Hello, listeners.

Welcome to another episode of the Jacob Shapiro podcast.

Joining me today is Hamidreza Azizi.

He is a visiting fellow at the German Institute for International and Security affairs in Berlin.

Previously a guest lecturer at the University of Tehran, holds a PhD in regional studies from the University of Tehran.

I wanted to bring him on.

He and I had a little back and forth on Twitter or X or whatever we're supposed to call it, and he was willing to come on and give Iran's viewpoint.

And I have to confess to you, his views of Iran were, and specifically of Iran's strategic position, were extremely grim from my point of view, surprisingly grim.

It doesn't look like Iran has a whole lot of options here.

Working very hard to get an israeli analyst and military historian on the podcast.

Hopefully in the next 48 hours, too, to give that part of the picture.

And Rob and I will be back at it for our normal weekly chat, too.

So quite a week of content from the podcast that you'll have here.

Hope you're enjoying it all.

If you have questions, comments about any of it, it's Jacob ognitive investments.

You can reach me there, or you can find me on social media, wherever you guys are.

So thank you for listening.

Thank you for sharing this podcast with all of your friends and family.

Thank you, if you have not already, for going and giving the podcast a rating on itunes or wherever you listen to it.

Take care of the people that you love.

Cheers and see you up.

So we're recording.

It's Wednesday, October 2.

It's about noon central time, about 07:00 p.m.

here for our guests.

Thank you for staying up a little bit late with us, although, like me, you're probably not doing very much sleeping at this particular moment.

I guess the first question I wanted to ask you is, at a very macro level, which is, it's been a very hectic year for Iran.

So you had the israeli attack on a consulate in Syria.

Then you had the iranian attack on Israel.

Then you had the, the suspicious death, I would call it, of Ibrahim Raisi, replacement of Iran's president, going from maybe hard liners to pragmatist.

Then you've got Israel just hitting Iran's proxies all over the place, assassinating Hania in Tehran, knocking out the leadership of Hezbollah, going after the Houthis in Yemen, something I didn't even think was possible, at least not at the scale that they seem to be indicating at.

And finally, Iran, looks to me, was goaded into a response here and sent a bunch of missiles to attack Israel, none of which killed anyone except apparently one Palestinian in the West bank.

And now Israel, promising, with us support, a severe counterattack on infrastructure, these other things.

So the macro question I'm building up to there is, how is Iran looking at this?

Because there's obviously no deterrence.

Their proxies are reeling.

They can't defeat Israel in a head to head combat simply because they're that far away from each other.

Neither one of them can do it.

It seems like Iran is in a bad situation.

Is that correct?

Or do you see opportunity?

Do you think things are going according to Iran's plans?

Yeah.

First of all, thank you very much.

For having me at this very critical moment.

I mean, it's getting just more critical the moment that we think that, you know, it cannot get any worse.

You know, there's always surprises, especially for people working on Iran.

So I don't remember any time in my career as busy as the past year.

So obviously the main developments you already mentioned.

So, I mean, to.

Explain how the thinking, strategic thinking actually in Iran goes.

At the moment, it's a bit more complicated and it's been through ups and downs since past year.

Exactly.

Since October 7.

You know, there was a moment they really taught that they have the upper hand and they are basically on the verge of reshaping the regional order, you know, in the way that they desire.

And then, you know, things started to change.

So just to give you an overview, so we know that actually this kind of network of non state allies and proxies, and by the way, I don't call all of them proxies because of the nuances in the relationships that each of these groups have with Iran.

So it's a range of different types.

Of relationships, from proxies to partners to allies.

So that's also important to note.

But anyway, this network that Iran calls.

The axis of resistance.

So it has two main logics.

One is an ideological rationale, of course, which is the sort of grand ideological design that Iran has had for the region since the islamic revolution, starting with ideas like exporting the revolution and then basically what I would call sometimes exporting the revolutionaries or exporting the revolutionary pattern, you know, because if you look at how these groups are built, Hezbollah, the popular mobilization forces in Iraq, they are all modeled after IRGC or parts of the IRGC like Basij militia when we speak about Syria, for example.

Anyway, long story short, so this is the ideological part of that.

But when we are speaking about the military aspects, the iranian strategic thinking is very much affected by the experience of the eight years of war with Iraq in the 1980s.

So at the time, Iran basically had the, kind of didn't have the capabilities that it needed to defeat the iraqi regime of Saddam at the time, especially in terms of the air defense, air force missiles, etcetera.

And one very important element of that was the support that the United States gave to Saddam.

So how it shaped the military thinking in Iran was that, okay, we are in a very volatile region with countries that can potentially threaten us.

And by the way, all these countries are somehow supported by the main adversary.

Which is the United States.

So that's the way they started to work on the kind of the military doctrine.

And that's where this idea of forward defense comes out.

So forward defense is based on the understanding that because of the us support.

And because of the international pressure on.

Iran, we cannot have kind of, we cannot compete in a kind of conventional way.

There's no symmetry in military capabilities between.

Us and our adversaries.

So we need to invest on these kind of asymmetric deterrence, as they call it.

So asymmetric deterrence.

There is a few tools that Iran has worked on.

Its missile program and the network of proxies and allies, as I said.

So that's apart from the ideological aspect, this is the military element of that, and also later drones and, and its naval strategy.

So here, that's how actually this kind of whole strategy took form.

And of course, when the October 7 started, they started to see one very important pillar of this strategy, which was the network of proxies and partners, the axis of resistance, actually working better than they had planned or they had expected in terms of the coordination in this network.

They have been promoting the idea of.

The so called unity of the front in the axis of resistance, in the.

Sense that there's going to be a coordinated response to any threat or coordinated action against potential adversaries.

But it was only an idea.

When the October 7 attack happened the next day, Hezbollah started.

After a few weeks, the iraqi groups started putting pressure on the US to indirectly pressure Israel into stopping the war.

The Houthis joined.

So Iran started feeling, actually its allies are doing very good for some time.

Israel got entangled in the Gaza war.

And so in the beginning, it was like, actually, I mean, their way of thinking was that, no, this strategy is actually working until April, until the attack on the iranian consulate in Damascus, which, of course, I mean, the trend had.

Already started a bit before.

From December, Israel had started targeting top commanders of the IRGC.

And that was a significant shift of pattern of engagement by Israelis against Iran, because before that, they would target only the backup of, like, you know, the convoys and kind of the logistics of.

Iran and its allies, but not the personnel, not the commanders.

That started to shift.

And that was actually the moment that Iran started feeling that the network is actually exposed, you know, because Israel has.

Started, had started actually, at the moment.

Already to basically target the back of Hezbollah in Syria and through that to.

Cut the connection between Iran and Hezbollah.

And at the same time to incrementally increase the pressure on Hezbollah in order.

To cut the ties between Hezbollah and.

Hamas in Gaza and of course, also.

With the help of the United States.

To put pressure on the husks.

So that was where the flaws of this strategy started to become clear.

What was Iran's response?

It went to the other element of this network, which was, sorry, this doctrine.

Which was the missiles, by firing missiles.

On Israel, hoping that it would deter Israel.

It obviously didn't.

And now over the past weeks, the kind of threat perception has skyrocketed on the iranian side, because now it's not just about the unity or the kind.

Of connection between those members of the.

Axis of resistance getting weaker.

It's about the whole axis, one of.

The main pillars of this whole strategy, on the verge of collapse.

And now the only thing they have is their missiles arsenal.

And that's, as I have indicated before in some interviews, that is good for inflicting damage and substantial damage if they want, on the adversaries, but not enough for getting engaged in a protracted war, especially when they don't have an effective air defense that could, you know, withstand something like f 35 fighter jets of Israel.

That sounds pretty grim and pretty dire from an iranian strategic perspective.

And it almost makes their retaliation to what Israel did seem unwise at best, if not impotent at sort of worse.

And they've also now just opened the door to Israel striking back and with the United States sort of solidly in, Israel's backing Israel up here, at least rhetorically.

So why.

Yeah, I guess start with, so why did Iran decide to retaliate with the missile strikes in the last couple of days?

And what do you think they were hoping to achieve?

Did they achieve anything that they were hoping, or was it just kind of, they had nothing else?

Yeah, actually, the reason why I try to kind of provide a comprehensive picture of the background was to mention that, you know, as far as I can see, what I understand is that iranian attack was a sign of desperation, not a kind of sign of strength.

So this is actually, one of the criticisms that some ultra hardliners in Iran are, you know, mentioning from time to time that actually when we had the upper hand in the region, that was the time that Hezbollah should have increased the scope of its attacks.

And already, for example, Raz, one forces, the ground forces should have already infiltrated into Israel, things like that, of course, very kind of far fetched scenarios.

But anyway, so the criticism inside the country is also growing.

So it was a sign of desperation.

What Iran wants to achieve, I would say it's about kind of trying to control the damage, trying to, you know, limit the scope of, or better to say, not to allow the scope of.

The war that they already perceive themselves.

Being in to further expand.

And here comes a very important difference.

When we compare what happened yesterday to the attack on April 13, the attack on April 13, as I said, it was a kind of a measure they took in order to basically, in their own terms, to restore deterrence against Israel.

And this is something that they are.

Quite clear about it.

When they mention the operation that they had, the attack that they conducted, they say that it was actually meant to be a show of force and show of intent to the israeli side in order to deter them from taking further steps.

What was the calculation?

The calculation, obviously was that the iranian.

Missiles being fired toward Israel, and as I said, the shoal intent to the.

Israeli side at the same time as Netanyahu, was actually having kind of serious challenges at the home front and at.

The same time increasing pressure from international organizations.

The combination of these would probably paralyze the strategic planning on the israeli side and would at least push them towards some sort of constrained policy going forward with a Iran at least.

So it obviously didn't work.

So the argument we've been hearing over.

The past few weeks, especially after the.

Killing of Nasrallah, was that it's actually a war.

So we wanted to prevent a war from happening.

War is already happening.

So it would be better for us to do something and to take the initiative and to use it as some sort of damage control before Israel is done with Hezbollah and then goes to Syria and then to Iraq.

And then when it comes to us, we have actually no allies left in the region to support.

You know, that's the sort of logic.

I mean, the main kind of the.

Key calculation behind yesterday's attack was that.

A war, a kind of, not to say a war, but because as I.

Said, they already see themselves as being.

A war, an israeli attack, maybe together.

With the United States, coordinated at least.

With the United States, is imminent, is certain.

So it's only a matter of time.

So it would be better for us.

To welcome this so far as we still have at least part of the capabilities that we used to have before in terms of the capabilities of allies.

So this is the main calculus, I would say, behind the iranian attack, and by the way, in terms of what they want to achieve.

So as I said, this time, they clearly know that it's not going to deter Israel.

What they want is to basically by, for example, using more advanced missiles, the hypersonics that they use and the kind of show of force that they intended to, to have, like missiles that can actually go through the israeli air defense and can hit targets to somehow, as the.

I mean, this is something actually, you see in the narrative, iranian narrative, from time to time, to disrupt, to impact and disrupt the strategic thinking on the.

Side of the adversary.

This is one part of it.

And on the other side, to basically by threatening the kind of widening the scope of the conflict to bring in other factors, especially the United States, to.

Increase the potential costs for the US.

In order for the United States to actually control this situation.

What are the potential costs?

For example, they are already speaking about.

I mean, they have been speaking about it already since April and before that, that any attack against Iran's nuclear installations will certainly result in weaponization of Iran's nuclear program.

And it seems, at least so far, it has worked.

Just an hour ago, I saw President Biden saying that the United is clearly saying that the United States does not support attack on Iran's nuclear facilities.

All beyond that, depending on the scope.

Of the israeli response, they threaten to, for example, attack the us interests and forces in the region, knowing that it's just one month until the election and betting on the us president not wanting to see us soldiers in body bags being sent home.

So these are the.

So, I mean, the whole thing looks.

Very much like a gamble, you know, and there's a lot of uncertainties in it.

And there's a sense of euphoria, of.

Course, right now among the pro government.

Circles in Iran, but even among themselves, there are people who are advising for.

Caution, just wait for israeli response, then.

We can decide whether it's been impactful or nothing.

Yeah.

Speaking to Iran's capabilities, I mean, whether they're hypersonic or not, I don't feel qualified to judge.

Maybe you have an opinion on that, but you're right that it looks like 20% of whatever Iran fired got through Israel's missile defense systems.

But it didn't hit anything it literally killed no Israelis.

According to the IDF, it caused no pause in operations.

I know you and I were debating on Twitter whether Iran gave a notification ahead of time.

It looks to me like they gave a very, very short notification last time.

It was like in three days or whatever it was, we will fire this time it was a couple of hours.

And maybe it caught some people off guard, but were they just sort of showing this capability and if they had to go again, do you think they would be able to strike and cause real damage or is this the best that Iran has?

Because if this is the best Iran has, this is not going to end well for them.

Look, it depends on how we interpret the aims of this operation, of course.

So I see people judging the outcome.

I mean, I personally, of course, agree that until the israeli response has not happened and then other kind of reactions, etcetera, we cannot actually judge about the effectiveness of this.

But overall, I mean, based on what we have so far, look, I see people, as I said, kind of how to say, assessing the impact and potential longer term implications of the attack on the number, or lack thereof, of, of casualties, actually.

So I don't really think that was the case.

And I really don't think that the aim was to kill this time.

The aim was to go one step.

Further from the previous operation.

I mean, a necessary explanation here.

I'm not saying that, you know, they are good guys.

They don't want to kill.

You know, we know that they are allied groups, especially in the case of Hamas, the massacre that happened on October 7, and also other incidents over the past 40 years.

So it's about this specific moment and this specific operation and the logic behind that.

As I said, if the aim is.

To control the scope and you know.

That, how sensitive the Israelis are toward the lives of the Israelis, then this.

Is not the first step you take.

To respond to the other side.

Right.

So you need to go one step.

Of course, the previous one didn't work.

Almost nothing went through.

So this time they did.

Some of them hit the targets, of course, no infrastructural damage, but still.

So it was actually, in terms of the strategic implications, I think it was quite considerable.

It depends on, of course, as I said, how Israel assesses the next steps, etcetera.

But the message that Iran wanted to send was that actually we have the capability, our missiles are capable of going through and hit the targets.

So this time the targets were chosen in a way that would be only, I mean, they were only military targets.

Right.

And after actually the conversation we had on Twitter.

I was also thinking, yeah, maybe.

Because maybe the key indication of a potential heads up beforehand was that not only the United States gave the warning that Iran was preparing for the attack, but they actually said, I mean, what are the targets?

So exactly those three targets that the US had mentioned and was kind of reflected on the media, those were the ones that were attacked.

So in that sense, maybe the aim.

Based on what I understand, the aim.

Was not to have casualties.

It was to show that we can choose targets and we can hit them.

And the israeli air defense is not good enough to intercept all of those missiles.

Does it mean that Iran has the.

Capability to change the equation?

Absolutely not.

The craziest thing here for me is.

That, come on, your adversary is a nuclear armed state.

So if it goes to the threshold of existential, you know, what awaits you.

So, you know, in a kind of logical and sort of how to say, a kind of rational assessment, you should do such a bold thing, a bold operation.

If you are also in possession of.

Nuclear weapons or you are sure that.

You know, the next step can be taken in a matter of few days, I don't know, maybe they are already there or it was just a very, very risky gamble, as I mentioned.

So these are the kind of nuances we need to take into account when speaking about impact.

And actually, I think because of their understanding of their limitations, they didn't go any further.

They know first that they are in the war.

They knew, second that they had to do something to take initiative in order to, you know, as I said, keep the scale as limited as possible.

But at the same time, they know.

How the reaction would be if the.

Israelis would have been killed.

You know, that would be for the different deal, actually.

Yeah, that makes sense to me.

Well, so let's try and play this forward.

And again, we're recording Wednesday, October 2.

We're going to try and get this podcast out as quickly as we can, but by the time we get it out, maybe Israel will have already responded.

Let's say that Israel doesn't strike the nuclear facilities, like you said, Biden said.

I missed that, but let's say that Israel doesn't strike the nuclear facilities.

The report I saw, though, was that they were considering hitting oil and gas targets and trying to hit Iran's economy meaningfully.

So let's say that's what happens.

Let's say that Israel, either with or without us support, hits oil and gas installations inside of Iran, and let's say Iranian civilians die in the attack.

What does Iran do, then what is the next move there?

Based on what I can see?

So they are prepared for kind of a period, let's say, of tithe, four Tas attacks, incrementally escalating, maybe even, and.

This is not just empty rhetoric.

I mean, they must be ready.

And they seem to be ready because, as I said, unlike in April, they.

Know that it's not going to deter.

Israel and the israeli response is going to come.

So this is the first thing we need to take into account.

Second is that based on the flaws in the iranian military doctrine that is becoming more and more evident, overdose over time.

They know their limitations, the limitations.

The main challenge is that, especially at the current circumstances, when Hezbollah is kind of seriously damaged, other groups are under pressure, they cannot afford the protracted war.

And by the way, most important than.

Everything else is the internal situation in Iran.

So a great fear, the greatest fear actually, for the islamic republic has been situation kind of scenario in which it.

Has to fight two wars at the.

Same time, one domestic against its own people and another one against a foreign enemy.

So that would be the kind of, you know, worst case scenario and the nightmare scenario, actually, for Iran.

So they don't want to kind of, you know, get entangled in a protracted war.

But what they are betting on, again, a risky bet is that the other side also cannot afford the protracted war at the moment.

That explains the timing because, you know, after a year or two when Israel would be done with all other Iran backed groups in the region and, you know, kind of it had, it would have already rebuilt its whole strengths, etcetera, then it would be in a kind.

Of much better position.

To go after Iran at whatever cost and to engage in a protracted war.

Iran couldn't afford that.

So at the moment, the calculation is that, okay, maybe we are going to have a few weeks, a couple months of incrementally escalating operations or kind of tit for tale attacks with Israel, but at some point, domestic pressure and international pressure is going to stop that.

So based on that, we can expect, of course, any israeli attack, I mean.

Nuclear side, because that would be a.

Different scenario, as I said, to give them enough justification, quote, unquote, to go for weaponization.

But apart from that, we can expect them to increase the scope of their attacks to include more targets, for example, this time to maybe even, you know, hit civilian areas.

You know, there could be quite a different scenarios.

And also, as I said, depending on how sorry if and how the United States is involved, the Iran backed groups around the region, especially in Iraq, are expected to sort of escalate against the United States in their planning.

Everything is going to be incremental, but.

The element of surprise and an israeli government, which after October 7, you know, thinks, and I mean, looks quite different to the region and has a totally different calculation toward its, you know, kind of toward the regional environment and its adversaries.

Plus the US election coming, and we don't know, you know, in which way it can impact the kind of situation.

So everything can explode, everything can get out of control, and everything can get, can go, you know, against Iran's planning of an incremental environmental escalation at any.

Point, I think, does Iran have any allies outside of the axis of resistance that it can count on?

For instance, Iran has been supplying Russia with drones and rockets.

Do they have any support from Russia if things start to escalate?

There's a longstanding relationship between Iran and countries like North Korea and like Venezuela, both countries that could cause problems for the United States or at least divert us attention away from the Middle eastern theater.

I know the relationship with China is complex, but China has also concluded deals of friendship or whatever with Iran and has incentive and, well, actually, China probably has incentive for the US to be distracted in the Middle east, not to be looking at other places in general.

Is there any, if I was really going off the wall, Turkey has been saying things about standing up for the Palestinians.

Could there be some small concentric circle of interests?

Is there anybody here willing to help Iran?

Or is Iran really on its own?

This is a very good question because, you know, it reminds me of a kind of a conceptual debate in hungarian academics, those working on international relations.

There is a concept called strategic loneliness when speaking about Iran's regional position.

So it is very interesting.

I would encourage the audience to look up for it.

So there's two people who have written about this.

The guy who.

Basically invented this term.

Is Mohiddin Mesbahi, a professor in the US.

I forgot which university, and then also Arashajaddeh.

These two people have written about this idea of strategic loneliness.

So it differs from isolation.

So the argument, the main argument is that due to the geographical and geopolitical kind of, how to say, elements, and also the historical experiences that Iran has had with a great powers.

So it cannot rely on any actor, especially among the great powers, as its allies.

So Iran has no ally in the region.

It's not isolated in the sense of being out of the dynamics of international system, which is true.

Iran is quite under pressure, but not kind of, you know, it's not like North Korea, of course.

So this is very, I mean, this is, this is something that is somehow.

An accepted term, an accepted idea, maybe.

Not in this exact wording in Iran.

That they cannot actually rely on any.

Power to provide them with security.

And by the way, when it comes to this so called axis of resistance, one of the ideas that is usually brought up is that this strategic loneliness actually prompts Iran to work with non.

State actors, you know, because it doesn't.

Have any state ally.

So it needs to forge allies among those ideologically kind of like minded groups, if you may say.

But it goes before the, you know, the islamic revolution.

Even the Shah of Iran, you know, established contacts with, with some of these groups, like the lebanese Shias or the iraqi course, this is actually the core argument of the second scholar I mentioned, Arash Raisinjad.

So anyway, so when it comes to.

Russia and China, in this specific case.

Just look at kind of the developments in the relationship over the past couple of years.

Everybody sees the part that is threatening most, I mean, for good reasons, which.

Is Iran providing Russia with drones and.

Now reports, still no evidence on the ground, but anyway, reports about the actual or potential delivery of iranian missiles to Russia.

But what has Iran achieved in return?

So Iran's main, I mean, when it comes to its defense and deterrence capabilities, one of the main areas that Iran has seen as a gap is its air defense and also air force.

So that's why Iran has been trying to get Su 35 fighter jetse from Russia.

Well, Russia has not provided them, obviously, out of the concern that, you know, it would irritate Iran's neighbors around the Persian Gulf.

And, I mean, those are actually actors on which Russia relies for economic cooperation, especially, you know, to circumvent the sanctions.

So it's a very complicated relationship.

It has, of course, developed in many ways, but it's far from an alliance.

It was just a few weeks ago.

Over the potential establishment of Zangezor corridor in the South Caucasus, which would actually cut Iran's land access to Armenia.

There was an actual, an open diplomatic, I wouldn't say dispute, but sort of apparent rift between Iran and Russia.

So Iran knows that in a war situation, if an actual war happens between Iran and either Israel or the United States, it cannot rely on Russia.

I mean, China is obviously not interested in involving in that.

You mentioned Turkey.

Turkey is a native ally.

People sometimes tend to forget that.

But despite the rhetoric, in the end.

Quite understandably, of course, what Erdogan wants.

Is to, on one hand, enhance his position among Islamists inside the country and outside to kind of get a better war game from its NATO allies, from the United States.

So that's what Turkey does.

So Iran is really on its own, and that's why it feels so threatened by the degradation of Hezbollah's capabilities or the potential weakening of this axis of resistance.

Actually, strategically speaking, Iran's options are quite limited, and it either needs to continue relying on this asymmetric deterrence, which seems to be quite outdated right now, especially given the current developments, or to go for another type of deterrence, which, you know, people, pro government experts, especially in Iran, are increasingly advocating for, and that's nuclear deterrence.

So it's about kind of, you know, bad or worse options that Iran has at the moment, I think.

Yeah, you're painting a pretty grim picture.

The last question that I'll ask you, and we sort of alluded to it very briefly, but I'd love to hear you expound on it a bit more, is Iran's internal politics, because in the context of everything we've had at the, you know, regional level war, Raisi is dead and dead in a strange helicopter crash.

There is a new president who is more pragmatic, the supreme leader.

I mean, I've been hearing since I began my career that he's not in good health.

And I've been around for over a decade now, but theoretically, he's not in good health.

And at some point there have already been some disputes around who's going to take over for him.

How do Iran, and I also know that we have a very limited viewpoint into this because it is hard to really get ground truth on what's going on in Iran itself.

But how are Iran's domestic politics being refracted in this?

Did Raisi get on the wrong side of the supreme leader because the strategy was going off the rails?

Is there no relationship between these two things?

And it's just an unhappy coincidence that Iran is having internal strife at the same time that its external strategies are failing?

How do you account for what's happening inside of Iran at the domestic level and how that affects things?

Because I don't know if you saw, I mean, that, what was it tv message that Netanyahu gave just yesterday or the day before?

I mean, directly threatening the life of the supreme leader.

And I saw reports that the supreme leader has now been, they've taken away his pagers.

That's a joke.

But, like, you know, isolated him and he's increased security measures, everything else.

I mean, how does all that fit into the picture that we're talking about here.

Yeah.

First of all, you know, of course.

It is a very green picture.

And this is for the first time, I mean, in such a scale, for the first time in many years, people within Iran, by people, I mean, of course, people at large, they have been criticizing the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic for quite a long time.

But I mean, experts, analysts, even those close to the government for the first time at, you know, kind of considerable scale, there are, they are also, you know, kind of expressing doubts about the sustainability of this whole strategy and looking for alternatives.

But it doesn't mean that, you know, Iran is weakened to the point that, you know, it's going to, for example, we are going to see a kind of internal, like, power struggle leading to coup or like, you know, a total weakening of the regime as a result of, you know, an israeli strike.

All this might happen, but it's not.

Like the first, you know, scenario that we can think of.

So this is one thing, and actually.

Iran, in this case islamic republic, because why I'm saying islamic republic, it's not just because, you know, I see duality because I want to emphasize on the ideological element of that, you know, that being cornered actually can make it even more dangerous.

Especially, again, we are speaking about technically threshold state, you know, in terms of nuclear capabilities.

So it's only a matter of political decision to go for actual weaponization.

Why Iran has not taken that step because, I mean, out of the fear of an all out war.

So if the war is already there, what would be left to be worried about?

And that's something that Iran would go for not only, and here comes a connection with domestic circumstances.

And that would be an asset not only to establish deterrence against foreign adversaries, but also to basically cements the position of the government inside the country.

So in every single step the islamic republic has taken since at least April in the attack, there's a clear element of domestic politics playing a role.

And that has to do with the islamic republic especially supremely.

They're not be willing to be seen as weak, you know, so it's not just, this is also very important in analyzing why Iran did what it did.

So they, the last thing they want.

To, you know, to see is to, you know, be seen by the people as being on the back foot and, you know, lacking any option for confronting the adversaries, despite decades of propaganda, etcetera.

And more important than the general public is actually the support base of the government.

Those people, I mean, that was quite.

I mean, even to me, I have lived in Iran for 32 years, most of my life, and I've been following Iran since leaving the country.

So that was a quite huge.

After the killing of Haniya and especially.

After the incident, incidents in Lebanon, ultra hardliners literally cursing.

I'm not saying criticizing.

They were literally cursing the IRGC.

And because they still have reservations with.

Regard to the supreme leader, President Fazeshkiyan, for not responding to Israel.

This was the circumstances.

This is the only thing left in terms of domestic legitimacy for the regime.

If they lose it, they lose everything.

So first step, and in terms of speaking of achievements, this is the main achievement.

They got back the trust of their own support base.

Say it's 10%, 15%, I don't know.

We don't have any kind of reliable poll, but for them, it's very important.

I mean, 10%, 15% in a country.

Of 19 million is quite significant.

And this is what the Islamic Republic has been investing on in all these years.

And it does, it doesn't want to lose that.

So that's very important.

Even if it means continuation of sanctions.

Even if it means, you know, kind.

Of, as I said, incrementally escalating war.

With adversaries, they need to have that.

Otherwise, collapse is imminent.

So this is how I see it.

In terms of, you know, expression of.

Interest for diplomacy, etcetera.

Of course, this has been the policy even under Raisi.

So I can see people speculating.

I think that there is an element of truth to that, that for Raisi.

It is actually lack of expertise and.

Lack of any kind of practical view of diplomacy that prevented the revival of the JCPOA.

Otherwise we would have been in a different circumstances, and same is the case.

But again, so, of course, we saw at the UN General assembly doubling down on this kind of expression of willingness for diplomacy, etcetera.

But back to the core base of the islamic republic, support base of the Islamic Republic.

After the recent incidents, there started to be a kind of strengthening argument that.

This is actually not the time for.

Diplomacy because we are having the lower hand.

So what is our bargaining ship?

If we want to start, enter into the negotiations, we need to restore some sort of balance and then go for the negotiations.

This is how it is anyway.

So what I want to say is how this, how closely these two things are connected.

This goes beyond Raisi or Pezyskian being president of the country.

This goes beyond Khamenei being there or not.

We are speaking about.

I mean, it's not a kind of.

Again, it's not North Korea.

It's not like I actually saw any.

It was very funny.

There was these photos of the operations room where IRGC commanders were ordering the.

Launch of the missiles.

And somebody had commented like, why is not the supreme leader there?

So, you know, some people have the kind of perception of North Korea, you know, Kim Jong un being there always when there's a missile launch or a nuclear launch of something.

It's a very sophisticated system in which there's entrenched economic and political interest by the military security establishment, which is represented by the IRGC.

But IRGC itself has different segments.

So it's not like Khamenei, for example.

Imagine you mentioned pager, whatever.

Next day Israel does something.

Khamenei gone.

The old system is going to dismantle.

So it will certainly go through sort of transformation.

But the challenge is that we don't know in which way.

So there's a lot of uncertainties at domestic front as well.

But these teams are very closely connected.

Thank you so much for your time.

This was a terrific interview and I dare say that the world will give us plenty of opportunity to have you back on the if we haven't scared you away too much.

It was a great pleasure.

Thank you for your good questions.

Actually, it prompted me to think of a lot of things that I wouldn't maybe in a normal situation.

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