1 00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:03,599 W. Curtis Preston: I prefer a cloud-based system that will backup 2 00:00:03,599 --> 00:00:05,159 the most important stuff for you. 3 00:00:05,999 --> 00:00:06,099 Um, 4 00:00:06,169 --> 00:00:08,159 Prasanna Malaiyandi: I'll disagree with Curtis here 5 00:00:08,679 --> 00:00:09,130 Mark Shriner: Okay, 6 00:00:09,239 --> 00:00:09,899 Prasanna Malaiyandi: I am. 7 00:00:10,630 --> 00:00:11,079 Mark Shriner: here we go. 8 00:00:11,669 --> 00:00:11,939 Prasanna Malaiyandi: Right. 9 00:00:12,159 --> 00:00:14,249 I agree that to some extent, yes. 10 00:00:14,249 --> 00:00:15,749 SaaS based is good. 11 00:00:16,569 --> 00:00:18,479 W. Curtis Preston: I just muted your microphone Prasanna. 12 00:00:20,819 --> 00:00:21,749 Prasanna Malaiyandi: Thanks, Curtis. 13 00:00:24,279 --> 00:00:25,239 W. Curtis Preston: I've never done that. 14 00:00:25,239 --> 00:00:25,809 That was fun. 15 00:00:46,818 --> 00:00:50,088 Hi and welcome to Backup Central's Restore it All podcast. 16 00:00:50,088 --> 00:00:50,808 I'm your host, W. 17 00:00:50,808 --> 00:00:51,458 Curtis Preston. 18 00:00:51,528 --> 00:00:52,488 AKA Mr. 19 00:00:52,488 --> 00:00:58,338 Backup and have with me, my close personal friend, but a guy who's impossible to get 20 00:00:58,338 --> 00:01:01,358 an actual date with Prasanna Malaiyandi. 21 00:01:01,378 --> 00:01:02,418 How's it going Prasanna. 22 00:01:02,698 --> 00:01:04,468 Prasanna Malaiyandi: oh, Curtis, I'm good. 23 00:01:04,518 --> 00:01:09,348 I know the fact that you came all the way up to Santa Clara to visit the office 24 00:01:09,408 --> 00:01:11,218 and we didn't get a chance to meet. 25 00:01:12,188 --> 00:01:13,728 W. Curtis Preston: And how many times has that happened? 26 00:01:13,998 --> 00:01:14,628 Just saying, 27 00:01:15,178 --> 00:01:15,628 Prasanna Malaiyandi: We didn't. 28 00:01:15,688 --> 00:01:16,138 No, no, no. 29 00:01:16,168 --> 00:01:20,278 I think last time you came up, we did meet because remember we did the photo shoot. 30 00:01:21,278 --> 00:01:21,758 W. Curtis Preston: okay. 31 00:01:21,788 --> 00:01:21,998 All right. 32 00:01:21,998 --> 00:01:22,618 That doesn't count. 33 00:01:22,618 --> 00:01:23,858 The photo shoot doesn't count. 34 00:01:23,948 --> 00:01:24,578 Prasanna Malaiyandi: it does. 35 00:01:25,238 --> 00:01:25,988 I think so. 36 00:01:27,278 --> 00:01:30,338 And then the time before we met twice, so 37 00:01:30,668 --> 00:01:30,818 I 38 00:01:30,818 --> 00:01:33,938 think that I get to carry over one of those, but you were also 39 00:01:33,938 --> 00:01:34,388 busy. 40 00:01:34,418 --> 00:01:34,688 You were 41 00:01:34,853 --> 00:01:36,008 W. Curtis Preston: still feeling a little butt hurt. 42 00:01:36,668 --> 00:01:37,988 Prasanna Malaiyandi: but you were also busy with 43 00:01:37,988 --> 00:01:38,108 your 44 00:01:38,293 --> 00:01:40,723 W. Curtis Preston: get a date with my friend, by the way, my 45 00:01:40,723 --> 00:01:46,453 friend whose wife isn't even in town, like who, who took, who took 46 00:01:46,453 --> 00:01:48,943 priority over hanging out with me? 47 00:01:49,243 --> 00:01:55,723 What entity I want you to say publicly, what entity took 48 00:01:55,723 --> 00:01:57,253 priority over, hanging out with me. 49 00:01:57,733 --> 00:01:58,453 Prasanna Malaiyandi: The dog. 50 00:01:58,738 --> 00:01:59,428 W. Curtis Preston: The dog. 51 00:01:59,458 --> 00:01:59,938 Yeah. 52 00:02:00,178 --> 00:02:00,598 Yeah. 53 00:02:00,838 --> 00:02:03,448 The dog, you had something to do with the dog. 54 00:02:03,808 --> 00:02:05,908 And so that was more important than hanging out with me, 55 00:02:06,058 --> 00:02:07,588 but whatever, I'm not hurt. 56 00:02:07,858 --> 00:02:08,698 I'm clearly I'm 57 00:02:08,698 --> 00:02:09,148 not hurt. 58 00:02:09,868 --> 00:02:10,618 Prasanna Malaiyandi: I love you. 59 00:02:11,438 --> 00:02:12,248 W. Curtis Preston: whatever. 60 00:02:13,888 --> 00:02:14,428 All right. 61 00:02:14,428 --> 00:02:18,838 So our guest is like, what have I wandered into, uh, so, 62 00:02:19,753 --> 00:02:19,873 Prasanna Malaiyandi: Yeah. 63 00:02:21,238 --> 00:02:24,778 W. Curtis Preston: so, uh, we actually have a, this is one of the 64 00:02:24,778 --> 00:02:30,058 few times where I was on our guest's podcast, and now he's on my podcast. 65 00:02:30,458 --> 00:02:34,168 Mark Shriner is the strategic sales director for a memo Q a leading 66 00:02:34,168 --> 00:02:38,728 translation management system and host of the secure talk podcast, 67 00:02:38,728 --> 00:02:41,068 which is how we came to meet. 68 00:02:41,308 --> 00:02:45,808 I got to go over and talk about backups on his podcast, and then he got to come here. 69 00:02:45,808 --> 00:02:49,468 He's now on my podcast to talk about security. 70 00:02:49,928 --> 00:02:52,738 He graduated from Penn state university with a bachelor's degree 71 00:02:52,738 --> 00:02:54,178 in liberal arts and sciences. 72 00:02:54,708 --> 00:02:59,478 In 2022, he completed Harvard cyber security, managing risk in the 73 00:02:59,478 --> 00:03:01,998 information age, diploma program. 74 00:03:02,378 --> 00:03:04,368 welcome to the podcast Mark Shriner. 75 00:03:05,093 --> 00:03:05,753 Mark Shriner: Thank you, Curtis. 76 00:03:05,753 --> 00:03:06,593 And thank you persona. 77 00:03:06,653 --> 00:03:09,863 It's a actually, I've had fun kind of watching you guys with the intro there. 78 00:03:09,863 --> 00:03:11,753 You seem like an old married couple or something too, 79 00:03:12,863 --> 00:03:15,083 W. Curtis Preston: We're an old, married couple that never sees each other. 80 00:03:15,083 --> 00:03:15,203 I'm 81 00:03:15,283 --> 00:03:15,623 Mark Shriner: right? 82 00:03:17,213 --> 00:03:20,123 W. Curtis Preston: cause cause Prasanna lives in and you know what it is. 83 00:03:20,123 --> 00:03:22,463 It's a Santa Clara Yeah. 84 00:03:22,703 --> 00:03:23,633 He lives in Santa Clara. 85 00:03:23,633 --> 00:03:26,783 I live in San Diego and you live a little bit farther north, 86 00:03:26,783 --> 00:03:28,223 as I recall up in Seattle. 87 00:03:28,463 --> 00:03:28,943 Mark Shriner: Yes. 88 00:03:28,943 --> 00:03:29,213 Yes. 89 00:03:29,213 --> 00:03:31,043 And I'm envious of both of your weather. 90 00:03:31,343 --> 00:03:34,103 Um, I actually, to be honest with you, I just spent the last three months 91 00:03:34,133 --> 00:03:37,973 traveling between Arizona, uh, St. 92 00:03:37,973 --> 00:03:41,153 George, Utah, Las Vegas, and San Diego and Los Angeles all in that 93 00:03:41,153 --> 00:03:43,793 area for three months for business and for some personal business. 94 00:03:44,333 --> 00:03:48,113 And in three months we had like five cloudy, rainy days. 95 00:03:48,473 --> 00:03:51,143 And I got back here at the beginning of may thinking like, Hey, it's 96 00:03:51,143 --> 00:03:52,763 safe to come back to Seattle wrong. 97 00:03:54,768 --> 00:03:55,908 W. Curtis Preston: Yeah, it's funny to see. 98 00:03:56,118 --> 00:04:00,438 Seattle is one of those places where, when it is sunny, it is just one of 99 00:04:00,438 --> 00:04:01,938 the most beautiful places on earth. 100 00:04:01,938 --> 00:04:02,178 Right. 101 00:04:02,228 --> 00:04:02,838 I remember. 102 00:04:02,978 --> 00:04:06,498 And I think I told you on when I was on your podcast, that I did some 103 00:04:06,498 --> 00:04:11,148 work for Amazon back in 1998, I put in for the record, I put it in their 104 00:04:11,148 --> 00:04:12,768 first enterprise wide backup system. 105 00:04:13,308 --> 00:04:17,168 And, um, I was there in the summer. 106 00:04:17,288 --> 00:04:17,798 Right. 107 00:04:17,888 --> 00:04:22,148 And not a single cloudy day for three months. 108 00:04:22,178 --> 00:04:27,128 And it was like I said to them, you know, going up to Mount Rainier and going out on 109 00:04:27,128 --> 00:04:33,908 the sound and watching them throw the fish there it's a pike place market, of course, 110 00:04:33,998 --> 00:04:35,498 hanging out at the bubble gum wall. 111 00:04:35,588 --> 00:04:37,508 I'm just saying, I like, I like Seattle, 112 00:04:37,898 --> 00:04:39,158 the original Starbucks. 113 00:04:39,248 --> 00:04:39,458 Prasanna Malaiyandi: Yeah. 114 00:04:39,458 --> 00:04:43,118 I went up for a trip, I think like four years ago around this time in may. 115 00:04:43,388 --> 00:04:46,098 And like, the weather was gorgeous, like perfectly sunny. 116 00:04:46,118 --> 00:04:48,728 And I was asking everyone, I was like, what are you guys complaining about? 117 00:04:48,728 --> 00:04:49,688 The weather is gorgeous. 118 00:04:49,688 --> 00:04:52,748 They're like, you just ended up being here on like the perfect week. 119 00:04:53,728 --> 00:04:53,938 W. Curtis Preston: Yeah. 120 00:04:53,998 --> 00:04:58,888 in contrast right now in Seattle or in San Diego, we are in the 121 00:04:58,888 --> 00:05:00,898 middle of what we call may gray. 122 00:05:01,138 --> 00:05:03,508 And then next, next month will be June loom. 123 00:05:03,838 --> 00:05:07,558 Uh, this is the worst time of the year to actually visit San Diego. 124 00:05:07,708 --> 00:05:11,218 I mean, you can get sunny days, but there will be, you know, 125 00:05:11,218 --> 00:05:14,128 multiple days in a row where it's just a hundred percent overcast. 126 00:05:14,608 --> 00:05:16,618 Mark Shriner: Is it, is it because of the fog that comes in 127 00:05:16,618 --> 00:05:17,938 or is it just overcast and gray? 128 00:05:18,303 --> 00:05:19,863 W. Curtis Preston: It's overcast and gray. 129 00:05:19,893 --> 00:05:21,273 Um, it's not, it's not. 130 00:05:21,273 --> 00:05:25,383 So the fog we call that the Marine layer, uh, the Marine layer generally 131 00:05:25,413 --> 00:05:27,753 burns off after around nine or 10. 132 00:05:27,753 --> 00:05:31,713 If you have, if you have a strong Marine layer and it's just weird because 133 00:05:31,713 --> 00:05:36,093 there's no rain connected with it, it's just sort of gloomy, you know? 134 00:05:36,183 --> 00:05:39,903 Um, and, uh, it just is what it is and, you know, and I 135 00:05:39,973 --> 00:05:41,043 talk to people all the time. 136 00:05:41,043 --> 00:05:42,783 They're like, yeah, yeah. 137 00:05:43,113 --> 00:05:44,493 Um, and it, and it just. 138 00:05:45,158 --> 00:05:46,428 Uh, people will come here. 139 00:05:46,458 --> 00:05:47,868 So I thought you guys were sunny. 140 00:05:47,888 --> 00:05:50,948 I'm like, you know, to tell you it's it's may gray man. 141 00:05:51,218 --> 00:05:51,608 Welcome to 142 00:05:51,668 --> 00:05:54,268 Mark Shriner: Whenever I've been in San Diego, it's always been sunny and I come 143 00:05:54,268 --> 00:05:55,348 down there three or four times a year. 144 00:05:55,348 --> 00:05:58,528 I'll be there twice, this summer for soccer, for my son's soccer tournaments. 145 00:05:59,128 --> 00:06:00,298 Uh, but I love it. 146 00:06:00,658 --> 00:06:02,038 W. Curtis Preston: So I I'm curious. 147 00:06:02,138 --> 00:06:04,628 What drew you to cybersecurity? 148 00:06:06,333 --> 00:06:08,463 Mark Shriner: Well, a couple of different things. 149 00:06:08,463 --> 00:06:08,823 I think. 150 00:06:11,483 --> 00:06:19,733 In 2017, we were moving back from a nine year stint in Asia, moving back to the 151 00:06:19,733 --> 00:06:23,453 states and a good friend of mine, uh, had. 152 00:06:24,268 --> 00:06:26,558 A company that would be with becoming a Microsoft 153 00:06:26,738 --> 00:06:28,148 cybersecurity compliance partner. 154 00:06:28,538 --> 00:06:30,938 Um, he was looking for some help on the business development side. 155 00:06:31,328 --> 00:06:33,428 And, um, and I, and I started taking a look. 156 00:06:33,788 --> 00:06:38,648 The more I researched, the more interested I became because, you know, cybersecurity 157 00:06:38,648 --> 00:06:40,598 is something that can go a mile wide. 158 00:06:41,098 --> 00:06:43,618 And, and, and then also a mile deep in any one of those things. 159 00:06:43,618 --> 00:06:48,298 If you want to talk about, you know, pen testing, uh, backups, um, 160 00:06:48,358 --> 00:06:52,318 encryption, different, you know, compliance organizations, you can 161 00:06:52,318 --> 00:06:56,098 just go in so many, uh, data loss prevention, endpoint protection. 162 00:06:56,098 --> 00:06:59,458 I mean, you can go so many different directions and then each one of those, you 163 00:06:59,458 --> 00:07:01,258 can go down these super deep rabbit holes. 164 00:07:01,618 --> 00:07:03,148 And I like learning. 165 00:07:03,418 --> 00:07:09,058 The other thing I, that I find interesting about cybersecurity back then, and now is. 166 00:07:10,043 --> 00:07:14,033 Before, I think we thought that this is the cybersecurity. 167 00:07:14,033 --> 00:07:17,893 There was a couple of people in the back, in the corner of the it department that, 168 00:07:17,893 --> 00:07:22,463 that their job is cybersecurity, but everybody in an organization needs to have 169 00:07:22,463 --> 00:07:25,923 some type of awareness and responsibility for security, but beyond that. 170 00:07:26,453 --> 00:07:30,173 Us as individuals and consumers, we need to be aware of some 171 00:07:30,173 --> 00:07:31,433 security best practices. 172 00:07:31,433 --> 00:07:33,023 And so it affects everybody's life. 173 00:07:33,413 --> 00:07:36,353 And it's something that, you know, 30 years ago, nobody was talking 174 00:07:36,353 --> 00:07:37,883 about because there was no internet. 175 00:07:37,883 --> 00:07:41,813 And now it's hugely important with the internet, social media, everything. 176 00:07:42,023 --> 00:07:42,923 I have three children. 177 00:07:43,408 --> 00:07:47,638 And they need to know some best practices about, you know, what 178 00:07:47,638 --> 00:07:50,278 does a phishing campaign look like or a phishing attack look like? 179 00:07:50,488 --> 00:07:53,098 What w you know, how do they protect their passwords? 180 00:07:53,278 --> 00:07:56,098 What should they shouldn't do with their, with their mobile devices, et cetera. 181 00:07:56,278 --> 00:07:57,388 So it affects everybody. 182 00:07:57,388 --> 00:08:04,048 And it's this, this like new field that was created partially based upon 183 00:08:04,048 --> 00:08:05,848 the explosion of the internet in IOT. 184 00:08:06,148 --> 00:08:10,598 So, um, I think we're just getting started in both in terms of understanding 185 00:08:10,618 --> 00:08:17,108 the threat landscape, but also the, um, the best practices for prevention. 186 00:08:17,168 --> 00:08:17,858 Does that make sense? 187 00:08:18,718 --> 00:08:21,808 Prasanna Malaiyandi: Do you see that a lot of this, I know it's an interesting point. 188 00:08:21,808 --> 00:08:23,878 You made that it's rolling into consumers. 189 00:08:23,878 --> 00:08:25,768 Like everyone has to start caring about this. 190 00:08:25,768 --> 00:08:26,668 Like every day. 191 00:08:27,358 --> 00:08:30,898 Do you start to find that that's actually happening or. 192 00:08:32,483 --> 00:08:35,303 Or are people sort of like, yeah, that's just something that a company 193 00:08:35,303 --> 00:08:39,933 has to worry about or a business has to worry about, or like this large CEO 194 00:08:39,933 --> 00:08:41,333 has to worry about not necessarily. 195 00:08:42,758 --> 00:08:46,388 Mark Shriner: Well, yeah, let me answer that by backing up even farther. 196 00:08:46,388 --> 00:08:50,108 I think in companies right now, where it used to be the perception of the. 197 00:08:50,643 --> 00:08:54,483 Part of the it teams or the, you know, the CISO's job there, is an a 198 00:08:54,483 --> 00:08:58,083 growing or increasing awareness that it's everybody's responsibilities. 199 00:08:58,233 --> 00:09:01,893 And so you'll have not only do you have like structured educational, um, 200 00:09:02,193 --> 00:09:05,703 programs, but you'll have like simulated phishing campaigns and things like that. 201 00:09:05,703 --> 00:09:07,383 So go enterprise wide. 202 00:09:07,623 --> 00:09:11,703 And if you get the CEO and he clicks on the wrong thing and boom, guess 203 00:09:11,703 --> 00:09:14,433 what you got to go to training you're in a you're you're doing timeout. 204 00:09:14,823 --> 00:09:16,473 Um, and companies try to make that. 205 00:09:17,188 --> 00:09:21,448 So in companies it's becoming, uh, I guess increasingly common for people to accept 206 00:09:21,448 --> 00:09:22,768 that everybody has a responsibility. 207 00:09:22,768 --> 00:09:25,828 If you find a thumb drive in the parking lot, don't just walk in and 208 00:09:25,828 --> 00:09:27,178 stick it in your company's device. 209 00:09:27,178 --> 00:09:27,478 Right. 210 00:09:27,478 --> 00:09:29,908 You know, and, and, and sharing those stories, you know? 211 00:09:31,373 --> 00:09:35,213 I remember growing up and listening to my, my grandparents, tell stories about this 212 00:09:35,213 --> 00:09:38,093 accident, that accident, this person who did something good, did something bad. 213 00:09:38,333 --> 00:09:39,863 And we learn from those stories. 214 00:09:40,193 --> 00:09:44,273 And I think when we share these stories about hacks or, you know, the famous 215 00:09:44,273 --> 00:09:47,213 story about somebody finding a thumb drive and then putting it in their device 216 00:09:47,213 --> 00:09:51,533 and then, you know, downloading some malware inadvertently, we learn from 217 00:09:51,533 --> 00:09:53,213 that and those stories are important. 218 00:09:53,543 --> 00:09:56,993 So that's one method of, uh, or one, I guess, data point. 219 00:09:57,753 --> 00:10:02,943 Come people in organizations are becoming increasingly where individuals I think 220 00:10:02,973 --> 00:10:07,233 are also becoming extreme, increasingly aware, let's start off with high net worth 221 00:10:07,233 --> 00:10:14,133 individuals, where they are very much in the sites of, um, targeted phishing, 222 00:10:14,133 --> 00:10:15,333 spear, phishing campaigns, right? 223 00:10:15,633 --> 00:10:19,773 And so there are certain tools and methods and processes out there to 224 00:10:19,773 --> 00:10:23,523 help these people at least become aware of what's what the threat looks like. 225 00:10:25,123 --> 00:10:28,388 But beyond that, I think, um, just the general public, you know, if 226 00:10:28,388 --> 00:10:33,068 I look at my kids, they are pretty suspicious and kind of cynical and 227 00:10:33,068 --> 00:10:36,728 almost jaded, uh, in terms of like, look at this, they'll show me stuff. 228 00:10:36,758 --> 00:10:39,008 They're like, look at this, you know, it's just, and because 229 00:10:39,028 --> 00:10:40,538 it's obviously it's a scam. 230 00:10:40,958 --> 00:10:41,678 And so I think. 231 00:10:42,518 --> 00:10:46,478 Um, people are becoming increasingly aware at the same time you still hear 232 00:10:46,478 --> 00:10:50,678 of consumers every day, you know, for example, they're, they're, they're 233 00:10:50,678 --> 00:10:55,478 transferring money to a title agency and somebody spoofs the, uh, the address, 234 00:10:55,778 --> 00:10:58,448 uh, that w where they're supposed to they're there, the account information, 235 00:10:58,688 --> 00:11:00,038 that kind of stuff is happening in. 236 00:11:00,038 --> 00:11:03,848 So, um, yes and no, to answer your question, I think people are 237 00:11:03,848 --> 00:11:06,698 becoming more aware, but there's, we have a long, long ways to go. 238 00:11:07,088 --> 00:11:07,418 Yeah. 239 00:11:07,538 --> 00:11:11,908 W. Curtis Preston: that there was a study back in 2016, uh, from the 240 00:11:11,908 --> 00:11:17,668 university of Michigan where they left a series of USB drives that had, 241 00:11:17,728 --> 00:11:22,378 that had an HTML in there that if you open up an HTML, it had an image tag. 242 00:11:22,378 --> 00:11:27,658 So they were able to identify, um, how many people actually clicked on the thing. 243 00:11:28,258 --> 00:11:31,798 What do you suppose the percentage was of the people that. 244 00:11:33,173 --> 00:11:36,953 Mark Shriner: Well, you know, university of Michigan, that's a, that's what? 245 00:11:36,953 --> 00:11:37,883 Big, big 10. 246 00:11:38,003 --> 00:11:45,173 Uh, those guys probably I'm west coast, so I I'm, I'm afraid to guess. 247 00:11:45,173 --> 00:11:45,953 W what was it? 248 00:11:46,358 --> 00:11:47,228 W. Curtis Preston: It was half, 249 00:11:48,683 --> 00:11:49,673 Mark Shriner: That was in what year? 250 00:11:50,258 --> 00:11:54,438 W. Curtis Preston: uh, 20 16, 297 USB drives around the Urbana 251 00:11:54,458 --> 00:11:56,648 champagne CA these are college kids. 252 00:11:58,448 --> 00:11:59,108 These are, 253 00:11:59,513 --> 00:12:01,583 Mark Shriner: At the one of the best universities in the country. 254 00:12:01,613 --> 00:12:02,123 Wow. 255 00:12:02,768 --> 00:12:05,288 W. Curtis Preston: They said they found that 48% of the drives are 256 00:12:05,288 --> 00:12:07,118 picked up and plugged into a computer. 257 00:12:07,328 --> 00:12:09,248 Some within minutes of being dropped. 258 00:12:11,183 --> 00:12:11,723 Mark Shriner: yeah. 259 00:12:11,843 --> 00:12:16,778 Well, Hopefully, hopefully the situation or the, the awareness is getting better. 260 00:12:17,048 --> 00:12:21,998 I mean, I look at little things like, um, turning on MFA's or multi-factor 261 00:12:21,998 --> 00:12:27,908 authentication two factor authentications for just any, any, obviously any bank 262 00:12:27,908 --> 00:12:32,408 accounts, but any, any of your online, um, tools or apps, just turn it on, 263 00:12:32,618 --> 00:12:34,628 you know, uh, it's a simple thing. 264 00:12:34,628 --> 00:12:36,308 That's going to stop 99%. 265 00:12:37,373 --> 00:12:38,843 But some people that, well, it's a hassle. 266 00:12:39,763 --> 00:12:40,183 W. Curtis Preston: Yeah. 267 00:12:40,223 --> 00:12:42,503 Mark Shriner: If you're, if your account gets compromised, then 268 00:12:42,503 --> 00:12:43,583 that's going to be a hassle. 269 00:12:43,583 --> 00:12:43,913 So. 270 00:12:44,073 --> 00:12:44,313 W. Curtis Preston: Yeah. 271 00:12:44,353 --> 00:12:48,333 I I've mentioned on this podcast a few times that I went from 272 00:12:48,333 --> 00:12:54,063 being kind of an MFA newb, I don't know, four or five years ago to. 273 00:12:55,223 --> 00:12:56,003 Slowly. 274 00:12:56,403 --> 00:12:59,513 And then, and then it sorta, it was sort of a snowball situation. 275 00:12:59,513 --> 00:12:59,743 Right. 276 00:12:59,783 --> 00:13:03,653 I ended up rolling MFA anywhere it mattered. 277 00:13:03,833 --> 00:13:04,313 Right. 278 00:13:04,793 --> 00:13:11,783 Um, and the cause I have, oh Lord, I have like 800 accounts. 279 00:13:12,608 --> 00:13:14,318 At, I'm not kidding. 280 00:13:14,318 --> 00:13:16,958 I have a password manager, so I, you know, I can pull it up and see it. 281 00:13:17,498 --> 00:13:21,338 And I have, uh, just, just hundreds and hundreds of 282 00:13:21,338 --> 00:13:23,768 accounts at random places where 283 00:13:23,818 --> 00:13:24,958 Mark Shriner: What are you doing, man? 284 00:13:25,333 --> 00:13:25,453 Prasanna Malaiyandi: Hey, 285 00:13:25,658 --> 00:13:27,488 W. Curtis Preston: I just, well, it's just stuff. 286 00:13:27,548 --> 00:13:28,028 Anyway. 287 00:13:28,288 --> 00:13:29,068 Mark Shriner: Persona persona. 288 00:13:29,068 --> 00:13:31,168 You going to tell me Curtis's into some shady stuff, man. 289 00:13:31,168 --> 00:13:32,298 If he's got 800 accounts, 290 00:13:33,253 --> 00:13:36,053 Prasanna Malaiyandi: well, I just hope he talks about his experience with MFA. 291 00:13:36,593 --> 00:13:36,983 W. Curtis Preston: Yeah. 292 00:13:37,013 --> 00:13:37,253 Yeah. 293 00:13:37,253 --> 00:13:42,893 So, and so I, I, don't my point, my point of mentioning how many accounts I have. 294 00:13:42,923 --> 00:13:47,093 I don't have MFA on most of those. 295 00:13:47,093 --> 00:13:47,393 Right. 296 00:13:47,393 --> 00:13:51,743 Because they're just stuff where I don't, there's no information I'm just anyway, 297 00:13:52,313 --> 00:13:56,513 but I did roll out MFA, uh, everywhere. 298 00:13:56,543 --> 00:14:01,313 And I, I use Google authenticator and wherever I could, because of what I knew 299 00:14:01,313 --> 00:14:03,383 about that using Google authenticator. 300 00:14:04,418 --> 00:14:11,078 Uh, text-based MFA and, and by the way, I, I, I dunno, well, I'd like to come back to 301 00:14:11,078 --> 00:14:13,058 that idea, but, but here's what happened. 302 00:14:13,478 --> 00:14:16,808 Um, I got a new phone and I got locked out of all my accounts. 303 00:14:17,348 --> 00:14:19,328 So, because I didn't know. 304 00:14:19,968 --> 00:14:21,558 I didn't know what I didn't know. 305 00:14:21,798 --> 00:14:29,128 And so I, um, I, when I re when I rolled that out again, uh, I switched to authy 306 00:14:29,478 --> 00:14:33,918 as an app, which allows you to back up the stuff and try, you know, anyway. 307 00:14:33,948 --> 00:14:34,158 Yeah. 308 00:14:34,158 --> 00:14:36,318 So, um, I'm a huge fan of MFA. 309 00:14:36,318 --> 00:14:38,718 And I, and I've mentioned before that, I went from kind of being 310 00:14:38,718 --> 00:14:41,568 a newb to being very angry. 311 00:14:41,568 --> 00:14:44,538 If there's a, if there's a company that I'm interacting with where 312 00:14:44,538 --> 00:14:46,548 things matter and they don't have. 313 00:14:47,558 --> 00:14:51,578 Uh, the authenticator style of, of, uh, MFA. 314 00:14:51,828 --> 00:14:54,078 Prasanna you're, you're you're up on this stuff. 315 00:14:54,078 --> 00:14:58,548 So here's, here's the thing I'm wondering if there's a company that offers 316 00:14:58,548 --> 00:15:01,278 multiple methods of authentication. 317 00:15:02,208 --> 00:15:07,788 Um, like my, my, my credit union, uh, they have my phone and, uh, 318 00:15:07,878 --> 00:15:11,838 they, they use a, they have an authenticator method where you get, 319 00:15:11,838 --> 00:15:14,568 uh, you get the little six digit code. 320 00:15:14,718 --> 00:15:17,748 If you, uh, pull up their app on your phone. 321 00:15:18,018 --> 00:15:18,978 I prefer that method. 322 00:15:18,978 --> 00:15:22,068 I use that method whenever I can, but should I be bothered by the 323 00:15:22,068 --> 00:15:24,498 fact that they also support SMS? 324 00:15:25,008 --> 00:15:27,618 Like there's no way to disable the fact that they have 325 00:15:28,168 --> 00:15:31,588 Prasanna Malaiyandi: I would be a little worried just because the number of sort 326 00:15:31,588 --> 00:15:35,188 of SIM swap attacks that are happening these days, like you hear it all the 327 00:15:35,188 --> 00:15:37,648 time when it comes to crypto, right. 328 00:15:37,798 --> 00:15:40,318 With all these acts where someone SIM swaps with someone else 329 00:15:40,528 --> 00:15:43,468 gets the authenticator code, cleans out their wallet, right. 330 00:15:43,498 --> 00:15:44,398 They're a Bitcoin wallet. 331 00:15:45,028 --> 00:15:47,248 So I think it is common. 332 00:15:47,458 --> 00:15:47,728 Right. 333 00:15:47,728 --> 00:15:48,868 And even T-Mobile right. 334 00:15:48,868 --> 00:15:52,678 Was accused of allowing a porting out of numbers as well. 335 00:15:52,678 --> 00:15:52,918 Right. 336 00:15:52,948 --> 00:15:53,758 That's another thing that can. 337 00:15:55,038 --> 00:15:55,398 W. Curtis Preston: right. 338 00:15:56,433 --> 00:15:58,743 So, so you, so you think I should be worried? 339 00:15:59,313 --> 00:16:00,513 I don't know what I could do. 340 00:16:00,918 --> 00:16:01,308 Prasanna Malaiyandi: Yeah. 341 00:16:01,338 --> 00:16:06,018 And it also depends to what extent, like some random person going after 342 00:16:06,018 --> 00:16:08,728 you specifically Curtis, right. 343 00:16:09,228 --> 00:16:10,668 W. Curtis Preston: I'm a big deal. 344 00:16:13,008 --> 00:16:13,668 Prasanna Malaiyandi: exactly. 345 00:16:14,568 --> 00:16:14,898 Right. 346 00:16:14,898 --> 00:16:19,488 But I think there are cases like if you're a high net worth user or even 347 00:16:19,548 --> 00:16:22,368 you have sensitive data or things like that, that you care about. 348 00:16:22,368 --> 00:16:22,668 Right. 349 00:16:22,668 --> 00:16:27,468 That I think, yeah, you should be worried about even email, right. 350 00:16:27,498 --> 00:16:28,908 Multi-factor authentication. 351 00:16:28,968 --> 00:16:30,378 Sometimes it's worrisome as well. 352 00:16:30,378 --> 00:16:30,708 Right. 353 00:16:31,008 --> 00:16:33,888 It's things which you can't completely secure on a. 354 00:16:35,743 --> 00:16:35,923 Mark Shriner: Yeah. 355 00:16:35,923 --> 00:16:42,073 That's what I'm seeing that most of the organizations that I'm F MFA with, um, 356 00:16:42,103 --> 00:16:46,963 offer an option could be, for example, a token that you have, um, uh, it could 357 00:16:46,963 --> 00:16:50,443 be the authenticator app could be a text, could be an email and they offer 358 00:16:50,443 --> 00:16:52,243 the consumer the choice at this point. 359 00:16:52,783 --> 00:16:56,123 Uh, probably just trying to make it easy for somebody to opt in with something. 360 00:16:56,618 --> 00:16:59,108 But there are obviously some that are more secure than others. 361 00:16:59,408 --> 00:17:03,818 And I, I spoke earlier about the, the awareness of some consumers, 362 00:17:03,818 --> 00:17:08,078 especially high net worth individuals, um, becoming more cyber aware. 363 00:17:08,498 --> 00:17:11,618 And the specific attack that I was thinking about is SIM swapping. 364 00:17:11,618 --> 00:17:13,778 And it's be, I, you know, I know a gentleman that's been, 365 00:17:13,778 --> 00:17:16,088 um, SIM swapped three times. 366 00:17:16,863 --> 00:17:21,993 You know, um, and it's, you know, he, he described it as he was on an airplane. 367 00:17:21,993 --> 00:17:23,523 He got out the airplane, his phone wouldn't work. 368 00:17:23,523 --> 00:17:23,763 Right. 369 00:17:23,763 --> 00:17:26,013 And it is took him days to get back online. 370 00:17:26,313 --> 00:17:31,593 It was maddening, scary, um, and primarily done through social engineering where 371 00:17:31,593 --> 00:17:36,813 they contact the, the, the mobile carrier and convince them that they 372 00:17:36,813 --> 00:17:39,153 are you and that you need a new SIM. 373 00:17:39,213 --> 00:17:40,403 And it's just that. 374 00:17:41,988 --> 00:17:42,188 W. Curtis Preston: Yeah. 375 00:17:42,218 --> 00:17:45,128 Prasanna Malaiyandi: They made it so easy to port numbers as well. 376 00:17:45,578 --> 00:17:48,878 That that's also another common vector. 377 00:17:49,633 --> 00:17:50,773 Mark Shriner: What does that mean to port a number? 378 00:17:50,773 --> 00:17:52,093 Does that mean to change carriers? 379 00:17:52,218 --> 00:17:53,218 Prasanna Malaiyandi: To change carriers. 380 00:17:53,413 --> 00:17:53,863 Mark Shriner: Okay. 381 00:17:53,868 --> 00:17:56,178 W. Curtis Preston: And so basically instead of just doing a SIM swap, 382 00:17:56,178 --> 00:17:59,688 they just pretend to be you and port your number to another carrier. 383 00:17:59,993 --> 00:18:00,533 Mark Shriner: Wow. 384 00:18:01,868 --> 00:18:02,288 W. Curtis Preston: Yeah. 385 00:18:02,438 --> 00:18:03,188 That's not good. 386 00:18:03,573 --> 00:18:05,073 Mark Shriner: These bad guys are really bad mint. 387 00:18:06,483 --> 00:18:08,433 W. Curtis Preston: I think that's something we can all agree on. 388 00:18:08,493 --> 00:18:15,063 Um, yeah, so, so like I have multiple accounts where, so like goo like Gmail. 389 00:18:15,123 --> 00:18:15,453 Okay. 390 00:18:15,483 --> 00:18:16,143 Gmail. 391 00:18:16,413 --> 00:18:18,753 It's very specific on what authentication. 392 00:18:19,578 --> 00:18:23,238 Systems that you use and you can disable ones that you 393 00:18:23,238 --> 00:18:24,708 don't want to use specifically. 394 00:18:24,708 --> 00:18:30,378 You can disable SMS authentication, but my credit union, uh, it supports all of them. 395 00:18:30,378 --> 00:18:34,458 And I suppose the only way to disable SMS based authentication is to delete 396 00:18:34,458 --> 00:18:36,468 my cell phone from the account. 397 00:18:36,498 --> 00:18:37,858 But that's just weird, 398 00:18:37,928 --> 00:18:39,548 Prasanna Malaiyandi: But Change it to like a mobile number 399 00:18:39,598 --> 00:18:40,868 or, sorry, to the home number, 400 00:18:42,568 --> 00:18:42,778 right. 401 00:18:42,778 --> 00:18:45,528 If your credit union allows you to say, is this a cell phone or. 402 00:18:46,533 --> 00:18:48,033 Or a mo or a home number. 403 00:18:48,783 --> 00:18:51,483 I'm sure if you select a home number, it won't send you SMS, but 404 00:18:51,668 --> 00:18:52,848 W. Curtis Preston: a ho what's a home number 405 00:18:52,848 --> 00:18:55,563 Prasanna Malaiyandi: a landline a landline and old school. 406 00:18:55,593 --> 00:18:58,803 Like, I, I know I've seen places where it's like, is this a home 407 00:18:58,803 --> 00:19:00,203 number or is this a cell phone? 408 00:19:02,448 --> 00:19:02,988 W. Curtis Preston: Interesting. 409 00:19:03,558 --> 00:19:08,688 Uh, so, so I'm curious, mark, what do you, if you're, so I know, you know, as 410 00:19:08,688 --> 00:19:13,068 a person dedicated to backup, there's, you know, I have sort of my top five 411 00:19:13,068 --> 00:19:17,268 of like, these are things and by the way, on your podcast, the first, like 412 00:19:17,268 --> 00:19:22,488 my biggest one, you and I talked about was the, the, the, the idea that cloud 413 00:19:22,488 --> 00:19:24,078 stuff is automatically backed up. 414 00:19:24,348 --> 00:19:25,028 Which it isn't. 415 00:19:25,988 --> 00:19:31,208 Um, if somebody were to say, you know, what are the top five things that I need 416 00:19:31,208 --> 00:19:36,368 to be concerned about, uh, as a, you know, either personally or, or it sounds 417 00:19:36,368 --> 00:19:37,838 like personally you're thinking MFA, 418 00:19:38,638 --> 00:19:38,938 Mark Shriner: All right. 419 00:19:38,968 --> 00:19:43,678 I would say that's just a best practice personally or for, for companies 420 00:19:43,978 --> 00:19:49,048 and companies have a little bit more sophisticated tools at their disposal, 421 00:19:49,048 --> 00:19:52,828 so they can push an MFA depending on, you know, the user behavior. 422 00:19:52,828 --> 00:19:53,938 Are they logging in from. 423 00:19:54,978 --> 00:19:55,998 A new location. 424 00:19:55,998 --> 00:19:57,528 Are they logging in from another country? 425 00:19:57,528 --> 00:20:01,608 Is there some kind of, some kind of anomalous behavior, this, you know, 426 00:20:01,608 --> 00:20:05,988 mark never accesses these files now he's downloading gigs, downloading 427 00:20:05,988 --> 00:20:08,008 gigabytes of finance records. 428 00:20:08,028 --> 00:20:10,548 Uh, I think we're gonna force an MFA on that. 429 00:20:10,548 --> 00:20:10,848 Right. 430 00:20:11,238 --> 00:20:16,758 Um, so I think MFA is kind of a foundational thing, uh, for 431 00:20:16,788 --> 00:20:18,168 individuals or organizations. 432 00:20:18,903 --> 00:20:27,423 I think some other best practices for, for individuals again, would be backup to 433 00:20:27,423 --> 00:20:29,253 ensure that your information is backed up. 434 00:20:29,283 --> 00:20:33,123 I don't know if you guys have seen these, uh, Mr. 435 00:20:33,123 --> 00:20:34,323 Backup gives me a thumbs up 436 00:20:34,773 --> 00:20:35,913 W. Curtis Preston: I'm very, very excited 437 00:20:36,093 --> 00:20:36,843 Mark Shriner: thumbs up from Mr. 438 00:20:36,873 --> 00:20:37,533 W. Curtis Preston: Very excited 439 00:20:37,533 --> 00:20:37,743 Mark Shriner: Backup. 440 00:20:37,763 --> 00:20:38,033 Yeah. 441 00:20:38,333 --> 00:20:44,333 Um, the, you know, you have, you guys get these emails that say, Hey, you know, I'm 442 00:20:44,603 --> 00:20:47,873 sorry to tell you, but I've been spying on you for the last couple of months. 443 00:20:47,873 --> 00:20:52,463 And, uh, you know, and if you don't send this money to whatever, I'm 444 00:20:52,463 --> 00:20:56,103 going to release this stuff, this, you know, this thing of you going 445 00:20:56,103 --> 00:20:59,543 into these inappropriate websites and they send these emails out to. 446 00:21:00,173 --> 00:21:03,533 Thousands of people and some people, cause they know that some people will 447 00:21:03,533 --> 00:21:05,573 be like, oh my God, I should pay this. 448 00:21:05,573 --> 00:21:05,873 Right. 449 00:21:06,503 --> 00:21:08,213 Well, you should, you should. 450 00:21:08,243 --> 00:21:09,293 For one, if you get that email. 451 00:21:10,068 --> 00:21:12,708 Delete it, I don't care what sites you've been going through. 452 00:21:12,708 --> 00:21:14,238 It's just a, they're just phishing. 453 00:21:14,658 --> 00:21:17,748 Um, and too, if you've got your stuff backed up, you don't have to worry 454 00:21:17,748 --> 00:21:19,098 about anybody encrypting anything. 455 00:21:19,098 --> 00:21:21,588 Now, if they're going to release stuff, that is another thing from 456 00:21:21,588 --> 00:21:24,828 malware is if they take your records, even though you've backed them up. 457 00:21:25,328 --> 00:21:28,838 If they're going to release something that you don't want released to the 458 00:21:28,838 --> 00:21:32,138 public, that's a whole nother discussion, but definitely you should back up, 459 00:21:32,528 --> 00:21:37,508 um, antivirus, running an antivirus is, is, is, you know, super important. 460 00:21:37,868 --> 00:21:39,338 Um, what else? 461 00:21:39,338 --> 00:21:40,328 As a, as a consumer. 462 00:21:40,878 --> 00:21:43,098 Just being aware and pausing. 463 00:21:43,098 --> 00:21:47,868 When you see something that looks a little off any time somebody says, Hey, 464 00:21:48,198 --> 00:21:49,968 um, there's a problem with your account. 465 00:21:49,968 --> 00:21:57,018 We need you to log in and can now just stop or, oh, your, your order for $15,000 466 00:21:57,018 --> 00:21:59,148 from Amazon is on its way, you know? 467 00:21:59,148 --> 00:22:01,968 And you're like freaking out, dude, just, yeah. 468 00:22:02,978 --> 00:22:04,798 Prasanna Malaiyandi: Like if you didn't expect it don't click it. 469 00:22:05,308 --> 00:22:06,208 Mark Shriner: Exactly. 470 00:22:06,208 --> 00:22:07,948 That's a, that's a perfect way to say it. 471 00:22:07,948 --> 00:22:08,418 I like that. 472 00:22:08,428 --> 00:22:08,968 Didn't expect it. 473 00:22:08,968 --> 00:22:09,508 Don't click it. 474 00:22:09,508 --> 00:22:14,818 And I mean, you know, obviously you can, you can, you know, cause you can look at 475 00:22:14,818 --> 00:22:18,478 the, uh, the sender's real, real address and see, is this something real read? 476 00:22:18,478 --> 00:22:22,498 It is a lot of this stuff, you know, they've got shoddy grammar, you know, 477 00:22:22,498 --> 00:22:24,808 fuzzy images, but people get worked up. 478 00:22:24,808 --> 00:22:29,128 I mean, yes, but I'm sure you've seen the ones where you get an email from the CEO. 479 00:22:29,338 --> 00:22:29,788 Hey mark. 480 00:22:29,818 --> 00:22:32,428 I need you to run out and buy 50 gift cards for target and send, you know, 481 00:22:33,783 --> 00:22:39,513 Uh, it's happened to one of my boys, uh, who was working as an internship for the 482 00:22:39,513 --> 00:22:44,043 cybersecurity committee that I was working with before, which the is Adaquest the CEO 483 00:22:44,043 --> 00:22:45,573 of Adaquest, his name is Hiram Machado. 484 00:22:46,083 --> 00:22:49,833 And, um, it was like my son's third day into his internship. 485 00:22:49,833 --> 00:22:54,803 And he got an email saying, Hey, um, you know, Makai. 486 00:22:54,903 --> 00:22:59,613 I need you to run out and buy, um, $500 worth of gift cards from target. 487 00:22:59,883 --> 00:23:03,063 And I need you to, once you have that, just let me know, and I'll 488 00:23:03,063 --> 00:23:04,533 tell you what we're going to do with them, but I need this for this 489 00:23:04,533 --> 00:23:05,643 event we're doing this afternoon. 490 00:23:06,213 --> 00:23:10,143 And so Makai again, again, telling you the kids are getting smarter these days. 491 00:23:10,533 --> 00:23:14,613 Hopefully not the ones in university of Michigan, I guess that was 2016. 492 00:23:14,853 --> 00:23:17,283 Um, he emailed me and he goes, what should I do with that? 493 00:23:17,283 --> 00:23:18,033 And I said, send it. 494 00:23:18,273 --> 00:23:21,063 I said, we're going to use this as a case study in a learning 495 00:23:21,063 --> 00:23:22,563 example, don't do anything with it. 496 00:23:22,563 --> 00:23:22,773 You know? 497 00:23:23,373 --> 00:23:25,053 Um, but yeah, I don't. 498 00:23:25,163 --> 00:23:26,943 What, what advice would you guys give. 499 00:23:28,293 --> 00:23:31,473 W. Curtis Preston: Uh, I mean that stuff's all all good. 500 00:23:31,473 --> 00:23:34,983 I think, um, the, you know, you talked about hovering 501 00:23:34,983 --> 00:23:36,453 over the site to see the site. 502 00:23:36,663 --> 00:23:42,038 What I generally say is if you get an unexpected communication from 503 00:23:42,038 --> 00:23:44,048 somebody you actually do business with. 504 00:23:44,048 --> 00:23:44,258 Right? 505 00:23:44,258 --> 00:23:46,058 Because I get stuff like that. 506 00:23:46,058 --> 00:23:48,068 My Citibank card has been compromised. 507 00:23:48,098 --> 00:23:50,468 I'm like I haven't had a Citibank card in like 20 years. 508 00:23:50,468 --> 00:23:56,808 So I think I'm pretty good, but I get, um, I I've gotten phished 509 00:23:56,828 --> 00:24:01,058 from like PayPal, um, you know, stuff like that or not from PayPal. 510 00:24:01,983 --> 00:24:02,853 You know, as 511 00:24:02,878 --> 00:24:04,498 Mark Shriner: Pretend people pretending to be PayPal. 512 00:24:04,528 --> 00:24:04,858 Yeah. 513 00:24:05,253 --> 00:24:09,543 W. Curtis Preston: pretending to be PayPal, um, is if you 514 00:24:09,543 --> 00:24:12,453 are actually concerned, if it sounds like something that, that 515 00:24:12,453 --> 00:24:17,163 might be real, go to paypal.com. 516 00:24:17,753 --> 00:24:22,493 Don't interact in any way with that email, go to PayPal.com or contact 517 00:24:22,493 --> 00:24:26,363 PayPal's phone number, not anything listed in that, in that email. 518 00:24:26,783 --> 00:24:28,973 Um, would, it's interesting though. 519 00:24:29,033 --> 00:24:32,333 There are times when I, in fact, just a couple of days ago. 520 00:24:33,228 --> 00:24:37,218 I got contacted by a company that I do business with. 521 00:24:37,728 --> 00:24:42,228 And there was a credit card company and they, they were like, you 522 00:24:42,228 --> 00:24:45,048 know, we're such and such from such and such credit card company. 523 00:24:45,318 --> 00:24:47,808 And we want to call to verify charges. 524 00:24:48,348 --> 00:24:51,348 And I'm like, well, how about I freaking verify you? 525 00:24:51,378 --> 00:24:53,358 Like, you're just random nude 526 00:24:53,568 --> 00:24:54,438 Mark Shriner: Show me your badge. 527 00:24:54,738 --> 00:24:57,468 W. Curtis Preston: show, you know, they will, well, we want to authenticate. 528 00:24:57,738 --> 00:24:58,908 We want to authenticate you. 529 00:25:00,123 --> 00:25:04,143 Uh, before we talk to you about account, I'm like, well, how do I authenticate you? 530 00:25:04,503 --> 00:25:07,773 Like, why do you people still think this is like Lee? 531 00:25:07,803 --> 00:25:08,483 I will call. 532 00:25:08,493 --> 00:25:09,003 Thank you. 533 00:25:09,003 --> 00:25:09,933 Thank you for calling. 534 00:25:09,963 --> 00:25:13,563 I will call the 800 number on and by the way, it was a real thing. 535 00:25:14,253 --> 00:25:19,083 Um, I will call the 800 number on my credit card and I will ask for the 536 00:25:19,083 --> 00:25:20,883 fraud department and it was real thing. 537 00:25:21,993 --> 00:25:24,363 Th that that's annoying that that happens, right. 538 00:25:24,423 --> 00:25:27,723 Uh, because that is a, that is a phishing way, right? 539 00:25:27,813 --> 00:25:28,953 Um, yeah. 540 00:25:29,203 --> 00:25:32,443 Mark Shriner: I mean, in, in people, people think that, um, all cyber 541 00:25:32,443 --> 00:25:36,973 attacks are through email or somehow somebody is getting into your network. 542 00:25:37,333 --> 00:25:38,593 Some of them are just a phone call. 543 00:25:38,833 --> 00:25:40,633 Uh, you know, I've, I've been called by. 544 00:25:41,388 --> 00:25:44,478 The IRS, the texts, whatever. 545 00:25:44,658 --> 00:25:45,768 And yeah, this Mr. 546 00:25:45,768 --> 00:25:46,098 Shriner. 547 00:25:46,128 --> 00:25:46,398 Yes. 548 00:25:46,668 --> 00:25:48,828 We have an urgent matter that we need to talk to you about. 549 00:25:48,858 --> 00:25:52,338 Um, uh, really, and I, I, sometimes I just like, well, where's this gonna go? 550 00:25:52,338 --> 00:25:55,548 Cause I know at one point they're going to ask me for social security 551 00:25:55,548 --> 00:25:56,448 date of birth, blah, blah, blah. 552 00:25:56,658 --> 00:25:57,318 I'm like, okay. 553 00:25:57,318 --> 00:25:57,718 Yeah, yeah. 554 00:25:57,848 --> 00:25:58,488 What's going on? 555 00:25:58,758 --> 00:26:00,618 They're like, well, uh, before we can go any further, we 556 00:26:00,618 --> 00:26:01,398 need to get some information. 557 00:26:01,993 --> 00:26:04,903 And typically the smart ones, they won't go right to social security. 558 00:26:05,143 --> 00:26:07,033 But just say like, they'll say, like, I just want to confirm that 559 00:26:07,033 --> 00:26:08,053 your name is blah, blah, blah. 560 00:26:08,083 --> 00:26:08,623 They got your name. 561 00:26:08,623 --> 00:26:08,833 Right. 562 00:26:09,043 --> 00:26:11,623 I'm like, yeah, that's me and that you're living at. 563 00:26:11,773 --> 00:26:12,093 Yeah, yeah. 564 00:26:12,093 --> 00:26:12,343 Yeah. 565 00:26:12,373 --> 00:26:14,353 And so now I'm starting to respond to them. 566 00:26:14,353 --> 00:26:14,653 Right. 567 00:26:14,953 --> 00:26:16,753 And then as sooner or later they're like, okay. 568 00:26:16,753 --> 00:26:20,023 And then, so, um, can we give us the year of your date of birth, you know, 569 00:26:20,023 --> 00:26:23,293 and you're like, and, and, and they just start to the good ones, start to tease 570 00:26:23,293 --> 00:26:26,023 it out of you because they're not gonna, if they come in first, first thing to 571 00:26:26,023 --> 00:26:27,193 ask you is social security people like. 572 00:26:27,858 --> 00:26:31,688 But you down there and then, you know, they build a rapport and that's, 573 00:26:31,688 --> 00:26:32,868 that's what they're all looking for. 574 00:26:32,933 --> 00:26:35,483 Prasanna Malaiyandi: Yeah, it feels like they have that information already. 575 00:26:35,483 --> 00:26:38,063 So it's like, okay, what's this one more piece of information. 576 00:26:38,288 --> 00:26:39,158 W. Curtis Preston: we're doing, we're doing it. 577 00:26:39,158 --> 00:26:41,378 Just to verify that we're talking to the right person, 578 00:26:41,528 --> 00:26:42,128 Mark Shriner: Exactly. 579 00:26:42,323 --> 00:26:43,133 Prasanna Malaiyandi: Well, and it's funny. 580 00:26:43,133 --> 00:26:46,853 Cause I remember when my dad retired, like he'd always get all these calls from. 581 00:26:47,523 --> 00:26:49,113 Scammers or salespeople. 582 00:26:49,113 --> 00:26:49,413 Right. 583 00:26:49,413 --> 00:26:51,423 And I'd be like, you guys should just chat with them. 584 00:26:51,423 --> 00:26:52,833 It's like, what do you have to lose? 585 00:26:53,043 --> 00:26:54,333 Just don't give them any information. 586 00:26:54,333 --> 00:26:54,813 But at least you're 587 00:26:54,908 --> 00:26:57,098 Mark Shriner: You retired, they're willing to talk to you, 588 00:26:57,603 --> 00:26:58,863 Prasanna Malaiyandi: And at least you're saving someone 589 00:26:58,863 --> 00:27:00,573 else from having to get a call. 590 00:27:00,573 --> 00:27:00,933 Right. 591 00:27:00,933 --> 00:27:01,323 So, 592 00:27:01,328 --> 00:27:01,868 Mark Shriner: right? 593 00:27:02,658 --> 00:27:04,128 W. Curtis Preston: Don't click on the emails. 594 00:27:04,158 --> 00:27:06,888 Like just, just again, if you think it's actually from 595 00:27:06,888 --> 00:27:09,108 PayPal, then go to paypal.com. 596 00:27:09,438 --> 00:27:10,848 Not anything with that. 597 00:27:10,968 --> 00:27:11,118 Go 598 00:27:11,323 --> 00:27:13,093 Prasanna Malaiyandi: and one of the points mark made earlier 599 00:27:13,093 --> 00:27:16,903 around social engineering, I think people also just, it should just 600 00:27:16,903 --> 00:27:18,613 be careful what they post online. 601 00:27:19,393 --> 00:27:19,813 Right. 602 00:27:20,053 --> 00:27:24,463 If you're like putting Facebook messages or tweets, right. 603 00:27:24,633 --> 00:27:27,813 Mark Shriner: Hey, we're leaving tomorrow for a three week 604 00:27:27,813 --> 00:27:30,873 vacation to The Bahamas, you know? 605 00:27:30,873 --> 00:27:31,203 Yeah. 606 00:27:31,233 --> 00:27:31,623 Sorry. 607 00:27:31,743 --> 00:27:31,953 I'm. 608 00:27:32,023 --> 00:27:32,683 Prasanna Malaiyandi: no, no, no, no. 609 00:27:32,683 --> 00:27:33,793 That's totally the case. 610 00:27:33,793 --> 00:27:34,033 Right. 611 00:27:34,033 --> 00:27:35,073 Or it's like, oh yeah. 612 00:27:35,153 --> 00:27:38,053 Or you start inadvertently being like, Hey, it's my birthday. 613 00:27:38,083 --> 00:27:40,993 Or it's like, oh, my mother is so and so right. 614 00:27:40,993 --> 00:27:43,243 And, or a favorite dog's name. 615 00:27:43,243 --> 00:27:43,423 Right. 616 00:27:43,423 --> 00:27:47,203 And all the rest of this and people can take that information and they 617 00:27:47,203 --> 00:27:50,083 could use it for social engineering to extract other information from you. 618 00:27:53,598 --> 00:27:55,638 W. Curtis Preston: I know, I know what your favorite dog's name is. 619 00:27:58,518 --> 00:28:01,158 Well, I, because he was more important than me. 620 00:28:01,218 --> 00:28:02,928 I'm sorry, I I'm going to let it go. 621 00:28:03,008 --> 00:28:03,248 Prasanna Malaiyandi: you a 622 00:28:03,948 --> 00:28:05,628 Mark Shriner: I think he's, he's really hurt, man. 623 00:28:06,558 --> 00:28:07,848 He's damaged, man. 624 00:28:09,738 --> 00:28:11,448 W. Curtis Preston: I went to il fornaio without you. 625 00:28:12,708 --> 00:28:13,758 That's some really good food. 626 00:28:14,448 --> 00:28:15,738 Um, yeah. 627 00:28:15,738 --> 00:28:17,748 So what about, what about companies? 628 00:28:17,748 --> 00:28:20,688 So we talked about, we talking about have MFA, so there's 629 00:28:20,688 --> 00:28:23,178 two ways to talk about MFA. 630 00:28:23,418 --> 00:28:28,788 You should, as a company, be offering MFA when people are interacting 631 00:28:28,788 --> 00:28:30,978 with your service online, right. 632 00:28:31,398 --> 00:28:36,408 Uh, and then you should, as a company, I like what you were talking about earlier. 633 00:28:37,293 --> 00:28:40,683 Um, cause obviously, um, by the way, I haven't thrown out our, 634 00:28:40,693 --> 00:28:43,783 our disclaimer, so Prasanna and I work for different companies. 635 00:28:43,783 --> 00:28:48,513 I work for Druva, he works for Zoom and this is not a podcast of either company 636 00:28:48,543 --> 00:28:51,453 and the opinions here are all ours. 637 00:28:51,783 --> 00:28:55,953 And, um, be sure to rate us by the way, at a ratethispodcast.com/restore. 638 00:28:56,403 --> 00:28:59,013 And then, um, you know, if you want to come on. 639 00:28:59,748 --> 00:29:03,098 You know, listen to me, complain to Prasanna yourself life. 640 00:29:03,098 --> 00:29:05,448 Um you do that 641 00:29:05,448 --> 00:29:05,728 Prasanna Malaiyandi: We 642 00:29:06,093 --> 00:29:09,828 W. Curtis Preston: that, just it just @wcpreston it on 643 00:29:09,828 --> 00:29:12,708 Twitter or wcurtispreston@gmail. 644 00:29:12,978 --> 00:29:17,778 So, um, yeah, so, you know, with Druva, for example, you know, we've 645 00:29:17,778 --> 00:29:22,458 supported, uh, third-party MFA for awhile, and now we support native MFA. 646 00:29:22,938 --> 00:29:24,348 Uh, if you're a company. 647 00:29:25,028 --> 00:29:31,208 If you're a cloud company, or if you're a company that has, that has information 648 00:29:31,268 --> 00:29:35,828 that is important like that, and people are logging into your system without MFA. 649 00:29:36,243 --> 00:29:38,913 Then bad, bad company. 650 00:29:38,973 --> 00:29:42,903 And, and, and, and it should also not be SMS based authentication you should 651 00:29:42,903 --> 00:29:49,053 offer, um, you know, authenticator method and, um, uh, and I'm gonna throw 652 00:29:49,053 --> 00:29:52,083 out, I'm going to throw out, please. 653 00:29:52,083 --> 00:29:58,033 Don't be a, website that is hard to use a password manager with, right. 654 00:29:58,063 --> 00:30:00,883 Don't be complaining about one or two of the character. 655 00:30:00,893 --> 00:30:05,023 The special characters that my password manager came up with, or I had, I 656 00:30:05,023 --> 00:30:06,553 had one this week that complained. 657 00:30:06,583 --> 00:30:08,503 They're like, Hey man, your password's too long. 658 00:30:08,983 --> 00:30:10,153 It was 20 characters. 659 00:30:10,723 --> 00:30:15,403 And they said, you can use a maximum 17 characters and I'm like, you suck. 660 00:30:16,333 --> 00:30:17,233 Yeah, 17. 661 00:30:17,563 --> 00:30:25,053 Um, and, uh, the, uh, So based on that, I no longer interact with the IRS. 662 00:30:25,503 --> 00:30:26,283 I'm not. 663 00:30:28,068 --> 00:30:29,868 Prasanna Malaiyandi: But I also want to go back to a point mark 664 00:30:29,868 --> 00:30:33,438 made earlier, which was that MFA. 665 00:30:33,438 --> 00:30:34,938 I don't think solves everything. 666 00:30:34,938 --> 00:30:38,268 You still need those, especially as a business, you still need those other 667 00:30:38,268 --> 00:30:40,608 things to look for anomalies, right? 668 00:30:40,638 --> 00:30:45,138 For look, to look at the behavior of the user because MFA will protect 669 00:30:45,138 --> 00:30:48,198 you to a certain extent, but it's not the only line of defense. 670 00:30:50,058 --> 00:30:50,328 Mark Shriner: Oh, yeah. 671 00:30:50,328 --> 00:30:54,633 I mean, at, at the corporate level again, The complexity of the problem 672 00:30:54,693 --> 00:30:58,953 and the P the, the complexity of the solutions available are much 673 00:30:58,953 --> 00:31:01,023 greater, um, at the corporate level. 674 00:31:01,023 --> 00:31:05,553 I mean, you, you have things like, um, device management, for example, and 675 00:31:05,553 --> 00:31:09,623 these days everybody wants to BYOD, uh, but you also have corporate devices. 676 00:31:09,723 --> 00:31:14,463 And, but on my B my own device, I'm going to have access to company apps and data. 677 00:31:15,543 --> 00:31:16,743 How does the company manage that? 678 00:31:16,773 --> 00:31:20,463 Well, there's mobile device management tools out there that 679 00:31:20,463 --> 00:31:23,703 can, if I lose my phone, I can tell the company, Hey, I lost my phone. 680 00:31:23,703 --> 00:31:25,833 They can remote wipe their data. 681 00:31:26,193 --> 00:31:29,883 Um, you know, they can do remote backups, all of that stuff. 682 00:31:29,913 --> 00:31:32,313 They can, they can check for anamolous behavior on a phone. 683 00:31:32,553 --> 00:31:37,023 Mark just logged in from Bellevue, but, but he's also logging in from romania. 684 00:31:37,203 --> 00:31:37,533 Hmm. 685 00:31:37,563 --> 00:31:38,433 Something's wrong here. 686 00:31:38,433 --> 00:31:38,763 Right? 687 00:31:39,123 --> 00:31:44,853 So, uh, yeah, I mean all that stuff and it's, you know, depending on the size 688 00:31:44,853 --> 00:31:48,933 and the shape of the organization, it can be, you have SEIMs to, to monitor all 689 00:31:48,933 --> 00:31:50,943 types of activity to collect your logs. 690 00:31:51,363 --> 00:31:56,283 Um, so that's, again, it comes back to that original point of why 691 00:31:56,283 --> 00:31:59,703 cybersecurity, cause it's such a broad field and there's so many different. 692 00:31:59,703 --> 00:32:00,993 It's constantly evolving. 693 00:32:01,023 --> 00:32:02,313 It's it's pretty cool. 694 00:32:03,273 --> 00:32:03,783 W. Curtis Preston: Yeah. 695 00:32:03,813 --> 00:32:09,753 Um, I, I'm curious what you think about, so one of the things I'm pushing 696 00:32:09,893 --> 00:32:13,803 outside of the backup space, one of the things that I'm pushing people to 697 00:32:13,803 --> 00:32:19,743 do or companies to do is to look into a couple of different types of tools. 698 00:32:19,743 --> 00:32:22,713 One is we've we've had, we had somebody on here from a 699 00:32:22,713 --> 00:32:25,323 company that does a DDI, right? 700 00:32:25,323 --> 00:32:28,343 So what, what did we decide that was DNS DHCP? 701 00:32:29,313 --> 00:32:30,373 And IPAM. 702 00:32:30,393 --> 00:32:30,693 Yeah. 703 00:32:31,263 --> 00:32:35,463 Um, and so th that, those one group of tools, which is like, 704 00:32:35,493 --> 00:32:39,183 they can do things of like, why is somebody going to this really? 705 00:32:39,183 --> 00:32:44,043 Why is, why is something looking at a DNS address that is a. 706 00:32:44,808 --> 00:32:48,738 You know, a DNS name that is, that is like 57 characters long, 707 00:32:48,738 --> 00:32:49,908 and it doesn't make any sense. 708 00:32:49,908 --> 00:32:50,148 Right. 709 00:32:50,148 --> 00:32:54,648 That, that is, that is a, you know, a, um, uh, 710 00:32:54,798 --> 00:32:58,128 ransomware thing, reaching out for command and control. 711 00:32:58,338 --> 00:33:03,408 Um, that's number one and number two, the type of software or system or 712 00:33:03,468 --> 00:33:07,158 whatever that can identify data leaks. 713 00:33:07,218 --> 00:33:07,578 Right? 714 00:33:07,608 --> 00:33:12,438 So that, so that you it's like, there's a general level of outgoing. 715 00:33:13,308 --> 00:33:17,148 Uh, you know, traffic and then suddenly there's this giant 716 00:33:17,148 --> 00:33:19,608 spike from Fred's desktop. 717 00:33:20,628 --> 00:33:22,038 Mark Shriner: And Fred's no longer in the company. 718 00:33:22,248 --> 00:33:24,378 W. Curtis Preston: And the company exactly. 719 00:33:24,768 --> 00:33:25,908 Fred's on vacation. 720 00:33:25,908 --> 00:33:28,878 Cause he posted on Facebook that he's in Maui this week. 721 00:33:29,328 --> 00:33:32,838 Um, and you know, his laptops doing that. 722 00:33:33,138 --> 00:33:35,358 What do you think about those two types of tools? 723 00:33:36,218 --> 00:33:39,668 Mark Shriner: I think, uh, depending on the situation, I mean, it's, 724 00:33:40,328 --> 00:33:43,418 every tool has its appropriate usage. 725 00:33:43,478 --> 00:33:46,388 And I think for, for most companies, both of those make sense. 726 00:33:46,448 --> 00:33:50,438 Um, I mean, for both those tools make sense for a lot of companies 727 00:33:50,438 --> 00:33:51,758 and organizations out there. 728 00:33:52,268 --> 00:33:58,348 Um, and I guess the question, I mean, I, again, I'm not technical more at 729 00:33:58,348 --> 00:34:02,608 the kind of higher level understanding what the, trying to understand, what 730 00:34:02,608 --> 00:34:04,318 the problems are putting together. 731 00:34:04,318 --> 00:34:04,948 Some solutions. 732 00:34:04,948 --> 00:34:08,008 One of the challenges is, is that you have so many different 733 00:34:08,008 --> 00:34:09,628 vendors of so many different tools. 734 00:34:09,628 --> 00:34:14,668 And so do you look for these custom bespoke kind of solutions and tools, 735 00:34:14,668 --> 00:34:19,433 or do you, do you work with a platform provider, for example, Microsoft 736 00:34:19,583 --> 00:34:21,893 365 has a lot of DLP tools in there. 737 00:34:21,893 --> 00:34:24,083 They have, uh, advanced threat protection. 738 00:34:24,443 --> 00:34:28,793 Um, they have antivirus, you know, uh, anomaly detection, 739 00:34:29,243 --> 00:34:30,473 all of that's built in there. 740 00:34:30,503 --> 00:34:33,653 Um, so do you, and then device management as well. 741 00:34:34,133 --> 00:34:38,843 Or do you say no, we don't want to put all of our eggs in the Microsoft basket 742 00:34:38,843 --> 00:34:40,403 and we want to go for best in breed. 743 00:34:40,823 --> 00:34:41,453 And I don't know. 744 00:34:41,453 --> 00:34:45,413 I mean, you know, Prasanna, like at, I don't know how much you can talk about 745 00:34:45,413 --> 00:34:50,123 at Zoom, but like, you know, how do you guys decide, you know, what kind of a tool 746 00:34:50,123 --> 00:34:53,783 are you going to go with a, an integrated approach or do you look for best in breed? 747 00:34:54,438 --> 00:34:56,028 Prasanna Malaiyandi: So I can't talk specifically about 748 00:34:56,028 --> 00:34:58,248 Zoom, but in general, right? 749 00:34:58,278 --> 00:34:59,418 I think it's going to come down to. 750 00:35:00,153 --> 00:35:03,483 The need for a tool, as well as the expertise. 751 00:35:03,783 --> 00:35:07,023 If I'm looking at sort of small, medium businesses where maybe they 752 00:35:07,023 --> 00:35:10,413 don't have specialized it admins, we face the same thing in backup as well. 753 00:35:10,413 --> 00:35:10,653 Right? 754 00:35:10,683 --> 00:35:12,873 There is no one who could go learn everything and 755 00:35:12,873 --> 00:35:14,883 anything about security tools. 756 00:35:14,883 --> 00:35:17,943 And so you're going to probably want a single tool that allows 757 00:35:17,943 --> 00:35:18,693 you to solve everything. 758 00:35:18,693 --> 00:35:19,533 Just like in backup. 759 00:35:19,533 --> 00:35:22,773 You sort of have those issues as well, but once you get to larger 760 00:35:22,773 --> 00:35:25,683 companies, or if you have specialized problems, you might start to. 761 00:35:26,913 --> 00:35:28,803 Uh, rollout into, okay. 762 00:35:28,803 --> 00:35:33,063 I now need a specialized tool, a best of breed tool because I have this special 763 00:35:33,063 --> 00:35:37,233 need, or I now have the skillsets to be able to address some of these issues. 764 00:35:37,233 --> 00:35:40,983 And therefore I'm going to pick different tools based on my needs. 765 00:35:41,463 --> 00:35:44,703 And I think it's sort of hard to say one is better than another. 766 00:35:44,913 --> 00:35:47,763 I think it depends on where you are and what your needs are. 767 00:35:48,843 --> 00:35:50,913 W. Curtis Preston: Yeah, I would, I would agree. 768 00:35:50,913 --> 00:35:55,113 I mean, and not just because I work for a SaaS company, but I would agree that 769 00:35:55,113 --> 00:36:00,063 where, where there's a big business need, that you have such as email, 770 00:36:00,213 --> 00:36:06,723 clearly a business need a need that every business has, um, that, that if a 771 00:36:06,763 --> 00:36:12,963 SaaS solution is available and it's a, it's a well-known respected et cetera 772 00:36:12,963 --> 00:36:15,213 solution that you can vet out then. 773 00:36:16,113 --> 00:36:22,383 Uh, from a security basis, I would prefer that over something that you're going 774 00:36:22,383 --> 00:36:28,413 to, let's say I would prefer Microsoft 365 over Exchange on prem in a heartbeat. 775 00:36:28,833 --> 00:36:31,113 Exchange on prem is harder to secure. 776 00:36:31,233 --> 00:36:32,283 It's harder to manage. 777 00:36:32,313 --> 00:36:34,233 So you've got to manage the system. 778 00:36:34,233 --> 00:36:37,353 You've got to manage the storage and then you got to manage the backup of that. 779 00:36:37,353 --> 00:36:39,303 And then you gotta make sure that backup gets off site. 780 00:36:39,963 --> 00:36:43,483 All of that is easier if you have Microsoft 365. 781 00:36:44,073 --> 00:36:44,433 Right. 782 00:36:44,553 --> 00:36:46,743 Um, now you should be backing it up, right? 783 00:36:46,813 --> 00:36:48,223 Microsoft is not backing it up for you. 784 00:36:48,243 --> 00:36:51,903 That was what you and I talked on your podcast, but there are services, 785 00:36:51,903 --> 00:36:55,803 that will back up, obviously Druva offers one, but there are many 786 00:36:55,803 --> 00:36:58,323 companies that backup Microsoft 365. 787 00:36:59,013 --> 00:37:05,013 And so I, I think from a security basis, as long as you vet the security vendor, 788 00:37:05,838 --> 00:37:11,208 Um, you know, look at, look for things like MFA, look for things like, um, you 789 00:37:11,208 --> 00:37:14,808 know, what their, what their NDA situation is to cut the type of data that they 790 00:37:14,808 --> 00:37:20,448 have, whether or not they share personal information, uh, cause some, so many 791 00:37:20,448 --> 00:37:25,398 of these SaaS vendors, that's actually their, um, that's their business model 792 00:37:25,398 --> 00:37:31,998 is they're they're, they're either cheap or, free, and they make, you know, their 793 00:37:31,998 --> 00:37:34,458 money with using your personal data. 794 00:37:34,848 --> 00:37:36,948 That's that's, uh, that's not what I'm recommending. 795 00:37:38,028 --> 00:37:38,388 Mark Shriner: No. 796 00:37:38,748 --> 00:37:39,888 Um, it's interesting. 797 00:37:40,518 --> 00:37:47,713 You know, when you talk about, um, tool selection, I think another factor should 798 00:37:47,713 --> 00:37:50,263 be, do you have the in-house expertise? 799 00:37:50,683 --> 00:37:55,033 Uh, and if you don't, how accessible is it on the market? 800 00:37:55,063 --> 00:37:58,453 Because right now, depending on what tool you're trying to deploy, 801 00:37:58,513 --> 00:38:00,343 uh, it could be very challenging. 802 00:38:00,343 --> 00:38:04,423 I mean, you can, you can get a great deal and that's interesting, cause it would 803 00:38:04,423 --> 00:38:05,443 be what people will start talking about. 804 00:38:05,443 --> 00:38:08,683 Well, how much is this per seat or per license and, and. 805 00:38:09,688 --> 00:38:11,698 One of the things that you have to look at is what are your 806 00:38:11,698 --> 00:38:12,748 deployment costs going to be? 807 00:38:12,748 --> 00:38:15,178 And then what are your ongoing maintenance costs going to be in terms 808 00:38:15,208 --> 00:38:17,458 of the, the expertise to manage that? 809 00:38:17,848 --> 00:38:23,098 And that's, that's something that often doesn't come into play until after the, 810 00:38:23,098 --> 00:38:27,418 you know, they, they, they focus on the technology, um, or the vendor, but not 811 00:38:27,418 --> 00:38:29,518 on the total cost of the deployment. 812 00:38:29,848 --> 00:38:31,918 And, uh, I would encourage everybody to do that. 813 00:38:31,918 --> 00:38:31,988 Prasanna Malaiyandi: Yeah. 814 00:38:32,558 --> 00:38:37,538 also along with the deployment, it's how flexible is it to change 815 00:38:37,598 --> 00:38:39,638 as your environment changes as well? 816 00:38:40,058 --> 00:38:42,938 I think some in some tools are very static. 817 00:38:42,938 --> 00:38:46,418 It's easy to deploy the first time, but anytime you add a new app or 818 00:38:46,418 --> 00:38:49,168 a new environment or something else, it becomes very difficult. 819 00:38:49,788 --> 00:38:50,058 Right. 820 00:38:50,058 --> 00:38:52,998 Or it's time consuming to get it, to expand to now cover that new 821 00:38:52,998 --> 00:38:56,508 workload, versus maybe it's better to get something that might be a little 822 00:38:56,508 --> 00:38:59,898 bit more complex for the initial deployment, but like you said, ongoing 823 00:38:59,898 --> 00:39:01,698 maintenance, ongoing monitoring, right. 824 00:39:01,698 --> 00:39:03,738 All the rest of that becomes a lot easier. 825 00:39:04,778 --> 00:39:07,238 W. Curtis Preston: Yeah, that that's, I think that's why from a 826 00:39:07,238 --> 00:39:11,498 security basis, I'm a big fan of SaaS apps because you know, you 827 00:39:11,498 --> 00:39:13,238 look at again in the backup space. 828 00:39:13,238 --> 00:39:18,698 If you're, if you're using an on-prem backup software, you must be up to date, 829 00:39:19,403 --> 00:39:25,883 right, on what, you know, you, you have both a, a box, maybe multiple boxes that 830 00:39:25,883 --> 00:39:30,503 are, you know, you might have a server, you might have a storage array and a. 831 00:39:31,263 --> 00:39:35,733 That, that you must be up to date on that operating system and protecting 832 00:39:35,733 --> 00:39:40,323 that operation, securing it, doing all of those things, uh, hope you have 833 00:39:40,323 --> 00:39:42,063 MFA on that backup server, by the way. 834 00:39:42,543 --> 00:39:45,633 And then, and then you've got the software, the backup software that 835 00:39:45,633 --> 00:39:51,183 you have to stay up on and people are notoriously very bad at upgrading 836 00:39:51,183 --> 00:39:55,923 their backup software that, uh, the, we, you know, we brought a guy over 837 00:39:55,923 --> 00:40:01,488 from Veritas and he told us that their best guess was that the average 838 00:40:01,488 --> 00:40:05,688 time that customers took to upgrade their backup software was 18 months. 839 00:40:06,360 --> 00:40:07,530 Prasanna Malaiyandi: If it works, don't touch it. 840 00:40:07,570 --> 00:40:09,100 W. Curtis Preston: People are terrified of upgrading their 841 00:40:09,100 --> 00:40:10,390 backup, their backup server. 842 00:40:10,390 --> 00:40:10,600 Right. 843 00:40:10,600 --> 00:40:13,690 Cause it's the last line of defense, but the problem is back up. 844 00:40:13,960 --> 00:40:17,860 The problem is that ransomware folks, uh, specifically the Conti group are 845 00:40:17,860 --> 00:40:20,320 specifically targeting backup servers. 846 00:40:20,860 --> 00:40:26,410 And so not only is it, um, You know, something that, 847 00:40:26,470 --> 00:40:27,610 that needs to be protected. 848 00:40:27,640 --> 00:40:31,000 It is a, you know, it is a direct attack point, right. 849 00:40:31,030 --> 00:40:32,710 So, um, 850 00:40:32,935 --> 00:40:35,725 Mark Shriner: I'm curious because we touched on consumers before. 851 00:40:36,085 --> 00:40:40,945 Uh, what are your recommendations or suggestions for just individuals, 852 00:40:41,005 --> 00:40:43,675 um, to, in terms of backing up their, their personal data. 853 00:40:44,485 --> 00:40:46,105 W. Curtis Preston: Uh, you know, I'm going to sound like a broken 854 00:40:46,105 --> 00:40:47,485 record, but SaaS backup, man. 855 00:40:48,055 --> 00:40:51,775 Uh, there are, there are SaaS backup Druva's not one of them. 856 00:40:52,135 --> 00:40:57,445 There are SaaS backup companies that target consumers and you're, you 857 00:40:57,445 --> 00:41:02,450 know, you're looking at like, Like 50 bucks a year, that sort of thing. 858 00:41:02,480 --> 00:41:08,450 Um, I, you know, I, I, I pay more than I would like to back up my iPhone, 859 00:41:08,450 --> 00:41:10,670 like I pay for paid for iCloud. 860 00:41:10,910 --> 00:41:15,620 So that's, you know, there's that, uh, but, but there are a number 861 00:41:15,620 --> 00:41:17,150 of services that will back up. 862 00:41:17,825 --> 00:41:19,355 What's important to you. 863 00:41:19,805 --> 00:41:24,575 Um, and specifically if, if you've got a, if you've got a laptop, right. 864 00:41:24,965 --> 00:41:27,725 Uh, and, and let's be honest, you got a laptop. 865 00:41:28,625 --> 00:41:30,965 Uh it's. 866 00:41:31,155 --> 00:41:34,205 It's not that hard to get that laptop backed up. 867 00:41:34,475 --> 00:41:41,320 I am not a fan of using uh, USB devices to backup the laptop. 868 00:41:41,890 --> 00:41:42,940 I know it works. 869 00:41:42,970 --> 00:41:47,950 The problem is that that USB devices generally sitting right next to, or in 870 00:41:47,950 --> 00:41:50,740 the same bag that the laptop itself is. 871 00:41:50,770 --> 00:41:52,960 You get a theft, there goes your backup. 872 00:41:52,990 --> 00:41:54,520 You get a fire that goes your backup. 873 00:41:54,520 --> 00:41:54,790 Right. 874 00:41:54,790 --> 00:41:57,760 So I much prefer for the same reasons for the companies. 875 00:41:57,760 --> 00:42:02,920 I prefer a cloud-based system that will backup the most important stuff for you. 876 00:42:03,760 --> 00:42:03,860 Um, 877 00:42:03,930 --> 00:42:05,920 Prasanna Malaiyandi: I'll disagree with Curtis here 878 00:42:06,440 --> 00:42:06,890 Mark Shriner: Okay, 879 00:42:07,000 --> 00:42:07,660 Prasanna Malaiyandi: I am. 880 00:42:08,390 --> 00:42:08,840 Mark Shriner: here we go. 881 00:42:09,430 --> 00:42:09,700 Prasanna Malaiyandi: Right. 882 00:42:09,920 --> 00:42:12,010 I agree that to some extent, yes. 883 00:42:12,010 --> 00:42:13,510 SaaS based is good. 884 00:42:14,330 --> 00:42:16,240 W. Curtis Preston: I just muted your microphone Prasanna. 885 00:42:18,580 --> 00:42:19,510 Prasanna Malaiyandi: Thanks, Curtis. 886 00:42:22,040 --> 00:42:23,000 W. Curtis Preston: I've never done that. 887 00:42:23,000 --> 00:42:23,570 That was fun. 888 00:42:25,120 --> 00:42:27,570 Prasanna Malaiyandi: I agree that there are certain things that you do, you will, 889 00:42:27,570 --> 00:42:29,400 you want to use a SaaS based service for. 890 00:42:29,880 --> 00:42:34,225 But if you're not willing to shell out, or if you don't think you really need 891 00:42:34,225 --> 00:42:39,295 it, take at least what's there with your existing, uh, laptop, for instance. 892 00:42:39,295 --> 00:42:41,905 Like if you have Time Machine, I know Curtis, we've had the discussion 893 00:42:41,905 --> 00:42:43,465 about Time Machine in the past. 894 00:42:43,465 --> 00:42:47,875 You're not as thrilled about it, but if you do have a mechanism, use that 895 00:42:47,875 --> 00:42:49,475 mechanism rather than have nothing. 896 00:42:50,075 --> 00:42:50,315 Right. 897 00:42:50,315 --> 00:42:54,595 I'd rather have someone use something rather than being like, oh, do I want 898 00:42:54,595 --> 00:42:56,725 to pay $50 a year or whatever it is? 899 00:42:57,055 --> 00:42:57,295 Yes. 900 00:42:57,295 --> 00:43:02,675 Those are better solutions, but take what you have and just do something. 901 00:43:02,795 --> 00:43:04,860 W. Curtis Preston: Yeah, I'm not going to disagree with that. 902 00:43:04,950 --> 00:43:09,240 Uh, I mean the only thing I will say is that hard drive that 903 00:43:09,240 --> 00:43:13,890 you, if you have the hard drive already, I'm not saying it's bad. 904 00:43:14,100 --> 00:43:18,720 I'm just saying you just need to think about the fact that, um, that hard drive 905 00:43:18,720 --> 00:43:22,990 is, you know, it's so do things like rotate, but the problem is you go buy. 906 00:43:23,160 --> 00:43:25,020 You go buy a modern hard drive. 907 00:43:26,265 --> 00:43:29,235 To, to, you know, to back up your, your system. 908 00:43:29,265 --> 00:43:31,995 Well, that's going to be a hundred bucks plus, right. 909 00:43:32,205 --> 00:43:34,635 That's a couple of years of the service that I'm talking about. 910 00:43:35,295 --> 00:43:40,785 So just saying, just saying, um, so anyway, what, 911 00:43:41,035 --> 00:43:43,315 Prasanna Malaiyandi: thought, I think the big thing is just do something. 912 00:43:43,375 --> 00:43:44,425 Don't do nothing. 913 00:43:45,465 --> 00:43:45,825 Mark Shriner: Yeah, 914 00:43:46,455 --> 00:43:48,315 W. Curtis Preston: I think we're saying that for, I think 915 00:43:48,315 --> 00:43:49,635 that's our summary statement. 916 00:43:49,665 --> 00:43:53,835 Maybe we'll make that the pilot title of the podcast just do something. 917 00:43:54,645 --> 00:43:56,715 Mark Shriner: kind of like the Nike thing, but, but just, just 918 00:43:56,715 --> 00:43:59,055 put, just change it to something. 919 00:44:01,420 --> 00:44:06,040 Do do something it's not as inspiring as it, but something, 920 00:44:08,265 --> 00:44:08,925 W. Curtis Preston: I like it. 921 00:44:09,090 --> 00:44:10,210 Mark Shriner: Hey, I gotta ask you guys something. 922 00:44:10,240 --> 00:44:12,250 Um, you know, cause you asked me earlier. 923 00:44:12,280 --> 00:44:16,810 Uh, so, uh, how did your, uh, the idea to do a podcast come about 924 00:44:16,810 --> 00:44:21,550 and you know, and your friendship and you know, how did that work? 925 00:44:22,540 --> 00:44:26,170 W. Curtis Preston: Um, I dunno, I, I got, I got the idea of 926 00:44:26,170 --> 00:44:28,210 doing a podcast after being. 927 00:44:29,335 --> 00:44:31,855 After going from like, not believing in podcasts. 928 00:44:31,855 --> 00:44:33,115 Like I didn't, I didn't get it. 929 00:44:33,115 --> 00:44:35,515 Like, I didn't understand why anybody would do a podcast. 930 00:44:35,515 --> 00:44:38,125 And then I, and then I started listening to podcasts. 931 00:44:38,125 --> 00:44:41,365 I, I got in a situation where they were valuable to me as a person. 932 00:44:41,365 --> 00:44:44,575 Then I was like, you know, I talk a lot. 933 00:44:44,755 --> 00:44:46,435 Maybe this would be something to do. 934 00:44:46,795 --> 00:44:50,755 And so, uh, and then I encountered Prasanna in the office. 935 00:44:50,755 --> 00:44:51,805 He used to work at Druva. 936 00:44:51,805 --> 00:44:53,005 That's how, that's where I met him. 937 00:44:53,395 --> 00:44:55,135 And, uh, I went up to him. 938 00:44:55,740 --> 00:45:00,540 And, uh, uh, I proposed the idea of us doing a podcast together 939 00:45:00,540 --> 00:45:05,730 because I thought that we had a, you know, a decent interaction and 940 00:45:05,730 --> 00:45:07,470 Prasanna just jumped at the chance. 941 00:45:07,470 --> 00:45:08,230 Didn't you Prasanna? 942 00:45:08,470 --> 00:45:11,560 Prasanna Malaiyandi: I was like, what are we going to talk about for 20 minutes? 943 00:45:11,590 --> 00:45:13,960 I have nothing to talk about at all. 944 00:45:13,960 --> 00:45:15,130 I don't know what you're talking about. 945 00:45:16,510 --> 00:45:18,140 W. Curtis Preston: yeah, yeah, yeah. 946 00:45:18,140 --> 00:45:19,190 It very quickly 947 00:45:19,325 --> 00:45:21,005 Mark Shriner: So wait, when did, when did you guys launch 948 00:45:21,005 --> 00:45:21,245 it? 949 00:45:22,095 --> 00:45:23,040 W. Curtis Preston: About three years ago. 950 00:45:23,150 --> 00:45:27,650 Mark Shriner: I got to say that I feel, um, extremely uncredentialed, 951 00:45:28,070 --> 00:45:33,110 um, because I'm looking at Curtis's background and he's he's got diplomas 952 00:45:33,110 --> 00:45:34,550 or certificates or something. 953 00:45:34,700 --> 00:45:35,960 At least he's got books there. 954 00:45:36,055 --> 00:45:36,415 Prasanna Malaiyandi: yeah. 955 00:45:38,420 --> 00:45:39,600 W. Curtis Preston: That's my book right there. 956 00:45:40,065 --> 00:45:41,405 Mark Shriner: Oh, it's your book. 957 00:45:41,525 --> 00:45:43,245 Little product placement there on the shoulder. 958 00:45:43,305 --> 00:45:43,695 All right. 959 00:45:43,770 --> 00:45:44,460 W. Curtis Preston: just a little bit. 960 00:45:44,520 --> 00:45:47,310 I mean, it's a very small, so it's not that good of a product 961 00:45:47,310 --> 00:45:49,080 placement, but, uh, yeah. 962 00:45:49,265 --> 00:45:50,195 Mark Shriner: Subliminal. 963 00:45:50,285 --> 00:45:51,125 Subliminal. 964 00:45:51,155 --> 00:45:51,455 Yeah. 965 00:45:51,620 --> 00:45:52,310 W. Curtis Preston: So, yeah. 966 00:45:52,460 --> 00:45:54,320 Um, so, uh, all right. 967 00:45:54,320 --> 00:45:57,770 Well, well, thanks a lot, mark, for coming on the podcast. 968 00:45:57,800 --> 00:45:58,510 Mark Shriner: This has been awesome. 969 00:45:58,540 --> 00:46:03,490 I don't get a chance to be on too many other podcasts other than my own. 970 00:46:03,490 --> 00:46:05,230 And, um, I've really, really enjoyed this. 971 00:46:05,230 --> 00:46:09,220 You guys are awesome and funny and obviously very, um, deep subject 972 00:46:09,220 --> 00:46:10,210 matter experts in this area. 973 00:46:10,210 --> 00:46:11,290 So I've enjoyed it. 974 00:46:11,990 --> 00:46:13,700 W. Curtis Preston: and I, and, and unlike being on your 975 00:46:13,700 --> 00:46:15,950 podcast, you can now just leave. 976 00:46:16,080 --> 00:46:16,350 Mark Shriner: Yeah. 977 00:46:16,740 --> 00:46:17,400 See you guys. 978 00:46:17,670 --> 00:46:18,360 I'm out of here. 979 00:46:18,810 --> 00:46:19,860 What are you going to get this edited? 980 00:46:19,860 --> 00:46:20,160 Curtis? 981 00:46:20,160 --> 00:46:21,270 What is he gonna go online, man? 982 00:46:21,270 --> 00:46:22,050 I mean, come on man. 983 00:46:22,050 --> 00:46:23,610 It's already Thursday. 984 00:46:24,860 --> 00:46:25,580 W. Curtis Preston: Exactly. 985 00:46:25,970 --> 00:46:29,300 Thanks Prasanna, you know, it's, you know, even though you ditched me 986 00:46:29,300 --> 00:46:29,810 Prasanna Malaiyandi: I'm sorry 987 00:46:30,760 --> 00:46:31,170 W. Curtis Preston: Curtis 988 00:46:31,170 --> 00:46:31,240 know, 989 00:46:31,935 --> 00:46:33,165 Prasanna Malaiyandi: I'm sorry, I disagreed with you 990 00:46:33,165 --> 00:46:34,515 about SaaS, but yeah, do 991 00:46:34,700 --> 00:46:36,290 W. Curtis Preston: yeah, whatever, whatever. 992 00:46:36,680 --> 00:46:37,130 All right. 993 00:46:37,130 --> 00:46:42,440 And thanks to the listeners, make sure to subscribe so that you can restore it all.