Hello, listeners. And welcome back to another thrilling episode
Speaker:of data driven. In today's episode, we delve deep into the
Speaker:fascinating and, let's be honest, slightly terrifying world of
Speaker:generative AI and security risks. Joining us is
Speaker:Niamh Braun, co founder and CEO of Noma Security,
Speaker:who's on the front lines of keeping your AI driven project safe from
Speaker:digital mischief. So grab a cuppa and let's get data
Speaker:driven. Well, hello, and welcome back to Data Driven, the podcast where we explore
Speaker:the emergent fields of AI, data science, and, of course, data
Speaker:engineering. Speaking of data engineering, my favoritest data
Speaker:engineer in the world can't make it, today. But we
Speaker:have an exciting, conversation queued up with Niv Braun,
Speaker:who is the cofounder and CEO of Noma. Noma
Speaker:is a security firm that focuses on effectively
Speaker:he'll describe it more eloquently than I can, but effectively thinks about
Speaker:security in the context of data and AI across the
Speaker:entire life cycle. Welcome to the show, Niv. Hey,
Speaker:Frank. Happy to hear you, bro. Yeah. It's good to have
Speaker:you. And and security is one of those things where I've been thinking about more
Speaker:lately. Right? So my background was a software engineer and,
Speaker:you know, software engineers historically have not thought of
Speaker:security. Then I made the transition into data engineering and data
Speaker:science, and, traditionally, security is not really at top
Speaker:of mind, for them either. Now I
Speaker:kinda look at this, and I kinda look at the landscape that we're in where
Speaker:enterprises are deploying LLMs,
Speaker:generative AI solutions, on top of the predictive AI solutions,
Speaker:fast and furiously, and not thinking about
Speaker:security ramifications. So what are your what's your take on
Speaker:that? 100% agree. I think that, it's
Speaker:even like the the the the current, like, timing is even more fascinating
Speaker:than the than just, like, a new technology. Because exactly like you said, like,
Speaker:Frank, like, we all like the data practitioners. We all know that, like, security is
Speaker:not, like, our top priority. And by the way, like, by, like, like, this is,
Speaker:like, how it should be. Like, we are focusing on the business and, like, drive,
Speaker:like, drive, like, the business forward. And this is why we're, like, this is
Speaker:what we're paid for. The problem is that
Speaker:because we're not, like, in this kind of, like, mindset, we also, like, like
Speaker:any technologies in the company, also, like, create some risk. What we see right
Speaker:now is the LLM drive, which is pretty cool, is that for the
Speaker:first time, the security teams started to put
Speaker:the focus and, like, the spotlight on the data and AI teams. Because until
Speaker:now, let's be honest, they were focusing only on the software developers and
Speaker:their SDLC and the CICD and all these areas. Like, we were,
Speaker:like, you know, like, in the shadow. And we were, like, able, like, to act
Speaker:like exactly like, like, like, completely freely as we wanted.
Speaker:But now when, like, the security team start, like, to put the spotlight on the
Speaker:data and AI teams, what they understand is that it's not
Speaker:only this new kind of LLM threats, but also all
Speaker:the basic principles of security are not implemented
Speaker:in the data engineers and the data science teams. Nobody, like, scans all the
Speaker:code in our notebooks, for example, unlike the software developers that, like, all
Speaker:their code is being scanned. Nobody helps us to
Speaker:find configurations in our data pipelines or our
Speaker:MLOps tools or our AI platforms, like Databricks, for example.
Speaker:Like, nobody, like, provide us this ability to to find it easily,
Speaker:unlike, again, the software developers that they receive all this coverage
Speaker:and everything. Like, on the moment that they have, like, the smallest misconfigurations
Speaker:in their SCM or their their CICD, they
Speaker:will immediately, like, receive, like, a notification, like,
Speaker:helping them exactly, like, how to secure it. And also eventually,
Speaker:like, in the run time, in the runtime, in software life cycle, in
Speaker:classic like software application, we also have a lot of API security and web
Speaker:application firewalls tools that help us to protect the application in the
Speaker:runtime. But now specifically in LLM, this is, like, very
Speaker:related also, like, to what you said. Like, there are new kind of adversarial attacks,
Speaker:all the prompt injection and model jailbreak and stuff like that.
Speaker:And, again, nobody, like, else would like to protect it, like, in real time. And
Speaker:I think that this is, like, one of, like, the main shift that we see
Speaker:today in this area. We understand that the spotlight
Speaker:moved to the data and AI teams, but we need to make sure that we
Speaker:do, like, both. Like, we start with, like, a new kind, like,
Speaker:trendy, like, risk that we want to make sure that we are protected from.
Speaker:But also that for the first time, after a lot of years, we're
Speaker:starting also, like, to implement the basic security measurements
Speaker:needed in our area. But the most important thing, of course,
Speaker:is to continue and, like, do it without slowing us down. Like, we need to
Speaker:make sure that, like, everything, like, all the different, like, security measurements that
Speaker:we take still provide us the ability to move fast, to enable
Speaker:the data sent the data science and the data engineering teams to
Speaker:continue and, like, innovate, but in a secure way.
Speaker:You know, that's a good point because I never thought about scanning a notebook for
Speaker:errors. Right? Shame on me. Right? Like for code
Speaker:security I mean, not errors, but, you know, security vulnerabilities. That's not something
Speaker:that I have seen done in practice. I mean, the the
Speaker:closest I've seen where security has been an issue for
Speaker:anyone in this space is,
Speaker:basically using protected, you know, Python
Speaker:libraries, right, or or Python library repos, right, where they're those
Speaker:are scanned by, I forget the name of the 3rd party that'll do it where
Speaker:you just basically say you point your Python instance to there. Yeah. Because
Speaker:I also think that Internal Artifactory. Yes, exactly. So
Speaker:like, what, because I often
Speaker:wonder, you know, people just like to install.
Speaker:God only knows what's in there. I can tell that, like, it already, like, happens.
Speaker:Like, I don't know if you heard, but for example, like, like,
Speaker:like, pretty recently, PyTorch, for example. Right.
Speaker:PyTorch that we all know was compromised. We all know and love. We're most people
Speaker:love. It was compromised. Like, specific version of PyTorch, a
Speaker:malicious actor succeeded to to put some
Speaker:code inside that basically,
Speaker:collected all the the the secrets and token that you have in the
Speaker:environment and sent it to DNS. Now we all
Speaker:know, like, how much like like, how many downloads, like, PyTorch have.
Speaker:And most times, where PyTorch is downloaded to through, like, to
Speaker:all these different, like, notebooks, wherever they be, JupyterOps,
Speaker:SageMaker, Databricks, like, we all use them.
Speaker:And it I can tell that, like, it caused us to a lot of, like,
Speaker:problem. I can tell, like, like, like, firsthand, like, we saw, like, a lot
Speaker:of organizations that were compromised because of this attack.
Speaker:And it happens all the time. And by the way, if you mentioned, for example,
Speaker:like, if you already, like, touched the point of, of open source,
Speaker:now you have also Hugging Face, which is completely different area. Now it's
Speaker:not only Open Source packages. It's all these different Open Source
Speaker:Hugging Face models and Hugging Face datasets. And there,
Speaker:all these internal artifact are completely useless because they don't even
Speaker:scan these models. It's completely different technology, completely different, like,
Speaker:heuristics in order to find it. And, therefore, you start to
Speaker:see kind of, like, trends for for the attackers. They started to
Speaker:upload a lot of backdoored and a lot of malicious models
Speaker:into Hugging Face. I can tell you, like, we personally, we already,
Speaker:like, detected, I think, almost, like, 100, back
Speaker:or the malicious models, on Hugging Face because it's a wild
Speaker:west. Right. Because how do you because these these models, first off,
Speaker:they're physically large files. Right? So that there's that's a factor.
Speaker:Right? I don't know how Hugging Face makes money. I'd be
Speaker:curious to have someone on the show talk about that. But, you know,
Speaker:they're doing the service. And, how would you even scan? I
Speaker:mean, that's a good question. Right? What types of vulnerabilities have you sent have you
Speaker:found so far? And how does one even scan, like, a safe
Speaker:tensor or g file? Like, how do you what's what's
Speaker:that look like? Right? Obviously, I'm pretty sure, you know, McAfee
Speaker:antivirus doesn't have a thing for that. But, like Exactly.
Speaker:But, how do you even do that? I'm just curious. Yeah. So this is, like,
Speaker:exactly, like, the problem. Like, it's even, like, in in in the models, like, it's
Speaker:even, like, a a more, like, the the risk there, like, is
Speaker:more, like, clearer because as you know, a lot of time, like,
Speaker:these models in hanging face are even, like, in pickle. And, like, pickle is, like,
Speaker:by design, like, insecure, like, file. And so
Speaker:binary dump, right, of, like, the memory space. Yeah. Like, in the deserialization
Speaker:process, like, basically, you can, like, put, like, any kind of, like, malicious,
Speaker:action that you'd like, that, like, the attacker can. So we see,
Speaker:like, different attacks. Like, most of the attacks come today, like, from pickle files.
Speaker:Some also, like, not even, like, in the deserialization process, but also, like, in the
Speaker:model code itself. For example, like, if you ask
Speaker:for a specific example, like, share something that we
Speaker:detected, like, recently. We found, like, a very,
Speaker:let's say, a popular, open source, LLA model that we all
Speaker:know. But we know that, like, a it has a lot of, like, different
Speaker:versions. And one of the version was actually a docker
Speaker:that took the original model, wrapped it up with few
Speaker:lines of code in the model, which what they did is that every
Speaker:input to the model and every output from the model
Speaker:was also sent to the attacker, which basically
Speaker:just received full visibility and observability to all the
Speaker:runtime application and production. So, like, all the organizations that,
Speaker:like, use this model. And performance wise, the
Speaker:data scientist, of course, they cannot, like, detect it because performance
Speaker:wise, it worked perfectly because it took the original model. So nothing to be
Speaker:suspicious about. If we want the data
Speaker:scientist, every new open source model that they like, like
Speaker:in Hugging Face, they'll start, like, to open, like, these files and the binaries and,
Speaker:like, to start, like, to looking, like, in their own hands, they're manually
Speaker:for, like, a for a for risk. First, like, of course,
Speaker:like, we understand that this is not their expertise and, like, it it
Speaker:like, we want to be secured, but, like, like, even, like, worse,
Speaker:we just spend all their time on security. And I think that
Speaker:this is, like, the worst stuff. Actually, it's not the worst. I think that, like,
Speaker:the worst, and this is also, like, something that, like, I saw recently in several
Speaker:organizations is just, like, to block everything. Organizations
Speaker:that, like, understand, okay, Hugging Face model, it's, like, true, like, a secure, like,
Speaker:in secure area. Let's block it. Let's say, like, to
Speaker:all the data scientists in the organization, you're disallowed to use HAG interface model. I
Speaker:think this is, like, the worst. That seems like a mistake because
Speaker:because the people are gonna find a way. Well, 1, where you can't stop the
Speaker:signal. Right? That was a line from, a movie.
Speaker:They can't, kudos if people know who that what movie that is.
Speaker:But, you know, if you block Huggy Face, people are gonna find a way
Speaker:around that. They're gonna put it on a thumb drive at
Speaker:home and then bring it in. So percent. This is, by the way, also, like,
Speaker:what you see, like, with this kind of, like, internal Artifactory. You see that, like,
Speaker:once you get to you you create for the r and d or create for
Speaker:the developers or for the data scientists, you create some level of, like,
Speaker:friction. They will just find a way out to, like, bypass
Speaker:it and to to lower this, this friction.
Speaker:Right. So so couple of questions.
Speaker:One, I've seen, improper naming
Speaker:Not improper naming, but but basically using, names,
Speaker:like, that's looks similar to what should be. Yeah. Type will split. Type
Speaker:type splitting. That's it. I've seen that, which is kind of, I guess,
Speaker:kind of, you know, dollar store approach. But also,
Speaker:how does how does it if you wanted to look through these model files, as
Speaker:far as I know, they're just I just looked at them. I just see binary
Speaker:stuff. Like, how would you look for malicious code in there? Because I think you're
Speaker:right. That's not a skill set the average AI engineer or data scientist
Speaker:would have. Yeah. So, basically, like, you need, like, to manually kind of, like,
Speaker:parsing it because, like, you have, of course, like, the the binary file, but most
Speaker:times, it's not only, like, the binary file. You label for, like, the the code
Speaker:file that run, like, run the model, and you label for, like, the, in
Speaker:case it's, like, pick a, like, the deserialization process, that you can, like,
Speaker:parse and then, like, to see, like, the code there. But then you
Speaker:need also, like, you know, like, you have, like, 2 phase. 1st, you need to
Speaker:to parse it, you know, like, to see, like, the code, but then you need
Speaker:also, like, to be able to read code and to understand which
Speaker:one is valid and which one is malicious, which is also, like, completely, like, you
Speaker:know, like, you need expertise in this area. If you see bash
Speaker:commands, is it okay or not? Do you see access to the
Speaker:Internet? Okay or not? Like, you you need, like, to have, like,
Speaker:some, like, detectors in there that, that know how to do it, like, build
Speaker:by by expert or something. So how would you even detect
Speaker:that if you found it? Like, how was this found? Was this just somebody looking
Speaker:in network packets? Or, like, what how was it discovered? I'm
Speaker:just curious. Yeah. This specifically was, like, by our
Speaker:security research team. Okay. Yeah. That's like, looks a
Speaker:lot if, a lot like all the time, like, you know, all these different kind
Speaker:of, like, open source and third party models in order to to help
Speaker:our users to make sure that, like, everything that they use
Speaker:is is valid. And again, most importantly, without slowing
Speaker:them down. They can just, like, download and, like, run, like, with everything that they
Speaker:that they want. And in case, we see something that is,
Speaker:that is suspicious, we know how to detect it and to to help them to
Speaker:to secure it. Interesting. Interesting.
Speaker:Because I know a lot of people, you know, they they've been downloading
Speaker:these models from Hugging Face. And just taking it on
Speaker:faith, and I've heard that these things don't call
Speaker:out to the Internet. Mhmm. And I fell into that. And then
Speaker:I kinda had this moment of paranoia where I'm like, how do I know?
Speaker:I mean, the only way I'm a I'm just a humble data scientist. Right? Like,
Speaker:so the only way I would think about it would be to have a firewall
Speaker:rule that would block network traffic going up for that box.
Speaker:And I'm sure there's probably workarounds to that too. I mean, are these
Speaker:attacks are these attacks that sophisticated yet?
Speaker:Yeah. Yeah. And, like, also, like, most times you don't, like, the data
Speaker:science, like, they don't want, like, to permanently, like, to close, like, the Internet, like,
Speaker:the outbound because also, like, the application needs it. And also, like, the, you
Speaker:know, like, the the in order, like, to download, like, the dependencies and the models
Speaker:you needed. So most times, like, just, like, to block the Internet, it doesn't solve
Speaker:everything. It was, like, more, like, in the past that everything was, like, network based
Speaker:only. Today, when you have, like, also, like, the applicative layer here, so
Speaker:it's, like, a bit more sophisticated.
Speaker:But yeah. Wow. So
Speaker:the safe tensor format, as I understand it, what you
Speaker:know, you basically digitally sign or somebody
Speaker:digitally signs the contents of it. Is that is
Speaker:that a correct understanding? Yeah. So it's end up like a
Speaker:like, in general, first thing, of course, that, like, a safe denture is, like,
Speaker:much more secure. Okay. I already like by design, and as long
Speaker:as we as the industry will go, like, more and more, like, towards
Speaker:this road, because today, like, we still see, like, tons of light pickles.
Speaker:But as long as we progress, like, all as an industry, we'll already,
Speaker:like, be, like, in a bit better situation. It's not
Speaker:perfect, of course. We still see some issues. And, of course, organizations still
Speaker:need, like, to have some security measurements and processes
Speaker:to make sure that, like, they're aware of what,
Speaker:like, Hang in Face are using. But I think that it's already, like,
Speaker:going to be a bit better. I can tell you something that, actually,
Speaker:like, recently one of our one of our partners told me,
Speaker:which was pretty cool, very similar to what you said that you
Speaker:start, like, to feel a lot of concerns about this area.
Speaker:VP data science of a very big like,
Speaker:Fortune Fortune 500, like, very big, like, corporate. And you kind
Speaker:of, like, the the head of, like, the older data science, like, groups here. And
Speaker:they told me, you know, Niv, I I already know
Speaker:what I'm going to be fired about, like, in a in the next, like,
Speaker:24 months, and it's going to be about that. I know for sure, like, we're
Speaker:using, like, so much, like, Agiface models. I know for sure that I'm this is,
Speaker:like, the reason that I'm going to be fired, like, one day. Because today, like,
Speaker:we're using it, like, freely. We are also, like, very creative. We're not, like,
Speaker:only using, like, the most popular LAMA model, but, like, we're to,
Speaker:like, take advantage of this great advantage of the platform, which is, like,
Speaker:the amount and the diversity of the model that you have there. But I have
Speaker:no no doubt that we create so many risks that we're just,
Speaker:like, not exposed yet, that I'm going to to pay with it,
Speaker:like, with my head. So it it's
Speaker:it's pretty cool because it's not it's not always that you see,
Speaker:r and d and business owners that are so concerned
Speaker:about security even before the security team arrived
Speaker:to them. But they're already aware of this risk. And it's something that
Speaker:we start, like, to see more and more because, you know, it's just like it's
Speaker:it's too obvious. Like, the the the window is open and everybody see it.
Speaker:Yeah. I I would suppose that's in in a in a very kinda strange way
Speaker:that's bit progress, right, where people think about security beforehand.
Speaker:Like, even if they don't know I mean, I think this this this VP,
Speaker:you know, is pretty spot on. Like, what concerns me about the widespread
Speaker:adoption of these models and particularly Hugging Face, so there are no knock on Hugging
Speaker:Face. I think whatever you get your models Mhmm.
Speaker:I mean, we just don't know. And these things are just complicated.
Speaker:Right? I mean, they are by design complicated with 1,000,000,000,000 of
Speaker:parameters. In some cases, I guess, 1,000,000,000,000. But also, you
Speaker:know, they have this ability to even
Speaker:even if everything worked out well, even even assuming everything is
Speaker:fine, right, in terms of the operationalization of these things,
Speaker:There's still the chance that the model itself and its
Speaker:training was poisoned. So, like,
Speaker:I I mean, like, there's just so many because when I my wife works in
Speaker:IT security, and I was all excited. It was about a year and a half
Speaker:ago. I I was talking to her about LLMs and stuff like that
Speaker:and chat GPT and and and those types of things.
Speaker:And I was like, oh, well, you take all this data and you train a
Speaker:model and you you distill down this graph and this and this. And then she's
Speaker:like, that sounds like a big attack surface to me. Yeah.
Speaker:And I was like like, data poisoning in the classic one and data
Speaker:poisoning can be, like, in in in 2 levels or, like like, someone
Speaker:like poisoning your data or exactly what you say,
Speaker:somebody just, like, this way, like,
Speaker:create backdoor in, in third party models and open source
Speaker:models that then, like, everybody downloads. Right.
Speaker:Right. And we wouldn't know, like, what's
Speaker:the I mean, the defense against that seems very
Speaker:intricate. Not impossible, but very delicate and intricate.
Speaker:So in in in classic application security, there is a
Speaker:great practice called SBOM. SBOM is a software
Speaker:billing of material. Basically, it means that, you get, like, in
Speaker:specific format, kind of like visibility to all the different
Speaker:software components that build your application. One of the things that
Speaker:now we're also, like, part of the building is a
Speaker:official framework of OWASP, the nonprofit organization
Speaker:around security of AI and machine learning. And
Speaker:what you have there is for the first time you have like double layer
Speaker:of visibility. The first one is just like to understand
Speaker:what models I'm even using in the organization. Everything, like
Speaker:what models like, include in my application. It can be open
Speaker:source models. It can be self developed models. Also, by the way, not only not
Speaker:only LLM, of course, also like vision, NLP, like everything else.
Speaker:And also third party models that are embedded as part of the application, they
Speaker:are not open no. They are not open source. For example,
Speaker:if software engineer add API call as part of the application
Speaker:to OpenAI, in this way, they embed
Speaker:LLM as part of the application. This is also like one of, like, the models
Speaker:that you are using, but you you you want to know this is all my
Speaker:AI and model inventory that I'm using as Spyro as part of the application.
Speaker:And in addition to that, you have even the deeper context there, which
Speaker:is also like what you referred to. It's not only this is
Speaker:the list of the model that I'm using, but for each one, you want to
Speaker:understand on what dataset it was trained, what data
Speaker:maybe also like it has access to in case it's in production, let's say, with
Speaker:RAG architecture. You want to understand, like, the deep context
Speaker:of all these, like, models, what I'm using, but also, like, what
Speaker:happens, like, in this specific, like, model. Sometimes
Speaker:it's, as you said, for to to understand what data was trained on a
Speaker:model before, like, I'm starting, like, to use it by 3rd party, a
Speaker:lot of time is even, like, internally in the organization.
Speaker:Because once we start to train a lot of models,
Speaker:we want to make sure that we don't violate
Speaker:any policy that we have in the organization, either it's for compliance or
Speaker:security. For example, one of the things that, like, we are like, I keep, like,
Speaker:hearing a lot of time from, from security and legal and privacy
Speaker:teams is that, look, we instruct all the
Speaker:organization not to train any sensitive
Speaker:data, PII, PCI, PHI, any other sensitive
Speaker:information on our models. But except instructing
Speaker:it and speak about it, nobody knows if it
Speaker:happens. And we don't provide also our data
Speaker:teams tools that will help them to
Speaker:detect it in case it, like, it happens, like like, not in purpose. For
Speaker:example, I can tell you, like, one of the thing that we saw very
Speaker:recently. Big organization, a huge Fintech company,
Speaker:that data scientist unintentionally trained all the
Speaker:transaction of the application on one of the models. Now it's
Speaker:a, like, crazy big violation there of, like, compliance and
Speaker:security. The data scientist did this unintentionally. They
Speaker:truly, like, didn't know it. If they had something that, like, would help them, like,
Speaker:the basic visibility that you mentioned before, it will truly, like, help them to
Speaker:start, like, to continue, like, innovate and just, like, in case something like bad happens,
Speaker:to be alerted in that. And so I see that, like, the the data training
Speaker:is also, like, very, very important point also internally and not
Speaker:only the external data train on the external models that we're embedding and
Speaker:downloading. So you mentioned, OWASP. So just
Speaker:for the benefit of folks who may not know, because most of our listeners are
Speaker:either data engineers, data scientists. What is OWASP? And what is the
Speaker:I think it's with the OWASP 10? Yeah. So
Speaker:OWASP in general, it's a amazing organization that,
Speaker:is like a nonprofit one that helps basically,
Speaker:we combine a lot of people together, gather together in order to make
Speaker:sure that all our industry is much more secured with a lot of
Speaker:different security initiatives in a lot of different aspects, mainly of like product
Speaker:security, but not only. Product security is like application
Speaker:security. It's building security.
Speaker:Specifically in OASP, you have several different types of
Speaker:projects. So for example, one type of project is the OSP10,
Speaker:top ten, that basically takes different areas
Speaker:and define the top ten risks in this specific area. So it can be top
Speaker:ten for API, top ten for
Speaker:CICD. And now there is also like top ten for LLM.
Speaker:Addition framework, like, there are a lot of like different tools. Specifically,
Speaker:if someone wants to understand a bit more about like the wide
Speaker:landscape and the risk around AI and machine learning,
Speaker:the framework that I would like recommend on, highly recommend on, is
Speaker:amazing and very comprehensive called the OWASP AI
Speaker:Exchange. A group of people, again, gathered together,
Speaker:that covered not only LLM, but all the basic
Speaker:principles and risk in data pipelines and MLOps
Speaker:and start from the building and up to the runtime and start from the
Speaker:classic machine learning and up to Gen AI, very comprehensive,
Speaker:very also practical, which is very important and
Speaker:speaks in both language, on both languages. On one hand,
Speaker:of course, security, but on the other, also like very oriented
Speaker:for data and machine learning and AI practitioners.
Speaker:Interesting. Interesting.
Speaker:What what do you see
Speaker:well, here's what I mean, I'll have a lot of questions, but one of them
Speaker:is, do you think the 0 what do you think the
Speaker:0 trust approach is a good starting point? I don't think
Speaker:it's the answer here like it is kinda everywhere else. But do you think that,
Speaker:that type of philosophy of don't trust anything?
Speaker:Right? Kind of like, I mean, is that because you you mentioned this
Speaker:early when I talked about network firewalls, right, where the old approach of thing
Speaker:is just pull the plug or set up rules. And that used
Speaker:to work, but there's plenty of other ways around it, Both I think
Speaker:kind of low skill, mid skill, and certainly high skill
Speaker:ways around that. What do you you mean then 0
Speaker:trust is meant to address that. What are your thoughts on like I
Speaker:mean, is that the pro is that the mindset that either
Speaker:security folks in this space would have to take on? Like, it's more
Speaker:if they well, they probably already have. Right? Yeah. I think you're,
Speaker:like, I think you're actually, like, the the you you you perfectly
Speaker:defined it because I believe that 0 Trust is exactly like you say, it's kind
Speaker:of like a, like, kind of like a mindset. It's not like a very
Speaker:accurate, like, technical approach, but it's kind of
Speaker:like more like a a philosophy with some level of implementation.
Speaker:I believe that, like, the right mindset and, like, the right framework to look
Speaker:on a on a security for AI and, like, all the building
Speaker:and also, like, the runtime is basically to take all the
Speaker:different principles that we are all already aware
Speaker:of. Like we are all, like I'm saying, like the security industry,
Speaker:we are all already aware of on classic software development,
Speaker:building and runtime, and to implement it on the
Speaker:data and AI lifecycle. For example, if we mentioned, like,
Speaker:code scanning, so code scanning the notebooks, we mentioned open source,
Speaker:so checking all the all the Ag interface models. But it's not only that.
Speaker:For example, one of the things that, like, we see, a lot of attacks that
Speaker:we, like, we had recently in the security area are around the
Speaker:CICD. A few years ago, there was a big attack called
Speaker:SolarWinds, that basically, yeah, so you know it
Speaker:perfectly, just for the audience that, like, are not familiar with the specific details
Speaker:in, like, very high level attacker that exploited and
Speaker:misconfigurations in CICD tools. And this is
Speaker:basically how they succeeded, like, to start, like, this whole huge attack and
Speaker:breach. Now one of the things that, like, it taught us all as an industry
Speaker:is that until now we were focusing on, like, securing only
Speaker:our code. Now we understand that the code is not enough. We need to make
Speaker:sure that the building tools are also well configured. So
Speaker:we start, like, to see a lot of, like, tools that help us to make
Speaker:sure that we don't have misconfigurations in the CICD and the SCMs and all
Speaker:these different kind of tools. But when we are going to our domain, when
Speaker:we go to the data and AI teams, as we know, we just use different
Speaker:stack. We use all these data pipelines and model
Speaker:registries and MLOps tools and platforms like Databricks and Domino
Speaker:and Snowflake and stuff like that. The configuration, as we know, is
Speaker:not like neverwhere. Most time, it's even wider. This is why it's
Speaker:not managed by DevOps. It's managed by us, by the data teams. It's managed by
Speaker:MLOps teams, by data infra, by data platform. And we're doing a
Speaker:lot like, a great job in order to optimize all the configuration for the
Speaker:product. We're not security experts. We don't want to be
Speaker:security experts and, like, start, like, to spend a lot of time in that. But
Speaker:nobody else just like to very easily find all these different kind of misconfigurations.
Speaker:And this is also a threat and, like, attack vector that we
Speaker:started, like, to see a lot in the field today. I can tell you that,
Speaker:like, we see tons of attacks around
Speaker:different misconfigurations in tools like Airflows and Databricks
Speaker:and stuff like that. And I think this is also like a very, very important,
Speaker:like, mindset, like, to be in. And in addition to that, of course, we have
Speaker:all the all the runtime and all the adversarial attacks there.
Speaker:There are specifically, if I mentioned in the
Speaker:OSPI exchange, so OSPI exchange covers everything.
Speaker:The OSPI 10LLM specifically is more
Speaker:covering this LLM, like,
Speaker:specific risk. And then you have, like, all the adversarial attacks, like prompt injection
Speaker:and model jailbreak and model dn out of service, model dn out of wallet,
Speaker:etcetera. So basically, the mindset should
Speaker:be we already know security very well. We already have, like, these
Speaker:principles. Until now, we just haven't
Speaker:implemented them on the data and AI teams,
Speaker:tools, and technology. And this is exactly what we start, like, to
Speaker:what we, like, need, like, to start to do. And this is what we see
Speaker:also that, like, you know, like, now we have no reason. Like, we all see,
Speaker:like, these different kind of attacks. So we start to see that all the organizations
Speaker:were, like, starting to to already, like, walk the walk.
Speaker:Wow. Yeah. I I often wonder too, like, what you
Speaker:mentioned the pipelines being a vulnerability or an
Speaker:attack surface. Right? Like, or a potential vulnerability.
Speaker:I often wonder now, like, when, you know, we're looking at agentic
Speaker:AI, right, where these things aren't just LLMs,
Speaker:right, producing text or going through these materials.
Speaker:We're giving them, you know, abilities,
Speaker:right, to influence pipelines, right, to to or to
Speaker:whatever. Right? Like, that just seems to me like a giant
Speaker:security risk. I mean, telling someone you know, there's there's multiple ways to
Speaker:break an LOM. Right? Like, obviously, there's the the the $1 Chevy
Speaker:Tahoe. Right? Where the guy did that. Right? Pretty low tech
Speaker:approach, pretty brute force ish.
Speaker:But I often wonder, like, well, what
Speaker:what sorts of things are agentic systems gonna open up?
Speaker:Like, what does that look like? I think that this is exactly like where we
Speaker:we will start, like, to see, like, the very big LLM,
Speaker:breaches, that we'll have. I believe that, by the
Speaker:way, my belief is that the the how does the
Speaker:attack start will still be, like, in a lot of cases,
Speaker:very similar to what we see today. But the impact of the
Speaker:attack will be much, much, much, much, much higher because now like the
Speaker:model cannot only like, promise you a
Speaker:$1 a car, but you can throw, like, I already like
Speaker:send the order, can send the car to you, can like book your
Speaker:hotel, can do like everything there, can share with you, like, the data
Speaker:of maybe, like, other customers in the application because it is,
Speaker:like, a RAG architecture, and it is also, like, different, like, tools
Speaker:that provide him the ability to maybe even, like, write different codes
Speaker:to the application. And then it might also like start like different types
Speaker:of remote code execution. As long as we are going to
Speaker:provide to these NLMs more privilege, more access,
Speaker:more tools, more abilities, the impact of the risk
Speaker:that they will be able, like, to cause will be much higher. I still
Speaker:believe again that that pack vectors are going to start from more or less,
Speaker:like, the same areas, like prompt injection and model jailbreak,
Speaker:but they they eventually, like, the outcome of these attacks will be much
Speaker:higher. I could see that. Because we're giving them
Speaker:actuators, so to speak. Right? Like we're not we're we're
Speaker:giving them agency. Right? Like where they could actually do real damage as
Speaker:opposed to because one thing in saying you're gonna give somebody
Speaker:a $1 Chevy Tahoe. It's quite another to actually place the order,
Speaker:sign off on the invoice, and then ship it. Right? Yep. And what
Speaker:if you'll do, like I don't know. Like, you'll you'll start, like, to see it
Speaker:also, like, in banks and in investments. They will start, like, to transfer
Speaker:your money. They will start, like, to invest, like, to buy stock. They will like,
Speaker:the the the the amount of, like, potential impact here is, like, a
Speaker:crazy high. I believe, by the way, that eventually, this is going to be one
Speaker:of the things that, like, we'll see also, like, slow down the adoption, not
Speaker:less than the than the technology or, like, finding, like, the
Speaker:right use case. Yeah. No. I could see
Speaker:that. I I just think that we're just setting, as an industry.
Speaker:We're setting ourselves up for a huge exploit that we
Speaker:haven't figured out is already there yet.
Speaker:And so so what what
Speaker:can AI engineers, data scientists,
Speaker:data engineers do today to make things
Speaker:better? I know we can't fix it because we don't know what's we really don't
Speaker:know what's broken. I think that's one of the frustrating and kind of fun things
Speaker:about security work is, like, it's not that there's no vulnerabilities.
Speaker:You haven't discovered any vulnerabilities yet. Right? There are no unknown there are
Speaker:always un there are always unknown unknowns.
Speaker:But if you have an unknown unknown or a known thing,
Speaker:you can you can say that you pretty much figured that out. But there's this
Speaker:whole aspect, which I don't think data scientists
Speaker:fully appreciate. I think they can understand the concept of the unknown
Speaker:unknowns. But in terms of the consequences of it, I don't
Speaker:think I think it's gonna take 1 major solar wind style
Speaker:issue or CrowdStrike style issue to make people conscious
Speaker:of of that. But how do
Speaker:we how do we prepare ourselves? Right? You can't
Speaker:stop the hurricane, but you can board up your windows. Right? Like, you
Speaker:know, how do you Yeah. I and I totally
Speaker:agree that, like, what's going through, like, to to shake every everybody
Speaker:will be, like, the the first SolarWinds or, like, the 4 log 4
Speaker:j attack that we see, like, in these areas. I think that,
Speaker:like, I think that you broke it very well
Speaker:and that we need to relate to both categories.
Speaker:1st is, like, the known,
Speaker:which already, like, exist. Like, we know that, like, you know, like,
Speaker:we see that as scientists. Like, we are not a scientist.
Speaker:And we see that one of the the things that, like, we see
Speaker:in in in our code in compared to software developers
Speaker:is that we don't give a
Speaker:tip on, like, everything, around security.
Speaker:Like, you'll see, like, tons of exposed secrets in plain
Speaker:text. You'll see tons of, like, test and, like, the sensitive data
Speaker:just like playing. And, like, it's state, like, exposed, like, in the notebooks.
Speaker:You'll see that we download, like, any dependencies without, like, like,
Speaker:even, like, think about it. Even so that, like, yeah, it looks like maybe, like,
Speaker:a bit suspicious and stuff like that. So it's it's far
Speaker:from from the basic. Let's make sure that, like, what we know that is not
Speaker:best practice, just, like, start, like, to implement it. And
Speaker:then regarding the unknown unknown, so, of
Speaker:course, like, you don't know how to handle it. I think that, like, as you
Speaker:as you said, you can start to prepare yourself. How do how do you
Speaker:prepare yourself in security? It's basically to be very
Speaker:organized and to to make sure that you have, like, the right visibility and
Speaker:governance. As long as you have, for example, like, you know how to build,
Speaker:like, your your AI or the machine learning bomb. You know all the
Speaker:different, like, models that are built or embedded as part of the application,
Speaker:and you have, like, the right lineage, which one
Speaker:was trained on which dataset, etcetera.
Speaker:Once, for example, that now let's say we'll continue with the
Speaker:examples of of Hugging Face. Like, a new Hugging Face
Speaker:model is is is now, like, published as a like, someone,
Speaker:like, found that it's, like, malicious. You because you prepared
Speaker:yourself and you have, like, the right visibility, you are able to go
Speaker:and very easily search exactly, like, if you use it and
Speaker:where you use it in all your organization. And this is also
Speaker:because you prepare yourself. This is exactly what happened, like, in Log 4
Speaker:j. In Log 4 j, it was like a dependency that
Speaker:found as a critical vulnerable. And a lot of
Speaker:organization, what they spent, like, most of the time is to try to understand
Speaker:where they even use this Log4j. And they seem that, like, if you prepare
Speaker:yourself, you are like, if you are organizing everything, you'll already
Speaker:be very, very, like, ready for the for the
Speaker:attack of, like, the unknown unknown. And, of course, everything
Speaker:in addition to to, you know, like, learning and, like, educating
Speaker:yourself. If you start, like, to understand, you'll go
Speaker:to, I don't know, Databricks, for example. A lot of people use Databricks. You'll
Speaker:go and, like, start, like, to see what are, like, the best practices of how
Speaker:to, like, configure your Databricks environments and what are, like, the best practices
Speaker:there. It's something that you can, like, find very easily, like, in the Internet. You
Speaker:don't need, like, to to do it, like, from scratch.
Speaker:But I'll say that, like, you you know, like, it's still, like, when we are
Speaker:aware of that, it's not still, like, the the top of our mind as the
Speaker:data practitioner to start looking, like, in our free time for this
Speaker:kind of concept. Right. I mean, that's a good point.
Speaker:Right? The fundamentals are still fundamental. Right?
Speaker:You know, making sure, you know, you track what
Speaker:your dependencies are. Right? So that way, if there's a breach in a hugging face
Speaker:model, like you said, you'll know right away whether or not it
Speaker:impacts you or not. Also too, I think you're
Speaker:right. This isn't top of mind for AI practitioners. Right?
Speaker:Even when I code, like, an app, my met
Speaker:my thought process are very different than when I'm in a notebook.
Speaker:Mhmm. It's just different wiring.
Speaker:Yep. And by the way, it's kind of like, it's kind of
Speaker:like a paradox because most times on the notebooks,
Speaker:we are connected to much more sensitive information than on our
Speaker:ID. Right. No. Exactly. So
Speaker:it's kind of it's like the worst, one of the worst case
Speaker:scenarios. Right? And and you're right. Like, people wanna work with real
Speaker:data, and they they just assume that if they're on a system that's
Speaker:secured and internal, they
Speaker:they, they don't have to worry about such things,
Speaker:which I think you're right. Like, with these systems that have access to
Speaker:sensitive data, these pipelines, I mean, it's one of those
Speaker:things where we need to start thinking about this. And what would you do
Speaker:you think that there's a, like, a career path for, like, an AI security engineer?
Speaker:Right? So it's not just a security engineer, like, in a traditional
Speaker:sense. Right? But also a someone who specializes
Speaker:in AI related issues. You think that's a growth industries? I
Speaker:have, like, no doubt that we are going to like to see more. Like, we
Speaker:already see these kind of practitioners in the field. I have no
Speaker:doubt that it's going, to be more and more frequent. And in
Speaker:addition to that, I believe that, like, even in the future, it's it's going to
Speaker:be even, like, several different, like, roles. For example, one of the
Speaker:things that, like, a lot of people that we work also, like, very closely with
Speaker:are AI red teaming. Right. It's not even,
Speaker:like, just like a AI security engineer, like, general one. Specifically around,
Speaker:like, credit teaming because all these kinds of adversarial
Speaker:attacks on models are very different, requires
Speaker:different techniques, different tactics. And the red teamers are the
Speaker:ones that, like, to, like, learning all these different
Speaker:types of adversarial attacks and how to, like, check your model,
Speaker:in your organization. And by the way, specifically in this
Speaker:area, I do feel that it's kind of, like, top priority and
Speaker:like top of mind also for the data science
Speaker:team. Like you do see that on LLMs,
Speaker:once they are deployed into production, the data
Speaker:scientists, they are kind of like understand that there are a lot of risk there
Speaker:and they are starting, like, to take also, like, responsibility even completely, like, regard
Speaker:regardless of the security team to make sure that, like, we we
Speaker:we reduce some of the risk there. Now the risk is not only
Speaker:security. The first thing is security, like, to try and, like, make sure
Speaker:that you are secured from all these different adversarial attacks or that you know how
Speaker:to detect sensitive data leakage, for example, as part of the response and stuff
Speaker:like that. In addition to that, it's also a lot of time
Speaker:like safety risks. You want to make sure that once you deploy LLM into
Speaker:production, your model doesn't give any financial advice to your
Speaker:customers, doesn't give any health advice in case it's not your business.
Speaker:So you then have, like, these kinds of responsibility, or example, like in the
Speaker:Chevy example that you gave, that you just, like, you don't just, release
Speaker:free cars or flights or books or a tail off, like, anything
Speaker:like that. So I think that because the
Speaker:the the the amount of potential risks are
Speaker:so high on the run time. In this area, I
Speaker:believe that, like, the data scientists already understood that this is, like,
Speaker:under their responsibility. They see it also as part of,
Speaker:like, being a professional data scientist. If I
Speaker:deploy this model, it has, like, a lot of, like, accuracy, but,
Speaker:like, it creates all these different kinds of risk.
Speaker:I would define myself as not a super professional data
Speaker:scientist, unlike on the supply chain, unlike in the
Speaker:notebooks that if I code a code that is not secure, I wouldn't say that,
Speaker:like, it's not professional. I would say that, like, it's okay. You're just, like, focusing
Speaker:on the business. So I do believe that we start, like, to seeing this shift
Speaker:also, like, in the mindset of the data scientist because of the risk of
Speaker:the Gen AI, but now it's also, like, like, a move
Speaker:to to all the the development and the building practices
Speaker:that we have. Yeah. And I think data
Speaker:scientists are acutely aware that LLMs
Speaker:are just taking they mean, we talk we we call it hallucinating when
Speaker:they get things wrong. But realistically, they're
Speaker:always hallucinating to a very real degree. Right? It's just they
Speaker:happen to be correct. And what these things are doing
Speaker:under the hood is they are looking for patterns of words.
Speaker:Sometimes those patterns of words are wrong, obviously wrong.
Speaker:And sometimes they may give out sensitive information
Speaker:inadvertently. So I can talk at least at least there's some common sense out there
Speaker:when they when they do realize these things are higher risk than I think
Speaker:we've been led to believe. Yeah. Actually, I love this this finish. They are,
Speaker:like, hallucinating, like, all this time. Sometimes they really find it
Speaker:as wrong. Like, they do the same thing as always. Right.
Speaker:Right. The they don't know they're hallucinating because they're just operating normally.
Speaker:And so when they go in a different direction and I've noticed
Speaker:that, you know, kinda like a little bit of, you you know, off by a
Speaker:little bit, and then then then it generates an off by a little bit, off
Speaker:by a little bit. I ran an experiment with a hallucination, and
Speaker:I read it through I ran it through a bunch of models and each one
Speaker:of them didn't do any fact checking, which I mean, realistically,
Speaker:I wouldn't expect that. Right? In the future, I think that'll be kind of table
Speaker:stakes. But, you know, it would just go through. So
Speaker:I took a hallucination, fed it through notebook l m, which then
Speaker:create even more hallucinations. Right? So it took this little
Speaker:genesis of something that was wrong and then made it even crazier wrong,
Speaker:which I think is an interesting kinda statement and and and
Speaker:also is a risk. Right? Like hallucination on top, compounding
Speaker:other hallucinations. And I don't think we've really seen that yet because we've
Speaker:only really seen for the most part, I've only seen one kind
Speaker:of model in production. But if you have these models that will kinda work together
Speaker:as agents or, you know, whether they're agents
Speaker:that do things or agents that it's different LLM discrete LLMs that talk
Speaker:to one another. They can get things wrong and make things worse. I mean, I
Speaker:haven't I think it's too soon to tell either way, honestly. Yeah. But, like, the
Speaker:like, theoretically, like, it makes a lot of sense. I think in general, like, we
Speaker:don't see, like, a lot like, we hear a lot about Gen AI.
Speaker:I think that, like, the level of adoption and the amount
Speaker:of business use cases that, like, businesses
Speaker:found are not that high yet. I think that, like, the
Speaker:most of the usage today is done by, like, consumers, like,
Speaker:like, directly, like, from, from the foundation model providers, like OpenAI and stuff
Speaker:like that for day to day, like, jobs, like, you know,
Speaker:like, reviewing mails and stuff like that.
Speaker:The the big businesses are still trying to find these
Speaker:different, like, use cases. I do believe that the that the
Speaker:agents are going, like, to open a lot of different use cases
Speaker:around it. Right. Right. I could I could see that. And
Speaker:I think I think it's just too soon to make a statement
Speaker:either way. But I think grounding yourself in the fundamentals
Speaker:is probably always a good idea. Mhmm.
Speaker:And probably a good a good
Speaker:approach. So so tell me about NOMA. What is is it NOMA? I
Speaker:I don't wanna make sure I pronounce it. NOMA. Okay. NOMA. Security. What does
Speaker:NOMA do? Is it security firms that focus on this space? You
Speaker:mentioned red teaming. Is that is that a sir service you offer?
Speaker:Yeah. So NOMA basically is an like, our name is Nomo
Speaker:Security. The domain is Nomo dot security. So it's Oh, okay. Sorry about
Speaker:that. No. No. We're good. So, so, yeah,
Speaker:what we do is, like, secure the entire data in the AI life cycle.
Speaker:Basically means that we truly, like, cover it end to end. Like, we enable, like,
Speaker:the data teams and the machine learning and the AI teams, to continue and
Speaker:innovate while we are securing them without
Speaker:slowing down. And this is like the the like, we are built from, like,
Speaker:data practitioner, like, the company. So this is, like, our main focus,
Speaker:meaning that we start, like, from the building phase. So if we
Speaker:said, like, notebooks and hugging face models and all these different stuff and the
Speaker:misconfigurations are on all the different stack and all the envelopes
Speaker:tools and AI platforms and data pipelines and stuff like that. So we are
Speaker:connected seamlessly on the background, and,
Speaker:basically assist the the data teams to to work securely,
Speaker:without changing changing anything in the workflows.
Speaker:And then also, like, we provide, as you said, the red teaming.
Speaker:Before you're deploying the model into production, you want to
Speaker:understand what is the level of, of
Speaker:robustness and security that the like, that your model has. And
Speaker:what we do is we had, like, a big research team that,
Speaker:like, builds, simulated, thousands of different
Speaker:attacks. And then we dynamically start to run all these attacks against
Speaker:your models, showing you exactly, like, what kind of, like, tactics
Speaker:and techniques your model is vulnerable to, and exactly
Speaker:also how to mitigate and improve it to be more
Speaker:robust. And then the 3rd part is also the runtime.
Speaker:We are mapping, we're scanning all the prompts and all the
Speaker:responses in real time, making sure that you don't
Speaker:have any risk on both sides. The security, we are detecting all these
Speaker:different kind of, like, a host and a little, like, adversarial tax prompt
Speaker:injection, model jailbreak, etcetera. We check also the responses for
Speaker:sensitive data leakage and stuff like that. But in addition, also the
Speaker:safety. We see a lot of organizations that the data scientists, as we
Speaker:said, they understand the risk of deploying
Speaker:models into production. And this is why not even, like, the security, but more like
Speaker:the the Chevy example and, like, the the health advice and stuff like that.
Speaker:So they built for their own, model
Speaker:guardrails in order to make sure that they are, like, controlling what
Speaker:are, like, the topics that the model is be able like, is allowed or
Speaker:disallowed to communicate about. And what we do is basically to save
Speaker:them also like this time. We also provide them, like, all this
Speaker:runtime protection already, like, as a service. You can define exactly what kind
Speaker:of, like, detectors and in native language, what kind of, like, policies you want
Speaker:to make sure that are enforced. And then we also, like, protect it in the
Speaker:run time. So, basically, we just, like, cover you, like, end to end, start from
Speaker:the building and up to the run time. It starts from the classic data engineering
Speaker:pipelines and machine learning and up to gen AI. Interesting. Interesting.
Speaker:It sounds like something I think is totally, I think, a
Speaker:needed needed service and and skill
Speaker:set. Because you're right. Like, I mean, there's just so many risks
Speaker:here, and the hype around Gen
Speaker:AI is so over the top.
Speaker:It is gonna be revolutionary, but
Speaker:maybe not in the way you think. Right? And I always call back to the
Speaker:early days of the dotcom. Right? Where it was pets.com. There was,
Speaker:you know, this.com, that, you know, like all these crazy things. But the
Speaker:real quote unquote winner of, you know,
Speaker:.com was some guy in Seattle selling books.
Speaker:Mhmm. Right? No one no one I mean, selling books. Like, really?
Speaker:Like, not, you know, and it's
Speaker:it's interesting to see how I think I
Speaker:think that the the obvious use case for chat for for
Speaker:LLMs thus far has been chatbots. Right? Customer
Speaker:service type things. I think that's really only the
Speaker:the the the the the surface of it. I think for me, what
Speaker:I've seen is most impactful is the ability for natural language
Speaker:understanding and their ability to understand what's happening in a in
Speaker:a block of text. And I think
Speaker:that that has enormous potential. I
Speaker:agree. A lot of risks too. Right? Because what if, you know, what if
Speaker:I I mean, to your point. Right? You wanna make sure these things stay on
Speaker:topic. Right? Like, I don't if I'm talking to a
Speaker:financial services chatbot and I say, hey, I have
Speaker:my my leg kinda hurts. Right?
Speaker:It's, you know, the risk of moving into health care, like, it's just kind
Speaker:of, I don't how mature are those guardrails? Because I've
Speaker:not really seen a good implementation of
Speaker:it yet. Yeah. So, you know, like, I
Speaker:don't want to to give ourself, like, a compliment, but,
Speaker:we Oh, you guys are pretty good at it? Yeah. Like, we're pretty good. Like,
Speaker:we were, like, you know, like, with fortune 5 100, with fortune 1 100.
Speaker:Not in vain. But, yeah, I believe that in general, specifically, like, when we speak
Speaker:more, like, on the guardrail side, I see that the most important thing is
Speaker:to make sure that it's, it's building the
Speaker:right architecture to be very flexible and easily
Speaker:configure for the organization because eventually, like, you know, like, each
Speaker:organization is completely different needs, completely different
Speaker:context to the calls, like, in their customers, internally to their employees.
Speaker:So everything should should be, like, very easily configured, but very flexible.
Speaker:Interesting. Interesting. I wanna I I could talk for
Speaker:another hour or 2 with you because this is this is a fascinating space.
Speaker:Where can folks find out more about Noma and you? I you think it's Noma
Speaker:dot security? Yeah. Noma dot security. Can't believe that's now
Speaker:a top load pain, but,
Speaker:and, any any, NOMA dot
Speaker:security, you're on LinkedIn, and, anything
Speaker:else you you'd like the folks to find out more?
Speaker:No. I had, like, a great time speaking with you, Frank. Great.
Speaker:Likewise. And for the listeners out there, if you're a little bit
Speaker:scared and a little bit paranoid about generative AI and LLMs,
Speaker:then I think we had a good conversation. Because I think we need a little
Speaker:bit of that fear in the back of our heads to guide us and
Speaker:maybe think about security issues. A
Speaker:little bit of thought ahead of time will probably save you a lot of problems
Speaker:later. And want to lose some. That's
Speaker:that's all I got, and we'll let the nice British AI,
Speaker:Bailey finish the show. Well, that wraps up another
Speaker:eye opening episode of data driven. A big thank you to Niamh
Speaker:Braun for sharing his expertise on the critical intersection of AI,
Speaker:security, and innovation. If today's conversation didn't make
Speaker:you double check your data pipelines or rethink your Hugging Face
Speaker:downloads, well, you're braver than I am. As always,
Speaker:I'm Bailey, your semi sentient MC, reminding you that while
Speaker:AI might be clever, it's never too clever for a security breach.
Speaker:Until next time, stay curious, stay secure, and
Speaker:stay data driven. Cheerio.