Michael Koehler: Welcome to Episode 10 of On the Balcony. My name is Michael Koehler, and I'm your host.

Today, we have a rich episode as we get to engage with a former Prime Minister, who, as all of our guests, has been intentionally drawing from the adaptive leadership framework. Prime Minister, George Papandreou, took office in Greece on the eve of the Euro Crisis in 2009, in which he practiced a lot of leadership, but also became a significant lightning rod for the underlying systemic challenges in Greece, Europe, and the global financial system. On the surface was a surprisingly big budget deficit that showed up when he took office, leading to higher interest rates in an uncertain market. Remember, this is only a year after the global financial crisis in 2008, and that led to even higher debt and worries of the bankruptcy with potential ripple effects to the whole Eurozone.

But, as you will see, there were a lot more and deeper adaptive challenges going on in the background of that case. Because this case is so rich, we'll spend this and next episode with Prime Minister Papandreou, and follow his reflections on his own leadership work. As always, we'll ground the conversation in a Chapter of Ron Heifetz’s book, Leadership Without Easy Answers. This week's chapter is Chapter 10, with the title, 'Assassination', and it explores why leadership is a dangerous activity.

The answer is simple, but not easy. At the heart of it is loss. People don't resist change, they resist loss, and will do a lot to avoid that loss, including: deny the problem exists, apply a technical fix, scapegoat someone, shoot the messenger, or blame authority. In its most intense form, they will assassinate you either in your role, meaning they'll fire you or force you to leave your role, or they might physically attack you, as we saw in terrifying ways in the civil rights case in Episode 9.

George Papandreou has first-hand experience with the dangers of leadership, both in office, but also through his family biography, which we'll learn more about too. We'll hear about the strategies he deployed as Prime Minister, but also learn how hard it was for him to lead beyond his authority. For example, when he tried to reframe the challenge from being a Greek challenge only, to being a European challenge.

As always, I encourage you to read the chapter yourself. This is Chapter 10 of Heifetz's Leadership Without Easy Answers, and here is part one of my conversation with the Prime Minister.

All right. Welcome, George Papandreou.

George Papandreou: Very nice to be with you, Michael. Very nice to be with you. Great to see you.

Michael Koehler: We'll start our conversation like we always do on our podcast, bringing a little bit roles and identities. And you are the first former Prime Minister on our podcast, and many people know that, but there's many more pieces to your identity. There's many more roles you're holding, and you have held that informed the way how you think about leadership and your place in the world. So, I invite you to share a few of those. Who are you?

George Papandreou: Well, sometimes it's a constant search, but it also is, you decide also what your identity is. For example, I'm Greek, but I was a Greek from the diaspora. I grew up in California, Minnesota. I was born, then I was a refugee with my parents in Sweden and Canada, and then studied in England. So, being a Greek was basically a choice. I decided I will come to serve my country, I will come to live here, I will come-- and sometimes I tell my fellow Greeks, "You know, when you're a diaspora Greek, you're doubly Greek because it's not just that you happen to be Greek, you also choose to be Greek." But I think that also shows that we have multiple identities, and I think that's very important because we are living also in a world where there are those who want to put you into boxes and to define your identity in one-dimensional way, very authoritarian.

So, I like to be able to bring all these multiple identities, and actually, they create a conversation sort of inside me all the time. Being a Greek of the diaspora, being a refugee also during the dictatorship in Greece, gave me a perspective of wanting to be a change-maker, because you live in different realities. And you say, "Well, I left this country because there were problems." As many refugees do, they leave their country because of the problems, but then potentially, they say, "Okay, of course, I go to another country where things are better, are different, where I can be free, where I can hope on a different life." So, therefore, that in itself makes you reflect and say, "Well, why can't my country be that way? Why can't I see my country change in a better way?"

Of course, I also had my father and my grandfather who were in politics, and both became Prime Ministers. Some like to call it "the dynasty," but "dynasty" has a very negative connotation. They were fighters; my grandfather went to jail or exile six times in his life, he was almost executed by one dictator when he was young, he was pardoned with a few others at the last moment. And when he died, his nickname was "the old man of democracy." And he died during the dictatorship, he died under house arrest, and his funeral became the first big demonstration against the dictatorship.

My father was exiled twice; once, with us as kids to Sweden and then Canada, but he was exiled also much younger, and that's how he went to the United States to study. Exiled from a dictatorship just before the Nazis took over Greece, and he then went on to Harvard and became a Professor in Berkeley, California, Head of the Economics Department, and also enlisted into the US Navy to fight against the Nazis. So, this was just part of it. My mother too, who is still around, 99, a long time feminist, fighting for changes for women, and, when we became government in the '80s, was able to help, through her movements, and other women's movements also, to pass some of the most progressive changes around gender equality and women's rights.

Michael Koehler: I can't help but think about the title of our chapter in Leadership Without Easy Answers, 'Assassination,' as I'm listening to that family story of exile. Of, you know, being in those high roles of authority, the highest role in a country, and then being exiled, and coming back, and being exiled, like, that journey. And a little bit later, we'll talk about your time as a Prime Minister, and the attacks on that role, and the challenges on how to maneuver that. So, I can't think about a better guest to talk about this chapter here. It's really wonderful that you're joining us today.

George Papandreou: Well, thank you.

Michael Koehler: So, before we dive into your experience deeper, I'd just love to take a minute or two for both of us to summarize a few core ideas from the chapter. What stood out for you this time?

George Papandreou: I think there's a lot of wisdom in this chapter, and not only this one. Of course, Ron Heifetz, is both a mentor, and a good friend. I have followed his class once when I had sort of left politics for a short brief moment and got to the Kennedy school. And from then on, I've been always trying to pick his mind in difficult situations or just around what the world is doing. But I think that what this shows is the difficulties of leadership and also how bringing change, helping the society, or moving the society towards adapting to new situations is not a simple process, there's no easy answers. And it is a continual struggle where you really have to gauge where you are, how much stress people can take, how much change they really would like or maybe want. When things get very, very stressful, then of course, things can get very, very difficult for any leader. He or she would be the one to take the blame, rightly or wrongly. It could be right that they do take the blame, but there also can be simply that the stress is too much, that changes are too many, the difficulties are too many, and then one looks for some other savior.

Michael Koehler: Yeah. That tendency to like, look for somebody who takes the pain away has been a theme that we've explored throughout the season, and I think it really culminates here. When people are disappointed that "the leader” is not taking the pain away or can't take the pain away fast enough, then they find a new one. And when I was thinking about the title, it's a brutal title, right? 'Assassination'. And I'm reading it as a metaphor. Like, one gets replaced, right? The role gets attacked, but it's also real. You know, as we heard in your family story, it is particularly in political office. Like, there are assassinations, it's a life and death situation sometimes when you are in these offices.

George Papandreou: Absolutely. Absolutely. Well, and during the dictatorship when my father was arrested, I had a gun put to my head because I was hiding him in a spot and they wanted me to reveal him. And then later on when I was Prime Minister, I had to make very difficult decisions, very painful. I mean, we all realized these were difficult decisions because this was a financial crisis, Greece had to make changes and cut down its deficits and its debt. And one of the ways was to cut wages and pensions from people who did not feel that they were responsible in one way or another. So, at some point, I got a lot of death threats, my family got a lot of death threats. There were lots of people saying, so this was a reality, and a difficult one.

Michael Koehler: What made it worth it? Sticking in the game. I mean, when this is so threatening when this becomes so personal. People-- I remember just briefly, I think, the first time I walked with you in Greece, in Athens, through a city, noticing people yelling at you. That was a few years after you got out of office, still angry. What made it worth it for you to do this work and to stay engaged in that work?

George Papandreou: Well, first of all, I understand that very well. I can understand the pain, and even people yelling at me at times. I think one has to stay with it, and one really believes in what one has been doing. I'll get into this more specifics, but first of all, if you are in politics, I mean, many people get into politics for many reasons, but we really think of politics in its very basic meaning. If we go back to the ancient Greeks, with all their faults and all their-- you know, there's no perfect society there either - the idea of politics comes from the idea of a citizen.

Basically, it is the revelation that you know, we actually can change our fate. Actually, we don't have to wait for a savior, we don't have to wait for some high authority. We don't want some high authority to concentrate power and decide for us. We, we, the people, the citizens - everybody was not a citizen - but I mean, we, the citizens can actually change things, and we can imagine a different world. We can imagine a better place, and we can see how collectively we'll deal with this and change things.

So actually, the idea of politics is to say, "Yes, let's get in here and see if we can make change, let's be change-makers." And some people actually have asked me many times something similar to what you asked me. They say, "Well, you were very unlucky. You know, you ended up becoming Prime Minister, you won 45% of the votes, you had a majority in parliament, you were very popular, and then you got with this terrible crisis, which fell upon Greece because of the previous government. So, you were unlucky." But I always say, "Well, you know, if I was called to run, to lead the country in its most difficult moments, then actually, that's an honor." And whether one did it the best one could do or not, that's another question. And running away from that responsibility would be like, "Well, why are you in politics, and why are you involved?" And of course, the responsibility also means burden, and it means, you know, problems that you will face, and you have to make some very difficult choices, and they will be painful; most for those whom they affect, but also for you yourself, your own person.

And they were, they were painful because they were not things I wanted to do. It was not like I wanted to cut wages, that I was sort of happy to, you know, but I knew that if this was not done, Greece would go bankrupt for a number of reasons. Of course, one thing that I think comes out of this chapter, but generally out of what Ron of course talks about is, you have those who look for technical solutions to these crises. And that was one of the problems I think that Europe, and maybe even Angela Merkel was seeing-- she had her approach, and we can get into that too. But then the different institutions, the IMF, the Central Bank of Europe, and the Commission of the European Union, this was called the Troika,if you like, they would make decisions. They would see it more as a technical problem. You just have the political will to make the technical issue go– well, with a technical problem, you have a deficit, all you do is just, you know, cut here, cut there, and then things are better.

What I was trying to say is, this was sort of the tip of the iceberg. Underneath, there were much deeper problems. Like, system of the state that were not functioning well, a lot of clientelism, there was corruption, there was lack of expertise in certain areas, there was too much concentration of power in the bureaucracy, and we needed to decentralize, but it was also an adaptive challenge for our whole society about how we do politics. That was difficult for many to see. And as a matter of fact, so when I left, the person that replaced me, immediately, I was able to create a coalition with other parties to sustain the program of change. But the technocrat basically took, as it did in Italy, after Berlusconi, because the idea was, "Okay, technocrat knows what to do." So, this was just the idea of, you know, "You just need to apply a technique." It was much deeper, much deeper to change the sort of, the whole way of looking at society and the way politics is done.

In these times of distress, in these times of uncertainty, there are different types of leadership reactions. So, one is like, "Okay, let's get back to normal." You know, we've lost the normalcy, we've lost what we had before with the financial crisis, we've had it now with the pandemic, let's just get back to normal. What that basically is telling people that this is a technical issue, you know, that all we need is, you know, the doctors to tell us what to do for our health, while it actually is a much deeper adaptive process. You know, climate change dealt us a blow with the viruses, but also the financial institutions dealt us a blow of maybe how our banks are working, maybe how we spend our money, how we bring in more transparency, how we fight corruption, client-holistic system, which seemed to work, you know, people could get their ways, but in the end, it was not productive and it was creating huge dependencies of people on "who has the power, and who has connections and so on." How do you liberate people from this and take their own responsibility and become more productive, more free, and so on?

So, going back to normal is in one way, very passive. It's not creating the capacity of a society. We lose an opportunity from this crisis if you just want to go back to normal. Because obviously, going back to normal means going back to where the problems actually began and repeating them. Then of course, we have this assassination, but it's a different type of assassination. It's not assassinating authority, it's basically finding a scapegoat, and then assassinating the scapegoat literally, or metaphorically. So, it's the foreigner, it's the migrant, it's the refugee, it's the, you know, the LGBT community, it's whatever is different. It's another nation, or the bad technocrats, or it's the other party, whatever. So, you find a scapegoat and you build your own constituency on hate, and on fear, and you empower your own constituency, but you don't empower them to actually make change, you empower them to hate somebody else. So, you give them a sense of mobilizing, a sense of power, but it's a power that divides society in a terrible way.

We've seen that in the United States, we've seen that in many other parts of the world. That also immobilizes society. That creates terrible problems for a society to be able to adapt because any change is then politicized into, "Okay, who is it? Is it for this side? Or is it for that side?" There's no way to move. So, how do we then create a society, which is– or a type of leadership, which mobilizes in a positive way, to be able to take pain, but also to include many more people or many more constituents in a way which you can-- you know, it's a bit like giving birth.

One is the very passive way of keeping society alone, not really involved, it's a bit of a suicide. Then another is assassination; you either kill authority or you kill the other guy on the other side. And the other one is really the pain of birth something we know, which is, actually, in our societies, very much a community activity. We all partake, even though women are the center of births, it is a community spirit, there's family, a neighborhood, society, you know, we celebrate births. But it's painful, there's labor.

Michael Koehler: What a beautiful analysis of the difficulty that comes with adaptive work and all of these different inclinations for us to avoid that work, and avoid the heat, avoid the pains that come with adaptive work.

We're really curious to learn a little bit more from your experience in your various, kind of, on various adaptive challenges. And I would love to anchor that, as always, around a quote that you brought. So, there's probably many good quotes here, but like, which is the one quote, George, that you chose for us to dig in a little bit more deeply today?

George Papandreou: Yes, there are many quotes. And I think the one that I feel is very pertinent for today's world is the following: "Severe distress can make people cruel. Empathy, compassion, and flexibility of mind, are sacrificed to the desperate desire for order." What we are facing today is severe distress. We are facing in our world today, severe distress. It's uncertainty, it's unpredictability, it's a sense of insecurity. I would add to that, there are real reasons, it's not just complexity. There is a lot of inequality, there's huge inequities in our societies in this globalized world of global capitalism. And again, you have different ways of dealing with this distress. People want, when they're in distress, the knee-jerk reaction is, of course, "Okay, how do we get back to some normalcy? To what I know, to what I know is safe." There is a lot of pressure on leaders then to just say, "Yeah, I'll get things quickly back to normal. You know, I'll calm you down.” Because what we are seeing today is not something temporary.

We are seeing a long period ahead of us, of major challenges for humanity. Just think of a climate crisis. This is a major adaptation. Major changes in our daily lives, and the way we consume, and the way we produce, and the way we communicate, our transport, build our housing, our energy, and of course, in our environment. So, how do you deal with this stress? Because of this fear, it's easy to look for a savior. It's also easy to move towards a sort of isolationism. You know, build walls, close down your house, close the shutters, let the storm go by, and we've seen this around the world. I mean, Brexit was one of these reactions, I believe. This is the way you feel to bring back control. That was the motto of the Brexiteers, to bring back control. But is it really control? Because I often, you know, when I go through stress and problems, I'd say, "Oh, I just want to go off to a Greek island, play my guitar, drink my wine, eat my fish, swim, you know, and isolate myself from the world."

And of course, there is respite. I mean, it's beautiful to go of to a Greek island, but then I remember last year I was on this beautiful island of Skopelos, it's one of these Mamma Mia islands, for those who have seen that movie. We were watching the other island next to us, just up in flames. And we were terrified that the fire would come to our island. We have water being warmer, because of the climate change, and we're getting tropical fish coming into the Mediterranean, that are predatory and very different, and I think destroying the ecosystem of the Mediterranean. You have the beautiful ruins underneath in the waters of Greece, but also you have, in the Mediterranean, all this plastic that's been around the world, of course, down there.

And of course, you could be on an island, nice little island, and of a sudden, a boat comes from Africa, and it's these, you know, very very, very people in pain; refugees. So, we cannot isolate ourselves from these problems. So, rather than giving this false narrative to our citizens, we have to be open and really educated. Now, that takes time. And as a leader, you don't always have that time to pace that.

Michael Koehler: I would love to talk about pacing, particularly when we think about that Euro Crisis, that story that you began to tell because, of course, the time was ticking there, quite intensely for massive amount of changes. And, so I want to invite you to share a little bit more about sort of how you managed the pacing there. But before that, I'll read this sentence one more time. And as I read it, I invite you to sort of, as you think about that experience, to see what moments, images are coming up. So here it comes; "Severe distress can make people cruel. Empathy, compassion, and flexibility of mind are sacrificed to the desperate desire for order."

George Papandreou: What comes to mind is both the anger on the one hand, which really started being expressed, and I would say, also exploited by other political figures saying, "You know, this is really, really building it up." But then also the desire for order takes the form of almost looking for a magical solution, than more sort of a magical formula. So, when I was dealing with this crisis, there were many people that would say, "Well, why didn't you go and ask? You know, you have a big debt, and people are not buying their bonds." I don't want to get into details of the financial crisis, but Greece could not borrow at levels which were sustainable. You know, the interest rate was going up, and up, and up, and markets were profiting on this. There was a lot of speculation, so people said, "Well, why didn’t you go to Putin? You know, go to Russia and ask them for a loan, and, you know, solve the problem." You know, actually, I did. I went to many leaders to see if they would be ready to buy Greek debt. They didn't. And I understand why. But of course, Putin said, "Well, are you going to buy some of our military equipment?" Anyway, I don't want to get into that.

But that was sort of a myth that, you know, we could just find somebody to solve our problem. Also, the idea that possibly you could have just defaulted the amount, and then this would've been easy. And we had actually thought about this and we said, well if we did defaulted, we would not be able to pay wages at all. We would have to, you know, and nobody– teachers, doctors, civil servants, military would have to all of a sudden stop. We would also have to move most likely to the Drachma, from the Euro, which would mean about 50% inflation. We basically felt just everything would go up. So, you could imagine this would've been a huge thing, but of course, it's very different when people feel the pain, and when you tell them the pain could be even worse. But they're saying, "Yeah, but I'm feeling the pain now. I don't know if it's going to be worse. Maybe there was a different solution." So, there is a tendency-- obviously, all of us, when we feel this pain to say, "okay, let's just find a way to get rid of it rather than seeing.”

Because this is an adaptive challenge for ourselves, but it was also an adaptive challenge for Europe, because when I went to my counterparts in the European Union, the other Prime Ministers, and they said, "Well, how did your governments run up such a huge debt and such a huge deficit?" The previous government, I was not the one that did that, it was the previous government. Well, first of all, people knew that in the European Union, many people knew it in the European Union, but they were sort of hiding it because they were worried about the consequences. So, they were not being honest. But then when it was revealed on my watch, and then of course everybody said, "Okay, why did you do this?" And so on, and I analyzed the reasons of it, and I said, "I'm ready to make the changes." But what happened then in Europe was they said, "Okay, this is just a Greek problem. It has nothing to do with the Euro, it has nothing to do with Europe, it has nothing to do with the financial crisis.” But actually, it was this problem that started in Wall Street.

The Euro has a new construction, we have different economies, different debts, and the markets we're seeing that you know, you have a strong economy in Germany, a weaker economy in Spain, or Italy, or Greece. So, the markets were seen as a very sort of construction, which was not very well thought through. When I would say, "Well, this is not just a Greek problem, it's also a European problem." People would say, "No, no, no, no, no. It's a Greek problem. "So, if it's a Greek problem, you have to do all the work. We don't have to do any work. We don't have to do as, you know, as European Union or as Germans or as French or whatever. You do the work, you do the difficult lifting, and things will be fine.” Well, as time went by, and this was not happening because the markets were saying, "Well, are you going to really support your own currency?" And the other countries, one after another, countries started to fall.

You know, so it was Greece, then it was Portugal, Ireland, and Cyprus, and it almost became Italy and Spain, and then Draghi came in and said," I will come in and look to the market, and I will calm the markets." And that slowed down this process. But then, easily scapegoating Greece became another story which did not allow for an adaptive change in Europe, because if just the Greeks are to blame, you know, "These lazy Ouzo-drinking Greeks," then it's very simple to blame them. Which means we're the thrifty Germans, you know, and then so on. But of course, what that did is undermine both the capacity for Europe to think how it should really rethink its own structures, but also, it undermined, the solidarity between Europeans, because then it became the question-- and I think that's what Europe then felt over the next few years, which brought up a lot of populism, a lot of isolationism or you know, racism, and so on.

Michael Koehler: Yeah. I remember very vividly the cruelty that this sentence talks about in German newspapers, kind of talking about Greek stereotypes. And as I'm listening to you, you know, it's really like in that short period, there was like so many adaptive challenges for you to address, both with authority in your own country, managing that really ambitious change agenda, but then also that adaptive work within Europe. And you know, around, like, how do we basically function as Europe together? How do we show solidarity? How do we function as an economic unit that is discovering how that works when suddenly we have a shared currency, and potentially different needs, and no real political body that holds all of Europe, but like, all of these authorities that have their own constituencies to cater to, but like constituencies have different needs? That seems like a lot of work to be done in a very short amount of time. Heifetz talks about pacing the work in this chapter. How can you even pace the work when the pressures are so high? Is it possible, or was it an impossible job that you had?

George Papandreou: It was a very difficult job. Actually, after about a year, a year and a half, when we had made some major reforms, we all of a sudden became the poster child in Europe. "Oh, wow. You're doing so great. No other country has ever cut their deficit so much. No other country has, you know, made so many reforms. No other country has been able to--" So, we were the poster child, but the problem was not going away. What was the problem? That Greece had to be able to go out on the markets and borrow at low interest rates, and they saw that this was not happening. Greece was continually being attacked. Why?

Because it was part of the Euro, and the European Union was not supporting it. They were not saying,"No, we're going to support the Greek bonds, since there's a community." And what happened in Europe actually was, because there was no one body, people looked - as Heifetz would say, to the silverback gorilla you - you know, who is the leader here? Well, who was the leader? Of course, it was Angela Merkel. Why? Because Germany was the strong economy of Europe. That may change now with this energy problem, as we're dealing with Ukraine, and so on. And it's really hitting the German economy very, very hard. But at that time, German economy was the strong economy, and the credible economy in the global markets.

So, what happened was everybody then looked towards Merkel. She was the one to make the decisions. And not only that, but people had to show that they were very close to Merkel and whatever she said. Because if you differentiated yourself from Germany, then the markets might say, "Oh, maybe this country is, you know, not really that credible. You know, they're not following these rules, they're not following what Merkel is saying.” So then, Merkel had this amazing, huge power to decide what should be done. And not only that, but then Greece was sort of the outcast. And I remember other countries that were sort of on the edge of possibly being attacked by the markets, like Spain or like Portugal, they would see Greece more like, "Oh, hey! Let's not get sick, let's not catch this virus. You know, let's not be these sort of lepers." So, in Greece, I was at the authority to make the changes, outside of Greece, I was the leper in a sense. So, how did you balance that? And of course, then, I had to explain to the Greek people.

I think in the initial stages, we were able to actually make big sacrifices, and the Greek people, I would say, the majority of the Greek citizens actually accepted us. They realized there was a problem, and there was support. And then when we were able to actually create a mechanism inside the European Union, which would protect us from the market-- so, if we needed to borrow from this mechanism, we could do so - I remember coming back after a very difficult struggle in, I think it was in Brussels, negotiation to create this mechanism - Angela Merkel was not too happy to have this mechanism, finally, she did accept it - and I remember I came back and I went to a restaurant and people were really following these things, you know, and I went to have a dinner in a restaurant, and all of a sudden everybody stood up and clapped, just like that.

So, they felt that I had brought a sense of protection. Europe was going to protect us. That was something really needed. So, there was a sense you need people to feel that you're fighting to protect them. What happened of course is, this dragged on and the initial very difficult sacrifices, people felt were not respected by others outside Greece. They were continually bashing the Greeks, continually saying how we're lazy, and so on, that even though we had made huge, huge changes, but then there was also the sense that we need to do more and do more because the markets were continually bashing Greece, and we were the problem. So, we reached a point where the stress was so big, so painful, that I realized I could not alone contain this.

Michael Koehler: We'll be back in two weeks with part two of our conversation with Prime Minister Papandreou, around Chapter 10 of Ron Heifetz’s book, Leadership Without Easy Answers. We'll dive more deeply into the work of pacing and inclusion, and we'll look at one of Papandreou's most controversial leadership moves at the time, which was to give people a choice through a referendum:

“I was giving power to our citizens. You can make the decision. And the traditional political world didn't like this because had the decision been a positive one in this plebiscite, in this referendum, the other parties would have no say. They would have lost power, and many others, of course. So, inclusion is not a simple thing either. You are basically changing the power structure, and the old power structures will very possibly react to this.”

Michael Koehler: Prime Minister Papandreou will also share some lessons from another leadership case from early in his career as Foreign Minister, where he made significant progress on the Greek-Turkish relations with beautiful insights about taking risks, using momentum, and more work on the theme of inclusion.

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On the Balcony is brought to you by KONU - Growing and Provoking Leadership – and hosted by me, Michael Koehler. We’re produced by Podigy: Editing – Riley Byrne, Daniel Link. Cover art by Kenneth Amoyo and Rosie Greenberg. Our music is called ‘Change in Blue’ by Hannah Gill and the Hours.

Thanks for listening. We'll see you for Episode 11, On the Balcony.