1 00:00:00,314 --> 00:00:04,454 You found the backup wrap up your go-to podcast for all things 2 00:00:04,454 --> 00:00:07,034 backup recovery and cyber recovery. 3 00:00:07,604 --> 00:00:10,994 In this episode, we talk about what's being called the largest 4 00:00:10,994 --> 00:00:16,754 data breach in history, a massive 16 billion login credentials exposed 5 00:00:16,754 --> 00:00:18,584 across 30 different databases. 6 00:00:19,154 --> 00:00:23,894 I'm joined by my co-author, Dr. Mike Saylor and my co-host Prasanna Malaiyandi. 7 00:00:24,239 --> 00:00:27,509 And we break down what this means for you and your organization. 8 00:00:28,259 --> 00:00:32,399 We'll talk about how this is actually not one breach, but a compilation of a 9 00:00:32,399 --> 00:00:37,469 number of breaches stolen, using probably info stealer malware, why your browser 10 00:00:37,469 --> 00:00:42,449 habits might be at risk, and what you need to do right now to protect yourself. 11 00:00:43,049 --> 00:00:46,529 Mike shares some uncomfortable truths about browser security that, 12 00:00:46,529 --> 00:00:48,299 uh, might make you question those. 13 00:00:48,744 --> 00:00:50,514 50 tabs like I have. 14 00:00:50,874 --> 00:00:53,364 Anyway, uh, this is a really good episode. 15 00:00:53,694 --> 00:00:58,074 If you don't know who I am, I'm w Curtis Preston, AKA, Mr. Backup, 16 00:00:58,344 --> 00:01:03,144 and I've been handling backup and recovery for over 30 years ever since. 17 00:01:03,144 --> 00:01:07,704 I had to tell my boss that we had no backups of that production database 18 00:01:07,704 --> 00:01:11,934 that we had just lost . On this podcast, we turn unappreciated backup 19 00:01:11,934 --> 00:01:14,484 admins into cyber recovery heroes. 20 00:01:14,814 --> 00:01:16,734 This is the backup wrap up. 21 00:01:30,887 --> 00:01:32,075 Welcome to the show. 22 00:01:32,302 --> 00:01:37,462 Hi, I am w Curtis Preston, AKA, Mr. Backup, and today is a special day. 23 00:01:37,462 --> 00:01:40,672 We actually have a couple of folks with us, and of course. 24 00:01:41,152 --> 00:01:46,262 We will start as always, with my favorite world traveler Prasanna. 25 00:01:46,552 --> 00:01:46,972 Molly. 26 00:01:46,972 --> 00:01:49,582 Andi, welcome back to my time zone. 27 00:01:49,972 --> 00:01:51,052 Thank you Curtis. 28 00:01:51,052 --> 00:01:55,792 It's good to be back and I think my jet lag is crossing 29 00:01:55,792 --> 00:01:57,922 my fingers almost all gone now. 30 00:01:57,922 --> 00:02:01,642 I, uh, am no longer waking up at like three 30 in the morning. 31 00:02:01,792 --> 00:02:04,732 Um, it was great from a productivity perspective because you can 32 00:02:04,732 --> 00:02:08,632 get a lot of work done when no one else is awake, but it 33 00:02:08,637 --> 00:02:08,877 Yeah. 34 00:02:08,877 --> 00:02:13,132 kind of painful when you're trying to stay awake at like 6:00 PM so I'm glad to be 35 00:02:13,207 --> 00:02:13,687 Right. 36 00:02:13,732 --> 00:02:14,182 time zone. 37 00:02:15,367 --> 00:02:17,467 Yeah, I can, I, I can understand that. 38 00:02:17,887 --> 00:02:23,647 And we also have like, I don't know, I'm gonna say the best co-author 39 00:02:23,647 --> 00:02:28,927 I've ever had since I've never had another co-author, Mike Sailor. 40 00:02:28,927 --> 00:02:29,452 How's it going, Mike? 41 00:02:30,052 --> 00:02:31,072 It's going well guys. 42 00:02:31,072 --> 00:02:32,752 Good to, good to be back on the air with you. 43 00:02:33,742 --> 00:02:40,642 You and I are, we are in the final throes of the rough draft of our upcoming book, 44 00:02:40,642 --> 00:02:44,452 learning Ransomware Response and Recovery. 45 00:02:45,022 --> 00:02:51,172 Um, it's, um, I, I, what, what's it been like for you to, to, to write this? 46 00:02:52,102 --> 00:02:54,832 I will tell you it's been, uh, it's been great for me, uh, 47 00:02:54,832 --> 00:02:58,012 having a co-author, uh, the, 48 00:02:58,157 --> 00:03:00,202 Have it only do, have to only do part of it. 49 00:03:00,472 --> 00:03:01,162 Absolutely. 50 00:03:01,192 --> 00:03:08,122 Well, and, and, someone, uh, someone that I can say, uh, you know, we're, 51 00:03:08,122 --> 00:03:09,502 we're right there together, right? 52 00:03:09,502 --> 00:03:11,152 So, uh, I'm 53 00:03:11,212 --> 00:03:11,722 yeah, 54 00:03:11,872 --> 00:03:12,922 because we're both behind. 55 00:03:14,182 --> 00:03:14,422 yeah. 56 00:03:15,367 --> 00:03:15,877 There is. 57 00:03:16,012 --> 00:03:16,882 There is that. 58 00:03:16,882 --> 00:03:18,442 There is like we're constantly, yeah. 59 00:03:18,772 --> 00:03:20,512 Um, and um. 60 00:03:21,172 --> 00:03:22,312 Yeah, it's, it's been great. 61 00:03:22,312 --> 00:03:26,842 And, and I like that, you know, there, obviously there are areas where, you 62 00:03:26,842 --> 00:03:31,672 know, I'm the SME and there's areas where you're the SME and there's, and, and, 63 00:03:31,672 --> 00:03:35,722 and many of those areas we often pretend to be the SME, uh, 'cause, you know, you 64 00:03:35,722 --> 00:03:37,162 gotta fake it till you make it right. 65 00:03:37,162 --> 00:03:40,252 But we, it, it's great that we have, we could say, okay, look, I, 66 00:03:40,252 --> 00:03:43,642 I did this part of the chapter and I really need you to take a look at it, 67 00:03:43,757 --> 00:03:44,107 Right. 68 00:03:44,242 --> 00:03:47,302 to make sure that, uh, you know, it's, it's correct. 69 00:03:47,692 --> 00:03:49,222 Um, and that's been great. 70 00:03:50,222 --> 00:03:53,732 How you guys are splitting up the book between Mike dealing with a lot 71 00:03:53,732 --> 00:03:55,022 of security stuff, you dealing with 72 00:03:55,037 --> 00:03:55,327 Yeah. 73 00:03:55,622 --> 00:03:58,472 stuff, it's just like an organization, right? 74 00:03:58,472 --> 00:04:03,572 If the two organiza or two business units, right, security and backup 75 00:04:03,782 --> 00:04:05,792 don't talk to each other, right? 76 00:04:05,792 --> 00:04:09,152 Then you're gonna have a very poor ransomware recovery, um, 77 00:04:09,332 --> 00:04:11,732 solution as a company, right? 78 00:04:12,182 --> 00:04:12,242 Yeah. 79 00:04:12,437 --> 00:04:15,467 Versus if you actually work together, then you can actually come up with great ways 80 00:04:15,467 --> 00:04:15,587 I. 81 00:04:16,037 --> 00:04:17,747 and recover from these issues. 82 00:04:17,747 --> 00:04:18,527 So what 83 00:04:18,557 --> 00:04:18,887 Yeah. 84 00:04:18,887 --> 00:04:19,277 And 85 00:04:19,457 --> 00:04:20,387 is exactly how like 86 00:04:20,642 --> 00:04:22,202 We're setting an example, Curtis, 87 00:04:22,667 --> 00:04:23,267 Exactly. 88 00:04:23,387 --> 00:04:26,747 we're setting an example and it's great because, you know, even on the areas 89 00:04:26,747 --> 00:04:31,217 where you know, you know more than I do, or I know more than you do, like. 90 00:04:31,802 --> 00:04:34,922 We're still giving feedback on that area. 91 00:04:34,952 --> 00:04:35,432 Right. 92 00:04:35,492 --> 00:04:40,982 Um, and, um, because even if you're, if you're not a specialist in something, 93 00:04:40,982 --> 00:04:44,792 you can still, uh, you know, Prasanna, we joke about, you know, when you first, 94 00:04:45,212 --> 00:04:48,092 you and I first started doing this recording, you know, so you said you 95 00:04:48,092 --> 00:04:49,442 were playing the dumb guy in the room. 96 00:04:49,442 --> 00:04:53,252 You, you were, you, you have been, although you were absolutely 97 00:04:53,252 --> 00:04:54,542 not the dumb guy in the room. 98 00:04:55,232 --> 00:05:00,272 One of your best traits here is that you ask really great questions, right? 99 00:05:00,272 --> 00:05:02,462 And, um, so yeah. 100 00:05:02,522 --> 00:05:07,382 Anyway, so I'm, I'm excited that we're getting, um, you know, really close 101 00:05:07,382 --> 00:05:09,272 to being done with the rough draft. 102 00:05:09,692 --> 00:05:10,982 Then we just have to edit. 103 00:05:11,192 --> 00:05:14,882 Um, and hopefully there's not too, you know, and we go through the 104 00:05:14,882 --> 00:05:16,802 tech review process, which is, uh, 105 00:05:17,027 --> 00:05:17,267 so 106 00:05:17,432 --> 00:05:18,032 um, 107 00:05:18,197 --> 00:05:18,737 when can they 108 00:05:18,842 --> 00:05:19,322 yeah, 109 00:05:19,607 --> 00:05:20,117 this? 110 00:05:20,267 --> 00:05:20,417 Is 111 00:05:20,432 --> 00:05:20,672 Well have 112 00:05:20,762 --> 00:05:22,082 that's a great question. 113 00:05:22,262 --> 00:05:22,532 there is a. 114 00:05:22,727 --> 00:05:23,267 this year? 115 00:05:23,707 --> 00:05:23,827 I. 116 00:05:23,852 --> 00:05:27,212 is an early release version already out there and Curtis, I don't know if you've 117 00:05:27,212 --> 00:05:28,982 looked at that, but they weren't kidding. 118 00:05:29,087 --> 00:05:29,477 Yeah, 119 00:05:29,582 --> 00:05:33,452 unedited, I mean, there are spelling mistakes and I mean, I was 120 00:05:33,527 --> 00:05:33,857 yeah, 121 00:05:33,992 --> 00:05:34,112 did 122 00:05:34,277 --> 00:05:34,907 yeah, 123 00:05:35,072 --> 00:05:35,552 it out? 124 00:05:36,347 --> 00:05:36,557 yeah. 125 00:05:36,557 --> 00:05:41,777 If you sign up for the O'Reilly Learning Platform, uh, you can get the, you 126 00:05:41,777 --> 00:05:47,657 know, the, you can get a, you can get access to the, um, to the 100% 127 00:05:47,767 --> 00:05:48,257 there's 128 00:05:48,317 --> 00:05:49,157 unedited. 129 00:05:49,217 --> 00:05:49,727 Um. 130 00:05:50,702 --> 00:05:51,242 Yeah. 131 00:05:51,302 --> 00:05:51,812 Yeah. 132 00:05:52,082 --> 00:05:56,192 Um, and we've written now like 10 or 11 chapters. 133 00:05:56,252 --> 00:06:00,753 Uh, so they get, it goes through some, some review, but very, very 134 00:06:00,758 --> 00:06:02,252 little, and then it goes out. 135 00:06:02,252 --> 00:06:08,702 So yeah, you can get, uh, access to, uh, the unedited version now and, uh, 136 00:06:08,837 --> 00:06:08,927 I 137 00:06:09,032 --> 00:06:09,452 yeah. 138 00:06:09,557 --> 00:06:14,567 look at the unedited version of chapter one, it's gonna look a lot different than 139 00:06:14,567 --> 00:06:16,757 the final version from what I understand. 140 00:06:17,147 --> 00:06:19,787 Uh, I did see the, the editor's notes on. 141 00:06:20,477 --> 00:06:24,407 Uh, some of the, some of the things that I put into chapter one that 142 00:06:24,527 --> 00:06:24,947 Mm-hmm. 143 00:06:24,947 --> 00:06:29,387 take out, but I think chapter one, as it is, has a ton of information, even 144 00:06:29,387 --> 00:06:33,857 though it might be kind of, uh, diluted a little bit to, to line up better with 145 00:06:33,857 --> 00:06:37,097 the, the chapter flow and although the book flow and, and some of those other 146 00:06:37,352 --> 00:06:37,682 Yeah. 147 00:06:38,237 --> 00:06:38,537 early 148 00:06:38,642 --> 00:06:39,272 Yeah, 149 00:06:39,377 --> 00:06:40,577 one, I think is a value, 150 00:06:41,882 --> 00:06:42,362 yeah. 151 00:06:42,452 --> 00:06:42,782 Yeah. 152 00:06:42,782 --> 00:06:43,652 So, uh. 153 00:06:45,407 --> 00:06:45,697 Yeah. 154 00:06:46,057 --> 00:06:47,612 Yeah, yeah. 155 00:06:47,612 --> 00:06:51,422 It's been, um, yeah, it, it's, you know, because for those that don't 156 00:06:51,422 --> 00:06:55,162 know, . There's a copy edit review, but there's also a tech review, right? 157 00:06:55,162 --> 00:07:01,042 So we have a team of people who have Google Docs, uh, access, uh, not a 158 00:07:01,042 --> 00:07:07,582 sponsor, um, Google Docs access to, uh, you know, basically the, the chapters 159 00:07:07,582 --> 00:07:09,712 as we finish them, we give 'em in there. 160 00:07:09,712 --> 00:07:11,812 They have a folder they go in and then they, you know, 161 00:07:11,812 --> 00:07:12,982 they tell us what they think. 162 00:07:13,457 --> 00:07:17,207 Um, and that's, that's, I think that's one of the best parts about how O'Reilly 163 00:07:17,207 --> 00:07:22,277 writes books, um, is that that copy at Pro and you can invite as many people as 164 00:07:22,277 --> 00:07:25,037 you are willing to take, uh, input from. 165 00:07:25,097 --> 00:07:25,577 Right. 166 00:07:26,057 --> 00:07:32,987 Um, so, um, Mike, I brought you in today because, uh, you know, there's 167 00:07:32,987 --> 00:07:36,977 this article that, you know, I, I happen to see it in Forbes, but, 168 00:07:37,347 --> 00:07:40,017 this, this, this link in Cyber News. 169 00:07:40,077 --> 00:07:41,967 It seems to be original reporting. 170 00:07:42,537 --> 00:07:46,617 Um, but there is this, this, you know, they're, they're calling it 171 00:07:46,617 --> 00:07:51,387 the largest data breach in history, including 16 billion login credentials, 172 00:07:51,387 --> 00:07:54,057 which for the record is two logins. 173 00:07:54,087 --> 00:07:56,067 Per human on the planet. 174 00:07:56,787 --> 00:07:58,887 Um, that's a lot there. 175 00:07:58,887 --> 00:08:01,527 You know, they're saying there's over, there's gonna be overlapping credentials. 176 00:08:01,527 --> 00:08:03,117 We don't really know what the credentials are. 177 00:08:03,117 --> 00:08:03,567 We don't know. 178 00:08:03,837 --> 00:08:05,427 We don't know where they came from. 179 00:08:05,877 --> 00:08:08,577 Um, and so I just thought it'd be a great time to bring you 180 00:08:08,577 --> 00:08:09,957 on and talk about this stuff. 181 00:08:10,017 --> 00:08:12,807 Um, where do you think would be a good place to start? 182 00:08:12,807 --> 00:08:16,707 Just give your overall thoughts about this, this, they're calling it a 183 00:08:16,707 --> 00:08:19,977 breach, but I, I think it's actually many different breaches, right? 184 00:08:20,322 --> 00:08:24,192 Well, I think similar to the Farmer's Almanac where we can use historical data 185 00:08:24,192 --> 00:08:29,262 to predict future events, uh, I think we need a cyber almanac because this, 186 00:08:29,262 --> 00:08:32,953 this, uh, largest breach in history happens about every two to three years. 187 00:08:34,692 --> 00:08:34,752 Uh. 188 00:08:35,232 --> 00:08:41,592 So there's this cycle, um, and the cycle is, primarily driven by complacency. 189 00:08:41,592 --> 00:08:45,612 So this bad thing happens and we get really diligent and aware, 190 00:08:45,882 --> 00:08:48,612 and then that dwindles and then the bad thing happens again. 191 00:08:48,912 --> 00:08:53,262 And then we're hypervigilant and aware for a period of time and that just wears off. 192 00:08:53,982 --> 00:08:59,352 And the, the things that we do to try to keep people more aware, um, 193 00:08:59,442 --> 00:09:02,802 unfortunately don't rise to the level of newsworthy. 194 00:09:03,387 --> 00:09:03,657 Right. 195 00:09:03,657 --> 00:09:08,007 So being in the news is what concerns a lot of people and companies, and 196 00:09:08,007 --> 00:09:11,217 everything below that is just kind of stuff we have to check the box and 197 00:09:11,217 --> 00:09:12,837 do, and don't pay much attention to. 198 00:09:13,737 --> 00:09:18,087 Um, and so I think that's, that's what drives a lot of the, the vulnerability 199 00:09:18,297 --> 00:09:20,337 that results in these data breaches. 200 00:09:20,937 --> 00:09:25,197 Um, but in this case, the, you know, it's just another large data breach. 201 00:09:25,287 --> 00:09:25,797 Uh. 202 00:09:27,057 --> 00:09:32,067 the idea that, you know, two, two credentials per human on the planet 203 00:09:32,072 --> 00:09:34,747 and, if you narrow it down to just humans that have internet access, it's 204 00:09:34,747 --> 00:09:36,697 probably more than two per person. 205 00:09:37,627 --> 00:09:38,017 Right. 206 00:09:38,017 --> 00:09:38,647 probably have. 207 00:09:38,887 --> 00:09:43,507 Not to mention, not to mention adults and or people old enough to, you 208 00:09:43,507 --> 00:09:44,977 know, use the internet, you know? 209 00:09:45,142 --> 00:09:47,542 it's, the adults are probably the ones that got compromised. 210 00:09:47,542 --> 00:09:50,002 The younger kids are like, there's no way, you know, my, my 211 00:09:50,002 --> 00:09:51,322 stuff's gonna get compromised. 212 00:09:51,322 --> 00:09:52,732 They, they do all the right things. 213 00:09:52,762 --> 00:09:53,422 Uh, it's, it's 214 00:09:53,617 --> 00:09:54,037 Right. 215 00:09:54,202 --> 00:09:57,292 uh, in the, in our older years that are still trying to get acclimated 216 00:09:57,292 --> 00:10:00,232 to, things that the, didn't, 217 00:10:00,247 --> 00:10:00,757 Yeah, I, 218 00:10:00,922 --> 00:10:02,362 we still don't read the manual. 219 00:10:02,482 --> 00:10:02,692 Right. 220 00:10:03,667 --> 00:10:04,207 right. 221 00:10:04,417 --> 00:10:04,777 What's a what? 222 00:10:05,017 --> 00:10:05,227 they 223 00:10:05,287 --> 00:10:06,217 What's a manual? 224 00:10:06,487 --> 00:10:08,617 Maybe AI reads it to them or their friends. 225 00:10:08,617 --> 00:10:13,087 It's all peer, peer pressured, uh, security diligence, uh, on in the 226 00:10:13,387 --> 00:10:13,717 Right? 227 00:10:13,912 --> 00:10:14,392 younger crowd. 228 00:10:14,827 --> 00:10:17,437 I have a. Question for your clarification. 229 00:10:17,437 --> 00:10:20,077 So they talk about this as a data breach. 230 00:10:20,557 --> 00:10:27,547 In my mind, a data breach involves sort of an attacker gaining access to 231 00:10:27,547 --> 00:10:29,827 credentials by attacking the provider. 232 00:10:30,217 --> 00:10:34,687 So a Facebook, a Google, a Apple, right, or LinkedIn, right In this. 233 00:10:35,107 --> 00:10:36,637 Whatever company it is. 234 00:10:37,417 --> 00:10:42,577 Um, but I was reading another article on bleeping computer where they mentioned it 235 00:10:42,577 --> 00:10:47,737 may not have been a data breach where the provider was, uh, breached, but it might 236 00:10:47,737 --> 00:10:52,927 be like an info stealer where someone had installed something on the user's laptop 237 00:10:52,927 --> 00:10:55,177 and had stolen credentials that way. 238 00:10:55,852 --> 00:10:58,177 And so I just wanna get your thoughts on that, 239 00:10:58,647 --> 00:10:58,937 Sure. 240 00:10:59,107 --> 00:11:00,577 it's like 16 billion passwords. 241 00:11:00,577 --> 00:11:01,327 That seems like a lot. 242 00:11:01,987 --> 00:11:04,507 I don't, I don't have the book here on my desk, but there's a 243 00:11:04,507 --> 00:11:07,507 good book, uh, written by Sean tma. 244 00:11:07,567 --> 00:11:13,087 He's a, he's an attorney, specializes in in, in cyber and, and incident response. 245 00:11:13,087 --> 00:11:17,077 And his book is about the need for general counsel 246 00:11:19,267 --> 00:11:19,537 uh. 247 00:11:20,287 --> 00:11:22,657 It leadership to have a good relationship. 248 00:11:23,227 --> 00:11:26,017 And one of those, one of the things he speaks about in his book, and 249 00:11:26,017 --> 00:11:30,457 something I harp on a lot is what is the definition of an event? 250 00:11:30,517 --> 00:11:32,197 An incident and a breach? 251 00:11:32,977 --> 00:11:36,547 Because those may be different to different organizations, but they are the 252 00:11:36,547 --> 00:11:41,737 same among insurance companies, law firms, you know, when it gets to litigation. 253 00:11:41,737 --> 00:11:47,077 So if you use the term incident when really it's not, you've, 254 00:11:47,107 --> 00:11:49,267 you've got that communicated out. 255 00:11:49,717 --> 00:11:51,817 As an incident that can be used against you? 256 00:11:52,142 --> 00:11:57,632 In your, in your example, uh, uh, a laptop was compromised with, uh, we, 257 00:11:57,692 --> 00:11:59,522 we call it a credential harvester. 258 00:11:59,942 --> 00:12:03,962 Uh, so its objective was to, to, to identify and exfiltrate 259 00:12:04,022 --> 00:12:06,242 login, pa login IDs and passwords. 260 00:12:06,647 --> 00:12:07,067 Mm-hmm. 261 00:12:07,112 --> 00:12:10,977 so thinking, uh, or, or the thought perspective that. 262 00:12:11,192 --> 00:12:16,532 Uh, that approach was not a data breach or a breach, and I think there's, 263 00:12:16,562 --> 00:12:18,632 there's two different, there's a data breach and a normal breach. 264 00:12:18,632 --> 00:12:23,792 There was a breach that allowed this malware to get on a computer, and 265 00:12:23,792 --> 00:12:26,552 then that resulted in a data breach. 266 00:12:27,092 --> 00:12:29,102 And even then, there's definitions there. 267 00:12:29,102 --> 00:12:33,242 So is the, is the theft or collection of credentials really a data breach, 268 00:12:33,272 --> 00:12:37,652 or is your data breach defined as client data or financial data or 269 00:12:38,162 --> 00:12:38,942 So, 270 00:12:39,062 --> 00:12:39,482 data? 271 00:12:39,812 --> 00:12:40,322 And who's 272 00:12:40,382 --> 00:12:40,922 Well, let me, 273 00:12:41,207 --> 00:12:41,667 Oh, sorry, 274 00:12:41,762 --> 00:12:43,682 well, let, let me follow on that, Mike. 275 00:12:43,682 --> 00:12:50,132 So, so really it wasn't a breach, it was millions of little breaches. 276 00:12:50,132 --> 00:12:50,402 Right? 277 00:12:50,492 --> 00:12:54,812 So you're saying that in this case the breach was the, the end user's laptop. 278 00:12:55,232 --> 00:12:55,742 Right. 279 00:12:55,772 --> 00:13:01,442 And then this info stealer grabs all the passwords that, that, um, user 280 00:13:01,442 --> 00:13:06,182 happens to, uh, interact with during the time that that malware is present. 281 00:13:06,212 --> 00:13:06,632 Right. 282 00:13:07,082 --> 00:13:11,732 Um, and so what I, I think what Prasanna was saying is it wasn't a breach 283 00:13:12,092 --> 00:13:14,642 of Google or a breach of Facebook. 284 00:13:14,642 --> 00:13:19,532 It was a breach of these individual people, uh, you know, and then 285 00:13:19,532 --> 00:13:21,302 their, their information was stolen. 286 00:13:21,302 --> 00:13:22,742 Is that, uh, 287 00:13:22,847 --> 00:13:23,297 and, and, 288 00:13:23,342 --> 00:13:23,637 go ahead. 289 00:13:23,687 --> 00:13:28,607 a, that's a good, um, uh, a good of, of that situation. 290 00:13:28,607 --> 00:13:30,887 But if, if we, if we bring it up a level. 291 00:13:31,592 --> 00:13:32,012 Mm-hmm. 292 00:13:32,282 --> 00:13:35,282 bad guys aren't gonna think, oh, we need to compromise 8 million 293 00:13:35,282 --> 00:13:36,902 people to get the passwords we need. 294 00:13:37,262 --> 00:13:37,592 They're gonna 295 00:13:37,772 --> 00:13:38,192 Mm-hmm. 296 00:13:38,312 --> 00:13:40,952 what do 8 million people generally use? 297 00:13:40,982 --> 00:13:43,262 Well, they use third party apps on their phones. 298 00:13:43,262 --> 00:13:49,322 They use, uh, cloud, cloud services, they use public wifi, so they're 299 00:13:49,382 --> 00:13:53,252 gonna strategize about the lowest effort to get the most return. 300 00:13:54,092 --> 00:13:57,812 so compromising 8 million people is not low effort, so they're gonna. 301 00:13:58,457 --> 00:14:02,177 Think of what, what is the most common denominator and 302 00:14:02,177 --> 00:14:03,617 let's go attack that thing. 303 00:14:03,707 --> 00:14:04,487 'cause that thing 304 00:14:04,797 --> 00:14:05,087 Okay. 305 00:14:05,717 --> 00:14:07,307 a million user credentials. 306 00:14:08,177 --> 00:14:13,157 And then let's take the example of a, a, a password vault. 307 00:14:13,637 --> 00:14:14,357 I don't have to hack 308 00:14:14,432 --> 00:14:14,972 Right. 309 00:14:15,527 --> 00:14:19,007 If I hack the, the password vault that a million users are using, I 310 00:14:19,007 --> 00:14:20,687 don't just get a million credentials. 311 00:14:20,687 --> 00:14:21,107 I get. 312 00:14:22,142 --> 00:14:25,472 you know, one to many credentials per user that's using the password vault. 313 00:14:25,982 --> 00:14:26,162 So 314 00:14:26,372 --> 00:14:26,732 Right. 315 00:14:27,062 --> 00:14:32,822 And that's what happened in the prior biggest breach in history is bad guys 316 00:14:32,822 --> 00:14:36,992 went after all these third party apps that, that are seemingly, you know, 317 00:14:36,992 --> 00:14:43,202 not a big deal, uh, that don't have the robust security that you know more the. 318 00:14:43,637 --> 00:14:47,627 Um, you know, leading, leading apps like Facebook or Google would have, they 319 00:14:47,627 --> 00:14:49,097 don't have the, the robust security. 320 00:14:49,097 --> 00:14:53,387 They're just a, a mobile app that was maybe designed with best practice, 321 00:14:53,387 --> 00:14:57,677 but not, you know, good cyber, you know, maturity or, or what have you. 322 00:14:57,677 --> 00:15:03,167 So they, they, they attack these third party apps and sure, maybe I'm only 323 00:15:03,167 --> 00:15:05,327 gonna get Curtis's one credential. 324 00:15:05,672 --> 00:15:09,902 But I know human nature that Curtis's One credential in this third party app 325 00:15:09,932 --> 00:15:15,902 is the same password that he uses for his bank or his business, and what they 326 00:15:15,902 --> 00:15:21,002 found in that prior breach Was, even though it was a third party app, people 327 00:15:21,002 --> 00:15:27,242 with.gov.edu dot mill, they were using that email address and those credentials 328 00:15:27,242 --> 00:15:29,402 to sign up for that third party app. 329 00:15:29,402 --> 00:15:30,212 So now I have 330 00:15:30,482 --> 00:15:30,872 Mm. 331 00:15:30,992 --> 00:15:34,412 work account because you use those credentials and 'cause 332 00:15:34,412 --> 00:15:36,302 we're lazy humans and bad 333 00:15:36,422 --> 00:15:36,902 Right. 334 00:15:37,562 --> 00:15:42,182 So in this case, I think it was a combination of info stealers. 335 00:15:42,182 --> 00:15:45,392 So whether that's just embedded malware and stuff we download like. 336 00:15:45,737 --> 00:15:50,387 You know, pirated movies or software or templates for PowerPoint 337 00:15:50,417 --> 00:15:51,527 or you know, whatever it is. 338 00:15:51,527 --> 00:15:53,027 So there's that, but that's the. 339 00:15:53,822 --> 00:15:58,022 the, probably the smallest percent of, uh, compromised data. 340 00:15:58,352 --> 00:16:03,092 But then they're gonna go after, um, you know, these, these other data sets. 341 00:16:03,122 --> 00:16:05,762 And so that dataset could be at a, a third party app. 342 00:16:05,762 --> 00:16:09,002 It could be at a cloud service, it could be anywhere, because that's 343 00:16:09,002 --> 00:16:12,122 the, you know, that's throwing the, that's throwing the net instead of, 344 00:16:12,152 --> 00:16:13,472 you know, the single fish in line. 345 00:16:14,432 --> 00:16:17,162 and then, you know, there's no honor among thieves. 346 00:16:17,162 --> 00:16:19,202 You know, they'll steal from each other also. 347 00:16:19,652 --> 00:16:20,792 Uh, but they also, they also 348 00:16:20,902 --> 00:16:21,232 Hmm. 349 00:16:21,362 --> 00:16:22,532 with each other, so. 350 00:16:22,907 --> 00:16:27,737 Um, I don't know if you've ever seen some of the, the, the kind of funny commercials 351 00:16:27,737 --> 00:16:31,487 where there's two people that, that are selling something right next to each other 352 00:16:31,847 --> 00:16:36,857 and one has four melons for, you know, $4 a piece, and the other one has six 353 00:16:36,857 --> 00:16:39,587 melons for, you know, three 50 a piece. 354 00:16:39,917 --> 00:16:40,157 And the 355 00:16:40,292 --> 00:16:40,712 Mm-hmm. 356 00:16:41,057 --> 00:16:41,747 aren't selling. 357 00:16:42,167 --> 00:16:45,737 So he makes an offer to the guy with six, and the guy with six 358 00:16:45,737 --> 00:16:47,447 says, I'll pay you $2 a melon. 359 00:16:47,687 --> 00:16:51,407 And then he has those melons and raises his price to $5. 360 00:16:52,172 --> 00:16:52,442 Right. 361 00:16:52,442 --> 00:16:54,512 So that's, that's normal business. 362 00:16:54,512 --> 00:16:54,722 Well, 363 00:16:54,872 --> 00:16:55,292 Yeah. 364 00:16:55,292 --> 00:16:56,102 doing that too. 365 00:16:56,102 --> 00:17:00,002 So I can, I can get a million credentials and you have 250,000. 366 00:17:00,212 --> 00:17:03,602 I'll give you something for your two 50 because 1.2 million is 367 00:17:03,602 --> 00:17:05,252 more valuable than my million. 368 00:17:05,822 --> 00:17:06,002 And 369 00:17:06,092 --> 00:17:06,482 Hmm. 370 00:17:06,872 --> 00:17:07,622 deals like that. 371 00:17:07,622 --> 00:17:11,282 And there are, they're, I mean, data brokers is a job, uh, that bad 372 00:17:11,442 --> 00:17:11,792 Right. 373 00:17:12,482 --> 00:17:13,562 uh, so. 374 00:17:14,372 --> 00:17:20,822 Collection, brokering, selling, uh, uh, using, uh, those credentials. 375 00:17:20,822 --> 00:17:24,422 Those are all different, uh, parts of the, the bad guy ecosystem. 376 00:17:24,482 --> 00:17:27,422 And so this, this biggest breach is probably a collection 377 00:17:27,422 --> 00:17:28,922 of a lot of different things. 378 00:17:29,157 --> 00:17:32,207 Yeah, and especially if you could start linking together different 379 00:17:32,207 --> 00:17:36,317 pieces of data from different websites or different aspects, like maybe 380 00:17:36,317 --> 00:17:41,267 one breach has addresses and email addresses, another has like email 381 00:17:41,267 --> 00:17:45,107 addresses and social security numbers, or emails and logging credentials. 382 00:17:45,107 --> 00:17:47,567 And so now you're able to piece together, basically you're 383 00:17:47,567 --> 00:17:49,277 building the user's profile. 384 00:17:49,722 --> 00:17:54,542 Well, and, and to make it even kinda worse, scarier, uh, it, um, you know, 385 00:17:54,752 --> 00:17:59,702 now let's, let's involve ai and so I can give AI this data set and tell 386 00:17:59,702 --> 00:18:01,277 it to go out to the world of things. 387 00:18:02,432 --> 00:18:06,542 Just everything that has a login portal, try all these credentials. 388 00:18:07,022 --> 00:18:07,802 And so 389 00:18:08,102 --> 00:18:08,462 Hmm. 390 00:18:08,762 --> 00:18:11,822 and, and if I have five of Curtis's credentials. 391 00:18:12,587 --> 00:18:16,727 The AI's gonna try every combination of all those five things on this one 392 00:18:16,727 --> 00:18:21,737 portal, and it's gonna do that in an automated, um, you know, hands-off 393 00:18:21,767 --> 00:18:24,737 fashion that bad guys are just gonna, you know, they, that that's when 394 00:18:24,737 --> 00:18:28,067 they're gonna take a, a, a longest vacation they've, they've ever had. 395 00:18:28,547 --> 00:18:34,457 But, um, so they're gonna try all of those, those all these credentials 396 00:18:34,457 --> 00:18:38,447 on that next data set that may have more credentials for that one user. 397 00:18:39,047 --> 00:18:41,387 so this is just gonna grow now that they have. 398 00:18:41,792 --> 00:18:44,642 A library of credentials. 399 00:18:44,642 --> 00:18:46,537 They can, they can try on any number of things. 400 00:18:48,787 --> 00:18:50,347 Um, so what. 401 00:18:51,662 --> 00:18:53,102 Man, so many, so many questions. 402 00:18:53,492 --> 00:18:58,922 So in the, that article that I was looking at, they mentioned that some of the data 403 00:18:58,922 --> 00:19:06,362 sets appear to have, uh, session IDs and, uh, you know, handshake credentials. 404 00:19:06,362 --> 00:19:07,622 I think that's the right term. 405 00:19:07,952 --> 00:19:11,492 Um, what, what does that tell you in terms of, does that tell 406 00:19:11,492 --> 00:19:16,412 you anything in terms of how that particular data was, was taken? 407 00:19:16,622 --> 00:19:18,992 there's two ways of collecting that kind of data. 408 00:19:18,992 --> 00:19:20,402 One is from a browser. 409 00:19:20,882 --> 00:19:21,092 Uh, 410 00:19:21,252 --> 00:19:21,672 Mm-hmm. 411 00:19:21,932 --> 00:19:27,722 was, uh, either infected or you concurrently or coincidentally, uh, 412 00:19:27,722 --> 00:19:31,262 went to an infected website while you were logged into something. 413 00:19:32,042 --> 00:19:32,372 and so 414 00:19:32,392 --> 00:19:32,472 Hmm. 415 00:19:32,582 --> 00:19:36,062 I'll, I'll, I'll give some, some kind of ps, you know, public service. 416 00:19:36,062 --> 00:19:41,432 Uh, at this point, if you're logging into something sensitive like your bank 417 00:19:41,522 --> 00:19:43,772 or your retirement fund, or your health 418 00:19:43,922 --> 00:19:44,342 Mm-hmm. 419 00:19:44,402 --> 00:19:49,322 or your health records, don't do anything else while you're doing that, right? 420 00:19:49,322 --> 00:19:54,032 So open a browser window fresh with that one tab. 421 00:19:54,122 --> 00:19:55,652 Log into that thing. 422 00:19:56,807 --> 00:20:00,737 don't open any other browsers or, or windows in, or tabs in that 423 00:20:00,737 --> 00:20:02,627 browser while you're doing that. 424 00:20:02,927 --> 00:20:07,937 And when you log off and do, click the log off, that's gonna send the 425 00:20:07,937 --> 00:20:13,247 end session note, uh, notice to the, to wherever you're logged in, and 426 00:20:13,247 --> 00:20:18,317 then close that browser and reopen it again to do something else. 427 00:20:18,707 --> 00:20:23,507 So that is going to completely end your session with that, whatever that. 428 00:20:23,822 --> 00:20:26,612 That, uh, activity was, and if 429 00:20:26,637 --> 00:20:28,647 So as, okay, go ahead. 430 00:20:29,042 --> 00:20:30,962 I was just gonna say, if you don't, if you don't follow those 431 00:20:30,962 --> 00:20:37,562 guidelines, you could end up on a bad website or, uh, have a bad plugin. 432 00:20:38,612 --> 00:20:44,462 'cause there there are, there is such a thing, a, a, a malicious plugin and they 433 00:20:44,462 --> 00:20:49,082 can steal not only your session, but also your multifactor authentication token. 434 00:20:49,742 --> 00:20:50,072 They can 435 00:20:50,102 --> 00:20:50,522 Right. 436 00:20:50,522 --> 00:20:52,082 that through the browser. 437 00:20:53,297 --> 00:20:57,647 it to replay your, your authentication to that site while 438 00:20:57,647 --> 00:20:59,927 the session is still active. 439 00:21:00,407 --> 00:21:03,317 And that's what's important about logging off and closing your browser. 440 00:21:03,632 --> 00:21:03,992 Okay. 441 00:21:04,022 --> 00:21:04,352 Okay. 442 00:21:04,352 --> 00:21:06,962 So that, so those two pieces of information are only 443 00:21:06,962 --> 00:21:08,612 valuable at that moment. 444 00:21:09,332 --> 00:21:14,762 Um, uh, but, but as long as that session is active, they could take that data 445 00:21:15,182 --> 00:21:17,192 and then basically pretend to be you. 446 00:21:17,492 --> 00:21:17,852 Yep. 447 00:21:17,912 --> 00:21:18,692 And the other way to do 448 00:21:18,812 --> 00:21:18,962 Okay. 449 00:21:18,992 --> 00:21:22,352 they've got, if they've compromised your, your whole computer, then that stuff 450 00:21:22,592 --> 00:21:22,862 Yeah. 451 00:21:23,072 --> 00:21:26,282 cached in memory and temporary internet files and yeah, 452 00:21:26,372 --> 00:21:29,732 Yeah, so, so let me make sure I understand. 453 00:21:29,732 --> 00:21:32,282 As a person who's currently sitting here with, I don't know, 454 00:21:32,282 --> 00:21:35,162 57 tabs on his browser, um, 455 00:21:36,287 --> 00:21:36,507 Bad 456 00:21:36,692 --> 00:21:39,392 is this, thank you. 457 00:21:40,202 --> 00:21:43,082 Uh, I, I'm, I'm just learning this now. 458 00:21:43,532 --> 00:21:48,062 Um, so I mean, you know, I'm doing a, a lot of the other 459 00:21:48,062 --> 00:21:49,262 things that are good Right. 460 00:21:49,262 --> 00:21:52,532 You know, from a obviously password manager and, and, and I do. 461 00:21:53,882 --> 00:21:59,672 Um, uh, but my question is, when you talked about that, so like right now 462 00:21:59,672 --> 00:22:05,972 I have a separate browser, uh, session that is, um, that being used for 463 00:22:05,972 --> 00:22:11,522 this and it's not part of the, the, the cluster o tabs over over there. 464 00:22:11,522 --> 00:22:15,212 I, is that what you're talking about, like, or is it, does it need to 465 00:22:15,212 --> 00:22:19,832 be like, do, do, does that window with all my other tabs, does that 466 00:22:19,832 --> 00:22:21,572 need to be completely shut down? 467 00:22:22,157 --> 00:22:25,487 Are you just talking about inside this little session right here that, because 468 00:22:25,487 --> 00:22:27,257 I have like three tabs on this session. 469 00:22:27,257 --> 00:22:29,417 browser, like edge, even if you 470 00:22:29,537 --> 00:22:29,957 Yeah, 471 00:22:30,107 --> 00:22:32,507 tab out into its own window, it's still part 472 00:22:32,597 --> 00:22:33,527 it's still the same. 473 00:22:33,617 --> 00:22:34,037 Yeah. 474 00:22:34,037 --> 00:22:34,247 Okay. 475 00:22:34,247 --> 00:22:36,257 Well that's not the answer I was looking for, Mike. 476 00:22:36,257 --> 00:22:37,067 So thanks. 477 00:22:37,197 --> 00:22:37,367 so 478 00:22:37,487 --> 00:22:38,057 Um, 479 00:22:38,147 --> 00:22:41,957 do, so my, and, and this is what I do because I log into so many 480 00:22:42,017 --> 00:22:44,237 Microsoft environments, I can't, I 481 00:22:44,417 --> 00:22:44,867 um. 482 00:22:45,617 --> 00:22:49,517 you know, my Black Swan account plus the, the colleges I 483 00:22:49,517 --> 00:22:51,317 teach at plus the nonprofit. 484 00:22:51,467 --> 00:22:56,507 I can't log into all three of those or more of those, uh uh, Microsoft 485 00:22:56,507 --> 00:22:57,827 accounts in the same browser. 486 00:22:58,517 --> 00:23:02,507 it's gonna, it, it logs me out of the other if I log into to one of these. 487 00:23:02,507 --> 00:23:05,267 So I have to have different, so I use, I use all of them. 488 00:23:05,267 --> 00:23:09,047 I use Firefox, Chrome, and, and so I'm, I'm 489 00:23:09,102 --> 00:23:10,667 So you go between them. 490 00:23:11,852 --> 00:23:12,302 can you 491 00:23:12,437 --> 00:23:13,127 Interesting. 492 00:23:13,142 --> 00:23:15,182 just use incognito when 493 00:23:15,347 --> 00:23:15,887 You could, 494 00:23:15,932 --> 00:23:16,262 using 495 00:23:16,607 --> 00:23:22,127 however, uh, incognito or the in private browsing doesn't, doesn't, um, 496 00:23:22,322 --> 00:23:22,592 cookie? 497 00:23:22,637 --> 00:23:26,477 has an issue with maintaining your session between, like, you can log 498 00:23:26,477 --> 00:23:30,587 into web mail, but if, if, uh, like oh 365, but then if you want to go 499 00:23:30,587 --> 00:23:32,837 to SharePoint, it, it has an issue. 500 00:23:33,227 --> 00:23:35,837 Or Teams, teams doesn't work in an in 501 00:23:35,942 --> 00:23:36,152 Uh. 502 00:23:36,707 --> 00:23:37,487 uh, browser. 503 00:23:37,547 --> 00:23:38,087 So there's some 504 00:23:38,147 --> 00:23:44,747 Also my password manager, which is browser based, um, doesn't work in incognito. 505 00:23:44,822 --> 00:23:45,332 problem. 506 00:23:45,332 --> 00:23:49,772 People even, even even in, in, uh, acceptable use in company policy that 507 00:23:49,772 --> 00:23:54,902 says, don't, uh, you know, don't auto save or autofill, but then you get this 508 00:23:54,902 --> 00:23:57,122 browser that keeps wanting you to do that. 509 00:23:57,122 --> 00:23:57,602 And so at 510 00:23:57,732 --> 00:23:57,952 Yes. 511 00:23:58,022 --> 00:24:00,062 people are gonna go, fine, stop asking me. 512 00:24:00,062 --> 00:24:00,782 Just do it. 513 00:24:01,112 --> 00:24:03,692 And now we've got credentials saved in browsers. 514 00:24:03,782 --> 00:24:06,092 And that's the other thing too, with multifactor authentication. 515 00:24:06,092 --> 00:24:08,192 If you log into O 365 and Edge. 516 00:24:08,522 --> 00:24:10,952 And it goes, Hey, uh, you know, you've logged in good. 517 00:24:10,952 --> 00:24:14,972 I sent you a code to your phone or, or your, or your, uh, your 518 00:24:14,972 --> 00:24:17,402 MFA app, and you enter that code. 519 00:24:17,582 --> 00:24:20,432 A lot of people check that box that says, remember me so I 520 00:24:20,432 --> 00:24:21,512 don't have to do this again. 521 00:24:21,512 --> 00:24:22,172 Well, guess what? 522 00:24:22,172 --> 00:24:26,192 That MFA token is now stored in your browser bad guys can steal that. 523 00:24:26,822 --> 00:24:27,032 Yeah. 524 00:24:27,532 --> 00:24:27,752 Hmm. 525 00:24:28,047 --> 00:24:28,532 True, true. 526 00:24:28,892 --> 00:24:33,692 Like effective MFA requires that you do MFA every single time. 527 00:24:33,797 --> 00:24:34,277 Every ti. 528 00:24:34,277 --> 00:24:34,937 Every time. 529 00:24:35,087 --> 00:24:35,447 Yeah. 530 00:24:36,572 --> 00:24:36,992 So. 531 00:24:37,487 --> 00:24:39,707 So going back to the breach, right? 532 00:24:39,707 --> 00:24:41,837 So there are a bunch of passwords, right? 533 00:24:41,837 --> 00:24:44,717 And you mentioned Mike, that hey, you might be reusing your password 534 00:24:44,717 --> 00:24:48,347 across multiple accounts and all the rest, so now it's available. 535 00:24:49,337 --> 00:24:53,147 What about for those who say like Curtis, who says, Hey, 536 00:24:53,147 --> 00:24:55,067 I'm using a password manager. 537 00:24:55,127 --> 00:24:59,447 I don't need to worry about this breach because I have a password manager 538 00:24:59,447 --> 00:25:00,797 that's auto generating passwords. 539 00:25:00,797 --> 00:25:02,717 I'm not using it across multiple sites. 540 00:25:03,587 --> 00:25:05,717 this something that they still need to worry about? 541 00:25:08,417 --> 00:25:12,077 they do because you don't know what was, what was taken. 542 00:25:13,127 --> 00:25:14,362 back to the, the session. 543 00:25:15,317 --> 00:25:22,907 So if, if I logged in today with a password and I did not log out, 544 00:25:23,207 --> 00:25:27,437 but at some point it, it maybe, I, I read this article and I think 545 00:25:27,437 --> 00:25:28,697 I need to change that password. 546 00:25:29,147 --> 00:25:34,247 And so I used my phone 'cause I read this on, you know, at the airport, 547 00:25:34,577 --> 00:25:38,237 uh, I used my phone to change my password, but my computer at home 548 00:25:38,237 --> 00:25:39,767 is still logged in with the old one. 549 00:25:39,767 --> 00:25:39,812 Them. 550 00:25:41,042 --> 00:25:43,862 So I still have an active session with the old password. 551 00:25:44,282 --> 00:25:47,252 So depending on what bad guys took, was it the session? 552 00:25:47,402 --> 00:25:50,402 You know, all the session information, you know, was it the old pass? 553 00:25:50,402 --> 00:25:54,752 Whatever it is, they still may have access if you did not log off, close 554 00:25:54,752 --> 00:25:58,832 your browser, you know, all those, all those things, uh, it's still possible. 555 00:26:00,927 --> 00:26:01,047 Hmm, 556 00:26:01,187 --> 00:26:01,877 So Curtis, 557 00:26:01,922 --> 00:26:04,562 I am really not liking this recording, Mike. 558 00:26:04,712 --> 00:26:08,522 This is not one of my favorite, uh, sessions. 559 00:26:08,537 --> 00:26:14,507 it's a constant, it's a, historic battle, you know, uh, fabled tale, you 560 00:26:14,507 --> 00:26:18,227 know, however you wanna say it, the, the battle between convenience and security. 561 00:26:18,857 --> 00:26:19,187 Uh, I 562 00:26:19,262 --> 00:26:19,892 Right, right. 563 00:26:20,207 --> 00:26:22,637 that's why convenience stores get robbed, right? 564 00:26:22,637 --> 00:26:24,587 They're convenient, they're too convenient, so. 565 00:26:25,472 --> 00:26:27,962 The, if they're open 24 7, the door's not locked. 566 00:26:27,962 --> 00:26:29,222 There's one person in there. 567 00:26:29,252 --> 00:26:30,152 It's too convenient. 568 00:26:30,572 --> 00:26:37,142 Uh, you have to find the balance, and the industry is still catering to the 569 00:26:37,142 --> 00:26:39,452 convenience more than the security. 570 00:26:39,692 --> 00:26:40,292 So the 571 00:26:40,332 --> 00:26:40,552 Mm. 572 00:26:40,802 --> 00:26:44,822 says, oh, we need multifactor, but then what we get is, well, you can just save 573 00:26:44,822 --> 00:26:45,902 that so you don't have to do it again. 574 00:26:46,637 --> 00:26:47,447 And then we get 575 00:26:47,687 --> 00:26:47,777 Right. 576 00:26:47,837 --> 00:26:49,337 do you wanna maintain the session? 577 00:26:49,337 --> 00:26:50,627 Do you want me to remember you? 578 00:26:50,627 --> 00:26:54,737 Do you All these things that just make life easier for us as consumers and 579 00:26:54,737 --> 00:26:59,357 users that are still catering to the bad guy's ability to, to compromise us 580 00:26:59,597 --> 00:27:02,267 Having 50 tabs open that shouldn't allow that. 581 00:27:06,287 --> 00:27:08,597 um, uh. 582 00:27:11,192 --> 00:27:13,622 It's not 50, it's like 47. 583 00:27:13,682 --> 00:27:19,142 But, um, I'm working on the book, Mike, like I got stuff going on. 584 00:27:19,562 --> 00:27:24,992 Um, but I wanna say, I, I do wanna say that it's not just, you know, like. 585 00:27:26,447 --> 00:27:29,177 So, so there's a lot of people I think like me that are trying 586 00:27:29,177 --> 00:27:31,787 to do the right thing, but, but aren't doing all the right things. 587 00:27:31,787 --> 00:27:32,027 Right? 588 00:27:32,027 --> 00:27:36,377 So it sounds like I, I need to add a new right thing, which is to stop 589 00:27:36,377 --> 00:27:40,517 doing this, but it, it, look, I, I'm, I'm just trying to figure out like 590 00:27:40,547 --> 00:27:43,967 how that changes my workflow because a lot of the reasons that I often have 591 00:27:43,967 --> 00:27:46,997 a bunch of tabs open is 'cause, so I don't have to remember which ones. 592 00:27:47,537 --> 00:27:50,297 You know, where I have the 57 different articles or whatever. 593 00:27:50,297 --> 00:27:50,597 Right. 594 00:27:51,047 --> 00:27:51,767 Um, wow. 595 00:27:51,767 --> 00:27:53,237 The number just went up to 57. 596 00:27:53,627 --> 00:28:00,107 But I do think that if that's interesting about the saving of the, the saving 597 00:28:00,107 --> 00:28:05,792 of the account, um, I. Uh, but I do think that password management 598 00:28:05,822 --> 00:28:09,332 plus MFA is a big deal, right? 599 00:28:09,362 --> 00:28:13,892 Um, those two things I think MFA is, is good, MFA, right? 600 00:28:13,892 --> 00:28:16,322 Not, not using your, your phone. 601 00:28:16,862 --> 00:28:20,612 Um, and that, um. 602 00:28:21,557 --> 00:28:26,147 And having a, and not just using a password manager to putting in 603 00:28:26,147 --> 00:28:27,857 the biggest password that you can. 604 00:28:27,887 --> 00:28:28,307 Right. 605 00:28:28,307 --> 00:28:30,827 So to, to lower the chance of guessing. 606 00:28:31,307 --> 00:28:34,937 Uh, but I do think those two things together with MFA reduces your, 607 00:28:34,997 --> 00:28:37,397 your chances of, of being in touch. 608 00:28:37,427 --> 00:28:41,447 Even if they got the, the username and password, uh, they 609 00:28:41,447 --> 00:28:43,247 wouldn't necessarily be able to. 610 00:28:44,162 --> 00:28:47,162 Breach your account if you have MFA enabled. 611 00:28:47,402 --> 00:28:50,102 If you don't have the thing you were just talking about, about the 612 00:28:50,942 --> 00:28:54,212 stealing it from the browser, which is a little disconcerting, but 613 00:28:54,602 --> 00:28:55,202 Well in the. 614 00:28:55,652 --> 00:28:57,062 what do you, what do you think about that comment? 615 00:28:57,062 --> 00:28:57,092 I. 616 00:28:57,527 --> 00:29:02,687 So there, there's, there's pieces to, to, to good cyber, uh, diligence. 617 00:29:02,687 --> 00:29:06,017 There's the, the thought, so I want to do this. 618 00:29:06,017 --> 00:29:08,957 There's the application of that and, and the, the good, 619 00:29:09,077 --> 00:29:10,277 the good application of that. 620 00:29:10,487 --> 00:29:14,177 Well, then there's, it doesn't matter how good you are, it's 621 00:29:14,177 --> 00:29:15,977 gonna happen at eventually, right? 622 00:29:16,097 --> 00:29:18,047 So you, you can have the best setup ever. 623 00:29:18,047 --> 00:29:19,607 Bad guys really want what you have. 624 00:29:19,607 --> 00:29:20,657 They're, they're gonna get it. 625 00:29:20,657 --> 00:29:21,317 So the, the 626 00:29:21,452 --> 00:29:23,642 That's kind of the, that's kind of the point of, that's kind of 627 00:29:23,642 --> 00:29:25,172 the point our, of our book, right? 628 00:29:25,202 --> 00:29:27,752 We're basically, we're going from an assumed breach. 629 00:29:27,932 --> 00:29:29,282 You're going to get 630 00:29:29,307 --> 00:29:29,727 mm-hmm. 631 00:29:30,632 --> 00:29:34,292 so you need to set up the, you know, you need to set yourself 632 00:29:34,292 --> 00:29:35,852 up to be able to respond to it. 633 00:29:35,882 --> 00:29:36,572 Anyway, go ahead. 634 00:29:36,632 --> 00:29:40,952 And absolutely so that, all right, so I think I'm doing everything right and 635 00:29:40,952 --> 00:29:45,062 then this biggest Breach Ever article comes out, how do I know if I, I'm 636 00:29:45,062 --> 00:29:47,282 compromised and what can I do if I am? 637 00:29:47,927 --> 00:29:49,007 Uh, how would I know? 638 00:29:49,277 --> 00:29:52,367 And so that alerting is, uh, is important. 639 00:29:52,427 --> 00:29:57,617 So I always get, I, I've set up as many accounts as I can to tell 640 00:29:57,617 --> 00:30:03,017 me when weird stuff happens or if just unexpected things happen. 641 00:30:03,047 --> 00:30:06,917 Like on my bank account, anything over a dollar in or out, I get a text message. 642 00:30:08,397 --> 00:30:08,667 Mm. 643 00:30:08,777 --> 00:30:12,947 I know I I, and, and it happens instantly when I'm at the store or buying. 644 00:30:13,292 --> 00:30:17,972 I used to buy gas, uh, or a car wash, uh, I'd get a text message, 645 00:30:17,972 --> 00:30:22,022 right then you spent this, or a deposit or a wire or whatever. 646 00:30:22,082 --> 00:30:26,402 At least I know, and I have a transaction log there, so immediately, and I do 647 00:30:26,402 --> 00:30:29,612 not, um, you know, you, you wanna do it smartly, so you're not over. 648 00:30:29,672 --> 00:30:32,702 You know, you, you don't become, um. 649 00:30:32,747 --> 00:30:32,807 Uh, 650 00:30:33,167 --> 00:30:33,857 Fatigued. 651 00:30:34,097 --> 00:30:34,817 fatigued by it. 652 00:30:34,817 --> 00:30:35,087 You're right. 653 00:30:35,087 --> 00:30:35,447 You, you 654 00:30:35,677 --> 00:30:35,967 Yeah. 655 00:30:36,017 --> 00:30:37,127 at it every time it happens. 656 00:30:37,427 --> 00:30:39,857 Alright, well you can do the same thing with a lot of your logins. 657 00:30:39,857 --> 00:30:44,387 Like with Google, it'll tell you when a new device connects to your account. 658 00:30:45,017 --> 00:30:45,377 Uh, 659 00:30:45,572 --> 00:30:45,902 Right. 660 00:30:46,097 --> 00:30:47,327 uh, same with LinkedIn. 661 00:30:47,327 --> 00:30:51,467 And LinkedIn did something, uh, new recently where even if I'm logged 662 00:30:51,497 --> 00:30:55,787 in, in one tab, if I open a new tab, it has the security feature to make 663 00:30:55,787 --> 00:30:57,467 sure I'm not a robot or something. 664 00:30:57,487 --> 00:30:57,567 Hmm. 665 00:30:57,992 --> 00:30:58,352 I've 666 00:30:58,442 --> 00:30:58,922 Mm-hmm. 667 00:30:59,162 --> 00:31:00,752 That's just happened in the last week or so. 668 00:31:01,892 --> 00:31:04,832 but for as many of your accounts as possible, definitely turn on MFA. 669 00:31:05,642 --> 00:31:08,942 Definitely turn on any kind of logging, especially your financial accounts, 670 00:31:09,212 --> 00:31:14,282 uh, and alerting, uh, and set those thresholds low so that you're, I mean, $25 671 00:31:14,282 --> 00:31:15,872 is still a lot of money to some people. 672 00:31:15,902 --> 00:31:17,192 I've set mine at $1. 673 00:31:18,602 --> 00:31:20,552 same with your, your credit cards. 674 00:31:20,852 --> 00:31:21,752 Uh, all those things. 675 00:31:21,752 --> 00:31:26,702 Just look at what you have and the capabilities of alerting you, uh, and, 676 00:31:26,792 --> 00:31:30,992 uh, auditing or logging in that stuff and use 'em to the extent possible. 677 00:31:31,382 --> 00:31:32,162 Alright, well then. 678 00:31:32,807 --> 00:31:33,647 So now you're breached. 679 00:31:33,647 --> 00:31:34,157 What do you do? 680 00:31:34,457 --> 00:31:37,847 I've asked so many people, you know, cyber, cyber isn't relatable to a lot of 681 00:31:37,847 --> 00:31:40,037 people, so I, I bring it back to identity. 682 00:31:40,787 --> 00:31:44,297 What would you do today if you learned your identity was stolen? 683 00:31:44,567 --> 00:31:47,297 I have no idea what's gonna happen. 684 00:31:47,297 --> 00:31:51,347 So you might wanna look into that the timeliness, just like 685 00:31:51,347 --> 00:31:56,627 in cyber, fast and effective you respond makes a huge difference. 686 00:31:57,077 --> 00:31:59,477 So, if you get an alert today that your identity's stolen and it's 687 00:31:59,477 --> 00:32:01,637 Friday at, you know, Friday morning. 688 00:32:02,417 --> 00:32:04,697 Are you gonna spend the rest of your Friday dealing with that? 689 00:32:04,697 --> 00:32:06,107 Or you're like, I'll deal with it after work. 690 00:32:06,107 --> 00:32:08,627 I've got too much to do today, or I don't, I have no idea. 691 00:32:08,627 --> 00:32:10,877 So I've gotta call somebody and wait for them to call me back. 692 00:32:10,937 --> 00:32:15,527 Well, that's time that bad guys are now opening accounts and doing a 693 00:32:15,527 --> 00:32:18,622 bunch of fraud, and who knows what I. 694 00:32:18,797 --> 00:32:18,857 I, 695 00:32:19,982 --> 00:32:20,732 Interesting. 696 00:32:21,197 --> 00:32:22,907 it's very uncomfortable talking to you, Mike, 697 00:32:25,952 --> 00:32:26,132 So 698 00:32:26,537 --> 00:32:27,167 like, I don't know. 699 00:32:27,227 --> 00:32:30,382 I don't know what I would do right now if, if I got that, if I got that alert. 700 00:32:31,232 --> 00:32:31,772 Right. 701 00:32:31,862 --> 00:32:35,792 Um, I mean, the good news is like, so one of the things I do Prasannally, you 702 00:32:35,792 --> 00:32:39,662 know, when you talk about like, identity stuff, one of the things I have is like, I 703 00:32:39,662 --> 00:32:42,632 have all my credit reports locked, right? 704 00:32:42,632 --> 00:32:43,712 Or frozen, right? 705 00:32:43,712 --> 00:32:47,012 Because fro free freezing, I dunno what the difference is between freezing 706 00:32:47,012 --> 00:32:49,082 and locking, but freezing is free. 707 00:32:49,502 --> 00:32:52,562 And, um, you know, I've got them all frozen. 708 00:32:52,952 --> 00:32:58,952 Uh, and so, so that at least I've got, I, I've got a relatively decent. 709 00:32:59,262 --> 00:33:05,292 Uh, belief that they're not gonna go and open, um, random accounts in my name. 710 00:33:05,352 --> 00:33:09,102 But, um, anyway, prana, you were, you were about to say something. 711 00:33:09,317 --> 00:33:10,457 two questions, Mike. 712 00:33:11,267 --> 00:33:15,197 the first is with this password breach, I, when you look through it, right, a 713 00:33:15,197 --> 00:33:18,077 lot of it is like login and password. 714 00:33:18,107 --> 00:33:20,507 I know one of the things you mentioned is, hey, if you had 715 00:33:20,507 --> 00:33:24,617 logged in with your E or used your email address as your login, right? 716 00:33:24,617 --> 00:33:28,097 Then they might try that same combination across multiple different 717 00:33:28,097 --> 00:33:29,657 websites and other things like that. 718 00:33:30,587 --> 00:33:31,037 Um. 719 00:33:31,652 --> 00:33:36,122 One of the things that I started doing recently is I don't use the 720 00:33:36,122 --> 00:33:38,642 same username across all my sites. 721 00:33:38,672 --> 00:33:41,732 Just like you don't use the same password, why is there even a 722 00:33:41,732 --> 00:33:43,112 need to use the same username? 723 00:33:43,922 --> 00:33:47,852 And it bugs me when websites don't allow you to use something 724 00:33:47,852 --> 00:33:48,932 other than email address. 725 00:33:50,222 --> 00:33:50,372 Well, 726 00:33:50,522 --> 00:33:50,602 Hmm. 727 00:33:50,612 --> 00:33:55,052 cool, what's cool is if you use a Google email address or Gmail. 728 00:33:55,502 --> 00:33:56,912 A lot of people don't know this. 729 00:33:57,902 --> 00:34:02,012 so let's just say my, my as an example, let's say my, my Google, 730 00:34:02,132 --> 00:34:03,482 my Gmail is Mike at gmail. 731 00:34:04,352 --> 00:34:06,782 And I want to create an account with Facebook. 732 00:34:07,052 --> 00:34:09,872 I can do Mike Facebook at Gmail, 733 00:34:10,667 --> 00:34:11,057 Hmm. 734 00:34:11,642 --> 00:34:14,582 and I still get the email to Mike at gmail. 735 00:34:15,272 --> 00:34:17,132 Gmail allows you to do that. 736 00:34:17,522 --> 00:34:20,642 That, uh, I don't know, I don't know what to call it. 737 00:34:20,672 --> 00:34:25,862 That, that add-on, that extension to your primary username, which does two things. 738 00:34:25,862 --> 00:34:27,272 It allows you to use different. 739 00:34:27,857 --> 00:34:31,787 Credentials, uh, with your Gmail account, but it also allows you 740 00:34:31,787 --> 00:34:36,137 to know if that account ever sold your information to a third party. 741 00:34:36,137 --> 00:34:36,377 So now 742 00:34:36,397 --> 00:34:36,757 Right. 743 00:34:36,917 --> 00:34:39,077 unsolicited spam using that email. 744 00:34:39,077 --> 00:34:40,577 You're like, yep, that's where that came from. 745 00:34:40,967 --> 00:34:41,777 And you can shut that 746 00:34:41,977 --> 00:34:42,397 What, 747 00:34:42,527 --> 00:34:42,797 Just a 748 00:34:42,817 --> 00:34:43,177 what? 749 00:34:43,177 --> 00:34:44,047 But, so 750 00:34:44,357 --> 00:34:45,677 oh, sorry, Curtis, before you, 751 00:34:45,727 --> 00:34:45,997 go ahead. 752 00:34:46,037 --> 00:34:46,847 a quick question, Mike. 753 00:34:46,847 --> 00:34:48,527 Is it a dot or a plus? 754 00:34:48,737 --> 00:34:49,757 Because I've seen the Plus. 755 00:34:49,757 --> 00:34:50,417 I haven't seen 756 00:34:50,477 --> 00:34:50,897 Hmm. 757 00:34:50,972 --> 00:34:51,192 So 758 00:34:51,347 --> 00:34:51,917 Maybe it is. 759 00:34:51,917 --> 00:34:52,812 Maybe it is a plus. 760 00:34:53,262 --> 00:34:53,552 Okay. 761 00:34:54,587 --> 00:34:55,787 But don't the bad guys. 762 00:34:55,787 --> 00:34:57,707 Just know that and just take the plus off. 763 00:34:59,087 --> 00:35:00,647 They could, but they're lazy. 764 00:35:00,707 --> 00:35:01,667 So they're gonna out, 765 00:35:01,847 --> 00:35:02,447 Oh, okay. 766 00:35:03,047 --> 00:35:03,497 out of these 767 00:35:03,857 --> 00:35:07,157 This is like the, this is like the bike lock theory, right? 768 00:35:07,187 --> 00:35:09,407 Just make it a little bit harder than the other guy. 769 00:35:10,307 --> 00:35:10,667 Right. 770 00:35:10,727 --> 00:35:11,147 Okay. 771 00:35:11,357 --> 00:35:11,717 so, 772 00:35:11,717 --> 00:35:12,107 Okay. 773 00:35:12,107 --> 00:35:12,137 I. 774 00:35:12,287 --> 00:35:17,117 my first question, and the second question I had is, I know you also talked about 775 00:35:17,117 --> 00:35:22,307 session tokens and being able to steal it in the web browser, and nowadays 776 00:35:22,307 --> 00:35:24,317 there's a lot of push on pass keys. 777 00:35:25,727 --> 00:35:31,277 Do pass keys change any of what we're seeing today in terms of these breaches, 778 00:35:31,337 --> 00:35:36,887 uh, from like info stealers or things happening in the web browser, et cetera? 779 00:35:37,337 --> 00:35:40,577 They, they do currently, you know, back in the day, if you remember back in 780 00:35:40,577 --> 00:35:44,657 the day when we had the RSA token, so if you wanted a remote access in, you 781 00:35:44,657 --> 00:35:48,137 had to have this little dongle and you push a button and it tells you a code. 782 00:35:48,617 --> 00:35:51,887 Well, that's all math based and that's what sessions and all 783 00:35:51,887 --> 00:35:53,567 these tokens, it's all math based. 784 00:35:53,567 --> 00:35:56,957 And even MFA to a degree, when you have to enter a code, that's all math. 785 00:35:57,827 --> 00:36:01,187 Because how in the world would the, the place I'm logging into know 786 00:36:01,187 --> 00:36:04,907 that the code that I got out of this third party app is, it's all math. 787 00:36:05,057 --> 00:36:05,477 Right? 788 00:36:06,887 --> 00:36:09,587 and so currently, and, and we'll back it up a bit. 789 00:36:09,587 --> 00:36:14,477 So the, the different factors of multifactor is what you have, 790 00:36:14,477 --> 00:36:16,157 what you know, and what you are. 791 00:36:17,057 --> 00:36:22,457 So biometrics is what you are, and even where you are now, GPS, uh, so 792 00:36:22,457 --> 00:36:27,047 biometrics, face, eyes, fingerprints, what you know is your credentials. 793 00:36:27,317 --> 00:36:31,217 What you have would be a dongle, like a pass key, uh, like an UBI 794 00:36:31,217 --> 00:36:33,857 key or an, is it ubi, Obi, UBI Key, 795 00:36:33,912 --> 00:36:34,132 Ubi. 796 00:36:34,577 --> 00:36:36,017 uh, and then where you are. 797 00:36:36,047 --> 00:36:40,817 So I can only log in with what I know, what I have, and. 798 00:36:41,972 --> 00:36:47,372 Where I am, like I can't log in from the Middle East if I have that 799 00:36:47,372 --> 00:36:51,872 configured and, and if, if it's not configurable, then you can alert on it. 800 00:36:51,872 --> 00:36:53,192 'cause a lot of those geo ips. 801 00:36:53,192 --> 00:36:56,702 But then if bad guys know that, that, but again, back to 8 million, they're 802 00:36:56,702 --> 00:37:01,412 not gonna know to try, you know, I'll go to VP n into Dallas, Texas to make 803 00:37:01,412 --> 00:37:02,852 sure I can log into Mike's account. 804 00:37:03,122 --> 00:37:06,992 They don't know that that's an evolution of their attack and that's not gonna 805 00:37:07,037 --> 00:37:08,237 They know it now. 806 00:37:09,362 --> 00:37:09,872 That's, yeah, 807 00:37:09,887 --> 00:37:10,847 They know it now. 808 00:37:11,207 --> 00:37:16,037 I, I do know that I, I, I give out misinformation from time to time. 809 00:37:16,487 --> 00:37:23,417 Uh, I, I've played this game, uh, but yes, what you have like a USB 810 00:37:23,567 --> 00:37:28,247 and, and, and, and there's actually a USB, uh, called an iron key. 811 00:37:28,862 --> 00:37:31,082 Uh, that's pretty, pretty legit. 812 00:37:31,082 --> 00:37:32,372 It's military grade. 813 00:37:32,372 --> 00:37:35,702 If you pry it open to try to get the data itself destructs, it's 814 00:37:35,702 --> 00:37:37,232 kind of mission impossible stuff. 815 00:37:37,982 --> 00:37:42,812 it's not only a storage USB, it's also a password manager and a pass key. 816 00:37:43,352 --> 00:37:47,942 And so to your point, if even if I knew my credentials and I had MFA, it's still 817 00:37:47,942 --> 00:37:50,942 wouldn't let me authenticate if I didn't have that plugged into my computer. 818 00:37:50,942 --> 00:37:52,202 To, to get that, that 819 00:37:52,232 --> 00:37:52,652 Hmm. 820 00:37:52,652 --> 00:37:56,102 bit of math, uh, from the pass key to, to add to it. 821 00:37:57,317 --> 00:37:57,677 Gotcha. 822 00:37:57,787 --> 00:37:57,867 Hmm. 823 00:37:57,947 --> 00:38:02,717 it looks like pass keys would be secure from the sort of data 824 00:38:02,717 --> 00:38:04,247 breach that we just saw, or the 825 00:38:04,562 --> 00:38:06,392 If your computer's not compromised, 826 00:38:08,072 --> 00:38:10,922 Okay, so let's say your computer was compromised and 827 00:38:10,922 --> 00:38:12,332 someone stole your pass key. 828 00:38:12,542 --> 00:38:14,222 It somehow figured out how to steal 829 00:38:14,432 --> 00:38:14,852 so the way, 830 00:38:14,947 --> 00:38:15,377 let's say. 831 00:38:15,422 --> 00:38:18,992 that would work, all that authentication happens before your session. 832 00:38:19,407 --> 00:38:19,827 Mm-hmm. 833 00:38:20,387 --> 00:38:20,657 Right. 834 00:38:20,657 --> 00:38:23,627 So once I'm fully authenticated with however many factors of 835 00:38:23,627 --> 00:38:27,017 multifactor I've used, I now have a session and a session key, 836 00:38:27,157 --> 00:38:27,377 Mm. 837 00:38:28,277 --> 00:38:28,967 And a token. 838 00:38:28,967 --> 00:38:33,137 So if my computer's compromised, the bad guy just has to wait until 839 00:38:33,137 --> 00:38:36,107 you've finished authenticating, and now I can steal that and use it 840 00:38:36,857 --> 00:38:37,307 Gotcha. 841 00:38:37,787 --> 00:38:38,237 unless you're 842 00:38:38,237 --> 00:38:41,747 Yeah, if your computer's compromised it, it seems like all bets are off, right? 843 00:38:42,447 --> 00:38:45,507 My thing with, so far, I've been trying to use PAs keys where I can. 844 00:38:46,107 --> 00:38:51,927 My thing has been that, um, the, the vendor, you know, the 845 00:38:51,927 --> 00:38:59,157 website, um, their implementation of PAs keys has been very varied, 846 00:38:59,222 --> 00:38:59,642 back to the 847 00:38:59,667 --> 00:38:59,997 right? 848 00:39:00,182 --> 00:39:02,762 They, they've gotta cater to the lowest common denominator. 849 00:39:03,377 --> 00:39:03,917 Yeah. 850 00:39:03,917 --> 00:39:08,777 And, and the, the one that, the one that, um, is the least helpful. 851 00:39:08,777 --> 00:39:12,827 And, and again, it's that, that the, um, the convenience 852 00:39:12,827 --> 00:39:15,497 versus security into it, right? 853 00:39:15,497 --> 00:39:17,027 Which I use quite a bit, right? 854 00:39:17,027 --> 00:39:19,817 I use, I use QuickBooks and I use, uh, TurboTax. 855 00:39:20,297 --> 00:39:24,377 Um, the way they implemented Passkey is that every, if, if 856 00:39:24,392 --> 00:39:26,032 I, if I choose to use a passkey. 857 00:39:27,047 --> 00:39:31,967 It requires me to, and again, I, I use Dashlane, right? 858 00:39:32,027 --> 00:39:35,447 And, um, Dashlane doesn't do this elsewhere. 859 00:39:36,707 --> 00:39:41,957 When I go to put in the pass key, it requires me to enter my Dashlane password, 860 00:39:42,347 --> 00:39:46,967 which is something I normally don't enter every single time because I, you 861 00:39:46,967 --> 00:39:48,977 know, again, convenience for, right. 862 00:39:49,217 --> 00:39:51,557 Um, and, um. 863 00:39:52,232 --> 00:39:54,302 It's just, it's a really long password. 864 00:39:54,362 --> 00:39:59,672 Uh, whereas others, it's like, if I'm at this computer with this login, 865 00:39:59,702 --> 00:40:02,942 you know, um, I'm not sure, I'm not sure how it all works on behind 866 00:40:02,942 --> 00:40:04,652 the scenes, but anyway, I dunno. 867 00:40:04,832 --> 00:40:06,962 Got, I hope that part just doesn't make me sound. 868 00:40:07,382 --> 00:40:07,712 versus 869 00:40:08,042 --> 00:40:08,942 It's that convenience. 870 00:40:08,942 --> 00:40:09,332 Yeah. 871 00:40:09,392 --> 00:40:09,902 Yeah. 872 00:40:10,142 --> 00:40:15,332 Um, it's just like with, with the password manager, uh, I deliberately 873 00:40:15,332 --> 00:40:18,242 made a, like a very long. 874 00:40:19,412 --> 00:40:20,102 Password. 875 00:40:20,132 --> 00:40:23,762 It's a very long password, but it's an easy password for me to remember, but it's 876 00:40:23,762 --> 00:40:27,692 quite a bit to type if I have to type it every single time, you know what I mean? 877 00:40:28,562 --> 00:40:31,742 Um, anyway, um, 878 00:40:31,757 --> 00:40:32,147 back to 879 00:40:32,432 --> 00:40:32,942 yeah. 880 00:40:32,957 --> 00:40:34,607 earlier about your 50 tabs, 881 00:40:35,167 --> 00:40:35,457 Yeah. 882 00:40:35,837 --> 00:40:36,952 and not wanting to remember. 883 00:40:37,432 --> 00:40:40,822 You know, or forget how to get to an article or something. 884 00:40:41,122 --> 00:40:45,112 Uh, create a, a text file or a notepad on your desktop and just put all those 885 00:40:45,112 --> 00:40:47,032 URLs in there and they're clickable. 886 00:40:47,152 --> 00:40:47,422 Um, 887 00:40:47,492 --> 00:40:47,552 Yeah. 888 00:40:47,872 --> 00:40:50,542 and, and that way you can just go back and forth. 889 00:40:50,692 --> 00:40:52,792 We do that a lot when we do security assessments. 890 00:40:52,822 --> 00:40:58,282 'cause you go from one, one host or, or one, uh, target to the next. 891 00:40:58,282 --> 00:41:00,202 And you want to keep notes, uh, without 892 00:41:00,552 --> 00:41:00,972 Mm-hmm. 893 00:41:01,282 --> 00:41:03,202 open because tabs consume resources. 894 00:41:03,202 --> 00:41:04,792 If you look at your task manager right now. 895 00:41:05,477 --> 00:41:08,747 Uh, whatever browser you using, it's probably at like 700. 896 00:41:08,747 --> 00:41:09,407 Uh, gig of 897 00:41:09,617 --> 00:41:12,557 That's why I have 47 gigabytes of Ram. 898 00:41:12,707 --> 00:41:13,247 Um, 899 00:41:13,337 --> 00:41:13,487 you 900 00:41:13,517 --> 00:41:13,967 Mike, um. 901 00:41:14,597 --> 00:41:16,487 You've, you've addressed the convenience part all. 902 00:41:17,777 --> 00:41:25,697 Um, uh, all right, so what would you given, given this thing has happened? 903 00:41:25,817 --> 00:41:31,877 Um, you know, other than the usual of, you know, password manager and MFA and, 904 00:41:31,907 --> 00:41:35,117 uh, and I like this and, and honestly, I, I don't know how, I didn't know 905 00:41:35,117 --> 00:41:38,087 this before, the whole browser thing, and I'm definitely gonna rethink that. 906 00:41:38,507 --> 00:41:44,537 I think for me, what I'm gonna do is I'm going to switch to a different. 907 00:41:45,152 --> 00:41:47,222 Browser, like a different product. 908 00:41:47,252 --> 00:41:51,422 I, you know, I pretty much stay in the same browser all the time, but 909 00:41:51,422 --> 00:41:57,002 I'm thinking that for things that are dangerous, like bank stuff, right? 910 00:41:57,392 --> 00:42:00,662 I'm thinking about using a completely different browser product. 911 00:42:01,112 --> 00:42:04,052 One that is supported by my password manager, which it 912 00:42:04,052 --> 00:42:06,542 supports like the top five, right? 913 00:42:07,142 --> 00:42:08,972 Um, and. 914 00:42:09,032 --> 00:42:15,692 Uh, and when I'm doing bank stuff, that kind of stuff, I go there and use that and 915 00:42:15,692 --> 00:42:22,022 then do the things and then that minimizes the, I'm not, I'm not sure how good I'm 916 00:42:22,022 --> 00:42:27,422 gonna be at closing all my 57 tabs, um, because you know, when you, what's that? 917 00:42:27,737 --> 00:42:28,227 Ease into it. 918 00:42:29,702 --> 00:42:32,102 He said, so make it 47 tenths. 919 00:42:33,032 --> 00:42:33,662 Um. 920 00:42:33,737 --> 00:42:35,807 tomorrow, 38 next week. 921 00:42:35,867 --> 00:42:36,287 30 922 00:42:36,422 --> 00:42:36,842 Yeah. 923 00:42:36,842 --> 00:42:41,492 You sound like, uh, back when my, um, when my doctor was trying to get me 924 00:42:41,492 --> 00:42:45,723 to give up, uh, sodas, she's like, you know, 'cause I was, I was, I 925 00:42:45,723 --> 00:42:50,702 was, at one time I was drinking like, like 2, 2 6 packs of sodas a day. 926 00:42:51,032 --> 00:42:51,782 That's a lot. 927 00:42:52,112 --> 00:42:54,932 And there were diet sodas, but it, but it was, it was causing, uh. 928 00:42:55,202 --> 00:42:55,472 Yeah, 929 00:42:55,787 --> 00:42:56,297 Yeah. 930 00:42:56,327 --> 00:42:56,777 Yeah. 931 00:42:57,167 --> 00:43:01,487 Um, and, um, uh, well, it wasn't, it was the, it was just the sparkling 932 00:43:01,487 --> 00:43:05,387 water stuff, but what it was, was it was causing me, uh, it was 933 00:43:05,387 --> 00:43:07,007 causing me, uh, shut up prassana. 934 00:43:07,127 --> 00:43:07,877 I didn't ask you. 935 00:43:08,147 --> 00:43:11,807 Um, it was causing, uh, digestive issues. 936 00:43:12,527 --> 00:43:14,117 Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. 937 00:43:14,117 --> 00:43:17,387 Anyway, she's like, you know, you don't have to go to zero, you know, you 938 00:43:17,387 --> 00:43:19,217 can go to like 10 and then, you know. 939 00:43:19,217 --> 00:43:19,427 Yeah. 940 00:43:19,427 --> 00:43:19,847 Anyway. 941 00:43:21,767 --> 00:43:23,567 Anyway, uh, okay, so. 942 00:43:24,332 --> 00:43:25,232 I like that. 943 00:43:25,892 --> 00:43:30,392 What about, you know, h how concerned should people at this 944 00:43:30,392 --> 00:43:34,802 point, should they go out and like change a bunch of passwords? 945 00:43:34,922 --> 00:43:37,142 That's what, that's, you know, 946 00:43:37,352 --> 00:43:40,412 It's probably something they need to do anyway 'cause they're using, they haven't 947 00:43:40,412 --> 00:43:42,512 done it and who knows, maybe never. 948 00:43:42,932 --> 00:43:43,322 Uh, but 949 00:43:43,327 --> 00:43:43,447 I. 950 00:43:43,592 --> 00:43:48,122 to think about and, and, and you know, like for me, I've got dozens of accounts, 951 00:43:48,122 --> 00:43:50,282 so, which I don't have time to do that. 952 00:43:50,312 --> 00:43:53,282 Well, if you don't have time to do all of them, focus on the important ones. 953 00:43:53,282 --> 00:43:53,912 Your bank. 954 00:43:54,962 --> 00:44:00,212 Your primary email accounts, uh, all your, all your financial health, you 955 00:44:00,212 --> 00:44:06,812 know, Prasannal record stuff, change those, but then uh, or, or at least 956 00:44:06,812 --> 00:44:10,862 put some thought to, do you have like password recovery accounts? 957 00:44:11,282 --> 00:44:15,392 So, you know, Mike at Gmail is the one I use every day, but if I, 958 00:44:15,422 --> 00:44:19,202 if I get locked outta my Facebook account or someone compromises 959 00:44:19,202 --> 00:44:20,672 it, or I can't remember the email. 960 00:44:21,032 --> 00:44:24,812 A lot of times that password reset does not come to the email 961 00:44:24,812 --> 00:44:26,162 account that you use to set it up. 962 00:44:26,162 --> 00:44:28,682 It comes to, you have to create some other accounts, 963 00:44:28,782 --> 00:44:29,132 Right. 964 00:44:29,252 --> 00:44:34,682 your, your spouse or you know, some, you know, Mike too at Yahoo or 965 00:44:35,132 --> 00:44:35,522 Yeah. 966 00:44:35,642 --> 00:44:38,972 Uh, so, and, and those are accounts that people have forgotten about, 967 00:44:39,122 --> 00:44:42,362 you know, years ago also, that, you know, I've never had to do that and 968 00:44:42,362 --> 00:44:43,652 it's just outta sight outta mind. 969 00:44:43,952 --> 00:44:45,932 So you've gotta remember that too, because. 970 00:44:46,727 --> 00:44:50,207 you, if if bad guys have your Facebook account today and you change the 971 00:44:50,207 --> 00:44:54,407 password, and they go, well, oh, I'm gonna, I'm gonna try to for, you know, 972 00:44:54,407 --> 00:44:58,007 do the, I forgot my password because I've also got the credentials to 973 00:44:58,007 --> 00:45:02,387 your Yahoo and your Gmail, and if you didn't change those, then I've got the 974 00:45:02,387 --> 00:45:04,187 link to reset your Facebook account. 975 00:45:04,667 --> 00:45:04,907 Uh, 976 00:45:05,192 --> 00:45:06,092 Yeah, I like that. 977 00:45:06,167 --> 00:45:06,437 that. 978 00:45:07,427 --> 00:45:07,577 And 979 00:45:07,832 --> 00:45:08,522 I like that. 980 00:45:08,912 --> 00:45:09,062 Yeah. 981 00:45:09,062 --> 00:45:12,362 For me, by the way, it would be the Amazon, I gotta change my Amazon 982 00:45:12,362 --> 00:45:16,442 password 'cause it, you know, I buy way too much stuff over there. 983 00:45:16,622 --> 00:45:16,952 account. 984 00:45:17,042 --> 00:45:17,882 And that's the other thing 985 00:45:17,882 --> 00:45:18,272 Yeah, 986 00:45:18,452 --> 00:45:20,612 Do not store your payment information. 987 00:45:21,782 --> 00:45:22,562 That's just as 988 00:45:22,862 --> 00:45:23,222 yeah, 989 00:45:23,282 --> 00:45:24,182 as storing your. 990 00:45:24,182 --> 00:45:24,332 yeah. 991 00:45:24,797 --> 00:45:25,757 Your password. 992 00:45:25,757 --> 00:45:30,107 So if, if someone got into my Amazon account, you could see my order history, 993 00:45:30,107 --> 00:45:31,277 but you couldn't buy something new. 994 00:45:31,307 --> 00:45:33,167 'cause I don't store my, my payment information 995 00:45:33,392 --> 00:45:34,022 Right, right. 996 00:45:34,037 --> 00:45:37,097 and, and I've entered my payment information enough that I've 997 00:45:37,097 --> 00:45:39,077 got it memorized so I don't have to go look for my wallet. 998 00:45:39,077 --> 00:45:40,157 I can just bang it out. 999 00:45:41,642 --> 00:45:44,042 So the back to the browser though. 1000 00:45:44,042 --> 00:45:46,322 So using different browsers is, is great. 1001 00:45:46,382 --> 00:45:47,462 That's a great first step. 1002 00:45:47,462 --> 00:45:48,722 But also configure them well. 1003 00:45:48,722 --> 00:45:50,012 Do not store passwords. 1004 00:45:50,012 --> 00:45:50,912 Do not store payment 1005 00:45:51,107 --> 00:45:51,467 Yeah. 1006 00:45:52,232 --> 00:45:55,712 Uh, it would be difficult for a lot of people, but you can also 1007 00:45:55,712 --> 00:45:59,132 configure it so that it deletes all your session data and history. 1008 00:45:59,132 --> 00:46:00,812 Every time you close your browser. 1009 00:46:01,022 --> 00:46:01,292 Some 1010 00:46:01,637 --> 00:46:01,937 Hmm. 1011 00:46:01,982 --> 00:46:05,972 to just start typing and it remembers where you were. 1012 00:46:06,332 --> 00:46:06,902 Um. 1013 00:46:07,907 --> 00:46:10,697 That's not, you know, your history's probably not as important as 1014 00:46:10,697 --> 00:46:15,077 your session data, uh, but you can configure that to, to purge. 1015 00:46:15,137 --> 00:46:16,637 Uh, more often than never, I. 1016 00:46:19,052 --> 00:46:19,502 All right. 1017 00:46:19,692 --> 00:46:20,352 Interesting. 1018 00:46:20,912 --> 00:46:23,162 Well, I think you've given us enough to think about. 1019 00:46:23,582 --> 00:46:24,362 Um, 1020 00:46:24,402 --> 00:46:27,462 spending this weekend, uh, updating all of his, uh. 1021 00:46:27,812 --> 00:46:28,202 yeah. 1022 00:46:28,277 --> 00:46:28,337 I, 1023 00:46:28,967 --> 00:46:29,627 Procedures. 1024 00:46:29,702 --> 00:46:33,527 I, I, I do think I'm gonna go out and change a bunch of the, the, like you 1025 00:46:33,527 --> 00:46:35,327 said, the important data passwords. 1026 00:46:35,722 --> 00:46:35,942 Um, 1027 00:46:40,487 --> 00:46:44,777 um, you got me a little freaked out, but, uh, but like, you 1028 00:46:44,777 --> 00:46:46,037 know, there, well, whatever. 1029 00:46:46,037 --> 00:46:47,627 Anyway, I'm not gonna argue. 1030 00:46:47,657 --> 00:46:49,277 I know I'm in the wrong whatever. 1031 00:46:49,697 --> 00:46:54,527 Um, but, uh, so tha thanks again, Mike, for coming on. 1032 00:46:54,677 --> 00:46:55,367 I do what I can. 1033 00:46:55,397 --> 00:46:57,797 You'll, you'll, you'll lose all of your hair like me at some point. 1034 00:47:00,852 --> 00:47:02,357 And thank you again, Prasanna. 1035 00:47:02,887 --> 00:47:07,232 No thank you, although I don't know if this was necessarily how I wanted 1036 00:47:07,232 --> 00:47:08,732 to start my weekend, but it's okay. 1037 00:47:08,732 --> 00:47:10,472 I will be changing lots of passwords again. 1038 00:47:11,467 --> 00:47:11,867 Yeah. 1039 00:47:11,897 --> 00:47:12,467 Yeah. 1040 00:47:12,617 --> 00:47:15,437 Um, and uh, thanks to the listeners. 1041 00:47:15,707 --> 00:47:18,167 I hope we didn't depress you too much. 1042 00:47:18,197 --> 00:47:21,947 And also, uh, well in this case, this goes live Monday morning, 1043 00:47:21,947 --> 00:47:23,567 so hope we didn't ruin your week. 1044 00:47:24,047 --> 00:47:25,915 Um, that is a wrap.