1 00:00:00,240 --> 00:00:01,200 So by now. 2 00:00:01,650 --> 00:00:03,510 You know that 23 and me. 3 00:00:03,990 --> 00:00:04,770 Was breached. 4 00:00:05,700 --> 00:00:10,860 And 23 and me is basically one of those who am I related to ancestry type. 5 00:00:11,790 --> 00:00:12,600 Services. 6 00:00:13,320 --> 00:00:14,970 And it got breached because. 7 00:00:15,840 --> 00:00:18,270 There were somewhat like 14,000. 8 00:00:18,660 --> 00:00:20,370 People or accounts. 9 00:00:20,850 --> 00:00:22,470 That had reused passwords. 10 00:00:23,280 --> 00:00:23,730 And. 11 00:00:24,420 --> 00:00:27,120 Whoever, whatever logged into those. 12 00:00:27,120 --> 00:00:32,070 And then was able to use this DNA family tree, something or other sharing. 13 00:00:32,820 --> 00:00:36,360 And scrape a bunch of data from, I don't know, 6.9 million 14 00:00:36,390 --> 00:00:37,830 accounts, which is kind of a lot. 15 00:00:37,830 --> 00:00:41,790 But you do have to wonder, like, I understand that you log into these sites 16 00:00:41,820 --> 00:00:46,170 and you've got to give away all this PII, personally identifiable information. 17 00:00:46,980 --> 00:00:47,580 I get that. 18 00:00:47,610 --> 00:00:50,130 First of all, I don't know why you're giving away to just check that out, 19 00:00:50,130 --> 00:00:52,560 but I understand people do that. 20 00:00:52,920 --> 00:00:53,370 Whatever. 21 00:00:53,850 --> 00:00:55,470 But you're giving it away to a private company. 22 00:00:55,470 --> 00:00:58,350 And then they get breached and all this data. 23 00:00:59,250 --> 00:01:00,269 I get scraped now. 24 00:01:00,269 --> 00:01:04,860 I don't think that whoever, whatever did this is getting actual DNA. 25 00:01:04,860 --> 00:01:05,730 That's not what it is. 26 00:01:05,730 --> 00:01:08,460 You weren't giving DNA samples, but you are giving away a lot of 27 00:01:08,460 --> 00:01:10,590 information about who we related to. 28 00:01:11,010 --> 00:01:11,820 Things like that. 29 00:01:11,820 --> 00:01:15,870 That can be used later for really good social engineering tactics. 30 00:01:15,870 --> 00:01:17,039 And that's going to make. 31 00:01:17,039 --> 00:01:18,630 That's going to make a huge difference. 32 00:01:18,840 --> 00:01:21,720 And I don't know what the ramifications of that are. 33 00:01:22,680 --> 00:01:26,250 But the thing that's a little bit disheartening is twofold. 34 00:01:26,820 --> 00:01:27,420 One. 35 00:01:27,420 --> 00:01:29,580 Quite a lot of cyber security community. 36 00:01:29,850 --> 00:01:32,400 At least the pulse I got was well. 37 00:01:33,300 --> 00:01:37,229 You know, basically it is the user's fault because they're reusing passwords 38 00:01:37,229 --> 00:01:38,190 and they shouldn't be doing that. 39 00:01:38,190 --> 00:01:38,789 And. 40 00:01:39,600 --> 00:01:43,800 Uh, while I agree that you should not be reasoning passwords. 41 00:01:43,800 --> 00:01:46,770 I completely disagree that it's on the users to do that. 42 00:01:46,770 --> 00:01:47,850 We're talking about. 43 00:01:48,360 --> 00:01:48,990 P I. 44 00:01:49,470 --> 00:01:50,250 And information. 45 00:01:50,250 --> 00:01:53,250 This is not just some news site or whatever. 46 00:01:53,640 --> 00:01:56,130 This company had an obligation to do something. 47 00:01:56,880 --> 00:02:01,590 And what they're falling back on is the definition of reasonable security, which 48 00:02:01,620 --> 00:02:03,540 there really is no definition for that. 49 00:02:03,540 --> 00:02:03,810 Right. 50 00:02:03,810 --> 00:02:06,420 You could argue that, Hey, reasonable security is username password. 51 00:02:06,420 --> 00:02:06,929 Okay. 52 00:02:06,929 --> 00:02:09,449 But there are so many things they could have done. 53 00:02:09,930 --> 00:02:13,440 From the start that they did afterwards after the breach. 54 00:02:14,340 --> 00:02:17,399 And this is about 10 things and I got these 10 things from 55 00:02:17,399 --> 00:02:19,680 chat GPT, my $20 subscription. 56 00:02:20,490 --> 00:02:24,090 But I'm sure that they paid a lot of money not to do any of these things 57 00:02:24,090 --> 00:02:26,820 or be told that they should do these and then said, okay, we'll do it. 58 00:02:26,820 --> 00:02:27,450 And then never did. 59 00:02:27,450 --> 00:02:30,600 One mandatory, mandatory, two factor authentication. 60 00:02:31,290 --> 00:02:33,960 They could have done mandatory two factor authentication. 61 00:02:33,989 --> 00:02:37,890 Now they did it after words, but they didn't do it in the beginning. 62 00:02:37,890 --> 00:02:39,750 I'm not even sure it was an option in the beginning. 63 00:02:39,750 --> 00:02:41,730 To be honest with you, I didn't sign up for the services. 64 00:02:41,730 --> 00:02:42,600 So I don't know. 65 00:02:42,600 --> 00:02:45,119 But it's weird that they did it. 66 00:02:45,600 --> 00:02:46,560 Much later. 67 00:02:46,560 --> 00:02:50,429 And I think some of the excuses were, well, it would stop people 68 00:02:50,429 --> 00:02:52,589 from, you know, adopting as quickly. 69 00:02:53,399 --> 00:02:54,540 As they normally would. 70 00:02:54,540 --> 00:02:55,950 And I completely disagree. 71 00:02:55,980 --> 00:02:57,540 Chat made me do two a Fe. 72 00:02:57,929 --> 00:02:58,799 Now I am in tech. 73 00:02:58,799 --> 00:03:00,060 So I'm going to adopt that anyway. 74 00:03:00,540 --> 00:03:03,899 But if people are really interested in their ancestry, which they were, and 75 00:03:03,899 --> 00:03:08,730 that was something that was just so hot three whatever years ago, they absolutely 76 00:03:08,730 --> 00:03:12,390 would have said it to a Fe on their phone to get past that, to continue on, 77 00:03:12,390 --> 00:03:13,709 to figure out who they're related to. 78 00:03:14,399 --> 00:03:17,880 There's just some things that are not going to stop a user from doing. 79 00:03:17,880 --> 00:03:20,040 And I think figuring out who you're related to, when you're 80 00:03:20,040 --> 00:03:21,089 really, really interested. 81 00:03:21,420 --> 00:03:23,730 Setting up to a fire on your phone is not going to stop you. 82 00:03:23,730 --> 00:03:27,090 Advanced password policies, you know, they could have enforced a strong 83 00:03:27,090 --> 00:03:30,300 password policy mix of letters, numbers, and special characters 84 00:03:30,300 --> 00:03:31,590 and a minimum password length. 85 00:03:32,579 --> 00:03:36,270 That most likely would have gotten rid of the reuse passwords because 86 00:03:36,270 --> 00:03:39,180 those aren't things that people are going to remember necessarily. 87 00:03:39,750 --> 00:03:42,300 Now they may, they may just say, oh, I'll just use the same password 88 00:03:42,300 --> 00:03:43,470 and I'll copy and paste it in there. 89 00:03:44,280 --> 00:03:46,680 But it would have been a little bit harder. 90 00:03:46,950 --> 00:03:51,600 For people just to type things into a box when you force them to do something. 91 00:03:52,470 --> 00:03:54,750 Crazy now they may still write it down somewhere. 92 00:03:55,440 --> 00:03:55,890 But. 93 00:03:56,820 --> 00:03:59,790 It may not be used in another breach, things like that. 94 00:03:59,790 --> 00:04:02,429 You also could check against known password lists. 95 00:04:02,429 --> 00:04:06,330 Like have I been poned to make sure, oh, you can't use this password because 96 00:04:06,330 --> 00:04:07,770 it's been found in a previous breach. 97 00:04:07,770 --> 00:04:09,119 You need to use a new one, right? 98 00:04:09,299 --> 00:04:10,049 Things like that. 99 00:04:10,739 --> 00:04:14,100 Account lockout mechanisms so they could have done, you know, 100 00:04:14,100 --> 00:04:17,250 temporarily locked accounts, side of number of failed login attempts. 101 00:04:17,250 --> 00:04:20,550 Now what happened was it's considered to be. 102 00:04:20,550 --> 00:04:23,310 Brute force, but it was really credential stuffing. 103 00:04:23,400 --> 00:04:25,710 So they're just using usernames and passwords that have been 104 00:04:25,740 --> 00:04:27,030 reused in previous breaches. 105 00:04:27,030 --> 00:04:30,690 So they weren't necessarily brute, forcing to get into accounts like. 106 00:04:30,960 --> 00:04:33,420 Trying someone's account over and over and over again. 107 00:04:33,810 --> 00:04:34,380 But before. 108 00:04:34,710 --> 00:04:37,620 But credential stuffing does fall under the us. 109 00:04:37,770 --> 00:04:38,849 For brute force. 110 00:04:38,849 --> 00:04:40,860 So you could have had account lockout. 111 00:04:41,190 --> 00:04:45,450 Mechanisms, you don't know if somebody tried these passwords in 112 00:04:45,480 --> 00:04:46,830 the end, the user had changed them. 113 00:04:46,830 --> 00:04:49,680 You could have locked it out and seen a high number of lockouts, 114 00:04:49,680 --> 00:04:51,300 which would be kind of weird. 115 00:04:51,300 --> 00:04:53,970 Behavior analysts and machine learning. 116 00:04:54,870 --> 00:04:57,840 That would have been nice if they had behavior analytics like unusual 117 00:04:57,840 --> 00:05:01,680 login patterns from unfamiliar locations or multiple failed 118 00:05:01,680 --> 00:05:03,420 login attempts, short period. 119 00:05:03,420 --> 00:05:07,230 Uh, 14,000 people logging in, in a short period of time, things like that. 120 00:05:07,920 --> 00:05:10,590 Even if you didn't have to have Fe enabled and I've had this on a 121 00:05:10,590 --> 00:05:13,830 financial site where someone knew my user and password shame on me. 122 00:05:14,700 --> 00:05:17,370 But they knew that it was not normal for me to log in there 123 00:05:17,370 --> 00:05:18,390 and they locked my account. 124 00:05:18,780 --> 00:05:22,560 So you could have had behavioral analysts, uh, working on that and. 125 00:05:23,190 --> 00:05:23,700 They did not. 126 00:05:24,270 --> 00:05:25,860 You could have had a capture challenge. 127 00:05:26,460 --> 00:05:27,900 The kind of lame for spam. 128 00:05:27,900 --> 00:05:30,090 But it's possible that if they were using an automate, well, 129 00:05:30,090 --> 00:05:33,599 they were our, no, one's going to sit down and do 14,000 logins. 130 00:05:34,049 --> 00:05:35,789 If you'd had a capture challenge. 131 00:05:36,090 --> 00:05:38,310 You potentially could have blocked a lot of this stuff. 132 00:05:39,150 --> 00:05:40,859 IP address monitoring and blocking. 133 00:05:41,669 --> 00:05:45,270 Did they really use 14,000 different IP addresses to log in in different 134 00:05:45,270 --> 00:05:46,680 locations across the world? 135 00:05:47,039 --> 00:05:48,060 Highly unlikely. 136 00:05:48,810 --> 00:05:51,750 Therefore, if they were coming from a VPN, you could have flagged that 137 00:05:51,780 --> 00:05:53,820 and, and, and block that activity. 138 00:05:54,150 --> 00:05:55,260 Which goes back to the. 139 00:05:55,260 --> 00:05:58,859 Account lockout mechanisms where you're seeing something coming in, you know, you. 140 00:05:58,919 --> 00:06:02,249 Web application firewall sees that, and you could have blocked that so they 141 00:06:02,249 --> 00:06:03,510 could have done something like that. 142 00:06:04,109 --> 00:06:05,640 Use your education and awareness. 143 00:06:05,669 --> 00:06:06,900 Now nobody does this. 144 00:06:06,900 --> 00:06:08,760 I mean, they do it internally, right? 145 00:06:09,629 --> 00:06:13,530 But you could have encouraged your users over time because this is a sensitive site 146 00:06:13,559 --> 00:06:15,659 that they shouldn't reuse their passwords. 147 00:06:16,020 --> 00:06:18,599 They should check if their email address had been part of any data 148 00:06:18,599 --> 00:06:22,859 breach, like have I been poned and then use a different password, but no. 149 00:06:23,309 --> 00:06:25,319 To be fair, no company does this, right. 150 00:06:25,319 --> 00:06:28,229 You just sign in and they're not going to educate you on security training. 151 00:06:28,559 --> 00:06:29,729 That's for your employer to do. 152 00:06:30,179 --> 00:06:31,559 Um, that could change though. 153 00:06:31,590 --> 00:06:33,690 Uh, regular security audits and updates. 154 00:06:33,750 --> 00:06:36,659 So somehow they got an ISO 27 0 1. 155 00:06:36,719 --> 00:06:36,989 Aye. 156 00:06:37,500 --> 00:06:38,310 Don't understand that. 157 00:06:38,310 --> 00:06:41,340 And there's me give me much credit that that's a useful search. 158 00:06:42,060 --> 00:06:43,349 But they've had that for a while. 159 00:06:43,349 --> 00:06:46,859 It could have been regular security audits to updates and fix these kinds of things. 160 00:06:47,400 --> 00:06:48,270 We don't know. 161 00:06:48,810 --> 00:06:49,380 We don't know. 162 00:06:49,650 --> 00:06:53,099 Uh, you don't know if that actually was true and then no one did anything with it. 163 00:06:53,130 --> 00:06:53,549 Who knows? 164 00:06:53,549 --> 00:06:54,929 So I don't know about this one. 165 00:06:55,739 --> 00:06:57,330 Multilayered security approach. 166 00:06:57,330 --> 00:06:58,710 So defense in depth. 167 00:06:59,010 --> 00:07:03,000 So firewalls intrusion, detection systems, regular vulnerability scanning. 168 00:07:03,210 --> 00:07:05,400 Now vulnerability scanning wouldn't have helped this, but. 169 00:07:06,270 --> 00:07:09,270 Honestly, you could have looked at, you could have looked at the loss stuff and 170 00:07:09,270 --> 00:07:10,380 you could have picked this stuff up. 171 00:07:10,409 --> 00:07:13,020 And that was intrusion detection systems may have flag that, 172 00:07:13,020 --> 00:07:14,460 Hey, this is unusual activity. 173 00:07:14,760 --> 00:07:16,799 You've got all these people logging in from all different 174 00:07:16,799 --> 00:07:17,880 places, all over the world. 175 00:07:17,880 --> 00:07:19,590 And that's not normally where they log in from. 176 00:07:20,099 --> 00:07:20,340 Right. 177 00:07:20,369 --> 00:07:21,030 If I'm from. 178 00:07:21,630 --> 00:07:22,890 If I am from California. 179 00:07:23,310 --> 00:07:26,039 And all of a sudden I'm logging in from, you know, a different country. 180 00:07:26,070 --> 00:07:27,270 Don't you think that's kind of weird. 181 00:07:27,299 --> 00:07:30,510 I mean, it's not, it's not impossible, but isn't it kind of weird that you'd want to 182 00:07:30,510 --> 00:07:32,489 like, maybe prompt me for something else. 183 00:07:32,489 --> 00:07:34,229 Like, Hey, you don't normally log in from. 184 00:07:34,890 --> 00:07:38,669 Europe, maybe we should ask you for some other thing, like your 185 00:07:38,669 --> 00:07:40,500 two FFA, which they didn't enable. 186 00:07:41,130 --> 00:07:43,710 And then of course encouraging the use of password managers. 187 00:07:44,250 --> 00:07:47,369 And promoting the use of password managers to help maintain strong, unique 188 00:07:47,369 --> 00:07:49,140 passwords for each of the online accounts. 189 00:07:49,169 --> 00:07:52,320 Again, it goes back to the user education awareness. 190 00:07:52,409 --> 00:07:53,640 Nobody's doing that, right? 191 00:07:53,940 --> 00:07:56,460 The people that are doing that at the cybersecurity, people telling you 192 00:07:56,460 --> 00:07:58,109 years using a password manager, right. 193 00:07:59,099 --> 00:07:59,609 But. 194 00:08:00,570 --> 00:08:05,639 If you want adoption to happen, sometimes companies have to force adoption and 195 00:08:05,639 --> 00:08:07,440 then everyone just starts doing it. 196 00:08:08,369 --> 00:08:10,200 So if you want to have faith to happen. 197 00:08:11,129 --> 00:08:13,710 Kind of like chat did at some point, probably because they 198 00:08:13,710 --> 00:08:15,450 had some kind of COVID incident. 199 00:08:16,200 --> 00:08:18,570 You just force everyone to start doing it and they're going to do 200 00:08:18,570 --> 00:08:21,119 it because they'd rather use the service to not use the service. 201 00:08:21,149 --> 00:08:22,560 And so you force them to do that. 202 00:08:22,560 --> 00:08:24,570 And it ends up being something that they can do. 203 00:08:24,570 --> 00:08:27,629 So when I, when I look at these lists of things they 204 00:08:27,629 --> 00:08:28,979 could have done, but didn't do. 205 00:08:28,979 --> 00:08:30,000 It's just concerning. 206 00:08:30,000 --> 00:08:33,030 And of course they've already, they've already turned around and 207 00:08:33,030 --> 00:08:35,880 blamed it on the user saying, Hey, you guys used reuse passwords. 208 00:08:35,909 --> 00:08:36,480 That's on you. 209 00:08:36,480 --> 00:08:38,370 We have reasonable security measures in place. 210 00:08:38,370 --> 00:08:39,568 And if you're going to just, you know, 211 00:08:39,568 --> 00:08:40,078 Reused. 212 00:08:40,109 --> 00:08:42,808 His name is passwords and I, there's not much we can do about it. 213 00:08:42,808 --> 00:08:46,859 So that's, that's on you and I completely disagree about disagree. 214 00:08:47,339 --> 00:08:47,879 With that. 215 00:08:48,420 --> 00:08:51,930 There's also the, it doesn't fall under the HIPAA laws because 216 00:08:51,930 --> 00:08:53,160 it's not medical information. 217 00:08:53,160 --> 00:08:53,400 Right. 218 00:08:53,400 --> 00:08:57,209 It's personally identifiable information, but it's not medical information is 219 00:08:57,209 --> 00:08:59,099 they're not actually getting DNA. 220 00:08:59,910 --> 00:09:01,589 And then there's some other obscure laws. 221 00:09:02,310 --> 00:09:05,219 That are going to say, well, they've had this information, but what 222 00:09:05,219 --> 00:09:09,479 exactly did they take that was used against you that caused you harm? 223 00:09:10,319 --> 00:09:11,069 Who knows man. 224 00:09:11,729 --> 00:09:12,089 So. 225 00:09:12,089 --> 00:09:15,209 And then they changed their terms of service at the end that you had to. 226 00:09:15,989 --> 00:09:19,979 You had to opt out so that you couldn't do this class action lawsuit. 227 00:09:19,979 --> 00:09:20,159 I had. 228 00:09:20,249 --> 00:09:23,639 I forgot it had to be like individual or something, but they kind of did 229 00:09:23,639 --> 00:09:25,199 it right, right after Thanksgiving. 230 00:09:25,199 --> 00:09:27,629 And they switched it and gave you 30 days to opt out. 231 00:09:28,199 --> 00:09:31,289 So, if you didn't opt out of this and you opted in, then you 232 00:09:31,289 --> 00:09:35,489 automatically opted into not being part of some class action stuff. 233 00:09:35,519 --> 00:09:35,909 So. 234 00:09:36,329 --> 00:09:39,449 A lot of shady stuff, but you know, it's an 85 cent stock. 235 00:09:39,449 --> 00:09:43,739 My guess is that the lawyers on probably both sides are gonna make a lot of money. 236 00:09:43,739 --> 00:09:44,459 They'll go out. 237 00:09:44,489 --> 00:09:46,050 They'll just file for bankruptcy. 238 00:09:46,170 --> 00:09:48,660 They'll either stay in business and just restructure or they'll 239 00:09:48,660 --> 00:09:49,890 just completely go away. 240 00:09:50,040 --> 00:09:50,640 Who cares? 241 00:09:50,670 --> 00:09:51,329 It doesn't matter. 242 00:09:52,140 --> 00:09:52,979 And then. 243 00:09:53,849 --> 00:09:56,430 You the end user, you, the person that was using this, you'll 244 00:09:56,430 --> 00:09:57,689 just move on to something else. 245 00:09:57,689 --> 00:09:58,680 Everybody got your data. 246 00:09:58,680 --> 00:09:59,640 You're going to get nothing. 247 00:09:59,939 --> 00:10:03,660 You're going to get some credit monitoring for three years, right? 248 00:10:03,989 --> 00:10:06,900 From another agency that was breached that leaked all your data. 249 00:10:07,800 --> 00:10:11,189 So, I mean, It's unfortunate at the end, the end user here 250 00:10:11,189 --> 00:10:12,420 is going to be like usual. 251 00:10:12,420 --> 00:10:15,149 It's going to be the loser in this, in this particular battle. 252 00:10:15,869 --> 00:10:16,410 And. 253 00:10:16,410 --> 00:10:21,359 You just have to start thinking if you, yourself and your friends and your family, 254 00:10:21,359 --> 00:10:23,550 you've got to just be better at security. 255 00:10:23,550 --> 00:10:26,759 Use the tools that are available on the site. 256 00:10:27,329 --> 00:10:32,280 Most most major sites, maybe, obviously not this one, but most, most major sites. 257 00:10:32,280 --> 00:10:34,349 If you go to the number two. 258 00:10:34,680 --> 00:10:37,290 F a.directory. 259 00:10:37,319 --> 00:10:41,520 That's the number two F a doc directory. 260 00:10:42,449 --> 00:10:44,310 You're going to see all the different sites. 261 00:10:44,310 --> 00:10:47,369 This is not, you know, this is not a hundred percent, but you're going to 262 00:10:47,369 --> 00:10:52,379 see a lot of sites and how to set up to a Fe on all these major accounts, 263 00:10:52,379 --> 00:10:54,839 all your social media, your email. 264 00:10:55,560 --> 00:10:58,290 You should just have an authenticator app on your phone. 265 00:10:58,319 --> 00:10:58,859 They're free. 266 00:10:59,579 --> 00:11:03,479 You should just go set up to a Fe as much as you can just do, make a 267 00:11:03,479 --> 00:11:05,040 goal, like one a day or something. 268 00:11:06,030 --> 00:11:08,879 And just don't be that low hanging fruit. 269 00:11:08,879 --> 00:11:09,149 Right. 270 00:11:09,179 --> 00:11:13,559 Even if you reuse the username and password, if you had 271 00:11:13,559 --> 00:11:15,269 to have a, on your account. 272 00:11:15,269 --> 00:11:16,589 That would not happen now. 273 00:11:16,589 --> 00:11:20,459 In this case, there was that DNA, whatever sharing kind of thing. 274 00:11:20,459 --> 00:11:25,020 So even the PR even these poor people that maybe really did have really long 275 00:11:25,020 --> 00:11:27,060 and complex passwords and super secure. 276 00:11:27,959 --> 00:11:30,959 The person that they were connected with, obviously got hacked and then 277 00:11:30,959 --> 00:11:32,339 their information gets scraped too. 278 00:11:32,339 --> 00:11:36,089 So this goes back to one of the thoughts that I had is. 279 00:11:36,089 --> 00:11:39,030 You've got to assume a breach mentality and it doesn't matter 280 00:11:39,030 --> 00:11:40,500 how safe and secure you are. 281 00:11:40,500 --> 00:11:42,329 If the place that's holding your data. 282 00:11:42,359 --> 00:11:43,800 Isn't right. 283 00:11:44,130 --> 00:11:44,609 So. 284 00:11:45,540 --> 00:11:49,020 Again, you could have had to have Fe you could have had a really strong 285 00:11:49,020 --> 00:11:51,000 password on this particular site. 286 00:11:51,000 --> 00:11:55,949 But because somehow in the backend, somebody opted into this DNA sharing 287 00:11:55,949 --> 00:11:59,040 or family tree sharing, and maybe you were, or were not involved in 288 00:11:59,040 --> 00:12:01,199 that your information gets scraped because you're connected with 289 00:12:01,199 --> 00:12:02,969 someone who's completely insecure. 290 00:12:03,420 --> 00:12:06,150 And this is one of those rare use cases, I guess you could say, but. 291 00:12:06,150 --> 00:12:11,460 He just got to adopt better security practices and this gets worse over time. 292 00:12:11,460 --> 00:12:15,690 And identity theft is real and identity theft is real painful. 293 00:12:15,690 --> 00:12:17,850 And the simplest thing you can possibly do. 294 00:12:18,360 --> 00:12:20,790 The simplest thing you can possibly do. 295 00:12:21,600 --> 00:12:22,860 Is freeze your credit. 296 00:12:23,790 --> 00:12:24,510 Online. 297 00:12:25,320 --> 00:12:26,040 For free. 298 00:12:26,580 --> 00:12:27,930 At the major credit bureaus. 299 00:12:27,990 --> 00:12:31,830 And what that does is that gives you an additional pin code. 300 00:12:32,640 --> 00:12:36,660 That you must use to log into those agencies, additional pin 301 00:12:36,660 --> 00:12:40,530 code, long pin code that you log into those additional agencies. 302 00:12:40,890 --> 00:12:42,750 That you can then unfreeze your credit. 303 00:12:43,290 --> 00:12:46,740 For a certain thought, whatever you want to call it for a certain period of time. 304 00:12:46,740 --> 00:12:47,880 And then it gets frozen again. 305 00:12:48,300 --> 00:12:51,840 And what that means is if somebody has all my information, they can go 306 00:12:51,840 --> 00:12:54,690 get a loan for a house or a car or whatever, and they're gonna apply for 307 00:12:54,690 --> 00:12:56,160 a loan and pretend that they're me. 308 00:12:57,150 --> 00:12:58,860 When they go to run those credit checks. 309 00:12:59,250 --> 00:13:03,570 Those those companies won't be able to get a credit check because they're going 310 00:13:03,570 --> 00:13:06,810 to say, oh, it looks like, you know, Experian or TransUnion or whatever. 311 00:13:07,380 --> 00:13:09,270 Is, um, They're not, I'm not getting it back. 312 00:13:09,270 --> 00:13:12,480 You're going to need to go and freeze that and that person, that thing is not 313 00:13:12,480 --> 00:13:15,390 going to have that pin code that you set up and therefore you're not going 314 00:13:15,390 --> 00:13:17,640 to have a loan outstanding in your name. 315 00:13:18,510 --> 00:13:21,120 And this goes for kids too, which is odd. 316 00:13:21,630 --> 00:13:22,050 But. 317 00:13:22,050 --> 00:13:26,790 If you think about it, if your children get their credentials stolen as well. 318 00:13:27,300 --> 00:13:27,840 Whatever. 319 00:13:27,840 --> 00:13:32,160 A person could theoretically get alone and you wouldn't even really know about that. 320 00:13:32,190 --> 00:13:35,340 You know, till much later it'd be 18 years later that your child's 321 00:13:35,340 --> 00:13:38,610 credit has been used by somebody and they have terrible credit. 322 00:13:38,640 --> 00:13:39,000 Right. 323 00:13:39,060 --> 00:13:40,650 I mean, there's all these possibilities. 324 00:13:41,490 --> 00:13:43,350 People always talk about, oh, you can get this thing. 325 00:13:43,680 --> 00:13:45,900 That will monitor your credit and do all this kind of stuff. 326 00:13:45,900 --> 00:13:48,180 And you pay yearly fee and why. 327 00:13:48,810 --> 00:13:49,290 Why. 328 00:13:49,950 --> 00:13:51,120 You just go lock your credit. 329 00:13:51,150 --> 00:13:51,780 The three major. 330 00:13:52,050 --> 00:13:53,370 At the three major. 331 00:13:54,000 --> 00:13:54,840 Credit unions. 332 00:13:55,560 --> 00:13:56,400 You get that? 333 00:13:56,400 --> 00:13:57,090 Pin code. 334 00:13:57,960 --> 00:13:58,950 And that's it. 335 00:13:58,950 --> 00:14:03,030 And then it's easy peasy and you know what it, yeah, it'll stop you temporarily 336 00:14:03,330 --> 00:14:05,340 from applying for credit cards online. 337 00:14:06,030 --> 00:14:06,540 But. 338 00:14:06,540 --> 00:14:09,180 You still, it's not hard to unfreeze it. 339 00:14:09,210 --> 00:14:10,020 It's quick. 340 00:14:10,950 --> 00:14:12,390 You can put a time limit on it. 341 00:14:13,140 --> 00:14:14,400 It's not a big deal at all. 342 00:14:14,400 --> 00:14:16,560 And in fact, you still get the promos and bonuses. 343 00:14:16,560 --> 00:14:18,390 I had my, I have my credit frozen. 344 00:14:19,350 --> 00:14:20,250 And I wanted some. 345 00:14:20,850 --> 00:14:22,020 Airline credit card. 346 00:14:22,980 --> 00:14:24,840 And I went and applied for it. 347 00:14:24,840 --> 00:14:27,120 And of course it said, Hey, it looks like your credit's frozen. 348 00:14:27,120 --> 00:14:30,900 So we're not able to do this at this online for you. 349 00:14:31,440 --> 00:14:35,490 But we're going to send you a met, you know, mail and then you can 350 00:14:35,490 --> 00:14:37,170 actually call in and blah, blah, blah. 351 00:14:37,170 --> 00:14:40,410 And when I did actually call in, I said, Hey, I need to unfreeze my 352 00:14:40,410 --> 00:14:42,000 credit so I can get this promotion. 353 00:14:42,000 --> 00:14:43,470 I just want to make sure I'm still going to get it. 354 00:14:43,470 --> 00:14:46,530 And they said, oh yeah, you're still gonna get it because you applied for it. 355 00:14:46,920 --> 00:14:50,910 During the promotional period, just because the promo closes and you haven't 356 00:14:51,390 --> 00:14:53,790 done it online or whatever you still got. 357 00:14:53,820 --> 00:14:56,340 So I just on frozen my credit, they were able to check online. 358 00:14:56,340 --> 00:14:56,610 Yep. 359 00:14:56,640 --> 00:14:59,010 And then they went ahead and did it, and I still got the promotion. 360 00:14:59,280 --> 00:14:59,730 So. 361 00:15:00,150 --> 00:15:04,170 If you are worried like, well, if this is a window and I want to get this thing. 362 00:15:04,170 --> 00:15:06,570 B you still applied during that time. 363 00:15:06,630 --> 00:15:09,300 And just because your credit's frozen doesn't mean you're not 364 00:15:09,300 --> 00:15:10,710 going to still hit that window. 365 00:15:10,710 --> 00:15:13,800 It just, it just takes a few, you know, a couple more days. 366 00:15:13,800 --> 00:15:16,230 So I'm going to send you a piece of mail and some number that you 367 00:15:16,230 --> 00:15:19,050 have to call in for them to do an additional verification check. 368 00:15:19,320 --> 00:15:20,460 So it's not a big deal. 369 00:15:20,910 --> 00:15:23,580 But people act like it's a big deal and it's a huge hassle. 370 00:15:24,060 --> 00:15:27,570 And I'm telling you the hassle is going to be when you get that identity theft. 371 00:15:27,870 --> 00:15:29,820 Uh, happens to you or your kid. 372 00:15:30,450 --> 00:15:31,800 That's going to be a hassle for you. 373 00:15:32,220 --> 00:15:36,780 So you're going to want to go out and, you know, Get better security hygiene. 374 00:15:36,780 --> 00:15:38,610 It's not that hard to do. 375 00:15:39,030 --> 00:15:39,780 It really isn't. 376 00:15:40,200 --> 00:15:42,690 You get an authenticator app and a password manager. 377 00:15:43,110 --> 00:15:43,860 Easy peasy. 378 00:15:44,040 --> 00:15:47,910 You go to that to F a that's number two F a.directory, and 379 00:15:47,910 --> 00:15:49,770 you just do one thing day. 380 00:15:50,400 --> 00:15:52,650 And he locked down all your social media accounts. 381 00:15:52,950 --> 00:15:56,100 You locked down your email accounts and things like that. 382 00:15:56,610 --> 00:15:59,670 And that just stops you from being that low hanging fruit. 383 00:16:00,120 --> 00:16:03,060 So I hope this has been an informative podcast for you, and I 384 00:16:03,060 --> 00:16:04,410 hope you weren't part of the breach. 385 00:16:04,860 --> 00:16:06,120 Um, it's unfortunate. 386 00:16:06,480 --> 00:16:09,390 But, you know, 20, 24 is just starting and I'm sure there's plenty 387 00:16:09,390 --> 00:16:10,980 more breaches where that came from.