1 00:00:01,440 --> 00:00:12,321 Welcome to Top Traders Unplugged. In markets success doesn’t 2 00:00:12,321 --> 00:00:24,411 come from predicting what happens next, it comes from being 3 00:00:24,411 --> 00:00:31,665 prepared for what you can’t predict. In each episode we go deep 4 00:00:04,620 --> 00:00:10,450 with some of the world’s most thoughtful minds in investing, economics, 5 00:00:10,450 --> 00:00:16,280 and beyond to understand how they think, how they prepare, and 6 00:00:16,280 --> 00:00:21,580 how they decide, and the experiences that shaped how they 7 00:00:21,580 --> 00:00:26,880 see the world. No noise, no short-cuts, just real conversations 8 00:00:26,880 --> 00:00:31,650 to help you think better and invest with confidence. 9 00:00:39,420 --> 00:00:42,577 Welcome and welcome back to this week's edition of the Systematic 10 00:00:42,577 --> 00:00:46,021 Investor series with Andrew Beer and Tom Wrobel as well as myself, 11 00:00:46,021 --> 00:00:49,178 Niels Kaastrup-Larsen, where we each week take the pulse of the 12 00:00:49,178 --> 00:00:52,048 global markets through the lens of a rules-based investor. Andrew 13 00:00:52,048 --> 00:00:56,353 and Tom, it is great to have you both back this week on the podcast. 14 00:00:56,353 --> 00:00:59,223 Tom, it's been a little while. How are you doing? 15 00:01:00,250 --> 00:01:04,306 Thanks, Niels. Yes, very well. Here we're in eclipse mania in London. 16 00:01:04,306 --> 00:01:07,686 We've had the solar eclipse which has been very exciting. 17 00:01:08,970 --> 00:01:12,092 Yeah, well let me talk to you about that as well. Andrew, how are 18 00:01:12,092 --> 00:01:14,768 you? And did you see the eclipse? Because I missed it completely 19 00:01:14,768 --> 00:01:15,883 because of clouds over here. 20 00:01:15,890 --> 00:01:21,454 I missed it completely, but we also didn't get it over here. It 21 00:01:21,454 --> 00:01:26,590 kind of arced from, I guess, sort of the Nordics down through… 22 00:01:26,590 --> 00:01:32,582 kind of hit Madrid. My sister did fly to Iceland to see it though… 23 00:01:32,690 --> 00:01:33,170 Wow. 24 00:01:33,170 --> 00:01:37,550 …with her daughter. And then had a perfectly cloudy day. But all 25 00:01:37,550 --> 00:01:42,295 things are great and thank you very much for having me back. It's 26 00:01:42,295 --> 00:01:43,755 great to be here. 27 00:01:43,770 --> 00:01:59,610 Absolutely. Tom, so did you actually see it? Because I was looking 28 00:01:46,872 --> 00:01:50,820 at it… So, here, where I am at the moment in Denmark, they said, 29 00:01:50,820 --> 00:01:55,050 oh, it's going to be 7 o'clock and then it's at 8 o'clock. And I 30 00:01:55,050 --> 00:01:58,152 was obviously not watching directly into the sun. I really didn't 31 00:01:58,152 --> 00:01:59,562 see any signs of it. 32 00:01:59,610 --> 00:02:04,846 Yeah, well, we had about 95% here in the UK which was pretty amazing. 33 00:02:04,846 --> 00:02:08,960 But interestingly, if you weren't looking at it through a sort 34 00:02:08,960 --> 00:02:13,074 of a safety glass or goggle, it was almost unobservable because 35 00:02:13,074 --> 00:02:18,310 the sun did get a lot dimmer, but it still was evening time, so 36 00:02:18,310 --> 00:02:22,798 the sun was going down anyway. However, we had some goggles, and 37 00:02:22,798 --> 00:02:24,294 it was really amazing. 38 00:02:24,350 --> 00:02:55,562 Wow. Okay, well next time I'll buy the goggles, that's for sure. 39 00:02:24,350 --> 00:02:28,750 Anyways, we've got a really good lineup of topics. Thanks so 40 00:02:28,750 --> 00:02:33,550 much for sending them over. We’ve got a question that came in 41 00:02:33,550 --> 00:02:39,150 as well. So, lots of things to dig into. But as usual, before we 42 00:02:39,150 --> 00:02:45,150 get into any of that, let me ask you, Tom, what has been on your 43 00:02:45,150 --> 00:02:49,550 (sort of outside the topics we're going to be discussing)… anything 44 00:02:49,550 --> 00:02:53,550 that you've sort of found interesting or caught your attention 45 00:02:53,550 --> 00:02:55,550 in the last few weeks? 46 00:02:56,530 --> 00:03:00,580 I think it's really been volatility. It's like the markets 47 00:03:00,580 --> 00:03:04,225 have almost forgotten about volatility and where we're going 48 00:03:04,225 --> 00:03:09,490 and the geopolitics that is going on. I think I feel like we're 49 00:03:09,490 --> 00:03:13,945 in a new normal where prices have now digested the volatility 50 00:03:13,945 --> 00:03:18,805 in the Iran war and it's almost like equities are off again 51 00:03:18,805 --> 00:03:22,045 and here come the next big major trends. 52 00:03:22,780 --> 00:03:30,424 Yeah, I mean that is true although there has been a little 53 00:03:30,424 --> 00:03:38,068 bit of volatility. It's just that net/net it's been up and down 54 00:03:38,068 --> 00:03:41,253 and not really going anywhere. What about you, Andrew? I know you 55 00:03:26,581 --> 00:03:33,640 said you were heading for… The last time we spoke you said, oh, 56 00:03:33,640 --> 00:03:40,156 I'm heading for the mountains, I'm going to relax. Have you succeeded 57 00:03:40,156 --> 00:03:41,242 in relaxing? 58 00:03:43,300 --> 00:03:55,840 Uncharacteristically, I have. I had been trying to tune out a lot 59 00:03:55,840 --> 00:04:09,425 of things that have been going on. I guess, sort of one observation 60 00:04:09,425 --> 00:04:24,055 (back to what Tom was saying) is that, I think I started my career 61 00:04:24,055 --> 00:04:35,550 in the hedge fund space working for a die-hard value investor, 62 00:04:35,550 --> 00:04:48,090 and before that I'd been an investment banker, and I worked briefly 63 00:04:48,090 --> 00:05:02,720 at an LBO firm. And I don't know how you conduct any kind of 64 00:05:02,720 --> 00:05:12,125 normal traditional valuation analysis in this world right now. 65 00:03:43,300 --> 00:03:59,212 And I've used this metaphor, I think the equity markets have just 66 00:03:59,212 --> 00:04:12,472 become… They used to have venture capital, Cathie Wood, ARK, 67 00:04:12,472 --> 00:04:29,710 these kind of pie in the sky things where God knows what's going 68 00:04:29,710 --> 00:04:46,948 to happen five or seven years out. But if you added up everybody's 69 00:04:46,948 --> 00:05:02,860 projections of what was going to happen five to seven years out, 70 00:05:02,860 --> 00:05:12,142 everybody would have these huge monstrous companies. But the 71 00:03:44,916 --> 00:03:55,420 reality of venture capital is that you get one or two winners and 72 00:03:55,420 --> 00:04:05,116 then it's a killing field for everybody else. And it feels like 73 00:04:05,116 --> 00:04:14,004 the equity markets today, I mean they're so strange that you 74 00:04:14,004 --> 00:04:22,892 have a SpaceX IPO that's talking about things that are… a 75 00:04:22,892 --> 00:04:30,972 company of that scale… that are so fantastical. That's just… 76 00:04:30,972 --> 00:04:40,668 I've been watching and I know we'll talk about some really good 77 00:04:40,668 --> 00:04:50,364 points on it. It's just, it does feel like there's just something 78 00:04:50,364 --> 00:05:00,868 very, very profound going on. And it could be a repeat of 2000 79 00:05:00,868 --> 00:05:10,564 or it could be something very different. We just don't know at 80 00:05:10,564 --> 00:05:12,180 this point. 81 00:05:12,910 --> 00:05:25,608 Yeah, and I think that's true. And I think the thing that we may 82 00:05:25,608 --> 00:05:37,399 not be noticing so much in what's going on is this ever increasing 83 00:05:37,399 --> 00:05:46,469 level of interest rates. Right? The yields are just ticking 84 00:05:46,469 --> 00:05:58,260 higher and higher. Not all the time, not every day, and you're almost 85 00:05:58,260 --> 00:06:07,330 kind of not paying attention to it. So, interestingly enough. 86 00:05:12,910 --> 00:05:21,867 So, for my part, I didn't find anything sort of from the markets 87 00:05:21,867 --> 00:05:30,135 because actually, as you both said, I mean, it's not like that 88 00:05:30,135 --> 00:05:40,470 a lot of things happening are new. But what is new is a story I 89 00:05:40,470 --> 00:05:46,671 noticed in the Danish newspaper. It's about an experimental 90 00:05:46,671 --> 00:05:54,939 magnetic train developed in China and it just broke its own world 91 00:05:54,939 --> 00:06:01,829 record. It accelerated from zero to 800 kilometers per hour. 92 00:06:01,829 --> 00:06:07,341 That's 500 miles per hour in 5.3 seconds. 93 00:06:07,680 --> 00:06:08,240 Wow. 94 00:06:11,320 --> 00:06:15,831 And I'm thinking that's going to be a fun ride. You don't want 95 00:06:15,831 --> 00:06:18,954 to have your coffee ‘just filled’ just before takeoff. 96 00:06:18,960 --> 00:06:21,680 Are you signing up for a ride on that then, Niels? 97 00:06:21,840 --> 00:06:45,570 No, so I'm not. But I was curious and so I asked ChatGPT, how 98 00:06:45,570 --> 00:07:05,910 does that compare to like the acceleration of like an F35? Would 99 00:07:05,910 --> 00:07:31,335 we even be able to go to these. And it says (and I have no 100 00:07:31,335 --> 00:07:51,675 idea if this is correct), it's roughly four to six times faster 101 00:07:51,675 --> 00:08:08,625 than an F35 acceleration. I'm thinking probably not for humans, 102 00:08:08,625 --> 00:08:20,490 for the moment at least, but anyways. All right, well, back to 103 00:06:28,660 --> 00:06:42,300 something that has not accelerated very much in recent weeks. 104 00:06:42,300 --> 00:06:55,940 And that's the trend barometer. In fact, it's been the 105 00:06:55,940 --> 00:07:10,944 opposite. It's gone down to 27, which actually, to Andrew's point, 106 00:07:10,944 --> 00:07:28,676 I think it was, it suggests that, at the moment, there are very 107 00:07:28,676 --> 00:07:43,680 few markets that are trending. It doesn't mean that trend followers 108 00:07:43,680 --> 00:08:00,048 can't make money, but it means that the opportunity set is very 109 00:08:00,048 --> 00:08:16,416 limited because only 27% of the markets that it tracks is “in 110 00:08:16,416 --> 00:08:20,508 a trending state”. So, I thought that's interesting also vis-a-vis 111 00:06:31,066 --> 00:06:50,836 the returns that I'm going to come to in a second, to me at least, 112 00:06:50,836 --> 00:07:10,606 we had a bit of a correction in June, I think it's fair to say. 113 00:07:10,606 --> 00:07:31,694 We had a bit of a soft July and not too bad. August so far seems 114 00:07:31,694 --> 00:07:51,464 to be off to a decent start. And from where I sit, it looks like 115 00:07:51,464 --> 00:08:05,962 equities, metals and maybe one or two currencies that are doing 116 00:08:05,962 --> 00:08:19,142 the heavy lifting. So, it’s not a broad-based participation as 117 00:08:19,142 --> 00:08:20,460 such. So, I wanted to maybe come to you, Tom, and ask a little 118 00:06:45,942 --> 00:07:04,482 bit, from your perspective, firstly, kind of what you've noticed 119 00:07:04,482 --> 00:07:21,168 since we last spoke, performance wise, over the summer, 120 00:07:21,168 --> 00:07:39,708 obviously, and sort of, yeah, anything you found interesting, looking 121 00:07:39,708 --> 00:08:03,810 at the space, again, not going into the topics we're going to talk 122 00:08:03,810 --> 00:08:20,496 about, but just overall performance wise or exposure wise? 123 00:08:21,010 --> 00:08:27,698 I think TTAs have definitely extended on some really good gains 124 00:08:27,698 --> 00:08:36,210 that they made at the end of last year. There was a very, very 125 00:08:36,210 --> 00:08:42,290 strong beginning kind of quarter and into the halfway point 126 00:08:42,290 --> 00:08:49,586 of 2026, which is fantastic. And I think the important thing to 127 00:08:49,586 --> 00:08:56,882 realize about those gains is they've come from a variety of places. 128 00:08:56,882 --> 00:09:04,178 It hasn't just been one trend, it's been precious metals which displayed 129 00:09:04,178 --> 00:09:10,866 some fantastic upside at the beginning of the year, then energies 130 00:09:10,866 --> 00:09:18,770 when the Iran war kicked off. And then, I think, in the background 131 00:09:18,770 --> 00:09:26,066 of that you've had equities with sort of slow and steady upward 132 00:09:26,066 --> 00:09:33,970 drift of a little bit of volatility in the middle of the year. 133 00:09:33,970 --> 00:09:39,442 But it's really been interesting to see trends contributing 134 00:09:39,442 --> 00:09:43,090 performance from a variety of places. And although we've had a 135 00:08:30,345 --> 00:08:52,749 bit of a downturn now in performance, I mean most CTAs are 136 00:08:52,749 --> 00:09:11,419 still holding on to some strong year-to-date gains. So, there's 137 00:09:11,419 --> 00:09:35,690 still a lot going on and there's still a lot that the CTAs 138 00:09:35,690 --> 00:09:43,158 are very proud of. If we look now, interestingly, thinking about 139 00:08:30,754 --> 00:08:46,066 gold, our trend indicator sort of model portfolio has actually gone 140 00:08:46,066 --> 00:08:58,594 short gold and is generating some interesting performance from 141 00:08:58,594 --> 00:09:13,906 that potential position. So, it looks as though CTAs, if they 142 00:09:13,906 --> 00:09:29,218 are themselves short, have sort of adapted and are now kind 143 00:09:29,218 --> 00:09:43,138 of taking advantage of the new environment that we're in. 144 00:09:43,250 --> 00:09:48,062 Yeah, we'll come to maybe some of the differences you're also noticing 145 00:09:48,062 --> 00:09:52,874 between managers later. I know that Andrew brought a point up that 146 00:09:52,874 --> 00:09:56,884 we'll touch on that. What about you, Andrew? You obviously 147 00:09:56,884 --> 00:10:01,696 look at the exposure of the industry as a whole, that's what 148 00:10:01,696 --> 00:10:06,107 you kind of replicate. From that vantage point, are you seeing 149 00:10:06,107 --> 00:10:09,716 any changes, themes in the last few weeks, months? 150 00:10:09,720 --> 00:10:25,011 Well, I guess one, just following observation, it's been 151 00:10:25,011 --> 00:10:43,700 incredible 12 months, I mean year-to-date aside. I mean I've got, 152 00:10:43,700 --> 00:11:02,389 last time I calculated and when we were talking about questions 153 00:11:02,389 --> 00:11:27,874 a few days ago, the SocGen CTA index is up 23% over the past year 154 00:11:27,874 --> 00:11:48,262 - 23%. Right? I mean, that's an incredible 12 month return. And 155 00:11:48,262 --> 00:12:05,252 the beta to equities… Now, everybody's been long equities, to 156 00:12:05,252 --> 00:12:25,640 some degree, over that period of time, which was the right trade. 157 00:12:25,640 --> 00:12:42,630 It was being long equities post Liberation Day was actually 158 00:12:42,630 --> 00:12:57,921 quite contrarian relative to what fundamental investors were saying 159 00:12:57,921 --> 00:13:03,018 at the time. So, this is my point about being contrarian, tactical, 160 00:10:45,171 --> 00:11:36,378 alpha generating. But with a beta of 0.3, you're up 23% over that 161 00:11:36,378 --> 00:12:27,585 period of time. The MSCI world, which has had a great 12 months, 162 00:12:27,585 --> 00:13:03,036 is only up 21% and bonds are up 2%. But what I think has been 163 00:10:26,490 --> 00:10:57,235 really interesting this year is that, and we've talked about this, 164 00:10:57,235 --> 00:11:30,775 there are some times when it feels like there's a single theme 165 00:11:30,775 --> 00:12:01,520 that's dominating the markets. And I don't care if you're trading, 166 00:12:01,520 --> 00:12:40,650 if you got a portfolio of 10 positions, like us, or 300 or 400, 167 00:12:40,650 --> 00:13:03,010 everything's kind of pointing in the same direction. And so, when 168 00:10:19,347 --> 00:11:01,064 you get an event like an SVB, or a Liberation Day, or something 169 00:11:01,064 --> 00:11:29,945 that reverberates across all these different markets, that's when 170 00:11:29,945 --> 00:12:05,244 CTAs can be most affected by whipsaws. What's been really interesting 171 00:12:05,244 --> 00:12:40,543 this year is when you talk about macro commentary, there are 172 00:12:40,543 --> 00:13:03,006 really two prevailing views of the world. On the equity side is 173 00:10:29,870 --> 00:11:22,260 fear of missing out. It's you only live once. It's this kind of 174 00:11:22,260 --> 00:12:02,560 venture capital like view of productivity growth, and AI, and 175 00:12:02,560 --> 00:12:30,770 everything else, and everything's CapEx, and everything's 176 00:12:30,770 --> 00:13:03,010 going to kind of grow to the moon. And then other parts of the 177 00:10:34,476 --> 00:11:19,862 market are much more cautious. Where you've got a potential squeeze 178 00:11:19,862 --> 00:12:01,122 in crude oil, you've got (you mentioned) rising interest rates 179 00:12:01,122 --> 00:12:38,256 and stubborn inflation. And those two prevailing narratives have 180 00:12:38,256 --> 00:13:03,012 both been evident in our portfolios. And so, what you've seen 181 00:10:17,455 --> 00:10:34,472 this year was kind of capitalizing on a number of trends 182 00:10:34,472 --> 00:10:53,036 that were working together in the first three or four months of 183 00:10:53,036 --> 00:11:16,241 the year and kind of big gains in the first. And then the rest of 184 00:11:16,241 --> 00:11:34,805 the year has kind of been treading water and holding onto gains 185 00:11:34,805 --> 00:11:54,916 during a period of time when gold goes up and then gets crushed, 186 00:11:54,916 --> 00:12:13,480 oil goes up and then gets crushed, and then bounces back, and 187 00:12:13,480 --> 00:12:30,497 then equities get crushed and then they come bouncing back. So, 188 00:12:30,497 --> 00:12:47,514 you've had all this volatility in all these different things and 189 00:12:47,514 --> 00:13:02,984 (at least we've seen in our portfolio) skating through it. And 190 00:10:13,257 --> 00:10:55,701 given how rough and volatile this year is, that's been a very, 191 00:10:55,701 --> 00:11:34,608 very… it actually felt like that, plus the cumulative year over 192 00:11:34,608 --> 00:12:13,515 year performance, it really strikes as one of the most extraordinary 193 00:12:13,515 --> 00:12:55,959 periods that I've seen in the space, just from a risk adjusted 194 00:12:55,959 --> 00:13:03,033 returns perspective. 195 00:13:03,840 --> 00:13:05,920 Yeah, absolutely. Yeah, go ahead. 196 00:13:06,400 --> 00:13:14,485 I think Andrew's exactly right, and I think the fact that 197 00:13:14,485 --> 00:13:22,570 CTAs have been able to hold onto this performance, they've generated 198 00:13:22,570 --> 00:13:31,390 it from a variety of sources, has made systematic trading far more 199 00:13:31,390 --> 00:13:37,270 palatable for investors. There's a common frustration that 200 00:13:37,270 --> 00:13:43,885 they don't always deliver that immediate protection during some 201 00:13:43,885 --> 00:13:51,970 sort of market event or volatility, but they have these longer-term 202 00:13:51,970 --> 00:13:57,850 statistical relationships. But this year has really demonstrated 203 00:13:57,850 --> 00:14:05,200 the resilience of having CTA style strategies in a diversified 204 00:14:05,200 --> 00:14:05,935 portfolio. And it's something which I think we always talk about 205 00:13:14,340 --> 00:13:23,074 on the podcast and it's something we sound like a broken 206 00:13:23,074 --> 00:13:32,602 record. But diversification is the only free lunch and the way people 207 00:13:32,602 --> 00:13:40,542 and CCTAs allocate risk across markets really is paying dividends 208 00:13:40,542 --> 00:13:49,276 this year. It's a very active process. They aren't just selecting 209 00:13:49,276 --> 00:13:58,804 markets then having a static allocation. And I think that is where 210 00:13:58,804 --> 00:14:05,950 they've been able to add a lot of value. 211 00:14:08,151 --> 00:14:12,267 Can I do a follow up on that? The importance of diversification, 212 00:14:12,267 --> 00:14:15,697 but also the point about resilience. What are your thoughts 213 00:14:15,697 --> 00:14:19,470 on the maybe “the lack of damage” that the yen intervention 214 00:14:19,470 --> 00:14:23,929 did for CTAs? What do you… I mean, because we've often seen some 215 00:14:23,929 --> 00:14:27,702 that something like that can really be the catalyst of something 216 00:14:27,702 --> 00:14:28,388 more meaningful. 217 00:14:33,861 --> 00:14:40,557 But it was painful but not that bad. Any thought from where 218 00:14:40,557 --> 00:14:41,681 you sit? Yeah, go ahead, Andrew. 219 00:14:42,321 --> 00:14:59,624 Well, so, to me the fact that the damage wasn't worse was incredible. 220 00:14:59,624 --> 00:15:19,589 Right? I mean it was. I mean the yen has been one of the very 221 00:15:19,589 --> 00:15:36,892 best money makers. And if you looked at our attribution a few months 222 00:15:36,892 --> 00:15:56,857 ago, we had kind of big gains in yen, and big gains in, say, crude 223 00:15:56,857 --> 00:16:12,829 oil, and some gains in equities. But I think it did show 224 00:16:12,829 --> 00:16:22,146 this kind of bifurcated world out there. Interesting for us is, 225 00:14:47,017 --> 00:15:01,105 again, when I see something like that because we tend to be, 226 00:15:01,105 --> 00:15:14,019 if something big idiosyncratic happens in the 10 markets, that I 227 00:15:14,019 --> 00:15:28,107 expect to be hit more. Right? And I tell clients, if everybody 228 00:15:28,107 --> 00:15:44,543 is long some dollar trade, the core of which is a short yen trade, 229 00:15:44,543 --> 00:15:59,805 and there's an intervention, in the end I expect us to lose more 230 00:15:59,805 --> 00:16:13,893 money. You should expect us to lose more money because there is 231 00:16:13,893 --> 00:16:22,111 some idiosyncratic risk in it as well. And we didn't and we actually 232 00:14:50,997 --> 00:15:06,903 outperformed it. The damage wasn't nearly as bad and we actually 233 00:15:06,903 --> 00:15:22,809 outperformed over those few days. And I'm still not quite sure 234 00:15:22,809 --> 00:15:44,499 exactly why that is. I mean, we can see it in some of our trend 235 00:15:44,499 --> 00:15:58,959 models but I can't quite pinpoint exactly what was causing 236 00:15:58,959 --> 00:16:20,649 it. But I think that's part of what I think is the success of this 237 00:16:20,649 --> 00:16:22,095 year. That's a nightmare scenario, like the war starting is 238 00:14:51,672 --> 00:15:02,062 a nightmare scenario, if you're long equities and you're long 239 00:15:02,062 --> 00:15:15,569 gold, but the saving grace was then, by that time, we were also 240 00:15:15,569 --> 00:15:29,076 long crude oil. This is one of those periods where flat has been 241 00:15:29,076 --> 00:15:42,583 the new up or stability has been so valuable over the past four 242 00:15:42,583 --> 00:15:56,090 or five months. Now you realize that I am taking a huge risk 243 00:15:56,090 --> 00:16:09,597 of jinxing it for every by saying this out loud on this podcast. 244 00:16:09,597 --> 00:16:22,065 But I do think it's been a terrific year for the space. 245 00:16:22,551 --> 00:16:27,051 What's interesting just hearing you talk about it like that. 246 00:16:27,051 --> 00:16:31,101 I'm thinking well, Andrew doesn't trade many currencies but 247 00:16:31,101 --> 00:16:36,951 one of them he picked is probably the only one where you still 248 00:16:36,951 --> 00:16:41,901 see intervention risk showing up. So, that. Yeah, that's a gutsy 249 00:16:41,901 --> 00:16:42,811 choice. Yeah. Anything on your side, Tom? 250 00:16:43,211 --> 00:16:46,118 It hasn't really been something that's been that much… 251 00:16:46,118 --> 00:16:49,348 You haven't had questions about it. I think, obviously, there 252 00:16:49,348 --> 00:16:52,901 has been a very strong downwards yen trend which has contributed 253 00:16:52,901 --> 00:16:56,131 really nicely to P&L in portfolios. It reverted, it reversed 254 00:16:56,131 --> 00:17:00,330 slightly. People lost as a bit of pain. There would have been some 255 00:17:00,330 --> 00:17:03,560 risk management, but I think hasn't raised too many questions. 256 00:17:03,560 --> 00:17:08,082 I think there's a lot of other things going on in the world and 257 00:17:08,082 --> 00:17:10,666 maybe that's kind of part of the reason. 258 00:17:11,390 --> 00:17:11,670 Yeah. 259 00:17:11,670 --> 00:17:12,190 Okay. 260 00:17:12,270 --> 00:17:17,366 Actually, can I ask a question for Tom on that because one of the 261 00:17:17,366 --> 00:17:21,734 things, and I think it's something we may talk about a little 262 00:17:21,734 --> 00:17:25,010 bit, is the non-trend strategies. So, a very interesting 263 00:17:25,010 --> 00:17:29,378 statistical quirk of July is that there are three kind of broad 264 00:17:29,378 --> 00:17:33,746 groups that we track. The SocGen CTA index is one. We consider 265 00:17:33,746 --> 00:17:37,022 that representative of the flagship hedge funds. Then you've 266 00:17:37,022 --> 00:17:40,662 also got two Morningstar indices, one of which covers the 267 00:17:40,662 --> 00:17:45,030 UCITS fund space, another one which comes of the US space. Both 268 00:17:45,030 --> 00:17:50,126 of those were up in July and the SocGen CTA index was down. And 269 00:17:50,126 --> 00:17:55,222 it looks to us like there were a couple of funds, within the SocGen 270 00:17:55,222 --> 00:17:58,862 CTA index, that had much larger than expected drawdowns in 271 00:17:58,862 --> 00:18:02,502 July. But is that carry trade that you're seeing, Tom? 272 00:18:04,891 --> 00:18:08,271 In other words, was an unintended consequence of the yen, 273 00:18:08,271 --> 00:18:12,327 which was bad from a trend perspective, but if you've been loading 274 00:18:12,327 --> 00:18:16,721 up on carry to diversify away from trend, did you get hit with 275 00:18:16,721 --> 00:18:17,735 a double whammy? 276 00:18:18,641 --> 00:18:27,601 I don't know. I'd have to do a bit of digging on that. I think we 277 00:18:27,601 --> 00:18:35,441 used to actually run a similar index. So, we had a CTA mutual fund 278 00:18:35,441 --> 00:18:43,281 index. And one of the only two kind of things we ever really observed 279 00:18:43,281 --> 00:18:50,001 from that index was that it had an unsurprisingly very high correlation 280 00:18:50,001 --> 00:18:57,281 to the main CTA index and to trend followers. But it seemed to 281 00:18:57,281 --> 00:19:02,881 have some structural kind of underperformance in terms of about 282 00:19:02,881 --> 00:19:09,601 200 basis points per year, which I think was due to structuring 283 00:19:09,601 --> 00:19:15,761 costs and other things. But then there were often markets that 284 00:19:15,761 --> 00:19:19,121 couldn't be traded in these structures. So, the only thought 285 00:18:22,677 --> 00:18:33,776 I have is that maybe, especially from a European lens in 286 00:18:33,776 --> 00:18:44,875 the UCIT space, commodities is something that is harder to access 287 00:18:44,875 --> 00:19:00,010 in a UCITS fund. So, the only thing I can think of was maybe those 288 00:19:00,010 --> 00:19:10,100 UCITS sort of CTAs were avoiding certain moves in commodity 289 00:19:10,100 --> 00:19:19,181 markets that maybe were dragging on performance in July. 290 00:19:19,531 --> 00:19:25,229 Actually, let me add two things to that. Actually, it's a 291 00:19:25,229 --> 00:19:30,927 good point you mentioned about UCITS because, as some people may 292 00:19:30,927 --> 00:19:37,143 know, when you do trade commodities in a UCITS fund, it takes 293 00:19:37,143 --> 00:19:43,877 an extra couple of days to settle the P&L. So, Andrew, if you're 294 00:19:43,877 --> 00:19:49,575 comparing two specific days with big movements and you say, well, 295 00:19:49,575 --> 00:19:56,827 this is what happened in ETF land, or in the index land, and this 296 00:19:56,827 --> 00:20:03,043 is what happened in the UCITS land. Actually, that's a tough comparison 297 00:20:03,043 --> 00:20:09,259 if you do specific days, if there are big commodity moves, because 298 00:20:09,259 --> 00:20:13,921 it doesn't show up in the same time span. However, to your point, 299 00:19:25,411 --> 00:19:43,051 I remember… do remember, a couple of years ago, over the summer, 300 00:19:43,051 --> 00:20:02,161 there was like a carry unwind situation for a few days in August? 301 00:20:02,161 --> 00:20:13,921 I can't remember if it was ‘23, ‘24. 302 00:20:16,161 --> 00:20:16,561 Yenmageddon. 303 00:20:16,801 --> 00:20:21,169 Right. And actually, when I looked at the UCITS space, so, I 304 00:20:21,169 --> 00:20:25,901 compared our UCITS with the kind of a peer group of UCITS, you 305 00:20:25,901 --> 00:20:30,633 could be right, Andrew, in the sense that there may be more carry 306 00:20:30,633 --> 00:20:35,729 going on in some funds. Not to say that they're not open about it. 307 00:20:35,729 --> 00:20:40,461 I'm just saying that it may be surprising that there are some funds 308 00:20:40,461 --> 00:20:44,829 that run more carry and not really pure trend and that causes 309 00:20:44,829 --> 00:20:48,105 differences when you have an unwind of a carry. 310 00:20:48,711 --> 00:20:51,402 Yeah. And by the way Tom, just interestingly, so, that we used to 311 00:20:51,402 --> 00:20:53,472 observe that difference between kind of hedge funds and mutual 312 00:20:53,472 --> 00:20:55,956 funds. Broadly, it's been a system, it's gone away in the CTA 313 00:20:55,956 --> 00:20:58,440 space. That actually, in the mutual fund space in the US, they 314 00:20:58,440 --> 00:21:00,924 underperformed by 400 or 500 basis points, in 2022, on the upside, 315 00:21:00,924 --> 00:21:02,994 which was basically because you had more things with tighter 316 00:21:02,994 --> 00:21:05,478 vol controls because of 40 act rules. But since then, there's been 317 00:21:05,478 --> 00:21:07,548 almost no difference in performance, and the same thing has 318 00:21:07,548 --> 00:21:08,790 happened now in the UCITS space. 319 00:21:10,991 --> 00:21:24,851 So, I think, years ago you had funds that were loaded with 2 and 320 00:21:24,851 --> 00:21:38,711 20 down in the Cayman subs plus other funds on top. It was basically 321 00:21:38,711 --> 00:21:49,601 these were… I mean, you might consider them garbage products, and 322 00:21:49,601 --> 00:21:55,541 almost all of them have gone. So, with AQR and Alpha Simplex and 323 00:21:18,992 --> 00:21:32,708 now Winton and others having kind of clean 150 basis point products, 324 00:21:32,708 --> 00:21:45,281 there's no spread anymore. That's why it was so unusual, in 325 00:21:45,281 --> 00:21:55,568 July, to see 150 or something basis point difference. 326 00:21:57,811 --> 00:22:02,322 It'd be interesting to look. So, whenever we do an in depth correlation 327 00:22:02,322 --> 00:22:05,792 analysis like that where we're trying to compare specific periods, 328 00:22:05,792 --> 00:22:10,303 we actually tend to roll data up into weekly periods just to avoid 329 00:22:10,303 --> 00:22:14,467 time zone differentials and as you say, Niels, maybe some sort of 330 00:22:14,467 --> 00:22:17,937 settlement issue. And we do observe much more stable correlations 331 00:22:17,937 --> 00:22:21,060 when we kind of do that weekly data analysis. 332 00:22:21,471 --> 00:24:48,371 Yeah. All right, well we've talked a lot about performance but 333 00:22:37,791 --> 00:22:55,743 let's get to August performance and this is as of Tuesday 334 00:22:55,743 --> 00:23:13,695 night, yesterday, I think was pretty flat overall. So, the BTOP50 335 00:23:13,695 --> 00:23:34,911 index was actually up 95 basis points so far in August, up about 336 00:23:34,911 --> 00:23:56,127 9% for the year. SocGen CTA index up 58 basis points, up 8.74% 337 00:23:56,127 --> 00:24:17,343 for the year. SocGen trend up 55 basis points, up 8.50% for the 338 00:24:17,343 --> 00:24:33,663 year. And the Short-Term Traders index doing well up 1.08% 339 00:24:33,663 --> 00:24:48,351 in August, and up 4.3% so far this year. In the traditional world. 340 00:22:27,175 --> 00:22:45,713 MSCI World, and this is as of yesterday, is up 3.31% in August, 341 00:22:45,713 --> 00:23:04,251 up 13.05 for the year. And then MSCI World eve, so without US 342 00:23:04,251 --> 00:23:24,215 and Canada, up 2.31% in August and up 12.34% so far this year. S&P 343 00:23:24,215 --> 00:23:42,753 US Aggregate Bond index is up 40 basis points ish for August, and 344 00:23:42,753 --> 00:24:02,717 up 6 basis points so far this year. And the S&P 500 Total Return 345 00:24:02,717 --> 00:24:24,107 up 3.46% so far in August, and up 13.19% so far this year. So, overall, 346 00:24:24,107 --> 00:24:36,941 actually both in the traditional and in the alternative 347 00:24:36,941 --> 00:24:48,349 world, CTA world, August is looking pretty good. All right, so, 348 00:22:35,241 --> 00:23:39,501 before we get to our list of topics, we want to just touch on 349 00:23:39,501 --> 00:24:34,581 a question that came in from Jamie and this was specifically mentioned 350 00:24:34,581 --> 00:24:48,351 for you, Andrew. So, Jamie writes, long time listener, first 351 00:22:30,900 --> 00:22:47,064 time writing in. I had a question for Andrew as, I believe, 352 00:22:47,064 --> 00:23:04,575 he has mentioned that he ran a commodity fund in the past. There 353 00:23:04,575 --> 00:23:18,045 are some newer active commodity funds that could be described 354 00:23:18,045 --> 00:23:31,515 by the technical literature as third generation funds. These funds 355 00:23:31,515 --> 00:23:46,332 take long flat or long short positions, are systematic and can 356 00:23:46,332 --> 00:23:58,455 use momentum and term structure strategies. I would be 357 00:23:58,455 --> 00:24:11,925 interested in hearing yours and Andrew's observation on how such 358 00:24:11,925 --> 00:24:26,742 funds are similar to and different from a typical CTA systematic 359 00:24:26,742 --> 00:24:38,865 trend following program, besides the obvious fact that they 360 00:24:38,865 --> 00:24:48,294 only invest in commodity futures. Sincerely, Jamie. He mentioned 361 00:22:35,461 --> 00:23:52,406 a couple of tickers. I'll leave them out. But just overall 362 00:23:52,406 --> 00:24:48,366 thoughts, Andrew, is this something you're familiar with? 363 00:24:49,411 --> 00:24:57,666 So, the business that I wasn't the PM of the business, I funded 364 00:24:57,666 --> 00:25:05,286 the business, I seeded it, I wrote the business plan and raised 365 00:25:05,286 --> 00:25:13,541 the initial money for it. But it was actually, it was the antithesis 366 00:25:13,541 --> 00:25:19,256 of it. They were all fundamental commodity traders. So, 367 00:25:19,256 --> 00:25:26,241 there were people who would make markets in fixed price natural 368 00:25:26,241 --> 00:25:31,956 gas futures contracts or forward contracts like somebody like 369 00:25:31,956 --> 00:25:39,576 John Arnold or Pierre Andurand etc. And it was actually to play 370 00:25:39,576 --> 00:25:42,116 against the CTA space. So, I guess what I would say is I'm delighted 371 00:24:55,911 --> 00:25:03,711 to have a conversation with you. I’m a little bit familiar with 372 00:25:03,711 --> 00:25:11,511 some of the funds I think you're referring to, but please reach 373 00:25:11,511 --> 00:25:19,311 out to me over LinkedIn and I'll tell you everything I know, 374 00:25:19,311 --> 00:25:25,161 which may be wildly disappointing given the nature of 375 00:25:25,161 --> 00:25:33,611 your questions, but maybe I can at least give you some of the 376 00:25:33,611 --> 00:25:40,761 historical background as I see it, because that business has changed 377 00:25:40,761 --> 00:25:42,061 a lot. 378 00:25:43,181 --> 00:25:46,231 That's an interesting career. First, you start by being against 379 00:25:46,231 --> 00:25:49,586 the CTAs and now you're with the CTA. There we are. 380 00:25:49,671 --> 00:26:03,080 Well, because a lot of those markets were thinly traded enough. 381 00:26:03,080 --> 00:26:16,489 And again, what I liked about it is the information asymmetries 382 00:26:16,489 --> 00:26:32,336 in those markets were huge. And, I mean, a friend of mine ran 383 00:26:32,336 --> 00:26:43,307 Calpine's natural gas trading business. Well, you're running a 384 00:26:43,307 --> 00:26:56,716 natural gas trading business and the company you work for happens 385 00:26:56,716 --> 00:27:12,563 to own a lot of the combined cycle natural power plants in the 386 00:27:12,563 --> 00:27:13,782 country. It gives you a kind of good insight into supply and demand 387 00:26:05,691 --> 00:26:21,711 that goes well beyond. And also there are a lot of asymmetrical… 388 00:26:21,711 --> 00:26:33,726 because you have the relationship to the physical economy, 389 00:26:33,726 --> 00:26:45,741 there are a lot of asymmetrical relationships. So, you 390 00:26:45,741 --> 00:27:00,426 move from hydropower to coal, there's a step function in cost. 391 00:27:00,426 --> 00:27:13,776 Then you go to natural gas, there's another step function. Standard 392 00:25:50,464 --> 00:25:58,394 options price, in theory, doesn't work well when you don't 393 00:25:58,394 --> 00:26:07,910 have normal distributions. So, a lot of the business back in the… 394 00:26:07,910 --> 00:26:18,219 it was really taking what Enron tried to do in the 1990s. And 395 00:26:18,219 --> 00:26:26,942 then, really, after Enron and Dynegy and all the merchant power 396 00:26:26,942 --> 00:26:33,286 companies collapsed to reconstitute those in hedge funds. 397 00:26:33,286 --> 00:26:42,802 Again, so, what we were focused on as a business was very 398 00:26:42,802 --> 00:26:52,318 different than CTAs in that it was much more about market structure. 399 00:26:52,318 --> 00:27:03,420 But again, please give me a call and I'll tell you all I know. 400 00:27:03,420 --> 00:27:13,729 I'll give you my two cents and you may be overpaying for it. 401 00:27:14,621 --> 00:27:23,322 I think this is what we would, historically, have classified as 402 00:27:23,322 --> 00:27:32,023 commodity enhanced beta in our cap intro world. And it's really 403 00:27:32,023 --> 00:27:41,515 a response to a lot of interest in commodities and the super 404 00:27:41,515 --> 00:27:51,798 cycle of commodities. But if you think back for a long time, just 405 00:27:51,798 --> 00:28:01,290 being long commodities was a very difficult thing to do. It was 406 00:28:01,290 --> 00:28:09,200 not profitable. Yet portfolio theory tells you these are great 407 00:28:09,200 --> 00:28:17,110 diversifiers and this is something that you should own during 408 00:28:17,110 --> 00:28:17,901 inflation. So these products are really a response to that. Trying 409 00:27:22,151 --> 00:27:29,681 to merge together and blend strategies which, I imagine, are 410 00:27:29,681 --> 00:27:37,964 probably some things like some trend, some carry, some curve structure, 411 00:27:37,964 --> 00:27:47,753 sort of rolling down the curve to try and mitigate the roll cost 412 00:27:47,753 --> 00:27:56,789 of basically having to be long commodities all the time. So, you 413 00:27:56,789 --> 00:28:02,813 do get that profile, hopefully, of inflation proofing 414 00:28:02,813 --> 00:28:11,096 with some sort of performance that can basically keep you alive 415 00:28:11,096 --> 00:28:17,873 for when the portfolio needs to have this protection. 416 00:28:20,491 --> 00:28:24,872 Point. If you look at the… we have this great chart of drawdowns 417 00:28:24,872 --> 00:28:27,905 across asset classes. The drawdowns in commodities, over the 418 00:28:27,905 --> 00:28:31,949 past 25 years, is 80%. Okay, like 80%. That's why there's this 419 00:28:31,949 --> 00:28:34,645 expression about, in commodities, you take the escalator 420 00:28:34,645 --> 00:28:38,689 up and the elevator down. So, I think people have always viewed 421 00:28:38,689 --> 00:28:42,059 commodities as… I mean, you think people worry about drawdowns 422 00:28:42,059 --> 00:28:46,777 in CTAs, and our max drawdown is sub 20% over 25 years across the 423 00:28:46,777 --> 00:28:50,484 space. I mean, you were talking about very, very, very different 424 00:28:50,484 --> 00:28:54,191 kinds of outcomes, which is why it's always been relegated usually 425 00:28:54,191 --> 00:28:56,887 to a very small percentage of people's portfolios. 426 00:28:57,371 --> 00:29:17,411 Yeah. And the funny part about that statistic, Andrew, is that people 427 00:29:17,411 --> 00:29:39,121 still think of what we do as highly risky, that's the funny part. 428 00:28:57,371 --> 00:29:04,895 Anyways, speaking of highly risky, you both brought up, or maybe 429 00:29:04,895 --> 00:29:13,787 I don't know if you both brought up, one of you brought up 430 00:29:13,787 --> 00:29:21,311 before the other, but kind of agree that that's an interesting 431 00:29:21,311 --> 00:29:30,203 place to start. It’s also a topic that we touched on last week 432 00:29:30,203 --> 00:29:37,727 and that is the Situational Awareness situation, if I can call 433 00:29:37,727 --> 00:29:39,095 it that. Andrew, I think maybe it was you who brought it up and 434 00:29:15,923 --> 00:29:32,929 maybe it relates to… Yeah, well, anyway, what does it relate 435 00:29:32,929 --> 00:29:39,113 to, in your view? 436 00:29:40,161 --> 00:29:45,465 Well, I think we always have these, at any point in these markets, 437 00:29:45,465 --> 00:29:50,361 you have kind of the prototype or the poster child or something. 438 00:29:50,361 --> 00:29:55,665 And here's a fund that, again, it's like an AI company. It's gone 439 00:29:55,665 --> 00:30:00,561 from zero, basically a few years ago, to being a US$20 billion 440 00:30:00,561 --> 00:30:00,969 fund… 441 00:30:00,971 --> 00:30:03,770 US$45 billion actually… 442 00:30:05,771 --> 00:30:18,550 So, zero to US$45 billion, it's a humbling number in a few years. 443 00:30:18,550 --> 00:30:33,295 I think it does point back to the fear of CTAs. I mean, the fear 444 00:30:33,295 --> 00:30:47,057 of CTAs is if there's a major whipsaw on the market and we all 445 00:30:47,057 --> 00:31:00,819 lose 5% in a week. I mean, it is so disconnected with how other 446 00:31:00,819 --> 00:31:11,632 markets move in terms of the magnitude of what they move. So, 447 00:30:06,281 --> 00:30:10,871 here's somebody who is basically doing venture capital investing 448 00:30:10,871 --> 00:30:16,481 would look like 4 to 1 leverage, or something like that. 449 00:30:16,481 --> 00:30:22,091 And it worked spectacularly well until it didn't. But I think 450 00:30:22,091 --> 00:30:28,211 it points out, and I think this is something Tom can provide 451 00:30:28,211 --> 00:30:33,821 a lot of insight on, is the difference between borrowing money 452 00:30:33,821 --> 00:30:39,431 from somebody who is looking over your shoulder, making sure you 453 00:30:39,431 --> 00:30:45,551 have enough money to pay it back, and the instruments that you 454 00:30:45,551 --> 00:30:51,161 have supporting as collateral, where they can kind of force you 455 00:30:51,161 --> 00:30:57,281 to unwind it (which is what happens in this case), versus trading 456 00:30:57,281 --> 00:31:01,871 liquid futures contracts where, yes, you may have notional 457 00:31:01,871 --> 00:31:07,991 leverage exposure, but again, I'm not aware of a CTA in history 458 00:31:07,991 --> 00:31:11,561 going through what Situational Awareness went through. 459 00:31:14,061 --> 00:31:28,582 So, before Tom jumps in, let me provide a little bit of context 460 00:31:28,582 --> 00:31:43,103 to that. First of all, by the way, I mean, you've had phenomenal 461 00:31:43,103 --> 00:31:57,624 asset growth, even though this guy seems to have had the accel growth 462 00:31:57,624 --> 00:32:09,911 of a Chinese magnetic train, that's for sure. But you mentioned 463 00:32:09,911 --> 00:32:15,496 this thing about the leverage. And actually, one of my very first 464 00:31:18,541 --> 00:31:27,501 guests on the podcast, not the first one, but one of the very first, 465 00:31:27,501 --> 00:31:35,181 had long track record and actually a really good one. And then 466 00:31:35,181 --> 00:31:44,141 I think they launched a five to one version of it, or three to 467 00:31:44,141 --> 00:31:53,741 one, or four to one, or five to one. And that fund ended up going 468 00:31:53,741 --> 00:32:00,141 down something like 90%. Which, for the normal leverage it's 469 00:32:00,141 --> 00:32:06,541 just a 20% drawdown. Right? Completely normal. But that's what 470 00:32:06,541 --> 00:32:14,221 leverage does. Right? And I think they ended up closing the business 471 00:32:14,221 --> 00:32:15,501 following that. So, yeah. But Tom, you probably see much more of 472 00:32:09,931 --> 00:32:15,518 these. 473 00:32:15,521 --> 00:32:38,511 Well, I think Andrew's correct. CTAs, when you look at the 474 00:32:38,511 --> 00:33:05,681 notional exposures that can be taken, there is a sort of a misunderstanding 475 00:33:05,681 --> 00:33:24,491 or a mistranslation of leverage from equities into listed 476 00:33:24,491 --> 00:33:41,211 derivatives because listed derivatives have an inherent leverage 477 00:33:41,211 --> 00:34:06,291 from futures margin. But the CTAs that we work with, these are 478 00:34:06,291 --> 00:34:31,371 groups that are sort of experts in this field and it's something 479 00:34:31,371 --> 00:34:54,361 which they do very actively and, ultimately, they are a hedge 480 00:34:54,361 --> 00:35:08,991 fund, they are trying to hedge risk. So, I think what was going 481 00:32:22,457 --> 00:32:34,017 on with Situational Awareness is sort of maybe an irresponsible 482 00:32:34,017 --> 00:32:46,733 use of leverage, but they definitely knew what they were doing. 483 00:32:46,733 --> 00:33:01,761 An investor in that fund must have known that this was the risk 484 00:33:01,761 --> 00:33:14,477 that was being taken with the portfolio - very concentrated with 485 00:33:14,477 --> 00:33:28,349 leverage. But what goes on in the CTA space in this derivatives 486 00:33:28,349 --> 00:33:43,377 is you've got an ability to size risk according to how an investor 487 00:33:43,377 --> 00:33:57,249 wants it and then the very careful control of that risk and 488 00:33:57,249 --> 00:34:12,277 the ability to exit that risk whenever they want. And I think this 489 00:34:12,277 --> 00:34:26,149 kind of feeds into the use of managed accounts, which is becoming 490 00:34:26,149 --> 00:34:38,865 a big theme across the entire industry, that investors are increasingly 491 00:34:38,865 --> 00:34:53,893 looking at ways to be much more efficient in the way they access 492 00:34:53,893 --> 00:35:06,609 markets and much more efficient in the way that they deploy 493 00:35:06,609 --> 00:35:08,921 their capital. So, the SBAI have written a really interesting 494 00:32:27,801 --> 00:32:44,686 guide, I think last week, a guide to separately managed accounts. 495 00:32:44,686 --> 00:33:04,641 And they lay out the sort of the reasons why groups are doing 496 00:33:04,641 --> 00:33:21,526 it and they lay out the advantages and disadvantages of each 497 00:33:21,526 --> 00:33:38,411 of the sort of perceived benefits. So, you've got this kind 498 00:33:38,411 --> 00:33:52,226 of notional funding and capital efficiency of only having 499 00:33:52,226 --> 00:34:10,646 to pay margin. You've got the ability to cross margin across different 500 00:34:10,646 --> 00:34:25,996 instruments, and for multi managers you've gone and got the 501 00:34:25,996 --> 00:34:42,881 even more increased efficiency of being able to cross margin across 502 00:34:42,881 --> 00:35:01,301 allocations at the top level. And then you've got all these liquidity, 503 00:35:01,301 --> 00:35:08,976 transparency, customization and control benefits. So, it really 504 00:32:20,384 --> 00:32:41,457 does seem that the trend of the SMA usage is going to continue 505 00:32:41,457 --> 00:32:59,288 growing and I think more and more investor types are continuing 506 00:32:59,288 --> 00:33:20,361 to explore it on a spectrum of kind of how direct and dedicated 507 00:33:20,361 --> 00:33:41,434 they are. So, you kind of start with this idea of managed account 508 00:33:41,434 --> 00:34:02,507 platforms doing a lot of the heavy lifting for you, and then you 509 00:34:02,507 --> 00:34:18,717 move along the spectrum to more dedicated vehicles and more 510 00:34:18,717 --> 00:34:36,548 dedicated platforms, to then going all the way to building your 511 00:34:36,548 --> 00:34:51,137 own platform or basically doing direct managed accounts yourself, 512 00:34:51,137 --> 00:35:08,968 which can be a heavy lift but has all those benefits. 513 00:35:10,500 --> 00:35:25,317 So, let me just try and intersect something and then, or 514 00:35:25,317 --> 00:35:40,134 inject something, and then love to hear your thoughts on this. 515 00:35:40,134 --> 00:35:57,645 So, one of the things that came to mind was… Well, first of 516 00:35:57,645 --> 00:36:13,809 all last week we touched briefly… So, when I spoke with Harry 517 00:36:13,809 --> 00:36:29,973 Moore from AHL, we touched briefly on a paper that went back 518 00:36:29,973 --> 00:36:48,831 to look at the math of the Turtles. But I will say this obviously 519 00:36:48,831 --> 00:37:04,995 goes back to even before the Turtles to really the pioneers of 520 00:37:04,995 --> 00:37:19,812 trend following. Because what I think people feel that they brought 521 00:37:19,812 --> 00:37:40,017 to the table was this idea of the benefit of buying a 100 day breakout, 522 00:37:40,017 --> 00:37:49,446 or the 150 day breakout, or whatever. But actually, what the 523 00:35:16,732 --> 00:35:32,312 paper suggests, from memory, and what I completely agree with, 524 00:35:32,312 --> 00:35:51,008 if indeed it does suggest it, is that actually it was probably 525 00:35:51,008 --> 00:36:08,146 much more about the risk management that they brought to the 526 00:36:08,146 --> 00:36:26,842 table. Not so much whether it's a 100 day breakout, or it's 527 00:36:26,842 --> 00:36:47,096 a vol breakout, or whatever, but it's the way they we manage risk 528 00:36:47,096 --> 00:37:07,350 is really why this industry is still around. And to your point earlier, 529 00:37:07,350 --> 00:37:29,162 we have seen very few blow ups unless you deliberately do a 5x version 530 00:37:29,162 --> 00:37:47,858 of your strategy, then you're probably going to blow up at some 531 00:37:47,858 --> 00:37:49,416 point. But my question, and I want to hear both of your opinions 532 00:35:43,380 --> 00:36:16,260 is that we're now bringing back SMAs is coming back into vogue, 533 00:36:16,260 --> 00:36:49,140 it seems like, from what Tom is saying. They've been there in 534 00:36:49,140 --> 00:37:16,540 the beginning of this industry, then it became more funds, 535 00:37:16,540 --> 00:37:49,420 and UCITS, and easy for investors to invest in and all that. 536 00:35:10,500 --> 00:35:32,424 Then we, on top of that, then we talk about capital efficiency 537 00:35:32,424 --> 00:35:56,175 and we see a lot of growth in the portable alpha strategies where 538 00:35:56,175 --> 00:36:16,272 we add “leverage”. And even though I've been asking the guests 539 00:36:16,272 --> 00:36:40,023 recently about why is it okay to add further leverage when it comes 540 00:36:40,023 --> 00:37:03,774 to these type products? And of course it's to do with the convexity 541 00:37:03,774 --> 00:37:27,525 of the things you combine and stuff like that. But still I wonder 542 00:37:27,525 --> 00:37:42,141 sometimes when we over-engineer things they don't necessarily 543 00:37:42,141 --> 00:37:49,449 become better with time. And I was just wondering whether there 544 00:35:22,463 --> 00:35:48,098 is a risk, a little bit to our industry, that we are trying to become 545 00:35:48,098 --> 00:36:06,897 too clever, we're trying to design too clever solutions, so to 546 00:36:06,897 --> 00:36:25,696 speak, to all sorts of problems instead of just saying this 547 00:36:25,696 --> 00:36:51,331 is what we're good at, we know how to find trends, we know how to 548 00:36:51,331 --> 00:37:13,548 follow trends or whatever it may be. But let's not get too clever 549 00:37:13,548 --> 00:37:32,347 about how we maximize the efficiency of the capital and do 550 00:37:32,347 --> 00:37:49,437 this, that and the other on top. Any thoughts here? 551 00:37:50,261 --> 00:38:31,783 Well, a point that I've been saying again and again, on this podcast, 552 00:38:31,783 --> 00:39:06,917 that relates to ETFs versus hedge funds and everything else is 553 00:39:06,917 --> 00:39:32,469 there's enormous heterogeneity of preference functions among investors. 554 00:39:32,469 --> 00:39:58,021 Capital efficiency is extremely important to certain investors. 555 00:39:58,021 --> 00:40:33,155 The ability to play a role in customizing something. There are 556 00:40:33,155 --> 00:40:39,543 vehicle preferences. I mean certain investors, if we talked about 557 00:38:16,821 --> 00:38:59,981 it, they have a hedge fund bucket and they're going to add CTAs 558 00:38:59,981 --> 00:39:49,781 or trend to it, it's going to be in a hedge fund. It doesn't matter. 559 00:39:49,781 --> 00:40:32,941 So, in our world we're trying to find people who have vehicle preferences 560 00:40:32,941 --> 00:40:39,581 for ETFs. So, I mean, I broadly agree with the over engineering 561 00:38:15,161 --> 00:38:50,021 point. I mean, you look at an industry for 25 years, that has had 562 00:38:50,021 --> 00:39:17,411 a lot of incredibly smart people working on more, and more, 563 00:39:17,411 --> 00:39:44,801 and more engineering and more, and more instruments and the Sharpe 564 00:39:44,801 --> 00:40:12,191 ratio hasn't budged. But I think there's two things, one is 565 00:40:12,191 --> 00:40:39,581 an investment decision, the other is a vehicle and delivery decision. 566 00:37:50,261 --> 00:38:22,811 As you know, I mean our view is we don't need a lot of versions 567 00:38:22,811 --> 00:38:53,191 of what we do and it's not very efficient for us to spend a 568 00:38:53,191 --> 00:39:19,231 lot of time trying to think about customizing it. But on the 569 00:39:19,231 --> 00:39:43,101 other hand, if we can create different vehicles that help people 570 00:39:43,101 --> 00:39:56,121 because somebody's particularly price sensitive, well, 571 00:39:56,121 --> 00:40:17,821 let's come up with very low-cost products. If somebody needs 572 00:40:17,821 --> 00:40:37,351 UCITS funds, if somebody doesn't want commodities in their 573 00:40:37,351 --> 00:40:39,521 portfolios. There are things that we can do at the margin to potentially 574 00:38:39,809 --> 00:39:29,357 expand the pool of investors. And I think the managed account is 575 00:39:29,357 --> 00:40:10,647 just that. I think you have institutions that are fundamentally 576 00:40:10,647 --> 00:40:39,550 changing how they think about hedge funds. And look, I'm of the 577 00:37:58,171 --> 00:38:15,573 view that it was almost a historical accident that CTAs ended 578 00:38:15,573 --> 00:38:36,139 up in a hedge fund vehicle in the first place. They weren't before 579 00:38:36,139 --> 00:38:53,541 that. Before the early 2000s, it was a managed account business. 580 00:38:53,541 --> 00:39:14,107 It was a managed account business, I mean, in the US at least, 581 00:39:14,107 --> 00:39:29,927 it was high net worth investors were setting up futures 582 00:39:29,927 --> 00:39:47,329 accounts at places like Dean Witter and getting exposure to John 583 00:39:47,329 --> 00:40:06,313 Henry and Campbell and other things like that with a great deal 584 00:40:06,313 --> 00:40:25,297 of leverage and swinging for the fences. Then it kind of became 585 00:40:25,297 --> 00:40:39,535 this institutional asset class with a hedge fund vehicle. And I 586 00:37:55,551 --> 00:38:27,291 think over the past 15 years, we've seen mutual funds like AQR 587 00:38:27,291 --> 00:38:53,741 and Alpha Simplex and everybody else has kind of launched 588 00:38:53,741 --> 00:39:25,481 mutual funds that give you the same kind of exposure without the 589 00:39:25,481 --> 00:39:49,286 illiquidity and other constraints. You’re now see it in 590 00:39:49,286 --> 00:40:23,671 UCITS land, you're seeing it in the QIS world, and you see it 591 00:40:23,671 --> 00:40:39,541 in managed accounts and now ETFs. So, I think it's just part 592 00:38:27,887 --> 00:39:30,597 of the natural evolution. Making the structure work, to me, 593 00:39:30,597 --> 00:40:33,307 is just very different from the over-engineering on the investment 594 00:40:33,307 --> 00:40:39,578 side. 595 00:40:40,541 --> 00:40:41,661 Any thoughts, Tom? 596 00:40:42,461 --> 00:41:01,744 Well, I don't think it comes down to over-engineering. I think 597 00:41:01,744 --> 00:41:22,780 it's if you go down the philosophical route of we want to 598 00:41:22,780 --> 00:41:43,816 be able to capture trends in as many different places and opportunities 599 00:41:43,816 --> 00:42:06,605 as possible, you need to be adding markets and you need to be 600 00:42:06,605 --> 00:42:18,876 thinking, how can we do that efficiently? So, I think the use 601 00:40:56,236 --> 00:41:21,031 of leverage through futures and through instruments like futures 602 00:41:21,031 --> 00:41:51,336 is going to be something that continues and thinking about how 603 00:41:51,336 --> 00:42:18,886 investors fund their investments is going to be more important. 604 00:40:42,461 --> 00:41:04,709 One of the things that falls out of using managed accounts is 605 00:41:04,709 --> 00:41:26,957 almost that you can get your CTA or your managed account allocation, 606 00:41:26,957 --> 00:41:47,351 sometimes, for “free”, without a capital cost. And this is kind 607 00:41:47,351 --> 00:42:09,599 of why portable alpha is so thematic at the moment, because it 608 00:42:09,599 --> 00:42:18,869 goes hand-in-hand with managed accounts. If an investor has US$100, 609 00:40:46,691 --> 00:40:55,997 and they're thinking where they want to allocate it, as Andrew 610 00:40:55,997 --> 00:41:05,303 says correctly, you've got this sort of equity FOMO. So, they 611 00:41:05,303 --> 00:41:14,609 want to have as much equity risk as possible. Now, historically 612 00:41:14,609 --> 00:41:26,453 you had to take dollars away from that to invest in a fund. But 613 00:41:26,453 --> 00:41:36,605 what you can do now, with portable alpha, is very easily and 614 00:41:36,605 --> 00:41:43,373 efficiently overlay your diversifiers, your alphas over the 615 00:41:43,373 --> 00:41:51,833 US$100 of equities with the additional kind of US$20, US$30, 616 00:41:51,833 --> 00:42:01,139 US$50 worth of other things like CTAs. And that isn't something 617 00:42:01,139 --> 00:42:12,137 that you have to go and borrow money to do. It's something that 618 00:42:12,137 --> 00:42:18,905 you can do very easily via listed derivatives. 619 00:42:19,151 --> 00:42:23,015 I completely agree with that. But it's also interesting to me that 620 00:42:23,015 --> 00:42:27,201 it's now in the last two or three years we're talking much more 621 00:42:27,201 --> 00:42:31,387 about it. I mean this is a concept that's been around for 30 622 00:42:31,387 --> 00:42:34,929 years and so, why now? Anyways, let's stay with your world 623 00:42:34,929 --> 00:42:38,793 a little bit for longer, Tom. You mentioned in your note something 624 00:42:38,793 --> 00:42:42,013 about that you see a bifurcation occurring in the CTA 625 00:42:42,013 --> 00:42:45,555 world. Do you want to talk a little bit about that? 626 00:42:46,200 --> 00:43:09,190 Yeah. It's something that we have really been looking at, how 627 00:43:09,190 --> 00:43:36,360 we classify CTAs. So, for a long time our broad SG CTA index 628 00:43:36,360 --> 00:43:57,260 has included all CTA strategies by which we mean systematic 629 00:43:57,260 --> 00:44:18,160 managed futures. So, this is strategies which have the predominant 630 00:44:18,160 --> 00:44:43,240 P&L drivers coming from active futures and FX trading. And an obvious 631 00:44:43,240 --> 00:45:08,320 kind of component of that is trend following. But it's not the 632 00:45:08,320 --> 00:45:29,220 only strategy that exists within CTAs. And something that we've 633 00:45:29,220 --> 00:45:56,390 been very actively looking at is how we classify CTAs to make it 634 00:45:56,390 --> 00:46:11,020 easier for investors to understand these strategies. So, 635 00:42:48,188 --> 00:43:12,044 we've really split the CTA world now, in our systems, and how 636 00:43:12,044 --> 00:43:39,876 we think of CTA as CTA trend (which I think most people are pretty 637 00:43:39,876 --> 00:44:03,732 familiar with), and then CTA non-trend. And I think this is a 638 00:44:03,732 --> 00:44:23,612 period, now, where we're starting to see investors maybe starting 639 00:44:23,612 --> 00:44:49,456 to understand that a bit more. I mean, trend is a very accepted 640 00:44:49,456 --> 00:45:13,312 and understood term. It’s kind of a term which is thrown around 641 00:45:13,312 --> 00:45:33,192 hand-in-hand with managed futures and CTAs. But I think we've 642 00:45:33,192 --> 00:46:03,012 got to a point where a lot of investors will have CTAs as a core 643 00:46:03,012 --> 00:46:10,964 part of their portfolio. Now it's maybe not as big a core part 644 00:43:11,112 --> 00:43:44,328 as Andrew would like and I think when we think about modern 645 00:43:44,328 --> 00:44:09,240 portfolio theory and thinking about an efficient portfolio, the 646 00:44:09,240 --> 00:44:36,920 allocation to non-equity things like CTAs should be a lot 647 00:44:36,920 --> 00:45:07,368 higher than it ever is. But trend is increasingly dominated by 648 00:45:07,368 --> 00:45:32,280 large established CTA groups. These groups are typically multibillion 649 00:45:32,280 --> 00:46:02,728 blue chip hedge fund managers and it's very difficult to break 650 00:46:02,728 --> 00:46:11,032 into that market. Successful new entrants really have to disrupt 651 00:43:09,328 --> 00:43:42,368 and typically that is around something like being a commodities 652 00:43:42,368 --> 00:44:12,104 specialist or operating in alternative markets which I know 653 00:44:12,104 --> 00:44:58,360 we're going to talk about a bit later. So, trend is kind of fairly 654 00:44:58,360 --> 00:45:31,400 vanilla but non-trend is really a lot less uniform. There 655 00:45:31,400 --> 00:46:07,744 isn't any definition of what non-trend is, it's just not trend 656 00:46:07,744 --> 00:46:11,048 following. Short term CTAs have always been and continue to 657 00:43:12,534 --> 00:43:47,646 be a really challenging space. We've had this year, we've had Quest 658 00:43:47,646 --> 00:44:16,906 returning capital, and only really, if you think long-term, of 659 00:44:16,906 --> 00:44:49,092 a billion dollar group, as Crabel, as a group that's managed 660 00:44:49,092 --> 00:45:21,278 to survive outside of the shorter-term space. I think the non-trend 661 00:45:21,278 --> 00:45:53,464 CTAs are becoming increasingly niche or starting to blur the lines 662 00:45:53,464 --> 00:46:11,020 with kind of quant multi strats. So, that's groups that deploy 663 00:42:57,455 --> 00:43:15,463 capital across multiple strategies with one centralized research 664 00:43:15,463 --> 00:43:35,722 function across all asset classes, maybe including single stock 665 00:43:35,722 --> 00:44:00,483 equities. And I think this loops back to SMAs because there's 666 00:44:00,483 --> 00:44:18,491 an increasing number of specialist managed account investors 667 00:44:18,491 --> 00:44:43,252 who are very happy allocating to high Sharpe, low capacity strategies. 668 00:44:43,252 --> 00:45:10,264 I'm thinking of groups like multi strats, or the new kind of 669 00:45:10,264 --> 00:45:30,523 evolution of fund-to-fund groups, where they have the expertise 670 00:45:30,523 --> 00:45:53,033 and knowledge to access these strategies and they're really interested 671 00:45:53,033 --> 00:46:11,041 in something that adds diversification to their portfolio. 672 00:46:11,941 --> 00:46:16,669 Can you break down when you talk about non-trend, I mean, what 673 00:46:16,669 --> 00:46:21,397 do you think about? Can you describe like three or four classic 674 00:46:21,397 --> 00:46:25,337 examples of trades, in very, very concrete terms, that you're 675 00:46:25,337 --> 00:46:26,125 referring to? 676 00:46:26,141 --> 00:46:29,562 So, we would probably class, of the three obvious groups that 677 00:46:29,562 --> 00:46:33,294 stand out is short-term. So, this is, as a trend follower, typically 678 00:46:33,294 --> 00:46:37,337 looking in sort of weeks to months if not longer. And so, we 679 00:46:37,337 --> 00:46:39,825 classify short-term as anything with an average holding 680 00:46:39,825 --> 00:46:42,624 period of two weeks or ten days and less. 681 00:46:43,701 --> 00:46:45,621 But it's trend. 682 00:46:45,621 --> 00:47:08,556 It can be, it can be. I think trend or breakout forms a part of 683 00:47:08,556 --> 00:47:28,433 that. But then there's a whole lot of other stuff going on. And 684 00:47:28,433 --> 00:47:45,252 what we have typically seen is that it's really parameter dependent. 685 00:47:45,252 --> 00:48:06,658 So, as soon as you change a parameter by a tiny amount it completely 686 00:48:06,658 --> 00:48:18,890 changes the way that the portfolio comes out. So, you've got 687 00:46:49,992 --> 00:47:06,019 short-term. I think we have then more kind of fundamentally driven 688 00:47:06,019 --> 00:47:19,132 or what we might call systematic or quantitative macro 689 00:47:19,132 --> 00:47:39,530 is a classic kind of area of focus as well in the non-trend space. 690 00:47:39,530 --> 00:47:52,643 So, these are groups where they're digesting more fundamental 691 00:47:52,643 --> 00:48:05,756 forward-looking market data versus a trend follower which is 692 00:48:05,756 --> 00:48:17,412 maybe looking at more historical technical price based 693 00:48:17,412 --> 00:48:18,869 data. That for me was an area that was obviously going to grow 694 00:47:01,161 --> 00:47:12,816 five, ten years ago, but surprisingly didn't. It's actually 695 00:47:12,816 --> 00:47:30,946 been an area where we've seen a lot of groups go out of business. 696 00:47:30,946 --> 00:47:45,191 So, I was expecting trend following to be a reducing strategy 697 00:47:45,191 --> 00:48:03,321 and quant macro to be a much more obvious area of growth for many 698 00:48:03,321 --> 00:48:18,861 years. Happy that I was not happy that it's been proven wrong. 699 00:46:45,621 --> 00:47:07,918 And then, I suppose, the third obvious group is then commodities. 700 00:47:07,918 --> 00:47:30,215 So, a quantitative group, maybe relating to some of the ETFs 701 00:47:30,215 --> 00:47:52,512 that we spoke about earlier, where they are taking advantage of 702 00:47:52,512 --> 00:48:12,782 a lot of factors across commodity markets, maybe that directional 703 00:48:12,782 --> 00:48:18,863 or relative value. 704 00:48:21,091 --> 00:48:29,220 I couldn't help noticing that you, in your description… I think 705 00:48:29,220 --> 00:48:38,088 the description is correct in terms of what the narrative is like 706 00:48:38,088 --> 00:48:46,956 where you say, yeah, trend is becoming plain vanilla. And I'm thinking, 707 00:48:46,956 --> 00:48:56,563 I think there's a lot more that goes into being a trend follower 708 00:48:56,563 --> 00:49:03,953 than plain vanilla. And, actually, the risk, the reason why 709 00:49:03,953 --> 00:49:12,821 I want to highlight it and kind of resist that narrative is 710 00:49:12,821 --> 00:49:23,167 I feel that there is a risk that people will get to the point 711 00:49:23,167 --> 00:49:32,774 where they say, well, trend, it's all the same, I just need one. 712 00:49:32,774 --> 00:49:41,642 Or it doesn't matter who I pick, I'll just pick the biggest 713 00:49:41,642 --> 00:49:51,249 or something like. And I think that's just so far away from the 714 00:49:51,249 --> 00:49:51,988 truth. And I just see a little bit of a risk once we start describing 715 00:48:31,199 --> 00:48:39,141 trend as something that is plain vanilla. Even though, of course, 716 00:48:39,141 --> 00:48:46,361 they're also for competitive reasons, people who would like it 717 00:48:46,361 --> 00:48:54,303 to sound like it's plain vanilla. And then they say… There 718 00:48:54,303 --> 00:49:02,967 was, I think they're still in business actually, so I don't want 719 00:49:02,967 --> 00:49:12,353 to necessarily mention them by name, but there was a firm, a few 720 00:49:12,353 --> 00:49:21,017 years ago, that came out saying, oh, we can do this trend 721 00:49:21,017 --> 00:49:29,681 stuff for 50 basis points. And they raised billions of dollars very 722 00:49:29,681 --> 00:49:38,345 quickly. And then it all went the other way. And that program, 723 00:49:38,345 --> 00:49:46,287 probably, if it still exists, it's very, very small today. So, 724 00:49:46,287 --> 00:49:52,063 I think there is a risk about that. 725 00:49:52,081 --> 00:49:58,204 So, maybe I should restate - maybe not plain vanilla. But I think 726 00:49:58,204 --> 00:50:02,443 the concept of trend following, as a portfolio element, 727 00:50:02,443 --> 00:50:08,095 is now more broadly accepted than it was maybe 10 years ago. 728 00:50:08,201 --> 00:50:16,841 Sure, that's absolutely fine. It's just that I think, actually, 729 00:50:16,841 --> 00:50:27,209 also you're right in the sense that people may think about trend 730 00:50:27,209 --> 00:50:34,121 as something that's really simple and plain vanilla. But anyways, 731 00:50:09,379 --> 00:50:16,447 I think the next topics that you brought along, Andrew, kind of 732 00:50:16,447 --> 00:50:23,515 touches on some of the stuff we've already talked about. I'd love 733 00:50:23,515 --> 00:50:31,172 to dig into that. So, why don't you kick off with the non-crisis 734 00:50:31,172 --> 00:50:34,117 or all weather alpha type. 735 00:50:35,321 --> 00:51:15,125 Well, look, I think, to pick up the discussion, I don't think 736 00:51:15,125 --> 00:51:54,929 that the drivers and returns of CTAs are that complicated at the 737 00:51:54,929 --> 00:52:41,367 end of the day, from my seat. When you sit down with a serious 738 00:52:41,367 --> 00:53:14,537 hedge fund manager, and you're talking about an investment idea, 739 00:53:14,537 --> 00:53:51,024 it's not just whether you think something is cheap, or interesting, 740 00:53:51,024 --> 00:54:34,145 or going to grow, there are a million smart people out there. Why 741 00:54:34,145 --> 00:54:50,730 aren't they capitalizing on it? There's this running joke about 742 00:50:41,971 --> 00:50:59,261 two economists who are walking down the street and one of them sees 743 00:50:59,261 --> 00:51:16,551 US$100 bill and goes to pick it up. And he says, don't bother. 744 00:51:16,551 --> 00:51:31,181 If it was there, somebody would have picked it up already. 745 00:51:31,181 --> 00:51:45,811 Right? And so, there's this kind of assumption that the best 746 00:51:45,811 --> 00:51:57,781 opportunities are because somebody has handcuffs from an investment 747 00:51:57,781 --> 00:52:12,411 perspective where even though they're smart and they met at the 748 00:52:12,411 --> 00:52:28,371 area, they somehow are not able to capitalize on it. And so, 749 00:52:28,371 --> 00:52:43,001 my conclusion about trend following (and I hate the term because 750 00:52:43,001 --> 00:53:01,621 I don't think it's about being late into a trend. I think it's about 751 00:53:01,621 --> 00:53:20,241 being very early into a trend when the signs of a trend begin to 752 00:53:20,241 --> 00:53:34,871 emerge), I think it's because the reality is that most investors 753 00:53:34,871 --> 00:53:52,161 (I mean, we're in this talking about a tiny, tiny, tiny, tiny subset 754 00:53:52,161 --> 00:54:08,121 of the overall investment world), you go out and you talk to 755 00:54:08,121 --> 00:54:21,421 somebody who's running a sovereign wealth fund, or a wealth 756 00:54:21,421 --> 00:54:30,731 management portfolio, or putting together asset allocation 757 00:54:30,731 --> 00:54:41,371 recommendations at an investment bank, the portfolios don't 758 00:54:41,371 --> 00:54:50,681 move. I mean, they just don't move. And so, thematically, most 759 00:50:47,781 --> 00:51:28,276 investors, although you get a lot of noise (it's a little bit like 760 00:51:28,276 --> 00:52:05,656 politics where the loudest and most active people kind of get the 761 00:52:05,656 --> 00:52:36,806 most attention), yes, of course, the 2x leverage, this, the 762 00:52:36,806 --> 00:53:17,301 3x leverage Nvidia fund that's going up or down, that gets all the 763 00:53:17,301 --> 00:53:54,681 attention. It's still a tiny, tiny, tiny, tiny portion of the overall 764 00:53:54,681 --> 00:54:22,716 universe. The overall universe are things like 60/40 portfolios 765 00:54:22,716 --> 00:54:50,751 that don't change or change minimally year to year. And so, I 766 00:50:50,057 --> 00:51:44,089 think what this space brings, and why it's an all-weather solution, 767 00:51:44,089 --> 00:52:33,209 is that there are always things that are changing outside 768 00:52:33,209 --> 00:53:22,329 the range of expectations of those big model portfolios, those 769 00:53:22,329 --> 00:54:11,449 strategic asset allocations. And human beings are just not very 770 00:54:11,449 --> 00:54:50,745 good at capitalizing on it. We're too emotional. And one of you 771 00:50:49,509 --> 00:51:21,432 was talking about introducing risk management and a rules-based 772 00:51:21,432 --> 00:52:07,543 approach to things. It's very hard for a human being to say yes, 773 00:52:07,543 --> 00:52:46,560 but all time looking at this opportunity and I started buying 774 00:52:46,560 --> 00:53:39,765 it at US$100 and it went up to US$110. And then all of a sudden 775 00:53:39,765 --> 00:54:25,876 it goes down to US$97. And I'm just going to sell everything and 776 00:54:25,876 --> 00:54:50,705 walk away and look for something new. Like it's very, very 777 00:50:57,061 --> 00:52:07,716 hard for humans to give up on their favorite ideas and their best 778 00:52:07,716 --> 00:53:12,936 ideas. The inclination is I'm going to hold it. And that's where 779 00:53:12,936 --> 00:54:18,156 you get this white-knuckle grip. And you can end up losing much 780 00:54:18,156 --> 00:54:50,766 more than people end up expecting. And so, the cold rational 781 00:50:57,726 --> 00:51:47,017 way in which this industry hunts for these big unexpected changes 782 00:51:47,017 --> 00:52:40,789 that are going to happen in the market and then ruthlessly gets 783 00:52:40,789 --> 00:53:34,561 out of them when they're not working is a money generating activity, 784 00:53:34,561 --> 00:54:23,852 an alpha generating activity that can function over the last year 785 00:54:23,852 --> 00:54:50,738 where there hasn't been a crisis. So, you could be up 23% over 786 00:51:09,705 --> 00:52:08,649 the course of the past year because people were wrong about Liberation 787 00:52:08,649 --> 00:53:07,593 Day resulting in a global economic slowdown and a 20% or 30% 788 00:53:07,593 --> 00:54:06,537 decline in equities. It was the right thing to buy them, even 789 00:54:06,537 --> 00:54:50,745 if that was very much of a FOMO trade. It was right to be long 790 00:50:52,541 --> 00:51:29,851 gold until early this year, and it was right to get out when 791 00:51:29,851 --> 00:52:07,161 they did. And it was right to start buying crude oil early on. 792 00:52:07,161 --> 00:52:44,471 So, I think in that context I think there really just needs to 793 00:52:44,471 --> 00:53:18,911 be this narrative reframing timing in the space and I think the 794 00:53:18,911 --> 00:53:53,351 language around trend is just not that helpful because it's a compliment. 795 00:53:53,351 --> 00:54:24,921 It's a completion strategy for something that you, as an allocator, 796 00:54:24,921 --> 00:54:50,751 don't do well, which is the time the markets. 797 00:54:52,770 --> 00:54:59,686 Well. I think you also had a question for Tom, if I don't misremember, 798 00:54:59,686 --> 00:55:04,132 something about whether allocators still rely on the crisis 799 00:55:04,132 --> 00:55:08,084 alpha pitch in the evolution in the thinking. 800 00:55:08,091 --> 00:55:23,521 For a period that was definitely something which CTA marketing 801 00:55:23,521 --> 00:55:43,580 was led with, wasn't it? And it obviously worked well. But I think 802 00:55:43,580 --> 00:56:02,096 it upset a lot of managers because that isn't what they're trying 803 00:56:02,096 --> 00:56:17,526 to achieve. They're trying to achieve long term portfolio gains. 804 00:56:17,526 --> 00:56:31,413 They're trying to realize a statistical relationship that shows 805 00:56:31,413 --> 00:56:43,757 that, yes, historically CTAs have delivered outsized performance 806 00:56:43,757 --> 00:56:57,644 and protected portfolios during crises. But there seem to 807 00:56:57,644 --> 00:57:09,988 be two things that go wrong with that. The first is that investors 808 00:55:16,221 --> 00:55:37,359 continue to expect it to always be a case. And so, they get 809 00:55:37,359 --> 00:55:50,367 increasingly upset when it doesn't always protect, especially 810 00:55:50,367 --> 00:56:08,253 in shorter and shorter time frames. You might see markets down 811 00:56:08,253 --> 00:56:27,765 for one or two months and investors suddenly start to ask questions 812 00:56:27,765 --> 00:56:44,025 about why these things they thought were crisis alpha aren't 813 00:56:44,025 --> 00:56:57,033 suddenly delivering 10%, 20%. Well, surprise, surprise, equity 814 00:56:57,033 --> 00:57:10,041 trends were very strong up until this point. So many groups 815 00:55:13,635 --> 00:55:35,811 will have been long those assets, and it takes time to re-adapt 816 00:55:35,811 --> 00:55:57,987 portfolios but it also takes time for new trends to emerge that 817 00:55:57,987 --> 00:56:16,467 maybe will be complementary over the medium to long-term and 818 00:56:16,467 --> 00:56:33,099 provide significant portfolio benefit. Now, I think more usefully 819 00:56:33,099 --> 00:56:57,123 the rhetoric has maybe changed to more be RMS. So, this is kind 820 00:56:57,123 --> 00:57:10,059 of a concept of risk mitigating strategies. But again, 821 00:55:11,963 --> 00:55:35,195 as we said Niels, it's nothing new. These aren't new concepts. This 822 00:55:35,195 --> 00:55:54,555 is simply adding things that diversify your portfolio and trying 823 00:55:54,555 --> 00:56:15,851 to build an all-weather solution that has a balance of things 824 00:56:15,851 --> 00:56:37,147 that are going to benefit during growth periods and also which 825 00:56:37,147 --> 00:56:50,699 can have protection and generate interesting performance 826 00:56:50,699 --> 00:57:08,123 during less interesting periods for equities and go through 827 00:57:08,123 --> 00:57:10,059 cycles. 828 00:57:10,861 --> 00:57:28,571 I disagree with that in that if you look at the past 25 years, 829 00:57:28,571 --> 00:57:45,016 the SocGen CTA index, it's on cash plus 250 basis points net of 830 00:57:45,016 --> 00:58:00,196 fees and expenses. And so, if you start with the assumption that 831 00:58:00,196 --> 00:58:17,906 every 8 or 10 years you're going to have a 20% return in the 832 00:58:17,906 --> 00:58:30,556 strategy that almost by definition means in every other year 833 00:58:30,556 --> 00:58:44,471 you're earning cash. The framing it of a crisis alpha was 834 00:58:44,471 --> 00:58:57,121 also something that took off when they weren't delivering returns 835 00:58:57,121 --> 00:59:04,711 in other periods, the overall space. So just the math is if you 836 00:57:18,379 --> 00:57:31,267 have very, very lumpy alpha and almost all of your returns over 837 00:57:31,267 --> 00:57:42,007 cash, again we're talking about a portfolio that's cash plus 838 00:57:42,007 --> 00:57:54,895 a futures generating return. You take out the cash, you end up 839 00:57:54,895 --> 00:58:06,709 with something where futures do really well in 2022. And then 840 00:58:06,709 --> 00:58:19,597 if you're doing roughly cash like returns the rest of the time, 841 00:58:19,597 --> 00:58:31,411 then the crisis alpha moniker makes sense because it's the only 842 00:58:31,411 --> 00:58:44,299 thing you have to offer to people because you have to basically 843 00:58:44,299 --> 00:58:58,261 ask them to hold on through a period of what is effectively on 844 00:58:58,261 --> 00:59:04,705 a risk adjusted basis, dead money. And so, when we looked at 845 00:57:16,117 --> 00:57:28,381 this phase 10 years ago, the only way you solve that and you turn 846 00:57:28,381 --> 00:57:38,893 into an all weather portfolio is by bumping the Sharpe ratio so 847 00:57:38,893 --> 00:57:48,529 that over that 10 year period, you're not doing cumulatively 20 848 00:57:48,529 --> 00:57:59,041 points over cash, you're doing 40 points over cash. So, then if 849 00:57:59,041 --> 00:58:09,553 I'm doing 200 basis points over cash in years one through eight 850 00:58:09,553 --> 00:58:20,065 and 20% in year nine, now you have something that actually now 851 00:58:20,065 --> 00:58:27,949 fits as an all-weather solution because if you're being 852 00:58:27,949 --> 00:58:38,461 paid to wait for that period of time, it's very different. So, 853 00:58:38,461 --> 00:58:48,097 I don't think it's just that people don't understand the concept 854 00:58:48,097 --> 00:59:00,361 or are framing it in the wrong way. I think it's a Sharpe ratio 855 00:59:00,361 --> 00:59:04,741 issue across the overall strategy. 856 00:59:06,191 --> 00:59:23,831 Well, I think we would have to sort of do a proper analysis of the 857 00:59:23,831 --> 00:59:35,591 CTA index. I think it's something that Niels has brought 858 00:59:35,591 --> 00:59:50,879 up before. I think about half of the funds or strategies that report 859 00:59:50,879 --> 01:00:04,991 their performance to us for the indices are some sort of composite 860 01:00:04,991 --> 01:00:17,927 of a managed account, so they won't include a cash rate. But I 861 00:59:08,581 --> 00:59:21,726 think your broad point does make sense in that there's something 862 00:59:21,726 --> 00:59:33,676 going on that they haven't been delivering quite enough during 863 00:59:33,676 --> 00:59:48,016 certain periods. I do think that the reason a lot of investors 864 00:59:48,016 --> 01:00:01,161 continue to look at these types of strategies is because they 865 01:00:01,161 --> 01:00:13,111 are interested in the broader portfolio benefits that they can 866 01:00:13,111 --> 01:00:17,891 provide across all scenarios. And I don't know if you maybe have 867 00:59:14,271 --> 00:59:24,371 anecdotal evidence, but it'll be interesting to think how many 868 00:59:24,371 --> 00:59:33,461 investors do mis-time CTA investments and therefore come away 869 00:59:33,461 --> 00:59:46,591 with a bad experience from an asset class which, or an asset group 870 00:59:46,591 --> 00:59:57,701 which should be very additive to portfolios, but they just happen 871 00:59:57,701 --> 01:00:10,831 to be interested in an invest at the wrong time and therefore walk 872 01:00:10,831 --> 01:00:17,901 away and never want to come back. 873 01:00:19,882 --> 01:00:34,222 I think it's important, again, always, when we use the term crisis 874 01:00:34,222 --> 01:00:48,562 alpha is actually to kind of go back and remember, remind ourselves 875 01:00:48,562 --> 01:01:06,487 what Katy meant by it when it came up, because it was kind of a 876 01:01:06,487 --> 01:01:20,827 question from an investor, I think, at the time, after the 2008 877 01:01:20,827 --> 01:01:35,167 period, where the question was something like, why is it that these 878 01:01:35,167 --> 01:01:45,922 strategies tend to do well in times of crisis? And I can't remember 879 01:00:26,502 --> 01:00:48,017 all of them, but there are like three reasons. One is that it's 880 01:00:48,017 --> 01:01:07,877 unbiased. The other thing is it's highly liquid so we can change 881 01:01:07,877 --> 01:01:26,082 exposure in no time. And it's opportunistic. But don't take my 882 01:01:26,082 --> 01:01:42,632 definitions as anything. Katy has a much better, clearer definition 883 01:01:42,632 --> 01:01:45,942 of it. But in any event, I think that that's where it came from 884 01:00:34,630 --> 01:00:51,836 and I think we as an industry found it very useful to talk about 885 01:00:51,836 --> 01:01:05,355 it as crisis alpha, even though of course the initial investors 886 01:01:05,355 --> 01:01:21,332 who… and of course back in 2009 who would have known what the 887 01:01:21,332 --> 01:01:36,080 equities were about to start doing for the next 15, 20 years. 888 01:01:36,080 --> 01:01:45,912 So it all made sense at the time. But I agree, I think it's wrong 889 01:00:38,131 --> 01:01:12,022 to sell it as a crisis alpha strategy, I don't think that's the 890 01:01:12,022 --> 01:01:45,913 right. I've kind of forgotten some of the points I wanted to say. 891 01:01:45,942 --> 01:02:06,768 Well, I mean, crisis alpha is a great term, right? It's a, it's 892 01:02:06,768 --> 01:02:25,992 a very clear, very concise term and it's what people want. But 893 01:02:25,992 --> 01:02:46,818 I think that, again, and Tom, your point about how much of the 894 01:02:46,818 --> 01:03:07,644 cash returns of the SocGen CTA index or how much of cash returns 895 01:03:07,644 --> 01:03:26,868 are not included in SocGen is a great statistical point that I'd 896 01:03:26,868 --> 01:03:47,694 love to know the answer to that. But I think that people are… 897 01:03:47,694 --> 01:04:06,918 And Tom raised the question about how do people mistime the strategy? 898 01:01:45,942 --> 01:02:32,946 At least looking at US mutual fund data. Yes, people do. People 899 01:02:32,946 --> 01:03:23,867 tend to buy. But that's true of everything in the US mutual fund 900 01:03:23,867 --> 01:04:06,954 space. I mean, something goes up a lot and I'm sure… So, by the 901 01:01:53,112 --> 01:02:19,402 way, going back to Situational Awareness for a second, we don't 902 01:02:19,402 --> 01:02:43,302 know a lot about the situation. Unless you've read articles 903 01:02:43,302 --> 01:03:11,982 or something that I haven't read. When somebody says it was down 904 01:03:11,982 --> 01:03:45,442 67% in July and was only then therefore up 80% for the year, that's 905 01:03:45,442 --> 01:04:06,952 a very weird sentence for a US$45 billion fund. So wait, I'm 906 01:01:51,435 --> 01:02:11,576 sorry, so through June you're up three hundred and something percent 907 01:02:11,576 --> 01:02:39,041 and you gave back the third of it in July and you still have Anthropic 908 01:02:39,041 --> 01:02:59,182 as one of your principal investments. But my point is somebody 909 01:02:59,182 --> 01:03:22,985 mentioned that a lot of the money may have come in this year, 910 01:03:22,985 --> 01:03:44,957 when they were already up 200%. And they may have been the 911 01:03:44,957 --> 01:04:05,098 fresh money coming into ARK just before ARK ended up getting 912 01:04:05,098 --> 01:04:06,929 crushed. But I think this sort of broader idea of what is the right 913 01:02:08,289 --> 01:02:27,198 return stream that people should be looking at to decide whether 914 01:02:27,198 --> 01:02:44,388 to include this in the portfolio? The SocGen CTA index, 915 01:02:44,388 --> 01:03:05,016 to me, is the gold standard from an index perspective. And yet 916 01:03:05,016 --> 01:03:23,925 it still has this limitation that, as interest rates have gone 917 01:03:23,925 --> 01:03:46,272 higher, if a lot of the funds are not reporting their cash returns, 918 01:03:46,272 --> 01:04:06,900 that is a hit to the returns of the strategy over time. I think 919 01:01:49,466 --> 01:02:15,896 what we need as an industry is a way for an allocator to very simply 920 01:02:15,896 --> 01:02:42,326 say this is what I'm buying, and this is what I expect to be my 921 01:02:42,326 --> 01:03:05,232 returns over time, this is what I think it's going to do, how 922 01:03:05,232 --> 01:03:24,614 it's going to contribute to the overall Sharpe ratio and efficient 923 01:03:24,614 --> 01:03:43,996 frontier of my portfolio, and then have a clean and consistent 924 01:03:43,996 --> 01:04:05,140 way of doing that, which, I think, so far people have struggled 925 01:04:05,140 --> 01:04:06,902 with. 926 01:04:08,162 --> 01:04:19,530 Can I ask a question here? So, Tom, one of the things I've been 927 01:04:19,530 --> 01:04:30,086 thinking about, because I see a lot of managers who come out and 928 01:04:30,086 --> 01:04:39,830 say, oh, I beat the index. Okay, well, we're kind of expected 929 01:04:39,830 --> 01:04:50,386 to beat the index, in my opinion. So, the way I think about 930 01:04:50,386 --> 01:05:01,754 the index, and maybe there are no other ways of doing it, but if 931 01:05:01,754 --> 01:05:10,686 you think about the index, especially say the trend index of 932 01:05:10,686 --> 01:05:21,242 10 managers, they're all very big. And the way I think about it 933 01:05:21,242 --> 01:05:31,798 is that, from time to time one of these firms starts to underperform 934 01:05:31,798 --> 01:05:43,166 but it takes a while before the AUM goes down, so they get replaced 935 01:05:43,166 --> 01:05:45,602 by someone else. So, you get all the negative performance in the 936 01:04:14,516 --> 01:04:22,988 index, but the one you've replaced them with is usually a fund 937 01:04:22,988 --> 01:04:31,460 that has grown in size because they've done really well, but we 938 01:04:31,460 --> 01:04:39,226 don't capture that positive lift anywhere, so to speak. And then 939 01:04:39,226 --> 01:04:47,698 once they get to a certain size, US$4 or US%5 billion, they're 940 01:04:47,698 --> 01:04:56,170 in the index and who knows what their performance will be suddenly 941 01:04:56,170 --> 01:05:04,642 at US$5 billion compared to what it was at US$500 million. And 942 01:05:04,642 --> 01:05:15,938 maybe there is just no way to deal with it. But my worry is a little 943 01:05:15,938 --> 01:05:24,410 bit that the index is always being slowed down, to some extent, 944 01:05:24,410 --> 01:05:33,588 because a manager who's in the index is not having a great time, 945 01:05:33,588 --> 01:05:40,648 but the one who potentially replaced that manager, we're not 946 01:05:40,648 --> 01:05:45,590 capturing the positive side of that performance. 947 01:05:45,662 --> 01:05:50,786 Yeah, it makes sense. And I think you raise a really interesting 948 01:05:50,786 --> 01:05:55,910 point. Your first assumption is we should expect to beat the index. 949 01:05:55,910 --> 01:06:01,461 Is that true? This is an index composed of the 10 largest, most 950 01:06:01,461 --> 01:06:05,731 sophisticated CTAs in the industry. So, thinking of these hedge 951 01:06:05,731 --> 01:06:11,709 fund indices in the same way we think of equity, like an S&P 500, 952 01:06:11,709 --> 01:06:12,990 is fundamentally different. 953 01:06:13,982 --> 01:06:19,596 Well, let me give you a little bit more clarity. I think that if 954 01:06:19,596 --> 01:06:24,408 a client was looking to invest with us, for example, they would 955 01:06:24,408 --> 01:06:30,022 expect us to beat the index. I don't mean every year. I mean, just 956 01:06:30,022 --> 01:06:33,631 generally we should be outperforming over time. I think 957 01:06:33,631 --> 01:06:34,032 that's… 958 01:06:34,062 --> 01:06:37,852 See, I would challenge that assumption because I don't think… 959 01:06:37,852 --> 01:06:39,742 I mean, that would be great if we can lower the bar a bit, that 960 01:06:39,742 --> 01:06:40,120 would be fine. 961 01:06:40,212 --> 01:06:58,872 I think you're dealing with a different type of index. It's an 962 01:06:58,872 --> 01:07:15,977 actively managed index. It's an index of active managers. It is 963 01:07:15,977 --> 01:07:37,747 not a passive benchmark in the same way that the S&P 500 is for 964 01:07:37,747 --> 01:07:56,407 equities. So, I think you've got that. Although the S&P 500 probably 965 01:07:56,407 --> 01:08:07,292 suffers from the same issue of bias. And I think Andrew, you came 966 01:06:44,490 --> 01:06:53,046 up with this kind of term - sneaky bias, sneaky selection bias. 967 01:06:53,046 --> 01:07:01,602 But it's a very good question. It's quite subtle but there's an 968 01:07:01,602 --> 01:07:08,019 excellent paper that Efficient Capital have written about called 969 01:07:08,019 --> 01:07:16,575 Blinded by Bias in which they kind of tackle this exact issue. 970 01:07:16,575 --> 01:07:24,418 Because if you take the current 10 constituents of our trend 971 01:07:24,418 --> 01:07:32,974 index, let's call it the 2026 vintage, and then backfill the data, 972 01:07:32,974 --> 01:07:40,104 that is going to be an unbelievably strong performance for 973 01:07:40,104 --> 01:07:47,947 the exact reason you say, Niels, that those funds are big. 974 01:07:47,947 --> 01:07:55,790 Primarily I would say there are other factors, but that’s going 975 01:07:55,790 --> 01:08:05,059 to be a very strong factor to do with their performance over the 976 01:08:05,059 --> 01:08:07,198 last recent history. So, this is something which we really do have 977 01:06:53,955 --> 01:07:13,806 to tackle with investors of when they look at the index and then 978 01:07:13,806 --> 01:07:32,130 they think about, well, those funds have done very well, or why 979 01:07:32,130 --> 01:07:50,454 isn't your fund done this, or why hasn't a multi manager blend 980 01:07:50,454 --> 01:08:07,251 of funds beaten the index? It is very hard to do. 981 01:08:07,692 --> 01:08:11,772 Why don't you publish, then, the 2026 or whatever year we are 982 01:08:11,772 --> 01:08:15,512 in vintage alongside the trend index because you have the data. 983 01:08:16,492 --> 01:08:19,404 Well, we wouldn't always have the data going back as far as we 984 01:08:19,404 --> 01:08:19,852 would want. 985 01:08:19,932 --> 01:08:21,692 No, no, fair enough. 986 01:08:22,332 --> 01:08:28,000 There's going to be a natural kind of period when it stops. But 987 01:08:28,000 --> 01:08:32,796 I think Efficient Capital does a very similar exercise and they 988 01:08:32,796 --> 01:08:35,848 compare the return characteristics of those back-filled 989 01:08:35,848 --> 01:08:39,772 vintages and it is significantly better than the live 990 01:08:39,772 --> 01:08:41,516 sort of walk-forward index. 991 01:08:41,692 --> 01:08:42,252 Okay. 992 01:08:44,252 --> 01:09:06,769 We've run the numbers as well, obviously, because we're very interested. 993 01:08:44,252 --> 01:08:49,760 So, first of all, SocGen does what I think is analytically correct, 994 01:08:49,760 --> 01:08:55,268 in January they take somebody out and they add somebody and they're 995 01:08:55,268 --> 01:09:00,776 not going back… In the early days of hedge fund indices people 996 01:09:00,776 --> 01:09:06,743 would go back and say let's change all of our numbers going back... 997 01:09:06,772 --> 01:09:08,332 Yeah, you backfill everything. 998 01:09:08,892 --> 01:09:44,152 You backfill everything. That's like a cardinal sin from a 999 01:09:44,152 --> 01:10:19,412 statistical perspective. But it was also that the original hedge 1000 01:10:19,412 --> 01:10:58,198 fund indices were built to also promote the hedge fund industry 1001 01:10:58,198 --> 01:11:36,984 and they competed with each other on the base of performance. 1002 01:11:36,984 --> 01:12:12,244 So, there was a lot of dumb things that happened. Pivotal Path, 1003 01:09:13,206 --> 01:09:43,404 by the way, if you want to point to somebody, I think has the 1004 01:09:43,404 --> 01:10:07,131 best broad hedge fund industry data, you should look at Pivotal 1005 01:10:07,131 --> 01:10:30,858 Path. But on the selection bias side, what happens (back to 1006 01:10:30,858 --> 01:10:58,899 your point), if you look at the SocGen CTA index versus the current, 1007 01:10:58,899 --> 01:11:24,783 the 2026 constituents of it, 17 of the 20 have outperformed the 1008 01:11:24,783 --> 01:11:52,824 index over the past 10 years. So, the SocGen CTA index would only 1009 01:11:52,824 --> 01:12:12,237 be in the 15th percentile of the current managers. And in fact, 1010 01:09:16,749 --> 01:09:48,177 if you look at Sharpe ratio (and historically the index has had 1011 01:09:48,177 --> 01:10:19,605 a somewhat… has had a strong Sharpe ratio, an above average Sharpe 1012 01:10:19,605 --> 01:10:37,938 ratio because of diversification of single manager 1013 01:10:37,938 --> 01:11:06,747 risk), the index comes into the 35th percentile. So, what it 1014 01:11:06,747 --> 01:11:30,318 does is, from an allocator's perspective, fund selection looks 1015 01:11:30,318 --> 01:12:09,603 easy when you look at the 20. 17 of the 20 look like they're above 1016 01:12:09,603 --> 01:12:12,222 average. And what I think it does, in sort of an insidious way, 1017 01:09:30,672 --> 01:09:48,822 is that people underestimate single manager risk in this space. 1018 01:09:48,822 --> 01:10:10,602 And there have been some papers that I've read over time that 1019 01:10:10,602 --> 01:10:34,197 said you shouldn't look at the index data. And they point to three 1020 01:10:34,197 --> 01:10:55,977 funds that have crushed the index over the past 20 years and 1021 01:10:55,977 --> 01:11:19,572 say, look, see this is why you should be looking at single funds 1022 01:11:19,572 --> 01:11:43,167 rather than the index. And I think that's just… But I want to 1023 01:11:43,167 --> 01:12:03,132 be very clear, I think from a SocGen perspective, they're doing 1024 01:12:03,132 --> 01:12:12,207 what is exactly right analytically. The burden is on the 1025 01:09:20,952 --> 01:09:49,896 allocator to say, okay, so who are the 2026 constituents that I 1026 01:09:49,896 --> 01:10:23,664 happen to be looking at today? Well, in fact, if only nine of the 1027 01:10:23,664 --> 01:10:52,608 20 strategies 10 years ago are still around today, I really should 1028 01:10:52,608 --> 01:11:23,964 look at some of the wounded people out there, like the firm that 1029 01:11:23,964 --> 01:11:48,084 you mentioned, Niels, who looked unbeatable for five or six 1030 01:11:48,084 --> 01:12:12,204 years and has pretty much disappeared from the trend space. 1031 01:09:08,892 --> 01:09:44,046 But look, I think this is the challenge we will face. I think what 1032 01:09:44,046 --> 01:10:16,689 it does over time though is you get people who pick a manager. 1033 01:10:16,689 --> 01:10:44,310 They think the manager is going to basically give them the 1034 01:10:44,310 --> 01:11:11,931 SocGen CTA index plus 200 basis points. So, every quarter they 1035 01:11:11,931 --> 01:11:47,085 can look at it and show, look, I would have been really happy owning 1036 01:11:47,085 --> 01:12:12,195 this over the past 10 years. And that doesn't happen. Then I mentioned 1037 01:09:14,337 --> 01:09:36,117 this kind of weird statistical thing with the SocGen CTA index and 1038 01:09:36,117 --> 01:09:57,897 maybe timing or other delays factor into it, but it looks like 1039 01:09:57,897 --> 01:10:17,862 some managers in the space did really surprisingly badly in July, 1040 01:10:17,862 --> 01:10:41,457 which was overall kind of an okay, a decent area for the space. 1041 01:10:41,457 --> 01:11:05,052 And so, that's where I think there are all these kind of complicated 1042 01:11:05,052 --> 01:11:25,017 issues on the alligator side where they're trying to get this 1043 01:11:25,017 --> 01:11:46,797 right. They're trying to get this right and they feel like they 1044 01:11:46,797 --> 01:12:06,762 keep kind of like stubbing their toes or stepping on landmines 1045 01:12:06,762 --> 01:12:12,207 in the process. 1046 01:12:14,502 --> 01:12:19,650 This is where I think there's an interesting role for either the 1047 01:12:19,650 --> 01:12:23,511 diversification across managers or the use of multi manager 1048 01:12:23,511 --> 01:12:28,230 solutions which potentially have a lot to offer and often use 1049 01:12:28,230 --> 01:12:32,949 these managed accounts, which we spoke about, to access them very 1050 01:12:32,949 --> 01:12:33,378 efficiently. 1051 01:12:34,182 --> 01:12:42,270 Well, and I'm sure efficient people are saying why would I invest 1052 01:12:42,270 --> 01:12:51,032 with you when I can invest with these seven guys who have done 1053 01:12:51,032 --> 01:12:52,380 much better? And they're saying, well, if you'd known they 1054 01:12:38,462 --> 01:12:46,487 were going to be so great 10 years ago, go back 10 years and invest 1055 01:12:46,487 --> 01:12:52,372 with them. Which is why we do the work as well. 1056 01:12:53,682 --> 01:12:57,569 Yeah. I mean, oddly enough, I remember I think Harold over at Transtrend 1057 01:12:57,569 --> 01:13:01,456 writing a paper, at some point, and I tend to agree with him. 1058 01:13:01,456 --> 01:13:04,446 I mean, I don't think any institutional investor would just 1059 01:13:04,446 --> 01:13:08,333 select one CTA and say, oh yeah, I've done my homework. I don't 1060 01:13:08,333 --> 01:13:12,220 think they do that in reality. They should pick two, or three, or 1061 01:13:12,220 --> 01:13:16,107 four. And I think when you do that, when you run most analysis 1062 01:13:16,107 --> 01:13:19,695 and you've picked two, or three, or four, and if I'm asked 1063 01:13:19,695 --> 01:13:23,582 about it, I would say pick two, or three, or four, that are 1064 01:13:23,582 --> 01:13:25,974 structurally different. Right? They're not all the same. 1065 01:13:27,102 --> 01:13:30,822 I agree with you on that. I don't think investors are trying 1066 01:13:30,822 --> 01:13:34,542 to pick three or four which are going to replicate the index 1067 01:13:34,542 --> 01:13:35,162 for them. 1068 01:13:35,182 --> 01:13:35,582 Right. 1069 01:13:35,582 --> 01:13:39,729 I think they are very aware and cognizant of the issue that is 1070 01:13:39,729 --> 01:13:43,876 presented to them and they are trying to pick three or four which 1071 01:13:43,876 --> 01:13:44,833 have different characteristics. 1072 01:13:45,082 --> 01:13:51,256 Yeah. And I think if you do that and you run most numbers, you'll 1073 01:13:51,256 --> 01:13:56,107 be fine. Anyways, we've gone along a little bit already. Now, 1074 01:13:56,107 --> 01:14:00,958 there were more topics that were brought up. We certainly have 1075 01:14:00,958 --> 01:14:05,809 another five minutes if we want, if there is anything either 1076 01:14:05,809 --> 01:14:11,542 of you want to really bring up, let's do it. But we probably 1077 01:14:11,542 --> 01:14:15,952 want to wrap up in about five minutes or so. Anything on your side, 1078 01:13:50,966 --> 01:14:10,089 Andrew? I know it was your topics that we were sort of going 1079 01:14:10,089 --> 01:14:15,973 through the list here. 1080 01:14:16,862 --> 01:14:32,559 I would love for somebody to really dissect this trend versus 1081 01:14:32,559 --> 01:14:45,402 non-trend because again, obviously, we're looking at the overall 1082 01:14:45,402 --> 01:15:01,099 space which is supposedly a trend versus non-trend. I don't see 1083 01:15:01,099 --> 01:15:15,369 the non-trend stuff as big drivers of performance over time. 1084 01:15:15,369 --> 01:15:28,212 I see them as satellites to the core driver. We've looked at 1085 01:14:18,347 --> 01:14:25,277 a lot of short-term models and we've looked at a lot of the questions 1086 01:14:25,277 --> 01:14:31,217 speed. We always come to the same conclusion. It's a zero Sharpe 1087 01:14:31,217 --> 01:14:37,157 ratio exercise. It looks great on a graph because it looks like 1088 01:14:37,157 --> 01:14:42,602 you're going to get in something earlier and get it out 1089 01:14:42,602 --> 01:14:49,037 later. But that ignores the fact that you get kicked in and out 1090 01:14:49,037 --> 01:14:55,967 of these trades, and you over trade all the way up, and you miss 1091 01:14:55,967 --> 01:15:01,907 a lot of the benefits of it. When people talk about including 1092 01:15:01,907 --> 01:15:07,352 carry and things like that, again, I forget exactly when the 1093 01:15:07,352 --> 01:15:12,302 SocGen CTA index, trend subindex, was created but if you 1094 01:15:12,302 --> 01:15:17,747 look at that versus the broader index, over time, it's like 1095 01:15:17,747 --> 01:15:23,687 it's the same Sharpe ratio. Right? It's not… I don't see the 1096 01:15:23,687 --> 01:15:28,142 diversification benefits of adding in all this other stuff. So, 1097 01:14:19,024 --> 01:14:44,968 I guess I'd be curious from your perspective, Tom, if you had 1098 01:14:44,968 --> 01:15:15,236 to say like, when you look at the broad index, how much does the 1099 01:15:15,236 --> 01:15:28,208 non-trend stuff really matter in it? 1100 01:15:30,302 --> 01:15:48,859 I agree with you. It's something which doesn't sit as a 1101 01:15:48,859 --> 01:16:05,729 group and is complicated to decompose because you haven't got 1102 01:16:05,729 --> 01:16:24,286 this sort of consistent risk factor that they're all trying to 1103 01:16:24,286 --> 01:16:25,973 capture. I remember one CTA telling me that they'd done a lot 1104 01:15:36,022 --> 01:15:42,262 of research, probably similar, and it kind of sounds like it mirrors 1105 01:15:42,262 --> 01:15:47,982 what your experience is in that the product that we're trying 1106 01:15:47,982 --> 01:15:54,742 to build and the product we're trying to give to an investor, longer-term, 1107 01:15:54,742 --> 01:16:00,982 just is better in general. But what they're trying to create is 1108 01:16:00,982 --> 01:16:06,702 something that an investor can hold and present to an investment 1109 01:16:06,702 --> 01:16:10,862 committee over different periods. So, adding shorter term 1110 01:16:10,862 --> 01:16:15,542 strategies definitely smooths out the return profile during volatile 1111 01:16:15,542 --> 01:16:21,782 periods which I think maybe goes a long way in explaining why 1112 01:16:21,782 --> 01:16:25,942 people try and add these shorter-term strategies in. 1113 01:16:27,912 --> 01:16:33,696 Risk management… of course you can do anything to reduce your drawdowns. 1114 01:16:33,696 --> 01:16:39,962 There are a lot of different things you can do to reduce your 1115 01:16:39,962 --> 01:16:45,746 drawdowns but you give up something for it. And some of the 1116 01:16:45,746 --> 01:16:52,012 popular mutual funds in the US were the ones that, after the whipsaws 1117 01:16:52,012 --> 01:16:58,760 at the end of 2022, at least the pitch was we're going to have 1118 01:16:58,760 --> 01:17:03,580 these short-term models that are going to, again, protect you 1119 01:17:03,580 --> 01:17:08,400 at the inflection points. Right? But that's no different than 1120 01:17:08,400 --> 01:17:13,702 vol controls, or stop losses, or other things that are designed 1121 01:17:13,702 --> 01:17:19,486 to basically get you out of positions faster, but it's a fancier 1122 01:17:19,486 --> 01:17:25,270 way of doing it. The problem was, over subsequent periods of time, 1123 01:17:25,270 --> 01:17:31,054 the impact of getting hit by these whipsaws. The loss of performance. 1124 01:17:31,054 --> 01:17:37,802 It, like a lot of things that end up reducing your risk over time, 1125 01:17:37,802 --> 01:17:43,586 it also had a true economic cost. Now, that's evident in the 1126 01:17:43,586 --> 01:17:45,032 numbers right now. And so, I think part of what you've seen, at 1127 01:16:37,432 --> 01:16:48,856 least in the US mutual fund and ETF space, is people saying, 1128 01:16:48,856 --> 01:16:59,328 all right, well maybe I'm not getting compensated for… maybe I 1129 01:16:59,328 --> 01:17:11,704 just have to kind of accept that there's going to be a little 1130 01:17:11,704 --> 01:17:25,984 bit more volatility. If I want to be able to have this be an all-weather 1131 01:17:25,984 --> 01:17:36,456 solution, that's going to give me enough returns over time, that 1132 01:17:36,456 --> 01:17:45,024 I can't worry as much about small inflection points. 1133 01:17:47,542 --> 01:18:34,655 Well, time will tell. We'll see. Anyways, this is great discussions. 1134 01:18:34,655 --> 01:19:26,051 Thanks so much for bringing up and bringing with you some really 1135 01:19:26,051 --> 01:19:51,749 important topics. I really appreciate that. Before we wrap up, 1136 01:17:51,614 --> 01:18:04,848 let me just remind the people listening today that we did, a couple 1137 01:18:04,848 --> 01:18:20,118 of weeks ago, we had Rich and Dave Dredge on. It was a very long 1138 01:18:20,118 --> 01:18:31,316 conversation, very important one I thought. And at the end of 1139 01:18:31,316 --> 01:18:42,514 it I actually mentioned that people could win some TTU merch, 1140 01:18:42,514 --> 01:18:53,712 namely the same vest that my prestigious panel of co-hosts are 1141 01:18:53,712 --> 01:19:05,928 wearing from time to time. Not today though, but in the wintertime 1142 01:19:05,928 --> 01:19:19,162 they generally dress up for that. And I have a couple of these 1143 01:19:19,162 --> 01:19:31,378 very unique vests that I’d like to offer as a little incentive 1144 01:19:31,378 --> 01:19:44,612 for people to go and leave a really nice review of the podcast 1145 01:19:44,612 --> 01:19:51,738 and show the appreciation to the co-host. But in order to do so, 1146 01:17:58,036 --> 01:18:22,522 and in order for me to know that you've done it, you need to 1147 01:18:22,522 --> 01:18:38,263 send me an email to the usual, info@toptradersunplugged.com with 1148 01:18:38,263 --> 01:19:04,498 a copy of what you wrote and then tell me where you wrote it - 1149 01:19:04,498 --> 01:19:27,235 which platform you left it at. That offer is still out there and 1150 01:19:27,235 --> 01:19:51,721 we will leave it until the end of August before we choose the winner. 1151 01:17:47,542 --> 01:18:13,234 Anyways, besides saying thank you to both of you, Andrew and Tom, 1152 01:18:13,234 --> 01:18:43,208 I was going to say, next week I'm joined by Rob Carver. I'm not 1153 01:18:43,208 --> 01:19:11,041 sure it's Rob coming. I think he's on holiday so I completely forgot 1154 01:19:11,041 --> 01:19:38,874 to look up who's joining. So, that'll be a surprise for not just 1155 01:19:38,874 --> 01:19:51,720 me but for anyone listening today. But if you do have some questions 1156 01:18:12,385 --> 01:19:02,071 for the next guest whom we don't know who will be, then by all 1157 01:19:02,071 --> 01:19:23,365 means send it to info@toptradersunplugged.com and 1158 01:19:23,365 --> 01:19:51,757 I'll do my best to bring it up. That's it for today from Andrew, 1159 01:18:05,716 --> 01:18:42,064 Tom, and me, thanks ever so much for listening. We look forward 1160 01:18:42,064 --> 01:19:21,441 to being back with you next week. And in the meantime, as usual, 1161 01:19:21,441 --> 01:19:51,731 take care of yourself and take care of each other. 1162 01:19:54,082 --> 01:21:27,161 Thanks for listening to Top Traders Unplugged. If you feel you 1163 01:19:59,398 --> 01:20:12,688 learned something of value from today's episode, the best way 1164 01:20:12,688 --> 01:20:29,965 to stay updated is to go on over to your favorite podcast platform 1165 01:20:29,965 --> 01:20:48,571 and follow the show so that you'll be sure to get all the new 1166 01:20:48,571 --> 01:21:01,861 episodes as they're released. We have some amazing guests lined 1167 01:21:01,861 --> 01:21:19,138 up for you and to ensure our show continues to grow, please leave 1168 01:21:19,138 --> 01:21:27,112 us an honest rating and review. It only takes a minute and 1169 01:20:15,562 --> 01:21:05,682 it's the best way to show us you love the podcast. We'll see you 1170 01:21:05,682 --> 01:21:27,162 next time on Top Traders Unplugged. This podcast expresses 1171 01:20:00,022 --> 01:20:25,762 the views of its hosts and the guests appearing on the podcast as 1172 01:20:25,762 --> 01:20:51,502 of the date of its recording, and such views are subject to change 1173 01:20:51,502 --> 01:21:13,282 without notice. Top Traders Unplugged do not have any duty or 1174 01:21:13,282 --> 01:21:27,142 obligation to update the information contained herein. Furthermore, 1175 01:19:56,352 --> 01:20:19,052 Top Traders Unplugged make no representation to its accuracy and 1176 01:20:19,052 --> 01:20:44,022 it shall not be assumed that past investment performance is an 1177 01:20:44,022 --> 01:21:06,722 indication of future results. Moreover, wherever there is a potential 1178 01:21:06,722 --> 01:21:27,152 for profit, there is also the possibility of loss. This content 1179 01:20:04,424 --> 01:20:50,963 is made available for educational purposes only and should 1180 01:20:50,963 --> 01:21:27,160 not be used for any other purpose. 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