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Jacob Shapiro: Hello listeners.

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Welcome to another episode
of the Jacob Shapiro podcast.

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Sorry for the brief, uh, hiatus.

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It was not intentional.

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Just had some guest
cancel, some personal life.

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Things come up, but we're back at it.

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Um, after the Ukrainian drone attack
on Russia, I had to get sim on the

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podcast as quickly as possible because
I have been very, uh, spun up on this.

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Uh, and sim was a nice sober corrective.

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He told me some of the
ways that I was right to.

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Feel this way, but also was like, Hey,
Jacob, like, read it back a little bit.

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It's not like, it's not like, uh,
fundamentally earth shattering either.

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So, um, I hope you enjoy this
episode as much as I did.

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I always learn so much when I, when I
talk to sim and the folks of his ilk.

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You can write to me@jacobatjacob.com
if you have any questions, comments,

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concerns, et cetera about the podcast.

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Otherwise, we've got a full slate
of guests coming up for this month.

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So buckle your seat belts,
uh, cheers and see you up.

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All right, SIM it's been too long since,
uh, you were on the podcast, which

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by the way, I think, um, reflects the
general level of fatigue around the

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Russia, Ukraine war, the ongoing war.

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Like even I have gotten fatigued
by some of the news around it.

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Um, and so we haven't had
you on recently to check in.

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And then lo and behold, last week,
the Ukrainians, uh, pull, pull

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a real rabbit out of their hat.

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Um, they.

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They attack Russia with what?

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Over a hundred drones.

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Uh, the reporting I've seen, you
know, the drones cost like, you know,

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a couple hundred dollars per drone.

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Um, and they destroy somewhere between,
I don't know, uh, a fourth and a third

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of Russia strategic bomber fleet.

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Like those are some of the
statistics that I've seen.

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Um, and for me, it made me stand up
in my, or sit up in my chair, stand

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up in my chair too, uh, and rethink.

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You know, the global
military balance of power.

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What does this mean for great
conventional powers versus asymmetric?

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Um.

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Attacks from smaller powers
that are next to them.

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Uh, it's hard not to think of the Israeli
attack on Hezbollah with the pagers.

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And it's hard not to think of the Houthis
just chilling there and Yemen like still

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bombing whatever they wanna bomb, even
though Biden and Trump have both tried to

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scare them and bomb them into submission.

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Um, so I wanted to have you on to ask.

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You, I mean, we can talk about, and I'm
sure we'll get into sort of the tactical

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aspects of the Russia, Ukraine war,
because even with this massive Ukrainian

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success, it doesn't look like things
are going particularly well for Ukraine.

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And Russia's been using drones to
its own, uh, to its own, you know,

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great effect on their side and
seizing territory from Ukraine.

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But tell me, as somebody who follows
this, this stuff much more granularly

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than I do, was it a similar Oh shit
moment for you, or was it like.

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Yeah, this is like, they just, I mean,
yeah, it's a, it's a higher value target.

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Like they upped the ante a little bit,
but this is what we've been seeing

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for years, and this is gonna be, is
continued gonna be the future of war.

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So take that, whatever direction you want
and we can dive into what all this means.

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Sim Tack: Yeah.

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Thank you fir First of all, thank
you for, uh, for having me again.

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Um, so on, on the attack itself, um,
I, I think it definitely stands out as.

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Um, an anomalous operation, right?

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Both in the way that it was set up
and the effects that it achieved.

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Um, so it's, you know, we've seen a
lot of back and forth attacks with

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drones, but not quite like this, right?

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Not these type of targets, not this type
of simultaneous reach, uh, across Russia.

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Um, one big thing maybe to start
at, uh, to address is you, you were

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mentioning you've seen a lot of those.

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Statistics numbers being thrown around.

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Initially I think the, the Ukrainian
SBU was claiming 41 aircraft destroyed.

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Mm-hmm.

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Um, you know, people making calculations,
that's this percentage of the

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strategic fleet, et cetera, et cetera.

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Um, so obviously one of the
first things that, that I've been

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doing, one of the things I've been
looking at for the past week is.

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Um, the satellite imagery coming out of
those different bases that were struck

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right, or allegedly struck, um, because
there were five air bases inside Russia

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that were initially mentioned, four main
ones where there were some indications

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that that strikes actually taken place.

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Um, so the interesting thing is
that at least in satellite imagery.

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We can only observe damage to
aircraft in two of those air bases.

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The other air bases
might have been attacked.

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I can't rule that out, but
there's no indications of that.

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There's no visible damage to aircraft,
there's no burnt down plots of grass or

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foliage as we see at the other places
where the explosives set that off.

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Um, so you know that that's the
first kind of dampener on, on just.

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The scale of, of this operational,
at least the scale of its success.

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Um, second to that is when we look at
those two air fields where there was

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actually damage observed, the number
of aircraft that was destroyed gets

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nowhere near the, the number of 41 that
Ukrainian sources initially alleged.

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Um, I think all combined we've got, um.

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11 aircraft that were
completely destroyed.

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Uh, seven, uh, I'm just gonna
check the numbers, make sure

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I'm saying the right thing.

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But yeah, seven T 95 Bear bombers.

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Um, and then four TU 22, uh, which are,
uh, the, the jets versus the, um, uh,

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the bear, which are the, the big kind
of B 52 ish looking, uh, aircraft.

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Um.

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So four to 20 twos, and then there's
two additional T 20 twos, one that

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in satellite imagery we can see it
was at least damaged, uh, to one of

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the wings, not completely destroyed.

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Um, and then there's another to 22
that was likely critically damaged

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based on some of the, some of the
videos that Ukraine's put out.

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So there's, there's one aircraft that's
not among the others that we could see

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in satellite imagery where you can see.

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Some distinct damage behind the cockpit,
uh, to diffuse lodge, um, which likely

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makes it in a critical condition,
needing some, some very serious repairs,

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uh, if, if not a full write off.

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So, um, you know, all combined,
we're, we're talking about, um,

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uh, about 13 of these, uh, of
these bombers, these strategic

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bombers that are out of action.

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At least now one big caveat is, you
know, there might be damage to some

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other bombers that wasn't, um, easily
observed in, in satellite imagery

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that wasn't proven in the videos.

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So there, there might be additional
damage, but that number of 13 is

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already several, um, several degrees
lower than the, the 41 and the huge

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percentages of that bomber fleet.

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Um, even in, in those.

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Individual air bases, there were
many more aircraft that were not

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hit than, than that were hit.

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Right.

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So, um, that's just
an, an important thing.

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So, um, when people are talking about
what this means for the, you know,

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nuclear balance of power in the world,
um, obviously this has some effect,

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but I don't think that this is a
qualitative shift where, where Russia,

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Russia's nuclear deed is suddenly.

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Um, suddenly inoperable because
of the loss of, of these aircraft.

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Right.

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I, I also don't think that, um, you
know, something that a lot of people have

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been talking about online is the, the
potential threat to us strategic bombers,

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uh, from similar type of drone attacks.

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I, I also don't think that, um, that
this attack necessarily shows that.

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Uh, bombers are extremely weak or
that would need to completely rethink

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how bombers fit into the nuclear
triad and, and, and things like that.

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Um, so I, I think there's, there's
a lot of, a lot of big talk, big

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reactions to a very exciting operation.

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Um, but I think as things calm down, we,
we haven't strayed too far from the norm.

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Jacob Shapiro: Okay.

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That's, that's a good sober corrective.

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Um, let's, um, let's dive into a
little bit more, 'cause I, I wanna

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talk about the US bombers and the
nuclear deterrent and everything

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else, and I have questions about that.

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But let's talk about just the
nature of the attack itself.

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Um, so taking, taking your point that,
um, at least what we know based on the

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satellite imagery and the data that you've
been able to gather, maybe not as big an

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attack as what the Ukrainian said, um, but
is it, is the quality of even if it was

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only two bases, and even if it is only.

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13, uh, you know, strategic bombers,
that's 13 more than they were able

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to bomb this entire war so far.

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Is, is this a qualitative
shift in the ability of smaller

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powers to attack larger powers?

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Does this give Ukraine some kind
of long, long range, like strike

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capability that it didn't have before?

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Or to your point, is this really
just like, hey, like the, the,

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the fact that they have lowered
the numbers, um, suggests that

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this is just, uh, relatively.

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Relatively normal.

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It seems not normal to me 'cause I
can't think of Ukraine being able to

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do, you know, if, if even a quarter
of what they've claimed is true.

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That seems like a big deal to me.

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Are you saying that well, even
that's not that big of a deal?

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Or are you, are you sort of correcting
down from the numbers but saying No,

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this still represents a transformative
moment in the history of war?

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Sim Tack: Uh, I don't believe
it's a transformative moment, um,

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because this threat has existed.

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Right.

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We, we have seen.

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Similar kinds of drone attacks.

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Um, uh, I think it was 2008,
2009, when, when we had those,

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uh, alleged assassination drones
targeting Maduro in, in Venezuela.

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We've seen Israel use, um, these
kind of quadcopter, explosive

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laden drones, uh, for attacks.

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So the idea of using
these kind of drones to.

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To attack military targets
is, is definitely not new.

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Um, what stands out about this operation
is how close they managed to get

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inside Russia, far behind enemy lines.

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'cause that's where these
bombers live, right?

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They, they sit at airfields that
are nowhere near the front line.

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So your, your other systems with
more limited range cannot get there.

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Um, I mean, these drones themselves
have fairly limited range.

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You physically have to get
next to the airport to be

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able to conduct these strikes.

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So what sets this operation apart
is the, the nature of it as an

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intelligence operation, right?

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It's, it's the, the infiltration of
Russia, it's the preparation of the

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equipment, the, you know, a lot of
people talking about the, the wooden

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boxes on the, on the trucks, et cetera.

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Um, it's, it's that kind of intelligence
operation that allowed Ukraine

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to get close to the air fields.

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Then strike them simultaneously,
which is an important element

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because that starts to go into
repeatability of an attack like this.

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Why do you strike all these air
airports or air bases at the same time?

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Because you know, you might
only get one shot, right?

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Once you conduct an attack like that.

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Russia is aware of this kind of operation.

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They're gonna be on alert looking for
Ukrainian infiltrate inside Russia.

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Trucks showing up near air
bases, things like that.

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So doing the exact same thing
over again is probably gonna be

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more difficult in the future.

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Um, and, and that I think is also
the key reason why I don't see it

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as a transformative event in the
way war is conducted because, um,

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these kind of one-off creative,
clandestine, or intelligence operations,

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whatever you want to call it.

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Um, you're always going
to have those in war.

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They're, they're, you know, the product of
creative approaches to, to real problems.

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Um, but if something is not a,
a threat or a capability that is

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sustainable, um, I don't think it
really reshapes the battlefield.

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And, and that's the big thing here
where yes, it's, it's great for

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Ukraine that they were able to take
out these aircraft and these aircraft.

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Apart from being, uh, part of,
of Russia's strategic force.

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Uh, of course we're also very much engaged
in launching, uh, precision missiles into

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Ukraine, into western Ukraine, et cetera.

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Um, so there's a very direct
reason for Ukraine to want to

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take out these air airplanes.

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And, um, so their success is
definitely not meaningless.

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But I think in the longer term, this
capability or this operation does not.

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Deny Russia the use of those bombers.

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For the duration of the conflict.

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Jacob Shapiro: Mm-hmm.

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Okay.

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I, I, I wanna get to you Ukrainian.

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We'll, we'll put a pin in that
'cause we'll come back to Ukrainian

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intentions and the timing of
this and all those other things.

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Uh, but I want to push a little bit more
on the nature of this attack, because you

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raised, you know, Israel using drones.

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Um, okay.

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But Israel is going after, you know,
non-state militias, maybe sort of

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sclerotic, you know, authoritarian,
uh, Arab regimes when it, when it has

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those drones, Maduro like, okay, like
some drones going after a single guy.

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This is, you know, going after a
country's conventional air force and.

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Striking a meaningful blow against a,
a country's conventional air force.

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So in that way it seems
like a huge escalation.

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But you, what you might, I, I can hear
you saying to me, okay, but that's

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just a difference in degree, Jacob.

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But let me give you a tangible example,
um, to sort of test what you're saying.

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Um, you know, one of the things I've
sort of taken for granted, um, for.

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I don't know.

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Over a decade now, since you and and
I, since you and I were together at

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Stratford, I've taken for granted
that Israel could never really

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strike Iran's nuclear capability
because it was just too far away.

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Like the planes were, their
planes couldn't get there.

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They would need help refueling, or they
would need some, you know, they would

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need the United States or some other
actor to help make a strike realistic.

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And it wasn't clear that any
actor was gonna support them.

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00:14:15,025 --> 00:14:17,485
And if they were, you were gonna see
those actions before it happened.

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So it wasn't gonna be
that big of a secret.

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Um.

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00:14:20,315 --> 00:14:21,335
Could that change?

246
00:14:21,395 --> 00:14:23,705
Like can Israel use these drones
that you've been talking about?

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00:14:23,705 --> 00:14:28,055
Not to just wipe out parking lots in
the Gaza Strip, but to go after Iran's

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00:14:28,055 --> 00:14:31,685
nuclear program because that, like,
that's where then that would be a sort

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of change and the capability of a nation
to conduct war, if it is or is this like,

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00:14:36,575 --> 00:14:40,625
well, not unless Jacob, they have the
Mossad on the ground having recruited

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00:14:40,625 --> 00:14:43,355
Iranians who are actually controlling
the things and doing the things.

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00:14:43,355 --> 00:14:45,905
So you would need the intel
operation in order to pull it off

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and maybe you only get one shot.

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So, uh, react to that example for me.

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00:14:50,430 --> 00:14:53,340
Sim Tack: So they, they have done
that, not, not necessarily with

256
00:14:53,340 --> 00:14:58,290
these same kind of drone attacks,
but um, that has been a massive part

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00:14:58,290 --> 00:15:05,610
of, of Israel's, um, efforts to, to
contain, uh, Iran's nuclear ambitions.

258
00:15:06,060 --> 00:15:09,900
Um, and I'm thinking specifically
of the, the attacks against

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Iranian nuclear scientists.

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Um, so there, there's been.

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I, I can't even think of the,
the exact dates, but the, by

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the time we met at Stratford, it
was already ongoing for years.

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Um.

264
00:15:22,050 --> 00:15:26,580
But, uh, I, I don't know if you
remember those, uh, those operations,

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00:15:26,580 --> 00:15:30,810
like where, where they use a remote
controlled gun in, in the back of an

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00:15:30,810 --> 00:15:36,750
SUV to target a vehicle that was driving
by, you know, a, a real, real action

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movie type intelligence operation.

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You know, um, so that, that sub happens.

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And, and Israel is definitely
leaning on that, especially

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at times when they don't have.

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Um, um, that conventional ability to
just go in and wipe everything out.

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Um, I would say more recently we have
seen another major change, which is the

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complete disappearance of the Syrian
Air Defense Network due to mm-hmm.

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Events that occurred in Syria and that,
uh, Israel very swiftly exploited to

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take out anything remotely, uh, uh,
air defense capable in inside Syria,

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because now this actually does leave.

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00:16:18,015 --> 00:16:25,995
Uh, Israel with a large, um, a, a, an
open flight route from Israel towards.

278
00:16:26,445 --> 00:16:29,055
Uh, towards Iran that
it didn't have before.

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Um, by which I mean to say like,
like, yes, conditions change, right?

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Things, things change.

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00:16:35,355 --> 00:16:43,965
Um, so as, as operations by Mossad inside
Iran occur, maybe, maybe they do get

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00:16:43,965 --> 00:16:48,945
experience from this and they, they are
able to launch some kind of drone based,

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00:16:49,125 --> 00:16:51,045
uh, attack against these facilities.

284
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But where all of that eventually
comes back, and I'm gonna.

285
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Link it to another element of our
days at Strat four, um, when we used

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00:16:59,790 --> 00:17:06,480
to, um, have the guys in the tactical
team talk about, um, the attack cycle.

287
00:17:07,530 --> 00:17:08,159
Remember that?

288
00:17:08,159 --> 00:17:08,250
Mm-hmm.

289
00:17:08,250 --> 00:17:11,879
Like the, the whole course, you know,
you start with, with surveillance,

290
00:17:12,000 --> 00:17:15,089
your, your preparation, et
cetera, before the actual attack.

291
00:17:15,089 --> 00:17:18,359
So there's, there's a lot of
components that take place.

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00:17:18,780 --> 00:17:22,079
Before, you know, in those cases we're
talking about terrorist attacks, but

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00:17:22,079 --> 00:17:27,179
I think the attack cycle looks very
similar when we're talking about, um,

294
00:17:27,869 --> 00:17:32,550
you know, Israeli operations inside Iran
or Ukrainian operations inside Russia.

295
00:17:33,030 --> 00:17:35,969
Um, and I think that's where
Russia really dropped the ball.

296
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Um, in, in these cases.

297
00:17:38,429 --> 00:17:41,399
The, the fact that Ukraine was able to.

298
00:17:42,270 --> 00:17:46,710
Get these, um, these
systems assembled inside.

299
00:17:46,710 --> 00:17:51,450
Russia was able to deploy them near air
bases, was able to scout those air bases.

300
00:17:52,080 --> 00:17:57,240
Um, that's where you would
normally have expected them to

301
00:17:57,240 --> 00:17:59,040
have gotten caught or discovered.

302
00:17:59,310 --> 00:17:59,640
Right.

303
00:18:00,000 --> 00:18:04,080
Um, and, and that's why when we're talking
about the risk of similar kind of attacks

304
00:18:04,140 --> 00:18:10,260
against Western Air bases, um, in, in
the US in in other NATO countries, um.

305
00:18:11,669 --> 00:18:16,530
I would expect, and I would hope that,
um, security procedures are much,

306
00:18:16,530 --> 00:18:22,860
much tighter, and that if you start to
drive around an airbase that hosts B

307
00:18:22,860 --> 00:18:28,649
two bombers multiple times in a, in a
short timeframe, you would probably get

308
00:18:28,649 --> 00:18:32,340
pulled over and you'd have some really
tough questions to, uh, to answer.

309
00:18:32,850 --> 00:18:35,790
Um, same thing with a
truck suddenly appearing.

310
00:18:36,209 --> 00:18:42,899
Um, my assumption would be that there
is very active, um, scanning for, for

311
00:18:43,050 --> 00:18:47,040
objects appearing that don't belong in
the areas of these strategic facilities.

312
00:18:47,610 --> 00:18:51,360
Um, I, I think those are all types
of things that are less ingrained

313
00:18:51,360 --> 00:18:55,290
in the, the kind of Soviet style
security services in Russia.

314
00:18:55,290 --> 00:18:57,030
So maybe that exposes them.

315
00:18:57,449 --> 00:18:59,669
A little more to this kind of attack.

316
00:19:00,149 --> 00:19:04,919
But then as that attack happens, of
course, that that also means that the next

317
00:19:04,919 --> 00:19:09,239
time you try to hit those bombers, you're
gonna have to do it slightly differently.

318
00:19:09,239 --> 00:19:13,739
So it becomes another new creative
intelligence operation that you have

319
00:19:13,739 --> 00:19:15,449
to set up and you might succeed.

320
00:19:16,530 --> 00:19:21,120
But I think that still makes it like a
one-off type of attack rather than, you

321
00:19:21,120 --> 00:19:24,989
know, we're able to actually suppress
that capability on the Russian side.

322
00:19:26,835 --> 00:19:28,875
Jacob Shapiro: I think you're a
little too sanguine of, at least in

323
00:19:28,875 --> 00:19:32,595
the United States, about the, the
thoroughness of the security here.

324
00:19:32,595 --> 00:19:35,475
I mean, we're talking about a country
that just a couple months ago accidentally

325
00:19:35,475 --> 00:19:38,505
fired a bunch of the employees that
were supposed to be working on nuclear

326
00:19:38,505 --> 00:19:40,065
safety and then tried to hire them back.

327
00:19:40,065 --> 00:19:43,665
I also, I don't know if you've seen
the picture of this 22-year-old, uh,

328
00:19:43,695 --> 00:19:46,965
who is now apparently being tasked
with, um, heading up the Center

329
00:19:46,965 --> 00:19:48,795
for Prevention Programs at DHS.

330
00:19:48,795 --> 00:19:52,395
So like one of the primary like US
departments for going after terrorism.

331
00:19:52,770 --> 00:19:53,370
Was working.

332
00:19:53,370 --> 00:19:55,800
I mean, no offense to those working
in grocery stores, but he was in a

333
00:19:55,800 --> 00:19:57,390
grocery store a year ago in his picture.

334
00:19:57,540 --> 00:20:00,660
Like if I was a terrorist, and I'm
looking at this picture on, um, the

335
00:20:00,660 --> 00:20:03,900
Department of Homeland Securities
website, I would be like, cool, like,

336
00:20:03,900 --> 00:20:05,340
probably security's not so good here.

337
00:20:05,700 --> 00:20:09,810
But, um, in, in any case, uh, I,
I think though in your response,

338
00:20:09,810 --> 00:20:13,380
like, yes, Israel has assassinated
Iranian scientists by car bombs in

339
00:20:13,380 --> 00:20:17,910
some of these other ways, but could
Israel knock out Iranian air defense?

340
00:20:18,825 --> 00:20:20,955
With a coordinated, huge,
massive drone strike.

341
00:20:20,985 --> 00:20:24,165
Could it take out a nuclear
facility with drones?

342
00:20:24,165 --> 00:20:25,695
Like that's the, the sort of leap.

343
00:20:25,695 --> 00:20:28,274
And I guess another, I'll let you
respond to that, but another sort of

344
00:20:28,274 --> 00:20:30,764
test example for what you're talking
about, and this is one that I think has

345
00:20:30,764 --> 00:20:33,645
gotten a lot of currency and I'm, I'm
curious to hear what your response is.

346
00:20:33,945 --> 00:20:36,794
I mean, I'm, I'm on record as
saying I don't think China is

347
00:20:36,794 --> 00:20:38,385
gonna invade Taiwan anytime soon.

348
00:20:38,385 --> 00:20:41,475
But let's say there's a naval
conflict in the South China Sea and

349
00:20:41,475 --> 00:20:44,054
China's on one side and the United
States is on the other side of it.

350
00:20:44,445 --> 00:20:44,925
Um.

351
00:20:45,115 --> 00:20:49,075
United States, like key to its naval
power is its aircraft carriers.

352
00:20:49,345 --> 00:20:53,635
Uh, does using drones in this sort of
manner basically just make the carriers

353
00:20:53,635 --> 00:20:56,455
sitting ducks, like, I'm not thinking
really about, oh, that the Chinese are

354
00:20:56,455 --> 00:21:01,315
gonna use drones to attack us, you know,
air assets inside of the United States.

355
00:21:01,315 --> 00:21:04,555
But if you're in the South China Sea
and you've got three carriers deployed.

356
00:21:05,090 --> 00:21:06,919
What at this point,
makes those key warriors?

357
00:21:06,919 --> 00:21:11,090
Anything but sitting ducks for massive
drone attacks from the Chinese, like that

358
00:21:11,090 --> 00:21:14,330
seems another way in which this completely
transformed the balance of power in,

359
00:21:14,330 --> 00:21:15,950
in a conflict that we could imagine.

360
00:21:17,685 --> 00:21:19,580
Sim Tack: I, I mean, I mean,
that's a very good use case.

361
00:21:19,580 --> 00:21:24,050
And there's, there's actually a very
good recent example on the use of

362
00:21:24,050 --> 00:21:27,830
drones in, in kind of a conventional
setting outside of Ukraine.

363
00:21:28,010 --> 00:21:28,610
Um.

364
00:21:30,030 --> 00:21:33,719
One of the big things I wanna say is
when I'm saying that this attack by

365
00:21:33,719 --> 00:21:35,729
Ukraine is not a transformative event.

366
00:21:37,889 --> 00:21:41,970
That doesn't mean that the
drones by themselves are not

367
00:21:41,970 --> 00:21:44,129
transformative in warfare, right?

368
00:21:44,430 --> 00:21:47,639
I just don't think that this event
is the big unveiling of a new

369
00:21:47,639 --> 00:21:49,350
capability that changes things.

370
00:21:49,350 --> 00:21:50,670
But you're absolutely right.

371
00:21:50,790 --> 00:21:56,760
The existence of these small drones and
growing capabilities in coordinating

372
00:21:56,760 --> 00:22:00,960
these drones with other types of
operations, using swans, et cetera,

373
00:22:01,290 --> 00:22:05,220
things that have been theorized and and
talked about and practiced for decades.

374
00:22:05,790 --> 00:22:10,500
Um, but that are now becoming more
practical knowledge as they're

375
00:22:10,500 --> 00:22:12,210
being executed on the battlefields.

376
00:22:12,210 --> 00:22:12,420
Right.

377
00:22:12,420 --> 00:22:16,080
I, I do believe that is a big difference
and, and, you know, a big threat

378
00:22:16,080 --> 00:22:17,910
to any, any war fighter out there.

379
00:22:18,270 --> 00:22:26,370
Um, now the example I wanted to to mention
is that in, um, uh, in the, the current

380
00:22:26,520 --> 00:22:32,190
kind of simmering troubles between, uh,
Pakistan and India, um, there, there

381
00:22:32,190 --> 00:22:34,200
was actually an incident recently.

382
00:22:34,590 --> 00:22:41,940
Um, that I, I heard from some people,
um, where, uh, Pakistan used a number

383
00:22:42,030 --> 00:22:48,480
of regular civilian drones, um, without
arming or anything, no explosives

384
00:22:48,480 --> 00:22:54,240
involved, um, to go and harass,
uh, Indian forces as a distraction.

385
00:22:54,389 --> 00:22:59,070
So they were, they were literally
just flying drones into Indian

386
00:22:59,100 --> 00:23:03,510
troops and into their positions,
um, to keep them occupied while.

387
00:23:03,899 --> 00:23:07,230
Actually executing other, uh,
operations at the same time.

388
00:23:07,680 --> 00:23:12,510
Um, so even something as simple as
that when you're talking about Israel

389
00:23:12,510 --> 00:23:20,310
leveraging this to, um, um, suppress or,
or destroy Iranian air defenses or China

390
00:23:20,310 --> 00:23:27,960
leveraging it to, um, to, let's, let's
say distract the defenses of a US carrier

391
00:23:27,960 --> 00:23:30,450
group, uh, I think that's very feasible.

392
00:23:30,930 --> 00:23:34,320
The, the question is, how, how are
you actually going to conduct it?

393
00:23:34,320 --> 00:23:36,420
There's a lot of ways that
you can approach that.

394
00:23:36,870 --> 00:23:41,640
Um, obviously these drones themselves
don't have the range to go from mainland

395
00:23:41,640 --> 00:23:46,500
China to wherever, uh, a US carrier
group might be hanging out at open seas.

396
00:23:46,980 --> 00:23:51,810
Um, but, you know, let, let's assume
the Chinese are launching these drones

397
00:23:51,810 --> 00:23:53,430
from, from somewhere in the water.

398
00:23:53,820 --> 00:23:57,240
Maybe they're even carrying them
all the way there in unmanned.

399
00:23:57,675 --> 00:23:59,805
Uh, unmanned surface vessels.

400
00:23:59,835 --> 00:24:03,375
Uh, which, you know, another thing that
we've seen really growing in importance

401
00:24:03,375 --> 00:24:07,905
in Ukraine, the way, the way that Ukraine
has used those kind of vessels to even

402
00:24:07,905 --> 00:24:10,995
take down aircraft, uh, from open sea.

403
00:24:11,355 --> 00:24:16,635
Um, so people, people are using these,
these remote operated platforms or,

404
00:24:16,635 --> 00:24:21,765
or even autonomous platforms in really
creative ways and, and obviously

405
00:24:21,765 --> 00:24:23,085
that is going to change a lot.

406
00:24:23,595 --> 00:24:26,325
About the ways that that wars are fought.

407
00:24:26,415 --> 00:24:29,535
And I, I don't think there's
even a limit to that.

408
00:24:30,345 --> 00:24:36,075
Um, but I think that just becomes an,
an, uh, an overall part of the, the

409
00:24:36,135 --> 00:24:38,445
technological evolution of, of warfare.

410
00:24:38,565 --> 00:24:38,925
Right?

411
00:24:39,255 --> 00:24:45,225
Um, and it's not necessarily specifically
targeted against those strategic assets

412
00:24:45,225 --> 00:24:47,775
like, uh, like the nuclear bombers.

413
00:24:48,195 --> 00:24:49,665
Um, it's, it's a more.

414
00:24:50,220 --> 00:24:55,740
General, um, evolution of, of the
level of technology that your, your

415
00:24:55,740 --> 00:24:57,540
standard war fighter is employing.

416
00:24:59,490 --> 00:24:59,820
Jacob Shapiro: Yeah.

417
00:24:59,850 --> 00:25:00,690
Sim Tack: Does that make sense?

418
00:25:01,620 --> 00:25:02,100
It does, it does.

419
00:25:02,495 --> 00:25:02,935
A little bit of a

420
00:25:02,935 --> 00:25:03,095
Jacob Shapiro: rant.

421
00:25:03,840 --> 00:25:04,200
No, no, no.

422
00:25:04,200 --> 00:25:06,420
You're this, you're, you're
literally here to go on rants.

423
00:25:06,420 --> 00:25:07,110
That's the whole point.

424
00:25:07,530 --> 00:25:10,350
Um, uh, okay.

425
00:25:10,350 --> 00:25:13,110
Well, one last example I wanna throw at
you, and then I want to get into some

426
00:25:13,110 --> 00:25:15,930
of the, well, actually, there's, there's
two more conceptual questions I want to

427
00:25:15,930 --> 00:25:18,810
ask you, and then we'll get into some
of the specifics about Russia, Ukraine.

428
00:25:19,260 --> 00:25:21,750
Um, you know, we talked about
Israel, Iran, uh, it sounds to

429
00:25:21,780 --> 00:25:22,620
me like you answered to China.

430
00:25:22,620 --> 00:25:23,310
Taiwan was, yeah.

431
00:25:23,310 --> 00:25:25,440
Actually, this does shake up
how you would think about a

432
00:25:25,440 --> 00:25:26,940
conflict in the South China Sea.

433
00:25:27,030 --> 00:25:28,590
Uh, correct me if I'm wrong,
you talked about India,

434
00:25:28,590 --> 00:25:30,030
Pakistan using its distraction.

435
00:25:30,460 --> 00:25:33,430
There's also, and, and this is the one
where it starts to get very dystopian,

436
00:25:33,850 --> 00:25:39,190
um, where this now empowers non-state
actors in a way that pre drones, they

437
00:25:39,340 --> 00:25:40,690
wouldn't necessarily have had that power.

438
00:25:40,690 --> 00:25:44,200
I'm thinking specifically about Mexico,
but you can imagine other examples

439
00:25:44,200 --> 00:25:48,490
where you have groups like cartels who
exist outside of the government, um, and

440
00:25:48,490 --> 00:25:49,780
who have problems with the government.

441
00:25:49,780 --> 00:25:53,200
Does this now give them some
kind of capability to go after

442
00:25:53,200 --> 00:25:55,240
the conventional assets of the.

443
00:25:55,465 --> 00:25:57,385
Of the military, of the
country that they're in.

444
00:25:57,745 --> 00:26:01,435
The cartels have used drones already
for assassinations and for attacks in,

445
00:26:01,435 --> 00:26:04,465
you know, far flung areas and some of
their turf wars and things like that.

446
00:26:04,465 --> 00:26:05,905
Even attacks on local police.

447
00:26:06,175 --> 00:26:11,095
But you haven't seen a Mexican cartel
say, go after like a Mexican military

448
00:26:11,095 --> 00:26:14,785
garrison or after a Mexican strategic
air asset or something like that.

449
00:26:15,235 --> 00:26:17,155
In part 'cause the conflict
hasn't gotten there yet.

450
00:26:17,185 --> 00:26:20,695
But does this, like if you are a country
where you have a non-state actor or you

451
00:26:20,695 --> 00:26:22,435
have a rebel group or something like that.

452
00:26:22,875 --> 00:26:26,445
Does this, even the balance of power in
some meaningful way, like should now,

453
00:26:26,775 --> 00:26:30,435
like can a cartel or you know, a militant
group in some country in the world,

454
00:26:30,435 --> 00:26:34,755
like take this playbook and strike the
conventional capacity of the government

455
00:26:34,755 --> 00:26:35,805
they're, that they're going against?

456
00:26:35,805 --> 00:26:37,665
Or am I reaching too far there?

457
00:26:40,125 --> 00:26:43,065
Sim Tack: Again, I think all the things
that you're saying all are correct

458
00:26:43,095 --> 00:26:44,865
except for that one little part.

459
00:26:45,435 --> 00:26:46,785
The, this now.

460
00:26:47,129 --> 00:26:48,179
Part, right.

461
00:26:48,179 --> 00:26:48,840
Where mm-hmm.

462
00:26:49,084 --> 00:26:52,620
I, I think all of this has been
the case for over a decade.

463
00:26:53,070 --> 00:26:57,810
We've, we've seen the use of these
kind of drones emerge and, and grow and

464
00:26:57,810 --> 00:27:03,270
become more professional over the course
of the Syrian Civil War, uh, Islamic

465
00:27:03,270 --> 00:27:05,639
state operations in both Syria and Iraq.

466
00:27:06,240 --> 00:27:10,709
Um, and from there, it, it has
panned out to the rest of the world.

467
00:27:10,709 --> 00:27:11,824
Ukraine has been another.

468
00:27:12,405 --> 00:27:17,835
Kind of big, um, uplift in, in
the level of those capabilities.

469
00:27:18,225 --> 00:27:23,745
Um, but we've also seen that kind of,
uh, the, the adaptation of those same

470
00:27:23,745 --> 00:27:31,215
kind of drones in places like Sudan, um,
Mexico, as you mentioned, the cartels

471
00:27:31,215 --> 00:27:37,005
using those kind of drones, I, I think
that capability is, is well, well known

472
00:27:37,275 --> 00:27:40,515
and, and being adopted by anyone that.

473
00:27:41,655 --> 00:27:44,895
That is trying to grasp at any
means they can to try and gain

474
00:27:44,895 --> 00:27:47,685
advantage over their, uh, opponents.

475
00:27:47,715 --> 00:27:53,265
And I think it's not even just an
asymmetric warfare element where, um,

476
00:27:53,475 --> 00:27:57,195
even conventional forces and, and you
know, Ukraine being the big example of

477
00:27:57,195 --> 00:28:02,745
that, even conventional forces order
stronger actors in a conflict even want

478
00:28:02,745 --> 00:28:07,335
to adopt these kind of technologies
because they're just so damn effective.

479
00:28:07,965 --> 00:28:09,675
Um, and in, in.

480
00:28:10,350 --> 00:28:11,010
Mexico.

481
00:28:11,010 --> 00:28:15,389
I think one of the reasons why we haven't
seen them go after air bases or, or to

482
00:28:15,389 --> 00:28:20,850
sink the, the Mexican Navy is because
those, those assets simply aren't

483
00:28:20,850 --> 00:28:23,370
what's troubling the cartels, right?

484
00:28:23,370 --> 00:28:28,139
You want to focus your efforts
against the things that you're, uh,

485
00:28:28,139 --> 00:28:29,730
you're actually being troubled by.

486
00:28:30,149 --> 00:28:35,520
Um, now I would say if, if, if
we go all the way back to, um.

487
00:28:36,600 --> 00:28:40,080
Uh, the Islamic State
in, in Syria and Iraq.

488
00:28:40,679 --> 00:28:46,679
Um, I remember them using drones to
attack Syrian air assets, for example.

489
00:28:47,100 --> 00:28:53,185
Um, of course Syria doesn't have nuclear
bombers, but, um, still taking down.

490
00:28:54,135 --> 00:28:58,065
Uh, attack helicopters, well, not
taking down, but destroying attack

491
00:28:58,065 --> 00:29:01,665
helicopters on the ground, destroying
fighter aircraft on the ground.

492
00:29:01,995 --> 00:29:03,525
That was a pretty big win for them.

493
00:29:03,915 --> 00:29:08,775
Um, but I would also add to that,
that I don't remember any incidents

494
00:29:08,775 --> 00:29:14,175
where Islamic State was able to target
coalition air bases in the same way.

495
00:29:14,685 --> 00:29:17,685
Um, because obviously those,
those coalition air bases were.

496
00:29:18,600 --> 00:29:24,479
Much farther removed spatially from the
battle space, um, had different levels

497
00:29:24,479 --> 00:29:27,330
of security than the, the Syrian one.

498
00:29:27,330 --> 00:29:33,989
So I, I think that's kind of the, um,
the, uh, the struggle, uh, or, or I guess

499
00:29:33,989 --> 00:29:35,760
the balancing that is happening, right?

500
00:29:35,760 --> 00:29:38,995
Where on the one hand you have this
capability, these groans, but it's also

501
00:29:38,995 --> 00:29:42,629
limited in, uh, in range and access.

502
00:29:43,140 --> 00:29:47,370
Um, and then you can actually set
up security procedures against it.

503
00:29:47,430 --> 00:29:51,870
There's also a lot of counter
drone weaponry these days.

504
00:29:51,870 --> 00:29:55,530
Um, some of it focusing on
detecting these drones early.

505
00:29:55,860 --> 00:30:01,110
Uh, some of it focusing on, um,
disrupting the communications,

506
00:30:01,140 --> 00:30:04,500
disrupting, uh, control of these drones.

507
00:30:04,950 --> 00:30:07,680
Um, and that actually kind of.

508
00:30:08,265 --> 00:30:12,255
Points to some of the interesting
elements in that whole arms race as well.

509
00:30:12,255 --> 00:30:19,335
Where in Ukraine you see evolutions
towards the use of, um, uh, fiber

510
00:30:19,335 --> 00:30:23,025
optic commanded drones, where, where
the drones are actually leaving

511
00:30:23,025 --> 00:30:26,865
a, a, a string of fiber optic that
connects them to the controller.

512
00:30:27,705 --> 00:30:31,575
Because then they can't be jammed
or they're not detected by, uh,

513
00:30:31,605 --> 00:30:33,225
by electronic warfare equipment.

514
00:30:33,735 --> 00:30:37,635
Um, and then as we saw in the
attack against the Russian air

515
00:30:37,635 --> 00:30:41,355
bases, where allegedly these
drones targeted the aircraft

516
00:30:41,415 --> 00:30:44,850
purely based on, I. On AI training.

517
00:30:44,940 --> 00:30:48,330
So they, they were, at least that's
the story going around, that they were

518
00:30:48,330 --> 00:30:54,180
trained on images of these bombers and
kind of self targeted bombers that matched

519
00:30:54,180 --> 00:30:55,710
the ones they were trained to target.

520
00:30:56,250 --> 00:30:59,160
Um, which is, which is feasible for sure.

521
00:30:59,520 --> 00:31:03,660
Um, but that dependence on AI
is also way to cut off external

522
00:31:04,020 --> 00:31:06,060
communications and, and dependencies.

523
00:31:06,090 --> 00:31:10,020
It, it means that if, if everything,
if your navigation you're targeting

524
00:31:10,020 --> 00:31:11,460
is computed within the drone.

525
00:31:11,955 --> 00:31:15,885
You don't have to rely on a radio
signal in and out of the drone,

526
00:31:16,395 --> 00:31:17,865
uh, to conduct your operation.

527
00:31:17,865 --> 00:31:22,635
So again, that, that cuts off that
potential line of defense in, in terms

528
00:31:22,635 --> 00:31:25,065
of electronic detection or, or jamming.

529
00:31:25,545 --> 00:31:31,425
Um, so I, I think it's a really
fascinating, uh, a really fascinating

530
00:31:31,665 --> 00:31:33,495
arms race because it's, it's a really.

531
00:31:34,245 --> 00:31:37,815
It's, it's kind of niche technology
going up against each other.

532
00:31:37,815 --> 00:31:42,375
And that's why when we're talking
about these potential future, uh,

533
00:31:42,405 --> 00:31:46,875
scenarios where a US carrier group
might face these kind of drone based

534
00:31:47,235 --> 00:31:51,345
challenges, um, we also have to
think about how, how is the US Navy

535
00:31:51,345 --> 00:31:52,965
preparing for those kind of threats?

536
00:31:52,995 --> 00:31:58,455
I, I would imagine they're very actively,
uh, investing time and resources into.

537
00:31:58,830 --> 00:32:03,030
Detecting those kind of drones, jamming,
those kind of drones, kinetically,

538
00:32:03,180 --> 00:32:04,800
taking out those kind of drones.

539
00:32:05,310 --> 00:32:10,139
Um, so it, it's difficult to say just
because they exist, they are a threat.

540
00:32:10,350 --> 00:32:10,649
Right.

541
00:32:10,649 --> 00:32:11,879
The, the counter threat

542
00:32:11,910 --> 00:32:12,480
Jacob Shapiro: might also, I.

543
00:32:12,990 --> 00:32:14,070
Already have been developed.

544
00:32:15,090 --> 00:32:15,240
Yeah.

545
00:32:15,240 --> 00:32:17,970
You sort of anticipated my next
question, which is how do you

546
00:32:17,970 --> 00:32:19,440
defend against these things?

547
00:32:19,590 --> 00:32:22,770
Like is there already gonna be
technology that makes this advantage

548
00:32:22,770 --> 00:32:25,950
mood, and is that the sort of technology
that only, you know, someone with

549
00:32:25,950 --> 00:32:29,639
an advanced conventional capability
is going to to have, I mean, the.

550
00:32:29,880 --> 00:32:32,910
The flip side of this though is,
I mean, this is where it does feel

551
00:32:32,910 --> 00:32:36,030
asymmetric and here the example of
Israel, you know, we're always gonna

552
00:32:36,030 --> 00:32:39,510
come back, I think, to examples
of Israel, Yemen, Ukraine, Russia.

553
00:32:39,540 --> 00:32:40,950
'cause this is where war is happening.

554
00:32:41,430 --> 00:32:45,660
Um, but, you know, uh, iron Dome and
Israel's missile defense system, you

555
00:32:45,660 --> 00:32:48,300
know, developed in, in cooperation
with the United States, incredible,

556
00:32:48,300 --> 00:32:52,045
like an incredible success rates,
but also like extremely expensive.

557
00:32:52,045 --> 00:32:55,890
Like the Iranians showed this, where
they can, you know, pop off relatively

558
00:32:55,890 --> 00:32:58,500
cheap Rockets exhaust the supply of the.

559
00:32:59,135 --> 00:33:02,315
The missile defense system and
then, okay, like eventually you're

560
00:33:02,315 --> 00:33:04,655
gonna run out of money and you're
gonna run out of the counters.

561
00:33:04,955 --> 00:33:08,225
Um, so I dunno, maybe somebody will
invent some type of technology.

562
00:33:08,225 --> 00:33:11,615
Maybe you can like send out an EMP
pulse or something in one direction.

563
00:33:11,615 --> 00:33:13,745
Like now we're getting really
science fiction oriented.

564
00:33:13,745 --> 00:33:17,405
But like, is is there a way to defend
against these things like it, or are

565
00:33:17,405 --> 00:33:20,825
we gonna see a whole industry of how
to defend against drones in general?

566
00:33:21,215 --> 00:33:22,235
Um, yeah.

567
00:33:22,295 --> 00:33:23,195
Take that however you want.

568
00:33:23,254 --> 00:33:23,495
Great.

569
00:33:23,495 --> 00:33:25,085
That, that industry already

570
00:33:25,085 --> 00:33:26,465
Sim Tack: exists and
it's, it's definitely.

571
00:33:26,820 --> 00:33:28,350
Pumping out revenue.

572
00:33:28,770 --> 00:33:30,120
Um, but it's

573
00:33:30,120 --> 00:33:31,260
Jacob Shapiro: a pumping
out product though.

574
00:33:32,250 --> 00:33:33,899
Sim Tack: Well, yes.

575
00:33:33,899 --> 00:33:34,080
Yeah.

576
00:33:34,085 --> 00:33:34,980
I, I, I think it is.

577
00:33:34,980 --> 00:33:39,450
But there's also a lot of solutions
that are not necessarily entirely

578
00:33:39,450 --> 00:33:40,860
focused on this new threat.

579
00:33:40,860 --> 00:33:45,840
So you, you have these companies, uh,
pushing these anti drone guns, right?

580
00:33:45,840 --> 00:33:49,770
Like the ray, the futuristic looking
ray guns that you aim at the drone,

581
00:33:49,770 --> 00:33:54,120
and, and it gives a very concentrated
deem to jam the signal effectively.

582
00:33:54,570 --> 00:33:55,200
Um.

583
00:33:55,890 --> 00:33:58,379
But let's, let's not forget
that, you know, the, the whole

584
00:33:58,379 --> 00:34:01,680
electronic spectrum of warfare
is, is not exactly something new.

585
00:34:01,710 --> 00:34:06,270
That's, that's something that's been going
on since the sixties, seventies when, uh,

586
00:34:06,870 --> 00:34:16,475
um, when the use of various kinds of, uh,
radars and jamming and, and restaurant,

587
00:34:16,770 --> 00:34:19,199
all of those things has, has only grown.

588
00:34:19,440 --> 00:34:21,360
Um, so.

589
00:34:22,500 --> 00:34:26,520
You know, kind of as an example of that,
one of the things that Ukraine has also

590
00:34:26,520 --> 00:34:33,029
been doing to, um, to save on kinetic
interceptions, um, 'cause as you mentioned

591
00:34:33,029 --> 00:34:36,929
with Iron Dome, that's one of the reasons
that the system is so damn expensive.

592
00:34:36,960 --> 00:34:41,279
'cause those interceptors are one
use by definition or single use.

593
00:34:41,699 --> 00:34:43,469
Um, so.

594
00:34:43,965 --> 00:34:47,385
One of the things that Ukraine has
been doing is using the F sixteens,

595
00:34:47,595 --> 00:34:53,895
um, that it got from, from European
partners, um, to jam the Iranian shaha

596
00:34:53,895 --> 00:34:55,545
drones that Russia fires at them.

597
00:34:55,995 --> 00:35:00,255
So instead of kinetically targeting,
they, they will target some of them

598
00:35:00,255 --> 00:35:04,605
kinetically, obviously they, they,
there's a lot of them to take down, but

599
00:35:04,605 --> 00:35:09,675
they also use the electronic warfare
equipment on the F 16 to jam it so

600
00:35:09,675 --> 00:35:11,775
that the drone, you know, either.

601
00:35:12,240 --> 00:35:17,160
Loses its navigation goes down or turns
back or, or whatever they do based

602
00:35:17,160 --> 00:35:19,530
on, on how exactly they're affected.

603
00:35:19,980 --> 00:35:26,010
Um, so that's, that's another way that
you can kind of limit the resources.

604
00:35:26,040 --> 00:35:30,030
'cause, you know, electronic
warfare is, is relatively cheap in

605
00:35:30,030 --> 00:35:31,890
the sense that it doesn't require.

606
00:35:32,220 --> 00:35:33,360
Ammunition, right?

607
00:35:33,360 --> 00:35:34,770
It, it requires powering.

608
00:35:34,770 --> 00:35:37,980
Of course, you need to acquire these
systems and the systems themselves

609
00:35:38,430 --> 00:35:43,590
surely aren't cheap, but, um, but
there's no big logistical train

610
00:35:43,590 --> 00:35:47,070
for the production of, of advanced
missiles and, and things like that.

611
00:35:47,070 --> 00:35:50,970
So, um, so I think that's why,
why we're seeing a lot of focus on

612
00:35:50,970 --> 00:35:56,850
that, um, on that electronic jamming
component of, of fighting drone threats.

613
00:35:57,270 --> 00:35:57,420
Um.

614
00:35:58,620 --> 00:36:02,339
But of course there's, there's a lot of
ways that, that the drones themselves are

615
00:36:02,339 --> 00:36:06,149
being hardened against electronic warfare.

616
00:36:06,149 --> 00:36:10,140
And, you know, I, I mentioned
the, the fiber optics, which of

617
00:36:10,140 --> 00:36:11,730
course is still limited in range.

618
00:36:11,790 --> 00:36:16,440
You can only carry so heavy,
a spool of, of fiber optics.

619
00:36:16,529 --> 00:36:20,879
Um, and, and that'll only have a
limited, uh, length that you can achieve.

620
00:36:21,509 --> 00:36:22,259
Um.

621
00:36:23,280 --> 00:36:28,170
The AI systems might, you know,
not have that range restriction.

622
00:36:28,170 --> 00:36:32,250
But then at the end of the day,
you know, how, how complex of an

623
00:36:32,250 --> 00:36:34,530
operation can you conduct purely on.

624
00:36:35,220 --> 00:36:40,379
Like pre-program, pre-trained behavior,
uh, without risking, you know,

625
00:36:40,379 --> 00:36:43,919
either mission failure or collateral
damage and, and things like that.

626
00:36:43,919 --> 00:36:47,279
So there's, there's these,
these pretty big trade-offs.

627
00:36:47,339 --> 00:36:51,569
Um, I think one of the other things
that we don't see a lot about today,

628
00:36:51,689 --> 00:36:56,640
I'm, I'm sure it is being experimented
with and a lot of these war zones, but.

629
00:36:57,060 --> 00:37:02,640
Um, and another way to combat that kind of
jamming is, is directional communications,

630
00:37:03,120 --> 00:37:09,210
um, using lasers or, or antennas that are
very specific about where they, they're

631
00:37:09,210 --> 00:37:12,779
able to receive signal from so that
it's, you know, any signal that comes in

632
00:37:12,779 --> 00:37:14,640
from other directions is shielded out.

633
00:37:15,270 --> 00:37:20,970
Um, so there's, there's a lot of things
going on there, and I'm, I'm not sure.

634
00:37:21,779 --> 00:37:25,259
Whether we can make a guess about like,
you know, which, which side will win out.

635
00:37:25,319 --> 00:37:29,819
Will it be, you know, the drone
threat cannot be tamed or the

636
00:37:29,819 --> 00:37:33,779
defenses will be so effective that
it becomes completely irrelevant?

637
00:37:34,439 --> 00:37:39,089
Um, I, I think right now we're in that
phase where everybody is so actively

638
00:37:39,089 --> 00:37:43,410
exploring it and, and pushing it as
far as they can, that the two are, are

639
00:37:43,410 --> 00:37:45,359
kind of constantly in balance, right.

640
00:37:47,340 --> 00:37:48,540
Jacob Shapiro: Yeah, absolutely.

641
00:37:49,110 --> 00:37:50,730
Um, and to all these
things, there's a balance.

642
00:37:50,850 --> 00:37:53,370
Um, alright, well let's, let's
talk a little bit more specifically

643
00:37:53,370 --> 00:37:54,990
about, um, Russia, Ukraine.

644
00:37:55,380 --> 00:37:59,970
Um, I, um, I take your point about,
um, you know, is this gonna lead to

645
00:37:59,970 --> 00:38:01,620
the attack of US strategic bombers?

646
00:38:01,620 --> 00:38:02,310
Probably not.

647
00:38:02,310 --> 00:38:06,630
Is this gonna de deter Russia's nuclear
deterrent or, uh, limit Russia's nuclear?

648
00:38:06,720 --> 00:38:07,650
Uh, excuse me.

649
00:38:07,680 --> 00:38:10,560
Is this going to limit Russia's
ability to have a nuclear deterrent

650
00:38:10,560 --> 00:38:11,970
or to have nuclear strike capability?

651
00:38:11,970 --> 00:38:13,470
No, I thought that was pretty sensational.

652
00:38:15,050 --> 00:38:17,960
Uh, I think specific question, and
the one I don't have clarity on is,

653
00:38:18,200 --> 00:38:21,320
does this meaningfully impact the
operations of the Russian Air Force?

654
00:38:21,560 --> 00:38:25,460
Does this mean that the Russian Air Force
is going to be less capable of attacking

655
00:38:25,460 --> 00:38:27,080
or bombing Ukraine in the future?

656
00:38:27,380 --> 00:38:31,100
Are the security checks and protocols that
Russia's gonna have to put in to protect

657
00:38:31,100 --> 00:38:32,750
from Ukraine, is that going to create.

658
00:38:32,905 --> 00:38:36,715
You know, supply chain havoc, or is
that gonna limit the capacity of Russian

659
00:38:36,715 --> 00:38:38,785
air power to respond to future attacks?

660
00:38:39,025 --> 00:38:41,245
Uh, can Ukraine spoof a bunch
of attacks in the future?

661
00:38:41,245 --> 00:38:44,065
Just send shit across the border
and like see if they can spin

662
00:38:44,065 --> 00:38:46,525
things up and make them constantly
guessing about what's going on.

663
00:38:46,525 --> 00:38:50,215
So, um, I, I, I take your points on
the bigger ones, but is there a, is

664
00:38:50,215 --> 00:38:53,725
there a tangible impact on Russian air
power in, in any way, whether that's

665
00:38:53,725 --> 00:38:57,325
capacity to do bombing runs or how
they think about future operations?

666
00:38:58,890 --> 00:39:02,279
Sim Tack: So, yeah, there's definitely an
impact and I, I don't think the impacts

667
00:39:02,279 --> 00:39:09,600
necessarily in, in terms of the collective
capacity that Russia can muster, but it's,

668
00:39:10,319 --> 00:39:17,160
um, it's imposing a lot of additional,
uh, tail to, to these operations.

669
00:39:17,549 --> 00:39:23,940
Um, by, by tail I mean like the, the,
the force protection element of, of.

670
00:39:24,690 --> 00:39:26,220
Uh, of their air operation.

671
00:39:26,220 --> 00:39:28,470
So one part of that, as you mentioned,
you know, they'll, they'll have

672
00:39:28,470 --> 00:39:33,240
to contribute more resources to,
um, to securing those airfields.

673
00:39:33,270 --> 00:39:36,569
Even though they're far away
from Ukraine, Russia cannot

674
00:39:36,569 --> 00:39:38,160
afford to leave them unprotected.

675
00:39:38,399 --> 00:39:42,509
Um, and that's, um, you
know, that's, that's another.

676
00:39:43,170 --> 00:39:46,590
Field of activity where they cannot
just draw people away and push them

677
00:39:46,590 --> 00:39:49,440
to the front in Ukraine, that it means
you're actually gonna have to have

678
00:39:49,440 --> 00:39:51,300
people there to protect the air bases.

679
00:39:51,840 --> 00:39:58,260
Um, in addition to that, um, something
that's already been happening, uh,

680
00:39:58,290 --> 00:40:03,060
because of other attacks against Russian
air assets, um, not, not so much the,

681
00:40:03,300 --> 00:40:09,930
the big heavy bombers, but against, uh,
airfields closer to the front line, um, is

682
00:40:09,930 --> 00:40:12,270
that Russia has been forced to disperse.

683
00:40:12,585 --> 00:40:14,385
It's air assets, right?

684
00:40:14,385 --> 00:40:19,755
So, um, the less aircraft you keep at
one single base, the more you spread

685
00:40:19,755 --> 00:40:24,795
them out, the more difficult you make
it for Ukraine to, uh, to destroy a

686
00:40:24,795 --> 00:40:26,835
lot of aircraft in a single attack.

687
00:40:27,345 --> 00:40:31,155
Um, so, and, and actually Russia
has already been doing that with

688
00:40:31,155 --> 00:40:33,045
their strategic bomber fleet.

689
00:40:33,810 --> 00:40:36,120
For quite some time during
the Ukraine conflict.

690
00:40:36,120 --> 00:40:39,840
'cause there have been other attempts
in the past to target them, um, like

691
00:40:39,840 --> 00:40:43,230
at Angles Airbase, where they've
launched the, the long range drones

692
00:40:43,230 --> 00:40:46,380
to, uh, to target, uh, the air base.

693
00:40:46,830 --> 00:40:50,910
Um, so they're constantly trying to play
a game of cups where they're, they're

694
00:40:50,910 --> 00:40:54,510
moving, they're moving their bombers
around, they're moving their fighter

695
00:40:54,510 --> 00:40:58,860
aircraft around to try and, um, you
know, make, make it as difficult as

696
00:40:58,860 --> 00:41:02,160
possible for Ukraine to, to target them.

697
00:41:02,595 --> 00:41:07,935
But at the same time, that is, that is
raising a cost on Russia's behalf, right?

698
00:41:07,935 --> 00:41:13,634
Because on the one hand, your, your flight
crews are constantly adapting to new

699
00:41:13,634 --> 00:41:15,884
locations that they're operating from.

700
00:41:16,305 --> 00:41:21,734
Um, the logistics, uh, uh, support
for all of those operations

701
00:41:21,734 --> 00:41:23,475
has to constantly be rerouted.

702
00:41:23,955 --> 00:41:26,955
Uh, you know, so after the
attacks, uh, against the Russian

703
00:41:26,955 --> 00:41:30,585
airfields, uh, one of the first
things that we saw appearing were.

704
00:41:31,185 --> 00:41:35,895
Aircraft to transport equipment and
personnel out of these bases to other

705
00:41:35,895 --> 00:41:39,405
bases where they will now be basing
some of these, uh, these bombers.

706
00:41:39,885 --> 00:41:43,845
Uh, but all of those constant air
bridges inside Russia, those are

707
00:41:43,845 --> 00:41:47,625
also taking a toll, uh, a toll
on, on Russia's capabilities.

708
00:41:47,685 --> 00:41:52,545
'cause the, um, you know, there's the cost
of the operations themselves and, and fuel

709
00:41:52,545 --> 00:41:54,825
man hours, however you want to express it.

710
00:41:55,365 --> 00:41:55,965
Um.

711
00:41:56,654 --> 00:42:01,125
But the, the increased level of
operations, the increased tempo of these

712
00:42:01,125 --> 00:42:07,395
kind of flights also means that there is
a higher, uh, potential for accidents.

713
00:42:07,484 --> 00:42:13,904
Um, uh, Russia tends to not have the best
reputation when it comes to, uh, aviation

714
00:42:13,904 --> 00:42:19,274
safety and any kind of additional stress,
additional flights that are required.

715
00:42:19,710 --> 00:42:23,700
That, that only increases the, the
potential of, of Russian aircraft going

716
00:42:23,700 --> 00:42:25,589
down without Ukrainian intervention.

717
00:42:26,130 --> 00:42:31,890
Um, so, you know, those are just a, a
couple like, you know, examples that I,

718
00:42:31,890 --> 00:42:36,450
that I'm pulling out, but in general, like
yes, these kind of attacks, they, they

719
00:42:36,450 --> 00:42:43,650
are putting a constant force protection,
uh, stress on the Russian military.

720
00:42:43,650 --> 00:42:46,110
And RAHA can decide to
deal with that in two ways.

721
00:42:46,110 --> 00:42:46,980
They can either.

722
00:42:47,565 --> 00:42:52,575
Either commit to that and, and that means
there's less resources that they could

723
00:42:52,575 --> 00:42:58,004
otherwise have pushed to the frontline,
or they can decide to ignore it and

724
00:42:58,125 --> 00:43:00,285
prioritize that frontline, but then.

725
00:43:00,825 --> 00:43:04,814
You know, essentially expose some
of their more strategic assets

726
00:43:04,814 --> 00:43:06,345
to, to those kind of threats.

727
00:43:06,674 --> 00:43:06,825
Jacob Shapiro: Mm-hmm.

728
00:43:07,694 --> 00:43:10,455
Which gets to the question of, and
this is like always the question when

729
00:43:10,455 --> 00:43:13,515
it comes to the thing, uh, when it
comes to these things, why did Ukraine

730
00:43:13,515 --> 00:43:15,555
you think, decide to do this Now?

731
00:43:15,975 --> 00:43:20,685
They've been planning this for 18 months,
they said, um, the situation does not

732
00:43:20,745 --> 00:43:24,345
correct me if I'm wrong, does not appear
to be going so well on the battlefield.

733
00:43:24,734 --> 00:43:26,654
Um, they're getting
pre, you know, they're.

734
00:43:26,830 --> 00:43:30,040
Yes, they have Europe more in their
corner, but, you know, the United States

735
00:43:30,040 --> 00:43:33,610
is not what it was even, you know, six,
eight months ago in terms of support.

736
00:43:33,610 --> 00:43:35,500
Like Trump is very, very
different than Biden.

737
00:43:35,500 --> 00:43:37,840
So the diplomatic picture
looks a lot more complicated.

738
00:43:38,350 --> 00:43:42,280
Um, like I, I take your point that
they're gonna put pressure on, on Russia,

739
00:43:42,280 --> 00:43:46,330
but they're also are putting pressure
on Russia to respond in a way that is

740
00:43:46,330 --> 00:43:50,080
extremely meaningful, which might open
up a whole Pandora's box there too.

741
00:43:50,080 --> 00:43:53,380
So, should we see this as a
sign of Ukrainian strength?

742
00:43:53,609 --> 00:43:57,089
Do you think that they saw some sort of
political moment where now is a time that

743
00:43:57,089 --> 00:44:01,170
if they did this, they could push towards
negotiations from a favorable position?

744
00:44:01,410 --> 00:44:05,520
Should we read it as Ukrainian weakness,
as a sign of desperation that they're

745
00:44:05,520 --> 00:44:08,490
losing things on the front lines and
they felt the need to push back or.

746
00:44:08,520 --> 00:44:11,910
Punch back in any sort of way to either
prove to themselves or to their allies

747
00:44:11,910 --> 00:44:12,990
that they could continue forward.

748
00:44:13,225 --> 00:44:16,920
How, how do you evaluate the timing or
the answer also could just be because

749
00:44:16,920 --> 00:44:18,930
they could, like they wanted to do it.

750
00:44:18,930 --> 00:44:21,240
So like if you're fighting war,
like you pull the levers, it's

751
00:44:21,240 --> 00:44:22,530
not so strategic all the time.

752
00:44:22,530 --> 00:44:24,450
But what do you think
about the timing of this?

753
00:44:26,105 --> 00:44:30,180
Sim Tack: I think it's very difficult to
make, to draw conclusions from the timing.

754
00:44:30,330 --> 00:44:30,600
Um.

755
00:44:32,460 --> 00:44:35,399
There, there are so many different
factors that could be at play here.

756
00:44:35,490 --> 00:44:39,569
One, one of them is simply, you know,
that preparation for that operation.

757
00:44:39,660 --> 00:44:44,790
Were they, were they just ready And
they launched it as soon as they could

758
00:44:44,790 --> 00:44:47,040
before potentially being discovered?

759
00:44:47,640 --> 00:44:51,839
Um, was there a risk of discovery
and did they prematurely launch

760
00:44:51,839 --> 00:44:55,350
it before everything, uh, went
completely out the window?

761
00:44:55,919 --> 00:44:56,549
Um.

762
00:44:57,450 --> 00:45:00,540
Or you know, as, as you mentioned,
was there some kind of political

763
00:45:00,540 --> 00:45:03,480
initiative where it's like,
Hey, this operation's been.

764
00:45:04,380 --> 00:45:06,180
On the books, it's ready to go.

765
00:45:06,180 --> 00:45:07,050
Now's a good time.

766
00:45:07,055 --> 00:45:08,160
I, I have no idea.

767
00:45:08,400 --> 00:45:13,890
And I, I, I don't think I could in, in, in
any kind of useful way speculate about it.

768
00:45:14,430 --> 00:45:15,000
Um,

769
00:45:15,570 --> 00:45:17,970
Jacob Shapiro: but I think then,
then, then spec, then speculate

770
00:45:17,970 --> 00:45:19,170
about it in a non-useful way.

771
00:45:19,170 --> 00:45:20,610
That's, that's also good too for me.

772
00:45:21,720 --> 00:45:24,570
Sim Tack: Well, let, let try to
pull it in, in, in a, in a, maybe

773
00:45:24,570 --> 00:45:28,080
in another useful direction, which
is in, instead of trying to think

774
00:45:28,080 --> 00:45:30,270
about the, the intent of the timing.

775
00:45:30,675 --> 00:45:33,435
We, we can talk about the
impact of the timing, right?

776
00:45:33,435 --> 00:45:39,315
Where, um, like as, as you mentioned, the
conflict in Ukraine itself has kind of

777
00:45:39,525 --> 00:45:41,835
stagnated a lot of people losing interest.

778
00:45:42,375 --> 00:45:47,685
Um, Ukraine has that u European support,
but I think one of the big things

779
00:45:47,685 --> 00:45:52,875
about that U European support is that
we've seen it also kind of evolve

780
00:45:52,995 --> 00:45:56,295
to, to want to align with Trump's.

781
00:45:56,820 --> 00:45:58,980
Uh, ambitions when it comes to Ukraine.

782
00:45:58,980 --> 00:45:59,640
So, mm-hmm.

783
00:45:59,880 --> 00:46:05,130
I feel like a lot of the conversations
between Europe and Ukraine have started

784
00:46:05,130 --> 00:46:12,060
to be about, uh, security guarantees once
that hypothetical ceasefire is in action.

785
00:46:13,110 --> 00:46:17,670
Um, there are of course still discussions
going on about supporting Ukraine

786
00:46:17,670 --> 00:46:21,960
and, and, and actions going on to
support Ukraine during the actual

787
00:46:21,960 --> 00:46:23,880
fighting short of such a ceasefire.

788
00:46:24,210 --> 00:46:24,870
Um.

789
00:46:25,365 --> 00:46:28,424
There's no real big
qualitative shifts in that.

790
00:46:28,575 --> 00:46:33,435
Um, I mean, there is the discussion
with Germany about unleashing the,

791
00:46:33,435 --> 00:46:39,285
the Taurus missiles, uh, which would
give Ukraine another, um, you know,

792
00:46:39,495 --> 00:46:43,185
long range precision weapon that,
that they can launch into Russia.

793
00:46:43,694 --> 00:46:44,355
Um.

794
00:46:44,715 --> 00:46:47,925
But I also don't think that that's
really going to turn the tide of

795
00:46:47,925 --> 00:46:49,485
the war or anything like that.

796
00:46:49,815 --> 00:46:53,955
The reality is that the war has
evolved to a point where the lines

797
00:46:53,955 --> 00:46:56,385
on the ground are very static.

798
00:46:56,985 --> 00:47:00,135
Russia continues to push a lot
of resources into the frontline,

799
00:47:00,135 --> 00:47:04,905
and they continue to make gains,
um, but in a positive sense.

800
00:47:04,905 --> 00:47:08,685
And I, I think we've talked
about that in, in previous, um,

801
00:47:08,805 --> 00:47:11,835
in previous podcasts where, uh.

802
00:47:12,675 --> 00:47:17,865
Russia kept advancing, but Ukraine
was kind of, um, not doing its due

803
00:47:17,865 --> 00:47:22,755
diligence in, in setting up additional
defensive lines behind their current

804
00:47:22,755 --> 00:47:26,175
positions, which caused them to,
you know, quickly have to give up

805
00:47:26,175 --> 00:47:29,295
terrain and then not necessarily
do any better after withdrawing.

806
00:47:29,685 --> 00:47:31,485
So that's something
that we've seen change.

807
00:47:31,485 --> 00:47:33,285
So since the beginning of this year.

808
00:47:33,645 --> 00:47:38,835
Um, around February, March, we've
seen some really impressive defensive

809
00:47:38,835 --> 00:47:44,234
preparations behind the front lines on
the Ukrainian side, um, which I think also

810
00:47:44,234 --> 00:47:47,295
signals Ukraine's current position, right?

811
00:47:47,325 --> 00:47:49,035
Dealing with Trump, with Europe.

812
00:47:49,035 --> 00:47:51,134
Everybody's talking about the cease spire.

813
00:47:51,674 --> 00:47:52,335
Um.

814
00:47:53,580 --> 00:47:57,450
I think they're also being realistic
and understanding like, hey, we're,

815
00:47:57,450 --> 00:48:01,290
we're not gonna get into a position
where we get the level of support that

816
00:48:01,290 --> 00:48:04,890
allows us to quickly break through
and take all this territory back.

817
00:48:05,610 --> 00:48:10,380
Um, but if they can stabilize the
frontline, if they can achieve some

818
00:48:10,380 --> 00:48:15,450
kind of ceasefire, and if Europe and
us come through with all the security

819
00:48:15,450 --> 00:48:19,080
guarantees that they've been talking
about, I think that's a, that's a

820
00:48:19,080 --> 00:48:21,930
scenario that Ukraine is more and more.

821
00:48:22,485 --> 00:48:27,825
Um, uh, looking more and more
positively at, um, and then they're

822
00:48:27,825 --> 00:48:31,424
putting the preparations in place
by, by creating those defenses.

823
00:48:31,935 --> 00:48:37,424
Um, meanwhile on, on the Russian end of
things, even though, you know, Russia

824
00:48:37,424 --> 00:48:43,545
continues to gain gain ground slowly
but surely, um, they are still paying.

825
00:48:43,950 --> 00:48:45,120
Heavy prices.

826
00:48:45,240 --> 00:48:50,460
Um, they, you know, we've seen the impact
on, on the Russian economy over time,

827
00:48:50,460 --> 00:48:52,740
which has not really gotten better.

828
00:48:53,190 --> 00:49:00,630
Um, we've seen, you know, Russia trying
to replace some of the arms production

829
00:49:00,630 --> 00:49:02,640
with supplies from North Korea.

830
00:49:03,630 --> 00:49:04,560
Which hasn't really helped.

831
00:49:04,560 --> 00:49:06,509
We've seen them bringing
in North Korean troops.

832
00:49:06,509 --> 00:49:10,319
I, I think that happened after we
last spoke, or, or maybe around

833
00:49:10,319 --> 00:49:11,940
the time we last spoke, I forgot.

834
00:49:11,940 --> 00:49:16,110
But, um, you know, those came and went and
that hasn't really made a big difference.

835
00:49:16,529 --> 00:49:22,710
Um, so Russia is trying to really
muster all it can to keep the war going.

836
00:49:22,715 --> 00:49:25,410
They're not in a position right
now where they want to accept

837
00:49:25,980 --> 00:49:27,990
a ceasefire in these positions.

838
00:49:28,440 --> 00:49:29,160
Um.

839
00:49:30,015 --> 00:49:34,694
Because obviously they, they still
want to try and, and use the current

840
00:49:34,694 --> 00:49:40,995
advances they're making to, to bully
Ukraine and or the West into, um,

841
00:49:41,055 --> 00:49:42,884
achieving a higher political goal.

842
00:49:43,275 --> 00:49:47,175
You know, I. Kind of like what
they started the war for, but

843
00:49:47,265 --> 00:49:49,095
never realistically could achieve.

844
00:49:49,605 --> 00:49:49,725
Mm-hmm.

845
00:49:50,055 --> 00:49:53,295
Um, so anyway, in, in that
entire situation that, that's

846
00:49:53,295 --> 00:49:57,015
kind of a long-winded sketch
of, of the current situation.

847
00:49:57,015 --> 00:50:00,495
But if, if you're looking at that
situation and then you see this

848
00:50:00,495 --> 00:50:07,305
attack occurring, um, against the, the
Russian strategic barber fleet, um,

849
00:50:08,085 --> 00:50:10,185
that's one of those elements where.

850
00:50:10,530 --> 00:50:14,910
Ukraine can still have an impact
beyond simply digging in on the

851
00:50:14,910 --> 00:50:21,960
frontline, and that at the very least
has a big visual impact on Russia.

852
00:50:22,530 --> 00:50:26,745
Um, so it's another one of those
stressor I. Events that, that put

853
00:50:26,745 --> 00:50:31,425
stress internally in Russia on the
government because the, the appearance

854
00:50:31,485 --> 00:50:34,965
of, you know, the government is messing
up the approach to this conflict.

855
00:50:35,295 --> 00:50:38,505
We're gonna waste our, our
nuclear deterrent over this

856
00:50:38,505 --> 00:50:40,365
little patch of land in Ukraine.

857
00:50:40,785 --> 00:50:44,655
Um, all of those ideas, um,
start to put stress on, on

858
00:50:44,655 --> 00:50:45,795
the, on the Russian government.

859
00:50:46,305 --> 00:50:49,605
Um, of course this, this is a
limited amount of stress compared to.

860
00:50:50,385 --> 00:50:53,805
The whole full spectrum of,
of stress that they're under.

861
00:50:54,285 --> 00:50:58,605
Um, but I think that's, that's where
I would kind of place this operation.

862
00:50:58,605 --> 00:51:02,055
It's, it's one of those, one of
those things where Ukraine can still

863
00:51:02,055 --> 00:51:07,215
reach out and try to have a visible
impact on Russian regime stability.

864
00:51:07,635 --> 00:51:11,775
Um, and, and I think they'll continue
to try and do those kind of things.

865
00:51:11,775 --> 00:51:15,945
It, it probably won't be the
same type of operation, probably

866
00:51:15,945 --> 00:51:17,445
not the same type of target.

867
00:51:18,015 --> 00:51:18,675
Um.

868
00:51:19,605 --> 00:51:23,535
But that's, that's probably one of the,
one of the big tools that they have.

869
00:51:24,105 --> 00:51:27,915
Uh, without capabilities to
actually reshape the, the

870
00:51:27,915 --> 00:51:29,024
battlefield on the ground.

871
00:51:30,584 --> 00:51:32,984
Jacob Shapiro: I'm not sure whether all
this makes me feel better or worse, sim,

872
00:51:32,984 --> 00:51:34,515
but I definitely feel like I know more.

873
00:51:34,515 --> 00:51:36,674
And that is the point of
all of this at the very end.

874
00:51:36,674 --> 00:51:38,895
So I could talk to you for
another hour, but unfortunately,

875
00:51:38,895 --> 00:51:40,125
um, I have to wrap it here.

876
00:51:40,154 --> 00:51:43,670
Um, but I. We will not wait another
six months to have you back on.

877
00:51:43,670 --> 00:51:47,120
We'll have you on extremely soon, I think,
because, I mean, I didn't even get to ask

878
00:51:47,120 --> 00:51:50,060
you how the heck the Houthis like made
problems for the F 30 fives because I've

879
00:51:50,060 --> 00:51:52,970
read the Wall Street Journal reporting and
all of it just doesn't make sense to me.

880
00:51:52,970 --> 00:51:54,799
But let's not open that
can of worms right now.

881
00:51:54,799 --> 00:51:56,270
We'll leave the listeners wanting more.

882
00:51:56,629 --> 00:51:57,440
Thanks for making the time.

883
00:51:57,440 --> 00:51:59,870
And it looks like, uh, I mean,
listeners, you can't see this, but

884
00:51:59,900 --> 00:52:02,960
there's a very nice collection of
liquor behind, uh, behind your left.

885
00:52:02,960 --> 00:52:04,430
Looks like you're primed
for a good weekend.

886
00:52:06,125 --> 00:52:06,545
Sim Tack: Uh, yeah.

887
00:52:06,545 --> 00:52:08,885
Well, I'm, I'm, I'm hoping it lasts
slaughtered on the weekend though.

888
00:52:09,095 --> 00:52:09,185
Oh, yeah.

889
00:52:10,265 --> 00:52:10,475
Jacob Shapiro: Yeah.

890
00:52:10,535 --> 00:52:11,315
Sim Tack: You only love once.

891
00:52:16,835 --> 00:52:19,655
Jacob Shapiro: Thank you so much for
listening to the Jacob Shapiro podcast.

892
00:52:19,715 --> 00:52:23,405
Uh, the show is produced and
edited by Jacob Mian, and it's

893
00:52:23,405 --> 00:52:24,905
in, in many ways, the Jacob Show.

894
00:52:25,205 --> 00:52:28,295
Um, if you enjoyed today's episode,
please don't forget to subscribe.

895
00:52:28,640 --> 00:52:31,790
Rate or leave a review, it takes just
a couple seconds of your time, but it

896
00:52:31,790 --> 00:52:33,470
really helps us also share with a friend.

897
00:52:33,740 --> 00:52:37,310
If you're interested in learning
more about hiring me to speak at your

898
00:52:37,310 --> 00:52:40,760
event, or if you wanna learn more
about the wealth management services

899
00:52:40,760 --> 00:52:44,450
that uh, I offer through bespoke or
at cognitive investments, you can find

900
00:52:44,450 --> 00:52:46,700
more information@jacobshapiro.com.

901
00:52:46,700 --> 00:52:50,630
You can also write to me directly
at jacob@jacobshapiro.com.

902
00:52:51,160 --> 00:52:53,440
I'm also on, on X for now with the handle.

903
00:52:53,440 --> 00:52:54,220
Jacob Shap.

904
00:52:54,220 --> 00:52:54,940
That's Jacob.

905
00:52:54,940 --> 00:52:55,960
SHAP.

906
00:52:55,960 --> 00:52:59,080
No DATs dashes or anything
else, but I'm not hard to find.

907
00:52:59,590 --> 00:53:01,330
Um, see you out there.