1 00:00:20,106 --> 00:00:22,386 how open should you be when things go wrong? 2 00:00:22,776 --> 00:00:25,266 Should you tell your boss, you made a huge mistake. 3 00:00:25,566 --> 00:00:28,866 Should your company tell everyone they got hacked this week? 4 00:00:28,866 --> 00:00:33,426 We talk with a wireless cybersecurity expert about this really important topic. 5 00:00:33,846 --> 00:00:34,626 I hope you enjoy it. 6 00:00:36,626 --> 00:00:39,806 W. Curtis Preston: Hi, and welcome to Backup Central's Restore it all podcast. 7 00:00:39,811 --> 00:00:42,416 I'm your host, w Curtis Preston, a k a, Mr. 8 00:00:42,416 --> 00:00:42,896 Backup. 9 00:00:43,286 --> 00:00:48,086 And I have with me, I think might be the only thing between me and a little 10 00:00:48,086 --> 00:00:51,416 dog Prasanna Malaiyandi that's it. 11 00:00:51,416 --> 00:00:52,536 How's it going Prasanna? 12 00:00:52,796 --> 00:00:56,276 Prasanna Malaiyandi: I am good and I hope the dog wins out. 13 00:00:57,086 --> 00:00:57,926 W. Curtis Preston: Oh. 14 00:00:58,466 --> 00:00:59,246 Prasanna Malaiyandi: What happened? 15 00:00:59,276 --> 00:01:00,416 What happened to 16 00:01:00,506 --> 00:01:03,026 W. Curtis Preston: I mean, you, you, you have, you have a little dog, right? 17 00:01:03,026 --> 00:01:07,316 So I, I, I technically don't, I, I have, I, you know, I have a grand 18 00:01:07,316 --> 00:01:09,956 dog who ha has been living with us. 19 00:01:10,766 --> 00:01:14,156 Uh, you know, my, my daughter and her husband live here with their dog, 20 00:01:14,456 --> 00:01:19,526 um, for a little bit, and I'm not used to having a dog around, right? 21 00:01:19,646 --> 00:01:23,456 So there are things that if you're used to having a dog around you just. 22 00:01:23,786 --> 00:01:24,596 Don't do. 23 00:01:25,016 --> 00:01:31,136 Um, one of those would be if per chance, I don't know, you've got a podcast 24 00:01:31,136 --> 00:01:36,746 recording coming up at say, I don't know, one o'clock, and perhaps you realize that 25 00:01:36,746 --> 00:01:41,906 say 1240, that you haven't eaten anything and you're gonna starve to death by two. 26 00:01:42,026 --> 00:01:47,156 And so you just go heat up some enchiladas and you put them on 27 00:01:47,156 --> 00:01:51,656 a plate on your desk inside your office where you close the door. 28 00:01:52,181 --> 00:01:57,461 Uh, except for like one minute, you go to get your AirPods 29 00:01:57,881 --> 00:01:59,501 because you forgot your AirPod. 30 00:01:59,501 --> 00:02:04,391 Just, just theoretically speaking, you go to get your AirPods and you leave the 31 00:02:04,391 --> 00:02:09,281 door cracked, not wide open, but cracked, and you say to yourself as you're walking 32 00:02:09,281 --> 00:02:15,971 away, BREW is not going to like open the door, go into the office, climb up 33 00:02:15,971 --> 00:02:19,091 onto my chair, and then attempt to eat. 34 00:02:19,451 --> 00:02:21,791 My enchiladas, she wouldn't do that in the 35 00:02:21,896 --> 00:02:22,476 Prasanna Malaiyandi: Oh no. 36 00:02:22,631 --> 00:02:24,491 W. Curtis Preston: I'm away from my desk. 37 00:02:24,761 --> 00:02:25,301 Yeah. 38 00:02:25,451 --> 00:02:29,501 So I come back and my enchiladas are upside 39 00:02:29,546 --> 00:02:29,816 Prasanna Malaiyandi: floor. 40 00:02:30,611 --> 00:02:34,331 W. Curtis Preston: on the floor with the plate on top of them and bru just 41 00:02:34,336 --> 00:02:38,531 sitting there on my chair, like, um, 42 00:02:38,771 --> 00:02:39,491 Prasanna Malaiyandi: on her face? 43 00:02:40,331 --> 00:02:43,901 W. Curtis Preston: uh, she didn't actually get, get too much apparently, 44 00:02:44,351 --> 00:02:47,231 uh, because the, the, but she, yeah. 45 00:02:47,891 --> 00:02:50,711 Prasanna Malaiyandi: so, but maybe that should tell you that if she's not 46 00:02:50,716 --> 00:02:54,341 going to eat your enchiladas, maybe you shouldn't eat your enchiladas. 47 00:02:54,761 --> 00:02:56,141 I'm just saying Curtis, 48 00:02:56,186 --> 00:02:58,316 W. Curtis Preston: No, I think she just didn't have enough time. 49 00:02:58,316 --> 00:02:59,576 She just didn't have enough time. 50 00:03:02,696 --> 00:03:03,686 Prasanna Malaiyandi: So basically this 51 00:03:03,686 --> 00:03:06,326 W. Curtis Preston: to remember to like close the doors, you know, at all times. 52 00:03:06,326 --> 00:03:09,956 It's just not something I'm used to doing, especially since we became 53 00:03:09,961 --> 00:03:11,726 empty nesters a little while ago. 54 00:03:12,236 --> 00:03:14,996 Um, so I'm just sort of, everything's open all the time. 55 00:03:15,176 --> 00:03:19,736 Um, and, uh, but yeah, so that dog, 56 00:03:19,826 --> 00:03:22,376 Prasanna Malaiyandi: Well, whose fault is it for leaving the chair next 57 00:03:22,406 --> 00:03:23,066 W. Curtis Preston: hey, hey, hey. 58 00:03:23,066 --> 00:03:24,206 Don't blame the victim. 59 00:03:24,206 --> 00:03:25,466 Don't blame the victim. 60 00:03:27,341 --> 00:03:30,131 Prasanna Malaiyandi: I am defending the dog who does not 61 00:03:30,131 --> 00:03:31,461 have a voice on this podcast. 62 00:03:32,516 --> 00:03:37,346 W. Curtis Preston: Your Honor, I present the, the case of the, the 63 00:03:37,346 --> 00:03:40,016 Preston household versus Brule. 64 00:03:40,916 --> 00:03:44,936 Uh, I submit the plate on the floor. 65 00:03:46,556 --> 00:03:51,626 Um, I could just see, I could just see, you know, a brew on the stand of 66 00:03:51,626 --> 00:03:54,116 like the little, the puppy dog eyes. 67 00:03:54,116 --> 00:03:54,626 She's gonna give 68 00:03:54,626 --> 00:03:54,746 you the 69 00:03:55,001 --> 00:03:55,241 Prasanna Malaiyandi: see. 70 00:03:55,331 --> 00:03:57,161 what was going through my head was like Snoopy. 71 00:03:58,031 --> 00:03:59,921 That's what was going through my head. 72 00:04:00,221 --> 00:04:03,301 It was like brew being Snoopy, being like it wasn't me. 73 00:04:04,121 --> 00:04:05,201 W. Curtis Preston: It was me. 74 00:04:05,291 --> 00:04:05,531 Yeah. 75 00:04:05,531 --> 00:04:06,431 It was totally her. 76 00:04:06,641 --> 00:04:06,941 Yeah. 77 00:04:07,001 --> 00:04:10,571 She was caught white handed, um, 78 00:04:10,726 --> 00:04:13,001 Prasanna Malaiyandi: this means is after the podcast is done, when 79 00:04:13,001 --> 00:04:16,571 you go get some lunch, you should just grab her a snack as well. 80 00:04:17,611 --> 00:04:17,901 W. Curtis Preston: Okay. 81 00:04:18,161 --> 00:04:20,021 I'm prohibited from giving her food. 82 00:04:20,171 --> 00:04:21,281 I, I, I have 83 00:04:21,326 --> 00:04:23,426 Prasanna Malaiyandi: Even her food, even her snack food. 84 00:04:24,656 --> 00:04:28,766 W. Curtis Preston: Well, she has a set snack time and, and this isn't it. 85 00:04:28,771 --> 00:04:34,166 So, um, I, I don't want to get in trouble with my daughter, um, or the 86 00:04:34,166 --> 00:04:36,956 way, the way my son-in-law, uh, says it. 87 00:04:36,956 --> 00:04:39,146 He's like, it's fine, Curtis. 88 00:04:39,146 --> 00:04:44,186 If you want her to live like three years less, it's fine. 89 00:04:45,146 --> 00:04:46,496 That's the way he says, you know, 90 00:04:47,291 --> 00:04:50,171 Prasanna Malaiyandi: Hey, so my parents, so growing up I am sure our 91 00:04:50,171 --> 00:04:51,701 guest is like, what is going on here? 92 00:04:51,911 --> 00:04:55,121 So growing up, my parents had a dog and we had a vet who was Indian, 93 00:04:55,121 --> 00:04:57,581 and the vet would always be like, look, I know you guys are Indian. 94 00:04:57,581 --> 00:04:59,291 I know you love to feed your dog Indian food. 95 00:04:59,621 --> 00:05:00,161 Don't do it. 96 00:05:00,161 --> 00:05:00,821 It's unhealthy. 97 00:05:01,121 --> 00:05:04,631 My parents ve everything like Indian Sweetss, Indian food, 98 00:05:04,631 --> 00:05:07,211 like for his birthday, they would make him special Indian food. 99 00:05:08,021 --> 00:05:12,551 He lived till he was 17 and a half, so, so there you go. 100 00:05:12,551 --> 00:05:12,881 Right? 101 00:05:12,881 --> 00:05:14,111 So exactly. 102 00:05:14,606 --> 00:05:17,006 W. Curtis Preston: I'm, I'm not having that argument with my daughter. 103 00:05:17,486 --> 00:05:17,546 Um, 104 00:05:17,686 --> 00:05:17,906 Scott Schober: Hm. 105 00:05:18,701 --> 00:05:19,241 W. Curtis Preston: Anyway. 106 00:05:19,691 --> 00:05:25,481 Well, uh, it's time to bring our guest on, uh, if he, is he still, is he still here? 107 00:05:25,526 --> 00:05:26,096 Prasanna Malaiyandi: He's still here. 108 00:05:26,096 --> 00:05:26,576 He's still here. 109 00:05:26,581 --> 00:05:26,996 Don't worry. 110 00:05:27,376 --> 00:05:32,381 W. Curtis Preston: in wireless and cybersecurity, and since 1990 has 111 00:05:32,381 --> 00:05:36,461 been the c e O of Berkeley Veratronic Systems, a wireless detection, 112 00:05:36,461 --> 00:05:38,441 manufacturing, and production company. 113 00:05:38,861 --> 00:05:42,011 He is also the host of the What Keeps You Up At Night 114 00:05:42,016 --> 00:05:43,721 Podcast, which is how I met him. 115 00:05:44,081 --> 00:05:46,241 Welcome to the pod, Scott Schober. 116 00:05:47,116 --> 00:05:48,436 Scott Schober: Hey, great to be with you. 117 00:05:49,586 --> 00:05:50,036 W. Curtis Preston: So I, 118 00:05:50,171 --> 00:05:51,461 Prasanna Malaiyandi: Do you have a pet Scott? 119 00:05:52,066 --> 00:05:52,906 Scott Schober: I, I do. 120 00:05:52,906 --> 00:05:56,506 And as you guys were talking about some of these things, I was thinking of my dog. 121 00:05:56,506 --> 00:05:59,446 We have a dog, Daisy, she just turned four years old. 122 00:05:59,446 --> 00:06:03,856 Mini golden doodle, lot of fun, high maintenance, but a lot of fun. 123 00:06:05,006 --> 00:06:08,546 W. Curtis Preston: Yeah, this is, this particular dog is a cockapoo. 124 00:06:09,116 --> 00:06:14,426 Um, and so it, it, you know, she would've had to literally jump up on my chair and 125 00:06:14,426 --> 00:06:17,426 I was, you know, I was just thinking, she's not gonna do that in the little 126 00:06:17,426 --> 00:06:19,646 time I have, in the little time I'm gone. 127 00:06:20,216 --> 00:06:21,026 Not so much. 128 00:06:21,776 --> 00:06:26,636 The, the, the smell of the food was just too, you know, too. 129 00:06:27,206 --> 00:06:27,986 Too enticing. 130 00:06:28,046 --> 00:06:28,436 Yeah. 131 00:06:28,586 --> 00:06:31,706 Um, if you wanna find brew, all you gotta do is start cooking something 132 00:06:31,706 --> 00:06:33,536 and she'll just magically show up. 133 00:06:35,381 --> 00:06:40,421 Uh, so I, Scott, I gotta, I gotta say, so it looks like the company 134 00:06:40,421 --> 00:06:43,841 that you're at has been around longer than you've been there. 135 00:06:43,871 --> 00:06:46,931 'cause you, you were saying that it has 50 years of experience. 136 00:06:47,051 --> 00:06:50,591 The company has been around for 50 years, but you've been there 30 years. 137 00:06:51,041 --> 00:06:55,211 Um, 'cause normally when I see somebody who's been somewhere for a really long 138 00:06:55,211 --> 00:06:57,071 time, it's like a company they started. 139 00:06:57,551 --> 00:07:01,511 And so of course they're there, but in your case, they brought you in 140 00:07:01,571 --> 00:07:03,131 after they'd already been going for. 141 00:07:03,656 --> 00:07:05,666 Close to 20 years or something in that neighborhood, 142 00:07:05,756 --> 00:07:06,086 Scott Schober: yeah. 143 00:07:06,746 --> 00:07:09,716 The interesting story is that it's a family business, so it's 144 00:07:09,721 --> 00:07:10,976 actually founded by my father. 145 00:07:11,471 --> 00:07:12,611 Still our c t o. 146 00:07:12,731 --> 00:07:15,821 He actually happens to be here today, uh, just checking in. 147 00:07:15,821 --> 00:07:18,701 But he, he's since retired and, uh, he founded the business. 148 00:07:18,701 --> 00:07:20,051 So it's really what I grew up with. 149 00:07:20,051 --> 00:07:24,311 I did actually start technically working for the company when I was in sixth grade. 150 00:07:24,821 --> 00:07:26,441 Uh, he, he challenged me. 151 00:07:26,446 --> 00:07:28,451 We had a number of, uh, keypads. 152 00:07:28,456 --> 00:07:32,381 These were wired keypads, old school keypads way, way back in the day. 153 00:07:32,711 --> 00:07:36,011 And he said, for every keypad that you fix, you'll get a dollar. 154 00:07:36,011 --> 00:07:37,301 And he showed me how to solder. 155 00:07:37,646 --> 00:07:41,096 And, and make measurements on a resistor and iOS and things like that. 156 00:07:41,096 --> 00:07:44,486 And I spent the day going through hundreds and hundreds of, of these 157 00:07:44,486 --> 00:07:48,446 keypads and realized, wow, I can make a lot of money fixing these things. 158 00:07:48,446 --> 00:07:51,806 And eventually I kind of got into the business and, and doing everything. 159 00:07:51,806 --> 00:07:55,106 So, um, it's kind of cool growing up in the family business. 160 00:07:55,136 --> 00:07:57,776 'cause I did everything from, you know, cleaning, cutting 161 00:07:57,776 --> 00:07:59,516 a lawn, painting, soldering. 162 00:07:59,516 --> 00:08:00,806 I went to school formally. 163 00:08:01,316 --> 00:08:06,236 And for, um, computer software development and telecommunications. 164 00:08:06,236 --> 00:08:09,206 I went to Kane University for undergraduate stuff and graduate 165 00:08:09,206 --> 00:08:10,826 stuff at, at New York University. 166 00:08:11,126 --> 00:08:16,106 Um, and it's kind of cool because it gets me to cross different things. 167 00:08:16,111 --> 00:08:19,676 You know, you talk about it in your daily life as a family, but 168 00:08:19,676 --> 00:08:21,086 it's also part of your business. 169 00:08:21,086 --> 00:08:24,776 And then also, I, I like to, you know, I'm, I was a gamer growing up. 170 00:08:24,776 --> 00:08:26,816 My father worked for a number of years at Atari. 171 00:08:27,131 --> 00:08:29,231 So he brought home all the latest and greatest games. 172 00:08:29,261 --> 00:08:32,951 My brother and I, we were game testers and we'd stay up to the wee hours 173 00:08:32,951 --> 00:08:36,641 of the night testing games, finding the bugs, documenting them, and then 174 00:08:36,641 --> 00:08:38,171 feeding it back to the programmers. 175 00:08:38,171 --> 00:08:42,401 So it, it's kind of neat 'cause you're around the culture growing up in it. 176 00:08:42,791 --> 00:08:43,961 It's part of your life. 177 00:08:44,111 --> 00:08:45,041 It's part of your D n a. 178 00:08:45,041 --> 00:08:48,701 So it's kind of exciting and that to me keeps me going from a 179 00:08:48,701 --> 00:08:52,631 standpoint of innovating products and ideas within the company. 180 00:08:52,631 --> 00:08:56,081 And I have people here that are actually implementing and doing it, that have 181 00:08:56,111 --> 00:09:00,821 PhDs and far smarter than I am that can actually make the technology work. 182 00:09:00,851 --> 00:09:03,971 So I'm kind of the the guy that's in between and gets my hands 183 00:09:03,971 --> 00:09:05,351 in a little bit of everything. 184 00:09:05,561 --> 00:09:07,421 I know enough about everything to be dangerous. 185 00:09:07,421 --> 00:09:11,711 So it's kind of a fun business and it's niche, very niche cybersecurity. 186 00:09:12,086 --> 00:09:13,676 And, and hardcore design. 187 00:09:13,676 --> 00:09:16,466 We're really hardware designers, which is a little bit different 188 00:09:16,466 --> 00:09:18,296 than most companies out there. 189 00:09:18,296 --> 00:09:21,566 It seems like everybody does software, be it apps or, or high 190 00:09:21,566 --> 00:09:23,006 level programming or whatever. 191 00:09:23,006 --> 00:09:23,876 And yeah, we do that too. 192 00:09:23,876 --> 00:09:27,836 We do program, but our expertise is really at the core, the, the hardware 193 00:09:27,841 --> 00:09:32,516 and understanding radio frequency, uh, be it the wireless I always like 194 00:09:32,516 --> 00:09:34,106 in our company is where we're at. 195 00:09:34,106 --> 00:09:37,736 The intersection of wireless and cybersecurity is kind of where 196 00:09:37,741 --> 00:09:39,026 we fit, which is kind of cool. 197 00:09:39,866 --> 00:09:40,166 Prasanna Malaiyandi: Nice. 198 00:09:40,196 --> 00:09:44,576 So you shifted then, I'm guessing you talked about keypads early on, right? 199 00:09:44,581 --> 00:09:47,816 And so at what point were you like, okay, keypads are great and 200 00:09:47,816 --> 00:09:51,806 now let's shift into this wireless cybersecurity aspect of things. 201 00:09:52,361 --> 00:09:52,571 Scott Schober: Good. 202 00:09:52,571 --> 00:09:53,261 Good question. 203 00:09:53,741 --> 00:09:56,501 The shift into the first part of your, your question, wireless 204 00:09:56,506 --> 00:09:58,451 really happened about mid 1980s. 205 00:09:59,456 --> 00:10:00,926 We actually got a call as a company. 206 00:10:00,926 --> 00:10:04,796 Again, being a hardcore hardware company, design company, people come 207 00:10:04,796 --> 00:10:09,326 to us with problems and we provide solutions hopefully that, that solve 208 00:10:09,326 --> 00:10:10,826 their problems and are affordable. 209 00:10:11,036 --> 00:10:14,576 And, uh, we were approached by a company down in Washington, DC and said, Hey, 210 00:10:14,906 --> 00:10:19,166 we've got an idea for developing some test equipment, but we don't know how to do it. 211 00:10:19,166 --> 00:10:20,246 You guys might know how to. 212 00:10:21,021 --> 00:10:21,941 We said, okay. 213 00:10:21,941 --> 00:10:24,851 We, we, we were hired for it took on the assignment and we 214 00:10:24,851 --> 00:10:28,961 developed actually the first test tools to test out the cell towers. 215 00:10:29,441 --> 00:10:34,361 And this was, um, very interesting because nobody knew at the time that 216 00:10:34,631 --> 00:10:36,401 wireless cell phones would take off. 217 00:10:36,401 --> 00:10:42,101 So we were in the early days of amps phones and we developed the actual test 218 00:10:42,101 --> 00:10:46,571 receivers and transmitters, and worked on some of the propagation analysis software 219 00:10:46,571 --> 00:10:48,041 so you could see what the coverage was. 220 00:10:48,341 --> 00:10:50,501 And we started work with this company. 221 00:10:50,501 --> 00:10:54,491 We worked for them for well over 10 years, developing test tools, which 222 00:10:54,731 --> 00:10:57,791 really took our business, allowed us to grow, and we're still doing it today. 223 00:10:57,821 --> 00:11:01,841 We're still developing test receivers and transmitters that we sell globally, 224 00:11:02,171 --> 00:11:05,381 but we're not selling it for the old school e amps and things like that. 225 00:11:05,381 --> 00:11:07,331 It went from second generation, third, fourth. 226 00:11:07,336 --> 00:11:10,661 Now we're into the five G technologies that we always hear about, that 227 00:11:10,661 --> 00:11:11,861 our smartphones work about. 228 00:11:11,861 --> 00:11:15,641 Well, a number of years into that, what I started to notice was. 229 00:11:16,466 --> 00:11:19,856 Business has changed and the way propagation analysis done, it's 230 00:11:19,856 --> 00:11:21,326 more done predictive analysis. 231 00:11:21,326 --> 00:11:24,056 In other words, you can use advanced algorithms to actually 232 00:11:24,056 --> 00:11:27,926 figure out how well signals propagate at different frequencies. 233 00:11:28,166 --> 00:11:31,916 So you don't need to do the hardcore drive studies where you're manually driving 234 00:11:31,916 --> 00:11:36,026 around collecting this data, spending thousands of hours and so on and so forth. 235 00:11:36,266 --> 00:11:39,236 So we, I said, let's shift the business a little bit and focus on 236 00:11:39,236 --> 00:11:40,766 the security since we understand. 237 00:11:41,186 --> 00:11:44,606 Smartphones and we know their vulnerabilities and we work 238 00:11:44,606 --> 00:11:45,926 with a lot of the companies. 239 00:11:46,256 --> 00:11:49,106 Let's analyze that space and see if there's some tools and 240 00:11:49,111 --> 00:11:50,546 technology we could develop. 241 00:11:50,846 --> 00:11:55,766 We started to do that and it really took off and, and the short of the story is the 242 00:11:55,766 --> 00:12:00,386 more we started doing it, I was brought in to, to share some expertise and things. 243 00:12:00,386 --> 00:12:02,786 We knew how to keep your company safe and so and so forth. 244 00:12:02,786 --> 00:12:05,816 Well, the more I did that, the more I got a target on my back and the 245 00:12:05,816 --> 00:12:09,176 company's back and hackers went after us, and now it started with. 246 00:12:09,671 --> 00:12:13,841 Credit card compromise, debit card compromise, Twitter account compromise, 247 00:12:13,841 --> 00:12:18,371 repeated DDoS attacks to our online store, so we couldn't do commerce, and finally 248 00:12:18,376 --> 00:12:24,191 we had $65,000 stolen out of our checking account, became a federal investigation, 249 00:12:24,221 --> 00:12:25,871 paperwork, email, so and so forth. 250 00:12:25,871 --> 00:12:28,301 The story goes on and on in the process. 251 00:12:28,301 --> 00:12:32,561 I thought it was kind of interesting because what do you do here you are as a 252 00:12:32,561 --> 00:12:37,751 wireless cybersecurity company, sharing expertise and advice, and you're a victim. 253 00:12:38,576 --> 00:12:39,866 And you made mistakes. 254 00:12:40,096 --> 00:12:43,676 And, and I, ironically, I came, I was doing an interview at the time, it was in 255 00:12:43,676 --> 00:12:48,746 New York City, Bloomberg, uh, TV stopped to get a bite to eat, and I got a phone 256 00:12:48,746 --> 00:12:50,786 call mysteriously from Associated Press. 257 00:12:50,786 --> 00:12:53,036 Don't know how they got my number or how they heard about it, but they 258 00:12:53,036 --> 00:12:55,496 said, we heard from reliable sources. 259 00:12:55,501 --> 00:12:59,666 Your company was hacked and you were the victim of a cyber attack. 260 00:12:59,666 --> 00:13:01,496 Would you be willing to go on the record and share this? 261 00:13:01,496 --> 00:13:03,086 And I said, yikes. 262 00:13:03,086 --> 00:13:05,156 And I said, okay, I'll, I'll, I'll be willing to share it. 263 00:13:06,091 --> 00:13:10,091 A, a allowing that I share maybe my misfortunes and my mistakes and 264 00:13:10,091 --> 00:13:12,731 hopefully some of the things I've learned so other business owners don't 265 00:13:12,731 --> 00:13:14,261 go down the same path that I've done. 266 00:13:14,261 --> 00:13:17,171 And they agreed, I agreed, turned out to be a great story. 267 00:13:17,431 --> 00:13:20,771 It it, it ended up getting me more interviews and more interest and I ended 268 00:13:20,771 --> 00:13:23,231 up being, um, talked into writing a book. 269 00:13:23,501 --> 00:13:24,971 Again, I'm, I'm not a writer. 270 00:13:25,241 --> 00:13:26,771 Um, I agreed to it. 271 00:13:26,771 --> 00:13:28,121 I said, let me try it and see. 272 00:13:28,126 --> 00:13:29,561 Uh, so I did self-publishing. 273 00:13:29,561 --> 00:13:31,361 It took me a little more than two years to write it. 274 00:13:32,021 --> 00:13:35,921 It was my first book called Hacked Again, because of the, the story of basically 275 00:13:35,921 --> 00:13:38,291 being hacked as a, a cybersecurity expert. 276 00:13:38,891 --> 00:13:41,141 And, uh, it kind of opened my eyes up to thing and it opened 277 00:13:41,141 --> 00:13:42,551 the doors up to many other things. 278 00:13:42,556 --> 00:13:46,031 I, I probably wouldn't be talking to the two of you right now if 279 00:13:46,036 --> 00:13:47,591 those chain of events didn't happen. 280 00:13:47,951 --> 00:13:50,741 And then subsequently I put out a second book, cybersecurity's 281 00:13:50,741 --> 00:13:53,771 Everybody's Business where it went more mainstream to other businesses. 282 00:13:53,771 --> 00:13:57,551 And then finally, Another project I had was I, I saw that seniors 283 00:13:57,556 --> 00:14:00,071 were being targeted and it really bothered me, so I wrote a book, 284 00:14:00,251 --> 00:14:02,141 senior Cyber and so on and so forth. 285 00:14:02,141 --> 00:14:05,561 Now thinking about book number four and getting that, the wheels in 286 00:14:05,566 --> 00:14:07,421 motion for that, when I find time. 287 00:14:08,466 --> 00:14:11,046 W. Curtis Preston: Yeah, that's the, that's the problem with once you, 288 00:14:11,076 --> 00:14:14,946 once you get over that, uh, that initial hurdle of writing that first 289 00:14:14,946 --> 00:14:17,676 book, uh, you know, I, my first book. 290 00:14:18,431 --> 00:14:20,321 Took me three years to write. 291 00:14:20,681 --> 00:14:25,901 Um, and it, and, and I, I thought I was, I thought I was gonna die. 292 00:14:25,991 --> 00:14:26,321 Right? 293 00:14:26,321 --> 00:14:30,221 The, but like the first, the, the first thing I wrote was actually 294 00:14:30,221 --> 00:14:35,591 an article for Unix Review Magazine back in 1990 something. 295 00:14:36,041 --> 00:14:42,881 And I remember being terrified about, You know, the whole, like, I'm gonna 296 00:14:42,886 --> 00:14:46,541 have a mistake in this article, which for the record I did, I had a 297 00:14:46,541 --> 00:14:50,291 mistake, I had a misunderstanding of the way Oracle hot backups worked. 298 00:14:50,741 --> 00:14:54,401 And uh, and I published that and I'm like, oh, I'm gonna be found, 299 00:14:54,406 --> 00:14:57,311 I'm gonna, I'm, you know, you know, imposter syndrome, right? 300 00:14:57,791 --> 00:15:03,071 And, uh, but from that, uh, I basically, you know, did the 301 00:15:03,071 --> 00:15:04,661 proposal to write my book. 302 00:15:05,531 --> 00:15:08,141 And it took about three years to, to write it. 303 00:15:08,231 --> 00:15:13,421 Um, and then the, you know, the next one that I wrote was much smaller and 304 00:15:13,421 --> 00:15:17,501 easier to digest and, you know, and so I had a running joke that like, 'cause 305 00:15:17,501 --> 00:15:19,991 the first one was like 700 pages, right? 306 00:15:20,351 --> 00:15:22,631 The, the next one was like 350 pages. 307 00:15:22,636 --> 00:15:24,401 And I said, I, I found out the formula. 308 00:15:24,701 --> 00:15:26,741 My next book's gonna be 30 pages. 309 00:15:27,416 --> 00:15:27,836 Right. 310 00:15:28,826 --> 00:15:29,306 Scott Schober: Short little 311 00:15:29,306 --> 00:15:29,816 ebook. 312 00:15:30,056 --> 00:15:32,606 W. Curtis Preston: less time and sulfur around the same price. 313 00:15:32,786 --> 00:15:38,066 Uh, but yeah, once you, once you've got that process down, uh, it's, 314 00:15:38,126 --> 00:15:42,026 it's, um, so you, you, you don't have to reveal it here, but you have, 315 00:15:42,146 --> 00:15:43,706 you have an idea for your next book. 316 00:15:44,981 --> 00:15:45,401 Scott Schober: Yeah. 317 00:15:45,401 --> 00:15:49,421 Yeah, actually, I, I, it's actually, uh, three or four different ideas I 318 00:15:49,421 --> 00:15:53,261 have and, and the, the hardest part is focusing on what do I wanna write about? 319 00:15:53,561 --> 00:15:56,681 And I'm starting to write about each one, which is probably not a good way to do it. 320 00:15:56,981 --> 00:15:59,701 Um, I get distracted, I get, I get, I lose focus. 321 00:16:00,421 --> 00:16:05,701 Um, but, but sometimes writing, I think, and, and maybe it's partly me and maybe 322 00:16:05,701 --> 00:16:08,541 it's other people find this, or I'm curious, maybe even you find this Curtis, 323 00:16:08,731 --> 00:16:10,741 it's almost therapeutic sometimes. 324 00:16:10,746 --> 00:16:14,581 You get a lot of stuff up here as you kind of put pen to paper. 325 00:16:14,581 --> 00:16:18,181 I, I've, I've kind of switched over actually doing, uh, speech to text. 326 00:16:18,181 --> 00:16:21,811 Somebody showed me that it's much faster by the time I got to the third book. 327 00:16:22,346 --> 00:16:23,786 I was like, wow, six months. 328 00:16:23,816 --> 00:16:24,416 Bam. 329 00:16:24,416 --> 00:16:25,076 Knock it out. 330 00:16:25,076 --> 00:16:25,826 This is great. 331 00:16:26,276 --> 00:16:28,796 Um, and, and you understand also the process. 332 00:16:28,796 --> 00:16:32,486 The first book I wrote this much and then trim, trim, trim, trim, lose 333 00:16:32,486 --> 00:16:35,696 this chapter, reorganize and, and you find you wasted a lot of time. 334 00:16:36,056 --> 00:16:39,266 If I spend more time up front and I think about it up here and 335 00:16:39,271 --> 00:16:42,266 organize kind of, kind of the flow. 336 00:16:42,611 --> 00:16:45,941 Get the thesis and here are the chapters and then I stick to it. 337 00:16:45,941 --> 00:16:48,251 I can, I can get through it quickly. 338 00:16:48,731 --> 00:16:52,151 And I think once you commit to it and then you stick with it, and I did, I 339 00:16:52,151 --> 00:16:54,431 do tend to, to write at weird hours. 340 00:16:54,436 --> 00:16:58,391 My family might go to sleep, my kids and the dog at 11 o'clock at night and I'll 341 00:16:58,396 --> 00:17:01,691 say, okay, I'm gonna put three hours in and just get this outta my head. 342 00:17:02,051 --> 00:17:03,401 And then I'll be thinking about it more. 343 00:17:03,401 --> 00:17:04,901 I'm on a plane ride for a couple hours. 344 00:17:04,901 --> 00:17:06,851 I'll get this part of it outta the head. 345 00:17:06,851 --> 00:17:08,651 And I have a story I wanna share here. 346 00:17:08,651 --> 00:17:09,341 Now I'm gonna go back. 347 00:17:09,341 --> 00:17:11,321 So you, you tend to do this a little bit. 348 00:17:11,846 --> 00:17:14,036 Um, it's a good process though. 349 00:17:14,036 --> 00:17:15,926 I learned a lot and I did it self-publishing. 350 00:17:15,926 --> 00:17:19,526 I'm not sure how you did it if, if you went that way, but I, I knew zero and 351 00:17:19,526 --> 00:17:21,596 I had to learn it all from scratch. 352 00:17:21,986 --> 00:17:26,576 And, and I, I also did soft cover, hard cover ebook, um, did 353 00:17:26,576 --> 00:17:28,586 the whole, uh, audible as well. 354 00:17:29,276 --> 00:17:34,076 So going through all of that, those processes with three books, it kind of 355 00:17:34,076 --> 00:17:37,136 scares me to go to book number four, but I know, I know all the difficult 356 00:17:37,136 --> 00:17:40,106 things that I have to overcome, the objectives and how to get through it. 357 00:17:40,481 --> 00:17:41,891 But, uh, but I agree with you. 358 00:17:42,091 --> 00:17:44,921 I, I used to get caught up on, oh, I'm gonna spell this wrong, or the 359 00:17:44,921 --> 00:17:46,511 sentence structure or whatever. 360 00:17:46,721 --> 00:17:48,581 'cause I'm not a writer per se. 361 00:17:49,001 --> 00:17:52,601 And, uh, I think I took one class in college, creative writing. 362 00:17:52,811 --> 00:17:54,341 It goes back a long time ago. 363 00:17:54,341 --> 00:17:56,801 And when I got to the class, I said to the professor, I said, 364 00:17:57,401 --> 00:17:58,541 I don't know how to write. 365 00:17:58,541 --> 00:17:59,561 I wanna learn how to write. 366 00:17:59,561 --> 00:18:00,461 He goes, don't worry. 367 00:18:00,776 --> 00:18:03,596 This year we switched to computers, and I know nothing about computers. 368 00:18:03,596 --> 00:18:05,396 I heard you're a computer science major. 369 00:18:05,726 --> 00:18:09,566 If you help me and all the girls in the class computers, you'll get an A in 370 00:18:09,566 --> 00:18:10,826 this course and I'll teach you to write. 371 00:18:10,831 --> 00:18:11,636 I said, fair Deal. 372 00:18:11,636 --> 00:18:13,076 And I got an A in the course. 373 00:18:13,256 --> 00:18:15,176 Uh, so I, I, I kind of give him some credit. 374 00:18:15,176 --> 00:18:18,926 I learned some bit of writing from him, but I was more of a writer for, 375 00:18:19,256 --> 00:18:22,376 you know, an article for Forbes or doing blogs and things like that. 376 00:18:22,376 --> 00:18:23,726 All short, short stuff. 377 00:18:23,726 --> 00:18:28,016 But it, it does help you, I think, because it forces you to do research. 378 00:18:28,296 --> 00:18:30,296 It, it forces you to think I. 379 00:18:30,836 --> 00:18:34,976 And not be too quick to put everything down on paper, but make, make sure you're 380 00:18:34,976 --> 00:18:38,636 doing the fact checking and you understand what you're explaining and you can 381 00:18:38,936 --> 00:18:40,886 break it down so the reader can get it. 382 00:18:40,886 --> 00:18:42,386 And I think that's an important part of it. 383 00:18:42,386 --> 00:18:45,806 So I kind of had to teach myself a lot of those steps and I, and I a 384 00:18:45,811 --> 00:18:47,186 lot of help from others, honestly. 385 00:18:47,516 --> 00:18:50,156 Talking to others, what are the techniques they use? 386 00:18:50,156 --> 00:18:53,906 I talked to one gentleman, he wrote 185 books 387 00:18:54,501 --> 00:18:54,921 Prasanna Malaiyandi: Wow. 388 00:18:56,081 --> 00:18:59,201 Scott Schober: How did you write 185 books and going strong? 389 00:18:59,201 --> 00:19:04,871 And he shared a few tips with me that I applied and I said, wow, this does work. 390 00:19:04,876 --> 00:19:08,621 And it really helps keep you focused and allows you to progress. 391 00:19:08,621 --> 00:19:11,891 And I mean, after that I actually got asked to do to, to 392 00:19:11,891 --> 00:19:13,421 go to two different book shows. 393 00:19:13,421 --> 00:19:15,881 One at Jacob Javit Center, I think one in Chicago. 394 00:19:16,406 --> 00:19:21,776 And explain the process of not knowing how to write to being a self-published author 395 00:19:21,776 --> 00:19:25,526 and, and some different things that you can do in the process to make it easier. 396 00:19:25,826 --> 00:19:29,246 And, and to me it's been a wonderful blessing that, that I've been able 397 00:19:29,251 --> 00:19:33,176 to do it and learn from so many great people and, and be on great shows like 398 00:19:33,181 --> 00:19:35,246 this and, and share different stories. 399 00:19:35,246 --> 00:19:36,026 So it's a lot of fun. 400 00:19:36,116 --> 00:19:38,006 W. Curtis Preston: Yeah, you and I are gonna have to have a 401 00:19:38,006 --> 00:19:39,536 longer conversation about that. 402 00:19:39,566 --> 00:19:41,426 'cause it sounds like we could swap some stories. 403 00:19:41,756 --> 00:19:44,606 By the way, just real quick, I will say I'm a huge fan of 404 00:19:44,606 --> 00:19:46,376 voice to text, so I use Dragon. 405 00:19:46,856 --> 00:19:49,856 Uh, my last three books have been written entirely in voice. 406 00:19:50,246 --> 00:19:54,026 Um, basically my, my key is that I, I'm a storyteller and I'm. 407 00:19:54,401 --> 00:19:59,291 You know, and what's funny is people like Prasannawho know me personally, and then 408 00:19:59,291 --> 00:20:03,641 they're, uh, they're a, they're a text, they're a, a technical editor for me. 409 00:20:03,911 --> 00:20:06,071 They tell me that when they read it, they hear it. 410 00:20:06,551 --> 00:20:07,421 In my voice. 411 00:20:07,451 --> 00:20:08,501 Prasanna Malaiyandi: hear Curtis's voice. 412 00:20:08,506 --> 00:20:08,721 Yeah. 413 00:20:08,771 --> 00:20:09,071 W. Curtis Preston: I mean? 414 00:20:09,946 --> 00:20:10,426 Scott Schober: I hear it. 415 00:20:10,751 --> 00:20:12,971 W. Curtis Preston: Because, because that's the way I write. 416 00:20:12,971 --> 00:20:14,441 I write the way I talk. 417 00:20:14,531 --> 00:20:19,061 Um, I, I agree with you, you, you need to spend more time upfront. 418 00:20:19,451 --> 00:20:22,961 Um, in, in fact, the last book, not on purpose, but the last 419 00:20:22,961 --> 00:20:26,951 book, it took me 10 years to agree on what I was gonna write on, 420 00:20:27,911 --> 00:20:28,201 Scott Schober: Yeah. 421 00:20:28,361 --> 00:20:30,341 W. Curtis Preston: and then three months I think to, to write it. 422 00:20:30,796 --> 00:20:36,136 Um, but yeah, it took, it, it, I just, I just kept, it was one of those, you know, 423 00:20:36,256 --> 00:20:38,416 you know what, get off the pot finally. 424 00:20:38,566 --> 00:20:43,726 Um, and, uh, was able to get, and I, I am, I am working on book four as well, 425 00:20:44,116 --> 00:20:46,636 but, uh, anyway, enough of what's that? 426 00:20:46,776 --> 00:20:46,996 Prasanna Malaiyandi: the. 427 00:20:47,381 --> 00:20:49,721 Scott Schober: I was just gonna share one thing, 'cause you, you hit the nail on 428 00:20:49,721 --> 00:20:52,361 the head on one thing just to expound on. 429 00:20:52,631 --> 00:20:55,571 People always ask me, what do you need to do to write a book? 430 00:20:55,571 --> 00:20:58,091 And people think time and money, and da, da, da, all that stuff. 431 00:20:58,271 --> 00:21:00,941 I always say that the most important ingredient I feel 432 00:21:00,946 --> 00:21:02,771 is being a good storyteller. 433 00:21:03,416 --> 00:21:06,896 And I think if you could be a good storyteller, you can learn how to write, 434 00:21:06,896 --> 00:21:10,196 you can learn how to spell check and edit, and you can get help with the graphics 435 00:21:10,196 --> 00:21:13,946 and the cover and the distribution, all the other things you can get help with. 436 00:21:14,186 --> 00:21:18,206 But if you can't tell a good story, nobody wants to read your book and, and 437 00:21:18,206 --> 00:21:21,596 you don't write a book to make a lot of money or to retire as a millionaire, 438 00:21:21,596 --> 00:21:24,266 anybody that thinks those type of things shouldn't be writing a book. 439 00:21:24,476 --> 00:21:28,376 If you have a story up here that you can get in the book, you, you got it. 440 00:21:28,376 --> 00:21:29,366 That's success right there. 441 00:21:29,366 --> 00:21:29,816 I feel. 442 00:21:31,031 --> 00:21:31,751 W. Curtis Preston: absolutely. 443 00:21:33,131 --> 00:21:36,851 Prasanna Malaiyandi: So I'm not a published author like both of you. 444 00:21:36,911 --> 00:21:41,411 Um, but uh, just sort of going back to your first book, right, Scott, 445 00:21:41,441 --> 00:21:44,231 it's, and or the situation you were talking about when you got hit 446 00:21:44,231 --> 00:21:46,481 with cyber, uh, by a cyber attack. 447 00:21:47,441 --> 00:21:52,511 It's, it come up on the podcast a lot of times where many organizations get hit by. 448 00:21:53,441 --> 00:21:54,251 Criminals, right? 449 00:21:54,251 --> 00:21:57,911 And have these cyber incidences, but they don't say anything. 450 00:21:58,541 --> 00:21:59,021 Right? 451 00:21:59,051 --> 00:22:03,281 And that's just such a huge disservice to the public and other 452 00:22:03,281 --> 00:22:07,451 people who want to learn about, okay, how do I protect myself? 453 00:22:07,451 --> 00:22:11,171 I'm glad to hear that your first book was like, Hey, here's what I could do to 454 00:22:11,201 --> 00:22:14,921 sort of prevent and help other companies prevent these from happening to them. 455 00:22:15,731 --> 00:22:16,541 Have you seen that? 456 00:22:16,541 --> 00:22:18,611 That still continues to be. 457 00:22:19,646 --> 00:22:24,026 Beneficial or that more people are opening up, or is it sort of one 458 00:22:24,026 --> 00:22:25,436 of those closely guarded secrets? 459 00:22:25,436 --> 00:22:27,206 I don't want to air my dirty laundry. 460 00:22:28,706 --> 00:22:30,146 Scott Schober: I, I see a mix a lot. 461 00:22:30,146 --> 00:22:35,366 A lot of the close colleagues that I think I've, I've gotten to know over the years, 462 00:22:36,326 --> 00:22:41,876 have shared their horror stories, their, their mistakes, their misfortunes, and 463 00:22:41,876 --> 00:22:44,336 that that granted them a level of success. 464 00:22:44,336 --> 00:22:48,971 I, I think of, um, Some of the things that happened to Brian Krebs, he 465 00:22:49,181 --> 00:22:51,371 a former Washington Post reporter. 466 00:22:51,731 --> 00:22:56,021 And now he focuses on, on cyber crime and reporting that he's got 467 00:22:56,021 --> 00:23:00,281 some incredible stories, how he's was and continued to be targeted 468 00:23:01,001 --> 00:23:02,741 and how it had to change his life. 469 00:23:02,741 --> 00:23:04,511 And I, I, I could certainly relate to that. 470 00:23:04,511 --> 00:23:05,231 I could feel that way. 471 00:23:05,231 --> 00:23:08,831 Talking to Kevin Mitnick, getting closer to him and interviewing 472 00:23:08,831 --> 00:23:09,851 him and talking to him. 473 00:23:09,971 --> 00:23:14,561 He's had some cool background stuff and, and he, he, he has a, a flare for, for 474 00:23:14,561 --> 00:23:18,701 magic and, and hacking and phone freaking, and all these other type of things. 475 00:23:18,701 --> 00:23:20,111 And I can relate to a lot of that. 476 00:23:20,501 --> 00:23:24,941 But hearing again, he was targeted and constantly people go after him. 477 00:23:24,941 --> 00:23:27,941 And I think that's a common theme that I'm seeing. 478 00:23:27,941 --> 00:23:33,221 And most of these people that I, I deal with these other, um, I guess 479 00:23:33,251 --> 00:23:36,791 cybersecurity people, they end up writing books and sharing their 480 00:23:36,796 --> 00:23:40,571 story and sharing their misfortunes and problems that they have. 481 00:23:40,631 --> 00:23:43,631 And I think in some ways, maybe that's how we help ourselves. 482 00:23:44,216 --> 00:23:48,026 And, and, and learn from our own mistakes by feeling like, you know, if I share 483 00:23:48,026 --> 00:23:52,256 some of the, the stupid things I did, other people won't make these same 484 00:23:52,256 --> 00:23:54,236 mistakes and they'll be better than me. 485 00:23:54,236 --> 00:23:55,226 And I think that's important. 486 00:23:55,226 --> 00:23:58,826 It, it's, it, part of it's, I feel like it's teaching and sharing knowledge. 487 00:23:59,186 --> 00:24:03,296 And I often learn from people, not just the things they tell you, Hey, you know, 488 00:24:03,386 --> 00:24:07,166 create a long password, but you also learn when, when you hear somebody, well, I 489 00:24:07,166 --> 00:24:10,646 created a weak password and I used it on 20 counts, and now look what happened. 490 00:24:10,676 --> 00:24:11,636 And it, it really. 491 00:24:11,921 --> 00:24:14,021 Puts up in your head, geez, I'm never gonna do that. 492 00:24:14,021 --> 00:24:15,071 That was really stupid. 493 00:24:15,071 --> 00:24:16,181 But at a teaching moment. 494 00:24:16,481 --> 00:24:19,871 And I think that's, that's one thing that I, I've had the gift to be, the 495 00:24:19,871 --> 00:24:21,791 ability to try to share these things. 496 00:24:22,001 --> 00:24:25,871 And I think writing a book leads to so many more things, and that's 497 00:24:25,871 --> 00:24:27,581 what most people don't realize. 498 00:24:27,881 --> 00:24:29,531 It leads to a podcast show. 499 00:24:29,531 --> 00:24:31,001 So I do two podcast shows. 500 00:24:31,001 --> 00:24:31,511 It leads to. 501 00:24:31,976 --> 00:24:35,366 TV and radio interviews, uh, uh, public speaking. 502 00:24:35,366 --> 00:24:36,266 I enjoy that. 503 00:24:36,266 --> 00:24:40,226 I get to travel and speak to audiences, and I'm hired to go in and, and speak 504 00:24:40,226 --> 00:24:41,426 about different topics and things. 505 00:24:41,426 --> 00:24:45,686 So sometimes don't look at just the book or the story. 506 00:24:45,896 --> 00:24:48,116 Look at the big picture, how it helps. 507 00:24:48,116 --> 00:24:48,146 I. 508 00:24:48,636 --> 00:24:53,646 You grow as a person, helps your business grow, helps other people learn 509 00:24:53,646 --> 00:24:56,586 and, and make practical application to some of the things that you've done. 510 00:24:56,586 --> 00:25:00,906 So to me, it's, it's kind of, I don't know if I, it, it, it's a little extreme thing. 511 00:25:00,906 --> 00:25:03,036 This, but it kind of changed my life, honestly. 512 00:25:03,336 --> 00:25:03,516 It 513 00:25:03,521 --> 00:25:06,096 changed the the daily routine, you know. 514 00:25:07,646 --> 00:25:08,786 W. Curtis Preston: Yeah, the same. 515 00:25:08,786 --> 00:25:10,246 The same as it. 516 00:25:10,251 --> 00:25:11,456 It's exactly the same. 517 00:25:11,516 --> 00:25:11,966 Hap. 518 00:25:13,601 --> 00:25:14,171 English. 519 00:25:14,651 --> 00:25:18,581 Um, exactly the same thing happened to me, Scott. 520 00:25:18,941 --> 00:25:19,271 Right? 521 00:25:19,271 --> 00:25:23,951 So my career was absolutely launched by a failed restore. 522 00:25:24,611 --> 00:25:28,451 And, uh, you know, I was at a, at a $35 billion bank. 523 00:25:28,451 --> 00:25:28,481 I. 524 00:25:28,841 --> 00:25:31,871 And we lost our purchasing database. 525 00:25:32,171 --> 00:25:37,121 And I didn't have a backup of it because I, because I didn't understand what 526 00:25:37,126 --> 00:25:41,321 it was, I was backing up and I didn't understand what I needed to do, et cetera. 527 00:25:41,591 --> 00:25:46,451 Uh, you know, we, at the time we blamed it on, um, training because 528 00:25:46,456 --> 00:25:48,221 I was relatively new in the job. 529 00:25:48,711 --> 00:25:55,971 But the reality was is I was using an untested backup and, um, the, 530 00:25:55,971 --> 00:25:59,511 the, and, and so I learned, you know, an incredibly valuable thing. 531 00:25:59,511 --> 00:26:04,821 And, and in my very first book, which was published in, in Christmas of 99, right? 532 00:26:04,821 --> 00:26:06,021 It was, it was my Y two K present. 533 00:26:06,856 --> 00:26:11,326 Um, it was, it was, uh, basically like page two or three of the book. 534 00:26:11,326 --> 00:26:15,466 There's a sidebar and it says the one that got away and it's basically about 535 00:26:15,496 --> 00:26:18,346 this restore that absolutely failed. 536 00:26:18,976 --> 00:26:24,256 And the only reason that, you know, the company didn't lose its entire 537 00:26:24,256 --> 00:26:29,086 purchasing database was a guy by the name of Joe Fitzpatrick that 538 00:26:29,116 --> 00:26:31,096 went in and did some magic stuff. 539 00:26:31,676 --> 00:26:35,696 On the hard drive to this day, I don't know what he did, and honestly, he 540 00:26:35,696 --> 00:26:39,176 doesn't even remember the event, so he doesn't know what he did, but he 541 00:26:39,176 --> 00:26:41,306 did some stuff and brought it back. 542 00:26:41,306 --> 00:26:45,596 So at least it was, it was a near disaster and wasn't a complete disaster. 543 00:26:46,496 --> 00:26:52,346 But I, I think that's a real lesson for all of us, that when you screw 544 00:26:52,346 --> 00:26:54,806 up, well, let's say two things. 545 00:26:55,016 --> 00:26:57,476 If you're, if you, if you have people that work for you, 546 00:26:58,706 --> 00:27:01,556 Um, let them screw up, right? 547 00:27:02,096 --> 00:27:06,716 Like if they, if they, if they screw up, they own up to their mistakes 548 00:27:07,196 --> 00:27:13,646 and they can, um, you know, learn what, what can they, and you and 549 00:27:13,651 --> 00:27:15,476 others learn from what happened? 550 00:27:15,626 --> 00:27:19,736 And they share that and they become a better person and an better, better 551 00:27:19,736 --> 00:27:22,106 employee, a better colleague as a result. 552 00:27:22,661 --> 00:27:27,071 Then encouraging your, your employee through that. 553 00:27:27,071 --> 00:27:30,431 You know, I go back to my boss, Susan Davidson, who did not fire me. 554 00:27:30,911 --> 00:27:35,291 Um, you know, I, uh, to this day, if she had fired me, I might 555 00:27:35,291 --> 00:27:36,731 have had a very different career. 556 00:27:37,031 --> 00:27:41,681 But she, she stood by her employee who had made an honest mistake that just 557 00:27:41,681 --> 00:27:43,781 happened to have grave consequences. 558 00:27:44,231 --> 00:27:47,831 And, um, you know, you don't, you don't, well, it's just my opinion. 559 00:27:47,921 --> 00:27:50,981 You don't fire somebody because something horrible happened. 560 00:27:50,981 --> 00:27:51,581 You fire them. 561 00:27:52,256 --> 00:27:56,606 Because you know, it's about, like to me it's about attitude and you know, 562 00:27:56,966 --> 00:27:58,526 was it that you just didn't care? 563 00:27:58,526 --> 00:27:59,786 Or did you make a mistake? 564 00:27:59,846 --> 00:28:00,266 Right? 565 00:28:00,626 --> 00:28:03,086 Um, did you willfully do something wrong? 566 00:28:03,596 --> 00:28:08,666 Um, and then the other thing is for those people that are the, the ones making 567 00:28:08,671 --> 00:28:15,176 the mistake, um, please, for the love of everything, don't try to hide the mistake. 568 00:28:15,866 --> 00:28:18,956 Um, uh, you know, I can think back to. 569 00:28:19,301 --> 00:28:25,211 I was, uh, on site at a very large, I think the general way to say it is a 570 00:28:25,211 --> 00:28:30,251 data warehouse company is one of these companies that other companies use, um, 571 00:28:30,281 --> 00:28:35,141 for loyalty like, um, you know, frequent flyer programs at like your grocery store. 572 00:28:36,161 --> 00:28:44,541 And, um, I worked with a guy who this was, um, It was a sun E 10 K Prasanna. 573 00:28:44,561 --> 00:28:44,981 You remember? 574 00:28:45,461 --> 00:28:46,301 You remember those. 575 00:28:46,631 --> 00:28:51,161 And it was, uh, think of it as like a virtual machine thing, and 576 00:28:51,161 --> 00:28:57,251 he took a backup of the dev of the test system and restored it onto 577 00:28:57,251 --> 00:29:00,071 the production system accidentally. 578 00:29:00,076 --> 00:29:02,861 And it was, it was a true accident. 579 00:29:03,251 --> 00:29:03,851 Okay. 580 00:29:04,361 --> 00:29:08,771 Um, but what got him fired was that he tried to cover it up. 581 00:29:09,461 --> 00:29:09,851 Right. 582 00:29:10,716 --> 00:29:11,046 Scott Schober: Yeah. 583 00:29:11,861 --> 00:29:15,041 W. Curtis Preston: And like, so, so don't do that, right. 584 00:29:15,041 --> 00:29:18,641 Don't, don't try to cover up your mistake, uh, cover, you know, it's, 585 00:29:18,791 --> 00:29:21,461 it's, it's never the thing you do, it's always the coverup that gets 586 00:29:21,461 --> 00:29:22,841 you, that gets you fired, right. 587 00:29:23,441 --> 00:29:23,681 Scott Schober: Yeah. 588 00:29:23,871 --> 00:29:26,511 W. Curtis Preston: So, so share, please share. 589 00:29:26,511 --> 00:29:30,951 This is, you know, we, the, the episode that we just published this week was 590 00:29:30,951 --> 00:29:35,601 about that, that he, he, it was a, you know, another cybersecurity guy. 591 00:29:35,601 --> 00:29:39,591 And what he was upset was that, that he believed that the LA Unified School 592 00:29:39,591 --> 00:29:45,351 District District was literally told that they weren't allowed to share, uh, what, 593 00:29:45,381 --> 00:29:47,271 you know, how and why they got hacked. 594 00:29:47,751 --> 00:29:55,901 And so I, I think the more of us that do this, Uh, the better it is for everything. 595 00:29:55,901 --> 00:29:56,771 And I apologize. 596 00:29:56,776 --> 00:29:59,531 I, I think I stepped up on the soapbox for 20 minutes there, but 597 00:29:59,861 --> 00:30:01,721 Scott, what, you know, what would 598 00:30:01,721 --> 00:30:01,961 Scott Schober: Yeah. 599 00:30:01,961 --> 00:30:03,821 I, I, I agree. 600 00:30:03,821 --> 00:30:07,391 I think if, if we can really be transparent and, and 601 00:30:07,396 --> 00:30:09,281 share, we're all imperfect. 602 00:30:10,031 --> 00:30:13,721 I think a lot of people in the industry, I'll just say it in a general statement, 603 00:30:13,721 --> 00:30:17,591 do have, tend to have big egos of themselves and they make no mistakes. 604 00:30:17,591 --> 00:30:19,241 And I think if they. 605 00:30:20,141 --> 00:30:22,361 Share their misfortunes and mistakes. 606 00:30:22,361 --> 00:30:25,481 They've made it, it shows their true self. 607 00:30:25,481 --> 00:30:27,311 And, and it becomes a learning moment. 608 00:30:27,316 --> 00:30:28,961 I always tell my kids this is a life lesson. 609 00:30:28,961 --> 00:30:32,141 I always stop them during different things and say, remember this. 610 00:30:32,141 --> 00:30:34,361 'cause throughout your life you're gonna remember this moment. 611 00:30:34,481 --> 00:30:35,981 And, and it's those type of things. 612 00:30:35,986 --> 00:30:39,671 I think when companies make big mistakes, it's how you handle 'em. 613 00:30:40,061 --> 00:30:43,211 Um, and I look back at even a lot of the breaches, one of the first 614 00:30:43,211 --> 00:30:44,741 ones that stands out in my mind. 615 00:30:45,101 --> 00:30:48,281 I'll never forget because, um, I remember sitting there on 616 00:30:48,281 --> 00:30:50,051 tv, it was the target breach. 617 00:30:50,741 --> 00:30:55,211 And I'm looking at it, I'm going, oh man, I can't believe those poor people. 618 00:30:55,216 --> 00:30:58,361 And my wife looks over at me and she says, you know, we have a Target card. 619 00:30:58,361 --> 00:30:58,841 I'm like, what? 620 00:30:59,621 --> 00:31:05,561 And, and that night I got six different phone calls for interviews for the next 621 00:31:05,561 --> 00:31:10,421 day on the target breach, and I was just running the entire day going from 622 00:31:10,421 --> 00:31:12,281 studio to studio to weigh in on it. 623 00:31:12,281 --> 00:31:14,411 So I'm doing research, staying up all night. 624 00:31:14,756 --> 00:31:18,986 And I went through the whole rounds doing C n N and, and Fox and Bloomberg 625 00:31:18,986 --> 00:31:20,696 and A, B, C, and so on and so forth. 626 00:31:21,596 --> 00:31:24,266 And just sharing what happened and what I learned and how could 627 00:31:24,266 --> 00:31:25,406 this have happened and stuff. 628 00:31:25,406 --> 00:31:29,636 But that moment really got me excited when you, when you hear about something 629 00:31:29,636 --> 00:31:36,446 that is such a big data breach and how many lives it affected, and 630 00:31:36,476 --> 00:31:39,446 most importantly, How is it handled? 631 00:31:39,656 --> 00:31:44,186 How do you disseminate what happened to to this many customers when it's millions of 632 00:31:44,186 --> 00:31:46,736 customers that are so loyal to your brand? 633 00:31:47,246 --> 00:31:48,416 What happens to the brand? 634 00:31:48,416 --> 00:31:49,496 What happens to the shareholders? 635 00:31:49,501 --> 00:31:50,756 What happens to the customers? 636 00:31:50,756 --> 00:31:52,856 What happens to the the security side? 637 00:31:52,856 --> 00:31:53,756 Who dropped the ball? 638 00:31:53,756 --> 00:31:54,416 How did this happen? 639 00:31:54,716 --> 00:31:59,456 All those questions go through my mind, and to me that's kind of exciting so 640 00:31:59,996 --> 00:32:03,926 that it kind of backed me into this part of the industry doing the research. 641 00:32:04,361 --> 00:32:08,351 When things happen makes you wonder and when you hear the stories like you were 642 00:32:08,351 --> 00:32:14,351 telling a great story about the mistakes of not having backed up data at the bank 643 00:32:14,351 --> 00:32:18,761 you were working at and, and as I hear that, It helps me appreciate if I want 644 00:32:18,761 --> 00:32:23,141 to go to an expert about backups, I'm gonna talk to Curtis before anyone else. 645 00:32:23,321 --> 00:32:24,431 'cause he's lived through it. 646 00:32:24,491 --> 00:32:26,801 He understands it, he gets it. 647 00:32:27,101 --> 00:32:29,621 And I think that's what's kind of cool about this industry 648 00:32:29,621 --> 00:32:31,301 if you really dive into it. 649 00:32:31,781 --> 00:32:35,861 Yeah, it's about technology and this and that, but ultimately it's about people and 650 00:32:35,861 --> 00:32:40,391 the mistakes that people make and how you could protect yourself from bad people. 651 00:32:40,661 --> 00:32:44,321 And if you do do that well, Then you can make a great career and 652 00:32:44,321 --> 00:32:46,091 you can also make a difference. 653 00:32:46,121 --> 00:32:47,711 And I think that's, that's an important thing. 654 00:32:47,711 --> 00:32:51,761 I look at people that are doctors and I, I see the amazing things they do. 655 00:32:52,331 --> 00:32:53,741 I faint at the sight of blood. 656 00:32:53,981 --> 00:32:58,391 I'm not the guy for that job, but I appreciate what they can do or a 657 00:32:58,391 --> 00:33:01,391 nurse, how they can be patient and put up with so many things and help 658 00:33:01,391 --> 00:33:02,621 people and make them feel good. 659 00:33:02,621 --> 00:33:03,461 That's important. 660 00:33:04,091 --> 00:33:07,541 Um, hopefully what we're doing in the world of cyber is making 661 00:33:07,541 --> 00:33:09,071 a difference in helping people. 662 00:33:09,371 --> 00:33:11,021 Whether or not they appreciate it or not. 663 00:33:11,051 --> 00:33:13,631 I, I don't know fully, but I think some people do. 664 00:33:14,111 --> 00:33:15,461 Um, I, I was laughing. 665 00:33:15,461 --> 00:33:17,471 I was at our R s A show recently. 666 00:33:17,471 --> 00:33:19,601 I had somebody that I never met. 667 00:33:19,871 --> 00:33:21,611 I happened to be speaking at the same show. 668 00:33:21,616 --> 00:33:24,281 I later found out with this individual and he came up to me 669 00:33:24,281 --> 00:33:25,811 and he says, are you Scott Schober? 670 00:33:25,871 --> 00:33:27,911 I said, yeah, I want to shake your hand. 671 00:33:27,911 --> 00:33:29,201 And he said, I said, okay. 672 00:33:29,201 --> 00:33:31,121 What's your name and how do I know you? 673 00:33:31,121 --> 00:33:32,051 He goes, oh, you don't know me? 674 00:33:32,051 --> 00:33:35,831 He goes, but I bought your book and I read your book 20 times. 675 00:33:36,611 --> 00:33:38,081 I said, that's more times than I read it. 676 00:33:38,081 --> 00:33:39,071 That's pretty amazing. 677 00:33:39,071 --> 00:33:41,861 He said, but I learned things and he started sharing all the things he learned. 678 00:33:41,861 --> 00:33:42,641 He was very excited. 679 00:33:42,641 --> 00:33:47,231 Individual was great, but I made a connection and it helped him solve a 680 00:33:47,231 --> 00:33:49,811 few problems that he had in his company. 681 00:33:50,171 --> 00:33:52,691 But more importantly, we made a connection and we became 682 00:33:52,696 --> 00:33:54,701 friends, and that's kind of cool. 683 00:33:54,701 --> 00:33:57,131 When you're in this industry, there's a lot of great people. 684 00:33:57,461 --> 00:34:00,221 That you're surrounded by a lot of people that are a lot smarter than me. 685 00:34:00,431 --> 00:34:01,511 I'm learning from them. 686 00:34:01,511 --> 00:34:03,911 Hopefully a little bit of the stuff I've learned I could share 687 00:34:03,911 --> 00:34:06,461 with them too, and, and it, and it just makes for a great community. 688 00:34:08,381 --> 00:34:08,841 Prasanna Malaiyandi: As you're. 689 00:34:08,841 --> 00:34:12,311 Are talking Scott, through sort of like backup, right? 690 00:34:12,311 --> 00:34:15,281 As being one place that you might like go talk to someone. 691 00:34:15,911 --> 00:34:19,181 I think when it comes to cybersecurity, at many companies it gets very 692 00:34:19,181 --> 00:34:22,961 difficult because it's not always like one person you can talk to, right? 693 00:34:22,966 --> 00:34:25,511 You might have the backup guy, you might have the security guy, you might 694 00:34:25,511 --> 00:34:29,591 have the applications guy, the database guy, the virtual machine admin, right? 695 00:34:29,591 --> 00:34:35,051 And there's so many people involved in order to keep an organization secure. 696 00:34:35,756 --> 00:34:36,146 Right. 697 00:34:36,146 --> 00:34:40,886 And I think making sure everyone is coordinated is a difficult task, right? 698 00:34:40,886 --> 00:34:45,176 Everyone has their own priorities, their own mandates coming from above. 699 00:34:45,176 --> 00:34:47,666 Sometimes they're not even in the same organization. 700 00:34:48,116 --> 00:34:48,446 Right? 701 00:34:48,451 --> 00:34:52,796 And I think that's another aspect that makes cybersecurity so interesting. 702 00:34:52,801 --> 00:34:52,886 It's. 703 00:34:53,936 --> 00:34:56,156 Not like you could say, okay, everyone do this one thing. 704 00:34:56,156 --> 00:34:56,336 Right? 705 00:34:56,336 --> 00:34:58,676 It's that coordination, that team building, right? 706 00:34:58,676 --> 00:35:03,326 It's like everyone needs to be a well-oiled machine for the security of 707 00:35:03,326 --> 00:35:06,236 the organization to be functional even. 708 00:35:07,646 --> 00:35:07,946 Scott Schober: Yeah. 709 00:35:08,006 --> 00:35:10,346 Yeah, I, I think that's a brilliant point, and I always talk. 710 00:35:11,321 --> 00:35:12,491 About cybersecurity. 711 00:35:12,491 --> 00:35:15,101 I've been brought into companies to educate, and I say, you know what? 712 00:35:15,491 --> 00:35:20,021 This spans the entire employee spectrum from janitor to c e o, 713 00:35:20,021 --> 00:35:20,801 and people are looking at me. 714 00:35:20,806 --> 00:35:22,961 No, no, we're talking about the IT team. 715 00:35:22,961 --> 00:35:23,832 And I'm like, no, no, no. 716 00:35:23,921 --> 00:35:25,601 I'm talking about the janitor, the ceo, e o. 717 00:35:25,901 --> 00:35:27,641 Everybody has a responsibility. 718 00:35:27,641 --> 00:35:31,311 It doesn't mean you have to be an expert in cybersecurity, but when 719 00:35:31,361 --> 00:35:35,681 you get onto a computer, you have to use some basic common sense 720 00:35:35,681 --> 00:35:37,361 and have some cyber awareness. 721 00:35:37,661 --> 00:35:41,351 So you don't just quickly click on things and, you know, write a sticky 722 00:35:41,351 --> 00:35:44,471 note with your passwords and all, all the silly things that we always hear 723 00:35:44,471 --> 00:35:47,141 about, but people do it every day. 724 00:35:47,141 --> 00:35:50,801 And that's the part that I kind of back up from and I look at and I'm saying, 725 00:35:50,801 --> 00:35:54,191 how could these companies and, and, and I've been to many large companies and 726 00:35:54,191 --> 00:35:59,891 some of the largest organizations, and I see sticky notes with their password. 727 00:36:00,251 --> 00:36:04,481 I see the, the passcode on their credit card machine to issue a 728 00:36:04,481 --> 00:36:06,191 refund that I'm sitting there going. 729 00:36:06,746 --> 00:36:11,576 I hide this, that code with my life so nobody could ever steal money, and yet 730 00:36:11,606 --> 00:36:13,316 they have it out there, broad daylight. 731 00:36:13,346 --> 00:36:15,656 So these things still happen. 732 00:36:15,661 --> 00:36:19,436 And something, uh, some of the basic techniques and things that I've 733 00:36:19,436 --> 00:36:22,466 learned and I try to share in the books and when I talk are things 734 00:36:22,466 --> 00:36:24,026 that people just don't think about. 735 00:36:24,206 --> 00:36:28,166 But when you share it with them, they go, oh, I didn't think about that. 736 00:36:28,196 --> 00:36:29,036 That's interesting. 737 00:36:29,076 --> 00:36:30,596 I, I, I'll give you a typical example. 738 00:36:30,596 --> 00:36:33,206 I always think about security challenge questions, right? 739 00:36:34,301 --> 00:36:36,311 What Curtis, what high school did you attend? 740 00:36:36,311 --> 00:36:39,551 That might be one of your, your answers might be blah, blah, blah, high school. 741 00:36:39,821 --> 00:36:41,981 And I always say don't answer it honestly. 742 00:36:41,981 --> 00:36:45,041 There you get a pass, you can answer it dishonestly and 743 00:36:45,041 --> 00:36:46,781 use a unique password there. 744 00:36:47,261 --> 00:36:50,621 And it could be password 1, 2, 3 is actually a hundred times 745 00:36:50,626 --> 00:36:53,291 more secure than putting the actual high school that you have. 746 00:36:53,321 --> 00:36:56,141 'cause anybody can go on Google and search and see what high 747 00:36:56,146 --> 00:36:59,321 school that Curtis attended, but nobody's gonna put in password. 748 00:36:59,326 --> 00:37:00,131 1, 2, 3, there. 749 00:37:00,416 --> 00:37:04,286 So like even the most basic common sense, almost stupid things that 750 00:37:04,286 --> 00:37:07,676 you could do, help people back up and say, oh yeah, wait a minute. 751 00:37:08,246 --> 00:37:09,536 I don't have to be honest. 752 00:37:09,536 --> 00:37:14,336 I can just create a single password that only I know in my head that I'll 753 00:37:14,341 --> 00:37:16,916 remember forever and use it there. 754 00:37:17,036 --> 00:37:17,816 Problem solved. 755 00:37:17,876 --> 00:37:19,256 Wow, that's great. 756 00:37:20,036 --> 00:37:21,746 Sounds too good to be true, but it worked. 757 00:37:22,136 --> 00:37:22,946 I did those things. 758 00:37:23,651 --> 00:37:26,081 W. Curtis Preston: You know, when you were, when you were talking earlier, 759 00:37:26,141 --> 00:37:29,201 um, you know, I was, you know, thinking about that we, that we should 760 00:37:29,201 --> 00:37:36,311 value, we should value people who've, um, had bad things happen to them. 761 00:37:36,311 --> 00:37:36,641 Right. 762 00:37:36,821 --> 00:37:40,391 That, that, that perhaps I, 'cause you know, as we're talking, I, I never know 763 00:37:40,391 --> 00:37:42,611 the way a particular podcast is gonna go. 764 00:37:42,611 --> 00:37:43,541 I, I, I think this is. 765 00:37:44,021 --> 00:37:47,471 This is the purpose of this particular episode is to get, 766 00:37:47,591 --> 00:37:50,051 is to encourage people to share. 767 00:37:50,411 --> 00:37:56,471 And, uh, you know, I think that we, we, um, uh, we value a little bit too 768 00:37:56,476 --> 00:37:59,921 much, you know, our little pride and our little whatever, and we think that 769 00:37:59,921 --> 00:38:01,991 that sharing is gonna get us in trouble. 770 00:38:02,261 --> 00:38:05,801 Uh, and I will say that if sharing a, a, a mistake gets you fired. 771 00:38:06,176 --> 00:38:08,816 Uh, maybe you didn't need to be working at that company anyway. 772 00:38:08,816 --> 00:38:10,046 That, that's one idea. 773 00:38:10,466 --> 00:38:13,406 But, but I was, I found myself, and this is gonna sound really 774 00:38:13,406 --> 00:38:16,946 weird, no matter how many times I explain it, but I found myself 775 00:38:16,946 --> 00:38:18,776 thinking about Platoon, the movie I. 776 00:38:19,076 --> 00:38:24,506 Um, and so my question is, who do you want to be in battle with? 777 00:38:24,506 --> 00:38:27,686 Do you wanna be in battle with Willem Defoe, this like battle 778 00:38:27,686 --> 00:38:31,046 hardened guy, although he turns out to be a bad guy, I think in 779 00:38:31,046 --> 00:38:33,176 the later, so we'll set that aside. 780 00:38:33,176 --> 00:38:37,136 But the battle hardened guy who's been shot at 4,000 times, 781 00:38:37,376 --> 00:38:39,476 or the brand new officer. 782 00:38:39,736 --> 00:38:41,296 Just outta college, right? 783 00:38:41,446 --> 00:38:44,536 The officer's, you know, super smart, super educated. 784 00:38:44,536 --> 00:38:47,836 He's been trained on all the ways that battle works, but 785 00:38:47,836 --> 00:38:49,876 he's never been shot at, right? 786 00:38:50,176 --> 00:38:54,346 Um, we use the term he's never, he's, he's never fired in anger, right? 787 00:38:54,406 --> 00:39:00,166 Um, you know, I think that the person who has been around a while, 788 00:39:00,526 --> 00:39:06,526 um, and has, has made mistakes because honestly, if you're not. 789 00:39:07,736 --> 00:39:13,076 If you're not making any mistakes, you're probably not, you're not innovating, uh, 790 00:39:13,076 --> 00:39:18,671 would definitely, I would say you're not innovating and, um, And if you're, if you 791 00:39:18,671 --> 00:39:21,611 say you've never missed, if you say you've 792 00:39:21,611 --> 00:39:24,251 never made a mistake, you're, yeah. 793 00:39:24,771 --> 00:39:28,941 So I, I liked, I really liked that idea that you, um, You know that 794 00:39:28,941 --> 00:39:32,811 you, that you were saying that, let's go to the person for advice 795 00:39:32,811 --> 00:39:34,551 who's actually been through things. 796 00:39:34,551 --> 00:39:35,721 I like that a lot. 797 00:39:36,021 --> 00:39:40,191 Can you think of any other ways that we can encourage those who, 798 00:39:40,701 --> 00:39:42,381 uh, both the company, right? 799 00:39:42,381 --> 00:39:44,421 So we're multiple levels here. 800 00:39:44,841 --> 00:39:48,711 We want to encourage the company to understand that sharing. 801 00:39:49,011 --> 00:39:51,351 Well, let, actually I have a thought, I'm gonna answer my own question. 802 00:39:52,131 --> 00:39:52,341 Scott Schober: sure. 803 00:39:53,406 --> 00:39:53,676 W. Curtis Preston: In. 804 00:39:55,446 --> 00:39:58,116 So I'm, my brain's just going a million miles. 805 00:39:58,116 --> 00:40:04,776 'cause I really like this discussion point and that is that we live in a world where 806 00:40:04,776 --> 00:40:11,886 we're almost, we, we become immune to the daily hacks that we see on the news, 807 00:40:13,001 --> 00:40:13,421 Scott Schober: Mm-hmm. 808 00:40:13,686 --> 00:40:14,766 W. Curtis Preston: We see 'em all the time. 809 00:40:14,766 --> 00:40:17,391 We're like, oh, we got, you know, Yeah. 810 00:40:17,661 --> 00:40:19,971 The, the, you know, the cyber of the day, right. 811 00:40:20,451 --> 00:40:24,501 Um, and so we, we don't, we don't think too much about it. 812 00:40:25,821 --> 00:40:31,341 Um, and so I think too many times the companies, they just try to, you know, 813 00:40:31,341 --> 00:40:34,341 like you, when back when you talked about your thing, you know, maybe they 814 00:40:34,341 --> 00:40:37,461 try to stay under the radar and they don't want to get that, they do not want 815 00:40:37,461 --> 00:40:39,411 to get that call from the ap, right? 816 00:40:39,921 --> 00:40:46,971 Um, but I'm thinking that, um, When I know when we Prasannayou and I, when 817 00:40:46,971 --> 00:40:54,171 we've evaluated sort of incidents, the thing that we value, Is how the 818 00:40:54,171 --> 00:41:00,441 company responds, how open they are, about how soon they announced it, how 819 00:41:00,501 --> 00:41:02,541 open they were about what happened. 820 00:41:02,871 --> 00:41:05,481 The fact that right now, like it just happened. 821 00:41:05,486 --> 00:41:07,071 It just happened two hours ago. 822 00:41:07,131 --> 00:41:08,951 We don't know squat, right? 823 00:41:09,801 --> 00:41:11,111 All we know is that something happens. 824 00:41:12,111 --> 00:41:13,521 Here's A U R L. 825 00:41:13,551 --> 00:41:14,691 Follow this U R L. 826 00:41:14,691 --> 00:41:16,401 This is my particular favorite way. 827 00:41:16,401 --> 00:41:17,541 Here's A U R L. 828 00:41:17,811 --> 00:41:21,141 You know, go to curtis preston.com/. 829 00:41:22,986 --> 00:41:24,066 2023. 830 00:41:24,576 --> 00:41:25,626 Right, and, and 831 00:41:25,761 --> 00:41:27,861 Prasanna Malaiyandi: That website does not work for our listeners, 832 00:41:28,476 --> 00:41:29,196 W. Curtis Preston: What's that? 833 00:41:30,081 --> 00:41:32,121 Prasanna Malaiyandi: that website does not work for our listeners on 834 00:41:32,476 --> 00:41:35,676 W. Curtis Preston: that, that website, they'll find out exactly. 835 00:41:36,036 --> 00:41:39,626 Um, that was a, that was the equivalent of a five, five, 836 00:41:39,626 --> 00:41:41,076 five phone number in the movies. 837 00:41:41,736 --> 00:41:47,736 Um, and, and just follow that and just, you know, get, like, it's, it's one nice 838 00:41:47,736 --> 00:41:52,176 way of saying leave us alone while we think, just go over there and don't, 839 00:41:52,176 --> 00:41:56,646 don't call us 8,000 times everything we know, we will put there and then do that. 840 00:41:56,676 --> 00:41:57,036 Right. 841 00:41:57,126 --> 00:41:57,996 Follow up. 842 00:41:58,316 --> 00:42:02,996 Uh, you know, a a along that, uh, the, the more you can share about 843 00:42:02,996 --> 00:42:07,646 what happened, when it happened, how it happened, what lessons you learned 844 00:42:07,646 --> 00:42:10,436 as a result, uh, I think it's better. 845 00:42:10,466 --> 00:42:14,606 I think it's better both for everybody, obviously, but also for you. 846 00:42:14,726 --> 00:42:20,066 I'm, I'm basically applying your, um, your statement about that. 847 00:42:20,066 --> 00:42:23,306 You want to go to the battle hardened person, and I'm applying this to a company 848 00:42:23,846 --> 00:42:26,156 that it's also good for the company. 849 00:42:26,961 --> 00:42:27,441 What? 850 00:42:27,441 --> 00:42:28,101 What happened? 851 00:42:28,851 --> 00:42:30,211 Are you doing a bump up butt Prasanna? 852 00:42:30,501 --> 00:42:33,921 Prasanna Malaiyandi: yes, I am doing a, but, but, but I think though I agree 853 00:42:33,921 --> 00:42:38,571 with everything you say, Curtis, but then I also look at the flip side, which is 854 00:42:39,141 --> 00:42:44,231 we're a very, lawsuit, happy country. 855 00:42:45,246 --> 00:42:50,646 And I think corporations worry about how much information they can publish. 856 00:42:50,646 --> 00:42:53,946 I agree that they need some amount of transparency and creating 857 00:42:53,951 --> 00:42:56,466 the website and putting the links that people can go follow. 858 00:42:56,466 --> 00:42:57,996 I a hundred percent agree with it. 859 00:42:58,356 --> 00:43:04,056 I think there's that risk balance that corporations struggle with because like 860 00:43:04,056 --> 00:43:07,716 Scott had mentioned, right, you do take a hit from a brand perspective, right? 861 00:43:07,721 --> 00:43:10,986 You might open yourself up to lawsuits, right? 862 00:43:10,986 --> 00:43:15,246 Or regulatory scrutiny or other aspects that once it's out 863 00:43:15,246 --> 00:43:17,136 there, it becomes hard to undo. 864 00:43:17,316 --> 00:43:21,276 I think the other thing to also mention is, There's also 865 00:43:21,276 --> 00:43:22,596 the public perception, right? 866 00:43:22,896 --> 00:43:26,136 Because when you publish something on a website, right, they assume, oh, this 867 00:43:26,136 --> 00:43:29,796 is a hundred percent the truth versus when you're, I'm sure, Scott, you 868 00:43:29,796 --> 00:43:31,206 could talk about this as well, right? 869 00:43:31,206 --> 00:43:33,876 When you're doing a cyber investigation, right, you don't 870 00:43:33,936 --> 00:43:38,736 always know like what it is really until you're sort of done, right? 871 00:43:38,736 --> 00:43:42,126 Yes, you might have know some aspects along the way, but you may 872 00:43:42,126 --> 00:43:44,676 not be a hundred percent confident the entire time because you're 873 00:43:44,676 --> 00:43:46,316 working off of partial information. 874 00:43:46,536 --> 00:43:46,776 Scott Schober: Yeah. 875 00:43:46,776 --> 00:43:47,066 Yeah. 876 00:43:48,426 --> 00:43:51,336 W. Curtis Preston: Yeah, I, I, um, I'll, I'll finish my comment. 877 00:43:51,336 --> 00:43:54,056 That was so rudely interrupted by Prasanna. 878 00:43:55,536 --> 00:43:57,036 So I agree. 879 00:43:57,036 --> 00:43:58,146 I agree with what you're saying. 880 00:43:58,146 --> 00:44:03,006 Prasanna, which is why any, uh, incident response plan has legal as 881 00:44:03,006 --> 00:44:04,416 part of the response plan, right. 882 00:44:04,421 --> 00:44:06,216 I'm not giving legal advice here. 883 00:44:06,426 --> 00:44:12,156 I'm just giving sort of my opinion that the more you can share confidently, I 884 00:44:12,156 --> 00:44:13,806 think you're better off as a company. 885 00:44:13,806 --> 00:44:15,246 Yes, I understand the. 886 00:44:15,816 --> 00:44:20,166 The legal thing, but I also know that unders sharing can also be 887 00:44:20,166 --> 00:44:23,106 illegal, um, you know, liability. 888 00:44:23,346 --> 00:44:24,246 So I don't know. 889 00:44:24,336 --> 00:44:27,816 Um, I, I, I never actually came up with a question there, Scott, but 890 00:44:28,221 --> 00:44:31,401 Scott Schober: I, I, I'll, I'll answer, I'll answer, the question even with, 891 00:44:31,401 --> 00:44:33,141 though, with two more questions. 892 00:44:33,146 --> 00:44:34,161 No, or two more statements. 893 00:44:34,161 --> 00:44:36,801 Let me give you maybe a, a case scenario that's in my mind. 894 00:44:37,521 --> 00:44:38,541 Think about Uber. 895 00:44:38,541 --> 00:44:44,031 A couple years ago, got, uh, breached, uh, interesting how they handled it. 896 00:44:44,031 --> 00:44:48,141 The president at the time, uh, they kind of covered it up. 897 00:44:48,141 --> 00:44:50,511 They kind of muddied the waters a little bit. 898 00:44:50,841 --> 00:44:57,441 Um, at one point they paid, I guess it was a ransom, but covered it as a 899 00:44:57,441 --> 00:45:03,141 bug bounty, dishonest, uh, misleading to shareholders, so on and so forth. 900 00:45:03,141 --> 00:45:05,841 I think they got their, their hands slapped a few times. 901 00:45:06,141 --> 00:45:07,641 Their brand got hurt. 902 00:45:07,971 --> 00:45:09,801 Um, they were struggling making money. 903 00:45:09,801 --> 00:45:11,481 I think they still are to some extent. 904 00:45:11,481 --> 00:45:16,281 So they kind of bumped along through different leadership and making mistake 905 00:45:16,281 --> 00:45:19,851 after mistake after mistake, and were breached many times and again. 906 00:45:20,286 --> 00:45:23,856 It's to the point they weren't really transparent about everything going on. 907 00:45:24,156 --> 00:45:27,216 They kind of did this and Don don't get anybody upset 'cause the money's 908 00:45:27,216 --> 00:45:29,976 coming in the front door and we need more investors and so on and so forth. 909 00:45:30,486 --> 00:45:33,306 Um, contrast that with JP Morgan. 910 00:45:34,116 --> 00:45:37,116 Uh, they had a major breach and now you're talking about at 911 00:45:37,116 --> 00:45:40,926 the time, the largest financial institution headed by Jamie Diamond. 912 00:45:41,316 --> 00:45:43,896 Um, they were transparent. 913 00:45:43,896 --> 00:45:47,616 Hey, it, it was a third party access, didn't have multifactor 914 00:45:47,616 --> 00:45:48,846 authentication in place. 915 00:45:48,846 --> 00:45:50,196 We didn't do this, this, and this. 916 00:45:50,196 --> 00:45:51,216 We made the mistakes. 917 00:45:51,396 --> 00:45:52,206 We're sorry. 918 00:45:52,266 --> 00:45:53,976 Here's what we're gonna do about it. 919 00:45:54,126 --> 00:45:57,576 Oh, by the way, going forward, we're gonna commit a half a billion 920 00:45:57,576 --> 00:45:59,346 dollars to improve our security. 921 00:45:59,351 --> 00:46:00,936 So these things don't happen again. 922 00:46:01,596 --> 00:46:03,576 Uh, which brand survived? 923 00:46:03,576 --> 00:46:06,606 I think I think you could look at and say, wow, you know what? 924 00:46:06,836 --> 00:46:10,976 JP Morgan Chase, their brand really thrived and continues to thrive. 925 00:46:11,276 --> 00:46:14,786 Uber is still kind of a struggling rideshare company, 926 00:46:14,791 --> 00:46:15,926 even though it's everywhere. 927 00:46:17,036 --> 00:46:20,426 You don't believe everything you hear, you talk to the the drivers 928 00:46:20,426 --> 00:46:21,596 and they're a little bit bitter. 929 00:46:21,596 --> 00:46:23,276 You talk to the shareholders, they're bitter. 930 00:46:23,276 --> 00:46:24,836 You talk to the employees, they're bitter. 931 00:46:24,836 --> 00:46:29,696 So I think a lot of it has to do with how you run an organization and 932 00:46:29,696 --> 00:46:32,066 when you deal with a cyber incident. 933 00:46:32,661 --> 00:46:34,851 To your point, how do you respond? 934 00:46:35,121 --> 00:46:38,091 It's gotta be a company wide and it's gotta come in a sense 935 00:46:38,091 --> 00:46:39,441 from the top down as far as. 936 00:46:39,936 --> 00:46:41,736 Hey guys, we screwed up. 937 00:46:41,766 --> 00:46:42,666 Let's own it. 938 00:46:42,726 --> 00:46:44,196 Let's inform everyone. 939 00:46:44,346 --> 00:46:48,816 Let's take care of it so it doesn't happen again, and let's, let's follow through 940 00:46:48,816 --> 00:46:53,946 this with our whole team and our employees and our shareholders and our customers. 941 00:46:53,946 --> 00:46:56,016 So I think that's kind of important. 942 00:46:56,021 --> 00:47:00,606 Being honesty, honest, and having integrity when there's a cyber 943 00:47:00,606 --> 00:47:04,056 situation really makes a difference in the long run at the moment. 944 00:47:04,846 --> 00:47:07,156 You probably look like an idiot in front of most people. 945 00:47:07,576 --> 00:47:11,626 But in the long run, in hindsight, I think you look back and you say, you know what? 946 00:47:12,526 --> 00:47:13,996 I'm glad I came clean. 947 00:47:13,996 --> 00:47:15,106 I have a clean conscience. 948 00:47:15,111 --> 00:47:18,436 I did it right, and it's not gonna happen again. 949 00:47:19,036 --> 00:47:21,316 And that's, that's probably one of the most important lessons 950 00:47:21,316 --> 00:47:23,566 I've learned is I'm paranoid. 951 00:47:24,216 --> 00:47:28,506 I'm paranoid and to, to the stuff that you have expertise backing up data. 952 00:47:28,506 --> 00:47:30,306 I'm always going around, we gotta get a backup of this. 953 00:47:30,306 --> 00:47:31,956 And they're like, Scott, you backed this up last week. 954 00:47:31,956 --> 00:47:35,286 I, I know, but just in case we changed the code, we updated the system. 955 00:47:35,286 --> 00:47:35,946 Let's back it up. 956 00:47:35,946 --> 00:47:37,836 I'll, I'll put it in the safe on a remote site. 957 00:47:37,841 --> 00:47:41,286 And, but, but you start to think like a cyber thief. 958 00:47:41,286 --> 00:47:44,676 Would you see the value in something and how easy it is to get it? 959 00:47:44,676 --> 00:47:45,846 Because I've learned one thing. 960 00:47:46,176 --> 00:47:47,736 Nothing's a hundred percent secure. 961 00:47:47,826 --> 00:47:50,136 And if somebody wants something bad enough, they're 962 00:47:50,136 --> 00:47:51,246 gonna find a way to get it. 963 00:47:51,516 --> 00:47:55,656 So you just have to do everything you can to make it difficult for them 964 00:47:55,746 --> 00:47:57,126 so they move on to the next target. 965 00:47:57,126 --> 00:47:57,996 That's gonna be much easier. 966 00:47:58,026 --> 00:47:58,806 That's all it's about. 967 00:47:58,806 --> 00:48:02,076 It's a, there's a cat and mouse game, or a whack the mo game, or 968 00:48:02,076 --> 00:48:05,256 whatever you want to call it, but that, that's oversimplifying it. 969 00:48:05,286 --> 00:48:08,286 I know, but I, I think that's important to, to just kind 970 00:48:08,286 --> 00:48:09,426 of think about those things. 971 00:48:09,426 --> 00:48:13,341 If you're running a company or part of an organization, You have to weave 972 00:48:13,341 --> 00:48:18,891 cybersecurity into the fabric of your organization so that you don't just do it 973 00:48:18,891 --> 00:48:21,561 once a year and do a quick phishing test. 974 00:48:21,621 --> 00:48:21,951 Pass. 975 00:48:21,951 --> 00:48:22,521 We move on. 976 00:48:22,521 --> 00:48:23,721 Let's get back to business guys. 977 00:48:23,871 --> 00:48:24,621 That doesn't work. 978 00:48:24,926 --> 00:48:26,436 Prasanna Malaiyandi: Yeah, I like that. 979 00:48:26,466 --> 00:48:32,456 I think going back to Uber, I think recently their CISO had some, uh, legal. 980 00:48:33,756 --> 00:48:36,466 Case proceedings against him and I think was found. 981 00:48:36,516 --> 00:48:38,406 W. Curtis Preston: Because, because of that incident, right? 982 00:48:39,056 --> 00:48:39,346 Prasanna Malaiyandi: Yeah. 983 00:48:40,206 --> 00:48:40,686 Scott Schober: Yeah, yeah. 984 00:48:40,686 --> 00:48:43,896 I avoid the legal side of things, but you're, you're absolutely right because 985 00:48:44,406 --> 00:48:49,806 the, the implications of getting caught and misleading shareholders and the public 986 00:48:49,806 --> 00:48:54,066 and covering it up or doing the bait and switch, it's not good for business 987 00:48:54,066 --> 00:48:55,446 in the long run when you get caught. 988 00:48:55,626 --> 00:48:57,846 And I think that was the mistake at the moment. 989 00:48:57,846 --> 00:48:59,946 It seemed like, yay, this is a win. 990 00:48:59,946 --> 00:49:02,526 Now we don't have to go through the pain of everybody else, but. 991 00:49:02,856 --> 00:49:06,966 It caught up with them, unfortunately, and sometimes people make say a little 992 00:49:06,966 --> 00:49:12,546 white lie and they get away with it, and then it leads to more things that they 993 00:49:12,546 --> 00:49:14,706 get implicated on and and legal mess. 994 00:49:14,711 --> 00:49:19,896 And the cost for legal things these days in this society is just astronomical and 995 00:49:19,901 --> 00:49:21,336 it distracts you again from the course. 996 00:49:21,336 --> 00:49:26,436 So sometimes the legal matter outweighs the actual cyber incident. 997 00:49:27,066 --> 00:49:27,126 Prasanna Malaiyandi: Yeah, 998 00:49:27,156 --> 00:49:29,586 Scott Schober: And, and that's often how cybersecurity works. 999 00:49:29,586 --> 00:49:34,926 I found interestingly enough, they, if they can settle it quickly, and sometimes 1000 00:49:35,046 --> 00:49:40,326 that's what a lot of these ransomware pay payments are about, uh, cybersecurity, uh, 1001 00:49:40,356 --> 00:49:44,016 insurance and the legal team get there and they look at it and say, you know what? 1002 00:49:44,226 --> 00:49:49,266 Pay this many bitcoins quickly, make this problem go away so we don't have to 1003 00:49:49,716 --> 00:49:51,966 pay this much over the next six months. 1004 00:49:51,996 --> 00:49:52,326 So, 1005 00:49:52,536 --> 00:49:52,956 W. Curtis Preston: Yeah. 1006 00:49:53,316 --> 00:49:54,106 And Prasanna. 1007 00:49:54,131 --> 00:49:58,626 I I think, um, going back to what you said, the, so somewhere on the, on the, 1008 00:49:58,836 --> 00:50:06,786 on the, the, uh, the pendulum of don't say anything and make up stuff, right. 1009 00:50:06,876 --> 00:50:10,476 Somewhere in there is where we're I, I, I think I'm, you know, I'm, I'm. 1010 00:50:11,661 --> 00:50:11,991 Wow. 1011 00:50:12,051 --> 00:50:14,571 I don't know if I like that pendulum I just created, 'cause I, I wanna 1012 00:50:14,571 --> 00:50:16,041 be closer to the making up stuff. 1013 00:50:16,041 --> 00:50:18,231 Meaning I, I, I, I don't wanna 1014 00:50:18,276 --> 00:50:18,817 Prasanna Malaiyandi: sharing too much. 1015 00:50:20,081 --> 00:50:20,371 Scott Schober: Yeah. 1016 00:50:20,501 --> 00:50:20,851 Don't 1017 00:50:20,851 --> 00:50:21,451 overshare. 1018 00:50:21,561 --> 00:50:22,791 W. Curtis Preston: we need to be right in the middle. 1019 00:50:22,796 --> 00:50:23,061 Right? 1020 00:50:23,061 --> 00:50:26,181 We don't wanna not say anything and we, we definitely don't wanna make up stuff. 1021 00:50:26,181 --> 00:50:27,231 We can all agree. 1022 00:50:27,531 --> 00:50:29,901 And that's why Prasanna, that, that there was a part in your 1023 00:50:29,931 --> 00:50:31,341 answer where you talked about. 1024 00:50:31,866 --> 00:50:33,996 That sometimes you just don't know. 1025 00:50:34,206 --> 00:50:37,596 Well, if you don't know, don't say, right. 1026 00:50:37,596 --> 00:50:41,106 You will, you will get in the, in the heat of the, of the 1027 00:50:41,106 --> 00:50:42,756 event, you will get pressure. 1028 00:50:42,846 --> 00:50:43,926 What happened. 1029 00:50:44,046 --> 00:50:48,066 If you don't know what happened, you can say, we still don't know what happened. 1030 00:50:48,486 --> 00:50:50,346 Um, I, I guess, and, and 1031 00:50:50,391 --> 00:50:51,831 Prasanna Malaiyandi: Perfectly acceptable answer. 1032 00:50:52,071 --> 00:50:52,401 Yeah. 1033 00:50:52,626 --> 00:50:52,916 Scott Schober: Yeah. 1034 00:50:53,061 --> 00:50:53,211 Prasanna Malaiyandi: Yeah. 1035 00:50:53,646 --> 00:50:54,516 W. Curtis Preston: acceptable answer. 1036 00:50:54,516 --> 00:50:55,866 I don't know yet. 1037 00:50:56,226 --> 00:50:59,826 We are, you know, we are investigating and we will investigate until 1038 00:50:59,826 --> 00:51:01,386 we find out the root cause. 1039 00:51:01,956 --> 00:51:03,756 Um, yeah, 1040 00:51:03,996 --> 00:51:05,616 Scott Schober: think that's human nature too. 1041 00:51:05,616 --> 00:51:07,086 You as a human. 1042 00:51:07,686 --> 00:51:08,676 Another person. 1043 00:51:08,706 --> 00:51:12,006 It's okay to hear something, even if it's a little bit disappointing. 1044 00:51:12,066 --> 00:51:15,066 I, I think about it directly with we're, we're late on a lot of 1045 00:51:15,066 --> 00:51:16,476 our deliveries to our customers. 1046 00:51:16,476 --> 00:51:18,606 Here I am, uh, going on the, on the record. 1047 00:51:18,611 --> 00:51:19,956 I'm apologizing here. 1048 00:51:20,286 --> 00:51:21,156 Please forgive us. 1049 00:51:21,156 --> 00:51:24,666 But I think communicating that with a customer is imperative. 1050 00:51:24,996 --> 00:51:27,126 Hey, we're late on delivery. 1051 00:51:27,546 --> 00:51:29,046 We told you it would take this long. 1052 00:51:29,076 --> 00:51:29,946 We were wrong. 1053 00:51:29,976 --> 00:51:33,846 There are reasons, and we don't want to stand here and reiterate all the reasons, 1054 00:51:33,846 --> 00:51:35,646 but here's a couple of the reasons why. 1055 00:51:35,976 --> 00:51:38,556 We're sorry, but here's what we're gonna do about it. 1056 00:51:38,916 --> 00:51:41,856 Whether it's you give him something or free chipping or whatever, 1057 00:51:41,856 --> 00:51:45,366 or or more importantly, when we do have the date, it will ship. 1058 00:51:45,846 --> 00:51:49,236 I will get back to you, I will send you the tracking number and the most important 1059 00:51:49,241 --> 00:51:50,736 thing is the follow through on it. 1060 00:51:51,006 --> 00:51:54,516 And it's funny, somebody that hates you or is very upset with you, 'cause they're 1061 00:51:54,521 --> 00:51:57,846 frustrated, they can't do their job, and when you give 'em the tracking number 1062 00:51:57,846 --> 00:51:59,916 and the follow through, they thank you. 1063 00:52:00,426 --> 00:52:01,236 They say Wow. 1064 00:52:01,596 --> 00:52:02,916 You got back to me. 1065 00:52:02,946 --> 00:52:05,646 You must care about me as a customer. 1066 00:52:05,676 --> 00:52:05,976 Thank you. 1067 00:52:06,576 --> 00:52:08,346 And to me, I've learned that's really important. 1068 00:52:08,616 --> 00:52:12,006 It doesn't matter what role you are in the company, and I'll often get that. 1069 00:52:12,006 --> 00:52:13,146 Sometimes I'll even get a, a thi. 1070 00:52:13,731 --> 00:52:15,381 Aren't you the c e o of the company? 1071 00:52:15,381 --> 00:52:18,231 Why are you saying sorry to me that you guys were late? 1072 00:52:18,231 --> 00:52:19,341 It's probably not your fault. 1073 00:52:19,341 --> 00:52:20,631 I said, no, it's all of our fault. 1074 00:52:20,661 --> 00:52:23,421 It's the company's fault, so I am sorry. 1075 00:52:23,451 --> 00:52:24,501 The company's sorry. 1076 00:52:24,651 --> 00:52:29,211 And just being able to express that I think helps them see you're real, your 1077 00:52:29,216 --> 00:52:33,291 honest, you're transparent, and you want what's best for them no matter what it is. 1078 00:52:33,411 --> 00:52:36,921 And I think that's important to develop relationships, business relationships. 1079 00:52:38,151 --> 00:52:38,901 W. Curtis Preston: Yeah, I like that. 1080 00:52:38,901 --> 00:52:42,231 And by the way, I, uh, the word legal came up. 1081 00:52:42,291 --> 00:52:47,391 I thought I forgot to throw out our usual disclaimer, uh, that, um, that this is an 1082 00:52:47,391 --> 00:52:51,561 independent podcast and you're hearing, uh, opinions of people and not companies. 1083 00:52:51,861 --> 00:52:55,841 And, uh, if you'd like to, Join the conversation I'd, 1084 00:52:55,841 --> 00:52:57,071 I'd love to hear from you. 1085 00:52:57,341 --> 00:53:04,151 W Curtis Preston at gmail, or at WC preston on Twitter or linkedin.com/in/mr. 1086 00:53:04,211 --> 00:53:04,811 Backup. 1087 00:53:05,231 --> 00:53:08,261 Uh, and we, you know, we'll get you, you know, we love to hear from people 1088 00:53:08,561 --> 00:53:12,731 and, um, so, and, and also, please rate us, uh, go to your favorite pod 1089 00:53:12,731 --> 00:53:14,111 catcher and give us all the stars. 1090 00:53:14,481 --> 00:53:15,441 And send us comments. 1091 00:53:15,441 --> 00:53:16,821 We'd love to see comments as well. 1092 00:53:17,331 --> 00:53:21,051 Uh, Scott, I, I want to thank you for, for coming on. 1093 00:53:21,411 --> 00:53:25,071 Uh, it's been a great, like I said, I never know exactly where a given 1094 00:53:25,071 --> 00:53:29,241 recording is gonna go, but I really like the, you know, our encouraging 1095 00:53:29,241 --> 00:53:31,671 people to share and, and how to share. 1096 00:53:33,081 --> 00:53:33,381 Scott Schober: Yeah. 1097 00:53:33,441 --> 00:53:33,621 Yeah. 1098 00:53:33,621 --> 00:53:36,531 No, thank you guys for taking the time and having me on as a guest. 1099 00:53:36,741 --> 00:53:40,371 I, I was, uh, approached by somebody before coming on and they said, you're 1100 00:53:40,376 --> 00:53:43,011 going on a podcast and what's it about? 1101 00:53:43,011 --> 00:53:43,821 I said, well, he is Mr. 1102 00:53:43,821 --> 00:53:44,661 Backup, this and that. 1103 00:53:44,661 --> 00:53:45,501 Well, whatcha gonna talk about? 1104 00:53:45,501 --> 00:53:49,041 I said, I have no idea, but probably something related to cybersecurity. 1105 00:53:49,041 --> 00:53:50,091 And if so, it'll be fun. 1106 00:53:50,091 --> 00:53:51,741 And then I said, that's all I need to know. 1107 00:53:52,356 --> 00:53:53,736 That was a great, great conversation. 1108 00:53:53,736 --> 00:53:54,326 That's what's important. 1109 00:53:54,326 --> 00:53:54,926 Thank you guys. 1110 00:53:55,866 --> 00:53:56,646 W. Curtis Preston: Absolutely. 1111 00:53:56,646 --> 00:53:59,856 And Prasanna, you know, thanks for interrupting me. 1112 00:54:01,686 --> 00:54:02,046 That was a, 1113 00:54:02,046 --> 00:54:02,796 that was a good point. 1114 00:54:02,796 --> 00:54:03,516 That was a good point you 1115 00:54:03,771 --> 00:54:04,101 Prasanna Malaiyandi: it. 1116 00:54:04,311 --> 00:54:06,381 It's okay though, Curtis, in post-processing. 1117 00:54:06,381 --> 00:54:09,411 You can just cut it all out and then you can just continue the conversation. 1118 00:54:09,416 --> 00:54:10,101 You'll be fine. 1119 00:54:10,206 --> 00:54:14,196 W. Curtis Preston: I'll, I'll, I, I might cut it to make it look like you really 1120 00:54:14,196 --> 00:54:15,816 stomped on my, on what I was saying. 1121 00:54:17,616 --> 00:54:19,206 You know, the, the, the ultimate 1122 00:54:19,281 --> 00:54:20,241 Prasanna Malaiyandi: It was nice chatting. 1123 00:54:21,816 --> 00:54:22,476 Exactly. 1124 00:54:22,476 --> 00:54:23,916 It was nice to chat with you, Scott. 1125 00:54:23,916 --> 00:54:24,726 Thanks for sharing. 1126 00:54:24,996 --> 00:54:25,026 Oh, 1127 00:54:25,461 --> 00:54:25,931 Scott Schober: Thank you guys. 1128 00:54:26,161 --> 00:54:27,211 Stay safe, everyone. 1129 00:54:28,671 --> 00:54:31,431 W. Curtis Preston: And, uh, thanks to our listeners and remember to 1130 00:54:31,431 --> 00:54:34,071 subscribe so that you can restore it all 1131 00:54:55,101 --> 00:54:56,571 you could restore it. 1132 00:54:59,901 --> 00:55:00,661 Rescue me.