Here is a summary of the March 5, 2025 Supreme Court opinion in the case called Bufkin vs.

Collins, case number 2371 3.

The question presented in this case is must the Veterans Court ensure that the benefit of the doubt rule was properly applied during the claims process in order to satisfy 38 USC Section 7261, which directs the Veterans Court to take due account a VA's application of that rule?

Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Soto, Mayor Kagan, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined.

Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Gorsuch joined.

Please note that this summary is read by an automated voice.

Justice Thomas Majority Opinion the Department of Veterans Affairs VA applies a benefit of the doubt rule that tips the scales in a veteran's favor when evidence regarding any issue material to a service related disability claim is in approximate balance.

38 United States Code section 5107B.

Petitioners are Veterans who applied for service connected Post Traumatic Stress Disorder PTSD disability benefits and were dissatisfied with the VA's resolution of their claims.

Petitioner Joshua Bufkin claimed that his PTSD stemmed from his military service, but the VA found no clear link.

Petitioner Norman Thornton obtained service connected PTSD disability benefits, but the VA denied his most recent request to increase his disability rating.

These adverse determinations were reviewed de novo by the Board of Veterans Appeals, which rendered final decisions on behalf of the VA denying the claims.

Petitioners then challenge the adverse determinations before the U.S.

court of Appeals for Veterans Claims.

Veterans court under section 7261A, the Veterans Court reviews legal issues de novo and factual issues for clear error and under Section 7261, the Veterans Court must take due account of the VA's application of the benefit of the doubt rule.

Applying those standards, the Veterans Court affirmed the VA's adverse benefit determinations, finding that the Board's approximate balance determinations were not clearly erroneous.

The petitioners then appealed to the Federal Circuit, challenging the Veterans Court's legal interpretation of section 7261 and arguing that the statutory command to take due account of the VA's application of the benefit of the doubt rule requires requires the Veterans Court to review the entire record de novo and decide for itself whether the evidence is in approximate balance.

The Federal Circuit rejected this argument and affirmed held the VA's determination that the evidence regarding a service related disability claim is in approximate balance is a predominantly factual determination reviewed only for clear error.

Pages 8 to 17A.

Under section 7261's plain text, the veterans court must take due account of the VA's application of the Benefit of the Doubt rule.

This requirement directs the veterans court to give appropriate attention to the VA's work.

The Veterans Court must review the VA's application of the benefit of the Doubt rule in making the determinations under subsection A, section 7261 subsection B, subsection 1.

Accordingly, the Standards of review provided in subsection A also govern the veterans court's review of benefit of the doubt issues.

Section 7261 makes explicit the veterans court's previously implicit duty to review the VA's application of the Benefit of the Doubt rule pursuant to the standards set forth in subsection A, pages 8 to 10B.

The appropriate standard of review for any given challenge depends on whether the challenge is factual or legal in nature.

The parties contest whether a veteran's challenge to the VA's determination that the evidence on a particular material issue is not in approximate balance involves a legal inquiry subject to de novo review or a factual finding, or at least a predominantly factual mixed question of law and fact subject to clear error review.

The approximate balance determination involves two steps.

First, the VA reviews each item of evidence and assigns weight to it a fact finding inquiry reviewed only for clear error.

Second, the VA determines whether the evidence is in approximate balance.

C.

Section 5107B.

This second step includes both legal and factual components, factual because it involves marshaling and weighing evidence, and legal because the approximate balance determination involves whether the evidence satisfies a legal standard.

The VA's approximate balance determination is thus at most a mixed question, and the appropriate standard of review for a mixed question depends on whether answering it entails primarily legal or factual work.

U.S.

bank Nav.

Village at Lakeridge, LLC, 583 U.S.

387396 reviewing a determination whether record evidence is approximately balanced is about as factual sounding as any question gets.

Idites at.397 In Bufkin's case, the Board weighed medical opinions and family testimony to assess his PTSD claims.

Similarly, the Board in Thornton's case analyzed symptom severity and medical evidence to assess his disability rating.

Both cases demonstrate that approximate balance determinations require case specific factual review warranting clear error review.

1013 C.

Petitioners counterarguments are Unpersuasive first, petitioners urge that by amending section 7261 to include the modest phrase take due account, congress imposed a new standard of review for challenges to the VA's application of the benefit of the doubt rule.

But had Congress intended to do so, it would have identified a standard just as it did in section 7261A.

Petitioners next argue that even if section 7261 incorporates section 7261A's standards of review, the VA's approximate balance determination is much like a court's probable cause determination, which involves a mixed question inquiry that appellate courts review.

De novo Ornelas vs United States, 517 U.S.

690, 699 Two features distinguish the probable cause determination from the VA's determination here.

First, probable cause is a constitutional standard, creating a strong presumption that determinations under that standard are subject to de novo review.

By contrast, the approximate balance determination is a creature of statute, not the Constitution.

Second, probable cause poses a question that requires substantial legal work.

U.S.

bank, 583 U.S.

at 398.

But the VA's approximate balance determination lacks a comparable legal component.

Petitioners contend that the Federal Circuit's reading of section 7261 renders the provision superfluous.

While this Court's reading of section 7261 might involve some redundancy, the canon against surplusage does not apply here because petitioners have not identified a competing interpretation that would avoid redundancy.

C.

Marks vs.

General Revenue Corp.

568, 371, 385, pages 13 to 1775.

F.

4th Street 1368, affirmed Justice Jackson, dissenting Opinion.

The Court draws two conclusions from today's evaluation of Congress's take Due account admonition.

C.38 USC section 7261.

First, it holds that when the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims Veterans Court reviews the Department of Veterans Affairs Virginia's application of the benefit of the doubt rule, that appellate tribunal must use the same standards of review that apply to its assessment of any other VA claims determination.

Second, the Court concludes that whether evidence is in approximate balance for purposes of the benefit of the doubt rule is a predominantly factual determination to be reviewed only for clear error.

The majority is wrong in both respects.

Nothing about the text, context, or drafting history of subsection B1 demonstrates that take due account actually means proceed as normal.

Reading the provision in that fashion, as the majority does, makes little sense.

That interpretation is also inconsistent with how we have treated identical language elsewhere in this same statute and renders meaningless the take do account command that Congress specifically amended section 7261 to insert the majority's clear error conclusion fares no better insofar as its reasoning ignores what appellate courts do and what we have consistently said about substantially similar circumstances.

That is, even if the majority were correct, that subsection instructs the Veterans Court to carry on applying the usual standards, clear error review would not be appropriate because whether the VA properly applied the benefit of the doubt rule does not present a question of fact.

The VA's benefit of the doubt determination poses at most a mixed question of law and fact, and one that is substantively indistinguishable from the kinds of mixed questions that this Court has long said are subject to de novo review on appeal.

In short, the Court today concludes that Congress meant nothing but when it inserted subsection B1 in response to concerns that the Veterans Court was improperly rubber stamping the VA's benefit of the doubt determinations and also that the Veterans Court is not obliged to do anything more than defer to those agency decisions.

Notwithstanding Congress's take due account direction, I respectfully dissent.

Case Implications the Court's ruling in Bufkin v.

Collins may impact how veterans disability claims, particularly those involving PTSD and other conditions with complex evidence, will be reviewed going forward.

By holding that the Veterans Court must review the VA's benefit of the doubt determinations only for clear error, the Court has effectively limited judicial oversight of these crucial veteran friendly provisions.

As Justice Jackson warns in dissent, this deferential standard means the Veterans Court will likely continue rubber stamping the VA's decisions about whether evidence is in approximate balance.

In practical terms, veterans face a higher hurdle in challenging VA decisions, as they must now show, the VA's determination was clearly erroneous rather than just incorrect.

This is particularly significant given that many veterans proceed without legal representation and that an appeal to the Veterans Court is often their final opportunity for review.

The decision may lead veteran advocacy groups to seek congressional intervention to strengthen judicial review of VA benefit of the doubt determinations, especially since Congress's 2002amendment, which the majority interpreted as merely clarifying existing duties, was originally enacted in response to concerns about insufficient veterans court oversight of VA decisions.