1 00:00:01,557 --> 00:00:04,287 for those of you growing increasingly concerned about the 2 00:00:04,287 --> 00:00:06,327 security of your it infrastructure. 3 00:00:06,567 --> 00:00:13,257 This episode talks about the concept of an MSSP managed security service provider. 4 00:00:13,557 --> 00:00:16,017 Uh, I think you're really going to like what we talk about. 5 00:00:35,899 --> 00:00:39,109 W. Curtis Preston: Hi, and welcome to Backup Central's Restore it all podcast. 6 00:00:39,109 --> 00:00:41,599 I'm your host w Curtis Preston, a k a, Mr. 7 00:00:41,599 --> 00:00:42,139 Backup. 8 00:00:42,499 --> 00:00:51,109 And I have with me the guy who I've finally experienced what his dog 9 00:00:51,109 --> 00:00:53,869 is named after Prasanna Malaiyandi 10 00:00:54,009 --> 00:00:55,419 Prasanna Malaiyandi: What's going on, Curtis? 11 00:00:55,689 --> 00:00:56,299 I know, 12 00:00:56,749 --> 00:00:57,169 W. Curtis Preston: you 13 00:00:57,169 --> 00:00:58,249 you really weren't sure 14 00:00:58,249 --> 00:00:58,879 where I, what I was 15 00:00:58,909 --> 00:01:01,159 Prasanna Malaiyandi: so I thought you were going to go for like your stair 16 00:01:01,159 --> 00:01:06,379 consultant or something like that, but No, I think that's a good thing. 17 00:01:06,379 --> 00:01:06,799 So, 18 00:01:07,399 --> 00:01:07,699 W. Curtis Preston: no. 19 00:01:07,839 --> 00:01:11,309 I, I, I got to experience, uh, Kulfi. 20 00:01:11,749 --> 00:01:12,659 Prasanna Malaiyandi: Indian Ice Cream 21 00:01:13,159 --> 00:01:15,589 W. Curtis Preston: um, yeah. 22 00:01:15,589 --> 00:01:19,639 That was quite, uh, cuz we went to this new, uh, place. 23 00:01:20,119 --> 00:01:23,419 Uh, and, and I, and I shouldn't, should I say Indian food or 24 00:01:23,424 --> 00:01:26,509 should I say Himalayan food or? 25 00:01:27,529 --> 00:01:30,379 Uh, cuz it was the taste of the Himalayas, 26 00:01:31,284 --> 00:01:32,854 Prasanna Malaiyandi: It could be, well, it could be like 27 00:01:32,854 --> 00:01:34,744 Indian or Nepalese, typically. 28 00:01:34,744 --> 00:01:35,404 Those are, 29 00:01:36,169 --> 00:01:36,409 W. Curtis Preston: Yeah. 30 00:01:36,409 --> 00:01:37,399 Nip Nepalese. 31 00:01:37,399 --> 00:01:37,789 yeah. 32 00:01:37,849 --> 00:01:38,299 Yeah. 33 00:01:38,899 --> 00:01:39,859 Um, but they 34 00:01:39,859 --> 00:01:41,049 had, but they had, Vindaloo. 35 00:01:41,539 --> 00:01:45,169 Although, um, it, it was funny, I, you know, I went, I think I 36 00:01:45,169 --> 00:01:52,249 told you I went once and I I got a seven outta 10 and it was like, as 37 00:01:52,249 --> 00:01:53,659 well have been ice cream as far as 38 00:01:53,734 --> 00:01:55,444 Prasanna Malaiyandi: you like really spicy Curtis? 39 00:01:55,939 --> 00:01:56,599 W. Curtis Preston: standpoint. 40 00:01:57,229 --> 00:01:59,329 And so I said to the, I went back to the waitress. 41 00:01:59,329 --> 00:02:01,099 So we literally went just a couple days later 42 00:02:01,204 --> 00:02:01,954 Prasanna Malaiyandi: Oh, you went back. 43 00:02:01,954 --> 00:02:02,824 I didn't know this. 44 00:02:03,889 --> 00:02:04,189 W. Curtis Preston: yeah. 45 00:02:04,459 --> 00:02:04,759 Oh yeah. 46 00:02:04,759 --> 00:02:08,089 We went back and I said, I said, you know, I had a seven the other day and it 47 00:02:08,089 --> 00:02:10,939 was nothing like, I need more than that. 48 00:02:11,149 --> 00:02:12,439 And she's like, she looked at me 49 00:02:12,439 --> 00:02:14,929 like, you can have an eight. 50 00:02:15,859 --> 00:02:18,379 Like, like I was, because I was gonna go for the 10. 51 00:02:18,499 --> 00:02:20,449 I'm like, if that's a seven, I'm gonna go for the 10. 52 00:02:20,449 --> 00:02:25,339 She's like, I'll let you have an eight, you know, and I was like, you know what? 53 00:02:25,339 --> 00:02:26,359 You're not in charge of me. 54 00:02:26,374 --> 00:02:26,884 Prasanna Malaiyandi: And how was he. 55 00:02:26,899 --> 00:02:28,699 W. Curtis Preston: Um, but I had a eight. 56 00:02:29,399 --> 00:02:32,479 It, it was definitely, it had more bite to it than the seven. 57 00:02:32,884 --> 00:02:38,384 But I don't know, I've had like authentic Indian vindaloo with, 58 00:02:38,444 --> 00:02:40,364 with authentic Indian spices. 59 00:02:40,694 --> 00:02:41,954 This doesn't taste like that. 60 00:02:42,119 --> 00:02:44,729 Prasanna Malaiyandi: well, I, I, I wanna say that each region 61 00:02:45,189 --> 00:02:47,759 probably does their spices slightly differently based 62 00:02:47,764 --> 00:02:49,049 on what they have access to. 63 00:02:49,394 --> 00:02:52,184 W. Curtis Preston: yeah, there's that, this is why I asked you 64 00:02:52,184 --> 00:02:54,644 the question about whether or not it's cheating just to throw in a 65 00:02:54,644 --> 00:02:55,484 little cayenne. 66 00:02:55,754 --> 00:02:56,864 And it sounds like it is. 67 00:02:57,194 --> 00:02:57,464 Cuz I 68 00:02:57,464 --> 00:02:58,454 tasted cayenne. 69 00:02:58,514 --> 00:03:01,814 I was like, I, I'm pretty sure they put cayenne in just 70 00:03:01,819 --> 00:03:02,924 to make it a little hotter. 71 00:03:03,344 --> 00:03:04,184 Um, 72 00:03:04,919 --> 00:03:06,479 Prasanna Malaiyandi: But then you ended with dessert, which 73 00:03:06,584 --> 00:03:06,914 W. Curtis Preston: you know 74 00:03:07,499 --> 00:03:08,039 Prasanna Malaiyandi: the mango. 75 00:03:08,504 --> 00:03:09,044 W. Curtis Preston: Oh right. 76 00:03:09,074 --> 00:03:09,974 Which we, yeah. 77 00:03:09,979 --> 00:03:10,294 Yes. 78 00:03:10,754 --> 00:03:12,384 And the mango Kulfi. 79 00:03:12,404 --> 00:03:15,944 And I was like, Kulfi, I know . I finally got to see what 80 00:03:15,944 --> 00:03:16,604 Kulfi 81 00:03:16,624 --> 00:03:20,069 Prasanna Malaiyandi: he was named Kulfi because when we were adopting 82 00:03:20,069 --> 00:03:22,319 him, uh, we called up my sister. 83 00:03:22,874 --> 00:03:26,264 And she was really hungry that day and so on. 84 00:03:26,264 --> 00:03:31,184 Her mind was food, so she started naming off Indian Foods like Chutney and 85 00:03:31,184 --> 00:03:35,004 Sambar and Mixture and Jalabi and kulfi. 86 00:03:35,024 --> 00:03:41,234 And so my wife and I, we decided kulfi was an awesome name and it works well for 'em. 87 00:03:43,544 --> 00:03:44,264 W. Curtis Preston: That's funny. 88 00:03:44,414 --> 00:03:44,984 That's funny. 89 00:03:44,984 --> 00:03:45,224 I know. 90 00:03:45,224 --> 00:03:46,094 He's, he's been on the 91 00:03:46,094 --> 00:03:47,354 podcast a few times. 92 00:03:47,954 --> 00:03:51,044 Um, mainly just sort of barking and 93 00:03:51,104 --> 00:03:52,244 Prasanna Malaiyandi: Yes, a couple times. 94 00:03:52,664 --> 00:03:53,084 W. Curtis Preston: wanting 95 00:03:53,264 --> 00:03:54,944 wanting to be on your lap, right? 96 00:03:56,444 --> 00:03:56,834 Yeah. 97 00:03:58,054 --> 00:04:03,041 Well our guest has 25 years of experience working in the 98 00:04:03,041 --> 00:04:06,521 networking, telecommunications, and information security space. 99 00:04:06,941 --> 00:04:11,771 Uh, he is currently serving as a c e O of Solcyber managed security services. 100 00:04:12,161 --> 00:04:13,781 We're excited to have him on the pod. 101 00:04:14,141 --> 00:04:17,961 Welcome to the podcast, Scott McCrady. 102 00:04:17,981 --> 00:04:19,641 Scott McCrady: Thank you Curtis Prasanna. 103 00:04:19,661 --> 00:04:20,921 Very nice to meet both of you. 104 00:04:20,981 --> 00:04:24,611 Um, I actually, I was just to pivot off your food conversation. 105 00:04:24,616 --> 00:04:26,981 I actually spent a year in Thailand when I was younger. 106 00:04:27,581 --> 00:04:31,571 I was a volunteer English teacher, and uh, I remember my very first meal there. 107 00:04:31,631 --> 00:04:33,341 I, I thought I was used to hot food. 108 00:04:33,341 --> 00:04:35,801 I, I grew up in Dallas, so you know, jalapenos and stuff. 109 00:04:36,461 --> 00:04:39,311 And so they asked, do you want it hot, medium, or mild? 110 00:04:39,311 --> 00:04:40,421 And I thought, you know, I'll be safe. 111 00:04:40,421 --> 00:04:42,041 I'll have, I'll, I'll get medium. 112 00:04:42,671 --> 00:04:44,891 Uh, it was, um, I don't know if you've ever gotten the 113 00:04:44,891 --> 00:04:46,511 hiccups from having food too 114 00:04:46,511 --> 00:04:49,751 hot, but I immediately, you know, two or three bites into it. 115 00:04:49,751 --> 00:04:50,921 I'm sweating profusely. 116 00:04:51,341 --> 00:04:54,521 And then just out of the blue, you just get this, these hiccups that 117 00:04:54,521 --> 00:04:55,721 for like two or three minutes. 118 00:04:55,721 --> 00:05:00,071 And, and that's when I realized that, uh, Thai hot food is a different level of hot 119 00:05:00,071 --> 00:05:01,991 food than what I'd, uh, what I'd gotten used 120 00:05:02,216 --> 00:05:06,386 W. Curtis Preston: I've been, I've been to, uh, Phuket and I just remember I 121 00:05:06,386 --> 00:05:11,276 was, I was hanging out with a local and I asked them to order two dishes. 122 00:05:11,276 --> 00:05:16,106 One that they felt was, you know, for the wimpy American, but still spicy. 123 00:05:16,111 --> 00:05:17,486 And one that they would eat. 124 00:05:17,906 --> 00:05:20,306 And I would try the one that they would eat. 125 00:05:20,396 --> 00:05:22,616 And if I couldn't eat it, then we would swap dishes. 126 00:05:23,036 --> 00:05:30,716 And I just touched the tongue, touched the spoon to my tongue, and I, my head 127 00:05:30,716 --> 00:05:32,996 blew off and I was like, swap, swap, swap. 128 00:05:33,046 --> 00:05:35,576 I, I can't, I can't do it. 129 00:05:35,636 --> 00:05:36,236 I can't do it. 130 00:05:36,956 --> 00:05:40,316 Scott McCrady: Un for, for, for, for my palate. 131 00:05:40,406 --> 00:05:43,766 Uh, the sticky rice and mango as a dessert was amazing. 132 00:05:43,796 --> 00:05:47,996 I could live, um, chicken fried rice, uh, with a beer was about 133 00:05:47,996 --> 00:05:48,776 as good as you're ever gonna. 134 00:05:50,141 --> 00:05:53,561 And I love their stir fries and their curries, but I generally had to tell 135 00:05:53,561 --> 00:05:54,941 'em to, to take it down a notch. 136 00:05:55,001 --> 00:05:57,731 Um, cuz I could, I could eat decently spicy food I 137 00:05:57,776 --> 00:05:59,186 Prasanna Malaiyandi: it's a different level sometime. 138 00:05:59,501 --> 00:06:01,661 Scott McCrady: it is just a different, it, it's a different level. 139 00:06:01,721 --> 00:06:02,351 It is a 140 00:06:02,351 --> 00:06:03,251 different level. 141 00:06:03,656 --> 00:06:04,106 W. Curtis Preston: Yeah. 142 00:06:04,166 --> 00:06:04,616 Yeah. 143 00:06:05,321 --> 00:06:05,981 Scott McCrady: Delicious. 144 00:06:05,981 --> 00:06:09,701 By the way, I never, never b been to a Thai restaurant in America that's been 145 00:06:09,701 --> 00:06:11,291 able to recreate that unique flavor. 146 00:06:11,726 --> 00:06:13,346 W. Curtis Preston: no, that's the problem. 147 00:06:13,346 --> 00:06:15,836 This is why no one should travel, right. 148 00:06:15,836 --> 00:06:22,016 Um, so so, uh, because, you know, you live in, you live in Texas . I 149 00:06:22,016 --> 00:06:27,056 live in San Diego, I can get decent, uh, Texas style barbecue here. 150 00:06:27,536 --> 00:06:31,076 Uh, but it's not that, it's not what you can get there. 151 00:06:31,346 --> 00:06:35,396 Um, and I will definitely tell you, no one here knows what 152 00:06:35,396 --> 00:06:38,486 a beef rib looks like, right? 153 00:06:38,486 --> 00:06:40,616 An actual Texas beef 154 00:06:40,886 --> 00:06:41,486 rib. 155 00:06:41,966 --> 00:06:45,296 It's, it's two and a half pounds, right? 156 00:06:45,296 --> 00:06:47,696 It's one rib, it's two and a half pounds. 157 00:06:48,116 --> 00:06:48,836 And, 158 00:06:49,031 --> 00:06:52,121 Scott McCrady: deliciousness, of sweet, sweet deliciousness 159 00:06:52,571 --> 00:06:53,321 W. Curtis Preston: Yeah. 160 00:06:53,651 --> 00:06:58,121 Um, uh, yeah, you know, we've already, we talked before the recording that 161 00:06:58,126 --> 00:07:01,811 you know, that I did this, this barbecue road trip with my wife, 162 00:07:01,841 --> 00:07:07,091 uh, there, just right when Covid was starting to die down just a little bit. 163 00:07:07,151 --> 00:07:11,621 Uh, and we did this little road trip and, uh, made a little YouTube 164 00:07:11,621 --> 00:07:16,241 video of each stop and, um, yeah. 165 00:07:16,301 --> 00:07:17,351 But, but this is the problem. 166 00:07:17,351 --> 00:07:20,591 Like, I, like I've been in New Orleans, I've had, , Cajun food in New Orleans. 167 00:07:20,621 --> 00:07:22,451 It nowhere is as good as 168 00:07:22,451 --> 00:07:23,171 it is there. 169 00:07:23,801 --> 00:07:25,601 Um, Indian food in India. 170 00:07:25,601 --> 00:07:27,461 I've had Indian food in India, right? 171 00:07:27,551 --> 00:07:30,341 Um, and made one big mistake there. 172 00:07:30,346 --> 00:07:37,241 I was at a, I was at a buffet and I managed to put, um, a big scoop of chutney 173 00:07:37,681 --> 00:07:38,531 Prasanna Malaiyandi: your problem. 174 00:07:40,106 --> 00:07:42,431 W. Curtis Preston: based on thinking it was, I thought it was a man. 175 00:07:42,791 --> 00:07:47,261 And, um, so I put a big scoop, big scoop of it in my mouth that, ah, 176 00:07:48,221 --> 00:07:50,291 you know, didn't burn my mouth off. 177 00:07:50,291 --> 00:07:53,411 It's just, it's a really strong flavor. 178 00:07:53,411 --> 00:07:53,711 Right. 179 00:07:53,716 --> 00:07:55,841 It's, it's something you're supposed to dab on. 180 00:07:56,216 --> 00:07:57,596 Prasanna Malaiyandi: Not eat as a main meal. 181 00:07:57,831 --> 00:08:02,151 W. Curtis Preston: That's both the joy and the, uh, like if you ever get 182 00:08:02,151 --> 00:08:08,511 a chance to go to, uh, uh, Holland, their, um, their food there, the, the, 183 00:08:08,541 --> 00:08:10,461 the Thai, the, uh, Indonesian food. 184 00:08:11,331 --> 00:08:11,781 Right. 185 00:08:12,291 --> 00:08:16,131 Um, uh, the, the, the rice, the rice dishes. 186 00:08:16,131 --> 00:08:16,911 Those are really good. 187 00:08:17,541 --> 00:08:18,021 Um, 188 00:08:18,411 --> 00:08:19,431 looks like we've lost our 189 00:08:19,506 --> 00:08:20,946 Prasanna Malaiyandi: just went to go look after his pup. 190 00:08:21,276 --> 00:08:21,666 Yeah. 191 00:08:23,601 --> 00:08:23,901 W. Curtis Preston: how 192 00:08:23,901 --> 00:08:24,171 how 193 00:08:24,351 --> 00:08:25,971 Scott McCrady: the, I told you guys this was gonna happen. 194 00:08:26,241 --> 00:08:28,821 He literally has been perfect today, 195 00:08:29,031 --> 00:08:32,261 and now he just threw his his bone underneath the couch. 196 00:08:33,331 --> 00:08:35,946 which of course he can't get to it cuz he doesn't have opposable thumbs. 197 00:08:36,456 --> 00:08:39,336 And uh, the only time he tends to freak out is if he, 198 00:08:39,456 --> 00:08:41,106 if his one of his toys or his 199 00:08:41,106 --> 00:08:42,996 bone gets underneath something and then he'll, 200 00:08:43,476 --> 00:08:43,776 you know, 201 00:08:44,526 --> 00:08:44,796 call 202 00:08:44,841 --> 00:08:47,421 W. Curtis Preston: you said he's, he's six, six months old, 203 00:08:47,916 --> 00:08:48,216 Scott McCrady: Eight 204 00:08:48,221 --> 00:08:48,486 months 205 00:08:48,506 --> 00:08:48,921 Prasanna Malaiyandi: get him as a 206 00:08:49,056 --> 00:08:49,806 Scott McCrady: Eight months old. 207 00:08:50,016 --> 00:08:55,326 His name I did, he is, uh, I, I traveled all my whole life and so 208 00:08:55,326 --> 00:08:56,526 I haven't had to be able to have a 209 00:08:56,526 --> 00:08:58,296 dog for, you know, a long time. 210 00:08:58,296 --> 00:09:00,336 So, you know, I was 211 00:09:00,336 --> 00:09:01,506 like, I'm gonna get a dog finally. 212 00:09:01,506 --> 00:09:03,696 I'm not traveling as much, I'm not going overseas. 213 00:09:03,696 --> 00:09:04,386 All this jazz. 214 00:09:04,746 --> 00:09:06,606 And oh my goodness, he's a blast. 215 00:09:06,606 --> 00:09:07,446 So much fun. 216 00:09:07,746 --> 00:09:10,136 Such a sweet boy, good puppy. 217 00:09:10,206 --> 00:09:12,126 You know, all dogs are nice, but 218 00:09:12,546 --> 00:09:14,286 for me he's easy because he's, 219 00:09:14,286 --> 00:09:15,096 he's, he's not too 220 00:09:15,231 --> 00:09:15,591 Prasanna Malaiyandi: Yeah. 221 00:09:15,861 --> 00:09:18,171 It's cra it's sort of the luck of the draw, right? 222 00:09:20,346 --> 00:09:20,586 Scott McCrady: That 223 00:09:20,586 --> 00:09:20,976 it is. 224 00:09:20,976 --> 00:09:21,996 You gotta love him no matter what. 225 00:09:21,996 --> 00:09:22,326 Right. 226 00:09:22,326 --> 00:09:24,066 But, uh, I did, I did get lucky. 227 00:09:25,011 --> 00:09:25,641 Prasanna Malaiyandi: awesome. 228 00:09:25,701 --> 00:09:26,391 W. Curtis Preston: Good for you. 229 00:09:27,651 --> 00:09:31,321 So we're, we're gonna talk about, um, you know, one of our favorite 230 00:09:31,326 --> 00:09:35,121 topics today, which is, uh, security. 231 00:09:35,841 --> 00:09:43,791 Um, and I honestly, you know, I can't imagine what it's like 232 00:09:44,871 --> 00:09:49,581 to manage information security in today's , today's world. 233 00:09:50,496 --> 00:09:51,426 Prasanna Malaiyandi: Oh, I was gonna tell you, 234 00:09:51,516 --> 00:09:53,286 wait before you go. 235 00:09:53,466 --> 00:09:55,926 I finished the book, cuckoos net. 236 00:09:55,956 --> 00:09:56,676 Cuckoos Egg. 237 00:09:58,341 --> 00:09:58,641 W. Curtis Preston: Oh, you 238 00:09:58,646 --> 00:09:59,631 finished the Cuckoos Egg 239 00:10:00,186 --> 00:10:03,456 Prasanna Malaiyandi: Sorry, I totally forgot to tell you since, 240 00:10:03,456 --> 00:10:05,046 but we're talking about security now. 241 00:10:05,046 --> 00:10:09,166 So for those who haven't read it, go read The Cuckoo's Egg by Cliff Stoll. 242 00:10:09,636 --> 00:10:11,406 It's a really good book. 243 00:10:11,436 --> 00:10:12,966 It's, or sorry, cliff Stole. 244 00:10:13,356 --> 00:10:14,946 Yeah, it's a really good book. 245 00:10:14,946 --> 00:10:19,546 It's from the eighties about, uh, what would you say, an IT 246 00:10:19,686 --> 00:10:21,636 person trying to find a hacker. 247 00:10:22,506 --> 00:10:23,226 I'll leave it at that. 248 00:10:24,201 --> 00:10:24,801 W. Curtis Preston: Yeah. 249 00:10:25,071 --> 00:10:25,371 Yeah. 250 00:10:25,371 --> 00:10:32,421 It's a fascinating story of, he's, he's, uh, a Unix cis admin at Berkeley Uni. 251 00:10:32,451 --> 00:10:33,231 It's a true story. 252 00:10:33,231 --> 00:10:37,821 He's a Unix CIS admin at Berkeley University, and they, they had, um, 253 00:10:37,821 --> 00:10:42,891 this was when the Unix computers, like university Eunice computers with 254 00:10:42,891 --> 00:10:49,521 Bill for time, and they had both the onboard, like the native time system, 255 00:10:49,821 --> 00:10:54,231 and they had the, um, and they had a commercial one, and they were, they were 256 00:10:54,371 --> 00:10:55,801 Prasanna Malaiyandi: 75 cents. 257 00:10:55,831 --> 00:10:56,321 Yeah. 258 00:10:57,261 --> 00:10:59,181 W. Curtis Preston: yeah, that's what, 75 cents. 259 00:10:59,391 --> 00:11:06,891 And so he just went as a project just because, um, and he ended up, you 260 00:11:06,891 --> 00:11:09,711 know, un uncovering, uh, hackers. 261 00:11:10,251 --> 00:11:14,511 And this is before, um, that was 262 00:11:14,911 --> 00:11:15,651 considered a crime. 263 00:11:15,651 --> 00:11:18,711 So like he, like he's, he goes to the FBI and FBI's like, 264 00:11:19,131 --> 00:11:20,691 Well, did they steal anything? 265 00:11:20,691 --> 00:11:21,981 Prasanna Malaiyandi: more than a million dollars? 266 00:11:21,981 --> 00:11:22,551 They're like, no. 267 00:11:22,551 --> 00:11:24,081 Do they steal classified information? 268 00:11:24,086 --> 00:11:24,096 Nope. 269 00:11:25,041 --> 00:11:26,271 They're like, not our problem. 270 00:11:26,421 --> 00:11:26,841 W. Curtis Preston: Yeah. 271 00:11:26,841 --> 00:11:27,171 It's, 272 00:11:28,071 --> 00:11:31,701 it is a fascinating story and where it ends up 273 00:11:32,181 --> 00:11:34,461 is, you know, it, I, I think it just, it 274 00:11:34,461 --> 00:11:35,721 just gets better and better as 275 00:11:35,781 --> 00:11:36,051 Prasanna Malaiyandi: I think 276 00:11:36,421 --> 00:11:36,951 everyone should read that. 277 00:11:37,041 --> 00:11:39,471 If you're into security and you want to see how it was done, 278 00:11:39,471 --> 00:11:41,481 like in the Hey days, right? 279 00:11:41,601 --> 00:11:45,651 In the very, very early days before all of this stuff actually happened. 280 00:11:46,071 --> 00:11:46,911 Read the book 281 00:11:47,451 --> 00:11:48,981 W. Curtis Preston: back when I had brown hair, 282 00:11:49,341 --> 00:11:49,641 Prasanna Malaiyandi: Yeah. 283 00:11:49,821 --> 00:11:50,091 Go. 284 00:11:50,181 --> 00:11:50,961 Go read the book. 285 00:11:50,961 --> 00:11:51,141 It's 286 00:11:51,681 --> 00:11:53,961 W. Curtis Preston: Scott, have you, have you ever read that book? 287 00:11:54,261 --> 00:11:56,511 Scott McCrady: I haven't, but I, uh, I typed it in while you guys 288 00:11:56,511 --> 00:11:58,101 were talking, so it will be, uh, 289 00:11:58,431 --> 00:12:00,291 I am a voracious reader, so I 290 00:12:00,291 --> 00:12:01,821 will, uh, it is on the list. 291 00:12:01,971 --> 00:12:06,771 W. Curtis Preston: it's, it is, it is a, you know, it's written as a, as a story. 292 00:12:07,161 --> 00:12:07,461 Scott McCrady: Yeah. 293 00:12:08,001 --> 00:12:11,781 W. Curtis Preston: Um, and you know, it's in a day before monitors. 294 00:12:12,756 --> 00:12:14,526 Like he has a, he has a printer. 295 00:12:15,276 --> 00:12:20,436 He has a printer that's printing, like he puts in honeypots and, and he's sleeping 296 00:12:20,436 --> 00:12:21,456 in the data center 297 00:12:22,116 --> 00:12:23,016 to, to 298 00:12:23,016 --> 00:12:23,976 listen for the printer 299 00:12:24,021 --> 00:12:25,581 Prasanna Malaiyandi: part is he's an astronomer, 300 00:12:25,641 --> 00:12:28,551 astronomer by education, right? 301 00:12:29,601 --> 00:12:30,391 Scott McCrady: my education. 302 00:12:31,251 --> 00:12:31,741 Yeah. 303 00:12:31,746 --> 00:12:33,741 But those were just the days where people just got in and 304 00:12:33,741 --> 00:12:35,301 started, you know, doing that. 305 00:12:35,361 --> 00:12:37,611 I mean, it's actually not that different than today, but, 306 00:12:37,911 --> 00:12:39,621 you know, back then it was pretty, uh, 307 00:12:39,921 --> 00:12:40,821 it was all, all 308 00:12:40,941 --> 00:12:41,901 Prasanna Malaiyandi: recommend reading that book. 309 00:12:41,901 --> 00:12:44,211 And the reason I brought it up is because we are talking about 310 00:12:44,211 --> 00:12:47,151 security and it just, uh, hit me. 311 00:12:47,151 --> 00:12:48,711 I was like, oh, I gotta remember, tell Curtis. 312 00:12:49,206 --> 00:12:49,386 W. Curtis Preston: Yeah. 313 00:12:49,391 --> 00:12:53,106 Scott, Scott was like, why are we talking about a book called Cuckoo's Egg? 314 00:12:53,616 --> 00:12:54,276 Um, 315 00:12:54,771 --> 00:12:57,351 Scott McCrady: Well, we've covered barbecue, spicy food, and books, 316 00:12:57,351 --> 00:12:58,881 which are three of my favorite things. 317 00:12:58,881 --> 00:12:59,241 So 318 00:12:59,481 --> 00:13:01,791 I can we call, can we call the podcast a success? 319 00:13:01,986 --> 00:13:02,646 W. Curtis Preston: Exactly. 320 00:13:02,646 --> 00:13:04,536 We, we could cover beer if you'd like. 321 00:13:04,596 --> 00:13:06,156 Um, I. 322 00:13:08,151 --> 00:13:08,271 I. 323 00:13:08,271 --> 00:13:12,411 made beer for a few years, uh, so we could talk about that as well. 324 00:13:12,831 --> 00:13:21,471 So, I mean, but, but let me, let me ask you this, besides what I see as 325 00:13:22,221 --> 00:13:27,081 the ever present worry of ransomware, 326 00:13:27,651 --> 00:13:28,261 Scott McCrady: Mm-hmm. 327 00:13:29,291 --> 00:13:34,911 W. Curtis Preston: what else, uh, are, are today's IT departments worried 328 00:13:34,911 --> 00:13:37,431 about from a security perspective? 329 00:13:38,501 --> 00:13:41,151 Scott McCrady: Well, ,I think. 330 00:13:42,081 --> 00:13:44,661 Um, That's a great question actually. 331 00:13:44,661 --> 00:13:46,671 I don't know if I've ever been asked that question because they'll say 332 00:13:46,671 --> 00:13:48,741 what, you know, question or what, what keeps people up at night? 333 00:13:49,191 --> 00:13:52,551 But outside of ransomware, I think, you know, Curtis, I think if you were 334 00:13:52,551 --> 00:13:58,611 to synthesize right this thing down is ransomware is the, uh, threat of the day, 335 00:13:58,616 --> 00:14:00,531 or it's the term that everybody knows, 336 00:14:01,071 --> 00:14:04,431 but ransomware now is really sort of morphed into lots of different things. 337 00:14:04,431 --> 00:14:08,451 And so, um, you get, there's terms like double ransomware, 338 00:14:08,511 --> 00:14:12,891 um, there's, uh, obviously the, the information gets, uh, stolen. 339 00:14:13,251 --> 00:14:17,301 And so what's happening is just the extortion where, uh, and so what's 340 00:14:17,301 --> 00:14:23,181 happened is just the process of people getting into organizations, uh, is causing 341 00:14:23,181 --> 00:14:26,661 this ability because of the threat is really sort of morphed into sort of 342 00:14:26,661 --> 00:14:29,961 what we call threat as a service or tax as a service, or hacking as a service. 343 00:14:30,411 --> 00:14:33,321 You don't have to be the smartest guy in the room to go hack somebody. 344 00:14:33,321 --> 00:14:37,191 Now you can literally just point and click there's, there's wind, you know, things 345 00:14:37,196 --> 00:14:38,511 that look like Windows applications. 346 00:14:38,511 --> 00:14:40,131 You can install a widget. 347 00:14:40,811 --> 00:14:44,196 and all of a sudden you can start hacking for almost nothing and not 348 00:14:44,196 --> 00:14:46,566 really know what you're doing besides if you can move a mouse around. 349 00:14:46,566 --> 00:14:49,536 So the whole threat landscape scape has changed. 350 00:14:49,836 --> 00:14:53,376 Ransomware tends to get the notice because there's notifications. 351 00:14:53,646 --> 00:14:57,576 Um, for a lot of the larger companies, it's a way of getting payments out. 352 00:14:57,581 --> 00:15:01,236 But when you start talking about the overall small medium enterprise, um, 353 00:15:01,236 --> 00:15:05,886 and just the massive number of companies that the, the US has specifically, um, 354 00:15:06,426 --> 00:15:10,146 once somebody's inside the organization, they've got, uh, the ability to wire. 355 00:15:10,266 --> 00:15:11,916 Uh, so wire fraud is huge. 356 00:15:12,276 --> 00:15:16,926 Um, they take taking over an account, uh, and do an extortion based on, uh, 357 00:15:16,986 --> 00:15:18,126 components that you have in your account. 358 00:15:18,486 --> 00:15:21,696 Uh, so there's all these different sort of knock on effects the 359 00:15:22,046 --> 00:15:22,866 customers once they're breached. 360 00:15:23,196 --> 00:15:23,586 And what, 361 00:15:23,616 --> 00:15:26,136 Prasanna Malaiyandi: Or I guess you're talking about the knock on effects. 362 00:15:26,376 --> 00:15:30,186 I guess even once they breach one of these, say small medium businesses, they 363 00:15:30,186 --> 00:15:33,816 could use that also as a launching point to attack other organizations as well. 364 00:15:33,816 --> 00:15:34,026 Right. 365 00:15:34,026 --> 00:15:35,856 Kind of bringing them. 366 00:15:36,381 --> 00:15:37,221 Scott McCrady: You're right on the money. 367 00:15:37,251 --> 00:15:39,471 It's called supply chain risk, right? 368 00:15:39,476 --> 00:15:43,071 And that supply chain risk, the classic is the H V A C company that, 369 00:15:43,071 --> 00:15:47,271 you know, got, was the mechan, was the mechanism to get into target. 370 00:15:47,751 --> 00:15:51,801 Uh, and so those, those small, medium organizations can actually be the 371 00:15:51,801 --> 00:15:54,171 threat vector into, uh, a, a future 372 00:15:54,336 --> 00:15:57,506 Prasanna Malaiyandi: In fact, a lot of the attacks we've seen right have been. 373 00:15:58,911 --> 00:16:03,621 about the actual organization, more about like a vendor or someone else, 374 00:16:03,621 --> 00:16:07,821 or a third party who had access to a company, which then allowed the attacker. 375 00:16:07,821 --> 00:16:10,281 And like if I go back and think Curtis about like the Okta hack 376 00:16:10,851 --> 00:16:13,401 right, was a third party right? 377 00:16:13,401 --> 00:16:14,871 That had access to Okta. 378 00:16:16,971 --> 00:16:17,461 W. Curtis Preston: Yeah. 379 00:16:17,541 --> 00:16:23,841 And that was, wasn't that one Scott, where they didn't necessarily do anything Right. 380 00:16:23,846 --> 00:16:25,731 They just showed that they got access. 381 00:16:25,731 --> 00:16:27,741 They showed some screenshots. 382 00:16:27,741 --> 00:16:29,451 Do you remember the, this one, Scott? 383 00:16:30,236 --> 00:16:33,606 Scott McCrady: I don't know if that one specifically, um, what you do see with 384 00:16:33,611 --> 00:16:37,836 a lot of the service providers, um, and you just saw it with last pass, is 385 00:16:37,986 --> 00:16:42,606 there's a variety of reasons why, uh, an organization would get, would breach. 386 00:16:42,876 --> 00:16:45,366 And so it could be just the consumption of the underlying data. 387 00:16:45,366 --> 00:16:48,786 So if it's a nation state, they literally are just building profiles 388 00:16:48,846 --> 00:16:52,446 on, you know, people in entities and organizations in the us. 389 00:16:52,866 --> 00:16:55,836 Um, so it could just be a theft, uh, it could be ransom, it could be 390 00:16:55,836 --> 00:17:00,996 financial, um, or it could be, uh, to leave code behind or leave breaches 391 00:17:00,996 --> 00:17:04,206 behind that they can then, um, weaponize at some point in time in the future. 392 00:17:04,656 --> 00:17:10,326 Uh, and so as, as an example in the past year, uh, you've seen about plus 393 00:17:10,326 --> 00:17:13,836 minus about four times as many zero days in the last 12 months, and you 394 00:17:13,836 --> 00:17:18,441 saw in the last four years, And so, um, a lot of those appeared to have 395 00:17:18,441 --> 00:17:22,611 already been obviously, uh, they were already, no, no, sorry, not known. 396 00:17:22,761 --> 00:17:26,181 They're already created, but they hadn't been used yet because they're 397 00:17:26,186 --> 00:17:29,061 being, they were waiting to use those when the time was right. 398 00:17:29,301 --> 00:17:32,751 And so you, you see these patterns that emerge based on what's happening 399 00:17:32,751 --> 00:17:36,231 around the world, um, what's happening in the economy, uh, or if 400 00:17:36,231 --> 00:17:39,411 they're what, uh, organizations or nation states want to accomplish. 401 00:17:39,411 --> 00:17:42,941 And, and that's sort of, you see this wave of threat patterns of which ransomware 402 00:17:42,941 --> 00:17:44,631 is, is obviously fitting inside of that. 403 00:17:44,931 --> 00:17:47,451 Um, but when you look at something like a zero day, you're not usually 404 00:17:47,451 --> 00:17:48,741 going to use that on a mid-tier 405 00:17:48,911 --> 00:17:50,001 Prasanna Malaiyandi: That's interesting. 406 00:17:50,001 --> 00:17:50,481 Yeah. 407 00:17:50,481 --> 00:17:51,681 I never would've thought like, 408 00:17:52,431 --> 00:17:54,771 sort of stockpiling your zero days, right. 409 00:17:54,771 --> 00:17:55,881 And then using it. 410 00:17:56,661 --> 00:17:57,621 Scott McCrady: Oh, for sure. 411 00:17:58,656 --> 00:18:02,226 W. Curtis Preston: Yeah, but isn't that like if you, so, so what 412 00:18:02,226 --> 00:18:04,686 you're saying, let me make sure I understand what you're saying. 413 00:18:04,926 --> 00:18:13,446 So someone develops an exploit that is unknown to anyone but themselves, 414 00:18:14,346 --> 00:18:17,646 and then they're just sitting there waiting for the right moment to use it. 415 00:18:18,246 --> 00:18:18,726 Is That 416 00:18:19,341 --> 00:18:20,961 Scott McCrady: That is exactly what I'm saying. 417 00:18:21,681 --> 00:18:21,951 Yep. 418 00:18:22,776 --> 00:18:24,876 W. Curtis Preston: Because I would think that once they get an exploit, they'd 419 00:18:24,876 --> 00:18:29,346 want to use it right away before anybody finds out about it and patches it and 420 00:18:29,511 --> 00:18:32,511 Scott McCrady: Not, if not, if you're a nation state, Curtis, um, you 421 00:18:32,511 --> 00:18:34,011 wanna keep these in your back pocket. 422 00:18:34,011 --> 00:18:38,301 Now some of these are against, uh, you gotta remember, and, and there's a lot 423 00:18:38,301 --> 00:18:40,941 of different verticals that are targets. 424 00:18:41,481 --> 00:18:45,561 You've got, um, infrastructure pipelines as an example. 425 00:18:45,561 --> 00:18:49,791 You've got, um, systems that, um, operate iot. 426 00:18:49,941 --> 00:18:51,351 So there's a lot of different areas. 427 00:18:51,351 --> 00:18:53,601 So when you talk about zero days, we tend to think like 428 00:18:53,606 --> 00:18:55,011 zero day on a Windows machine. 429 00:18:55,341 --> 00:18:59,691 But the, um, but the, the spectrum of what can have a zero day is 430 00:18:59,696 --> 00:19:01,851 actually quite large cuz so many connected machines are out there. 431 00:19:03,666 --> 00:19:04,776 W. Curtis Preston: That's, yeah. 432 00:19:05,316 --> 00:19:08,376 Um, fascinating. 433 00:19:08,486 --> 00:19:10,956 I, I, I actually never even, never even 434 00:19:11,106 --> 00:19:13,536 Prasanna Malaiyandi: But I guess the one downside of sort of keeping it in 435 00:19:13,536 --> 00:19:19,296 your back pocket is someone may discover the exploit or the bad code, right? 436 00:19:19,296 --> 00:19:20,736 And go and patch it before you get it. 437 00:19:20,741 --> 00:19:24,876 But like you said, it's like if it's existed around for a while, maybe no one's 438 00:19:24,881 --> 00:19:28,386 going to notice it, and it's probably a risk that they're willing to take. 439 00:19:28,566 --> 00:19:28,846 Right. 440 00:19:31,281 --> 00:19:32,271 Scott McCrady: Yeah, and again, it 441 00:19:32,271 --> 00:19:33,771 really is organizational dependent. 442 00:19:33,776 --> 00:19:38,601 So if you're, if you are a, uh, threat acting organization that's really designed 443 00:19:38,631 --> 00:19:41,061 around making money, you're probably going to use it relatively quickly. 444 00:19:41,481 --> 00:19:42,201 Um, get your money. 445 00:19:42,201 --> 00:19:46,431 If you are a nation state, uh, targeting infrastructure, then you may hold in 446 00:19:46,436 --> 00:19:50,841 your back pocket because it may not be super common to find, uh, that zero 447 00:19:50,841 --> 00:19:52,131 day inside a piece of infrastructure. 448 00:19:53,536 --> 00:19:56,946 A zero day in windows obviously is, is, you know, the golden 449 00:19:56,946 --> 00:19:58,026 goose in a lot of cases. 450 00:19:58,266 --> 00:20:02,586 So each of the systems and the goals of the underlying, uh, technology and the 451 00:20:02,591 --> 00:20:06,216 underlying organization dictates the use of how the different attacks are done. 452 00:20:06,378 --> 00:20:10,038 One of the things in most of the conversations talk about, uh, malicious 453 00:20:10,038 --> 00:20:12,648 activities, by the way, because that's what sort of, everyone's used to, 454 00:20:12,648 --> 00:20:16,788 like, they think about the virus on the machine, but really in today's world, 455 00:20:16,908 --> 00:20:21,198 a significant amount of the attacks and especially the damaging ones start, um, 456 00:20:21,468 --> 00:20:22,848 with known username and credentials. 457 00:20:23,288 --> 00:20:29,553 And so about 60 to 70% of the actual, um, More damaging attacks actually start from 458 00:20:29,553 --> 00:20:33,033 the fact that somebody harvests it, Scott McCrady's credentials and now the bad 459 00:20:33,033 --> 00:20:34,893 actors are logging in as Scott McCrady. 460 00:20:35,343 --> 00:20:39,843 So, um, now they may in the future drop a piece of code or they may put a file 461 00:20:39,843 --> 00:20:43,083 list, uh, executable up in memory that's downloading stuff from the internet. 462 00:20:43,503 --> 00:20:46,863 But because we spent so much time talking about malicious attacks and 463 00:20:46,863 --> 00:20:49,923 zero days and things like that, it actually does, I think, obfuscate from 464 00:20:49,923 --> 00:20:53,613 the fact that there's a whole breadth of breaches that start from the fact 465 00:20:53,613 --> 00:20:55,533 that the bad actors are logging in 466 00:20:56,063 --> 00:20:57,558 Prasanna Malaiyandi: like this is like phishing attacks and 467 00:20:57,693 --> 00:20:58,263 Scott McCrady: So they're log, 468 00:20:58,373 --> 00:20:59,988 Prasanna Malaiyandi: that give their 469 00:21:00,183 --> 00:21:01,143 Scott McCrady: well, no, not even that. 470 00:21:01,143 --> 00:21:04,053 So let's, so imagine a phishing attack that says, Hey, you 471 00:21:04,053 --> 00:21:07,803 know, um, re-log into Azure ad you click on the button, you put your username 472 00:21:07,803 --> 00:21:09,363 and password in, it says, thank you. 473 00:21:09,573 --> 00:21:10,383 Now they have your username and 474 00:21:10,383 --> 00:21:10,743 password. 475 00:21:10,743 --> 00:21:12,063 They log in as Scott McCrady. 476 00:21:13,023 --> 00:21:13,383 How do you 477 00:21:13,383 --> 00:21:15,513 know that that's not me, right? 478 00:21:15,543 --> 00:21:16,653 Because they just logged in as me. 479 00:21:17,133 --> 00:21:21,303 So, um, I guess my point being is we talk a lot about malicious, 480 00:21:21,303 --> 00:21:22,833 which we should malicious code. 481 00:21:23,523 --> 00:21:25,863 There's a whole world around, um, trying to protect 482 00:21:25,863 --> 00:21:28,953 organizations from, um, legitimate 483 00:21:28,953 --> 00:21:29,433 access 484 00:21:29,538 --> 00:21:31,788 Prasanna Malaiyandi: Do you know what the split in your mind, what the split 485 00:21:31,788 --> 00:21:33,288 between those two categories would be? 486 00:21:33,288 --> 00:21:33,618 Like? 487 00:21:33,858 --> 00:21:39,888 Are most of it through the harvesting credentials side of things? 488 00:21:40,833 --> 00:21:44,763 Sort of less of it around the malicious attacks. 489 00:21:45,723 --> 00:21:46,053 Scott McCrady: Yeah. 490 00:21:46,833 --> 00:21:51,063 60 to 70% of the, uh, of the more significant breaches start with harvest, 491 00:21:51,123 --> 00:21:52,743 with some sort of harvested credential. 492 00:21:54,303 --> 00:21:57,903 W. Curtis Preston: and it, it's funny you, you said that literally like the 493 00:21:57,903 --> 00:22:03,693 question that I was going to ask you before you started talking about this. 494 00:22:04,323 --> 00:22:08,823 Um, so I say a lot that if everyone. 495 00:22:10,413 --> 00:22:14,493 just use good password, uh, rules. 496 00:22:14,493 --> 00:22:14,913 Right? 497 00:22:14,913 --> 00:22:19,113 Which is like not using the same username and password everywhere. 498 00:22:19,533 --> 00:22:21,333 Um, using mfa, 499 00:22:22,463 --> 00:22:22,588 Scott McCrady: Mm-hmm. 500 00:22:23,103 --> 00:22:24,693 W. Curtis Preston: you know, and having a decent password. 501 00:22:24,903 --> 00:22:25,293 Right. 502 00:22:25,833 --> 00:22:29,763 Um, and not using m or I'm sorry, and, and use mfa if, if just 503 00:22:29,763 --> 00:22:32,193 everybody did those two things, 504 00:22:32,883 --> 00:22:37,113 it would stop a significant portion of the attacks out there. 505 00:22:37,653 --> 00:22:38,583 What do you think about that? 506 00:22:39,648 --> 00:22:41,748 Scott McCrady: If somebody says, what's the one thing I can do? 507 00:22:42,138 --> 00:22:43,338 I would say, turn on mfa. 508 00:22:44,298 --> 00:22:45,858 Now there's ways of getting around it. 509 00:22:46,188 --> 00:22:47,928 Uh, you know, there's 510 00:22:48,018 --> 00:22:49,728 there's more elegant means. 511 00:22:49,758 --> 00:22:52,458 Most people still think of like the, the phone messages. 512 00:22:52,878 --> 00:22:55,278 Uh, but some of the authenticators tied in to, you know, some of the 513 00:22:55,278 --> 00:22:58,428 major products these days, um, are, are a lot more seamless than what 514 00:22:58,428 --> 00:22:59,658 people probably think they are. 515 00:23:00,018 --> 00:23:02,958 Uh, so, um, it, to your point, Curtis, yeah. 516 00:23:03,048 --> 00:23:04,728 When I get asked, what's the one thing you do? 517 00:23:04,728 --> 00:23:05,748 I'm like, turn on mfa. 518 00:23:05,808 --> 00:23:09,288 It's, it's, now there are ways again to get through that, but it is a massive, uh, 519 00:23:09,768 --> 00:23:09,798 benefic, 520 00:23:10,128 --> 00:23:12,828 W. Curtis Preston: So let, let, lemme tell you something, uh, Scott, 521 00:23:12,828 --> 00:23:16,008 there's a, there's a new movie that's in the theaters right now called 522 00:23:16,008 --> 00:23:19,938 Missing and um, it's, it's a sec. 523 00:23:20,088 --> 00:23:22,578 It's a standalone sequel to the movie searching. 524 00:23:23,088 --> 00:23:27,828 Both of them have the same premise where it's, um, where it's somebody's 525 00:23:27,833 --> 00:23:32,178 searching, looking for somebody that's disappeared and they're doing it all 526 00:23:32,178 --> 00:23:35,028 on the computer screen and the whole, the whole movie's, the computer screen. 527 00:23:35,598 --> 00:23:39,678 and and in this movie, one of the plot, you know, developments is 528 00:23:39,683 --> 00:23:46,248 that the, the character figures out how to hack into an account, right? 529 00:23:46,608 --> 00:23:52,698 And this person, um, then, then they're able to get into every other account 530 00:23:52,698 --> 00:23:56,898 cuz they use the same username and password on every one of the accounts. 531 00:23:57,018 --> 00:23:59,568 And not one of them had MFA turned on , right? 532 00:24:00,138 --> 00:24:03,748 The movie would've been a lot shorter if, uh, if, if they had 533 00:24:03,903 --> 00:24:06,453 Scott McCrady: A lot less drama if they got caught after five minutes. 534 00:24:06,453 --> 00:24:07,473 And, uh, 535 00:24:07,758 --> 00:24:10,878 W. Curtis Preston: Yeah, but I, I've literally, the, the best part is the 536 00:24:10,878 --> 00:24:16,938 person that they were able to, uh, do this to is a security specialist, 537 00:24:17,223 --> 00:24:18,813 Scott McCrady: Yeah, of course, of course. 538 00:24:19,743 --> 00:24:20,763 Welcome to Hollywood. 539 00:24:21,003 --> 00:24:25,833 I, I, uh, I lived in, uh, I lived in, uh, you know, overseas, uh, in a few places. 540 00:24:25,863 --> 00:24:30,813 And, uh, there, let's just say that the, uh, viewpoint of Americans 541 00:24:30,813 --> 00:24:32,103 was very Hollywood centric. 542 00:24:32,103 --> 00:24:35,463 So, you know, they'd be like, you know, are, are gangs just running 543 00:24:35,463 --> 00:24:36,723 wild and shooting people on this? 544 00:24:36,723 --> 00:24:39,753 We're like, I know, you know, that's not, like, that's not happening. 545 00:24:40,113 --> 00:24:42,693 Um, and so Hollywood does tend to, I don't know if you guys 546 00:24:42,698 --> 00:24:46,203 remember this movie called Swordfish, where Hugh Jackman early days, and 547 00:24:46,203 --> 00:24:49,053 like, he's like dancing in his chair as he's hacking into stuff with 548 00:24:49,053 --> 00:24:50,703 like 75 screens up in front of him. 549 00:24:50,703 --> 00:24:53,343 And I'm like, yeah, that's, that's exactly, that is literally 550 00:24:53,343 --> 00:24:54,573 exactly the way it goes down. 551 00:24:54,578 --> 00:24:56,253 That's, that's exactly what happens. 552 00:24:57,393 --> 00:24:57,843 W. Curtis Preston: Yeah. 553 00:24:57,903 --> 00:25:04,113 Um, the, yeah, it's funny, I, I, I, I gave up like criticizing movies, 554 00:25:04,143 --> 00:25:06,213 uh, for the most part for that stuff. 555 00:25:06,423 --> 00:25:10,893 Uh, and, and more like applauding when they actually get it, uh, correct. 556 00:25:11,753 --> 00:25:12,033 Scott McCrady: yes. 557 00:25:12,153 --> 00:25:12,513 W. Curtis Preston: Right. 558 00:25:12,603 --> 00:25:17,883 Um, which, which is not , which means I don't have to do it very often, so, yeah. 559 00:25:17,883 --> 00:25:24,603 So, so you said MFA and Well, let, let me, um, so we, we talked about LastPass, 560 00:25:25,083 --> 00:25:28,623 uh, and by the way, we did a whole episode on LastPass a couple weeks ago. 561 00:25:28,903 --> 00:25:32,283 And, and the thing for us, by the way that that's interesting about the 562 00:25:32,433 --> 00:25:37,443 LastPass story is, is it was their backup system that ultimately, uh, 563 00:25:37,443 --> 00:25:41,613 was the result of the, it was the, you remember it was a two-phase hack, right? 564 00:25:41,613 --> 00:25:44,793 And it was the, they ended up being able to access the backup system and 565 00:25:44,793 --> 00:25:49,563 get, get ac, get their hands on the, you know, the, um, what do you call 566 00:25:49,563 --> 00:25:49,743 that? 567 00:25:49,803 --> 00:25:50,553 What do you call that? 568 00:25:50,558 --> 00:25:52,833 The um, The vault. 569 00:25:53,073 --> 00:25:57,283 I was gonna use a, like a, anyway, uh, sometime. 570 00:25:57,633 --> 00:25:58,143 I'm sorry. 571 00:25:58,143 --> 00:25:59,673 English is not my first language. 572 00:25:59,733 --> 00:26:00,543 Oh, wait, it is. 573 00:26:01,323 --> 00:26:07,023 Um, but yeah, that, having, having said that, I am still a 574 00:26:07,023 --> 00:26:10,113 huge fan of password managers. 575 00:26:10,113 --> 00:26:15,543 Um, and I I'm just curious if you have a, if you have a, an alternative to that. 576 00:26:15,543 --> 00:26:17,733 If you, what, what do you think about password managers 577 00:26:19,203 --> 00:26:20,763 Scott McCrady: I mean, absolutely necessary. 578 00:26:20,943 --> 00:26:23,943 Uh, we're going to move away from passwords, so it's gonna become a 579 00:26:24,393 --> 00:26:25,473 W. Curtis Preston: at some point? 580 00:26:26,103 --> 00:26:26,643 Right. 581 00:26:26,853 --> 00:26:27,573 Scott McCrady: in the future. 582 00:26:27,963 --> 00:26:31,683 But obviously in today's world, you know, you gotta have a password manager. 583 00:26:32,523 --> 00:26:38,043 Uh, but the, and the reality is, is that, uh, the, the joke that we 584 00:26:38,043 --> 00:26:41,403 were just making about the Hollywood folks, but it's, it's not an uncommon 585 00:26:41,403 --> 00:26:45,003 situation where, uh, you know, the passwords are used more often, you 586 00:26:45,003 --> 00:26:45,843 know, more often. 587 00:26:45,843 --> 00:26:50,043 And so they're like, well have the, have the 20, you know, letter 588 00:26:50,043 --> 00:26:51,423 and number and all that stuff. 589 00:26:51,723 --> 00:26:55,953 But again, the way that that's usually, uh, received is from 590 00:26:55,953 --> 00:26:57,453 a breach from somewhere else. 591 00:26:57,903 --> 00:27:00,213 Or they, they harvest it, right. 592 00:27:00,283 --> 00:27:00,643 And. 593 00:27:01,098 --> 00:27:04,758 To your point around mfa, changing your passwords, things along those lines. 594 00:27:04,998 --> 00:27:09,348 Um, a lot of the work that we do is around securing organizations, uh, obviously 595 00:27:09,348 --> 00:27:13,638 from malicious activity, but also from legitimate login via nefarious actors. 596 00:27:13,638 --> 00:27:18,588 And so there's, there's outside of, of, um, just looking for malicious 597 00:27:18,588 --> 00:27:21,918 code dropped on machines, there's way to look at seeing what people are 598 00:27:21,918 --> 00:27:25,128 doing, how they're writing, what things that they're, they're taking care of. 599 00:27:25,128 --> 00:27:29,118 So imagine that somebody logs in as, as Scott or Curtis, and they're looking 600 00:27:29,118 --> 00:27:30,678 at emails and they want a wire done. 601 00:27:30,678 --> 00:27:31,758 This is super common. 602 00:27:32,478 --> 00:27:35,028 They'll send a, an email message to someone saying, Hey, this is 603 00:27:35,028 --> 00:27:36,258 Scott, please send this wire here. 604 00:27:36,258 --> 00:27:37,068 Here's the information. 605 00:27:37,488 --> 00:27:39,798 We, there's ways of detecting that now. 606 00:27:40,308 --> 00:27:44,058 Um, and just go, okay, that there's almost no chance that Scott, even 607 00:27:44,058 --> 00:27:49,218 though they used Scott's name password, he's logged in as him. 608 00:27:49,518 --> 00:27:51,648 Uh, maybe it's from a different location than he usually is. 609 00:27:51,888 --> 00:27:53,178 There's a lot of his style. 610 00:27:53,178 --> 00:27:56,178 Maybe he doesn't put deer in his, you know, response emails. 611 00:27:56,178 --> 00:27:56,778 Almost never. 612 00:27:56,778 --> 00:27:58,788 I mean, there's all these things that can trigger. 613 00:27:59,508 --> 00:28:02,388 That we spend a lot of time on to try to make sure that we can, uh, 614 00:28:02,448 --> 00:28:02,928 help secure 615 00:28:02,928 --> 00:28:03,678 organizations. 616 00:28:03,748 --> 00:28:05,668 Prasanna Malaiyandi: Past guests on the podcast, we've talked 617 00:28:05,668 --> 00:28:07,078 about that sort of thing, right? 618 00:28:07,318 --> 00:28:12,898 Being able to detect these patterns is sort of fine tuning for each environment. 619 00:28:13,408 --> 00:28:18,718 It's sort of complex, and when you end up with a lot of false positives, it's 620 00:28:18,718 --> 00:28:20,858 almost like the boy who cried wolf, right? 621 00:28:21,298 --> 00:28:23,578 At some point people just start to ignore those. 622 00:28:23,578 --> 00:28:26,248 So how do you go about this 623 00:28:26,328 --> 00:28:29,368 Scott McCrady: Prasanna, I'm gonna, I'm gonna slip you a 20 after this for leading 624 00:28:29,368 --> 00:28:32,218 me, leading into my, uh, my spiel here. 625 00:28:32,638 --> 00:28:33,508 Uh, no. 626 00:28:33,688 --> 00:28:36,478 I, so I spent 20 years in the MSSP space, right? 627 00:28:36,478 --> 00:28:40,678 I, I helped build out, um, the largest MSSP in the world, built out their 628 00:28:40,678 --> 00:28:44,788 APJ business, and then ran their global s p business as with Symantec. 629 00:28:45,178 --> 00:28:48,628 Um, helped build FireEye, Mandy, and SSP business, uh, 630 00:28:48,628 --> 00:28:49,798 and we call it alert fatigue. 631 00:28:50,878 --> 00:28:53,538 And so the standard model, uh, is. 632 00:28:54,538 --> 00:28:57,928 Uh, you have a person or people, especially in the large enterprise, 633 00:28:57,928 --> 00:29:02,008 right, they have to weed their way through the 40, 4500 security vendors, 634 00:29:02,398 --> 00:29:06,868 figure out which of 'em, um, look interesting, do proof of concepts on 635 00:29:06,868 --> 00:29:11,668 the top two or three, land on one, sign the contract, pay the upfront payment, 636 00:29:12,208 --> 00:29:13,558 put the, all the stuff in place. 637 00:29:13,558 --> 00:29:15,718 And then when they're done, they kick a bunch of data over to the 638 00:29:16,158 --> 00:29:21,148 SS P M S P looks through it all and then sends over alerts going back 639 00:29:21,148 --> 00:29:22,768 saying, Hey, this is informational. 640 00:29:22,978 --> 00:29:23,788 This is a warning. 641 00:29:23,788 --> 00:29:26,548 Which means, I don't know, it could be something bad, could not be bad. 642 00:29:26,553 --> 00:29:27,118 I don't know. 643 00:29:27,148 --> 00:29:29,278 This one looks critical, looks like there's something bad, but 644 00:29:29,278 --> 00:29:30,268 we can't do anything about it. 645 00:29:30,748 --> 00:29:31,888 Here's some things you can go check. 646 00:29:32,308 --> 00:29:35,128 Um, and that model to me was very broken. 647 00:29:35,188 --> 00:29:37,018 And so, especially in the mid-market. 648 00:29:37,408 --> 00:29:40,798 Uh, and so we took a very different approach and tried to take the lessons 649 00:29:40,798 --> 00:29:45,898 learned from 20 years, uh, of doing this for the global 1000 and, uh, trying 650 00:29:45,898 --> 00:29:50,218 to deliver something that is much less alert, fatigue and much more, uh, what 651 00:29:50,218 --> 00:29:53,698 we call practical security that, uh, allows organizations to have really. 652 00:29:54,583 --> 00:29:58,123 truly, you know, fortune 500 level nation state creates security, but 653 00:29:58,153 --> 00:30:01,123 tone down the noise and actually just solve the problems as they come up. 654 00:30:01,183 --> 00:30:02,233 Keep the breaches from happening, 655 00:30:02,478 --> 00:30:05,508 Prasanna Malaiyandi: Because especially in these companies, organizations, I 656 00:30:05,508 --> 00:30:10,008 should say, they may not have like the same level of security experts as you 657 00:30:10,013 --> 00:30:12,838 would in those like global one thousands. 658 00:30:12,843 --> 00:30:13,038 Right? 659 00:30:13,038 --> 00:30:13,698 And so 660 00:30:14,508 --> 00:30:15,498 they probably don't. 661 00:30:15,558 --> 00:30:19,128 Well, every once in a while, maybe they spent enough money to hire 662 00:30:19,128 --> 00:30:20,898 away the right set of folks, right? 663 00:30:22,363 --> 00:30:22,513 Scott McCrady: Mm-hmm. 664 00:30:22,648 --> 00:30:23,138 Prasanna Malaiyandi: Yeah. 665 00:30:23,623 --> 00:30:26,623 Scott McCrady: It's very, so what you tend to find in the, so when we built 666 00:30:26,623 --> 00:30:30,943 solcyber, we've explicitly said we wanted to target the mid-market because 667 00:30:31,473 --> 00:30:36,913 they struggle to get access to the capabilities and when the capabilities are 668 00:30:36,913 --> 00:30:40,663 a combination of, of the classic people, process and technology, but a lot of the 669 00:30:40,663 --> 00:30:44,713 best in class tech, they don't really sell it below 2000 users, 2000 employees. 670 00:30:44,718 --> 00:30:46,153 It's kind of hard to get your hands on it. 671 00:30:46,633 --> 00:30:50,593 Um, the stuff we use for user behavioral analysis, If you're below 10,000 672 00:30:50,598 --> 00:30:53,113 employees, you're never, you're, you, you're not even going use it. 673 00:30:53,113 --> 00:30:54,463 It's too complex, it's too heavy. 674 00:30:54,733 --> 00:30:59,413 Um, and so, uh, it's just hard, um, to get ahold of tech. 675 00:30:59,413 --> 00:31:01,123 The second thing is, is the right people. 676 00:31:01,333 --> 00:31:03,283 And so, you know, you're 400 employees. 677 00:31:03,283 --> 00:31:05,563 You may have two or three folks total, right? 678 00:31:05,893 --> 00:31:09,193 One person who may be super savvy at security or maybe 679 00:31:09,193 --> 00:31:11,083 actually just a good IT person. 680 00:31:11,923 --> 00:31:13,513 And so how do they work their way through this 681 00:31:13,513 --> 00:31:16,303 massive mound of security stuff to figure out what actually 682 00:31:16,303 --> 00:31:17,503 secures the organization? 683 00:31:18,103 --> 00:31:21,413 Or you have somebody who's super, super smart, they really understand security. 684 00:31:22,153 --> 00:31:22,603 They don't have the 685 00:31:22,608 --> 00:31:25,333 people to manage it, the time to put it all in place 686 00:31:25,408 --> 00:31:26,338 Prasanna Malaiyandi: Or even budgets. 687 00:31:26,803 --> 00:31:27,643 Scott McCrady: Uh, and so, 688 00:31:28,303 --> 00:31:29,833 and then the third one is the budget, right? 689 00:31:30,553 --> 00:31:33,553 Is stroking these upfront payments so that you're, you're hitting on the head. 690 00:31:34,118 --> 00:31:35,043 W. Curtis Preston: So two things. 691 00:31:35,043 --> 00:31:37,788 One is, Uh, time for me to do 692 00:31:37,788 --> 00:31:41,358 our disclaimer, uh, Prasanna and I work for different companies. 693 00:31:41,358 --> 00:31:42,198 He works for Zoom. 694 00:31:42,203 --> 00:31:43,038 I work for Druva. 695 00:31:43,308 --> 00:31:47,448 And this is a, this is an independent podcast, not a podcast by the 696 00:31:47,448 --> 00:31:48,798 company and the opinion set. 697 00:31:48,798 --> 00:31:49,988 You hear our ours. 698 00:31:50,568 --> 00:31:54,408 And, um, also if you wanna join the conversation, reach out to 699 00:31:54,408 --> 00:31:59,868 me at w Curtis Preston, uh, at gmail or at WC Preston on Twitter. 700 00:32:00,318 --> 00:32:03,288 And, um, you know, join the conversation. 701 00:32:03,288 --> 00:32:05,568 Also, be sure to rate us, go to your favorite. 702 00:32:05,598 --> 00:32:08,868 Uh, most of you, it looks like you're listening on, uh, uh, 703 00:32:08,868 --> 00:32:11,478 apple, you know, uh, podcasts. 704 00:32:11,478 --> 00:32:15,318 Uh, just scroll down to the bottom and you can give us, you know, six stars. 705 00:32:15,348 --> 00:32:16,968 If you can give us six stars, that'd be great. 706 00:32:17,448 --> 00:32:21,018 Um, by the way, you were, you were talking about, uh, fatigue, right? 707 00:32:21,018 --> 00:32:28,788 So I just yesterday, so I use, um, uh, Zapier, like an automated tool and I've 708 00:32:28,793 --> 00:32:35,208 been playing around with it, uh, of doing Reddit searches and, um, Just play. 709 00:32:35,568 --> 00:32:38,358 You have to be careful with Reddit searches cuz you can get a lot. 710 00:32:38,808 --> 00:32:42,438 And uh, I was like, oh, I'm gonna pick one of our, without saying who it is one 711 00:32:42,438 --> 00:32:46,368 of our competitors who has a very unique name that isn't gonna show up anywhere 712 00:32:46,373 --> 00:32:47,868 other than discussions about them. 713 00:32:48,228 --> 00:32:52,488 And so I put them in and uh, on the video, uh, I'm gonna take 714 00:32:52,488 --> 00:32:54,078 this out, but this is today 715 00:32:55,198 --> 00:32:55,808 Scott McCrady: Mm-hmm. 716 00:32:58,098 --> 00:33:00,588 W. Curtis Preston: and I can't imagine if those were security things 717 00:33:00,738 --> 00:33:02,298 that I had to actually reply to. 718 00:33:03,258 --> 00:33:03,738 Scott McCrady: That's right. 719 00:33:04,428 --> 00:33:04,788 No, guys. 720 00:33:04,788 --> 00:33:07,608 It literally came up on a conversation with a customer today is they 721 00:33:07,608 --> 00:33:08,988 said, how do you get around this? 722 00:33:08,988 --> 00:33:11,778 And we actually spent a lot of time talking through how we, uh, 723 00:33:11,868 --> 00:33:15,378 really streamlined the alerts, um, and the responses to make it 724 00:33:15,738 --> 00:33:18,268 much more practical because they, they'd used an MSSP in the past and. 725 00:33:18,268 --> 00:33:19,158 They're like, it was just like 726 00:33:19,163 --> 00:33:20,388 they gave me more work. 727 00:33:20,388 --> 00:33:21,198 They didn't save me time. 728 00:33:21,198 --> 00:33:22,878 They made my life, they made my life worse. 729 00:33:23,088 --> 00:33:24,978 W. Curtis Preston: By the way, I should have, I should have made you 730 00:33:24,978 --> 00:33:27,628 do this before, but what is an m s. 731 00:33:28,728 --> 00:33:30,798 Scott McCrady: Ah, managed security service provider. 732 00:33:30,903 --> 00:33:31,593 W. Curtis Preston: thank you. 733 00:33:32,163 --> 00:33:32,513 Uh, 734 00:33:32,538 --> 00:33:33,318 Prasanna Malaiyandi: what does it do? 735 00:33:33,408 --> 00:33:33,648 Yeah, 736 00:33:33,673 --> 00:33:34,473 W. Curtis Preston: what is that? 737 00:33:34,983 --> 00:33:35,473 Yeah. 738 00:33:36,828 --> 00:33:38,118 Scott McCrady: Yeah, so it's a great question. 739 00:33:38,208 --> 00:33:42,468 It started out, um, historically if you, you know, if you guys, we were 740 00:33:42,618 --> 00:33:47,058 talking about the eighties before, uh, when firewalls and IDSS came 741 00:33:47,058 --> 00:33:50,068 out, large organizations had NOCs, 742 00:33:50,388 --> 00:33:51,798 Prasanna Malaiyandi: Network Operation Center, 743 00:33:51,922 --> 00:33:52,492 Scott McCrady: Yes, sir. 744 00:33:52,972 --> 00:33:56,002 And so if you think of somebody like Eeds or ibm, they had these big, 745 00:33:56,002 --> 00:33:58,612 beautiful BU buildings that showed that the network was all up and 746 00:33:58,612 --> 00:33:59,902 running and online and all that jazz. 747 00:34:00,922 --> 00:34:05,632 Uh, when all of a sudden these firewalls and IDs is inion detection systems 748 00:34:05,722 --> 00:34:09,592 started generating lots of data, nobody knew what to do with them. 749 00:34:09,622 --> 00:34:12,772 There was no system to dump that data into, right? 750 00:34:12,772 --> 00:34:18,442 And so, um, your first security operation center was one who manages 751 00:34:18,442 --> 00:34:21,382 the firewall and the IDs just from a day-to-day care and feeding. 752 00:34:21,802 --> 00:34:26,182 But two, the, you, you generate the data in order to do something with it. 753 00:34:26,182 --> 00:34:26,302 And. 754 00:34:27,097 --> 00:34:31,117 Um, the process of gathering up that data and running analytics against it 755 00:34:31,327 --> 00:34:36,577 was really the foundation of the first MSSP and that that contrasts with an 756 00:34:36,577 --> 00:34:38,587 msp, which is a managed service provider. 757 00:34:38,587 --> 00:34:40,117 And these get confused often. 758 00:34:40,447 --> 00:34:42,877 And MSP is basically looking after your it, right? 759 00:34:42,877 --> 00:34:44,167 Do you have your laptop set up? 760 00:34:44,287 --> 00:34:45,397 Is your email turned on? 761 00:34:45,847 --> 00:34:50,167 Um, that is not what an MSSP does and somebody like us, um, which is a 762 00:34:50,167 --> 00:34:55,267 specialty mssp, we really focus on the threat and trying to keep organizations 763 00:34:55,272 --> 00:34:57,007 protected, you know, against the threat. 764 00:34:57,007 --> 00:34:58,877 So we don't, you know, we don't manage firewalls. 765 00:34:58,882 --> 00:35:01,807 There's tons of infrastructure companies and MSPs that do that. 766 00:35:02,137 --> 00:35:04,297 We'll take a data feed from your firewalls, for instance. 767 00:35:04,657 --> 00:35:05,557 Uh, and that's really the core 768 00:35:05,557 --> 00:35:05,977 difference. 769 00:35:06,060 --> 00:35:10,680 Prasanna Malaiyandi: So when you get this feed, then are you basically acting, 770 00:35:11,310 --> 00:35:14,550 so are you acting on that data or are you sort of crunching it, looking at 771 00:35:14,550 --> 00:35:18,870 patterns, anomalies, et cetera, and then spitting it back to the customer's? 772 00:35:19,230 --> 00:35:21,990 Uh, security operation center? 773 00:35:23,530 --> 00:35:23,685 Scott McCrady: right? 774 00:35:24,015 --> 00:35:25,065 That's the standard model. 775 00:35:25,065 --> 00:35:25,705 What Prasanna? 776 00:35:25,725 --> 00:35:27,015 We built something very different. 777 00:35:27,045 --> 00:35:32,295 What we did was, we said, um, for a mid-market company, which we consider a 778 00:35:32,295 --> 00:35:36,975 hundred users up to about 200 employees, uh, there's a set of stuff everybody 779 00:35:36,980 --> 00:35:38,415 needs to secure their environment. 780 00:35:38,625 --> 00:35:40,035 We call it foundational coverage. 781 00:35:40,605 --> 00:35:43,545 Uh, and if you look at the kill chain, Lockheed Martin kill chain, there's 782 00:35:43,545 --> 00:35:44,775 a big one, there's a small one. 783 00:35:45,075 --> 00:35:48,825 Um, there's a standard set of activities that a malicious actor 784 00:35:48,825 --> 00:35:51,675 goes through in order to breach an organization and then either lock 785 00:35:51,675 --> 00:35:53,235 up the data or exfiltrate the data. 786 00:35:53,475 --> 00:35:56,865 And so in order to protect against that, you need about eight different things. 787 00:35:57,405 --> 00:36:00,585 What we did was we went out and used the tools that we've been using at, 788 00:36:00,675 --> 00:36:04,485 you know, these big, big companies and we put those into a package 789 00:36:04,485 --> 00:36:05,875 that we call foundational coverage. 790 00:36:06,345 --> 00:36:09,915 And we sell that to an organization and it's all inclusive. 791 00:36:09,945 --> 00:36:13,185 So you get your, inst your implementation, you get your licensing, 792 00:36:13,485 --> 00:36:16,365 you get your management, you get your monitoring, uh, you get your 793 00:36:16,425 --> 00:36:18,015 detection, and you get your response. 794 00:36:18,255 --> 00:36:20,415 Um, and so our model is very different because. 795 00:36:20,970 --> 00:36:25,170 The tech stack that underlines a lot of the problems in the breaches 796 00:36:25,740 --> 00:36:26,880 is not under the control of the 797 00:36:26,880 --> 00:36:28,680 mssp, it's under the control of the customer. 798 00:36:29,490 --> 00:36:31,890 Um, and our view, especially in the mid-market, is they weren't 799 00:36:31,890 --> 00:36:33,060 getting best-in-class tools. 800 00:36:33,065 --> 00:36:36,660 We used to joke that they've got AV and a firewall, and that's not gonna 801 00:36:36,665 --> 00:36:38,550 protect, uh, people in today's world. 802 00:36:39,030 --> 00:36:42,090 And so think of NextGen E P P E D R capabilities. 803 00:36:42,090 --> 00:36:43,170 Think of user behavioral 804 00:36:43,455 --> 00:36:45,075 W. Curtis Preston: you're gonna have to define that acronym. 805 00:36:46,230 --> 00:36:48,780 Scott McCrady: E P P EDR is basically endpoint protection and 806 00:36:48,780 --> 00:36:50,040 endpoint detection and response. 807 00:36:50,040 --> 00:36:54,060 And so think of a really high-end piece of code running on a machine 808 00:36:54,630 --> 00:36:58,980 that allows one to detect if somebody's changed a, a process on the machine. 809 00:36:58,980 --> 00:37:01,800 And two, allows someone like us to get onto that machine 810 00:37:01,800 --> 00:37:04,230 and fix it if something malicious is happening. 811 00:37:05,640 --> 00:37:10,110 Uh, user behavioral analysis, U B a, um, process of mapping out of people are doing 812 00:37:10,200 --> 00:37:13,170 weird random things that appear abnormal. 813 00:37:13,470 --> 00:37:13,830 So 814 00:37:13,905 --> 00:37:17,265 W. Curtis Preston: like suddenly uploading a lot of data from somewhere. 815 00:37:18,045 --> 00:37:18,915 Scott McCrady: perfect example. 816 00:37:19,545 --> 00:37:23,985 And so these, these components we actually sell per user per month. 817 00:37:24,015 --> 00:37:27,135 Now each of these components, usually you have to pay up front for, you 818 00:37:27,135 --> 00:37:29,745 have to deploy them, you have to do a POC on 'em, and then you have to 819 00:37:29,750 --> 00:37:33,315 obviously, uh, sell, you know, uh, manage 'em and detect and all that stuff. 820 00:37:33,315 --> 00:37:36,525 So what we do is very different Prasanna is we sell all of that. 821 00:37:36,585 --> 00:37:40,575 Now on top of that core set of stuff that protects every company. 822 00:37:41,175 --> 00:37:43,785 There's a lot of other things that people can send to us. 823 00:37:43,965 --> 00:37:45,165 We call 'em data feeds. 824 00:37:45,405 --> 00:37:48,195 We, we take data feeds from like 400 different technologies 825 00:37:48,585 --> 00:37:49,305 and we'll use that as 826 00:37:49,310 --> 00:37:49,845 context. 827 00:37:49,845 --> 00:37:52,605 We'll correlate all the data, um, and, and things like that. 828 00:37:52,605 --> 00:37:53,745 So that's how we do things differently. 829 00:37:54,475 --> 00:37:58,065 W. Curtis Preston: So li a little confused there. 830 00:37:58,695 --> 00:37:59,505 Um. 831 00:38:01,350 --> 00:38:06,450 You, it sound like some of the things a person needs to protect 832 00:38:06,450 --> 00:38:11,190 their environment you provide and some that they're providing. 833 00:38:11,580 --> 00:38:13,800 Uh, so he help me understand that. 834 00:38:15,285 --> 00:38:19,335 Scott McCrady: we draw the line between what we consider in, in infrastructure 835 00:38:19,545 --> 00:38:20,625 and then threat. 836 00:38:20,955 --> 00:38:25,635 And so what we provide is, is all cloud-based capable, but they're 837 00:38:25,635 --> 00:38:27,045 tools that land on the endpoint. 838 00:38:27,255 --> 00:38:29,445 And so we start at the user and we say, how do we protect 839 00:38:29,445 --> 00:38:30,585 the user and the identity? 840 00:38:31,365 --> 00:38:35,475 Um, and things that encompass all of that are included in the service. 841 00:38:36,375 --> 00:38:41,505 But if, if a, if an, if a customer said, Hey, I've got 400 employees and I've got 842 00:38:41,505 --> 00:38:45,405 two offices and my employees are most of the time at the house, but sometimes come 843 00:38:45,405 --> 00:38:49,755 to the office and at the office we have a firewall, um, we're like, great, we'll 844 00:38:49,755 --> 00:38:52,815 take a data feed from your firewall, but we're not gonna sell 'em a firewall and 845 00:38:52,815 --> 00:38:56,505 implement a firewall because generally speaking, we consider that infrastructure 846 00:38:56,535 --> 00:38:57,915 traditionally with sort of security. 847 00:38:57,915 --> 00:39:00,945 But a lot of that type of stuff has moved over to an infrastructure team. 848 00:39:01,035 --> 00:39:04,545 So whoever's handling their router switches and laptops can 849 00:39:04,545 --> 00:39:05,925 usually also deploy the firewall. 850 00:39:06,585 --> 00:39:07,515 And that's how we define it. 851 00:39:08,110 --> 00:39:09,515 W. Curtis Preston: Just finished the thought here. 852 00:39:09,845 --> 00:39:14,915 And what about, what about servers, infrastructure and, 853 00:39:14,915 --> 00:39:16,655 and cloud infrastructure? 854 00:39:16,865 --> 00:39:19,925 What about, because it sounds like you're focusing on the endpoint. 855 00:39:19,955 --> 00:39:22,535 What about that other part of the infrastructure? 856 00:39:23,915 --> 00:39:25,715 Scott McCrady: Uh, so servers we consider an endpoint. 857 00:39:25,985 --> 00:39:26,405 Uh, so 858 00:39:26,405 --> 00:39:30,455 we can take what we're doing, uh, on, you know, Scott's machine and do it at, at a 859 00:39:30,455 --> 00:39:32,015 server, which most of our customers do. 860 00:39:32,435 --> 00:39:33,515 Uh, and then cloud. 861 00:39:33,725 --> 00:39:34,505 Great question. 862 00:39:34,595 --> 00:39:37,385 There's essentially two types of security for the cloud. 863 00:39:37,835 --> 00:39:39,935 Uh, the first one is threat. 864 00:39:40,925 --> 00:39:43,935 So we can actually take a data feed from every cloud provider's 865 00:39:43,940 --> 00:39:46,115 security, uh, tools toolkit. 866 00:39:46,125 --> 00:39:46,735 W. Curtis Preston: Mm-hmm. 867 00:39:47,435 --> 00:39:49,175 Scott McCrady: so that's the cloud watchers, what have you. 868 00:39:49,175 --> 00:39:51,785 We can take a data feed and we have a bunch of analytics we run against that. 869 00:39:52,415 --> 00:39:56,445 The second piece is, um, a more sophisticated layer 870 00:39:56,795 --> 00:39:57,965 of security in the cloud. 871 00:39:57,965 --> 00:39:59,525 And so there's tools that can be deployed. 872 00:40:00,245 --> 00:40:01,055 Into the cloud. 873 00:40:01,055 --> 00:40:04,745 So there's a, there's a concept called, uh, cloud security and posture management. 874 00:40:04,745 --> 00:40:08,165 So a lot of your big breaches have happened because somebody left the front 875 00:40:08,170 --> 00:40:13,085 door open to their storage . Um, and so what this does is in real time looks for 876 00:40:13,085 --> 00:40:18,935 a change in that posture that says that that's now probably an open, uh, an open 877 00:40:18,935 --> 00:40:21,035 service or an open storage, uh, container. 878 00:40:21,545 --> 00:40:24,365 Uh, and so there's tools that can be deployed, deployed there, 879 00:40:24,545 --> 00:40:27,275 and we offer all those, we call those extended coverage options 880 00:40:27,275 --> 00:40:30,695 because not every customer has a sophisticated cloud infrastructure. 881 00:40:30,935 --> 00:40:33,875 Uh, and so we don't put that in foundational because not 882 00:40:33,875 --> 00:40:34,985 every customer needs it. 883 00:40:35,285 --> 00:40:37,265 Uh, but uh, we do offer those as extended 884 00:40:37,530 --> 00:40:38,930 Prasanna Malaiyandi: Do you support? 885 00:40:38,930 --> 00:40:42,020 Like I know you talked about server, you talked about 886 00:40:42,025 --> 00:40:43,640 device, you talked about cloud. 887 00:40:44,180 --> 00:40:45,640 What about SaaS services? 888 00:40:45,645 --> 00:40:47,960 Like are there things you do around Microsoft 365? 889 00:40:49,705 --> 00:40:52,550 and other services like Salesforce, et cetera, 890 00:40:53,405 --> 00:40:55,155 Scott McCrady: Yeah, great question. 891 00:40:55,160 --> 00:40:56,835 So the. 892 00:40:58,600 --> 00:41:02,840 Majority, probably 80% of our customers are, are, have a cross section of things. 893 00:41:02,840 --> 00:41:07,220 That cross section tends to be, uh, mostly remote with some, some 894 00:41:07,220 --> 00:41:10,100 small offices, very sass heavy. 895 00:41:10,250 --> 00:41:10,700 Right. 896 00:41:10,790 --> 00:41:16,100 Um, and on Office 365, that would be like, if you were to say draw the circle, right. 897 00:41:16,105 --> 00:41:17,330 80% would sort of land there. 898 00:41:18,140 --> 00:41:22,880 And first of all, office 365 provides a lot of amazing identity telemetry. 899 00:41:23,420 --> 00:41:27,170 So we scoop all that up and we, uh, we tie it into the back end 900 00:41:27,175 --> 00:41:30,140 so that we can actually get the ID telemetry and correlate that 901 00:41:30,220 --> 00:41:31,460 Prasanna Malaiyandi: it's like the data stream that we talked 902 00:41:31,460 --> 00:41:32,420 about with the firewalls. 903 00:41:32,420 --> 00:41:33,890 Similar to that, you just get a data stream. 904 00:41:34,940 --> 00:41:38,000 Scott McCrady: exactly, and, and part of the reason why that matters is, 905 00:41:38,000 --> 00:41:42,350 and this goes back to the whole alert, fatigue and noise and the, it's very 906 00:41:42,350 --> 00:41:47,030 common in a lot of situations where the MSSP is saying something like, ten, 907 00:41:47,030 --> 00:41:50,990 ten, ten seven we think has a problem. 908 00:41:51,290 --> 00:41:52,520 Sort of like this. 909 00:41:52,580 --> 00:41:54,290 These are the four things you need to go check. 910 00:41:54,290 --> 00:41:57,380 And then, Prasanna or Curtis, you guys go run off and check it and 911 00:41:57,380 --> 00:41:58,550 you come back and say, I'm not sure. 912 00:41:58,550 --> 00:42:00,260 And then you contact us and we go back and forth. 913 00:42:01,070 --> 00:42:04,730 What we're doing is we're switching that and we're trying to say, um, Scott 914 00:42:04,730 --> 00:42:07,550 McCrady and his machine have a problem. 915 00:42:07,550 --> 00:42:11,540 And we know that based on the identity data, the machine data, the user 916 00:42:11,545 --> 00:42:14,540 data, um, and, and, and this is how we 917 00:42:14,540 --> 00:42:15,410 solve that problem. 918 00:42:16,100 --> 00:42:19,190 So because we track to user instead of the ips and knowledge 919 00:42:19,220 --> 00:42:22,440 W. Curtis Preston: And, And, it sounds like you're able to, uh, 920 00:42:22,840 --> 00:42:28,080 actually stop it, that you c you can actually affect the change necessary. 921 00:42:29,060 --> 00:42:29,480 Scott McCrady: we can. 922 00:42:29,480 --> 00:42:30,170 So we do. 923 00:42:30,230 --> 00:42:33,950 So one of the frustrating parts of of security is these words 924 00:42:33,950 --> 00:42:36,350 get sort of used by everybody. 925 00:42:36,740 --> 00:42:38,900 And so there's a concept called response. 926 00:42:39,560 --> 00:42:44,480 And so a lot of companies are not what I would call, they're being disingenuous in 927 00:42:44,480 --> 00:42:47,590 the fact that they say they do response, but what they really are doing is notifi. 928 00:42:48,485 --> 00:42:51,185 they're saying, Hey, we think we, we think we detected something, and 929 00:42:51,185 --> 00:42:52,445 we're sending you a notification. 930 00:42:52,445 --> 00:42:53,465 They call that response. 931 00:42:54,035 --> 00:42:55,565 What we do is actual response. 932 00:42:55,570 --> 00:43:00,245 So if we are, if we see, uh, a hash on a process change that we know 933 00:43:00,245 --> 00:43:03,755 should never change, we're gonna go back there and try to quarantine that 934 00:43:03,760 --> 00:43:05,585 process, quarantine that machine. 935 00:43:05,590 --> 00:43:07,295 We're gonna do something if we can. 936 00:43:07,985 --> 00:43:11,195 Uh, and that's, that's a fundamental difference about what we do because 937 00:43:11,195 --> 00:43:14,615 again, if you're looking at the mid-market, do they have the people that 938 00:43:15,065 --> 00:43:18,185 know how to go research and track that down and, and do what they need to do? 939 00:43:18,935 --> 00:43:19,775 Oftentimes not 940 00:43:21,605 --> 00:43:23,555 W. Curtis Preston: so let me ask you this. 941 00:43:23,615 --> 00:43:30,485 Um, and, and I'm, I'm gonna preface my statement slash question with, 942 00:43:30,545 --> 00:43:31,955 with the following statement. 943 00:43:32,135 --> 00:43:33,035 I have never. 944 00:43:33,905 --> 00:43:36,425 Bought a security product in my life. 945 00:43:36,755 --> 00:43:37,145 . Okay. 946 00:43:37,535 --> 00:43:39,215 Like for IT infrastructure. 947 00:43:39,245 --> 00:43:39,665 Okay. 948 00:43:40,145 --> 00:43:44,825 Um, obviously some stuff's from my own stuff, right? 949 00:43:44,825 --> 00:43:46,475 But not nothing for a company. 950 00:43:47,345 --> 00:43:49,835 Uh, I looked at your pricing model. 951 00:43:50,675 --> 00:43:56,555 Um, first I did one of the simplest pricing models I've ever seen. 952 00:43:57,125 --> 00:43:58,265 Uh, I like that. 953 00:43:58,790 --> 00:43:59,560 Scott McCrady: one SKU, 954 00:43:59,855 --> 00:44:00,515 W. Curtis Preston: What's that? 955 00:44:01,190 --> 00:44:01,550 Scott McCrady: one 956 00:44:01,925 --> 00:44:02,675 W. Curtis Preston: exactly? 957 00:44:02,840 --> 00:44:03,770 Scott McCrady: Customers don't believe it. 958 00:44:04,055 --> 00:44:04,535 W. Curtis Preston: Yeah. 959 00:44:04,745 --> 00:44:08,525 I, I will say that I choked a little when I saw the number. 960 00:44:09,215 --> 00:44:12,095 Um, that's why I'm saying I prefaced this with, I've never 961 00:44:12,095 --> 00:44:13,895 paid for anything like this before. 962 00:44:14,525 --> 00:44:20,135 Um, it, it, it just seemed like a lot be because it was per user, right? 963 00:44:20,135 --> 00:44:23,855 I believe the current, it was current was $57, I think per. 964 00:44:23,910 --> 00:44:24,950 Scott McCrady: $57. 965 00:44:25,190 --> 00:44:25,640 W. Curtis Preston: Right. 966 00:44:25,850 --> 00:44:29,090 So I'm sitting here going, so if I have, so you're going for the 967 00:44:29,090 --> 00:44:34,070 mid-market, I've got 500 employees, I'm gonna be paying you $25,000 a month. 968 00:44:35,240 --> 00:44:37,580 Uh, that seems like a lot to me. 969 00:44:38,040 --> 00:44:38,650 Scott McCrady: Mm-hmm. 970 00:44:38,930 --> 00:44:41,030 W. Curtis Preston: me understand how that compares 971 00:44:41,150 --> 00:44:42,470 Scott McCrady: that's not a, that's not a lot 972 00:44:42,620 --> 00:44:43,040 W. Curtis Preston: Yeah, 973 00:44:44,360 --> 00:44:45,680 Scott McCrady: Um, no, it's a great question. 974 00:44:45,680 --> 00:44:49,040 First of all, I wa it is funny because as far as I know, we're one 975 00:44:49,040 --> 00:44:51,830 of the only companies that actually puts our pricing on our website. 976 00:44:52,310 --> 00:44:55,730 Uh, so we have the sing, which we call, um, annoyances, and 977 00:44:55,730 --> 00:44:56,870 we put make cartoons about it. 978 00:44:56,870 --> 00:44:59,030 And so you'll go out to these, security comes, it'll like, 979 00:44:59,060 --> 00:45:01,400 it'll be pricing, you'll click on it and we like contact sales. 980 00:45:01,820 --> 00:45:03,650 Um, so we actually list out our pricing. 981 00:45:03,890 --> 00:45:07,220 Now, I will say we have bands, so we, and we don't list out every 982 00:45:07,225 --> 00:45:08,300 band, cuz that'd just be sort 983 00:45:08,305 --> 00:45:08,810 of silly. 984 00:45:08,840 --> 00:45:12,890 But, um, so obviously, you know, we're working with a company 985 00:45:12,890 --> 00:45:14,960 that's like 4,000 employees. 986 00:45:15,050 --> 00:45:17,090 You know, the band's lower than $57. 987 00:45:17,090 --> 00:45:21,110 But candidly most com most of the time we sell our deals are at $57. 988 00:45:21,980 --> 00:45:27,650 And the way it breaks down is a very basic security stack, not 989 00:45:27,650 --> 00:45:28,700 even the stuff that we're doing. 990 00:45:29,240 --> 00:45:33,710 If you're a 200 employee company, you're going to run about $40 in 991 00:45:33,715 --> 00:45:35,450 license costs per user, per year. 992 00:45:35,870 --> 00:45:36,140 Oh, sorry. 993 00:45:36,140 --> 00:45:37,461 For per, per user, per month. 994 00:45:37,970 --> 00:45:39,050 $40 and just the 995 00:45:39,065 --> 00:45:40,555 W. Curtis Preston: just licensing. 996 00:45:40,665 --> 00:45:41,155 Okay. 997 00:45:41,990 --> 00:45:45,050 Scott McCrady: but all that licensing is going to be actual annual paid up front. 998 00:45:45,260 --> 00:45:47,450 So they, you don't get charged per user per month. 999 00:45:47,450 --> 00:45:48,530 You'd have to back into it. 1000 00:45:48,530 --> 00:45:51,050 You say, well, I'm gonna pay a hundred thousand dollars divided 1001 00:45:51,050 --> 00:45:53,060 by 200, you know, divided by 12. 1002 00:45:53,990 --> 00:45:57,860 So most organizations pay around $40 for what we'd call, you know, 1003 00:45:57,890 --> 00:46:00,920 relatively mid-tier cap capabilities. 1004 00:46:01,010 --> 00:46:02,570 Now, mid-tier tools, these aren't best 1005 00:46:02,585 --> 00:46:03,725 Prasanna Malaiyandi: That's just a softer stack, 1006 00:46:03,725 --> 00:46:04,055 right? 1007 00:46:04,375 --> 00:46:04,865 Yeah. 1008 00:46:05,840 --> 00:46:08,810 Scott McCrady: just the software stack, and this is street price by the way. 1009 00:46:08,810 --> 00:46:12,890 This is all stuff we've purchased in our life that we actually know exactly. 1010 00:46:12,890 --> 00:46:15,860 I mean, we got to, um, this things that we've, we've purchased. 1011 00:46:15,860 --> 00:46:19,550 So that's before you get somebody that actually has to deploy it and manage it, 1012 00:46:19,850 --> 00:46:22,100 has to, that's gonna run the simulations. 1013 00:46:22,460 --> 00:46:24,890 Um, so that's before what we call care and Feeding. 1014 00:46:25,310 --> 00:46:29,600 Uh, care and feeding for a standard 200 employee company for, uh, again, a basic 1015 00:46:29,600 --> 00:46:31,340 security stack is a person, it's a. 1016 00:46:32,285 --> 00:46:36,545 Today's world called a hundred, $125,000, um, for, you know, a 1017 00:46:36,545 --> 00:46:38,675 semicon for a competent IT person. 1018 00:46:39,215 --> 00:46:40,865 Uh, so there you go. 1019 00:46:40,865 --> 00:46:41,555 Right there, right? 1020 00:46:41,555 --> 00:46:42,785 So you're already over 57. 1021 00:46:42,935 --> 00:46:44,885 That's before you get into detecting response. 1022 00:46:45,155 --> 00:46:48,695 So that's before you actually take all that data out of there and run into 1023 00:46:48,695 --> 00:46:52,355 a 24 by seven system and then, you know, responds at whatever two in the 1024 00:46:52,355 --> 00:46:53,795 morning and actually fixes the problem. 1025 00:46:54,305 --> 00:47:00,065 So we tend to be about 40 to 50% cheaper, believe it or not, um, to do this than 1026 00:47:00,070 --> 00:47:01,385 actually trying to build it yourself. 1027 00:47:01,835 --> 00:47:04,445 Uh, we also don't charge upfront fees. 1028 00:47:04,445 --> 00:47:06,335 So we financially companies love it. 1029 00:47:06,665 --> 00:47:10,235 And to give you a sense, an MSP that if you were, if you were a hundred 1030 00:47:10,235 --> 00:47:14,375 or 200 person company, almost all of, use an MSP to manage their laptops and 1031 00:47:14,375 --> 00:47:18,185 their, you know, email and all that, they charge about 150 to 200 bucks 1032 00:47:18,190 --> 00:47:20,405 per user per month to do all that. 1033 00:47:20,525 --> 00:47:20,915 So, 1034 00:47:21,425 --> 00:47:26,375 um, we tend to get very, very, Yeah, we, we tend to get very, we're people 1035 00:47:26,375 --> 00:47:28,325 are very complimentary of the model. 1036 00:47:28,535 --> 00:47:31,475 We, we, uh, businesses is relatively speaking pretty good. 1037 00:47:31,850 --> 00:47:34,760 Prasanna Malaiyandi: Wow, that's Well, and just in my head I'm going and 1038 00:47:34,760 --> 00:47:39,260 thinking about, okay, so there was like, you were talking about the M S P was 1039 00:47:39,260 --> 00:47:42,320 like a hundred to 150 a user, right? 1040 00:47:42,320 --> 00:47:44,870 Security is like 50 a user. 1041 00:47:45,260 --> 00:47:45,440 Right? 1042 00:47:45,445 --> 00:47:47,270 And then I started thinking about, okay, backup. 1043 00:47:47,300 --> 00:47:52,010 And it's like backup is such a small percentage of that if you think about 1044 00:47:52,220 --> 00:47:52,340 W. Curtis Preston: Well, 1045 00:47:52,760 --> 00:47:56,810 but yeah, that, and that, that was the problem, Scott, because I'm 1046 00:47:56,815 --> 00:48:01,010 comparing it to like, what we charge and you know, we're, we're like a 1047 00:48:01,010 --> 00:48:03,200 couple of dollars a user, right? 1048 00:48:03,560 --> 00:48:06,650 Um, but it, it's not the same, you know, it's not the same. 1049 00:48:06,680 --> 00:48:06,980 Right. 1050 00:48:07,040 --> 00:48:09,830 Um, so that's, that's where my sticker shot came from. 1051 00:48:10,370 --> 00:48:15,200 But I, by the way, I, I am, you know, I, I get the thing that I work for a 1052 00:48:15,200 --> 00:48:18,890 SaaS company and that of course I'm gonna like the SaaS pricing model, but 1053 00:48:19,400 --> 00:48:21,260 I really like a SaaS pricing model. 1054 00:48:21,290 --> 00:48:22,400 You know, the, the 1055 00:48:22,400 --> 00:48:24,440 old, the old way 1056 00:48:24,500 --> 00:48:24,860 Prasanna Malaiyandi: three-year 1057 00:48:24,860 --> 00:48:27,050 W. Curtis Preston: I mean, the way you have to buy a. 1058 00:48:27,425 --> 00:48:27,695 Yeah. 1059 00:48:27,695 --> 00:48:31,505 Exact three year contracts, five year contracts, having to, you 1060 00:48:31,505 --> 00:48:36,005 know, on our, on our, in our world, I have to size everything, right? 1061 00:48:36,010 --> 00:48:36,335 I have to, 1062 00:48:36,635 --> 00:48:39,005 how big will my backups be in three years? 1063 00:48:39,305 --> 00:48:40,655 No freaking idea. 1064 00:48:41,105 --> 00:48:41,615 Right? 1065 00:48:41,885 --> 00:48:46,355 And so I'm gonna oversize it and overspend and I have to buy it all now. 1066 00:48:47,255 --> 00:48:47,735 Right. 1067 00:48:47,855 --> 00:48:51,245 Um, and, and 90% of it's gonna go unused. 1068 00:48:51,875 --> 00:48:53,675 Scott McCrady: we talked about the Netflix model, right? 1069 00:48:53,675 --> 00:48:57,155 Or your streaming service model of choice, which, but you all remember, I 1070 00:48:57,155 --> 00:49:01,115 mean, um, Curtis, you and I are probably older than Prasanna, which I, you know, 1071 00:49:01,475 --> 00:49:01,955 but 1072 00:49:02,255 --> 00:49:02,465 W. Curtis Preston: we are. 1073 00:49:03,035 --> 00:49:03,335 Scott McCrady: like, 1074 00:49:03,395 --> 00:49:05,195 we're probably technically savvy people. 1075 00:49:05,195 --> 00:49:06,935 So I built a media server at one point in time. 1076 00:49:07,085 --> 00:49:10,055 I went out and bought all my CDs or Blu-ray discs, and then I bought my 1077 00:49:10,055 --> 00:49:13,625 media server and I got my Plex server, and I sort of had, quote unquote, 1078 00:49:13,625 --> 00:49:15,005 on demand entertainment, right? 1079 00:49:15,035 --> 00:49:15,455 I built it 1080 00:49:15,455 --> 00:49:18,275 all, and then Netflix came around and basically said, Hey, 1081 00:49:18,275 --> 00:49:19,625 we're gonna do all that for you. 1082 00:49:19,685 --> 00:49:23,795 Stream it to you, give you a lot more choices, and we're gonna charge you 9 99. 1083 00:49:24,420 --> 00:49:24,860 and I was like, I 1084 00:49:24,860 --> 00:49:26,090 don't really need my media. 1085 00:49:26,360 --> 00:49:27,200 I mean, I still have it 1086 00:49:28,610 --> 00:49:31,280 . Um, and so that's the security model right now. 1087 00:49:31,430 --> 00:49:32,360 I say it's all the time. 1088 00:49:32,360 --> 00:49:33,440 It's lost in the eighties. 1089 00:49:33,770 --> 00:49:37,130 You're going to, you gotta still go build this crap all the time. 1090 00:49:37,310 --> 00:49:39,770 Pay up front, stitch it all together. 1091 00:49:39,800 --> 00:49:40,520 Hopefully it works. 1092 00:49:40,550 --> 00:49:42,380 Oh, by the way, we're not 4k. 1093 00:49:42,680 --> 00:49:45,560 So now you gotta change it all out so the latest threat comes out and 1094 00:49:45,560 --> 00:49:48,380 all of a sudden your current security stack doesn't work against it. 1095 00:49:48,800 --> 00:49:51,230 And there's nobody that's actually solving that problem. 1096 00:49:51,235 --> 00:49:52,760 and and that's what we're trying to solve. 1097 00:49:53,085 --> 00:49:55,180 W. Curtis Preston: As soon as, as soon as you said you had a, and by 1098 00:49:55,180 --> 00:49:59,290 the way, my, my media library or the hardware that comprised my media 1099 00:49:59,295 --> 00:50:04,720 library is right over there in a box . That's, that's gonna go somewhere. 1100 00:50:04,780 --> 00:50:07,180 Cuz I had to save, had the same exact thing. 1101 00:50:07,870 --> 00:50:09,850 Prasanna Malaiyandi: I think the other thing with the SaaS service, and I don't 1102 00:50:09,850 --> 00:50:12,040 know if you do this as well, Scott, it's. 1103 00:50:13,760 --> 00:50:16,915 unlike in backup, where you'd have to wait for like the patches to come 1104 00:50:16,915 --> 00:50:19,765 out, and then you'd have to deploy it across your entire infrastructure, 1105 00:50:19,765 --> 00:50:21,505 and that takes time in scheduling. 1106 00:50:21,895 --> 00:50:22,195 Right? 1107 00:50:22,195 --> 00:50:24,895 With the SaaS service, a lot of times you get the benefits of, Hey, it's 1108 00:50:24,895 --> 00:50:30,115 easier to push updates and upgrade without having to sort of wait for 1109 00:50:30,145 --> 00:50:32,755 some IT person to be like, yeah, let me go schedule these things. 1110 00:50:33,113 --> 00:50:34,223 Scott McCrady: No, it's, it's, it's true. 1111 00:50:34,313 --> 00:50:37,673 So again, we target mid-market and we we're very explicit about that. 1112 00:50:37,673 --> 00:50:41,543 But one of the reasons is everything we do in the stack itself, so all 1113 00:50:41,543 --> 00:50:44,573 these best in breed products are now all cloud-based or on, they have both. 1114 00:50:44,813 --> 00:50:45,473 Some have both. 1115 00:50:45,473 --> 00:50:47,183 Most of 'em are cloud have shifted. 1116 00:50:47,453 --> 00:50:50,243 So none of our stuff's on-prim except for the stuff we have to put on 1117 00:50:50,693 --> 00:50:52,733 the actual endpoint itself. 1118 00:50:52,973 --> 00:50:56,423 Uh, and so it gives us this unique ability to up, we update the 1119 00:50:56,423 --> 00:50:57,863 service about every six months. 1120 00:50:58,103 --> 00:51:01,373 So as we see the threat change, uh, as we see something coming down the. 1121 00:51:02,093 --> 00:51:05,573 As cyber insurance changes, uh, we just update the service. 1122 00:51:05,603 --> 00:51:08,453 Um, and as a foundational coverage customer, it's included. 1123 00:51:08,543 --> 00:51:12,383 So you get on your quarterly business review and we say, Hey, now you get, you 1124 00:51:12,383 --> 00:51:16,553 know, we added in proactive threat, you know, uh, intelligence, blah, blah, blah. 1125 00:51:16,553 --> 00:51:16,913 This is 1126 00:51:17,183 --> 00:51:18,383 you, you now have access to it 1127 00:51:18,413 --> 00:51:19,343 So we just turn it on. 1128 00:51:19,583 --> 00:51:20,033 Some stuff 1129 00:51:20,048 --> 00:51:22,208 W. Curtis Preston: beauty, that is the beauty of SaaS 1130 00:51:22,268 --> 00:51:22,868 my friend. 1131 00:51:23,063 --> 00:51:23,273 Scott McCrady: Yep. 1132 00:51:23,738 --> 00:51:25,688 W. Curtis Preston: Um, we say the same thing. 1133 00:51:25,838 --> 00:51:29,318 Um, I'm looking at, and we don't have time to cover all these things, 1134 00:51:29,318 --> 00:51:32,978 but I'm just sort of scrolling through on Solcyber, by the way. 1135 00:51:32,978 --> 00:51:35,498 Tell me, uh, tell me what the story behind the name. 1136 00:51:35,618 --> 00:51:37,058 So l cyber.com. 1137 00:51:38,723 --> 00:51:41,963 Scott McCrady: So, uh, sun, so it was basically, you 1138 00:51:41,963 --> 00:51:44,003 know, a play on, on sun cyber. 1139 00:51:44,333 --> 00:51:47,363 Uh, and so obviously we're in Texas, it's warm. 1140 00:51:47,453 --> 00:51:52,448 Um, . And so the idea was really around the fact of soul, cyber, sun Bright. 1141 00:51:52,808 --> 00:51:54,338 Um, we wanted to be approachable. 1142 00:51:54,608 --> 00:51:58,178 Um, approachability as a concept, you know, this and security is like, 1143 00:51:58,178 --> 00:52:01,508 you know, here's the angry falcon as it sweeps down upon you, right? 1144 00:52:01,513 --> 00:52:05,588 Um, we didn't want to be a bird of prey because everybody's a bird of prey. 1145 00:52:05,888 --> 00:52:10,568 Um, so we were trying to figure out like, what's, what's approachable, 1146 00:52:10,573 --> 00:52:15,488 what's, what's more, uh, interesting and what's our, what's our tone of voice? 1147 00:52:15,488 --> 00:52:18,908 And so we thought soul cyber was just a, an approachable, 1148 00:52:18,938 --> 00:52:21,368 bright, uh, airy type, uh, 1149 00:52:21,488 --> 00:52:22,208 Prasanna Malaiyandi: I like it. 1150 00:52:22,613 --> 00:52:25,163 W. Curtis Preston: And Trademarkable, and you can get a, you can get 1151 00:52:25,163 --> 00:52:28,563 a, uh, domain name . So there's, so that's always helpful. 1152 00:52:29,588 --> 00:52:31,088 Scott McCrady: The domain name does come in handy. 1153 00:52:31,193 --> 00:52:31,793 W. Curtis Preston: what's that? 1154 00:52:32,468 --> 00:52:33,818 Scott McCrady: The domain name is Handy 1155 00:52:33,893 --> 00:52:35,273 W. Curtis Preston: Yeah, absolutely. 1156 00:52:35,603 --> 00:52:42,983 So just curious, uh, um, do you have any advice for our, our backup listeners 1157 00:52:43,373 --> 00:52:47,123 specifically, you know, with regards to protecting backup infrastructure? 1158 00:52:47,573 --> 00:52:50,333 Uh, you have any thoughts there? 1159 00:52:50,993 --> 00:52:51,833 Scott McCrady: first of all. 1160 00:52:51,838 --> 00:52:58,763 I mean, kudos to them because we do what we do because we really attack sort of 1161 00:52:58,763 --> 00:53:01,463 the, the threat aspect of life for our 1162 00:53:01,883 --> 00:53:02,163 customers. 1163 00:53:02,423 --> 00:53:06,503 But there's a lot of, um, runway organizations can get by doing 1164 00:53:06,503 --> 00:53:08,083 what I call the basics, right? 1165 00:53:08,213 --> 00:53:11,453 And so people are always asking me like, what do you tell kids or young 1166 00:53:11,453 --> 00:53:13,943 people about like being successful in a career or what have you? 1167 00:53:13,943 --> 00:53:14,963 And I'm like, do the basics. 1168 00:53:15,233 --> 00:53:18,923 Be nice, show up on time, like be easy to get along with. 1169 00:53:18,983 --> 00:53:21,563 And it's sort of the same when it comes to security, right? 1170 00:53:21,773 --> 00:53:24,203 Confidentiality, integrity, and availability is the three 1171 00:53:24,203 --> 00:53:25,733 pillars of, of security. 1172 00:53:26,423 --> 00:53:27,443 We handle piece of that. 1173 00:53:27,623 --> 00:53:32,003 But the concept around like MFA and what we're gonna talk about here, um, 1174 00:53:32,033 --> 00:53:34,133 disaster recovery in the form of backup. 1175 00:53:34,973 --> 00:53:40,733 If companies were to do that effectively, uh, and manage it well, uh, a whole bunch 1176 00:53:40,733 --> 00:53:44,153 of problems sort of get solved and a bunch of risk gets taken off the table. 1177 00:53:44,213 --> 00:53:47,993 And so, uh, the first thing I'd say is, is will you tell everybody, you 1178 00:53:47,998 --> 00:53:49,583 know, they, they need to have 'em done. 1179 00:53:49,588 --> 00:53:50,363 They need to be tested. 1180 00:53:50,363 --> 00:53:51,653 You probably need to use a service. 1181 00:53:51,683 --> 00:53:55,193 Um, so that, you know, you take, again, you take some of that risk off the table. 1182 00:53:55,193 --> 00:53:58,463 Do you really wanna be checking your backups, uh, yourself And 1183 00:53:58,463 --> 00:53:59,693 most com Most people don't. 1184 00:53:59,933 --> 00:54:00,083 They 1185 00:54:00,083 --> 00:54:00,503 just don't. 1186 00:54:00,533 --> 00:54:02,213 They, they say they do, but they don't, right? 1187 00:54:02,543 --> 00:54:03,353 They don't have the time. 1188 00:54:03,383 --> 00:54:04,343 Life gets in the way. 1189 00:54:04,553 --> 00:54:07,313 So, um, it's absolutely critical. 1190 00:54:07,343 --> 00:54:09,593 100% mission critical to every organization. 1191 00:54:09,593 --> 00:54:10,433 We recommend it. 1192 00:54:10,763 --> 00:54:14,693 Um, a lot of the MSPs we partner with, uh, do it on behalf of the customers. 1193 00:54:14,783 --> 00:54:20,363 Um, and, uh, it's just something that is, is you can't, you cannot not do it in 1194 00:54:20,668 --> 00:54:21,648 Prasanna Malaiyandi: and you were 1195 00:54:21,728 --> 00:54:21,938 W. Curtis Preston: Yeah. 1196 00:54:21,943 --> 00:54:26,558 No, we have, we, we have a, uh, Druva has a big s p program now. 1197 00:54:26,678 --> 00:54:29,408 Um, and so trying to roll that out. 1198 00:54:29,438 --> 00:54:31,958 Um, by the way, our name came from, 1199 00:54:31,963 --> 00:54:35,708 it's the Sanskrit word for North Star. 1200 00:54:36,248 --> 00:54:38,228 Um, so we're leading the way. 1201 00:54:38,588 --> 00:54:42,308 I don't know if she That's So you're after a son? 1202 00:54:42,308 --> 00:54:43,208 We're after a star. 1203 00:54:43,228 --> 00:54:43,838 Scott McCrady: Mm-hmm. 1204 00:54:44,258 --> 00:54:45,248 . You gotta pick something, 1205 00:54:45,248 --> 00:54:45,668 right? 1206 00:54:46,478 --> 00:54:46,718 Some 1207 00:54:46,838 --> 00:54:49,508 Prasanna Malaiyandi: Scott, I know previously earlier we were talking about 1208 00:54:49,508 --> 00:54:51,488 sort of how you map everything to users. 1209 00:54:51,968 --> 00:54:55,658 When you go into these environments with backup servers or with things 1210 00:54:55,663 --> 00:55:00,638 that need to be backed up, do you consider that the same as any other 1211 00:55:00,638 --> 00:55:02,198 user device in the environment? 1212 00:55:02,648 --> 00:55:02,948 Right. 1213 00:55:02,948 --> 00:55:06,758 Where it is critical, it is important to make sure that's secure, right? 1214 00:55:06,758 --> 00:55:09,569 Just like anything in, probably, it's actually more important to 1215 00:55:09,574 --> 00:55:12,518 make sure that's very secure, just given all the data that's 1216 00:55:12,518 --> 00:55:14,618 sort of associated with backups. 1217 00:55:16,628 --> 00:55:16,808 Scott McCrady: Yeah. 1218 00:55:16,868 --> 00:55:17,708 Again, good question. 1219 00:55:17,708 --> 00:55:20,138 So there's two answers to that. 1220 00:55:20,198 --> 00:55:22,118 Um, is one you do actually. 1221 00:55:22,208 --> 00:55:25,418 Uh, so there was, there was, if we back up actually, and, and you all 1222 00:55:25,418 --> 00:55:29,648 may remember these days, there was a really big push around information, 1223 00:55:30,248 --> 00:55:33,038 um, attribution, uh, in classification. 1224 00:55:33,218 --> 00:55:34,988 And this was maybe seven or eight years ago. 1225 00:55:34,988 --> 00:55:37,688 And EY and Accenture, all these guys were like, let's go classify 1226 00:55:37,688 --> 00:55:40,838 all your information and then we're gonna have different security levels. 1227 00:55:40,838 --> 00:55:43,508 Relatively the classification of the information super makes 1228 00:55:43,508 --> 00:55:45,098 sense in, in, in life, right? 1229 00:55:45,278 --> 00:55:48,008 But it's like trying to keep your Tupper war drawer, you know, organized. 1230 00:55:48,008 --> 00:55:49,838 Like unless you're that company. 1231 00:55:50,258 --> 00:55:54,278 It's gonna be a mess relatively soon, even if you're a super organized, uh, person. 1232 00:55:54,668 --> 00:55:57,728 And so this whole concept around the classification of the 1233 00:55:57,728 --> 00:56:00,578 underlying assets and information sort of fell by the wayside. 1234 00:56:01,088 --> 00:56:06,278 Um, and so our view is a much, um, again, we, we call ourselves practical 1235 00:56:06,283 --> 00:56:07,658 security, as much more practical view. 1236 00:56:07,658 --> 00:56:12,128 So there's a set of tools that we deployed to every entity, right? 1237 00:56:12,128 --> 00:56:14,798 Most of those are tied to a user, but the servers, backup 1238 00:56:14,798 --> 00:56:15,938 servers, all that we deploy. 1239 00:56:16,568 --> 00:56:20,708 And the second thing is we actually, in the onboarding process, we classify 1240 00:56:21,008 --> 00:56:25,898 at a much more high level, um, the different types of assets, right? 1241 00:56:25,898 --> 00:56:32,288 And so, you know, CEOs, CFOs, like cfo, uh, if, if we see, uh, certain 1242 00:56:32,288 --> 00:56:35,198 types of emails going out from the cfo, they trigger faster than if we 1243 00:56:35,258 --> 00:56:36,578 see it going out from somebody else. 1244 00:56:36,818 --> 00:56:39,008 Same thing comes to the underlying assets of the server. 1245 00:56:39,008 --> 00:56:43,118 So if you are running a certain type of, of server and we see certain types 1246 00:56:43,123 --> 00:56:46,553 of information going to it, , we'll, we've already classified that at a 1247 00:56:46,553 --> 00:56:50,003 high level and said, okay, that's, you know, that's, that's benign 1248 00:56:50,063 --> 00:56:51,773 or that should never be happening. 1249 00:56:52,043 --> 00:56:56,693 And so we actually have the ability to, um, prioritize different types of assets. 1250 00:56:56,993 --> 00:57:00,683 Um, and, and that does apply towards certain types of servers, uh, 1251 00:57:00,833 --> 00:57:04,133 Prasanna Malaiyandi: And I'm assuming that they would be able to send a data stream 1252 00:57:04,133 --> 00:57:08,603 from like your backup logs or the backup server to you guys to be able to detect. 1253 00:57:08,633 --> 00:57:11,693 And Curtis, maybe this could be one way to catch, I know we talk a lot 1254 00:57:11,693 --> 00:57:15,323 about ransomware and how it goes and deletes all your backups, right? 1255 00:57:15,743 --> 00:57:19,133 , if they sent you a log of, Hey, here's a data stream of events happening. 1256 00:57:19,553 --> 00:57:19,853 Right. 1257 00:57:19,853 --> 00:57:23,603 That's probably something that could be flagged from a security perspective. 1258 00:57:23,703 --> 00:57:24,893 Scott McCrady: you know, it's a great question. 1259 00:57:25,103 --> 00:57:25,883 I don't know. 1260 00:57:25,883 --> 00:57:30,103 We actually do take, um, logs from backup systems. 1261 00:57:30,763 --> 00:57:33,103 Uh, and we have, we have correlated. 1262 00:57:33,233 --> 00:57:34,993 It's a great, it's a great question, prana. 1263 00:57:35,023 --> 00:57:38,143 I, it is now on my list with my CTO on our one-on-one tomorrow. 1264 00:57:38,413 --> 00:57:43,228 Um, because we have the capability, but I don't know, I can't think of anybody 1265 00:57:43,288 --> 00:57:43,558 having 1266 00:57:43,723 --> 00:57:44,143 Prasanna Malaiyandi: because it'd 1267 00:57:44,353 --> 00:57:44,473 be. 1268 00:57:45,058 --> 00:57:46,018 Scott McCrady: um, but theoretically, 1269 00:57:46,068 --> 00:57:48,133 Prasanna Malaiyandi: things that we, that we've seen at least in 1270 00:57:48,133 --> 00:57:53,383 some cases is right, hacker gets in, they then go to the backup server, 1271 00:57:53,533 --> 00:57:55,573 they disable all the jobs, right? 1272 00:57:55,603 --> 00:57:58,003 They delete all of 'em, and then they delete all the backups that 1273 00:57:58,003 --> 00:58:00,823 exist, and now you're screwed. 1274 00:58:02,848 --> 00:58:03,268 Scott McCrady: Yep. 1275 00:58:04,198 --> 00:58:05,098 And nobody's there. 1276 00:58:05,338 --> 00:58:08,608 I mean, this is the reason why you do detect and response 1277 00:58:08,608 --> 00:58:09,658 is literally that story. 1278 00:58:09,658 --> 00:58:09,748 Now 1279 00:58:09,748 --> 00:58:13,828 you just used it for backups, but at some point in time there was alerts 1280 00:58:13,833 --> 00:58:17,608 going off that said that something, something, something's happening 1281 00:58:17,608 --> 00:58:18,958 that should not be happening, right? 1282 00:58:19,588 --> 00:58:21,148 And so imagine that's really the 1283 00:58:21,148 --> 00:58:24,778 job that we have, um, across a, an organization saying there's things 1284 00:58:24,778 --> 00:58:26,158 that are happening that, and there are 1285 00:58:26,158 --> 00:58:28,978 things sending off alerts that are notifying that 1286 00:58:28,978 --> 00:58:30,658 something, that something nefarious is going on. 1287 00:58:30,928 --> 00:58:33,418 So now imagine, again, we don't manage a backup system, 1288 00:58:33,418 --> 00:58:34,648 but imagine that we contact. 1289 00:58:35,623 --> 00:58:36,943 Or whomever and they said, oh, 1290 00:58:37,003 --> 00:58:37,363 crap. 1291 00:58:37,393 --> 00:58:38,383 And then they went in, fixed it. 1292 00:58:38,383 --> 00:58:38,563 Right. 1293 00:58:38,563 --> 00:58:40,003 That's really the goal, right? 1294 00:58:40,993 --> 00:58:42,343 W. Curtis Preston: Sounds great. 1295 00:58:43,363 --> 00:58:46,753 Um, , so, so, we could talk about this for a while. 1296 00:58:46,753 --> 00:58:50,173 And, and also apparently backups, I'm sorry, uh, barbecue 1297 00:58:50,533 --> 00:58:55,003 and, uh, media streamers and Thai food. 1298 00:58:55,093 --> 00:58:57,283 Uh, sounds like we have a lot of the same interests. 1299 00:58:57,288 --> 00:59:00,343 Scott, um, by the way, you have to come, you know, if 1300 00:59:00,373 --> 00:59:02,383 Scott McCrady: be beer and bourbon are also on my list. 1301 00:59:02,383 --> 00:59:02,653 So if 1302 00:59:02,833 --> 00:59:04,603 W. Curtis Preston: now see there, there's one. 1303 00:59:04,963 --> 00:59:07,003 That's one vice we do not share. 1304 00:59:07,003 --> 00:59:07,123 I'm 1305 00:59:07,413 --> 00:59:11,443 not a huge, uh, any fan of like, bourbon, whiskey, scotch, any of that. 1306 00:59:11,448 --> 00:59:13,753 I've never, I've never crossed that. 1307 00:59:14,023 --> 00:59:14,503 But 1308 00:59:14,653 --> 00:59:17,293 Scott McCrady: German and my dad's Scottish, so I, I don't have a choice. 1309 00:59:17,293 --> 00:59:20,593 I like, I think it's in, I think, I think as in the dna 1310 00:59:20,743 --> 00:59:24,283 W. Curtis Preston: um, I, um, uh, but if you want to come down 1311 00:59:24,283 --> 00:59:26,533 to San Diego anytime, uh, and fi 1312 00:59:26,563 --> 00:59:30,313 and, you know, have some, have some, actual Mexican food, not the stuff 1313 00:59:30,313 --> 00:59:31,963 you guys have over there, right? 1314 00:59:31,963 --> 00:59:32,263 Not the 1315 00:59:32,428 --> 00:59:34,678 Scott McCrady: I used to do a lot of work in utc actually. 1316 00:59:34,678 --> 00:59:36,268 That is, it is a beautiful area, 1317 00:59:36,583 --> 00:59:38,113 W. Curtis Preston: Yeah, it's a, it is, yeah. 1318 00:59:38,143 --> 00:59:41,143 La Jolla, which is, uh, Spanish for expensive af. 1319 00:59:41,503 --> 00:59:46,663 Anyway, um, so , so, uh, thanks. 1320 00:59:46,663 --> 00:59:47,503 Thanks a lot, Scott. 1321 00:59:47,503 --> 00:59:48,713 It's been a great conversation. 1322 00:59:50,338 --> 00:59:51,028 Scott McCrady: Ah, thanks for having me. 1323 00:59:51,028 --> 00:59:52,138 Hopefully as useful. 1324 00:59:52,168 --> 00:59:56,128 I know, uh, uh, the Dr and the backup people out there, uh, appreciate the 1325 00:59:56,128 --> 00:59:59,578 work and, uh, if any of you are, are like, man, I'm not sure if our security 1326 00:59:59,578 --> 01:00:03,158 is where it needs to be, then feel free to reach out Scott@soulcyber.com 1327 01:00:03,178 --> 01:00:04,628 or obviously solcyber.com. 1328 01:00:04,768 --> 01:00:05,578 Uh, you can find us 1329 01:00:06,283 --> 01:00:06,973 W. Curtis Preston: Absolutely. 1330 01:00:06,978 --> 01:00:09,643 And Prasanna, thanks again for your 1331 01:00:09,943 --> 01:00:10,483 Prasanna Malaiyandi: I try. 1332 01:00:10,483 --> 01:00:12,583 I try, and Scott, good luck with moose. 1333 01:00:12,763 --> 01:00:14,683 Hopefully he's quieted down back there. 1334 01:00:16,198 --> 01:00:18,088 Scott McCrady: He is, he's already back to his nap. 1335 01:00:18,088 --> 01:00:22,228 It was, uh, obviously, uh, he, he, he wrestled that, uh, piece of, uh, 1336 01:00:22,408 --> 01:00:23,758 sweet potato to the ground, so he's 1337 01:00:23,818 --> 01:00:26,068 W. Curtis Preston: It's a tough, tough day to be a dog. 1338 01:00:26,068 --> 01:00:29,428 So I don't, we don't have a dog, but we have, uh, we have a grand dog. 1339 01:00:29,728 --> 01:00:31,018 Her name is Brulee. 1340 01:00:31,408 --> 01:00:36,298 Um, and, uh, she's a cockapoo and adorable, but, uh, and her favorite person 1341 01:00:36,303 --> 01:00:37,978 in the world is my wife for some reason. 1342 01:00:37,983 --> 01:00:41,368 But anyway, uh, well listen, thanks to our listeners. 1343 01:00:41,608 --> 01:00:45,178 Uh, you know, we'd be nothing without you, and be sure to subscribe 1344 01:00:45,448 --> 01:00:47,278 so that you can restore it all.