1 00:00:31,846 --> 00:00:33,496 W. Curtis Preston: Hi, and welcome to Backup Central's 2 00:00:33,496 --> 00:00:34,816 Restore it All all podcast. 3 00:00:34,821 --> 00:00:35,506 I'm your host W. 4 00:00:35,506 --> 00:00:37,366 Curtis Preston, AKA Mr. 5 00:00:37,366 --> 00:00:40,876 Backup and I have with me, my wireless access point 6 00:00:40,876 --> 00:00:42,746 consultant, Prasanna Malaiyandi. 7 00:00:42,766 --> 00:00:43,646 How's it going Prasanna. 8 00:00:44,401 --> 00:00:45,181 Prasanna Malaiyandi: I'm good Curtis. 9 00:00:45,181 --> 00:00:48,571 Although, um, I don't know if you should take my advice on wireless 10 00:00:48,571 --> 00:00:52,141 access points since I'm struggling a little with the stuff in my house now. 11 00:00:52,686 --> 00:00:53,461 I blame it on you. 12 00:00:53,551 --> 00:00:56,641 W. Curtis Preston: you just bought like the expensive one, And 13 00:00:57,241 --> 00:01:00,121 Prasanna Malaiyandi: now comes the things like where you buy the expensive one, 14 00:01:00,121 --> 00:01:01,891 but now you gotta fine tune it to work. 15 00:01:01,891 --> 00:01:02,911 It's not one of those things where 16 00:01:03,001 --> 00:01:04,471 W. Curtis Preston: I don't tune, I don't 17 00:01:04,486 --> 00:01:06,856 Prasanna Malaiyandi: know, but that's what I'm going through right now. 18 00:01:07,521 --> 00:01:12,741 W. Curtis Preston: As you know, my problem is that I made a change to my, 19 00:01:12,921 --> 00:01:19,881 my internet provider and that the, the box that provides the internet is it's. 20 00:01:19,881 --> 00:01:21,741 I went with the Verizon. 21 00:01:23,076 --> 00:01:29,736 5g box and the problem is it doesn't know how to not be a router and a, and a NAT. 22 00:01:30,156 --> 00:01:34,836 So I had to turn off my router and NAT and just turn it into a wireless access point. 23 00:01:35,166 --> 00:01:39,726 And it has been misbehaving, uh, since, um, it's 24 00:01:39,871 --> 00:01:42,606 Prasanna Malaiyandi: thinks wifi is so easy, but if you scan your 25 00:01:42,606 --> 00:01:43,806 W. Curtis Preston: yeah, everyone is wrong. 26 00:01:44,196 --> 00:01:47,496 Prasanna Malaiyandi: well, if you look at like how many wifi access points 27 00:01:47,501 --> 00:01:51,726 there are just around you and how everyone picks the same channels and 28 00:01:51,726 --> 00:01:54,666 everyone cranks up the power to high, and you get all this interference and 29 00:01:54,666 --> 00:01:56,916 people are like, why is my access point? 30 00:01:56,916 --> 00:01:58,096 Why is my wifi down? 31 00:01:58,626 --> 00:01:59,316 It's like, yeah. 32 00:01:59,406 --> 00:02:01,446 Oh, speaking of which, remember we had that episode. 33 00:02:01,446 --> 00:02:02,646 Why is my wifi down? 34 00:02:03,066 --> 00:02:03,756 W. Curtis Preston: We did. 35 00:02:03,756 --> 00:02:04,776 We did what? 36 00:02:04,781 --> 00:02:06,551 Prasanna Malaiyandi: That's when we had our mystery guest, I think that was 37 00:02:06,551 --> 00:02:08,381 like one of our very, very first ones. 38 00:02:08,636 --> 00:02:09,146 W. Curtis Preston: Yeah. 39 00:02:09,176 --> 00:02:09,836 Yeah. 40 00:02:10,206 --> 00:02:11,521 All I know is it's been annoying. 41 00:02:11,551 --> 00:02:14,761 And so now I'm on, I'm hardwired on my laptop because 42 00:02:14,836 --> 00:02:16,546 Prasanna Malaiyandi: That's how everything should be. 43 00:02:17,276 --> 00:02:19,966 Everyone's like, oh, everything's gonna be wifi that it's like, oh yeah. 44 00:02:19,966 --> 00:02:22,036 Now we're just gonna hardwire everything because it's more accurate. 45 00:02:22,156 --> 00:02:24,826 And now there's a new standard wifi, six E, which gives 46 00:02:24,831 --> 00:02:26,656 you actually a new spectrum. 47 00:02:26,656 --> 00:02:30,346 So it's now six gigahertz wifi, but there are very, very, very few 48 00:02:30,346 --> 00:02:32,506 devices which actually support that. 49 00:02:32,506 --> 00:02:33,046 And most of the 50 00:02:33,046 --> 00:02:34,456 routers that need it are very. 51 00:02:35,521 --> 00:02:40,741 W. Curtis Preston: my most mission critical app, uh, in the house is wifi 52 00:02:40,741 --> 00:02:42,781 only, you know what that is right. 53 00:02:43,456 --> 00:02:44,236 Prasanna Malaiyandi: Uh, streaming. 54 00:02:44,881 --> 00:02:51,331 W. Curtis Preston: Yeah, the streaming is wifi only, so, uh, anyway, well 55 00:02:51,336 --> 00:02:53,371 enough complaining about my problems. 56 00:02:53,371 --> 00:02:58,021 Our guest today is, uh, a repeat offender and he's been an it 57 00:02:58,141 --> 00:03:01,591 about as long as I have just mostly on the, on the vendor side. 58 00:03:01,951 --> 00:03:07,921 Whereas I spent my time all the way on the other side and, um, He is Druva's CTO. 59 00:03:08,161 --> 00:03:10,531 Welcome to the podcast, Stephen Manley. 60 00:03:12,210 --> 00:03:13,200 Stephen Manley: Good to be here. 61 00:03:13,200 --> 00:03:17,040 I have no idea why you invited me Curtis, but, uh, I think the important 62 00:03:17,040 --> 00:03:21,720 thing is between what I've learned about wifi and ideally hoping to 63 00:03:21,720 --> 00:03:24,240 get 6 cents back from, uh, from my taxes. 64 00:03:24,240 --> 00:03:25,200 This should be productive. 65 00:03:26,566 --> 00:03:27,226 W. Curtis Preston: It should be good. 66 00:03:27,226 --> 00:03:27,886 It should be good. 67 00:03:28,226 --> 00:03:31,486 I'll have to throw out our usual disclaimer, even though on this episode, 68 00:03:31,486 --> 00:03:33,306 we'll be talking primarily about Druva. 69 00:03:33,336 --> 00:03:34,756 This is not a Druva podcast. 70 00:03:34,756 --> 00:03:36,406 This is my independent podcast. 71 00:03:36,706 --> 00:03:39,766 And, uh, the opinions that you hear are mine and Prasannas. 72 00:03:40,046 --> 00:03:42,926 We work for different companies see, actually happens to work for Zoom. 73 00:03:43,286 --> 00:03:46,506 And I do work for Druva, but again, this is not a Druva podcast. 74 00:03:46,956 --> 00:03:50,496 Uh, if you do, uh, if you do enjoy what you hear, please rate us 75 00:03:50,496 --> 00:03:53,016 at ratethispodcast.com/restore. 76 00:03:53,166 --> 00:03:55,506 If you don't like what you hear, no need to rate us. 77 00:03:56,860 --> 00:03:57,040 . Prasanna Malaiyandi: And 78 00:03:57,186 --> 00:03:58,326 W. Curtis Preston: If you're interested. 79 00:03:58,626 --> 00:03:58,896 Yeah. 80 00:03:58,896 --> 00:03:59,436 If you're, yeah. 81 00:03:59,436 --> 00:04:02,616 If you're interested in what we, uh, in what we're doing here, And you'd like to 82 00:04:02,616 --> 00:04:07,476 join the, the conversation, just reach out to me @wcpreston on Twitter, or 83 00:04:07,616 --> 00:04:10,416 wcurtispreston@gmail and we'll get you on 84 00:04:10,416 --> 00:04:10,716 here. 85 00:04:11,556 --> 00:04:14,896 And, uh, but it's been a, it's been a big week for Druva. 86 00:04:15,136 --> 00:04:19,596 Stephen actually it's been a big month because it wasn't that long ago that 87 00:04:19,596 --> 00:04:21,696 we had the security release, Right. 88 00:04:22,356 --> 00:04:24,246 Like it all blurs together. 89 00:04:24,251 --> 00:04:24,726 After a while 90 00:04:25,670 --> 00:04:25,880 Stephen Manley: Yeah. 91 00:04:25,880 --> 00:04:29,690 I mean, if we, if we, if you, if you view month as 30 consecutive days, as 92 00:04:29,690 --> 00:04:33,830 opposed to, you know, the arbitrary, you know, calendars, cuz you know, it is 93 00:04:34,221 --> 00:04:35,211 W. Curtis Preston: Right, right, 94 00:04:35,660 --> 00:04:35,780 Stephen Manley: then. 95 00:04:35,780 --> 00:04:35,990 Yeah. 96 00:04:35,990 --> 00:04:36,410 It's true. 97 00:04:36,410 --> 00:04:38,360 If, if you're counting three days into 98 00:04:38,360 --> 00:04:40,850 August, I feel like you're probably overreacting. 99 00:04:42,531 --> 00:04:42,821 W. Curtis Preston: Yeah. 100 00:04:43,871 --> 00:04:48,551 Let's first talk about the security release and, you know, it's interesting 101 00:04:48,556 --> 00:04:50,261 the way we do things, right? 102 00:04:50,261 --> 00:04:52,991 Because we, we come out the way we do development. 103 00:04:52,991 --> 00:04:56,951 We come out with lots of little features, uh, you know, we release 104 00:04:56,951 --> 00:05:00,641 them one at a time, uh, via that agile development process. 105 00:05:00,641 --> 00:05:02,201 You would know that more than I would. 106 00:05:02,711 --> 00:05:03,571 Uh, and then we. 107 00:05:03,956 --> 00:05:07,766 Batch them together into what we call a release and we had 108 00:05:07,771 --> 00:05:09,716 the, the security release. 109 00:05:10,256 --> 00:05:12,626 And how, how would you summarize that 110 00:05:13,056 --> 00:05:14,736 Prasanna Malaiyandi: Real briefly, before you talk about security 111 00:05:14,736 --> 00:05:19,056 release, can you briefly give a description of what Druva is for some 112 00:05:19,056 --> 00:05:20,616 of our listeners who may not have 113 00:05:20,616 --> 00:05:21,066 heard 114 00:05:21,194 --> 00:05:21,514 W. Curtis Preston: a good point. 115 00:05:22,026 --> 00:05:24,066 Prasanna Malaiyandi: about our podcast before or the company? 116 00:05:24,726 --> 00:05:25,416 Stephen Manley: Sure. 117 00:05:25,446 --> 00:05:26,766 I I'm happy to do that. 118 00:05:26,856 --> 00:05:30,396 Uh, so, so Druva is a data protection as a service company. 119 00:05:30,401 --> 00:05:35,796 So if you've got laptops, desktops, data center, applications, 120 00:05:35,796 --> 00:05:39,776 cloud native applications, SaaS applications, like Microsoft 365 121 00:05:39,776 --> 00:05:42,056 Google workspace, Salesforce. 122 00:05:42,056 --> 00:05:44,336 And you wanna have that data protected for you. 123 00:05:44,336 --> 00:05:47,126 So you're not managing boxes, you're not managing processes. 124 00:05:47,126 --> 00:05:49,556 You're not managing, you know, capacity planning. 125 00:05:49,556 --> 00:05:51,206 And it just all happens for you. 126 00:05:51,446 --> 00:05:52,116 That's Druva. 127 00:05:52,166 --> 00:05:54,206 Then on the backend, we're storing the data. 128 00:05:54,206 --> 00:05:56,336 We're archiving the data we're doing Dr. 129 00:05:56,341 --> 00:05:56,756 For you. 130 00:05:56,756 --> 00:05:58,436 We're doing ransomware protection. 131 00:05:58,766 --> 00:06:00,686 You know, we're doing compliance governance. 132 00:06:00,686 --> 00:06:02,546 We're giving you insights into the data. 133 00:06:02,786 --> 00:06:07,076 And again, the main point behind all this is, we do all the work for you because. 134 00:06:07,276 --> 00:06:10,246 I have yet to meet a person who says I'd love to spend more time 135 00:06:10,246 --> 00:06:11,656 working on my backup environment. 136 00:06:12,256 --> 00:06:12,676 Prasanna Malaiyandi: Curtis. 137 00:06:13,676 --> 00:06:13,966 Yeah, 138 00:06:13,979 --> 00:06:15,289 W. Curtis Preston: Yeah, that to me. 139 00:06:16,469 --> 00:06:20,399 Although, although, although I will say I much prefer doing restores. 140 00:06:20,999 --> 00:06:21,359 Oh, oh. 141 00:06:21,526 --> 00:06:22,936 Stephen Manley: used the working 142 00:06:23,596 --> 00:06:25,366 like spending time with the backup 143 00:06:25,366 --> 00:06:26,776 environment, but the working 144 00:06:26,776 --> 00:06:27,526 part. 145 00:06:29,534 --> 00:06:30,854 W. Curtis Preston: Yeah, I, I will agree. 146 00:06:30,994 --> 00:06:34,424 I mean, I mean, one thing, you know, I've been in backups for, in not 147 00:06:34,424 --> 00:06:36,254 too many months, it'll be 30 years. 148 00:06:36,254 --> 00:06:40,694 And one thing that's never changed is that nobody wants to be the backup person. 149 00:06:40,904 --> 00:06:41,324 Right. 150 00:06:41,414 --> 00:06:43,784 Um, it, it that's literally. 151 00:06:44,214 --> 00:06:52,974 I mean, that's how I got my job right back in, uh, January of, of, of 1993. 152 00:06:53,094 --> 00:06:53,484 Right. 153 00:06:53,514 --> 00:06:57,414 Um, that, that this guy didn't wanna be the backup person. 154 00:06:57,419 --> 00:07:00,924 And so he gave it to me cuz he wanted to move on to be a, a real SIS admin. 155 00:07:01,134 --> 00:07:01,494 Right. 156 00:07:01,914 --> 00:07:05,454 Uh, so yeah, so, and that's but the thing is it's wouldn't you 157 00:07:05,454 --> 00:07:07,344 agree, Stephen, that it's moved. 158 00:07:08,744 --> 00:07:13,364 To the front though, like backups have gone from this sort of back 159 00:07:13,364 --> 00:07:19,694 of the room, back of the shelf, uh, thing it's moved to the front because 160 00:07:19,694 --> 00:07:21,044 of what's happened with ransomware. 161 00:07:21,044 --> 00:07:21,277 What, 162 00:07:21,277 --> 00:07:23,527 Stephen Manley: All three of us on this podcast might actually have all 163 00:07:23,527 --> 00:07:28,087 started as our first jobs as, as be, I know mine was, was like yours, Curtis. 164 00:07:28,087 --> 00:07:30,877 There was somebody at NetApp who had worked on the backup stuff. 165 00:07:31,582 --> 00:07:35,272 Uh, and it wasn't actually working, but he was far more senior to me. 166 00:07:35,272 --> 00:07:38,722 I was the new college grad and like, Hey, you could go fix this person's work. 167 00:07:39,082 --> 00:07:40,402 Uh, because they don't wanna do it. 168 00:07:40,762 --> 00:07:44,212 Um, and I think Prasanna, you came in kind of the same way on 169 00:07:44,212 --> 00:07:45,382 some data protection stuff too. 170 00:07:45,382 --> 00:07:45,682 Right. 171 00:07:45,712 --> 00:07:51,712 So, so, so I think the shift is that we went from, oh, you're doing this 172 00:07:51,717 --> 00:07:52,912 because no one really wants to do it. 173 00:07:52,912 --> 00:07:57,682 No one cares to now it's, it's so scary and complicated and 174 00:07:57,682 --> 00:07:59,212 there's so much writing on it. 175 00:07:59,917 --> 00:08:03,307 You almost don't want to do it because it's all, there's all the 176 00:08:03,307 --> 00:08:05,977 downside and the upside's not great. 177 00:08:05,977 --> 00:08:08,407 So because it's it's front and center because it's so 178 00:08:08,412 --> 00:08:12,787 hard, you, see a lot of people going, Ooh, I don't do I really can't. 179 00:08:12,787 --> 00:08:14,257 We make that someone else's problem. 180 00:08:14,685 --> 00:08:17,115 W. Curtis Preston: Are you, are you saying it's the third rail in the data center? 181 00:08:17,812 --> 00:08:20,002 Stephen Manley: It, it's getting awfully close to that. 182 00:08:20,002 --> 00:08:23,062 I, I probably, there's probably something in networking. 183 00:08:23,062 --> 00:08:26,902 That's probably worse at this point that, that P you know, cuz everyone always goes, 184 00:08:26,902 --> 00:08:29,092 oh my God, the, you know, wifi maybe. 185 00:08:29,482 --> 00:08:31,312 Uh, but, uh, but yeah. 186 00:08:32,027 --> 00:08:34,127 Prasanna Malaiyandi: Well, well, and I think some of it also comes down 187 00:08:34,127 --> 00:08:36,857 to it's a little bit about risk management, right? 188 00:08:36,977 --> 00:08:40,277 Anytime you're there in an environment trying to reduce risk, right. 189 00:08:40,427 --> 00:08:44,297 It's not the same way as like increasing revenue or productivity or other aspects. 190 00:08:44,297 --> 00:08:47,597 And so you kind of have that stigma associated with it as well. 191 00:08:48,105 --> 00:08:48,395 W. Curtis Preston: Well, 192 00:08:48,402 --> 00:08:50,857 Stephen Manley: if you get it right, everyone says, you know, 193 00:08:50,887 --> 00:08:52,267 yeah, that's what we paid you for. 194 00:08:52,272 --> 00:08:52,957 If you get it wrong, 195 00:08:52,997 --> 00:08:53,477 you're fired. 196 00:08:54,480 --> 00:08:54,930 W. Curtis Preston: right. 197 00:08:54,990 --> 00:08:55,410 right. 198 00:08:55,470 --> 00:08:58,320 No, you're, you're either invisible or you're fired. 199 00:08:59,880 --> 00:09:00,300 right, 200 00:09:00,540 --> 00:09:03,990 No one's ever heard your name or everyone knows your name 201 00:09:04,350 --> 00:09:06,480 and neither of those are good. 202 00:09:06,750 --> 00:09:07,170 right. 203 00:09:07,260 --> 00:09:10,380 And, and the thing is what, what, I guess what I was alluding to before is that. 204 00:09:11,295 --> 00:09:14,805 Backups used to be this thing sort of in the back of the data center. 205 00:09:14,865 --> 00:09:20,505 And, and you didn't have to worry about the security of the backups itself. 206 00:09:20,835 --> 00:09:21,315 Right. 207 00:09:21,320 --> 00:09:25,365 But now we know that ransomware groups are specifically targeting 208 00:09:25,365 --> 00:09:29,445 backups and they're, they're taking the backups out first because they 209 00:09:29,445 --> 00:09:32,805 know if they can do that, they can make a much stronger argument to, to 210 00:09:32,805 --> 00:09:35,200 get the victim to pay the ransom. 211 00:09:36,032 --> 00:09:36,332 Stephen Manley: Yeah. 212 00:09:36,452 --> 00:09:38,342 Uh, that's a really good point. 213 00:09:38,397 --> 00:09:42,357 And I think that's one of the challenges that we see in backup 214 00:09:42,357 --> 00:09:46,527 teams today is it used to be the sort of thing that they just had to do. 215 00:09:46,527 --> 00:09:49,047 And again, it was, it was that, you know, the group that worked in 216 00:09:49,052 --> 00:09:52,407 the basement, no one talked to 'em you, you just got your job done. 217 00:09:52,412 --> 00:09:55,647 You put the tapes on the truck and, and then, you know, you, you either went 218 00:09:55,647 --> 00:10:00,237 home or you slept in the basement one or the other, um, Where, whereas today the 219 00:10:00,237 --> 00:10:04,587 backup admin has to work with the security team because are my backup secure. 220 00:10:04,587 --> 00:10:07,497 And when ransomware attack happens, you're part of the process to, 221 00:10:07,797 --> 00:10:09,477 to do forensics and recover. 222 00:10:09,747 --> 00:10:12,387 You've gotta work with the application teams, cuz I 223 00:10:12,387 --> 00:10:13,887 don't wanna just recover data. 224 00:10:13,887 --> 00:10:15,327 I wanna recover apps. 225 00:10:15,537 --> 00:10:16,887 I've gotta work with the cloud team. 226 00:10:16,887 --> 00:10:18,362 It's got tentacles everywhere. 227 00:10:18,692 --> 00:10:22,562 It's a complicated, hard job that, that isn't just about tech anymore. 228 00:10:22,562 --> 00:10:22,892 It is. 229 00:10:22,892 --> 00:10:23,492 It's a lot 230 00:10:23,492 --> 00:10:24,852 about connecting with different people. 231 00:10:25,652 --> 00:10:28,052 Prasanna Malaiyandi: So I know you talked about Druva being backup, 232 00:10:28,052 --> 00:10:29,372 compliance, everything else. 233 00:10:29,372 --> 00:10:31,862 And now you're talking about ransomware and having the backup 234 00:10:31,862 --> 00:10:34,592 team, working with the security team and the application team. 235 00:10:34,802 --> 00:10:38,222 So what is this new security release that Druva just announced? 236 00:10:39,962 --> 00:10:43,162 Stephen Manley: In my mind, it's really, it it's three things, you know, there 237 00:10:43,162 --> 00:10:46,222 there's a lot of parts to it, but when you break down a, a recovery from a 238 00:10:46,222 --> 00:10:49,942 ransomware, the first part is always, I need to make sure my backups are 239 00:10:49,942 --> 00:10:53,122 there and they're recoverable because that's, that's, that's the basic. 240 00:10:53,152 --> 00:10:56,842 And so in this release, we, we added the data lock option, which really 241 00:10:56,842 --> 00:11:00,862 gives you that, you know, this backup can't be deleted no matter what happens. 242 00:11:00,892 --> 00:11:03,222 And so you know that your backup's gonna be there. 243 00:11:04,022 --> 00:11:08,172 Then the second part is you wanna be able to, detect and minimize 244 00:11:08,172 --> 00:11:11,032 the possible damage of a ransomware attack, cuz no matter how good your 245 00:11:11,032 --> 00:11:15,262 defenses are, someone somewhere is gonna click on a phishing email and 246 00:11:15,262 --> 00:11:16,402 you're gonna get hit with ransomware. 247 00:11:16,822 --> 00:11:21,412 And so, you know, our security posture really helps you understand, you know, 248 00:11:21,412 --> 00:11:25,702 how can you bring your environment up to best practices so that you, you you'll 249 00:11:25,762 --> 00:11:28,602 have minimal impact from, from being hit. 250 00:11:29,082 --> 00:11:32,327 And, and then, and then the last part is, is, is that detection piece. 251 00:11:32,327 --> 00:11:36,527 So looking at the observability saying we're tracking what's happening, not 252 00:11:36,527 --> 00:11:40,817 just from a data change, but also, uh, unusual administrator behavior, 253 00:11:40,817 --> 00:11:43,997 unusual settings, you know, all the things that could highlight 254 00:11:44,002 --> 00:11:47,927 that someone has gotten into your environment that is doing something bad. 255 00:11:48,477 --> 00:11:52,587 Uh, so, so that you can stop it and start that forensics and recovery 256 00:11:52,587 --> 00:11:53,997 process as soon as possible. 257 00:11:53,997 --> 00:11:55,347 So your business is up and running. 258 00:11:55,377 --> 00:11:59,307 So, so it's really those three chunks that, that we focused on in this release. 259 00:11:59,852 --> 00:12:00,212 Prasanna Malaiyandi: Gotcha. 260 00:12:00,217 --> 00:12:04,952 And going back to sort of Druva as that managed service, I'm assuming 261 00:12:04,952 --> 00:12:06,452 in some large companies, right. 262 00:12:06,452 --> 00:12:10,202 They probably are doing this in some sort of manual way where they're standing up 263 00:12:10,202 --> 00:12:13,502 sort of SEIMs analyzing data if possible. 264 00:12:14,327 --> 00:12:16,127 At least looking at the admin actions. 265 00:12:16,127 --> 00:12:16,367 Right. 266 00:12:16,367 --> 00:12:18,797 But going back to what you were talking about, like Druva helped 267 00:12:18,797 --> 00:12:22,307 you sort of simplify that And gives it all to you as kind of a service. 268 00:12:22,517 --> 00:12:23,627 So you don't need that person. 269 00:12:23,627 --> 00:12:24,527 Who's an expert at that. 270 00:12:25,177 --> 00:12:25,897 Stephen Manley: Exactly. 271 00:12:25,897 --> 00:12:29,827 And then, and then for those larger companies, we will then feed the, the, 272 00:12:29,827 --> 00:12:33,067 the alerts and the things that we're figuring out into their SEIM, so they 273 00:12:33,067 --> 00:12:37,447 can make it part of an even larger rule set because unusual things happening 274 00:12:37,447 --> 00:12:40,987 in your backup environment, combined with other, you know, sort of other 275 00:12:40,987 --> 00:12:45,487 triggers may, may give you that, that sort of certainty that yes, I am under a 276 00:12:45,487 --> 00:12:46,327 ransomware attack. 277 00:12:46,327 --> 00:12:49,327 It's time to pull the big red lever and, and get the company 278 00:12:49,327 --> 00:12:50,707 in, into ransomware recovery. 279 00:12:51,945 --> 00:12:54,375 W. Curtis Preston: Now, uh, just curious, uh, although, 280 00:12:54,405 --> 00:12:56,925 you know, I know the answer to this question, but you're 281 00:12:56,930 --> 00:12:58,185 on the hot seat today, buddy. 282 00:12:58,515 --> 00:13:03,885 So you, you mentioned about this data lock feature and that sounds good, but 283 00:13:04,125 --> 00:13:06,555 didn't you already previously talk about. 284 00:13:06,845 --> 00:13:09,425 That backups couldn't be deleted. 285 00:13:09,425 --> 00:13:11,945 So how is this different than what you already had? 286 00:13:12,892 --> 00:13:13,102 Stephen Manley: Yeah. 287 00:13:13,102 --> 00:13:17,622 Some, someone, I, uh, someone I know well talks about immutability as being, 288 00:13:17,622 --> 00:13:22,342 you know, a bit of a, a, you know, a continuum, a sliding window, if you will. 289 00:13:22,362 --> 00:13:22,582 And 290 00:13:22,922 --> 00:13:32,382 so if you think about though slightly overpaid, but anyway, the, the, 291 00:13:32,382 --> 00:13:33,742 the, the way to think about it is. 292 00:13:34,582 --> 00:13:37,792 You know, Druva for the longest time has basically said, look, 293 00:13:38,122 --> 00:13:41,832 here's what we're doing is your backups are already off-site. 294 00:13:42,187 --> 00:13:46,207 In the cloud under separate account control, because again, SaaS service 295 00:13:46,207 --> 00:13:47,857 Druva's in control your backups. 296 00:13:48,307 --> 00:13:53,807 Um, the data is de-duplicate compressed, encrypted, sharded, uh, in object storage. 297 00:13:53,832 --> 00:13:57,547 So it's largely inert in like a big jigsaw puzzle that no one can do anything with. 298 00:13:57,547 --> 00:14:00,967 Anyway, until Druva puts it back together, you know, in conjunction 299 00:14:00,967 --> 00:14:04,877 with, with the customer's requests, , in an environment that doesn't really 300 00:14:04,877 --> 00:14:06,107 have persistent compute running. 301 00:14:06,107 --> 00:14:09,287 So there's not even a place for ransomware to, to sort of launch 302 00:14:09,287 --> 00:14:10,877 attacks against your backups. 303 00:14:10,937 --> 00:14:15,197 So your backups were already, you know, unmodifiable, 304 00:14:15,467 --> 00:14:16,997 inaccessible to the ransomware. 305 00:14:17,927 --> 00:14:20,777 Um, but what we did find is that, uh, again, the, the 306 00:14:20,777 --> 00:14:22,607 ransomware attacks get smart. 307 00:14:23,027 --> 00:14:27,072 So they weren't just going after the backup server anymore, they were trying to 308 00:14:27,072 --> 00:14:30,852 social engineer to get to complete control of our, our customer's environment. 309 00:14:30,852 --> 00:14:33,792 So, you know, passwords access the whole deal. 310 00:14:34,122 --> 00:14:37,032 In which case, now the ransomware starts to look like an insider 311 00:14:37,032 --> 00:14:40,302 threat because they literally have control of your environment. 312 00:14:40,782 --> 00:14:41,352 And so. 313 00:14:41,957 --> 00:14:43,337 Those insiders are smart. 314 00:14:43,367 --> 00:14:45,917 They start to go, well, what if I just delete all the backups? 315 00:14:45,917 --> 00:14:48,137 I don't have to, to get into the Druva cloud. 316 00:14:48,137 --> 00:14:51,047 If I simply make it look like the administrator's trying to delete all 317 00:14:51,047 --> 00:14:56,927 the backups or set the retention to one hour or stop scheduling backups 318 00:14:56,927 --> 00:14:58,367 or any of those sorts of things. 319 00:14:59,162 --> 00:15:04,122 And so the immutability was all about, look, even if someone, you know, 320 00:15:04,122 --> 00:15:08,122 becomes Curtis the administrator, they can't delete those backups. 321 00:15:08,122 --> 00:15:11,362 Now we already had protections in place that, you know, if they became 322 00:15:11,422 --> 00:15:14,972 you, Curtis, you know, we'd be able to recover those backups for another week. 323 00:15:15,382 --> 00:15:18,932 And, and we would again be detecting the unusual patterns, but this just 324 00:15:18,932 --> 00:15:23,852 gives you that extra degree of, of belt suspenders and something else that would 325 00:15:23,852 --> 00:15:25,532 hold up your pants that I can't think of. 326 00:15:25,532 --> 00:15:25,742 Right. 327 00:15:26,837 --> 00:15:27,767 Anti-gravity 328 00:15:28,782 --> 00:15:31,962 Prasanna Malaiyandi: so having worked in the storage industry, Stephen, right. 329 00:15:32,442 --> 00:15:37,492 A lot of people have very specific definition of what immutability means. 330 00:15:37,512 --> 00:15:39,322 Typically it's just at a storage layer. 331 00:15:39,582 --> 00:15:45,252 It looks like what Druva's offering is you're protecting customers by giving 332 00:15:45,252 --> 00:15:47,622 them that same guarantee that their backups aren't going away, which is 333 00:15:47,622 --> 00:15:49,832 what the storage immutability gives. 334 00:15:49,832 --> 00:15:52,792 But you're doing it at sort of from an admin perspective and protecting 335 00:15:52,792 --> 00:15:56,912 the front end as well because normal storage immutability wouldn't prevent 336 00:15:56,912 --> 00:16:00,102 someone from stopping your scheduled backups from happening or other aspects. 337 00:16:01,000 --> 00:16:01,300 W. Curtis Preston: right. 338 00:16:01,300 --> 00:16:05,490 Cuz it's immutability for, for all aspects of the Druva environment, not 339 00:16:05,490 --> 00:16:06,610 just your backups. 340 00:16:06,660 --> 00:16:09,210 We could have used object lock, right? 341 00:16:09,210 --> 00:16:12,780 Because we use S3, we could have used object lock, which means 342 00:16:12,780 --> 00:16:17,580 that when a backup is made, a customer's backup is locked by 343 00:16:18,210 --> 00:16:20,430 AWS and nothing can ever be done. 344 00:16:20,670 --> 00:16:22,200 You know, there's no way to get out of that. 345 00:16:22,740 --> 00:16:29,350 That does occasionally create, um, Uh, compliance issues where customers 346 00:16:29,355 --> 00:16:30,420 comes and says, you know what? 347 00:16:30,750 --> 00:16:34,140 I know I told you that I didn't want to be able to delete any of my backups. 348 00:16:34,650 --> 00:16:37,830 There's this thing that we back up that we really need to get rid of 349 00:16:37,890 --> 00:16:39,690 all evidence of et cetera, et cetera. 350 00:16:39,780 --> 00:16:44,370 Cetera, we do have a process that it's not through the UI. 351 00:16:44,370 --> 00:16:45,870 You have to contact support. 352 00:16:45,870 --> 00:16:48,750 There's lots of legal stuff going back and forth to make sure that 353 00:16:48,750 --> 00:16:50,490 we're talking with the right entity. 354 00:16:50,790 --> 00:16:55,380 Uh, we are able to selectively allow you to go in and delete that. 355 00:16:55,560 --> 00:16:58,260 You wouldn't be able to do that if we had used object lock. 356 00:16:58,510 --> 00:17:04,360 I wanted to discuss that because I, I really saw that as we needed to come out 357 00:17:04,360 --> 00:17:08,650 with those features in order to do the thing that we just announced, uh, we're 358 00:17:08,650 --> 00:17:10,540 actually recording this on the day that. 359 00:17:11,590 --> 00:17:17,170 That the, this thing was announced and this'll, this'll go live, um, next week. 360 00:17:17,620 --> 00:17:22,870 But, um, talk to me, Stephen, about the, you know, the thing 361 00:17:22,870 --> 00:17:23,740 that was announced today. 362 00:17:24,482 --> 00:17:24,752 Stephen Manley: Yeah. 363 00:17:24,752 --> 00:17:30,662 So today Druva announced its $10 million data resiliency guarantee and. 364 00:17:31,247 --> 00:17:33,287 You know, you hear that term. 365 00:17:33,437 --> 00:17:36,197 And, and the first thing I wanna do is just, just tease apart. 366 00:17:36,527 --> 00:17:39,677 What are the two things in this that, that make it make it special? 367 00:17:39,677 --> 00:17:43,217 Because there have been guarantees in our, in our part of the industry before. 368 00:17:43,787 --> 00:17:46,337 Uh, and so the first part that I think everyone's gonna be able to get 369 00:17:46,337 --> 00:17:50,777 pretty quickly is that's 10 million, which is twice as much as 5 million, 370 00:17:50,777 --> 00:17:52,157 which was the highest guarantee. 371 00:17:52,712 --> 00:17:55,022 So double the size, right? 372 00:17:55,022 --> 00:17:56,432 So let's get that one out of the way. 373 00:17:56,432 --> 00:17:57,482 That's the easy one. 374 00:17:58,172 --> 00:18:01,622 The main purpose though behind it, isn't so much at all. 375 00:18:01,622 --> 00:18:03,962 We, we put in twice as much for twice as confident though. 376 00:18:03,962 --> 00:18:04,412 It's true. 377 00:18:04,802 --> 00:18:09,392 Uh, the main purpose was the fact that the guarantee covers a lot more. 378 00:18:09,887 --> 00:18:12,467 Because, you know, we've gotten so focused on ransomware. 379 00:18:12,467 --> 00:18:18,897 Look, ransomware is a huge deal, but you know, if you look at the set of Druva 380 00:18:18,917 --> 00:18:20,897 restores and, and people restoring Dr. 381 00:18:20,927 --> 00:18:21,757 Data from Druva. 382 00:18:21,947 --> 00:18:24,077 Basically 24 by seven, right? 383 00:18:24,082 --> 00:18:28,727 Given we've got thousands of customers globally, most of those restores are 384 00:18:28,727 --> 00:18:31,352 not because of ransomware attacks. 385 00:18:31,352 --> 00:18:35,702 They're because of, you know, natural disasters or system failures or 386 00:18:35,702 --> 00:18:40,742 users do something or applications fail, or administrators configure all 387 00:18:40,742 --> 00:18:42,242 those sorts of things still go wrong. 388 00:18:42,662 --> 00:18:45,842 And so the whole point in the guarantee was five SLAs. 389 00:18:46,772 --> 00:18:48,722 And it all started with reliability. 390 00:18:49,022 --> 00:18:52,652 You know, anytime we talk about recovery and, and, and Curtis loves 391 00:18:52,652 --> 00:18:56,582 recovery, but it, you know, to be able to recover, you need a good backup. 392 00:18:56,882 --> 00:18:59,522 And so this is where we said, you know, we're gonna, we're gonna 393 00:18:59,522 --> 00:19:01,922 guarantee 99% successful backups. 394 00:19:02,132 --> 00:19:06,152 Um, then, you know, the, the next thing is all right, so now 395 00:19:06,152 --> 00:19:07,442 that, that data's been backed up. 396 00:19:07,442 --> 00:19:07,742 All right. 397 00:19:07,742 --> 00:19:12,542 Let's make sure that it can't be hit by, by ransomware either, uh, 398 00:19:12,572 --> 00:19:17,222 exfiltrating the data or breaking confidentiality or deleting the backup. 399 00:19:17,522 --> 00:19:22,097 So a hundred percent guarantee that if you do a backup successfully, You 400 00:19:22,097 --> 00:19:25,697 know, you'll be able to restore that backup, um, regardless of ransomware 401 00:19:25,697 --> 00:19:30,437 attack, uh, as well as you know, that data's never gonna get compromised and 402 00:19:30,437 --> 00:19:35,327 spread, then you get to, to the next piece, which is, but of course, I might 403 00:19:35,327 --> 00:19:36,827 need to restore this 10 years from now. 404 00:19:36,827 --> 00:19:38,177 That's not a ransomware attack. 405 00:19:38,177 --> 00:19:41,652 That's, Prasanna's probably getting sued for some reason, and we need that 406 00:19:41,652 --> 00:19:46,662 data back to prove that in fact, he came up with that IP or, you know, 407 00:19:46,662 --> 00:19:48,732 whatever that is, that that happens. 408 00:19:48,822 --> 00:19:53,202 Uh, and so, so, so now it's the we're going to be able to, to, you know, 409 00:19:53,202 --> 00:19:56,802 that that durability of data, the five, nine S is gonna be recoverable. 410 00:19:57,192 --> 00:19:59,832 And then the last part is, look, if this is a service. 411 00:20:00,482 --> 00:20:02,972 Better be up and running because if I need to get something outta 412 00:20:02,972 --> 00:20:07,412 my service and I get the, you know, the spinning circle that says 413 00:20:07,412 --> 00:20:09,572 it's not running, that's super bad. 414 00:20:09,572 --> 00:20:14,522 So we have the 99.5% availability, uh, guarantee as well. 415 00:20:14,527 --> 00:20:18,722 So we wanted to make sure people knew we're guaranteeing their end to end data 416 00:20:18,722 --> 00:20:23,942 protection, not just like one little piece in saying, and the rest is all up to you. 417 00:20:23,942 --> 00:20:24,722 Good luck. 418 00:20:24,782 --> 00:20:27,742 Uh, but that, again, as a service, we're covering the whole thing. 419 00:20:28,982 --> 00:20:29,912 Prasanna Malaiyandi: I like the five points. 420 00:20:29,912 --> 00:20:30,332 I like that. 421 00:20:30,332 --> 00:20:31,382 It's very simple. 422 00:20:31,382 --> 00:20:33,152 And you articulated it really well. 423 00:20:33,512 --> 00:20:41,072 Um, one question I had is why was like the percentage for backups at 99. 424 00:20:41,132 --> 00:20:42,542 I think you said 99%, right. 425 00:20:43,052 --> 00:20:43,952 And not a hun. 426 00:20:44,162 --> 00:20:44,372 Yeah. 427 00:20:44,372 --> 00:20:46,652 And not a hundred percent successful backups. 428 00:20:46,682 --> 00:20:47,162 why 429 00:20:47,312 --> 00:20:48,272 why that 1%. 430 00:20:50,347 --> 00:20:52,627 Stephen Manley: And the reality is I think anybody who's, who's been in the 431 00:20:52,627 --> 00:20:54,717 industry for, for a long time knows. 432 00:20:55,417 --> 00:20:59,977 Yeah, backups fail for reasons that, that, you know, the Druva cloud can be up and, 433 00:20:59,977 --> 00:21:05,467 and everything's going well, but your server goes down, your network goes down, 434 00:21:05,767 --> 00:21:08,467 um, you know, your system is overloaded. 435 00:21:08,767 --> 00:21:11,317 Uh, you know, because we do endpoint backups, you know, 436 00:21:11,317 --> 00:21:13,807 someone shuts off their laptop. 437 00:21:13,807 --> 00:21:17,347 It's really hard to get a backup of a system that's shut down. 438 00:21:17,677 --> 00:21:17,827 Yeah. 439 00:21:17,827 --> 00:21:23,587 So, so, so, so the, the reality is, as you know, We'd love to get to a hundred 440 00:21:23,587 --> 00:21:26,647 percent, but we do live in the real world. 441 00:21:26,647 --> 00:21:30,787 And in the real world, there are external factors that can cause backups to fail. 442 00:21:30,907 --> 00:21:34,417 And, and so we went through our numbers and said, this is, this 443 00:21:34,417 --> 00:21:38,587 is a, a credible reasonable number that Druva is able to deliver. 444 00:21:38,777 --> 00:21:39,887 Let's put our stamp on that. 445 00:21:40,340 --> 00:21:44,120 W. Curtis Preston: I would put that next to the durability, uh, 446 00:21:44,180 --> 00:21:49,430 guarantee, because what we're saying is 99% of the time you ask us to do 447 00:21:49,430 --> 00:21:51,140 a backup we'll, we'll get that done. 448 00:21:51,140 --> 00:21:51,440 Right. 449 00:21:51,440 --> 00:21:54,380 And if that one doesn't work, we're gonna retry and, and get another 450 00:21:54,380 --> 00:21:55,550 one and get that one successful. 451 00:21:55,555 --> 00:21:55,790 Right. 452 00:21:56,030 --> 00:22:00,900 But once we get that backup done and successful, we've got five nines 453 00:22:00,900 --> 00:22:05,480 of durability that once it's backed up, we're guaranteeing that we will 454 00:22:05,480 --> 00:22:06,860 be able to recover that backup. 455 00:22:06,960 --> 00:22:08,550 Stephen Manley: We did mention we're on S three. 456 00:22:08,640 --> 00:22:13,500 Um, and, and some of our metadata is stored in, in other other AWS tools. 457 00:22:13,980 --> 00:22:18,155 Um, itself has certain reliability durabilits guarantees. 458 00:22:18,155 --> 00:22:19,290 So again, as I look out. 459 00:22:19,690 --> 00:22:22,930 10 years, 20 years, life of patient plus seven years. 460 00:22:23,290 --> 00:22:27,310 Um, you know, we are potentially talking about restoring data from 50 year. 461 00:22:27,340 --> 00:22:30,580 Well, obviously we don't have 50 year old data yet, but, but as, 462 00:22:30,580 --> 00:22:32,230 as you know, as that time goes. 463 00:22:32,230 --> 00:22:35,830 And so, so there is some room there for, you know, how do you manage 464 00:22:35,830 --> 00:22:37,090 bit rot and things like that. 465 00:22:38,016 --> 00:22:40,316 Prasanna Malaiyandi: so are there certain things A customer 466 00:22:40,321 --> 00:22:42,776 has to do in order to qualify? 467 00:22:42,781 --> 00:22:44,456 Like I know you mentioned okay. 468 00:22:44,666 --> 00:22:46,526 You wanna make sure that your backups are successful. 469 00:22:46,526 --> 00:22:48,476 There are certain things that are outside of your control. 470 00:22:48,806 --> 00:22:51,056 Um, are there other things A customer has to do in order 471 00:22:51,056 --> 00:22:52,346 to qualify for this guarantee? 472 00:22:53,501 --> 00:22:54,211 Stephen Manley: A absolutely. 473 00:22:54,241 --> 00:22:56,971 That's one of the things that is important to me about this. 474 00:22:56,971 --> 00:22:59,851 And, we were talking to, to someone in the press who said, you know, 475 00:22:59,851 --> 00:23:03,181 is this release really just sort of a marketing fluff thing meant to 476 00:23:03,181 --> 00:23:05,851 get some attention or is this real? 477 00:23:06,101 --> 00:23:08,891 And frankly, that's a really good question, because I would imagine a 478 00:23:08,891 --> 00:23:13,301 lot of people who have been in this industry for a long time, right? 479 00:23:13,331 --> 00:23:16,781 Whether you've seen Tommy boy or not, you know, that warranties and guarantees, 480 00:23:16,781 --> 00:23:19,681 don't always mean something real. 481 00:23:19,681 --> 00:23:23,131 And so some of what we wanted to do is we, we did wanna put some, 482 00:23:23,341 --> 00:23:26,641 some, some teeth behind it to make sure that, you know, the, the, the 483 00:23:26,646 --> 00:23:29,641 customers treat it seriously as well. 484 00:23:29,701 --> 00:23:33,811 And so, uh, so some of the gates here are you do have to have the, 485 00:23:33,811 --> 00:23:35,461 the, the data lock feature enabled. 486 00:23:35,496 --> 00:23:39,876 You do have to, uh, you know, get the observability suite so that you can be 487 00:23:39,876 --> 00:23:41,766 monitoring for the ransomware protection. 488 00:23:42,006 --> 00:23:45,216 You are gonna have to go through sort of a security health check with 489 00:23:45,221 --> 00:23:48,906 us to make sure that again, you're configured reasonably, right? 490 00:23:48,906 --> 00:23:52,956 I mean, if, if you've got the world's worst setup, then I'm not 491 00:23:52,956 --> 00:23:56,736 gonna get 99% backup reliability or the security because. 492 00:23:57,066 --> 00:24:00,606 You know, you're handing out your password to, to everybody that's 493 00:24:00,606 --> 00:24:02,916 posted on your, your window outside. 494 00:24:02,916 --> 00:24:04,206 That's that's not gonna work for us. 495 00:24:04,206 --> 00:24:04,476 So, 496 00:24:04,626 --> 00:24:06,966 Prasanna Malaiyandi: And that's probably some like the best practices. 497 00:24:06,966 --> 00:24:09,456 That's probably things companies should be following already. 498 00:24:09,516 --> 00:24:12,516 And if they're not like, I know we had Curtis, we had snorkel 499 00:24:12,516 --> 00:24:13,866 42 on the podcast, right. 500 00:24:13,866 --> 00:24:16,836 Talking about, Hey, here are some basic security things. 501 00:24:16,836 --> 00:24:19,626 Even if you don't have a CISO, you should be doing. 502 00:24:19,626 --> 00:24:23,406 And a lot of 'em were very basic things that most companies can do 503 00:24:23,406 --> 00:24:27,556 and prevent a lot of ransomware attacks or other intrusions. 504 00:24:28,301 --> 00:24:30,371 Stephen Manley: Yeah, well, one, one of the things that I, I talk 505 00:24:30,371 --> 00:24:31,901 to our customers about a lot 506 00:24:31,931 --> 00:24:32,441 is. 507 00:24:33,836 --> 00:24:38,116 Because almost like Curtis's point on immutability, never being a hundred 508 00:24:38,116 --> 00:24:41,436 percent, you're never gonna be a hundred percent protected from ransomware because 509 00:24:41,436 --> 00:24:43,276 you do have users, you do run a business. 510 00:24:43,276 --> 00:24:48,716 Security is always risk management, but the customers that I have 511 00:24:48,986 --> 00:24:51,996 seen that are more successful, there's two things they do. 512 00:24:52,166 --> 00:24:55,166 And this is almost that model of, you know, you drive through 513 00:24:55,166 --> 00:24:58,016 a neighborhood and you see people with like the thing in their lawn 514 00:24:58,016 --> 00:25:00,401 that says protected by XYZ security. 515 00:25:01,871 --> 00:25:05,786 of what you're trying to do is just show external attackers that you're 516 00:25:06,306 --> 00:25:10,586 probably well protected enough that there's an easier target somewhere else. 517 00:25:10,586 --> 00:25:13,256 And I know it, it sounds bad because it's basically saying go 518 00:25:13,256 --> 00:25:14,816 hit my neighbor instead of me. 519 00:25:15,116 --> 00:25:16,646 But the reality is this is your business. 520 00:25:16,646 --> 00:25:17,666 This is your livelihood. 521 00:25:17,666 --> 00:25:22,496 So if you follow these best practices, there are enough easier targets out 522 00:25:22,496 --> 00:25:26,306 there that most of the ransomware, you know, attackers will focus on those. 523 00:25:26,606 --> 00:25:30,386 So if you do those best practices, right, and you get the basics, you know, 524 00:25:30,386 --> 00:25:33,596 again, you don't have to be faster than the bear just gotta be faster than you. 525 00:25:34,286 --> 00:25:35,846 Uh, that that's one. 526 00:25:35,846 --> 00:25:40,556 And then, and then the second one is if you get hit and you are able to recover 527 00:25:40,556 --> 00:25:44,696 quickly and not pay the ransom again, the, the odds of you getting hit with 528 00:25:44,696 --> 00:25:48,026 lightning twice drop a lot, because what's the point of hitting somebody 529 00:25:48,026 --> 00:25:49,706 that's already shown that they can resist. 530 00:25:49,756 --> 00:25:52,456 So this is the old perfect is the enemy of the good. 531 00:25:53,206 --> 00:25:57,136 Do the right things, do the basic right things, you know, do the health 532 00:25:57,136 --> 00:26:00,706 check with us and the chances of you being attacked actually drop a lot. 533 00:26:00,796 --> 00:26:03,586 Not because your security will be perfect, but because it'll 534 00:26:03,591 --> 00:26:05,176 be better than everybody else's. 535 00:26:06,414 --> 00:26:07,014 W. Curtis Preston: Yeah, I like that. 536 00:26:07,019 --> 00:26:09,324 And by the way, I do have it on good authority that. 537 00:26:10,219 --> 00:26:16,009 If you happen to go to eBay and you buy the signs from XYZ security company that 538 00:26:16,009 --> 00:26:19,879 you put in front of your door that say protected by XYZ security company, but 539 00:26:19,879 --> 00:26:21,919 you don't actually have the service. 540 00:26:22,309 --> 00:26:27,319 Um, you will receive a call from XYZ security company that says, Hey, 541 00:26:27,799 --> 00:26:31,399 um, we noticed you have signs out front of your house that say you're 542 00:26:31,399 --> 00:26:33,719 protected by us, but you're not. 543 00:26:33,749 --> 00:26:35,819 Would you like to actually have service? 544 00:26:36,539 --> 00:26:40,589 I'm just saying on good authority that that's what will happen 545 00:26:41,011 --> 00:26:44,041 Prasanna Malaiyandi: well, I, well, and here, but here's the other thing 546 00:26:44,041 --> 00:26:45,391 about that challenge with that though? 547 00:26:45,391 --> 00:26:49,261 Curtis is there have been alarm systems in the past that have had, 548 00:26:49,571 --> 00:26:54,911 vulnerabilities and actually advertising that you have XYZ system may actually 549 00:26:54,911 --> 00:26:58,961 not be the best approach because it can also help the people identify, 550 00:26:58,961 --> 00:27:00,401 Hey, that's a house I should actually. 551 00:27:00,926 --> 00:27:02,246 So it kind of goes both ways. 552 00:27:02,324 --> 00:27:04,484 So you have this guarantee in place. 553 00:27:04,484 --> 00:27:06,614 You help the customers go through, make sure everything's set up. 554 00:27:07,604 --> 00:27:10,484 What happens if or when they get hit, like, are they 555 00:27:10,484 --> 00:27:12,014 supposed to reach out to you? 556 00:27:12,044 --> 00:27:12,344 Right. 557 00:27:12,344 --> 00:27:13,514 Like what does that look like? 558 00:27:13,514 --> 00:27:14,084 How do they know? 559 00:27:14,084 --> 00:27:16,514 Because I know usually you have a ransomware playbook. 560 00:27:16,514 --> 00:27:20,654 When we had Tony Mendoza from spectralogic on and they got hit with ransomware. 561 00:27:20,654 --> 00:27:23,654 He was walking us through the fact that they had no playbook. 562 00:27:23,654 --> 00:27:25,754 and so they worked with their cyber insurance company to 563 00:27:25,754 --> 00:27:27,254 sort of get things going. 564 00:27:27,794 --> 00:27:29,744 What happens for these customers? 565 00:27:29,744 --> 00:27:32,384 Like how is Druva helping them with that playbook? 566 00:27:32,384 --> 00:27:32,774 If you will. 567 00:27:33,284 --> 00:27:36,524 Stephen Manley: So I'd break that into, into two questions and, and, and so 568 00:27:36,524 --> 00:27:41,054 the first one is, uh, again, one of the press people called, how do I win? 569 00:27:41,774 --> 00:27:41,984 Right. 570 00:27:41,984 --> 00:27:46,634 So, so it's the, how do I get this payout? 571 00:27:46,724 --> 00:27:51,374 And, and to your point, Uh, basically it's, it's, it's a real simple form that 572 00:27:51,374 --> 00:27:55,964 if the customer feels like I've had a lot of backup failures lately, or again, you 573 00:27:55,964 --> 00:27:58,004 know, I wasn't able to recover my data. 574 00:27:58,364 --> 00:27:59,744 You know, it's, it's a real simple form. 575 00:27:59,744 --> 00:28:03,554 They file, uh, with Druva and then obviously we, we work with them 576 00:28:03,554 --> 00:28:06,914 to, to diagnose and, and job one's gonna be first, let let's get 577 00:28:06,914 --> 00:28:08,414 your environment up and healthy. 578 00:28:08,414 --> 00:28:11,469 And then job two is, is, you know, Let's figure out what sort 579 00:28:11,469 --> 00:28:12,999 of compensation you deserve. 580 00:28:13,599 --> 00:28:16,659 Uh, so, so yeah, so again, the goal here is to make it pretty easy for 581 00:28:16,659 --> 00:28:19,869 them just to, to submit a claim and then, and then, and then process 582 00:28:19,869 --> 00:28:23,649 that now I think the second part is if they're hit with ransomware. 583 00:28:23,859 --> 00:28:24,009 Yeah. 584 00:28:24,039 --> 00:28:26,439 Druva has a lot of playbooks in terms of. 585 00:28:26,689 --> 00:28:29,539 This is how you respond to a ransomware attack. 586 00:28:29,599 --> 00:28:33,679 Um, you know, ranging from these are your first step, you know, core. 587 00:28:33,709 --> 00:28:37,849 Your backup should be quarantined to here's the logs you're gonna need for 588 00:28:37,849 --> 00:28:42,379 your forensics to here's how you're gonna do sort of a sandbox recovery. 589 00:28:42,379 --> 00:28:44,089 Here's how you can scan for malware. 590 00:28:44,089 --> 00:28:45,499 So you're not gonna recover it. 591 00:28:45,619 --> 00:28:48,499 Here's how you get a golden image of, of your data. 592 00:28:49,099 --> 00:28:51,799 That, that has sort of the latest, good version of every file. 593 00:28:51,889 --> 00:28:55,039 Here's how you can bring that data back into your environment 594 00:28:55,039 --> 00:28:56,179 and get yourself up and running. 595 00:28:56,179 --> 00:29:00,109 So, so, so we definitely wanna help them recover from ransomware, but again, if 596 00:29:00,109 --> 00:29:04,159 something goes wrong, if we don't meet our SLAs, then absolutely we would make 597 00:29:04,159 --> 00:29:08,569 it easy for them to file a claim so that they can, uh, quote unquote, win. 598 00:29:09,534 --> 00:29:10,284 Prasanna Malaiyandi: And I think, 599 00:29:11,062 --> 00:29:13,642 W. Curtis Preston: Oh, I'll, I'll put something on top of that, Stephen, cuz I 600 00:29:13,642 --> 00:29:17,842 know one of the, you know, we we've been working on this for a little, you know, 601 00:29:17,902 --> 00:29:19,972 for a minute as the young kids would say. 602 00:29:20,312 --> 00:29:23,852 One of the things that we had to do was to give the customer easier. 603 00:29:24,147 --> 00:29:29,307 Uh, an easier way to see what metrics they have. 604 00:29:29,547 --> 00:29:33,327 Like we already had these metrics, we were monitoring the metrics, but we didn't 605 00:29:33,327 --> 00:29:37,557 have an easy way for each customer to see what their personal metrics were. 606 00:29:37,887 --> 00:29:38,127 Right. 607 00:29:38,132 --> 00:29:44,132 So I know that we, we did some work in the back end, so that the customers could 608 00:29:44,132 --> 00:29:48,332 see what their SLAs, you know, whether they're being met or not met, which would 609 00:29:48,332 --> 00:29:54,242 be sort of the first step of, Hey, I'm at a 97% success rate on my backups. 610 00:29:54,452 --> 00:29:57,242 Then they go to that they go to that, uh, that form 611 00:29:57,292 --> 00:29:59,742 Stephen Manley: It's one of the things, obviously, you know, if people. 612 00:30:00,412 --> 00:30:01,682 Don't know on this podcast Prasanna. 613 00:30:01,702 --> 00:30:05,332 And I worked together for about a billion years, including at EMC. 614 00:30:05,982 --> 00:30:09,712 And, and one of the nice things about being in a SaaS company is you look and 615 00:30:09,712 --> 00:30:12,322 say, boy, I'd really love that statistic. 616 00:30:12,322 --> 00:30:15,502 I'd love that piece of telemetry and you pop it in. 617 00:30:15,502 --> 00:30:19,072 And two weeks later, you know, the, you get your, you get your update and 618 00:30:19,072 --> 00:30:20,542 suddenly you're getting that telemetry. 619 00:30:20,542 --> 00:30:21,922 So you can get that reporting. 620 00:30:22,432 --> 00:30:25,102 You contrast that to back in the old days. 621 00:30:25,527 --> 00:30:26,897 Where it was like, all right. 622 00:30:26,897 --> 00:30:28,487 So we know we need this piece of data. 623 00:30:28,727 --> 00:30:28,907 All right. 624 00:30:28,907 --> 00:30:32,207 We're gonna get it in the next release, the next release ships in 18 months. 625 00:30:32,237 --> 00:30:32,477 Okay. 626 00:30:32,477 --> 00:30:36,827 So then after it releases in 18 months, it's probably about six months before 627 00:30:36,827 --> 00:30:40,637 any customers really deploy it outside of like their test environments. 628 00:30:40,907 --> 00:30:43,877 And then another 12, pass that before the enterprise customers 629 00:30:44,237 --> 00:30:45,587 really roll it out in fury. 630 00:30:45,587 --> 00:30:49,577 So if we put these numbers in today three years from now, 631 00:30:49,757 --> 00:30:51,487 we'll finally start to get data. 632 00:30:51,657 --> 00:30:55,432 So, so yeah, it's been nice to be able to just say, yep, you're right. 633 00:30:55,432 --> 00:30:58,642 We need that stat put that stat in and now, you know, to your point, 634 00:30:58,642 --> 00:31:02,182 Curtis, we can, we can, we can actually calculate and share these numbers. 635 00:31:05,559 --> 00:31:08,499 Prasanna Malaiyandi: I was just recalling those days and it's like, yeah, if you 636 00:31:08,499 --> 00:31:12,159 didn't plan ahead of time for when the first release goes out of, Hey, here's 637 00:31:12,159 --> 00:31:15,669 all the telemetry and stats I need, then good luck trying to get it in. 638 00:31:15,669 --> 00:31:16,239 Anytime later. 639 00:31:17,092 --> 00:31:19,672 W. Curtis Preston: yeah, it's on that huge list of why SaaS. 640 00:31:19,852 --> 00:31:20,272 Right. 641 00:31:20,662 --> 00:31:24,802 And, and why, when we look at these other vendors, you know, I won't name 642 00:31:24,862 --> 00:31:28,562 any of them specifically, but other vendors that are lift and shift. 643 00:31:28,912 --> 00:31:29,232 Right. 644 00:31:29,672 --> 00:31:33,142 They have a traditional development model for their software. 645 00:31:33,142 --> 00:31:35,332 That's based on a traditional delivery model. 646 00:31:35,662 --> 00:31:41,182 And then if they have a, if they also have a SaaS based service, 647 00:31:41,632 --> 00:31:44,032 they're basically behind even that. 648 00:31:44,062 --> 00:31:44,362 Right. 649 00:31:44,362 --> 00:31:47,722 I mean, maybe they're on par, I don't know, in terms of their 650 00:31:47,727 --> 00:31:49,342 release dates, but it's essentially. 651 00:31:49,717 --> 00:31:51,787 It's a traditional delivery model. 652 00:31:52,097 --> 00:31:54,047 It's not features released every two weeks. 653 00:31:54,177 --> 00:31:55,677 That's a really good, that's a really good point. 654 00:31:55,737 --> 00:31:56,387 Uh, Stephen. 655 00:31:56,847 --> 00:32:02,322 The other thing, Prasanna, is that when you were asking about, there 656 00:32:02,322 --> 00:32:05,712 was a question you asked earlier, I can't remember as you can't remember 657 00:32:05,922 --> 00:32:12,522 which one it was, but when you, you were asking about what's the, like 658 00:32:12,527 --> 00:32:14,382 how you qualify for the guarantee. 659 00:32:15,642 --> 00:32:21,492 One other area, when we compare our guarantee to some others, right? 660 00:32:22,182 --> 00:32:25,505 Is that they have some odd exclusions. 661 00:32:26,150 --> 00:32:27,500 That we do not have. 662 00:32:27,500 --> 00:32:32,240 Our exclusions and inclusions are all, I would say common sense. 663 00:32:32,510 --> 00:32:34,580 You need to have health checks. 664 00:32:34,760 --> 00:32:36,950 You need to be following our best practices. 665 00:32:37,130 --> 00:32:41,010 You need to be using the appropriate level of service that has the 666 00:32:41,040 --> 00:32:45,950 features in it that we're counting on in order to deliver these SLAs. 667 00:32:46,380 --> 00:32:49,980 We don't have weird things like, oh, and by the way, if you're 668 00:32:49,980 --> 00:32:53,770 the reason you got ransomware, we're not gonna pay the guarantee. 669 00:32:54,040 --> 00:32:54,310 Right. 670 00:32:54,310 --> 00:32:56,710 There are other vendors that have guarantees. 671 00:32:57,385 --> 00:33:02,755 As I make quotes in the air that, that have weird legalese exclusions 672 00:33:02,755 --> 00:33:06,355 in them that say things that sound like if the reason you got 673 00:33:06,355 --> 00:33:09,025 ransomware was internal negligence. 674 00:33:09,655 --> 00:33:14,295 Um, what we're saying is like, we don't care how or why you got. 675 00:33:14,295 --> 00:33:19,165 We're not looking for excuses to not pay a guarantee. 676 00:33:19,630 --> 00:33:23,020 We're just wanting to make sure that we're all on the same page here. 677 00:33:23,410 --> 00:33:23,740 Right? 678 00:33:23,740 --> 00:33:25,180 You follow the best practices. 679 00:33:25,180 --> 00:33:28,420 We follow the best practices, you know, you're using the right 680 00:33:28,420 --> 00:33:30,040 level of service, et cetera. 681 00:33:30,490 --> 00:33:36,310 Um, I, I, you know, I participated in the review of this document, uh, 682 00:33:36,340 --> 00:33:41,640 that, you know, the, the actual legal document and we worked very hard 683 00:33:41,640 --> 00:33:45,130 to have limited legalese nonsense. 684 00:33:45,130 --> 00:33:49,990 I mean, it's a legal document, so there's, it's full of legalese, but I, I don't 685 00:33:49,990 --> 00:33:54,130 recall seeing anything that, that seemed like, oh, we're, this is just there. 686 00:33:54,130 --> 00:33:55,300 So we don't have to pay anything. 687 00:33:55,660 --> 00:33:57,310 I don't know if Stephen, you have a comment on that. 688 00:33:57,978 --> 00:34:01,998 Stephen Manley: I think you were the one that pointed out initially the, the, yeah. 689 00:34:02,028 --> 00:34:06,288 If it's internal negligence, I was like, man, what ransomware attack isn't because 690 00:34:06,288 --> 00:34:10,008 of internal negligence, it's always because someone clicked on an email or 691 00:34:10,013 --> 00:34:14,238 a text or they went to a website they weren't supposed to, or something to that. 692 00:34:15,108 --> 00:34:20,598 How else do ransomware attacks get in or, or, or someone shares a document and maybe 693 00:34:20,598 --> 00:34:22,308 you should have scanned it or something. 694 00:34:22,308 --> 00:34:29,518 But, so, yeah, so to me that was why I think so many people in our industry, 695 00:34:29,548 --> 00:34:34,678 anytime they see one of their guarantees, their very first thought is okay, so yeah. 696 00:34:34,678 --> 00:34:35,758 So what's the fine print. 697 00:34:35,788 --> 00:34:38,608 How, how are you going to make sure that you never pay me? 698 00:34:38,948 --> 00:34:40,983 I agree, you know, our, our goal was. 699 00:34:41,333 --> 00:34:45,233 We believe in our service and something that I think you pointed out is on 700 00:34:45,233 --> 00:34:48,893 most of these things, they were already part of our contract anyway, so we're 701 00:34:48,893 --> 00:34:52,613 drawing attention to it, but this isn't like a whole bunch of new stuff. 702 00:34:52,613 --> 00:34:54,563 We came up with to make a press release. 703 00:34:54,563 --> 00:35:00,023 It's like, oh man, if other people are making noise about stuff that isn't even 704 00:35:00,028 --> 00:35:03,683 that realistic, we should probably make noise about the stuff that we do, that, 705 00:35:03,783 --> 00:35:05,273 that affects people on a daily basis. 706 00:35:06,340 --> 00:35:06,580 W. Curtis Preston: Yeah. 707 00:35:06,700 --> 00:35:10,480 And, and I know, I know the clause that I'm making allusion to in that other 708 00:35:10,480 --> 00:35:16,000 company's ransomware guarantee . Um, and I know that they argued it doesn't 709 00:35:16,000 --> 00:35:17,620 mean what we're saying that it means. 710 00:35:18,640 --> 00:35:22,210 And I'm like, but it sure really reads that way. 711 00:35:22,210 --> 00:35:26,200 Like, you know, I don't know if you're familiar with the the plain English 712 00:35:26,440 --> 00:35:28,630 interpretation concept in law. 713 00:35:28,900 --> 00:35:32,440 And it's like, so what does a, like a regular person reading 714 00:35:32,440 --> 00:35:34,060 that What does that mean? 715 00:35:34,570 --> 00:35:37,840 And, and it reads that, way, but, but what's worse. 716 00:35:37,840 --> 00:35:43,960 What's worse is the language is actually, at best, ambiguous and you 717 00:35:43,960 --> 00:35:45,790 could interpret it to mean either thing. 718 00:35:45,790 --> 00:35:47,680 And that is not a good place to be in. 719 00:35:47,680 --> 00:35:50,800 If you're on the, you know, the potential receiving end of a 720 00:35:50,805 --> 00:35:52,120 guarantee, that's poorly worded. 721 00:35:52,170 --> 00:35:55,680 Prasanna Malaiyandi: I think what Druva is doing and even some of the pseudo, 722 00:35:56,700 --> 00:35:58,380 so I should say guarantees in quotes. 723 00:35:58,710 --> 00:35:59,100 Right. 724 00:35:59,400 --> 00:36:04,410 I think though, in the end, it's good for the end customer and the end user, right. 725 00:36:04,410 --> 00:36:07,410 Because it's actually putting focus on yes. 726 00:36:07,410 --> 00:36:11,050 There are ways to protect yourself from ransomware. 727 00:36:11,065 --> 00:36:13,255 Taking hold of your environment, right? 728 00:36:13,255 --> 00:36:15,955 Deleting all your backups, which is your last line of defense. 729 00:36:16,585 --> 00:36:16,975 Right. 730 00:36:17,035 --> 00:36:18,325 And being able to detect it. 731 00:36:18,325 --> 00:36:22,795 So I think all of these things are good for the end user and I'm hoping more 732 00:36:22,795 --> 00:36:30,180 companies take Druva as sort of a guiding principle or a, uh, A thought leader in 733 00:36:30,180 --> 00:36:34,290 this space of being like, Hey, by the way, now I wanna make sure that the products 734 00:36:34,290 --> 00:36:38,910 I build are following that similar, uh, vein, because consumers should be asking 735 00:36:38,910 --> 00:36:41,010 For, the exact same sort of protections. 736 00:36:41,010 --> 00:36:43,950 If they're using a different backup product as well, being like, Hey, 737 00:36:43,950 --> 00:36:47,340 Druva's offering this guarantee, how are you protecting me from making 738 00:36:47,340 --> 00:36:50,880 sure my backups aren't deleted or being able to detect when settings 739 00:36:50,880 --> 00:36:51,870 are changed and other things. 740 00:36:53,285 --> 00:36:56,225 Stephen Manley: And, and, and I think from an infrastructure's perspective, 741 00:36:56,230 --> 00:36:59,105 I think it's also a signal of the shift that we've been trying to do. 742 00:36:59,615 --> 00:37:03,425 And you, you and I certainly for, for 20 years is shifting 743 00:37:03,425 --> 00:37:04,825 the discussion away from. 744 00:37:05,245 --> 00:37:06,745 Here's a piece of technology. 745 00:37:06,745 --> 00:37:12,535 Good luck with it to look you're, you're buying this to, to for some end result. 746 00:37:12,565 --> 00:37:12,745 Right. 747 00:37:12,745 --> 00:37:17,125 And the more that we shift towards these SLA type discussions versus 748 00:37:18,145 --> 00:37:20,185 I do deduplication well, great. 749 00:37:20,395 --> 00:37:24,685 You know, but, but really all I care about is that my backups are done and they're 750 00:37:24,685 --> 00:37:28,765 done on time and they're recoverable and how much you're gonna charge. 751 00:37:29,490 --> 00:37:32,160 Frankly, I don't care what technology you use underneath. 752 00:37:32,490 --> 00:37:34,380 I just want the result. 753 00:37:34,440 --> 00:37:37,290 And I think the more that the technology industry shifts towards 754 00:37:37,290 --> 00:37:39,510 results away from mechanism. 755 00:37:39,510 --> 00:37:41,320 I think the happier customers are gonna be. 756 00:37:42,810 --> 00:37:42,950 W. Curtis Preston: that. 757 00:37:42,950 --> 00:37:46,753 And I'm gonna take that as a super easy segue to the final topic, which we're just 758 00:37:46,753 --> 00:37:48,163 gonna talk about for a couple of minutes. 759 00:37:48,168 --> 00:37:52,933 And that is the fact that Druva was announced again, as a visionary in 760 00:37:52,938 --> 00:37:57,463 Gartner's latest magic quadrant for enterprise backup and recovery solutions. 761 00:37:57,553 --> 00:38:02,288 And also, um, you know, we are definitely pointing out that we 762 00:38:02,288 --> 00:38:07,328 are the vendor that moved the farthest in both, both axes, right? 763 00:38:07,383 --> 00:38:10,293 Completeness of vision and ability to execute. 764 00:38:10,683 --> 00:38:14,103 Uh, it's difficult to move in these quadrants as you know, anybody 765 00:38:14,103 --> 00:38:18,393 who's been in this space is aware, uh, but we moved more than any 766 00:38:18,393 --> 00:38:20,593 other vendor on both, uh, axes. 767 00:38:20,613 --> 00:38:24,543 And I, I think that's a pretty big, um, you know, pretty big deal. 768 00:38:24,543 --> 00:38:25,503 Any, any thoughts on that? 769 00:38:26,730 --> 00:38:29,430 Stephen Manley: I think for me, one of the things that, that, uh, you 770 00:38:29,620 --> 00:38:34,680 know, We see again, last year, Gartner shifted the quadrant from data center, 771 00:38:34,680 --> 00:38:38,850 backup and recovery to enterprise data protection, which was a huge shift 772 00:38:38,850 --> 00:38:42,060 because it was acknowledging that data's not just in the data center anymore. 773 00:38:42,660 --> 00:38:45,270 I think that what we saw this time through, you know, 774 00:38:45,275 --> 00:38:46,650 why did Druva move so much? 775 00:38:46,650 --> 00:38:50,130 I think part of it is, again, as, as we're growing, we're getting new 776 00:38:50,130 --> 00:38:52,020 customers, we're getting larger customers. 777 00:38:52,020 --> 00:38:55,050 We're getting, you know, customers with with more depth with, 778 00:38:55,055 --> 00:38:56,280 with more, you know, sort of. 779 00:38:56,670 --> 00:38:58,740 More more workloads and applications. 780 00:38:58,800 --> 00:39:01,860 Again, I think Gartner takes a lot of phone calls from customers. 781 00:39:02,160 --> 00:39:05,610 They're seeing the trend that people are shifting more to this new model 782 00:39:05,610 --> 00:39:07,020 because they want the results. 783 00:39:07,470 --> 00:39:13,110 Um, and, and so, so I think to, to me, you know, it's reflective of all 784 00:39:13,110 --> 00:39:17,970 the hard work that we're doing in combination with the fact that I think 785 00:39:18,050 --> 00:39:20,010 it, it is meeting what the market wants. 786 00:39:20,310 --> 00:39:24,540 I think Gartner is, is, is recognizing, you know, what we're doing. 787 00:39:24,540 --> 00:39:26,015 And, and I think where the market's going. 788 00:39:26,755 --> 00:39:29,950 Prasanna Malaiyandi: Sometimes it takes time for the ship to turn. 789 00:39:30,250 --> 00:39:30,580 Right. 790 00:39:30,610 --> 00:39:33,670 And it looks like now you have that validation, right. 791 00:39:33,670 --> 00:39:36,280 From a large industry leader, like Gartner. 792 00:39:36,398 --> 00:39:38,498 W. Curtis Preston: mean, you know, are we disappointed we're 793 00:39:38,498 --> 00:39:39,578 not in the leader quadrant? 794 00:39:39,608 --> 00:39:40,268 Of course. 795 00:39:40,268 --> 00:39:40,598 Right. 796 00:39:40,598 --> 00:39:43,868 But you know, the thing is, And again, reminding this is an independent 797 00:39:43,868 --> 00:39:49,178 podcast, um, you know, Gartner and a lot of, I don't think a lot of 798 00:39:49,183 --> 00:39:53,948 people realize this, but Gartner puts a lot of weight on revenue size. 799 00:39:54,428 --> 00:39:54,818 Right. 800 00:39:54,818 --> 00:39:58,298 They put a lot of weight on revenue size and also. 801 00:39:58,913 --> 00:40:01,043 How big are your biggest customers. 802 00:40:01,103 --> 00:40:05,033 And that's what determines what, that's not the only thing obviously, 803 00:40:05,033 --> 00:40:09,263 but that is one of the things that determines what quadrant you end up in. 804 00:40:09,623 --> 00:40:13,313 And, um, you know, the other folks that are up there, they 805 00:40:13,313 --> 00:40:15,263 are bigger companies than we are. 806 00:40:15,383 --> 00:40:16,793 Much bigger in some cases. 807 00:40:16,793 --> 00:40:17,093 Right. 808 00:40:17,543 --> 00:40:20,213 And so they will continue to have that advantage, but we are 809 00:40:20,213 --> 00:40:23,603 moving and we're catching up, uh, and we're moving in the right. 810 00:40:23,603 --> 00:40:24,113 direction. 811 00:40:25,195 --> 00:40:30,015 Prasanna Malaiyandi: Is there a place that Druva is offering a read out of 812 00:40:30,015 --> 00:40:32,205 the magic quadrant for our listeners or, 813 00:40:32,935 --> 00:40:33,795 W. Curtis Preston: Druva.com. 814 00:40:34,365 --> 00:40:34,425 Prasanna Malaiyandi: okay. 815 00:40:35,368 --> 00:40:37,108 W. Curtis Preston: we'll put a link, we'll put a link in the 816 00:40:37,108 --> 00:40:38,278 show description, but yeah. 817 00:40:38,278 --> 00:40:40,678 Thanks for, thanks for that softball question there. 818 00:40:40,683 --> 00:40:42,508 Uh, Prasanna, but yeah. 819 00:40:42,568 --> 00:40:43,978 Um, yeah. 820 00:40:44,098 --> 00:40:44,428 Yeah. 821 00:40:44,428 --> 00:40:50,188 Druva.com and, um, anyway, well, let's, you know, um, Stephen, thanks for coming 822 00:40:50,188 --> 00:40:52,838 on and, you know, taking the questions. 823 00:40:53,930 --> 00:40:55,490 Stephen Manley: It's always fun talking to you guys. 824 00:40:55,490 --> 00:40:59,540 And, uh, again, I think the important thing that everyone should walk away from 825 00:40:59,540 --> 00:41:04,400 this podcast on is, you know, just like your wifi, your backups should just work. 826 00:41:04,520 --> 00:41:06,920 You know, if you're spending a bunch of time tuning it, 827 00:41:07,400 --> 00:41:09,260 you're probably doing it wrong. 828 00:41:10,348 --> 00:41:11,368 W. Curtis Preston: Wow. 829 00:41:11,428 --> 00:41:12,608 What do you think of that Prasanna. 830 00:41:13,785 --> 00:41:13,995 Prasanna Malaiyandi: That. 831 00:41:18,680 --> 00:41:19,040 Stephen Manley: don't 832 00:41:19,483 --> 00:41:20,113 W. Curtis Preston: persona. 833 00:41:20,420 --> 00:41:21,410 Stephen Manley: don't cry. 834 00:41:21,470 --> 00:41:22,160 don't cry. 835 00:41:22,190 --> 00:41:22,430 It's 836 00:41:23,755 --> 00:41:24,045 Prasanna Malaiyandi: Yeah. 837 00:41:24,223 --> 00:41:24,493 W. Curtis Preston: Don't 838 00:41:24,740 --> 00:41:25,820 Stephen Manley: some people like to 839 00:41:25,843 --> 00:41:26,263 W. Curtis Preston: cry. 840 00:41:26,383 --> 00:41:27,043 All right. 841 00:41:27,403 --> 00:41:30,533 Well with that, I will put an end to his madness. 842 00:41:30,553 --> 00:41:32,298 Uh, thanks everyone for listening. 843 00:41:32,658 --> 00:41:36,768 And, uh, you know, you're why we here and, uh, remember to subscribe 844 00:41:36,768 --> 00:41:38,418 so that you can restore it all.