:45:39,215
do something.

1037
00:45:39,360 --> 00:45:41,790
it's not as inspiring
as it, but something,

1038
00:45:44,015 --> 00:45:44,675
I like it.

1039
00:45:44,840 --> 00:45:45,030
Hey, I

1040
00:45:45,185 --> 00:45:45,605
yeah.

1041
00:45:45,660 --> 00:45:45,960
something.

1042
00:45:45,990 --> 00:45:47,040
cause you asked me earlier.

1043
00:45:47,120 --> 00:45:50,600
how did your, the idea to do a
podcast come about and and your

1044
00:45:50,600 --> 00:45:53,680
friendship and how did that work?

1045
00:45:54,620 --> 00:45:58,160
I dunno, I got the idea of
doing a podcast after being.

1046
00:45:59,285 --> 00:46:01,505
After going from not
believing in podcasts.

1047
00:46:01,505 --> 00:46:02,345
Like I didn't get it.

1048
00:46:02,345 --> 00:46:04,565
I didn't understand why
anybody would do a podcast.

1049
00:46:04,565 --> 00:46:06,785
and then I started listening to podcasts.

1050
00:46:06,785 --> 00:46:09,875
I got in a situation where they
were valuable to me as a person.

1051
00:46:09,875 --> 00:46:12,455
Then I was like, I talk a lot.

1052
00:46:12,635 --> 00:46:14,315
Maybe this would be something to do.

1053
00:46:14,675 --> 00:46:18,735
And and then I encountered Prasanna in
the office, he used to work at Druva,

1054
00:46:18,735 --> 00:46:19,935
that's how, that's where I met him.

1055
00:46:20,325 --> 00:46:21,675
And, I went up to him.

1056
00:46:22,280 --> 00:46:26,990
And, I proposed the idea of us doing
a podcast together because I thought

1057
00:46:26,990 --> 00:46:32,400
that we had a, a decent interaction
and Prasanna just jumped at the chance.

1058
00:46:32,400 --> 00:46:33,160
Didn't you Prasanna

1059
00:46:33,400 --> 00:46:36,490
I was like, what are we going
to talk about for 20 minutes?

1060
00:46:36,520 --> 00:46:38,890
I have nothing to talk about at all.

1061
00:46:38,890 --> 00:46:40,060
I don't know what you're talking about.

1062
00:46:41,440 --> 00:46:41,680
yeah.

1063
00:46:41,680 --> 00:46:46,580
It very quickly evolved into kind of a
forty-five minutes About three years ago.

1064
00:46:46,690 --> 00:46:47,310
3 years ago?

1065
00:46:47,555 --> 00:46:47,795
Yeah.

1066
00:46:47,795 --> 00:46:52,665
I remember first couple of episodes and
being okay, we got to plan this out.

1067
00:46:52,665 --> 00:46:53,565
What are we going to talk about?

1068
00:46:53,565 --> 00:46:54,375
What are the questions?

1069
00:46:54,825 --> 00:46:59,085
And for me, it just evolved into,
I just like to have a conversation,

1070
00:46:59,185 --> 00:47:00,625
this is, let's just see where it goes.

1071
00:47:00,625 --> 00:47:02,875
Most of the time it works,
sometimes it flops, but.

1072
00:47:03,460 --> 00:47:04,690
Most of the time it works.

1073
00:47:04,690 --> 00:47:05,050
Yeah.

1074
00:47:05,230 --> 00:47:11,360
And sometimes we get, really just a
really banter going and, you can sometimes

1075
00:47:11,360 --> 00:47:13,130
uncover some really interesting stuff.

1076
00:47:13,250 --> 00:47:19,460
I got to say that I feel, extremely I'm
looking at Curtis's background and he's

1077
00:47:19,460 --> 00:47:21,950
got diplomas or certificates or something.

1078
00:47:22,100 --> 00:47:23,360
At least he's got books there.

1079
00:47:23,455 --> 00:47:23,815
yeah.

1080
00:47:25,820 --> 00:47:27,000
That's my book right there.

1081
00:47:27,465 --> 00:47:27,975
Oh,

1082
00:47:28,350 --> 00:47:28,710
Yeah.

1083
00:47:28,925 --> 00:47:29,115
little

1084
00:47:29,190 --> 00:47:29,700
Behind me.

1085
00:47:29,835 --> 00:47:30,645
there on the shoulder.

1086
00:47:30,660 --> 00:47:30,810
Yeah.

1087
00:47:30,840 --> 00:47:31,860
A little, just a little bit.

1088
00:47:31,970 --> 00:47:32,180
Yeah.

1089
00:47:32,250 --> 00:47:35,900
it's a very small, so it's not that
good of a product placement, but, yeah.

1090
00:47:36,020 --> 00:47:36,500
Anyway.

1091
00:47:37,105 --> 00:47:37,945
Subliminal.

1092
00:47:37,975 --> 00:47:38,275
Yeah.

1093
00:47:38,400 --> 00:47:38,790
yeah.

1094
00:47:38,900 --> 00:47:41,960
all thanks a lot, mark,
for coming on the podcast

1095
00:47:41,990 --> 00:47:42,700
this has been awesome.

1096
00:47:42,730 --> 00:47:47,680
I don't get a chance to be on too
many other podcasts other than my own.

1097
00:47:47,680 --> 00:47:48,820
And, I've really enjoyed this.

1098
00:47:48,820 --> 00:47:52,360
You guys are awesome and funny
and obviously very, deep subject

1099
00:47:52,360 --> 00:47:53,350
matter experts in this area.

1100
00:47:53,350 --> 00:47:54,430
So I've enjoyed it.

1101
00:47:55,310 --> 00:47:58,920
I, and unlike being on your
podcast, you can now just leave

1102
00:47:58,980 --> 00:48:00,270
and then I have to edit it.

1103
00:48:00,640 --> 00:48:01,330
I'm out of here.

1104
00:48:01,780 --> 00:48:02,830
What are you going to get this edited?

1105
00:48:02,925 --> 00:48:03,195
Yeah.

1106
00:48:03,220 --> 00:48:04,000
is he gonna go online,

1107
00:48:04,020 --> 00:48:04,500
Yeah.

1108
00:48:04,560 --> 00:48:04,720
come

1109
00:48:04,800 --> 00:48:05,670
Yeah, exactly.

1110
00:48:06,040 --> 00:48:06,580
Thursday.

1111
00:48:07,830 --> 00:48:08,550
Exactly.

1112
00:48:08,940 --> 00:48:09,210
All right.

1113
00:48:09,250 --> 00:48:09,760
right, guys.

1114
00:48:09,790 --> 00:48:09,970
Hey,

1115
00:48:09,990 --> 00:48:10,470
and thanks.

1116
00:48:10,540 --> 00:48:11,560
and have a great 20, 22.

1117
00:48:11,560 --> 00:48:11,860
Okay.

1118
00:48:12,040 --> 00:48:12,370
Cheers.

1119
00:48:12,600 --> 00:48:14,900
thanks Prasanna it's,
even though you ditched

1120
00:48:14,900 --> 00:48:14,960
me

1121
00:48:14,960 --> 00:48:15,470
I'm sorry.

1122
00:48:15,470 --> 00:48:16,900
Curtis curtis know

1123
00:48:17,210 --> 00:48:17,470
and,

1124
00:48:17,595 --> 00:48:20,655
I'm sorry, I disagreed with you
about SaaS but yeah, do something.

1125
00:48:20,760 --> 00:48:21,240
whatever.

1126
00:48:21,630 --> 00:48:22,080
All right.

1127
00:48:22,080 --> 00:48:22,230
And

1128
00:48:22,345 --> 00:48:23,035
Thanks mark.

1129
00:48:24,330 --> 00:48:27,390
make sure to subscribe so
that you can restore it all.