1 00:00:00,112 --> 00:00:03,962 But when a quantum computer is ready, we 2 00:00:03,962 --> 00:00:07,556 will be able to break that encryption. And with that, we will be able 3 00:00:07,652 --> 00:00:11,326 to read or to see information or private 4 00:00:11,326 --> 00:00:14,358 information, government secrets that are being 5 00:00:14,711 --> 00:00:18,240 sent and received through the internet. So 6 00:00:18,257 --> 00:00:21,658 Q-Day, as it's called, is 7 00:00:21,706 --> 00:00:25,540 not something that we know for sure when it's going to 8 00:00:25,540 --> 00:00:29,261 happen. We know it's going to happen. We know that AI is 9 00:00:29,453 --> 00:00:33,238 accelerating that day. And it's better 10 00:00:33,238 --> 00:00:37,006 for all of us to be prepared. And the 11 00:00:37,006 --> 00:00:40,855 risk is there. And yeah, we need to be prepared. And we 12 00:00:40,855 --> 00:00:43,758 are offering that to the organizations we talk to. 13 00:00:44,880 --> 00:00:48,713 Quantum Podcast, turn it up fast. Candace and Frank 14 00:00:48,713 --> 00:00:52,450 blowing my mind at last. Quantum Podcast, they're breaking 15 00:00:52,546 --> 00:00:56,395 the mold. Science has got beats to fold. Hello and welcome 16 00:00:56,411 --> 00:00:59,585 back to Impact Quantum, the podcast where we explore the emerging industry 17 00:00:59,922 --> 00:01:03,753 of quantum computing and what that means for the future of 18 00:01:03,849 --> 00:01:07,552 security and computing and generally what 19 00:01:07,552 --> 00:01:11,383 careers will look like in a quantum era. And with me is the 20 00:01:11,383 --> 00:01:15,214 most quantum-curious person I know, Candace Cahouli. How's it going, Candace? 21 00:01:15,807 --> 00:01:19,591 It's great. Thank you very much for asking. I'm really excited about 22 00:01:19,591 --> 00:01:23,261 today. Now, the way he pronounces his name correctly, he 23 00:01:23,261 --> 00:01:26,740 rolls his Rs, so it sounds much better. But I'm gonna try. I was 24 00:01:26,852 --> 00:01:30,526 suitably— I was impressed in the green room. Right, the rolling of the Rs is 25 00:01:30,639 --> 00:01:34,219 just beautiful. So we have Pablo Carrillo, and 26 00:01:34,251 --> 00:01:37,961 he is the founder and CEO of Cubris. How 27 00:01:38,169 --> 00:01:41,798 are you today, Pablo? Hey, Kandace. Hey, Frank. 28 00:01:41,975 --> 00:01:45,748 I'm doing great. Really thrilled about this conversation. And yeah, my 29 00:01:45,748 --> 00:01:49,264 name is Carrillo. It's Spanish, so it's a bit 30 00:01:49,264 --> 00:01:51,914 difficult to get it, but you will get it at some point. Just get it. 31 00:01:52,058 --> 00:01:55,830 It's beautiful. I love it. I love it. Pleased to 32 00:01:55,830 --> 00:01:59,376 be here. Yeah, no, I'm sorry, go ahead. No, no, pleased to be here 33 00:01:59,937 --> 00:02:03,002 and looking forward to our conversation today. Awesome, 34 00:02:03,547 --> 00:02:07,189 awesome. I'm very curious to hear about 35 00:02:07,237 --> 00:02:10,911 you and what you're doing. I think we did have a little bit of a 36 00:02:10,911 --> 00:02:14,280 conversation in the virtual green room, and tell me what it is that you do. 37 00:02:15,724 --> 00:02:19,157 Well, we help sectors, 38 00:02:19,591 --> 00:02:23,441 not companies, but a sector to migrate to post-quantum cryptography. 39 00:02:25,094 --> 00:02:28,611 We do this because we learned it the hard way. We went, we 40 00:02:28,659 --> 00:02:31,598 started conversations with banks, financial institutions, 41 00:02:32,914 --> 00:02:36,366 and other organizations that are already thinking or planning about 42 00:02:36,366 --> 00:02:39,979 migrating to PQC. And we 43 00:02:39,979 --> 00:02:43,688 found that our proposal landed, everyone was on board, 44 00:02:44,314 --> 00:02:48,056 but then nothing happened. And that's because they were asking 45 00:02:48,393 --> 00:02:52,118 us, who else is doing this in our sector? Is there a 46 00:02:52,118 --> 00:02:55,907 regulation? Why do we need to do this? They know, I mean, the why, 47 00:02:56,036 --> 00:02:59,632 the technical why is there, but not 48 00:03:00,387 --> 00:03:04,032 something that really gets the buy-in from the board 49 00:03:04,562 --> 00:03:08,399 to start moving. So we understood that we needed to 50 00:03:08,399 --> 00:03:11,498 go to a higher level, and it's the regulators 51 00:03:12,092 --> 00:03:15,705 who are planning to migrate all the sector. 52 00:03:16,492 --> 00:03:20,265 And we learned that in the Middle East, where we are having active conversations with 53 00:03:20,265 --> 00:03:23,541 the central bank. They are planning to migrate around 54 00:03:23,733 --> 00:03:27,475 20 banks that are part of their, of the country. 55 00:03:28,374 --> 00:03:31,938 And we decided that that was the best approach for us 56 00:03:32,002 --> 00:03:35,792 and a differentiator approach, because this is going to be 57 00:03:36,257 --> 00:03:39,838 more efficient than rather than going 58 00:03:40,534 --> 00:03:41,734 Organization by organization. 59 00:03:44,460 --> 00:03:47,808 So for our listeners who are new to the topic, can you 60 00:03:47,872 --> 00:03:50,897 define post-quantum cryptography? 61 00:03:52,805 --> 00:03:56,413 Yeah, I don't want to get that much technical here, but basically 62 00:03:57,073 --> 00:04:00,820 today we use classic encryption and the encryption we use for 63 00:04:00,868 --> 00:04:04,325 communications and every data transfer 64 00:04:05,257 --> 00:04:09,061 is using Let's say a type 65 00:04:09,061 --> 00:04:12,240 of algorithms that at this point are not breakable, 66 00:04:13,075 --> 00:04:15,692 but when a quantum computer is ready, 67 00:04:16,848 --> 00:04:20,525 we will be able to break that encryption. And with that, we will be able 68 00:04:20,686 --> 00:04:24,314 to, to read or to see information or private 69 00:04:24,314 --> 00:04:27,333 information, government secrets that are being 70 00:04:27,702 --> 00:04:31,219 sent and received through the internet. So 71 00:04:32,262 --> 00:04:35,923 Q-Day, as it's called, is not something 72 00:04:35,955 --> 00:04:39,793 that we know for sure when it's going to happen. We know 73 00:04:39,793 --> 00:04:43,454 it's going to happen. We know that AI is accelerating that day. 74 00:04:44,449 --> 00:04:47,757 And it's better for all of us to be prepared. 75 00:04:48,464 --> 00:04:52,253 And the risk is there. And yeah, we need to be 76 00:04:52,253 --> 00:04:55,304 prepared. And we are offering that to the 77 00:04:55,721 --> 00:04:59,475 organizations we talk to. Have you noticed that there's been a shift, 78 00:04:59,780 --> 00:05:03,531 I would say maybe in the last 12 to 18 months of the urgency 79 00:05:03,579 --> 00:05:07,249 of this? Because I remember talking about this and I'm 80 00:05:07,249 --> 00:05:11,097 sure there are people that when Shor's algorithm came out were sounding the alarm 81 00:05:11,097 --> 00:05:14,912 in the '90s. But I remember people starting to worry about this 82 00:05:15,104 --> 00:05:18,679 maybe going back 6 to 8 years ago. And 83 00:05:19,015 --> 00:05:22,397 I've noticed in the last, definitely last 84 00:05:22,397 --> 00:05:25,603 year, the panic on this is been turned up, 85 00:05:26,164 --> 00:05:28,359 not to 11 just yet, but yeah. 86 00:05:29,753 --> 00:05:33,487 Yeah. And we started reaching out to companies last year 87 00:05:33,519 --> 00:05:37,253 around this time. And even the last few months has 88 00:05:37,381 --> 00:05:41,035 been, the acceleration has been higher. I 89 00:05:41,067 --> 00:05:44,881 think it's due to the fact that the big companies 90 00:05:44,993 --> 00:05:47,942 are moving. They are starting to talk about this. 91 00:05:48,599 --> 00:05:52,444 Google is starting to talk about this. The big banks are starting to 92 00:05:52,444 --> 00:05:55,649 plan. So that creates this maybe 93 00:05:55,649 --> 00:05:59,414 nervousness in the companies. So they 94 00:05:59,414 --> 00:06:02,539 start like, if they are moving, then this is real. Right. 95 00:06:03,179 --> 00:06:06,640 Because I remember we had a conversation with a bank 96 00:06:06,640 --> 00:06:10,309 CISO and we proposed our 97 00:06:10,309 --> 00:06:14,091 services and he was telling us like, who else is doing this? 98 00:06:14,876 --> 00:06:18,321 Because they wanted to know, despite they were a big bank in their country, 99 00:06:18,954 --> 00:06:22,032 They were asking who else in the world is doing this. The 100 00:06:23,421 --> 00:06:27,168 CIOs or CISOs, they don't want to risk and start doing something 101 00:06:27,200 --> 00:06:30,424 that maybe gets stuck. But when the big 102 00:06:30,683 --> 00:06:34,280 companies start to move, everyone should pay 103 00:06:34,329 --> 00:06:37,807 attention and start moving. You know, 104 00:06:38,322 --> 00:06:42,136 I'm questioning what usually prompts an organization to begin 105 00:06:42,651 --> 00:06:44,469 this PQC journey. 106 00:06:48,066 --> 00:06:51,640 What we have seen is that the trigger is usually 107 00:06:51,672 --> 00:06:55,325 regulation, despite— rather than 108 00:06:55,421 --> 00:06:59,107 an initiative like a real 109 00:06:59,107 --> 00:07:02,472 threat. Because when they need to comply with the 110 00:07:02,472 --> 00:07:06,141 regulation, they just need to do it, even if they don't necessarily 111 00:07:07,039 --> 00:07:09,987 think about that. So when the regulations, the regulation 112 00:07:10,099 --> 00:07:13,485 gets out, They can ask for a budget 113 00:07:13,871 --> 00:07:17,566 because this isn't— this is sometimes it's expensive. The 114 00:07:17,582 --> 00:07:21,277 first step is the main one because you need to know 115 00:07:22,290 --> 00:07:25,664 all your assets, everything that is exposed. So that first 116 00:07:25,664 --> 00:07:29,295 discovery is what triggers everything. And the 117 00:07:29,295 --> 00:07:32,701 process of migrating could take years because it's not 118 00:07:32,733 --> 00:07:36,364 something that is only about you. It's everyone that you are 119 00:07:36,364 --> 00:07:39,975 connected to needs to be compliant. or needs to have the same level of 120 00:07:39,975 --> 00:07:43,581 security. If not, you are vulnerable. So 121 00:07:43,581 --> 00:07:46,915 regulation drives this. And in some other cases, we have seen 122 00:07:47,011 --> 00:07:50,634 that market differentiation, they want to tell their clients, 123 00:07:51,098 --> 00:07:54,336 and that's something difficult to tell because you can tell your clients that you are 124 00:07:54,384 --> 00:07:58,167 more secure. But when you say that, also you are 125 00:07:58,167 --> 00:08:01,661 exposing like, oh, so I was not that secure. Like if I am a bank, 126 00:08:01,677 --> 00:08:04,899 like now I'm more secure. So before we were not as secure as you are 127 00:08:04,979 --> 00:08:08,816 saying that we are now. So it's a complex conversation to have 128 00:08:08,816 --> 00:08:12,383 even with your clients because you don't really know how they are going to take 129 00:08:12,913 --> 00:08:16,545 this. But of course, it's a differentiator and you 130 00:08:16,545 --> 00:08:20,289 can tell your clients that you are creating a new version 131 00:08:20,401 --> 00:08:23,551 of your bank, of your online banking 132 00:08:24,338 --> 00:08:28,178 to protect their assets, protect their information. So yeah, 133 00:08:28,194 --> 00:08:32,018 I mean, first of all, regulation, and then there are other factors. 134 00:08:32,820 --> 00:08:33,923 But mainly regulation. 135 00:08:38,001 --> 00:08:41,514 What— how would you say, how do we know? 136 00:08:41,966 --> 00:08:44,780 So this is kind of the thing that always bothered me, not bothered me like 137 00:08:44,796 --> 00:08:48,232 in a bad way, but kind of like, how do we know something is 138 00:08:48,490 --> 00:08:51,798 quantum? Because I used to hear this term quantum resistant, 139 00:08:52,298 --> 00:08:55,121 right? And then it switched to post-quantum cryptography, 140 00:08:56,130 --> 00:08:59,832 given that there's no real quantum 141 00:08:59,832 --> 00:09:03,663 computer today, and I'll put that in air quotes, and before 142 00:09:03,776 --> 00:09:07,478 you start writing hate mail, listeners, dear listeners, 143 00:09:07,834 --> 00:09:10,651 I mean, how do we know it's really going to be safe, right? Like, I 144 00:09:10,651 --> 00:09:13,941 like the term of quantum resistant because I thought that was a little more 145 00:09:14,071 --> 00:09:16,275 realistic, but how do we know? 146 00:09:22,341 --> 00:09:24,687 Well— Or do we not know? We're making best guesses. 147 00:09:26,180 --> 00:09:28,374 I think the algorithms, 148 00:09:30,415 --> 00:09:33,918 the organizations, NIST, who approved the new algorithms 149 00:09:34,030 --> 00:09:37,052 to encrypt data, they chose 150 00:09:38,289 --> 00:09:41,391 the best human creations because 151 00:09:42,210 --> 00:09:44,158 all these new algorithms were 152 00:09:44,158 --> 00:09:48,001 created by humans. They tested 153 00:09:48,034 --> 00:09:51,777 them as possible, of course. But what 154 00:09:51,777 --> 00:09:55,612 you're saying, your concern, I think your concern is, is 155 00:09:55,628 --> 00:09:58,714 a concern that everyone has had in the space. 156 00:09:59,851 --> 00:10:03,457 I even think and ask myself that. And to be honest, 157 00:10:04,006 --> 00:10:07,725 I think we have risk and we 158 00:10:07,725 --> 00:10:11,188 have mitigated as much as possible the risk, 159 00:10:11,896 --> 00:10:15,334 and we have tools that help us mitigate it as much. 160 00:10:16,404 --> 00:10:19,876 We cannot be really or 100% sure about that 161 00:10:20,406 --> 00:10:24,158 until we get a quantum computer and someone tries to 162 00:10:24,174 --> 00:10:27,173 break one of these algorithms. 163 00:10:28,440 --> 00:10:31,824 I think that's what we as engineers do well, and 164 00:10:31,824 --> 00:10:35,641 cryptographers. I don't consider myself a cryptographer, but you try to 165 00:10:35,641 --> 00:10:37,677 mitigate the risk. You try to find 166 00:10:38,239 --> 00:10:41,831 something to protect yourself as much as possible. 167 00:10:42,505 --> 00:10:45,575 And then once the technology, 168 00:10:46,314 --> 00:10:50,154 the attacking technology is ready, you can start improving what you already 169 00:10:50,186 --> 00:10:53,856 have. But I think that it's a great starting 170 00:10:53,953 --> 00:10:56,482 point to defend ourselves against this threat. 171 00:10:58,568 --> 00:11:02,113 Interesting. What do you think surprises your customers the 172 00:11:02,113 --> 00:11:04,492 most once they begin assessing their 173 00:11:04,702 --> 00:11:07,130 cryptographic infrastructure? 174 00:11:11,803 --> 00:11:14,970 It's getting to know that they have 175 00:11:18,382 --> 00:11:21,819 more assets than they thought. Because 176 00:11:22,741 --> 00:11:26,056 most of the organizations, they don't really have a 177 00:11:26,137 --> 00:11:29,893 full inventory of all their assets. So 178 00:11:29,989 --> 00:11:33,642 once they find out, that's something that changes the 179 00:11:33,642 --> 00:11:36,986 scope of the project. Because they think like this is a short 180 00:11:37,484 --> 00:11:40,667 project, some like a few 181 00:11:41,406 --> 00:11:44,990 assets to protect, but then they discover there are more. And with 182 00:11:45,103 --> 00:11:48,284 AI, now that the AI, the agents, 183 00:11:48,879 --> 00:11:52,446 they get connected to our tools, that 184 00:11:52,446 --> 00:11:55,198 increases the number of authentication 185 00:11:58,047 --> 00:12:01,750 connections that we have. So you are creating with AI, we're 186 00:12:01,750 --> 00:12:04,383 creating more assets or more 187 00:12:04,929 --> 00:12:08,493 vulnerabilities because every one of these AI 188 00:12:08,541 --> 00:12:12,251 identities that are created to connect are also 189 00:12:13,037 --> 00:12:16,650 encrypted and are also vulnerable. So we're creating assets every day. 190 00:12:17,308 --> 00:12:21,066 So that's why this first step is, is key for the project, key 191 00:12:21,066 --> 00:12:24,421 for scoping the effort, and also the 192 00:12:24,421 --> 00:12:26,782 most surprising part of it. 193 00:12:29,664 --> 00:12:33,087 Well, you mentioned financial services and you mentioned the government. 194 00:12:34,137 --> 00:12:37,939 I'm thinking about perhaps what 195 00:12:38,020 --> 00:12:41,564 other industries are falling 196 00:12:41,596 --> 00:12:44,245 behind or are especially vulnerable. 197 00:12:45,893 --> 00:12:49,205 Well, we have in the health sector, hospitals, 198 00:12:50,270 --> 00:12:53,366 insurers, because they handle sensitive data. 199 00:12:54,627 --> 00:12:57,946 in other, any, anything in the government that is related to your 200 00:12:57,994 --> 00:13:01,718 identity, your personal records, but 201 00:13:02,793 --> 00:13:05,345 health and also utilities, 202 00:13:06,645 --> 00:13:10,192 electric companies, the electric grids, the 203 00:13:11,139 --> 00:13:14,782 water providers. Critical infrastructure. Critical infrastructure. 204 00:13:14,847 --> 00:13:17,864 Yeah, that's the name. Because right now everything is 205 00:13:18,554 --> 00:13:22,310 exposed. I mean, it's not exposed, but it's connected to the internet. So you 206 00:13:22,374 --> 00:13:26,124 are vulnerable. If someone gets in, they are 207 00:13:26,124 --> 00:13:29,900 going to be able to even 208 00:13:29,981 --> 00:13:33,668 to control the data, even to control operations. So 209 00:13:33,766 --> 00:13:36,434 everything will be at risk at this point. 210 00:13:37,727 --> 00:13:41,010 There are some regulations that are already in place for those sectors, 211 00:13:41,689 --> 00:13:45,354 but the migration is going to— it's not— the schedule is 212 00:13:45,386 --> 00:13:49,050 not that demanding as in other sectors because 213 00:13:49,243 --> 00:13:53,023 right now, like, all the focus is in government and and financials 214 00:13:53,697 --> 00:13:57,361 because it supports the others. But yeah, I mean, any 215 00:13:58,116 --> 00:14:01,958 health record needs to be held for 10, 15 years depending on the 216 00:14:01,958 --> 00:14:05,227 country. And if we are 217 00:14:05,453 --> 00:14:08,981 having a quantum computer in 5 years, 218 00:14:09,742 --> 00:14:11,376 that data is going to be exposed. 219 00:14:14,102 --> 00:14:17,836 So yeah, those are like the main sectors 220 00:14:18,111 --> 00:14:19,474 that are being impacted by this. 221 00:14:22,479 --> 00:14:26,165 Plus anything that people, like, even people's like private photos, like I can 222 00:14:26,165 --> 00:14:29,550 easily imagine, you know, Apple 223 00:14:29,759 --> 00:14:33,256 iCloud, right? At some point consumers are gonna demand 224 00:14:34,315 --> 00:14:37,540 that data is also, right? I, you're right. Like obviously you're gonna start at the 225 00:14:37,540 --> 00:14:40,572 government level, then critical infrastructure, but then I think 226 00:14:41,230 --> 00:14:44,423 ordinary civilians, regular people are gonna demand this, right? Yeah. 227 00:14:45,729 --> 00:14:49,373 Yeah, and that could be, I think about like it's been even 228 00:14:49,389 --> 00:14:52,938 exploited in a way for 229 00:14:53,794 --> 00:14:57,217 knowing better your consumer 230 00:14:57,588 --> 00:15:01,206 trends or patterns. Because right now, when you 231 00:15:01,206 --> 00:15:04,910 interact in social media, you have, you are revealing your 232 00:15:04,910 --> 00:15:08,710 behavior with and your interests. And that helps 233 00:15:08,710 --> 00:15:12,406 the algorithm put in front of you some ads. But if I find a 234 00:15:12,406 --> 00:15:15,957 way to secretly know more 235 00:15:15,957 --> 00:15:19,364 specifically what are you searching, what are you 236 00:15:19,541 --> 00:15:23,161 reviewing, what are you buying specifically things, I will be 237 00:15:23,161 --> 00:15:26,574 able to create like 238 00:15:26,880 --> 00:15:30,682 more specific campaigns based on some data that you may 239 00:15:30,682 --> 00:15:32,692 not be sharing all the time on the internet. 240 00:15:35,594 --> 00:15:39,422 Can organizations upgrade gradually? Or does everything 241 00:15:39,471 --> 00:15:41,117 have to change at once? 242 00:15:45,932 --> 00:15:49,374 I could say that you can have 243 00:15:49,730 --> 00:15:51,993 waves in which you migrate. 244 00:15:53,760 --> 00:15:56,744 Because at this moment, nobody is— no, not nobody, but 245 00:15:58,083 --> 00:16:01,520 not all the organizations are moving at the same pace. 246 00:16:03,454 --> 00:16:07,196 And yeah, waves. are something you can think about, but 247 00:16:07,196 --> 00:16:10,808 at some point you will need to cover everything. The ideal will be that 248 00:16:10,808 --> 00:16:14,614 everyone will decide at some point to do it all together 249 00:16:15,063 --> 00:16:18,788 so everything is protected, but it's 250 00:16:18,837 --> 00:16:21,968 not technically feasible. And even 251 00:16:22,979 --> 00:16:26,817 I was discussing with a colleague the other day, and he and one 252 00:16:26,865 --> 00:16:29,996 of his partners, they did some research and some estimations. 253 00:16:30,967 --> 00:16:34,782 And there are not even the amount 254 00:16:34,782 --> 00:16:38,405 of cryptographers or companies that are 255 00:16:38,453 --> 00:16:42,020 focused on PQC. There are not enough companies in the world to cover 256 00:16:42,490 --> 00:16:45,973 all the work that needs to be done. So yeah, 257 00:16:46,363 --> 00:16:50,114 the wave approach is the best for now. But 258 00:16:50,179 --> 00:16:53,573 if a sector or an organization starts 259 00:16:54,987 --> 00:16:58,458 getting behind, There will be a moment in 260 00:16:58,732 --> 00:17:02,524 which a lot of organizations need to do it all at 261 00:17:02,524 --> 00:17:06,354 once. It's certainly a growth market, 262 00:17:06,370 --> 00:17:08,370 I think. Yeah. 263 00:17:10,869 --> 00:17:13,820 What would— oh, go ahead, Candace. What are the most common 264 00:17:13,820 --> 00:17:16,886 misconceptions organizations have about 265 00:17:17,503 --> 00:17:17,990 PQC? 266 00:17:23,120 --> 00:17:26,727 I think that one of 267 00:17:26,759 --> 00:17:30,584 the, the one that I have heard the most is that 268 00:17:32,090 --> 00:17:35,718 it's like sci-fi, that Q-Day is not coming, 269 00:17:35,832 --> 00:17:39,661 that yeah, this sounds great, but 270 00:17:40,192 --> 00:17:43,877 we don't think this is really coming. We have heard this. And 271 00:17:43,877 --> 00:17:44,601 also the 272 00:17:49,090 --> 00:17:50,360 the lack of 273 00:17:53,030 --> 00:17:56,698 ownership inside an organization. It's not that 274 00:17:56,987 --> 00:18:00,748 PQC needs to be a different role, but the real 275 00:18:00,748 --> 00:18:04,074 ownership comes from how we secure 276 00:18:05,167 --> 00:18:08,972 our data and how we envision the 277 00:18:09,053 --> 00:18:12,788 future threats. So they think that for now, as Today 278 00:18:12,916 --> 00:18:16,667 is everything is okay. There's nothing wrong that's going to 279 00:18:16,683 --> 00:18:20,514 happen in the future. So they relax and as they don't see any 280 00:18:20,546 --> 00:18:23,881 other companies doing the same, they don't do anything. So 281 00:18:24,939 --> 00:18:28,481 not seeing the competitors doing the 282 00:18:28,481 --> 00:18:32,136 migration or starting the migration is something that is keeping 283 00:18:32,232 --> 00:18:34,621 organizations back from starting. 284 00:18:35,679 --> 00:18:38,356 And another misconception is that that. 285 00:18:39,657 --> 00:18:43,223 If there's no regulation, they don't really need to do anything. 286 00:18:44,142 --> 00:18:47,917 It's a shame, but sometimes it's like they need this push 287 00:18:47,998 --> 00:18:49,905 from a regulator to start doing things. 288 00:18:51,839 --> 00:18:55,502 Interesting. So you think it's a push, not a pull, 289 00:18:55,680 --> 00:18:58,488 like people aren't pulling themselves, or is it a little bit of both? 290 00:19:00,910 --> 00:19:04,508 Yeah, I mean, I think they are curious. They are quantum curious or peaky 291 00:19:04,572 --> 00:19:08,186 curious. Yeah, yeah, yeah. They are not necessarily 292 00:19:09,070 --> 00:19:12,882 Because they are exploring, they are asking for some information. I mean, 293 00:19:12,914 --> 00:19:16,251 they are shopping around, like seeing if something convinces 294 00:19:16,845 --> 00:19:20,343 them to do something or how they can position 295 00:19:20,937 --> 00:19:24,724 PQC as a market differentiator, 296 00:19:25,013 --> 00:19:28,848 but not as a real need. So I think they are just 297 00:19:28,864 --> 00:19:32,619 finding, finding, I mean, fooling around and finding out. Right. 298 00:19:32,908 --> 00:19:36,743 So the regulator is, is the, is at the end of the day is 299 00:19:36,743 --> 00:19:39,647 the organization that is going to push everything, everyone to do that. 300 00:19:40,518 --> 00:19:42,971 And in emerging markets, where is our focus? 301 00:19:44,432 --> 00:19:47,627 Despite there are not many regulations active in 302 00:19:48,125 --> 00:19:51,208 emerging markets in Latin America, Middle East, Africa, 303 00:19:52,541 --> 00:19:56,378 what is happening is that the first world countries, 304 00:19:56,410 --> 00:19:59,911 G7, they are moving already. And as in 305 00:19:59,943 --> 00:20:03,411 financial institutions, you have correspondence, you have 306 00:20:03,411 --> 00:20:06,768 transactions. they are going to be 307 00:20:06,768 --> 00:20:10,271 forced into this. In that case, they are going to be pulled because 308 00:20:10,930 --> 00:20:14,400 if not, we're going to have 2 different banking systems or 309 00:20:14,400 --> 00:20:18,000 financial systems, one that is quantum ready and 310 00:20:18,000 --> 00:20:21,487 another one that is disconnected from it because they never migrated. So 311 00:20:22,821 --> 00:20:26,099 that's something that we, that we see, something that could happen if 312 00:20:26,468 --> 00:20:28,894 sectors do not migrate at the same time. 313 00:20:32,422 --> 00:20:35,881 How— I'm thinking about AI and the role that AI 314 00:20:36,813 --> 00:20:40,646 will play. I wonder, how is AI changing 315 00:20:40,743 --> 00:20:43,316 the way organizations approach 316 00:20:44,076 --> 00:20:47,200 post-quantum cryptography, both in 317 00:20:47,200 --> 00:20:50,545 identifying risks and accelerating migration? 318 00:20:52,861 --> 00:20:55,704 Right now, there are many inventory tools 319 00:20:56,210 --> 00:21:00,022 that use AI. To help improve or accelerate 320 00:21:00,070 --> 00:21:03,252 the inventory. And 321 00:21:03,911 --> 00:21:07,719 that helps because when you don't have like all the infrastructure of a Big 322 00:21:07,768 --> 00:21:11,480 4 company, you use this 323 00:21:11,480 --> 00:21:14,754 type of tools that help you get inventory ready. 324 00:21:15,432 --> 00:21:18,918 And also it helps you identify easily or map 325 00:21:19,047 --> 00:21:22,231 easily what algorithm is better 326 00:21:22,231 --> 00:21:25,100 depending on the type of asset you have. 327 00:21:25,943 --> 00:21:28,772 So in that way, AI is 328 00:21:29,515 --> 00:21:32,992 helping optimize how we're going to protect against 329 00:21:32,992 --> 00:21:34,593 quantum computers. 330 00:21:38,341 --> 00:21:42,041 And organizations are not using directly it. It's the companies 331 00:21:42,073 --> 00:21:45,706 that are assessing or creating this or 332 00:21:45,850 --> 00:21:49,547 running this inventory assessments. Those are the 333 00:21:49,547 --> 00:21:53,163 companies that are using AI. A company like 334 00:21:53,484 --> 00:21:57,275 a bank or a healthcare company, they 335 00:21:57,275 --> 00:22:00,458 don't necessarily see AI 336 00:22:01,406 --> 00:22:05,039 in the same, like, for a, like, as a 337 00:22:05,554 --> 00:22:08,819 catalyst of security or as something that can help them 338 00:22:09,494 --> 00:22:10,877 improve security right now. 339 00:22:14,438 --> 00:22:14,841 Interesting. 340 00:22:18,837 --> 00:22:22,273 What led you into What led you to 341 00:22:22,500 --> 00:22:26,001 pursue this as a career? Because post-quantum 342 00:22:26,001 --> 00:22:29,573 cryptography as a— or quantum-resistant cryptography, 343 00:22:30,665 --> 00:22:34,056 theoretically, I guess it's been around since '94 with Shor's algorithm, 344 00:22:34,152 --> 00:22:37,962 theoretically, but wasn't really, I think, a viable career path 345 00:22:38,010 --> 00:22:40,589 until maybe 10 years ago. 346 00:22:42,410 --> 00:22:46,114 How did you get here? I'm just curious. I 347 00:22:46,183 --> 00:22:49,943 think curiosity. Took me here. I have a 348 00:22:49,943 --> 00:22:53,287 background in project management and operations and 349 00:22:53,866 --> 00:22:56,834 have worked for software companies, 350 00:22:57,679 --> 00:23:01,224 the public sector in my country, and in 351 00:23:01,224 --> 00:23:05,053 different software projects. And I just got curious 352 00:23:05,053 --> 00:23:08,383 about how can I 353 00:23:08,897 --> 00:23:10,249 use that experience 354 00:23:17,866 --> 00:23:20,746 to be— how can I use that experience 355 00:23:22,811 --> 00:23:26,404 to build something that will help us be ahead 356 00:23:27,387 --> 00:23:31,023 of the technological advancements? So that 357 00:23:31,023 --> 00:23:33,723 somehow brought quantum computing, 358 00:23:35,275 --> 00:23:39,010 brought PQC, and not because I 359 00:23:39,010 --> 00:23:42,804 am a cryptographer, but it brought the idea of This is not a 360 00:23:42,804 --> 00:23:46,331 cryptography problem. This is a coordination problem, a governance problem. 361 00:23:46,988 --> 00:23:50,707 So with my experience, I saw myself and I saw the company as 362 00:23:51,685 --> 00:23:54,923 the orchestrator that helps put everything in place 363 00:23:56,414 --> 00:24:00,214 to help with the migrations, to help with identifying what needs to be 364 00:24:00,214 --> 00:24:03,805 done, and then getting those things done, even by 365 00:24:03,805 --> 00:24:07,540 ourselves or with partners. In 366 00:24:07,637 --> 00:24:10,670 each region or in the world, because 367 00:24:11,665 --> 00:24:15,084 there is room for a lot of businesses, a lot of companies 368 00:24:15,998 --> 00:24:18,984 to take part in this process of migrating to PQC. 369 00:24:19,930 --> 00:24:23,269 So you have companies that are only focused on 370 00:24:23,317 --> 00:24:27,121 inventory, other companies that are focused on migrating 371 00:24:27,217 --> 00:24:30,780 algorithms, other companies that are focused on the hardware part of it. 372 00:24:31,342 --> 00:24:35,104 So this is a And then you have to sell this to the 373 00:24:35,104 --> 00:24:38,648 board and you need to have someone inside the company who, inside the 374 00:24:38,648 --> 00:24:42,483 organization, who is going to be responsible for moving things ahead. 375 00:24:43,406 --> 00:24:45,606 So I saw myself like that 376 00:24:47,111 --> 00:24:49,700 element in this ecosystem. 377 00:24:52,220 --> 00:24:55,872 Have you ever come across organizations and 378 00:24:56,033 --> 00:24:59,395 when they assume that they're ready for it, but they're actually not? 379 00:25:03,131 --> 00:25:06,641 Fortunately, I mean, yes, but not in the way that we may think. 380 00:25:07,203 --> 00:25:10,813 They feel ready because they think nothing is going to happen ever, not 381 00:25:10,813 --> 00:25:14,328 because they have done anything. Okay. So they don't think that the 382 00:25:14,328 --> 00:25:17,473 Q-Day is coming or anything like that. So they say, no, we're going to be 383 00:25:17,473 --> 00:25:20,056 good, we don't need that, or it's not a priority right now. 384 00:25:20,858 --> 00:25:24,613 So not really. I haven't seen a 385 00:25:24,613 --> 00:25:27,148 company that say, yeah, we're ready. I have seen 386 00:25:28,686 --> 00:25:32,182 big organizations like Santander Bank in Spain, 387 00:25:34,003 --> 00:25:37,597 which I think they are leading a bit this migration 388 00:25:38,259 --> 00:25:42,068 in Europe and in the financial sector. And even 389 00:25:42,132 --> 00:25:45,618 them, I mean, I think they feel that they are doing a great job, but 390 00:25:45,683 --> 00:25:48,802 I don't think they feel 100% confident that everything is 391 00:25:49,332 --> 00:25:52,498 already done and they don't need to get worried about anything. 392 00:25:53,318 --> 00:25:56,846 I think that someone that understands The 393 00:25:56,846 --> 00:26:00,668 complexity of this, which is the organization part and everyone 394 00:26:01,021 --> 00:26:04,811 migrating, I think once they have done their part, 395 00:26:04,939 --> 00:26:08,696 I think they will be more concerned because the others are not doing 396 00:26:09,852 --> 00:26:13,353 their part and that puts themselves at risk. So 397 00:26:13,866 --> 00:26:17,704 that coordination is which is needed more and 398 00:26:17,704 --> 00:26:20,578 more to get us ahead of 399 00:26:26,142 --> 00:26:29,886 Have there been any common lessons that you've learned from working 400 00:26:29,918 --> 00:26:31,097 with early adopters? 401 00:26:35,140 --> 00:26:35,425 Yeah. 402 00:26:39,533 --> 00:26:42,347 Usually the lesson is we should have started earlier 403 00:26:43,334 --> 00:26:47,055 because there's a lot to be done. Yeah. And also, 404 00:26:47,920 --> 00:26:51,481 From the budget perspective, starting, I mean, it's a 405 00:26:51,481 --> 00:26:55,050 consequence of starting earlier. If they have started earlier, they 406 00:26:55,243 --> 00:26:59,038 would have now more budget allocated to do this 407 00:26:59,397 --> 00:27:03,115 in a, to not be in a 408 00:27:03,115 --> 00:27:06,682 rush, like to be more organized, to do it in more 409 00:27:06,682 --> 00:27:10,337 phases. And so it's easier to allocate 410 00:27:10,337 --> 00:27:13,466 budget. So those are like the main points that all these 411 00:27:14,536 --> 00:27:18,175 early adopters have in common. Is 412 00:27:18,207 --> 00:27:21,660 it really, you think it'll be part of the role of the CISO 413 00:27:22,467 --> 00:27:25,992 to address this, or is it going to be requires everybody to 414 00:27:26,976 --> 00:27:30,395 play along? We have seen that 415 00:27:30,444 --> 00:27:34,035 everyone needs to play along. This is a company effort, but 416 00:27:34,035 --> 00:27:36,058 everyone is, of course, like the 417 00:27:37,659 --> 00:27:41,275 accountability part falls on the CISO, but 418 00:27:41,654 --> 00:27:45,471 Everyone needs to take part. Everyone needs to be on board with the 419 00:27:45,471 --> 00:27:49,052 idea and know the impacts 420 00:27:49,245 --> 00:27:52,649 because when migrating to a new algorithm, 421 00:27:53,259 --> 00:27:56,711 computing time is going to be increased. So maybe the user 422 00:27:56,727 --> 00:27:59,617 experience is going to be impacted a bit. 423 00:28:00,516 --> 00:28:04,193 So everyone has a say, but I think that 424 00:28:04,193 --> 00:28:05,735 everyone needs to be on board too. 425 00:28:10,808 --> 00:28:14,225 So what skills should 426 00:28:14,808 --> 00:28:18,165 cybersecurity professionals begin developing today, 427 00:28:18,863 --> 00:28:21,513 thinking about forward thinking to 428 00:28:22,374 --> 00:28:24,081 quantum and PQC? 429 00:28:26,486 --> 00:28:29,513 I could say that we will need to be able to— 430 00:28:31,035 --> 00:28:32,735 sorry, my English betrayed me. 431 00:28:35,271 --> 00:28:39,035 My— We will need like some kind of white 432 00:28:39,035 --> 00:28:42,863 hat quantum hacking or penetration testing. 433 00:28:43,961 --> 00:28:47,536 We need that. And I mean, a real like hands-on with a computer. 434 00:28:47,600 --> 00:28:50,787 Like the fact of not having a quantum computer now 435 00:28:51,822 --> 00:28:55,600 stops us a bit. You can try to simulate it 436 00:28:55,632 --> 00:28:59,408 with the IBM's 437 00:28:59,908 --> 00:29:03,415 quantum services or Google's quantum 438 00:29:03,447 --> 00:29:07,295 computer services. Those are simulators that you can run now, but at some 439 00:29:07,312 --> 00:29:11,007 point we will need people in the cybersecurity space that are able 440 00:29:11,040 --> 00:29:13,451 to do penetration testing. 441 00:29:15,021 --> 00:29:18,807 And also, I wouldn't 442 00:29:18,823 --> 00:29:22,496 say that at some point we will need to create new algorithms to protect 443 00:29:22,496 --> 00:29:25,690 ourselves, but that's, I think that in 444 00:29:25,912 --> 00:29:27,368 Cryptography is going to be 445 00:29:29,767 --> 00:29:33,008 always a race between 446 00:29:34,628 --> 00:29:38,415 how far the machine can 447 00:29:38,431 --> 00:29:41,814 go. So we will— quantum computers can 448 00:29:42,154 --> 00:29:45,433 keep improving. So we will need to create 449 00:29:45,740 --> 00:29:49,584 stronger encryption. So that's something that's going to 450 00:29:49,584 --> 00:29:53,343 evolve in time. So cryptography, I think that's going to stay 451 00:29:53,506 --> 00:29:55,596 here with us forever. We don't know 452 00:29:55,596 --> 00:29:59,189 what what's possible yet. And once, 453 00:30:00,207 --> 00:30:03,942 right now, AI is accelerating quantum, but once quantum 454 00:30:03,942 --> 00:30:07,730 starts accelerating AI, I think there will be more risks, more threats. 455 00:30:08,437 --> 00:30:12,133 And yeah, I would say that someone 456 00:30:12,310 --> 00:30:15,911 in the space will need to get to understand better quantum computing and its 457 00:30:15,911 --> 00:30:18,602 capabilities for breaking encryption. 458 00:30:19,295 --> 00:30:23,127 Hmm. What can 459 00:30:23,127 --> 00:30:26,675 we do as consumers, right? I have a bank, I have 460 00:30:27,113 --> 00:30:28,911 everything the average person would have. 461 00:30:30,960 --> 00:30:32,873 What can consumers do to 462 00:30:34,771 --> 00:30:38,421 encourage their banks? Banks are probably already doing it, right? But 463 00:30:38,453 --> 00:30:41,945 like other organizations to upgrade their 464 00:30:41,945 --> 00:30:45,633 encryption algorithms. I think consumer demand is gonna have 465 00:30:45,665 --> 00:30:49,466 to accelerate this. Is that even possible? Like, are you gonna look like 466 00:30:49,466 --> 00:30:51,380 a crazy person? Like, I'm not, not that I'm gonna go down to my supermarket 467 00:30:51,380 --> 00:30:55,080 or my bank and say like, We need quantum, post-quantum 468 00:30:55,080 --> 00:30:58,581 encryption, cryptography, right? Like, what could the average person 469 00:30:58,613 --> 00:31:02,067 do to— 'cause there's really 2 470 00:31:02,067 --> 00:31:05,837 stories here in my mind, at a minimum of 2 stories, right? Like, one, career-wise, 471 00:31:06,030 --> 00:31:09,459 right? Like, what can you do today to have a fulfilling career in 472 00:31:09,556 --> 00:31:13,190 quantum, post-quantum cryptography, this kind of space? And then 2 is 473 00:31:13,224 --> 00:31:16,727 like, what can I do to protect my data? What, 474 00:31:18,081 --> 00:31:21,853 how do you, like, what? Yeah. To me, that's something I don't think 475 00:31:21,853 --> 00:31:24,918 anyone's really thought about. Do we need consumer education? 476 00:31:25,528 --> 00:31:29,299 Obviously, that's going to have a long— that's a long cycle. But 477 00:31:29,299 --> 00:31:33,118 like, what can— and the people listening to this are savvier than the average 478 00:31:33,615 --> 00:31:37,418 consumer, but like, what can people who are a little more savvy do to, you 479 00:31:37,418 --> 00:31:40,948 know, when they go to Thanksgiving with their relatives, they talk about this? Like, 480 00:31:41,734 --> 00:31:45,441 what does that look like? I think, yeah, I 481 00:31:45,441 --> 00:31:47,495 know that the listeners are savvy enough to have a 482 00:31:49,174 --> 00:31:53,000 password vault and that kind of things. But even if these 483 00:31:53,275 --> 00:31:57,120 tools that we use or these places where we go and our information 484 00:31:57,168 --> 00:32:00,888 is not protected, that changes everything because there's not much 485 00:32:01,276 --> 00:32:04,446 we can do directly with the company. 486 00:32:05,320 --> 00:32:08,901 Right. So I think this goes back or falls back to we 487 00:32:09,047 --> 00:32:10,944 as citizens can 488 00:32:12,598 --> 00:32:15,582 demand from our governments and from our 489 00:32:16,112 --> 00:32:19,949 lawmakers to go and create the regulations needed 490 00:32:19,981 --> 00:32:23,448 to force everyone that is handling our data to 491 00:32:23,448 --> 00:32:27,029 migrate to this. And I mean, that could sound 492 00:32:27,125 --> 00:32:30,898 like also like something like this crazy guy is coming to say 493 00:32:30,898 --> 00:32:34,687 that we need to create a PQC readiness 494 00:32:34,976 --> 00:32:38,299 law. I'm pretty sure if I ran down to my local bank branch talking about 495 00:32:38,668 --> 00:32:42,393 rent, you know, I would probably be on the news that night 496 00:32:42,393 --> 00:32:46,145 and not for any good. Yeah, but I think 497 00:32:47,427 --> 00:32:51,000 at the end of the day is having an opportunity to share with the people 498 00:32:51,192 --> 00:32:54,766 you talk about this threat and getting 499 00:32:55,343 --> 00:32:58,804 everyone, making everyone conscious about the risk. 500 00:32:59,829 --> 00:33:03,531 And that could start moving like a community to 501 00:33:04,797 --> 00:33:07,985 demand this from governments. Right. Because you can really, 502 00:33:08,738 --> 00:33:12,359 like as an individual, you cannot do much. But as a 503 00:33:12,359 --> 00:33:15,886 community, there are more possibilities, there are more 504 00:33:16,563 --> 00:33:19,687 opportunities to get things done. 505 00:33:20,589 --> 00:33:24,072 And maybe it's not something that is going to happen. I 506 00:33:24,153 --> 00:33:27,682 think about my country and emerging markets. 507 00:33:28,346 --> 00:33:31,976 Our countries are like laws and regulations are the things 508 00:33:32,077 --> 00:33:35,752 that are, I could 509 00:33:35,752 --> 00:33:39,219 say, are 510 00:33:39,620 --> 00:33:42,375 not prioritized as they should. 511 00:33:43,400 --> 00:33:46,957 So we prioritize lawmakers like our Congress, 512 00:33:47,470 --> 00:33:50,786 usually in my country, they focus on other 513 00:33:50,866 --> 00:33:54,663 topics and not necessarily this type of threats. They don't even 514 00:33:54,679 --> 00:33:57,146 have the technical foundation to 515 00:33:58,124 --> 00:34:00,703 present a law like this. 516 00:34:01,744 --> 00:34:05,221 But I think that we as individuals can 517 00:34:05,269 --> 00:34:08,605 share what we know, can start building 518 00:34:08,958 --> 00:34:12,603 from the streets, from our neighborhoods, from our cities, and demand 519 00:34:12,747 --> 00:34:16,392 the government to start doing this. But yeah, I think this is 520 00:34:16,745 --> 00:34:20,470 a long way, but we need to start. It's 521 00:34:20,519 --> 00:34:24,340 definitely a long game, right? Like, I was somewhere and 522 00:34:24,517 --> 00:34:27,792 this was 4 or 5 years ago and 523 00:34:28,932 --> 00:34:31,630 they were saying like, you know, we need to start doing this. This is before 524 00:34:33,931 --> 00:34:37,737 This is before kind of the, the recent last couple years 525 00:34:37,769 --> 00:34:40,878 where this has become more and more of an urgent kind of topic. 526 00:34:41,519 --> 00:34:45,029 He was talking about like— no, it was 2015. He was talking about post-quantum 527 00:34:45,221 --> 00:34:48,843 cryptography and saying like, look, I know it's going to be years away, but it 528 00:34:48,843 --> 00:34:52,400 was a government IT forum. And he was saying like, 529 00:34:52,512 --> 00:34:56,358 well, you know, you know how quickly government moves, right? Yeah. If you want something 530 00:34:56,358 --> 00:34:59,179 done in 20 years, you got to start today. Yeah. 531 00:34:59,243 --> 00:35:02,226 Something to that effect. And 532 00:35:03,332 --> 00:35:07,165 no, you're right. And legislators are barely getting— if 533 00:35:07,165 --> 00:35:09,875 you hear the conversations going on around Capitol Hill, 534 00:35:10,692 --> 00:35:14,156 listeners, some listeners will know, but I used to work at Microsoft at the K 535 00:35:14,236 --> 00:35:17,924 Street office and work with lobbyists. These people are 536 00:35:17,924 --> 00:35:21,709 not technically savvy, and that's being generous. I would say of 537 00:35:21,837 --> 00:35:25,397 every elected official I met, there were probably only about 2 538 00:35:26,559 --> 00:35:30,190 And let's just say it's like I've met 100, right? It's 2% 539 00:35:30,270 --> 00:35:34,005 or less, I would say. Yeah. Are technically savvy in any meaningful 540 00:35:34,021 --> 00:35:37,676 way. And if you watch some of the things going on now 541 00:35:37,741 --> 00:35:41,572 about AI and GPUs and things like that, you can tell they're not 542 00:35:41,572 --> 00:35:45,387 exactly, they're not exactly on the ball. And I would 543 00:35:45,403 --> 00:35:48,802 say that quantum is probably the wave beyond AI 544 00:35:49,667 --> 00:35:53,281 that they're even less aware of. Yeah. 545 00:35:53,508 --> 00:35:56,930 And now the focus is AI. Right. Now 546 00:35:57,076 --> 00:35:59,897 everybody's attention is on AI. Yeah. Yeah. So they 547 00:35:59,897 --> 00:36:03,107 are creating laws 548 00:36:03,862 --> 00:36:07,124 about everyone is thinking about how we're going to regulate this. How is this going 549 00:36:07,220 --> 00:36:10,916 to prevent me to lose my job 550 00:36:10,916 --> 00:36:13,959 or how am I going to be protected from not being 551 00:36:14,780 --> 00:36:18,378 unemployed or how my data is going to be protected. So 552 00:36:19,736 --> 00:36:22,919 I don't really think that there's going to be enough attention to 553 00:36:23,857 --> 00:36:27,300 PQC from legislators at some point, but 554 00:36:28,465 --> 00:36:30,956 I just hope that 555 00:36:32,688 --> 00:36:35,649 we start talking about this and at some point it will 556 00:36:36,238 --> 00:36:39,791 have the space it deserves. So if 557 00:36:39,872 --> 00:36:43,530 every CIO and technology leader listening 558 00:36:44,401 --> 00:36:47,986 could accomplish one thing in the next 6 months 559 00:36:48,195 --> 00:36:52,022 to improve their quantum readiness, what 560 00:36:52,022 --> 00:36:53,234 would you want that to be? 561 00:36:56,312 --> 00:36:57,645 I would want them to 562 00:37:00,071 --> 00:37:03,590 start their inventory 563 00:37:04,731 --> 00:37:07,253 and to know where the threats are. 564 00:37:09,990 --> 00:37:13,498 And with that knowledge, I think they will have 565 00:37:15,406 --> 00:37:19,221 a scope and roadmap to what needs to be 566 00:37:19,270 --> 00:37:21,168 done and how much it's going to cost. 567 00:37:23,290 --> 00:37:26,763 And an inventory could take 6 months, 1 year. I mean, it depends 568 00:37:26,795 --> 00:37:30,576 on what tools you use and how fast you move and 569 00:37:30,576 --> 00:37:34,254 how you map everything. So I think it's a 570 00:37:34,565 --> 00:37:38,061 good timeline to start To start this, this long 571 00:37:38,158 --> 00:37:38,515 process. 572 00:37:42,617 --> 00:37:42,730 Cool. 573 00:37:47,179 --> 00:37:49,749 I don't have any more questions. I think this is awesome. So what it is, 574 00:37:49,927 --> 00:37:52,902 what do you do and what does your company do to— feel free to pitch 575 00:37:52,934 --> 00:37:56,329 your product because folks have been kind enough to listen this long. Thank you. We've 576 00:37:56,329 --> 00:37:59,759 been talking to them, but, but no, I'm curious, like, what's your solution? 577 00:38:01,386 --> 00:38:05,042 We don't have a specific tool. what we do is 578 00:38:05,235 --> 00:38:08,856 we help a sector migrate in 579 00:38:08,856 --> 00:38:12,574 emerging markets, migrate to PQC. We do this by using 580 00:38:13,567 --> 00:38:17,413 inventory tools. I mean, we are open about that. We don't 581 00:38:17,413 --> 00:38:21,115 have like, we're tool agnostic. Then we map 582 00:38:21,115 --> 00:38:24,864 everything and we plan with the sector the roadmap to the 583 00:38:24,864 --> 00:38:28,550 migration. And we use waves. We 584 00:38:28,550 --> 00:38:32,258 have different ways to approach this. So we 585 00:38:32,258 --> 00:38:35,984 can do it, we do a pilot, check the pilot, and 586 00:38:36,161 --> 00:38:39,920 then we move on with all the sector. We do this using 587 00:38:40,032 --> 00:38:42,698 pods and waves. So we 588 00:38:42,843 --> 00:38:46,681 migrate the biggest organizations in the sector, let's say 589 00:38:46,681 --> 00:38:50,070 like a central bank. We start migrating the 590 00:38:50,151 --> 00:38:53,572 biggest banks and then we move to the smaller ones 591 00:38:54,311 --> 00:38:58,034 and start migrating everything. And then we 592 00:38:58,259 --> 00:39:01,868 help inside the organization to sell the 593 00:39:01,868 --> 00:39:04,740 PQC migration and we help 594 00:39:05,253 --> 00:39:08,975 establish the processes to keep compliant with everything. 595 00:39:09,568 --> 00:39:13,306 And then we work with the sector, with the organizations 596 00:39:14,365 --> 00:39:17,926 to maintain because one thing is to migrate, another thing is to migrate— 597 00:39:18,231 --> 00:39:21,873 sorry, to maintain. And basically that's our 598 00:39:22,359 --> 00:39:25,478 our proposal. And we're focusing on emerging markets. 599 00:39:26,530 --> 00:39:30,267 We try to be more efficient 600 00:39:30,316 --> 00:39:33,877 than Big 4 consultancy companies. 601 00:39:35,850 --> 00:39:39,457 And yeah, we are expecting or 602 00:39:39,924 --> 00:39:43,628 expectant about the regulations in these markets. 603 00:39:43,950 --> 00:39:46,359 Regulations are not coming out, 604 00:39:47,170 --> 00:39:50,949 but we're ready even to help create those with the regulation, 605 00:39:50,965 --> 00:39:53,235 with the regulators. So yeah. 606 00:39:54,817 --> 00:39:58,175 Cool. That's great. So if people want to find out more 607 00:39:58,288 --> 00:40:01,775 about you and more about your company, where should 608 00:40:03,302 --> 00:40:07,065 we send them? We can, well, you can find me on my LinkedIn, Pablo 609 00:40:07,081 --> 00:40:10,631 Carrillo, and also cubrews.com, 610 00:40:11,522 --> 00:40:14,941 our website. You can check it and 611 00:40:15,313 --> 00:40:17,325 you can send me an email at 612 00:40:17,357 --> 00:40:20,840 pablo@cubrews.com and we can 613 00:40:21,118 --> 00:40:22,050 start the discussion.