Hello, listeners, and welcome to another episode of the Jacob Shapiro podcast.

As usual or not as usual, over the past five weeks, I'm Jacob Shapiro, and

I'm back hosting the podcast with you.

First, I owe you an explanation of why there have been no episodes

for the past four to five weeks.

If you listen to the most recent cousins episode with Marco Pappi, you

know that, uh, since early August I've been dealing, um, with an illness.

It started as some unnamed virus.

It was not COVID, it was not the flu.

I have no idea what it was, um, that turned into pneumonia.

The pneumonia was impossible to get rid of.

I was on three different courses of antibiotics.

Uh, finally the third course seemed to work.

Um, I'm finally back and feeling better and a little bit like, like myself.

Although as I was commenting to my wife, um, just before I recorded this podcast,

I feel a little bit like Rumpelstiltskin.

I'm like picking up the thread of where I was a month ago.

It's remarkable how many things have not changed in geopolitics,

uh, while I was on my sick hiatus.

And also, uh, how many things did change.

Um, who better to bring the podcast, uh, back with after its,

uh, unintended hiatus than Elohim?

Menard ELO has been a guest on this podcast several times.

I also wanna share with you.

Um, that I'm helping ELO with his own podcast, and it's called Co Converso dea.

Um, our idea was to create a podcast like the one that I do, but accept

to do it in Spanish because I wanted some of the ideas that we're talking

about to be out there in Spanish.

And I also wanted ELO to be talking to the types of people that, because

I don't speak Spanish, all of my training is in Hebrew and Arabic.

Uh, I can't really speak Spanish in any meaningful way.

I wanted to be able to see elo be in conversation with thought leaders

in the Spanish speaking world, especially in the Latin American

world, and learn from that conversation and learn from that perspective.

So we will have a link to his show in the notes.

Um, if you don't speak Spanish, okay, you're in the same boat as me.

Maybe you go and, uh, have the transcript, uh, translated by chat

GPT if you're working on your Spanish.

Or if you do speak Spanish, though, I would highly encourage you to

go listen, um, to ELO's podcast.

We're trying to get some of these ideas and this style of

analysis out there to a broader.

Um, segment of the population.

And I think that especially the Latin American world, these ideas,

um, don't have a lot of currency and need to have more currency.

It's not just about educating in English.

There's a whole world out there in general.

Um, besides that, thank you to those of you who have asked over the past

couple of weeks where the heck I was.

Um, it is nice to be missed even though I couldn't, uh, get

off my feet and get back to it.

Um, but I'm really happy to be back.

We've got a bunch of episodes that are coming and a very,

very busy fall in front of us.

Um, so I hope you're all doing well.

Uh, I always say take care of the people that you love.

That feels all the more apropos right now.

Cheers.

I will see you out there thankfully.

Alright, um, we're here together, elo, it's nice to be with you first

podcast since I'm back for my illness.

And who better to do it with?

Um, we've got a lot of stuff to talk about.

Um, the first thing, and, and I, I wanted to structure things a little bit

differently, so I went through and created an outline for our conversation, and then

I asked chat, GPT what would be the, the best way to sort of set the conversation?

And it said, well, how about you start each.

Each, you know, segment or each topic with a provocative statement.

And then you guys can talk about yes or no.

So maybe we'll try that for the first one and see if it works.

I've never actually tried this before.

Um, but so the idea was to talk about US transactional and what the

relationship is between the United States and Latin America in general.

I think it's a really important time to talk about this because we're

recording here Monday, September 8th.

Uh, we won't sit on this episode that long.

It'll come out soon.

Um, but Politico and a bunch of other US media outlets are reporting about

how Pete Hegseth has a draft of this new national defense strategy on his desk

that we'll see the United States move away from focusing on Asia and thinking

more about the Western hemisphere.

This is something that Marco Rubio has been talking about since his

very first day as Secretary of State.

So, um, it's interesting to think about in those terms, but the, the provocative

statement that chat GPT wanted me to start with was Latin America is

part of a declining American empire.

Agree or disagree.

And then I would just sort of add on to that question.

Um, I think most Latin American leaders, and I'm thinking specifically

of Claudia Shane Baum, and I know that that doesn't map on perfectly because

Mexico has a unique relationship with the United States and a unique economic

dependence on the United States.

Um, but it's very hard to think of a Latin American country that has

defied the United States or has pushed back in a major way, in a material

way against what the US is doing.

Maybe we could talk about Brazil and Lula engaging with the bricks and

things like that, but even he has had his hands tied behind his back because

of the right and because of what Trump has been saying about Bolsonaro.

But so do you think Latin America is part of a declining American

empire, and can you think of.

Any Latin American leader who has been faced with, you know what I is, predatory

is the wrong word, but imperialistic US trade policy and has pushed back,

rather than doing what Claudia Shane Baum, I think pragmatically has done and

said, no, we'll do whatever you want.

We'll, we'll deploy National Guard to the border and we'll put tariffs on

China and we, we want to be friends, we wanna do whatever you want.

President Trump, you just tell us how high and we will jump.

So why don't we start there?

Okay.

So let's go from the first one.

The decline of the American Empire is a fact, is seem, it's imploding, right?

I think that it will take time, but it's a fact.

So you have like the power that the last century was, uh, present in many ways.

Now these countries trying to deploy it.

Only by force, not by values anymore.

And I think what they are not seeing is that values also matter in the same way.

If we agree with that,

the next question that you frame, that you frame is like, if Latin America is

part of that, and I, my, my answer would be, what country is not part of that?

Right.

What region is not part of that?

So the ans the, the answer would be in which way Latin America

is part of this, uh, gradual decline as it is any other region.

And I would say that it comes, uh, with the idea of Latin America as the

backyard of the us That has been a very important framing in last century.

Uh, will, Latin Americans don't like it, but the US time and again tries to,

depending who is the leader is trying to.

Remind us that we are part of this territory and we have

to be somehow domesticated.

We're not only in the backyard, but we also, uh, those people in the

backyard that should stay there first.

And in addition to that, we should avoid them to create too much problem

because it could jump onto our domains.

So that's the framing from the us.

So how new it, it is, what is happening?

So the US has deployed military in the, in our countries before, has

subsidized the coups in different pa uh, parts of Latin America.

So actually what is happening here?

Right now is an attempt of the US to keep that line in a different world.

In different times.

Maybe it will not directly invest in coups, but it is using its power to,

as I use this word, and I'm pretty sure many Latin Americans don't like it.

This government particularly is trying to ate the hemisphere and Latin America

is key in this, uh, in this way.

What is the capacity of our leaders, Latin American leaders to push back?

I would not say that it is, I would say that it is not fair to compare

other leaders with shame bomb.

I think Mexico, it's a very.

Particular case of relationship with the US in terms of territory,

in terms of economy, in terms of politics, in terms of culture.

And I would argue that shame bound is brilliantly dealing with asymmetry

and asymmetry of power that is huge and a threat that is constantly there.

And shame has this extraordinary capacity of dealing with this

leader that wants to take it all, maybe as it was AMLO Lopez Obrador in his time.

And actually what we, I, I don't know if you, we talked about it

last time, but I want to bring it, uh, on the table again, which is.

The capacity of shame bound with to deal with this, uh, populist like amlo.

I think that is helping her to deal with this populist that is Donald Trump.

I think that they are not so different in terms of character.

It's, they are different in terms of the power they have now and the

language they speak, but at the end, both of them want to take it all.

So shame by naturally is doing a great job in my, I think that in

terms of economics, for example, you cannot compare Mexico with Brazil.

Brazil with these 50% tires is not suffering with a 50% tires.

Mexico would be death.

Right.

So you cannot compare that, right?

Yeah.

Actually this amazing capacity of Brazil to diversify the economy across the world

and only having some specific products that go to the US is amazing in terms of,

actually, it, it grew 4%, I think, uh, in the last, uh, metrics, uh, after this.

So in the metrics that've measured actually the, the

impact, I, i dunno, the experts.

The experts actually grew 4% after this.

So it's amazing.

Now we have other problems in Latin America that come to

reduce the capacity to push back.

What are those problems?

First, the lack of that historical issue of integration.

So we are not able to make coalitions as nations.

So actually.

Each country in Latin America is negotiating with the us, uh, one to one.

And that is a problem, right?

So mm-hmm.

No leader in Latin America has the capacity to negotiate with

the United States one to one.

Uh, that is first.

Second, and maybe this will bring some new ones to what I

said, instead of the in, in, in.

Instead of saying that all the countries will work in the same way,

maybe we can say maybe there are some countries that will go better

than others based on ideology.

So actually Argentina was able to start negotiating the Visa waiver.

The US said no, they pushed back.

However, Argentina was able to say, Hey, let's try, I think the there

are of countries that they would even, they would not even try.

So I, I can't imagine colomb.

Like negotiating a Visa waiver would be like shooting their feet, right?

So I think that in terms of ideology, some countries will,

could be able to do better.

And one critical point about this is the elections that are coming in the

end and region, namely Chile Bolivia, which is finishing actually in the,

in the next, uh, couple of weeks, uh, Peru next year, Colombia next year.

If there is a turn to the right and

uh, Chile, Bolivia, or is almost confirmed, Peru and Colombia come

from the left to the right, maybe they will have a different conversation

with the US based on ideology.

Hmm.

And to finish this one example is Brazil that we will, I, I'm pretty sure in

your cha GPT outline that Brazil we will, we will go in depth about Brazil,

but arguably, and we will develop this idea of arguably the US sanctions

to Brazil is because of ideology, because the connection of Trump with

Bolsonaro and uh, as a kind of revenge to trying to keep his friend or ally

or whatever you wanna call it, safe.

Um.

That's my point.

Yeah.

There, there's a lot to unpack there.

The first is, um, I, I'm struck by your, your first statement, which

is, you know, the, the decline of American Empire is a fact.

Um, 'cause uh, you say it, it's well established.

And I know there's a lot to unpack there because first you have the

ar you have to have the argument about whether the United States is

an empire, and then you have to talk about what imperial decline looks like.

Um, and the reason I think it's a, it is such a provocative question is

because I think you can argue that the United States was the unipolar

hegemon since the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.

And that at that point, I mean you can call it empire, you can call

it the liberal international order, you can call it whatever you want.

But basically countries went along with whatever the United States wanted and the

countries that didn't were an exception.

That was North Korea or Iran, Cuba, the ji, we absolutely,

it was a very small list.

Um, but, so if the, if the United States is, uh, is an imperial decline.

I think part of what it actually means is the United States can no

longer extend that writ globally.

It means that it has to bring things in closer to home.

So even if US reach is define is declining globally, that would actually maybe mean

bad things for Latin America because it would mean the United States is gonna

focus more on the Western hemisphere.

It's gonna go back to its Monroe doctrine, 19th century ideas that, okay, to your

point, this is our backyard and these are our, uh, barbarians to civilize and

everybody else needs to stay out of our backyard because we are going to have

all the resources here and go forward.

Which would actually be, I think, maybe a negative.

We're Latin, we're we're aligned.

I'm also struck by, I thought, I thought you would be, and then the other, I'm

sure we're gonna be aligned on this.

I was, I was surprised you didn't take it this direction.

Um, but, uh, it doesn't seem to me that us, um, policy

towards Latin American general.

Has ever been anything but transactional and about force.

I mean, think about all the different countries that the United States

has either invaded in this part of the world or supported, uh,

with, in terms of regime change.

I mean, the United States has been behind regime change and potential coups

in Honduras, in Bolivia, in Brazil.

In Chile, in Cuba, in the Dominican Republic, in Guatemala, in Haiti,

in Argentina, in Nicaragua.

Like these are all countries, uh, Panama before we even get there, these are all

countries that the United States has either occupied at one point in time, or

American companies have been involved with stalling leaders that were better for them

so that they could have better policies.

That's the example of Honduras.

Or you have the CIA running around, whether it's with AE or

in Brazil in 64 or Argentina.

Um, you know, sort of fomenting all these things.

So there's this, I think the United States has this pleasant story of itself as

values oriented and favoring democracy, and that all of these interventions

were done in the service of that.

Patently not in the 19th century.

It was about making money.

In the 20th century.

There was this ideological veneer, but it didn't really go anywhere.

And I think the United States, in some senses, drank its own Kool-Aid.

It allowed itself to think post-Cold War, that, oh, now it's about values,

uh, between us and the organization of an American states and Mercer

and nafta, and everybody's doing what the United States is doing.

Everybody wants to do that.

But that's not like US relations with, um, Latin America are much more like,

uh, that bombing, that Venezuelan ship with drugs, uh, than they are about

aligning it all about values at all.

And you're exactly right about the, the tariffs on Brazil.

Uh, Brazil, it like, there's no trade deficit with Brazil.

It's surplus.

One of the only countries where you can actually say the, the, the

sanctions don't make any sense.

And President Trump t tied it directly to Bolsonaro.

And even created a hostile reaction in the Brazilian right, because people in

the Brazilian right saw that and said, well, whoa, whoa, whoa, whoa, whoa.

We like Bolsonaro, but we don't like being told by the American president to like,

Bolsonaro, this is, this is not okay.

Like we saw this movie in the sixties and we don't want to go.

Let me, lemme provide a new ones.

I think for me, for, for, for the listeners here, please,

which is the Brazil, el, the Brazilian elites are very, very nationalistic.

They really, so you can see it everywhere.

They protect their economy, they protect their, their politics and

their protective and their culture.

When you go to a concert in Brazil, everybody knows every single song

of every single Brazilian singer.

So they are very, uh, into their own country as those who made decision.

And that's it.

An elite thing, even whether you are right or left leaning.

Yeah, and I mean, and we can even maybe move up the Brazil part of the

conversation because the last thing I'll just say is that Brazil reminds

me more than any other country in the world of the United States.

It's as if the US had not, has it had its civil war, it would look somewhat like

Brazil, looks like Brazil just because of where it was and how it was colonized.

Um, it's less about, it has, it doesn't have these huge pockets of

indigenous people where everything just got smooshed together and it's a

big melting pot and it's, I mean, all culture and nationalism is artificial,

but it's more so in Brazil in the same way that it is with the United States.

It's not that way.

Maybe I'm speaking too far here.

Maybe you'll correct me, but like in Peru.

Like there's very clearly an indigenous population and then there's the

European colonizer population afterwards and the relationship between them.

Whereas Brazil is just, sure there's some indigenous and there's some Europeans

and there's some black slaves that were imported and there's this over

here and it's all smushed together.

And by the way, if we could just get to the Pacific, uh, and dominate

the entire continent, like we would have manifest destiny Brazil style.

So it's this weird dynamic where Brazil has been held back by its own conservatism

and pride, but if it ever unshackled itself, it would actually be a fairly

significant power in South America.

And it hasn't been willing or able to do that quite yet.

And we can talk about whether there are signs that there are gonna do it.

So I'll leave it to you.

Elo, do you wanna start going down sort of the Venezuela rabbit

hole or do you wanna move up the Brazil part of the conversation?

I think maybe we should move to the Brazil part of the conversation first.

What do you think?

Let's talk about the Brazil and we will end up talking about Venezuela because

they are so close and so neighbors.

So I think.

I, I'm not, I'm not sure about what you're saying about this, that USA ended up like

Brazil ended up like Brazil or Brazil ended up like the US I think they have

very different histories of, they, they have different colonial histories, right?

Mm-hmm.

So actually we have in South America, we, if we understand the difference

between Brazil and the rest of, of South America, we can go back and understand

the Portuguese, uh, colonialism and the Spanish art, uh, colonialism.

So I think that that is so critical in our histories and trajectories

that I, I think that the US has not had that kind of experience.

To really match it down.

That said, they are two huge countries with huge populations,

both of them, federal, right.

Uh, both of them with, uh,

with histories of some specific states that had some specific power

in contrast to others like Rio Baia Sa Paolo in Brazil and, and in, in the

US with other kind of hi, uh, history.

So you can, you can do some parallel, but I would say it's not fair to say

that they are so close and they could have been in the, in the same point

in history without some changes.

Okay.

That said, I think that.

And, and I just had a very, a fantastic episode in, in the

podcast with Juana Guo, which is an expert of geopolitics in Brazil.

He's Spanish, and he explained beautifully how Brazil has international

projection, but not necessarily ambition to be the leader of whether

the Americas or even other places.

So he actually deflated the idea that Brazil has that kind of purpose and it

comes back again to the elites, right?

The Brazilian elites are looking inside Brazil and they're looking at.

The exterior, as long as it helps the current situation.

So the endeavor to Brazil to become a leader of the

Americas, I think it's too much.

That said, it's great to, it's a great reference, international

reference of what you can do to keep yourselves sovereign enough.

That's the example with the judiciary decision with ex Los Elon Musk.

A, you have to follow the rules in this country.

If you don't follow the rules, you will shut down.

That's, that's it.

That's, and that's even more institutional, institutional,

what the US is right now.

Right.

So that's first.

Um, secondly, with this, uh,

decision of the 30 Faso, it's the way they call it because it's like, uh.

Tar Tar Tarso is the big, uh, a, the big, the big Tar Tar Faso, they call it.

I love the name.

Um, so with the Tar Faso, what the Brazilians are doing is saying, Hey, okay,

this unfair, but we're not gonna jump, uh, from our balconies because of this.

My country would be jumping from the balconies, right?

So the elites, I mean the, the, the business people would be crazy.

They would say, okay, we're gonna not grow economically anymore.

We're we're gonna be, and, and obviously they we're gonna become

Venezuela because every, every single problem it'll become Venezuela.

So I think that the elites in Brazil are saying, well, there will be some

industries that will be affected, but our core industries are not.

We have.

History of developing our trade all across the world.

Our soya, our soy goes to China.

We are the most IPO important seller in the world, and China is the

most important buyer in the world.

And that's an example of how, uh, Brazil has invested in their autonomy.

Now, Brazil can take the leadership on some issues.

For example, with the collapse of U-S-A-I-D, Brazil will take the

lead on environmental issues in the region and maybe in the world.

They're hosting a COP 2025 in a few months, and it will be at the core of

the Amazon rainforest, which is in.

Which is the, the port that, that is located actually in the

junctures of the Amazon re, uh, river and the, uh, Atlantic Ocean.

So it's beautiful symbolically and geographically.

So I think that they will take the lead on this.

Definitely.

Uh, at the same time, I loved how Lula framed the idea that, hey, Donald

Trump, we, uh, the United States picked you to be the president of the United

States, not the president of the world.

I loved that framing, right?

Uh, it connects with this French guy who said something like, I think it was the,

the foreign minister who said like, it's not fair that in Wisconsin, uh, we're

gonna decide the future of the world.

Right?

So I, how can we not agree with Lula?

Right.

He's right.

So, and I think that Lula also is, is now restraining his own ambition, ABI

ambitions on, for example, when he will try to mediate in Ukraine, when he,

uh, and when he did not, uh, intervene, when it was necessary, when Venezuela

had, uh, a self school, we can call it, when the, the elections were robbed,

however you want to call it, right.

So I think that also Luli is restraining his, uh, international ambitions.

That said, what I am, and I would like to know your approach about this is

I don't understand, or I partially understand, but I don't fully understand

the foreign policy of this government in us, uh, in the relationship with

Brazil and other Brix, uh, countries.

So Youi can argue that the Tar Faso is because of Bolsonaro.

That is what Donald Trump said.

But do you believe it?

So is it a coincidence that actually those with the Tarso, it's like

also India has a Tar Faso and South Africa has some sanctions.

So is it a coincidence that the, the.

This is Juana Gu Jo's idea.

I have to recognize it in my previous conversation.

So, mm-hmm.

Is it really Bolsonaro?

Is it a thing with the bricks?

It's like, I cannot attack Russia.

I cannot attack China, but maybe I can attack Brazil.

I can attack India and I can attack South Africa and I will find an excuse.

So is it a coincidence that India and Brazil, those who are attacked, uh, by

Donald Trump commercially, uh, it, it was very interesting the point, but at

the same time, you can argue that by doing so, actually you are pushing China.

You are pushing them to China's hands.

So, because China will embrace them very easily.

So actually we saw it India and China together, uh, Maori and, and Xi

Jinping together after a long time.

So I don't understand that point of the foreign policy.

So I, if we extend the idea of the, where sanctioning those who are, it's at the,

the old school of the not aligned, right?

It's like if you are not aligned, I will, I will give sanctions.

But is the not aligned idea a still here?

So is it a good, a good reading of the geopolitical thing or is like an idea

of someone who does not looks at the world beyond a very small town in Ohio?

Yeah, there, there's a couple things to unpack there.

So the first is, uh, I don't think he actually said this, which is too bad.

We'll have to find out who actually said it.

But Charles Desal is reputed to have said that Brazil is the country

of the future and always will be.

And I've always liked that framing, um, because Brazil has all of

this potential and never seems to be able to capitalize on it.

You say that Lula's restraining himself?

Well, he has to restrain himself.

Congress is going to have his hands behind his back.

He's not the Lula of the early two thousands.

He's older.

Um, probably whoever comes after him, he's not gonna have

the same sort of ideological.

Affinities that he's does.

And the world has changed around Lula.

Lula had the right policies for Brazil in the early two thousands.

It's less clear that maybe now he has the policies.

I think it's also tough for Brazil because you know, for me, the question

with Brazil is, is it going to embrace that leadership role in the region?

Which it has not.

It has not embraced it to your point on a political or security perspective.

So Brazil is not policing narco trafficking, it's not stopping

Venezuela from doing things.

It's not putting its foot down.

Um, when the United States or China or somebody else is running through

parts of the regions to do things.

Brazil's biggest trading partner, its biggest export partner is China.

Yes.

Even though Brazil is supposed to be part of Mercer.

And you would think that if Brazil was trying to vertically integrate and

build this huge economy, well then trade with Argentina, trade with your other

merker mates and it's neighbors have gotten so frustrated with this countries

like Uruguay that they're like, okay, fine, we won't listen to Mercer either.

We're gonna go do our own trade agreement.

And Brazil has to choose between the low hanging fruit of, yeah, we'll just send

our soybeans to China or we'll send, you know, and brayer planes to China and

everything will be fine versus, okay, but what if we actually became this

leader in the region and what would that mean for us and how could we push back?

And I think that's a project that both, you know, the Brazilian

left and right could be part of.

Brazil actually has a really interesting history of thinking geopolitically in

a way that most, um, countries don't.

So there's the Brazil, um, sort of specific aspect, um, of it on one hand.

And then, you know, when you start backing into some of what you were

saying about the bricks, I mean, I'll, I'll say two things about this.

I think I've said on the podcast a couple times now.

US foreign policy makes a lot more sense right now if you treat it less like

policy and more like a reality TV show.

So think about every week or every other week you need a new episode.

So you need some new crisis and some new deal, and then there has to be some

melodrama, and then there's a day Newmont, and then Trump saves the day and blah.

Like we're, we're at the end.

And he needs this constant repetition of things.

And the substance doesn't matter.

Like in some sense, the style is the substance.

He's the deal maker, he's making deals, he's punishing countries that we're

taking advantage of the United States.

And if you wanna be, you know, that I think is one way of looking at it.

It's all short-termism.

There's no strategic long-term point of view.

It's literally just about, well, what is the episode for next week?

Mm-hmm.

And what are we gonna give the people in terms of serving them.

I think if you want to be more charitable, because I'm sure that some

people are listening to this being like, oh, here goes Jacob on his Trump

derangement, uh, you know, rant again.

Um, come

on Jacob.

If you wanna be charitable, come on.

Oh, it's fine if you wanna be charitable, like if I wanted to

impute some strategic logic here, I think you can do it in, in two ways.

Number one, just because there are countries like Brazil or like India that

have been aligned with the United States.

Nominally, they have been part of a global international order where they

benefited more than the United States.

And if the United States is closing ranks, if it's near shoring, if it's declining

imperially, whatever valence you wanna put on that, then the United States has

to say, you know what, we weren't getting that much out out of the international

led global order, and our friends were even taking advantage of us or the

people who called themselves our friends.

So Brazil, you know what, we do have problems with you.

We have problems that you're usurping the US farmer as the low

cost producer of corn and soybeans.

And we have problems with you that, you know, you say one thing about China,

but that China's your top trade partner.

We have problems with the fact that you're not doing anything

to help us with Venezuela, that Lula even has some affinity.

To leftist politicians in the Western hemisphere that we don't like and we,

that we think are bad for stability.

So there's that aspect of it.

And then you can also say, if what you really, really want is to stick

it to China, which until recently, I thought was the main plank of

the, of the Trump foreign policy.

There's some doubt about that now, in my mind, based on these reports

about hegseth and moving away.

Um, you know, from Asia and focusing more on the Western hemisphere.

But let's say for now, let's take for granted that the United States' big

foreign policy goal is to compete with China as its pure competitor and to make

sure that China's not more powerful.

Well then if you want to make China convinced of this, because you know, the,

the 50% Tar Faso for Brazil, what was it?

Did he get to 240% when he was threatening with China and he couldn't even get

Xi Jinping to pick up the phone?

If you're gonna communicate to China how serious you are, then yeah, go

make an example of your friends first.

'cause you can go say, Hey China, you see what we did to India and Brazil?

What do you think we're gonna do to you if we're willing to do that to our friends?

You really want to mess around with us, you think I'm just bluffing.

You think that all these phonies out here who think it's a reality TV show,

don't recognize that I'm a strategic brilliant mastermind who's the best

deal maker in the entire world.

And then once he gets his China deal, he can come back to Brazil and India

and be like, thanks for playing along.

I needed that leverage.

Now that we've got the China situation figured out, which was a problem for all

of you as well, why don't we go back and, and redo the terms of these deals a little

bit in a way that makes sense and, and we can sort of push forward That I think

is the most charitable interpretation.

I don't see a whole lot of evidence that that's the

direction that Trump is going in.

And you know, the, your sort of examples exhibits A and B number one is the

tariff Faso, like the, the tariffs on Brazil make no sense patently, at least

with some of the other Trump policies.

You know, you could say, oh, it's about a deficit, or Oh,

it's about taking advantage.

Or, oh, like they have this pro, Brazil has none of that, like Brazil

has, like Brazil is the poster child for what countries should be.

If everything the administration says about trade is correct,

ditto that with India.

Like, okay, like yes, there are some arguments to be made here about India,

and if what you wanna do is nearshore, you don't just want the jobs to go

from China to India, you want 'em to come back to the United States.

So you have to sort of put the stops on that.

But then why go out of your way to be friendly with Pakistan, a country which

has done absolutely nothing for you.

A country which housed Osama Bin Laden behind your back.

Like, why are you, because you need minerals from them.

That's ridiculous.

The United States has more minerals than it knows what to do with it.

It needs refining capacity at home.

It doesn't need to go get minerals from the Hindu Kush.

Like how many times are we gonna go to Asia?

Uh, thinking we're gonna get things and convinced that things are gonna

turn out differently, but that's at least my attempt of explaining what the

Trump administration is trying to do.

It's trying to say, you know what?

The liberal international order that was actually just code for people

taking advantage of the United States.

And these friends of ours, they've been living large off of us interest.

So why don't you come back and let's reset the table a little bit.

And we'll also use that in the context our of our negotiations with others.

That's my best attempt to try and make some sense of it.

Are you convinced?

So it's coherent, but then you reach the point of how can you

lead a world or even your own, uh, side of the world without friends?

That's, that's.

That's very difficult to understand.

And I would say not necessarily horizontal threats.

It's like it's still us.

Still know that there is this asymmetry of power, but how

can you do it with no threatt?

The relationship with between Brazil and Uni, the United States, at

least in the last 50 years, maybe a little bit more, was completely

like respectful, horizontal.

Uh, each one of them knew their position in the world, not

trying to threat the other.

So that's very d with the relationship that we were discussing a moment ago about

the other countries in the region, right?

Mm-hmm.

But now suddenly.

It's trying to sanction Brazil in something that actually

it is not harming enough.

It is pushing the country towards China.

It is making the elites the right wing, elites inclusive against the us.

So what is the game?

Is it not reading the, the geopolitical situation, uh, well enough from this

us, uh, of, uh, officials now in government or it is something that

actually I do not see, and those people who think that they are so brilliant

that we cannot guess what they're doing.

Well, no.

And this is a contradiction that the Trump administration is not alone in having,

because the United States, to your point.

Thinks it's the most powerful and greatest country in the entire

world, and yet is also talking about, but we want to put America first.

And the truth is, you can't have both of those things at the same time.

It makes sense for the United States to have no friends.

That's how the United States was founded.

George Washington himself and his farewell address after he was

president said the United States should have no permanent allies.

It should just have interest.

I'm paraphrasing, but that was his parting message.

He didn't want the United States to have lots of friends.

He wanted it to think in terms of its interest.

The United States really only builds alliances the way we think of them today

because of World War I and World War ii.

This goes back to what I was saying about US involvement in Latin America.

In the 19th century, there were no alliances.

There were no values.

The US just invaded countries or companies, you know, sponsored

regime change of countries because they wanted different terms.

That begins to change a little bit, um, into the 20th century.

And this, by the way, is something that China knows very well.

China has one defense treaty relationship.

Amidst all the countries in the world, North Korea, and I bet it

doesn't really like having that defense treaty relationship either.

China doesn't think in terms of alliances, China thinks in terms of

interest, but I think you're right.

You cannot have your cake and eat it too.

The United States can do what it wants to do without friends.

It can just be transactional and say, we have this economic level and this

military level, and this cultural level.

Do what?

What we want you to do, or X, Y, Z consequences.

Or it can say no.

We are all part of a universal LED order.

We have shared cultures and shared value and a sense of law and order, and so if

you participate in this system, which the United States will underwrite and protect.

Then you get to have some sort of relationship with us.

And I think this is the problem.

Um, Biden had this problem too because Biden, I mean, you know,

Trump was, make America great again.

Biden was basically make things in America great.

Again, it was, it was a small, like very nuanced shift.

They were both doing pretty much the same thing.

But you can't make America great again and also have America be the

unipolar power that runs the world.

And I think for 30, 40 years, you know, there is not, there's not a

generation of foreign policy experts in the United States who are accustomed

to the United States not being the most powerful country in the world.

They take it for granted and they can't even imagine that there would be

a country that would challenge them.

And I think that's where you, you crash on the shoals of some of that.

But I think you raised a really good point about.

Yeah, whether the United States is pushing Brazil to China, and maybe you

can put on your hat as a Peruvian now too, because one of my questions here

is, um, is the United States really pushing these countries toward China?

Can these countries even embrace China?

Or is the United States basically just saying, Hey, like the, that was a nice 30

year fever dream where we all thought the end of history was ni, but really we're

going back to the way things used to be.

And sure, you wanna flirt with China, fine, but China's not the one that's

gonna bomb Venezuelan drug ships, and China's not the one that's gonna engage

in regime change, and China's not the one that has been here for 250 years

pulling all the strings because find me a Latin American country that doesn't have

us fingerprints all over its politics.

I mean, I, I don't think one exists.

Um, and this go, and, you know, I'm rambling a little, but the last

thing I'll just say is, um, Columbia I think is actually an example.

Of a case of what you're saying, which is you remember, I mean this feels like three

years ago now, but one of the first fights that the Trump administration picked was

with President Petro over migration and about deporting these illegal migrants.

And this was very much the reality TV show, right?

Like they manufactured a crisis and then Trump got tough and then

he got exactly what he wanted.

And Petro said some really out there things.

I believe he called Trump a white slaver and said that Columbia

would no longer deal with all these slaves and everything else.

But he totally capitulated and he totally capitulated.

'cause Columbia's one of the only countries that their top trading

partner is the United States.

They don't have the benefit of Brazil being able to just go to China.

But, but a couple months later, who's signing Belt and

Road Initiative frameworks?

It's President Petro.

And what is Columbia doing?

Uh, well, it's thinking a lot more seriously about China and suddenly

the US' most important prob maybe, I think, think you could argue

maybe it's most important security partner in South America, at least.

It no longer has that.

And also that President Trump could take a victory lap on a legal

migration in February, something that none of us remember right now.

So in that sense, yeah, you are moving the shift, but what if Columbia Alexa

right as president next year, to your point, and that guy just cozies

right up to Trump and everything goes back to the way it was before then.

The Trump administration could say, see, like we knew where the cards were.

Okay, they made some noise for a couple months, but ultimately

things are gonna come back to us.

I don't know, I threw a lot at you there, so take it whatever direction.

So it's

very, it's very difficult to say that it will come back to the way it was before.

So first, I think that this is a process that goes beyond, uh, Donald Trump

and Donald Trump is like accelerating the relationship with China in many

ways of, uh, of these countries.

For example, Peru, my country, so the, the A who is managing the energy, the

electricity of Lima, the capital city.

35% of the population of the country, two Chinese companies, right.

The big port that actually could, it is not right now, but

sometimes it appears again as the center of the geopolitical issue.

The, the Chiang Kai port of the Chinese people in Peru would be the

largest country, the largest, uh, port in our country in decades, maybe

from the beginning of our times.

So there was no bigger port ever in Peru.

Always.

It was Kaja, right?

So you go back to the colony and Kaja was there and now.

Shanghai, right?

Who is there?

Chinese.

Yeah.

Don't tell me that it will come back.

So the port is there, it's infrastructure.

Uh, Octa Pass used to say that architecture is a witness of the

unavoidable witness of history, right?

So the port is there, there is, there is nothing to go back.

And I think that it comes to the idea also that we should see the relationship

with China in terms of foreign investment and how China has been very

clever in, in this small sometimes as is strategic, small for, for eight.

I mean, so for China, managing the energy of Lima is like, it's

not a huge development, right?

But it is very strategic, right?

So I think in terms of foreign investment, uh, China has been, uh,

developing more than the US by far.

And in times like now when the US is like suddenly telling the story

that you are not friends anymore.

And that comes with something that you said a moment ago when you were

tracking the history of the relationship with the US and Latin America, which

I completely agree that it was always transactional until, until the eighties

and the nineties after all this time when this idea of soft power and values and

so on, you created, you mean the US you created the sense that we are friends.

Something that didn't happen before.

So now we will work with you.

We will negotiate trade agreements for years until we reach out to them, right?

It's not the the Trump approach, right?

What is that?

Like trade agreement?

And you negotiate that thing.

Come on.

But it's about loss aversion.

So you had it, you were so, you created for at least one or two generations

the idea that we were friends and now suddenly it goes, uh, from your hands

and also with U-S-A-I-D, with U-S-A-I-D, investing in democracy, investing

in the environment and and so on.

So I agree with you what that, that we are coming back to normal, but it doesn't

mean that there was a kind of commitment that hurts and push you even more.

To China or others or India maybe soon.

I have read it's, I think it's, they're still very small, but India

is also putting its nose into Latin America to see what is happening.

So yes, I think that, um, China is present, but I don't think that

it will be a way back as you at least suggested at some point.

Yeah.

And, and this maybe gets us to, we won't do all of this justice, but I, I do

want to like get to this point, which, 'cause this is something that you brought

up, which is, I think for the last 30 years we've thought of US politics

impacting Latin American politics.

Part of what you've, you've, uh, just mentioned there, I think is

part of that, but now it seems to be happening in reverse.

Um, and you, you actually raised this first, there was actually an article

in the Atlantic just this past week that was comparing Donald Trump.

Um, to Juan Perone and Peronism in Argentina.

I love where this conversation is gonna hit Century.

So go on.

I, I knew you would, I'm setting you up for this one.

And I mean, if, if a lot of listeners probably don't know

who Perone is, you should go, you know, read his Wikipedia page.

But he basically had this notion that the way for Argentina's economy to

move forward, um, was a combination of sort of, uh, Perone personally deciding

which companies received favors, which industries got nationalized or protected.

Uh, which businesses would sort of, uh, profit from state large debts.

There was a lot of import substitutions.

So we will make these things here, therefore we will raise tariffs.

Um, all that resulted by the way, was that Argentinians went to the black market

or went to Chile to buy their iPhones rather than buying the shitty iPhones

that were made by, you know, the Argentine companies that were doing things.

But when you think about Perone and what he did, and you look at what

Trump has done recently, whether it's.

You know, telling US semiconductor firms like a MD and Nvidia, that

they have to give the government a 15% cut of their sales to China

in exchange for export approvals.

Or the US is just gonna take a 15% stake in a rare earth miner like MP material

so that the Department of Defense can get, um, uptake agreements first, or

that they're gonna take a 10% stake in Intel, uh, because it's important that

the United States do this and also the US is gonna build a sovereign wealth fund.

I mean, this is out of, and then this goes straight to, by the way, the firing of the

Bureau of the Labor, uh, bureau of Labor Statistics Commissioner and I brought a

whole thing on Substack about, of all the things that Trump administration has done

domestically this year so far, that was the first time I felt like I had to weigh

in because it's not normal for the US who has data, and I don't trust any data, but

usually US data was better than the rest.

Uh, now it's not, the commissioner was fired for not anymore reporting the data.

And the BLS is actually reducing the number of inputs that it actually measures

itself because it's fired a bunch of workers because of Elon Musk and Doge.

And now it's just using historical models for in some cases a third of

the things that they're collecting.

And this, again, you're, you're manufacturing numbers

that the government wants.

I mean, and that's Peronist.

That's Maoist.

I mean that's like sort of classic, I don't even wanna say authoritarian,

but I guess it is authoritarian.

I don't know exactly what it is, but usually the United States would let

the data stand for itself when the politicians would have to deal with

it, not the politician decides the data sucks and appoints someone who's gonna

give them the data that they want.

So talk about this two way street, because you were, you were on this

literally months ago and were the first person I heard that said,

you know what, this is the Latin Americanization of American politics.

And if that's right, I, and maybe you'll, is that just about Trump or

do you think this goes beyond Trump?

Like do you think whoever is president next, like.

A precedent has now been established and that American politics will now

resemble Latin American politics, even as the United States like waves

its finger and says, well, all of you Latin American countries need to

embrace, you know, American freedom and democracy and blah, blah, blah.

That la that last one is a bigger question.

Let's just start with something.

We, in Spanish, in Latin American Spanish, we do have a word for what

is happening in the US Gradually we, because we all know the word ura, right?

Which is dictatorship.

What we in Spanish, in Latin American Spanish, we have dicta

lamba, which is a soft dictatorship.

It's not dicta doura, because dura is his hard, it's like

dicta lambda because it's soft.

So we have this word, it's a, we say, well, that's not a dicta

doura, that's a dicta lambda, right?

So you have all the characteristic of the authoritarian regime, but

you are not, uh, going, uh, to kill people the very first day.

So that's it.

What is the, what are the signals of the Latin Americanization

of, uh, the US politics?

So, I will start with my take and then we'll, I will, uh, import some

ideas from my, uh, very close friend and Martina Chavarria, who was in

the podcast, and I will, uh, uh, post his interview in a few days.

So first, I think that we have, there are many, but let's just start

with the, something more recent, the militarization of security

that is so Latin America, right?

And that comes along with the idea of the accept, the, how you make

the exception, how do you call it in Spanish, is like a exception.

Is a exception.

Measures.

You make a constant of it.

So it's like, okay, we will do this.

Mm-hmm.

Because we are in an emergency and we are always in emergency,

we are always in a threat.

And so we always need to do exceptions.

So we are in a permanent process of the politics of exception, right?

Mm-hmm.

So I think the US is doing that also, if like, well, we are an

emergency, so we need to do this.

We're in an emergency, we need to do that.

So we are in an emergency that's so Latin American too, right?

What is also very Latin American in, in how these dicta, blanda, uh,

work, this, uh, soft, uh, dictators work is like the how you throw

all your enemies to the judiciary.

You don't kill them anymore.

You make them exhausted.

You made them tired.

Tired of dealing with the judiciary, which is like, okay, you don't like this?

Okay, Kafka, come on, let's do the process with them.

Right?

And you see how universities, um, lawyers and in the US and like Latin America,

where we have some, a little bit more resilient with these kind of people.

But what I'm amazed in the US is like even powerful people are like

falling down and accepting and making a reverence to solve the issue, right?

So I'm a little bit surprised of how the leads in the US quickly,

uh, endorsed these, uh, processes.

I thought it was gonna be, uh, more difficult because of the rule of law and

all the values that I thought were, uh.

Intrinsic to your system and your culture.

And now I'm realizing that it is not, at least in if we talk about the elite.

So another one is the relationship with the media, right?

So historically, uh, Latin America, the government and the

media have, uh, this relationship of, okay, I give and I receive.

Right?

So unless it's a hard dictatorship, is adic Doura where, where,

where they size the, the media corporations In dicta, Blenda.

In a soft dictatorship, what you do is like, you just give and receive.

You re you re you receive and you give.

It's like.

Okay, I will dis concessions and what is happening, for example, with CBS,

what is happening with Paramount?

This like, so Latin American, so, oh, you want a license?

Okay, let's change the, let's change the editorial.

Right.

So it's so Latin America, but it, it is also an, but it, it is the US

So it is, it will never be the same.

It's like, it will come with more technologies, it will

come with more innovation.

It will come with, uh, even, even the UI have to recognize that the

us uh, has this dicta, bland, this like innovative deland, right?

It's like now Donald Trump has its own media channel.

Come on.

That's like Maduro and Chavez had their, uh, had their uh, uh, radio

show, uh, AMLO had their morning, uh, meet televised meetings.

But Donald Trump is.

One step beyond.

He has its own media channel, right?

It's a true social Right.

So it's a

Yeah.

And, and and his own currency.

And if you buy enough of his stupid shit coin, then you get

to have dinner with him too.

With, with no conflict.

With no conflict

of interest.

That's some, that's all that's an American, it's like, so, which is the

paradox is like they are trying to spell Latin Americans from the country while

importing their ways of doing politics.

That is amazing.

Right?

It's like, we want, we want your way of doing politics, but, but I don't, I

don't like the way you, you look, right.

Something like that.

So we, white people need to do this in terms of, uh, what the argument would,

would be from, uh, what's the name of the, the, the deputy chief of star of, uh,

the, um, the guy from Duke that you love.

Um, the guy from Duke?

Yes.

I I will remind, I will call you a moment.

Okay.

So in addition to that, this, you have this very strong, bad saddle at the same

time wave way of creating self censorship.

Right?

So nowadays the USA is specific with some populations is leaving,

uh, a regime of self censorship.

No international student can talk about Palestinians because we will be expelled.

Um, no university can make, uh, an event.

Inviting Palestinians because it will be sanctioned and seen as and submitted.

Right.

So actually I do have friends who told me, and I'm not saying two or three, a

lot of friends, international students like me, who just don't press like

on Facebook or Instagram or LinkedIn because they are, they are really afraid

of being expelled because of that.

Or when they go to their countries and come back, they, uh, some uh,

government official from migration will see, uh, their social media accounts.

Right.

But it's goes, it goes even beyond.

I was talking to a scholar.

Uh, who told me I am afraid of talking at a US citizen scholar studying politics.

I am afraid of speaking because I have a relative with without green card.

Okay, so come on.

That is, that is a, a regime of terror, but it's subtle in the,

in the way it develops, but it's very strong in the, in the impact.

Right?

So many of these ideas come also from Martin Martinez who was in my podcast.

Uh, but I think I gave you a set of examples of how the US is

importing Latin American politics.

Yeah, I love that.

We had the terra fasio at the beginning and now we have the

soft dictatorship showing you that the English language is not.

Sort of lead.

Exactly.

Um, well, I, I know we're re reaching time here and we wanted to wrap up in about an

hour and obviously we're gonna talk more.

Um, but I thought maybe we could just close out with maybe some final

thoughts on what's happening, um, between the United States and Venezuela.

Um, and so for those who don't know, I mean last week the US Navy carried

out strikes on Venezuelan vessels that they accused of trafficking drugs.

I believe about 11 people were killed and the Trump administration framed

this as part of the wider war on drugs.

Um, and maybe it's just the United States, the.

Playing a game of Whack-a-mole.

Maybe it is just about drugs.

Um, but, you know, the Trump administration tried regime change

in Venezuela during the first term.

Didn't work too well.

It was sort of a Bay of Pigs light version.

Remember Juan Gudo and some countries recognizing him and some not.

I mean, that was the United States sort of importing things there.

Um, this Venezuelan government seems much more brittle than during

the first Trump administration.

A lot of people have left, um, the countries in a state of disrepair.

Uh, you gotta think eventually somebody maybe in the military is gonna have enough

of Maduro and take him out, and maybe you get something moved in that direction.

Do you think there's anything to take from what the US just just did to Venezuela?

Is it Venezuela specific?

Is it, is it the Latin Americanization of American foreign policy

or is that not even a thing?

Like how, how do you like.

That's a US thing.

Alright, well help from your perspective, help me make sense of it because I,

I look at it and I'm thinking about the first term in Juan Gudo and I'm

thinking about the, the cartels.

I dunno if you saw this.

JD Vance, um, put out this incredible tweet where he said, um, I'm paraphrasing,

but it was like the highest, what is the, what is the highest and

best use of the American military, if not to shoot cartel members?

And I wanted to be like, well, I thought it was to defend the United

States from other enemies and to win wars, to defeat global fascism

and communism, things like that.

But sure, lighting up some cartel guys.

Some of whom are probably young kids who had no opportunity and are, I'm not

saying I'm excusing them, but like the idea that that's, that the US military

exists to blow up cartel people.

Wow.

We really have fallen from, from what our ideals were.

Anyway, I'm rambling again.

So tell, tell me how you are from your perspective.

Like if you're in Peru, if you're in Lima, or if you're in Brazil,

um, how are you looking at what the United States just did?

Is it just like, yeah, they do that all the time, or is there something more here

that we should consider in the context?

We're country, we all

have the resources to use these big boats to, to kill 11 people with a

small boat, we just go and arrest them.

So it's, it's more efficient, right?

So I think that it's, it, it says a lot about the show, right?

So you don't use that machinery for 11 people that actually you

don't know if they're drug dealers.

Some, the narrative in Venezuela, which actually it's very reliable, is that

it's 11 people who were from a small.

Moving drug from one place another to another, which is something

that usually happens in the part of, in that part of the region.

But actually you killed the last part of the chain.

So the, the poor people that need to move drug from, uh, one place

to another in a boat because they know have anything else to do.

So were they really the key pings?

So, so I think that it's a lot of show and it's a lot of investigations that I'm also

surprised of the media in the US not doing the right research on an investigations

on how the taxes of the US people are going into killing, uh, these, uh, 11

people in the middle of the Atlantic.

So, I dunno.

So I, I, how much does it cost to actually move the, those na Navy boats

and, uh, shooting this kind of, eh.

Arm.

I dunno.

I'm very surprised of the

accountability at least.

Well, there's one thing here I also wanna ask you, which is maybe the

thing I've been most surprised at this year, or the thing that I learned that

I was most surprised about this year, um, I was in Mexico earlier this year.

I was doing a lot of research on Mexico, especially during the first quarter.

And I was thinking that the US government threat and President Trump threatened

this often on the campaign trail that he was going to use the US military

to go after Mexican drug cartels.

And I brought this up to some people that I was talking to in

Mexico and asked, well, wouldn't that offend your sensibilities?

You don't want the United States running around your country.

And I mean, this was not a hundred percent of the time, and I know

that this is anecdotal, but the vast majority of people I spoke to

about this said that would be great.

We would love if the US military would come in here and blow up some cartels,

our government's not gonna do it.

And these cartel guys, you know, they're messing around with these

Latin American police forces.

And you know, as to your point, ill-equipped military forces, uh,

let's get these rangers and seals that you guys are talking about all

the time and take out our problems so we can go back in the streets

and not have to do it bouquet style.

Is there any credence to that?

Like is there any like that, that we're thinking about this the wrong

way and actually normal Venezuelans, if there are any of them left that

haven't fled the country would be like, yes, go get these guys.

Or if you were in Chile and the US government was offering to just blow up

your narco traffickers or an Ecuador, that the normal citizen would be like,

wonderful, this is ex we need, we need this kind of machismo from our leaders.

Like, yes, president Trump, take them out.

We did this test.

Testosterone.

Is that, is that

right?

We did the uf the, yeah.

And I dunno if that's unique UC way of doing politics and,

okay, so in, in the octagon.

You are right, you are right.

Uh, we are so desperate, uh, dealing with organized crime in many ways.

Drug dealers is one of them.

Now we have, uh, illegal gold mining.

We have, uh, uh, people trafficking everywhere and actually diversifying

business from a cartel perspective or from an organized crime, organized crime,

uh, criminal organization perspective.

So if we agree this is a show, the next question is what is this show for?

So what is the long-term take of this?

And I, when I saw the news and I was thinking about it, I had this

guess that I hope it is not true, but this is really very reliable.

And I think that the United States is trying to have a war

that is who the United States.

I mean, the US government right now is trying to have a war that

is like, they can show that they won and maybe the war on drugs two

point 0.0 would be the best take.

Um, so if you are doing a lot of things like changing the name of the,

the Department of Defense, department of War, so it is like you will have

a Department of War without a war.

Maybe you could have a war with all these criminal organizations that

suddenly they become terrorists, all them across Latin America.

So I think the long term shot could be that actually there,

there will be a war on drugs 2.0.

And what we were witnessing was like the creating the conditions for that.

Right.

So how the que the next question is how will the, how, how this

war on drugs 2.0 will develop.

And I think it is more like now how we will see the

oppor, the operations of this.

I think that's a little bit of, of what we saw in this show.

Now, will they, will they be more surgical in the future in terms of,

uh, doing more strategic targets instead of this small boat of 11 people

with maybe that maybe was a trial.

That's something that we will witness in the near future.

That's it.

Even if I agree that many Latin American countries or.

People from, uh, from this side of the world will, would welcome any

hard, uh, position from everywhere to attack these criminals.

I think with Venezuela there is something different because what you are doing

is that you are reinforcing Maduros and Chavez historical argument, which

is that the US wants to invade us.

So, and that's another contradiction that we can find in all these foreign

policy things that we were discussing, uh, in the last hour, which is that I,

I, I read, uh, I think Ian Bramer, uh, that said something like, well, maybe

this is a way for the US to start, like, uh, having some impact within the.

The Venezuelan elites and the people to say, Hey, the US creating some

contradictions and, and, and frictions.

And they would say, no, actually, it'll empower even more and make a very stronger

coalition against the historical enemy.

Right.

So I haven't seen the narratives I have.

I I would do, I would have to, to do some research on what are the

narratives in Venezuela about this.

But what I can bet is like, uh, that if this is the way the US wants to intervene

in Venezuela in order to make the re the regime to collapse, I would have

some doubts because I would say that this has been the, the point of Chavismo

and now of Maduro historically, which is the US wants our natural resources.

We should defend ourself from that culturally, ideologically,

economically, and politically, which is now, I I sent you a few

days ago this, uh, a Bank of Japan statement about, uh, the US politics.

And I think that's, that's important to say that how the left historically have

seen that politics is merged with culture, with economics and everything else.

It's like in, in feminism you say sex is poli is political.

Right.

And now the right wing has the same approach.

Everything is together.

Yeah.

And, and I think you're right also to, to talk about Venezuela

being somewhat exceptional because this is really original.

Sin is too strong.

Where like us polity towards Venezuela in the 18 hundreds even was complicated.

Everybody knows about the Monroe doctrine.

But they forget about the Roosevelt corollary to the Monroe Doctrine,

uh, to the Monroe Doctrine, which is, you know, in, um, in the early

19 hundreds, I think 19 0 2, 19 0 3, Venezuela was blockaded for a couple of

months by European powers because the government wasn't paying for in debts.

Um, and the United States got involved in, and Theodore Roosevelt sort of articulated

this notion that the US could intervene in the internal affairs of Latin American

countries if they were doing something that was flagrantly flagrantly wrong,

or if they were doing something that was sort of against like US civilizational

or foreign policy interests.

And that's when you get this big stick policy.

It's you get the beginning of dollar diplomacy with William Howard, uh, Taft,

trying to minimize military force, but still using US dollar influence throughout

the region, which is something that the region is still having to deal with.

Um, so yeah, I think you're right that there's something.

There's something particular about Venezuela, and in the same way that

we maybe can't read things about Shane Baum and the rest of the

region, maybe we have to be cautious about reading us actions towards

Venezuela and the rest of the region.

And, and I don't know.

I mean, just the last thing I'll say is if they are going for a war on drugs

2.0, I mean, look, I, I don't think anybody would, no self-respecting person

would say that the cartels are good.

But if you're thinking pragmatically, usually the times of peace in the last 30

years have been when there are larger drug cartels that are not competing for turf.

And when the United States has gone in and attacked cartels and

disrupted their operations, they don't actually get rid of the cartels.

They just get rid of the stability.

And then these smaller splinter cartels see a vacuum of power.

And so they start doing insane things like stitching people's heads on soccer

balls and all this other crazy stuff as they try to assert themselves.

And at that point, the United States says, oh, well these places are just so

uncivilized and ungovernable and violent.

There's nothing we can do.

Um, so, and there are problems with thought that

if you wanna a show, cartels know how to do a show.

So let's be careful with that.

Yeah,

yeah, exactly.

Right.

And it's like, if, if you, if you're gonna pick that fight, you better, like,

if you wanna like, make things better for people, you gotta finish the fight.

You can't do what the United States did in Mexico in the early two thousands

and say, Hey, do a war on drugs.

Hey, we'll give you weapons and then escalate it.

Shit, hit the fan, escalate, and then leave

the problem for those who are poorer and those who are there

without any way of living.

And then when they leave, they go to your country and then you expel it.

Exactly.

So,

um, like I, I think there, I, there's an argument in there for, I feel like this

is the story of the Trump administration.

Like there is the kernel of an idea there.

Like it would give the United States tremendous economic, soft

and hard power if the United States said no more drug cartel.

We are waging war on these things.

We are gonna go after them financially.

We're gonna go after their supply chains, we're gonna go after enforcement,

we're gonna go after consumption.

This will no longer be a thing that affects the Western hemisphere

and we will lead the charge.

That would be an incredible way to engender goodwill, um, in Latin America.

Uh, and you can sort of feel that like the United States is groping towards

that policy and yet cannot help itself.

Like it, it like wants to be that and then, but it then

it's a 50% tar on in Brazil.

But let, because of false not, but lemme

share one final thought about it, because if you do good will, if you

have empathy with my region, I don't think there is any empathy with,

at least from this government, with my region, there is no empathy.

So it is not that they really care about what is happening to the people

out there, which I think it's the core.

Of the shift in foreign policy in the last years, because at least in

the narrative, and at least in the heart of a few government officials,

there was some empathy or what was happening in Latin America and that

was the whole idea of U-S-A-I-D.

Now that is cut from the roots.

There is no empathy, so we cannot expect what you're saying.

Alright.

Well, elo, I kept you longer than I was supposed to, but this was great

and we'll have you on again soon.

Okay, thank you.

Always a pleasure, Jacob.

Bye-Bye.