1 00:00:07,360 --> 00:00:10,600 It is extraordinarily difficult once you've set the wheels 2 00:00:10,600 --> 00:00:15,959 in trade. You can either tell every middleclass Chinese household 3 00:00:15,959 --> 00:00:19,400 that, actually, they're being functionally expropriated. You were 4 00:00:19,400 --> 00:00:22,080 told that housing would always go up in value and now it's not. 5 00:00:22,080 --> 00:00:29,130 Sucks to be you. Or you can have a situation in which the house 6 00:00:29,130 --> 00:00:32,530 prices go through the roof, the inequality is exacerbated, and 7 00:00:32,530 --> 00:00:35,090 also the, you know, the financial system and entrepreneurial 8 00:00:35,090 --> 00:00:38,570 activity is warped. And for a lot of Chinese people, they've come 9 00:00:38,570 --> 00:00:41,690 to what, I think, for a very long time was the rational decision 10 00:00:42,090 --> 00:00:46,250 that housing was the right asset to invest in, regardless of, 11 00:00:46,250 --> 00:00:48,090 you know, whether you're going to leave it empty or not. 12 00:00:49,850 --> 00:00:54,050 Imagine spending an hour with the world's greatest traders. Imagine 13 00:00:54,050 --> 00:00:56,730 learning from their experiences, their successes and 14 00:00:56,730 --> 00:01:01,550 their failures. Imagine no more. Welcome to welcome to Top Traders 15 00:01:01,550 --> 00:01:04,790 Unplugged, the place where you can learn from the best hedge fund 16 00:01:04,790 --> 00:01:08,150 managers in the world so you can take your manager, due diligence 17 00:01:08,150 --> 00:01:11,950 or investment career to the next level. Before we begin today's 18 00:01:11,950 --> 00:01:15,470 conversation, remember to keep two things in mind. All the discussion 19 00:01:15,470 --> 00:01:18,630 we'll have about investment performance is about the past, and 20 00:01:18,630 --> 00:01:21,870 past performance does not guarantee or even infer anything 21 00:01:21,870 --> 00:01:24,750 about future performance. Also, understand that there is a 22 00:01:24,750 --> 00:01:27,910 significant risk of financial loss with all investment strategies 23 00:01:27,910 --> 00:01:31,310 and you need to request and understand the specific risks from 24 00:01:31,310 --> 00:01:34,370 the investment manager about their product before you make investment 25 00:01:34,450 --> 00:01:38,650 decisions. Here's your host, veteran hedge fund manager, Niels 26 00:01:38,650 --> 00:01:39,810 Kaastrup-Larsen. 27 00:01:45,090 --> 00:01:48,850 For me, the best part of my podcasting journey has been the opportunity 28 00:01:48,850 --> 00:01:52,290 to speak to a huge range of extraordinary people from all around 29 00:01:52,290 --> 00:01:55,970 the world. In this series, I have invited one of them, namely 30 00:01:55,970 --> 00:01:59,010 Kevin Coldiron, to host a series of in depth conversations 31 00:01:59,610 --> 00:02:03,610 to help uncover and explain new ideas to make you a better investor. 32 00:02:04,250 --> 00:02:07,370 In the series, Kevin will be speaking to authors of new books 33 00:02:07,370 --> 00:02:10,810 and research papers to better understand the global economy and 34 00:02:10,810 --> 00:02:14,530 the dynamics that shape it so that we can all successfully navigate 35 00:02:14,530 --> 00:02:19,370 the challenges within it. And with that, please welcome Kevin Coldiron. 36 00:02:22,330 --> 00:02:26,490 Okay, thanks Niels. And welcome everyone to the Ideas Lab. 37 00:02:26,970 --> 00:02:31,600 I'm going to start today with a quote. "Before the existence of 38 00:02:31,600 --> 00:02:35,320 investment funds, pensions, stocks, bonds or international currency 39 00:02:35,320 --> 00:02:39,720 markets, even before human history was recorded in any meaningful 40 00:02:39,720 --> 00:02:44,440 way, land was the original asset. The ability to own and control 41 00:02:44,520 --> 00:02:49,920 territory was the first means of turning power into wealth." Now, 42 00:02:49,920 --> 00:02:53,960 that quote comes from a new book just out this month called The 43 00:02:53,960 --> 00:02:58,890 Land Trap: A New History of the World's Oldest Asset. The author 44 00:02:58,890 --> 00:03:02,810 and today's guest is Mike Bird. Mike is the economist Wall 45 00:03:02,810 --> 00:03:06,530 Street editor and c-host of the financial podcast Money Talks. 46 00:03:07,010 --> 00:03:09,930 He previously worked at the Wall Street Journal, where he won 47 00:03:09,930 --> 00:03:13,290 the Harold Wincott Award for Young Financial Journalist of The 48 00:03:13,290 --> 00:03:17,130 Year, in 2016. And in 2020, he was part of the Journalist team that 49 00:03:17,130 --> 00:03:20,210 won the Human Rights Press Award for their coverage of the Hong 50 00:03:20,210 --> 00:03:24,570 Kong protest. So Mike, thanks so much for joining us and welcome 51 00:03:24,570 --> 00:03:25,090 to the show. 52 00:03:26,050 --> 00:03:28,770 Kevin, Very, very happy to be here. Thank you for having me. 53 00:03:29,650 --> 00:03:34,170 Okay, so this is a book that includes a lot of history as the 54 00:03:34,170 --> 00:03:37,970 title suggests, but it's history that remains extremely relevant 55 00:03:37,970 --> 00:03:41,970 to understanding the modern financial system. You say that today 56 00:03:41,970 --> 00:03:46,330 the market in land is about twice as valuable as all the listed 57 00:03:46,330 --> 00:03:50,700 companies on every stock exchange in the world. And we're 58 00:03:50,700 --> 00:03:54,260 going to dig into why land remains so central. But before that, 59 00:03:54,260 --> 00:03:57,980 I guess I was curious to ask you about the title of the book, 60 00:03:57,980 --> 00:04:04,300 the Land Trap. Could you summarize for us what the trap is? 61 00:04:04,460 --> 00:04:08,540 And I guess I was also curious, you know, was your motivation 62 00:04:08,540 --> 00:04:11,980 in writing the book because you sort of saw the trap and wanted 63 00:04:11,980 --> 00:04:15,220 to explain it to people or was it something that kind of emerged 64 00:04:15,220 --> 00:04:16,140 from your research? 65 00:04:18,019 --> 00:04:21,419 Absolutely. I think you can think about the trap in a few different 66 00:04:21,419 --> 00:04:24,419 ways. I'll tell you about the way I thought about it. When I was 67 00:04:24,419 --> 00:04:30,819 first starting out, I lived in Hong Kong for several years after 68 00:04:30,819 --> 00:04:33,739 living in London. And when I lived in London I'd become a bit 69 00:04:33,739 --> 00:04:38,739 obsessed with house prices and housing. This is extraordinarily 70 00:04:38,739 --> 00:04:42,899 important in the uk. Huge part of whether you're considered wealthy 71 00:04:42,899 --> 00:04:47,230 secure is about home ownership. And when I moved to Hong 72 00:04:47,230 --> 00:04:53,030 Kong, that was true on steroids. Hong Kong has extraordinarily 73 00:04:53,030 --> 00:04:59,070 high house prices, apartment prices really, and the ownership 74 00:04:59,070 --> 00:05:03,310 or non ownership of, of housing is really the sort of symbol 75 00:05:03,310 --> 00:05:07,590 again even more than in the UK of, of sort of entry to the secure 76 00:05:07,750 --> 00:05:13,070 middle classes. And in Hong Kong the government owns all the 77 00:05:13,070 --> 00:05:16,230 land. And a huge amount of the way the government finances itself 78 00:05:16,230 --> 00:05:19,830 is through land sales. And this jumped out to me and I became 79 00:05:19,830 --> 00:05:25,030 very, very interested in it. And it seemed to me over time that 80 00:05:25,030 --> 00:05:30,070 there was an issue here, a sort of pincer in the sense that 81 00:05:30,230 --> 00:05:34,630 when land prices went up, that brought with it a lot of problems, 82 00:05:35,590 --> 00:05:39,430 greater inequality, young people who couldn't afford to move 83 00:05:39,430 --> 00:05:42,830 out of their parents homes. Very common in Hong Kong to live 84 00:05:42,830 --> 00:05:45,390 with your parents until you get married and you can afford to 85 00:05:45,390 --> 00:05:49,510 buy somewhere. So that was a big problem. If land prices go up, 86 00:05:49,590 --> 00:05:53,910 it exaggerates that part of inequality which is very, very visible 87 00:05:53,910 --> 00:05:59,190 in Hong Kong. But if land prices go down, that brings its own 88 00:05:59,350 --> 00:06:02,190 really, really significant problems, especially in a place like 89 00:06:02,190 --> 00:06:06,900 Hong Kong. Again, because the government loses money that it finances 90 00:06:06,900 --> 00:06:09,740 itself with, that it finances a great deal of its capital investment 91 00:06:10,140 --> 00:06:14,940 in Hong Kong, in Hong Kong's case. But also the largest single 92 00:06:14,940 --> 00:06:19,300 asset that most households have is falling in value. You get 93 00:06:19,300 --> 00:06:23,020 the trickle through effects of that in every way, but mostly through 94 00:06:23,180 --> 00:06:26,820 the wealth effects that we would discuss when talking about 95 00:06:26,820 --> 00:06:30,710 real estate. People pare back their consumption if they think that 96 00:06:30,710 --> 00:06:33,590 their asset wealth is declining. You know, they might be 97 00:06:33,590 --> 00:06:37,750 thinking of their future security and they behave differently 98 00:06:37,750 --> 00:06:40,510 in the present if they, if they believe that their wealth is 99 00:06:40,510 --> 00:06:45,630 declining, even if it's only going to be temporary. So that's 100 00:06:45,630 --> 00:06:49,910 the trap that I was thinking of in writing this book. And I think 101 00:06:49,910 --> 00:06:54,270 through the process of research and writing it almost became 102 00:06:54,270 --> 00:06:58,070 a more expansive thing in that the trap is once you get into this 103 00:06:58,070 --> 00:07:01,930 position where land wealth is a really, really important part of 104 00:07:01,930 --> 00:07:05,570 the economy, an important distinction between haves and have 105 00:07:05,570 --> 00:07:09,130 nots very closely associated with the health of the financial 106 00:07:09,290 --> 00:07:13,530 system as well, it's very, very difficult to move in any direction. 107 00:07:13,770 --> 00:07:16,610 It's very difficult to do anything about it politically. There's 108 00:07:16,610 --> 00:07:19,130 lots of governments all over the world that are pinned between 109 00:07:19,130 --> 00:07:22,930 these really, really difficult to reconcile goals when it comes 110 00:07:22,930 --> 00:07:27,020 to land and housing. And those are especially between, for example, 111 00:07:27,420 --> 00:07:31,820 the existing homeowners want to retain the value of the land, 112 00:07:31,900 --> 00:07:35,220 the property that they own. They would really like it to go up, 113 00:07:35,220 --> 00:07:38,060 and they would like it to go up at a decent speed if possible, 114 00:07:39,260 --> 00:07:44,220 but that's impossible to achieve with a goal of widespread 115 00:07:44,220 --> 00:07:48,820 land and home ownership as well. You can't make it affordable 116 00:07:48,820 --> 00:07:55,920 for people and at the same time make it a rapidly growing store 117 00:07:55,920 --> 00:07:58,840 of wealth. And I think those are the main two elements of it. 118 00:07:58,840 --> 00:08:01,880 This crops up again and again and again through history, these 119 00:08:01,880 --> 00:08:04,960 political conflicts, these financial issues. But the nature 120 00:08:04,960 --> 00:08:08,720 of the trap is that it's very difficult to move in either direction. 121 00:08:08,720 --> 00:08:11,520 That's partly because of the sort of special attributes that land 122 00:08:11,520 --> 00:08:13,680 has as an asset. Yeah. 123 00:08:13,680 --> 00:08:17,440 And so thanks for that. That's a very clear explanation, I have 124 00:08:17,440 --> 00:08:23,430 to say. The first house that I ever owned was in London a very long 125 00:08:23,430 --> 00:08:30,270 time ago. And yeah, I remember thinking that, oh wow, I'm an actual 126 00:08:30,270 --> 00:08:37,310 adult now, I own property. It was a funny feeling, but yeah, property 127 00:08:37,470 --> 00:08:42,630 was really deeply embedded in the culture there. But let's talk 128 00:08:42,630 --> 00:08:48,790 about why land is so valuable as an asset, you give us essentially 129 00:08:48,790 --> 00:08:52,440 three characteristics of that make it so important. I was wondering 130 00:08:52,440 --> 00:08:56,760 maybe you could just go over that, explain that and tell us why 131 00:08:56,760 --> 00:09:00,240 that makes it so valuable as an asset. 132 00:09:01,280 --> 00:09:06,240 Absolutely. So most of the history within the book contains 133 00:09:07,040 --> 00:09:11,760 the last 400 years and really I would say the last 300 years. It's 134 00:09:11,920 --> 00:09:17,690 during the period of economic transformation, essentially the advent 135 00:09:17,690 --> 00:09:21,690 of modernity, industrialization, global trade, 136 00:09:22,490 --> 00:09:27,810 agglomeration, urbanization. So this is a strange thing. And at 137 00:09:27,810 --> 00:09:30,090 the entry of the book I sort of try and imagine this from the 138 00:09:30,250 --> 00:09:36,250 perspective of someone living several millennia ago. Land was extraordinarily 139 00:09:36,250 --> 00:09:40,850 important in a pre modern economy because it was what you grew 140 00:09:40,850 --> 00:09:47,050 crops from. People paid tax, often in the form of grain, and essentially 141 00:09:47,050 --> 00:09:49,770 what you could mine from the ground, what you could grow from. 142 00:09:49,770 --> 00:09:55,250 It was the economy as we know it. It was the lion's share of economic 143 00:09:55,330 --> 00:09:59,930 activity. That's no longer the case. Agriculture is less than 5% 144 00:09:59,930 --> 00:10:03,530 of global economic output. In most advanced economies it's less 145 00:10:03,530 --> 00:10:08,450 than 2%. So that can't be true. And essentially what has happened, 146 00:10:09,220 --> 00:10:12,820 this will come as no surprise to anyone, but the economic activity 147 00:10:12,820 --> 00:10:17,060 around these urban centers that have absolutely exploded, especially 148 00:10:17,140 --> 00:10:21,740 in the last century, but over the last 300 years, let's say, has 149 00:10:21,740 --> 00:10:27,540 given land enormous value. The three facets that I think are most 150 00:10:27,540 --> 00:10:33,300 important are the fact that first, unlike every other asset in 151 00:10:33,300 --> 00:10:37,920 the world and every other good produced by anyone, you can't really 152 00:10:37,920 --> 00:10:43,480 make more of land that's not 100% binding. You look at Tokyo or 153 00:10:43,480 --> 00:10:47,480 Singapore or the Netherlands, they've managed to invent some land 154 00:10:47,480 --> 00:10:51,200 effectively to create some land with these land redemption schemes. 155 00:10:51,200 --> 00:10:54,040 Incredibly useful if you can do it. But in most of the world you 156 00:10:54,040 --> 00:10:57,000 can't do it. It's extraordinarily expensive even when 157 00:10:57,000 --> 00:11:00,960 you can. So very worthwhile. But sort of that's I would say a 158 00:11:00,960 --> 00:11:06,790 sort of 98, 99% binding factor of land. The second factor very closely 159 00:11:06,790 --> 00:11:12,030 related is you can't move it either. Every other part of an economy 160 00:11:12,110 --> 00:11:16,750 is to some degree movable. You can move people, they can move themselves. 161 00:11:17,710 --> 00:11:21,710 You can move a business, you can re domicile it somewhere else. 162 00:11:22,190 --> 00:11:26,670 Capital obviously almost completely free flowing, as are ideas 163 00:11:26,910 --> 00:11:30,300 which you can spread by word of mouth or writing about them or 164 00:11:30,300 --> 00:11:33,940 anything like that. And even the things that get built on top 165 00:11:33,940 --> 00:11:38,700 of land are to some degree movable. You can recycle them. There's 166 00:11:38,700 --> 00:11:41,700 not many people that move their houses around, but the actual 167 00:11:41,700 --> 00:11:46,540 things that it's built out of can be moved Land you can't move. 168 00:11:46,700 --> 00:11:50,220 Which is why functionally identical pieces of land in different 169 00:11:50,220 --> 00:11:52,940 parts of the world, very differently priced. Again, everyone 170 00:11:52,940 --> 00:11:56,420 sort of knows this, but the building blocks actually make it 171 00:11:56,420 --> 00:12:00,720 extremely different to other assets and worthy, I think, of this 172 00:12:00,720 --> 00:12:04,360 sort of singular focus. The third factor that I think people 173 00:12:04,840 --> 00:12:08,240 sometimes forget about when we talk about land and real estate and 174 00:12:08,240 --> 00:12:14,680 housing is that land doesn't decay. Everything else decays. You 175 00:12:14,680 --> 00:12:20,440 know, again, to go to ideas. Ideas are replaced by better ideas. 176 00:12:21,640 --> 00:12:26,160 Businesses fade and die if they don't innovate, if they're producing 177 00:12:26,160 --> 00:12:30,650 something that the people stop wanting. Even human beings age and 178 00:12:30,650 --> 00:12:35,210 die. Everything built on top of land eventually falls apart. The 179 00:12:35,210 --> 00:12:40,370 land itself. That's not the case. Land doesn't depreciate in 180 00:12:40,370 --> 00:12:45,050 accounting terms, which makes it very interesting because if you 181 00:12:45,050 --> 00:12:48,770 happen to own it in the right place, there's no reason to expect 182 00:12:48,770 --> 00:12:52,690 the value to ever fall. It doesn't require intervention of any 183 00:12:52,690 --> 00:12:56,970 kind, innovation, leadership, entrepreneurship, anything like that. 184 00:12:57,850 --> 00:13:02,490 You look at the families in London, let's say, that have owned 185 00:13:02,490 --> 00:13:06,490 portions of central London for large part the last 400 years. These 186 00:13:06,490 --> 00:13:09,730 are some of the wealthiest families in Britain today. The economy 187 00:13:09,730 --> 00:13:13,370 bears no relation to what it did when their ancestors started 188 00:13:14,410 --> 00:13:18,090 building these sort of small land empires. But they've been very 189 00:13:18,090 --> 00:13:21,530 fortunate because they did so in a place that happens to have boomed. 190 00:13:21,730 --> 00:13:25,090 This is not the case in a lot of cases. If you had an agricultural 191 00:13:25,090 --> 00:13:30,730 land Empire in 1500, it might be worth pennies. Now it may well 192 00:13:30,730 --> 00:13:33,410 be not worth very much because the economy's changed so much. But 193 00:13:33,490 --> 00:13:38,170 that sort of luck element means that the fact that land doesn't 194 00:13:38,170 --> 00:13:41,530 decay becomes extremely important for a number of different 195 00:13:41,530 --> 00:13:42,050 reasons. 196 00:13:42,610 --> 00:13:45,490 When you say land doesn't appreciate, okay, land in central 197 00:13:45,490 --> 00:13:49,690 London obviously hasn't depreciated. But you know, land in, 198 00:13:50,010 --> 00:13:53,170 I don't know, let's say central Pennsylvania, where my family 199 00:13:53,170 --> 00:13:58,490 is from, you know, kind of coal country, you know, my parents 200 00:13:58,490 --> 00:14:02,610 land is worth a lot less now than when they, when they bought 201 00:14:02,610 --> 00:14:07,130 it. So is that not depreciation or am I mixing that 202 00:14:07,130 --> 00:14:11,770 up with the change in the kind of, I don't know, the economic value 203 00:14:11,850 --> 00:14:15,150 of the stuff going on around it. Like, how do you distinguish 204 00:14:15,150 --> 00:14:16,030 between those two? 205 00:14:16,510 --> 00:14:19,630 That's a great point, and I think you've nailed it completely 206 00:14:19,630 --> 00:14:24,190 there by thinking about the difference between the economic activity 207 00:14:24,430 --> 00:14:30,030 surrounding a piece of land and the actual depreciation. By depreciation, 208 00:14:30,030 --> 00:14:33,710 I really mean that it doesn't decay naturally. There's no reason, 209 00:14:33,710 --> 00:14:38,550 if the economic activity remains for it to decay. Right. Now 210 00:14:38,550 --> 00:14:41,100 you mentioned, you know, central Pennsylvania. One of the 211 00:14:41,100 --> 00:14:44,140 examples I draw on in the book, towards the end of the book 212 00:14:44,540 --> 00:14:49,420 is a comparison between Detroit and other CITIES in the U.S. 213 00:14:49,740 --> 00:14:55,140 you, you go back to the middle of the 1950s and you look for Census 214 00:14:55,140 --> 00:14:58,220 Bureau used to publish these sort of median house prices before 215 00:14:58,220 --> 00:15:01,340 we had good private data aggregating those sort of things. 216 00:15:01,820 --> 00:15:07,650 You could buy an ordinary home in basically any city in the United 217 00:15:07,810 --> 00:15:13,090 states in the mid-1950s, and it would be somewhere between sort 218 00:15:13,090 --> 00:15:17,810 of 25 and 50% more expensive or cheaper than another. Right. But 219 00:15:17,810 --> 00:15:21,290 all in all, really not a significant difference. You're talking 220 00:15:21,290 --> 00:15:27,330 about in $1955, a few thousand US dollars difference between a house 221 00:15:27,330 --> 00:15:32,050 in San Francisco, Detroit, Cleveland, New York, Chicago, wherever 222 00:15:32,050 --> 00:15:34,640 you wanted. Some would be a little bit bigger, some would be 223 00:15:34,640 --> 00:15:37,560 a little bit smaller. But it was essentially much of a muchness 224 00:15:37,800 --> 00:15:42,440 that obviously isn't the case today. So if I owned land, you know, 225 00:15:42,440 --> 00:15:45,920 you take your two families, one that owned land in, in urban 226 00:15:45,920 --> 00:15:51,560 Detroit and one that owned land in urban Manhattan, those two 227 00:15:51,560 --> 00:15:54,880 families might not have been all that different in the middle 228 00:15:54,880 --> 00:15:59,160 of the 1950s. The result of them keeping that land within the 229 00:15:59,160 --> 00:16:03,310 family is that one now has millions, potentially tens of millions 230 00:16:03,310 --> 00:16:07,430 of dollars in land wealth. All the security that buys them all the 231 00:16:07,430 --> 00:16:10,630 access to credit that buys them, all of the options that it 232 00:16:10,630 --> 00:16:13,910 buys them for living anywhere else in the country. The people who 233 00:16:13,910 --> 00:16:17,550 own the plot in Detroit, obviously they'll be sitting on something 234 00:16:17,550 --> 00:16:21,150 that is in real terms, probably worth less than it was at 235 00:16:21,150 --> 00:16:24,510 the time that it was purchased. So you have these astounding 236 00:16:24,510 --> 00:16:24,990 differences. 237 00:16:25,720 --> 00:16:25,960 Now. 238 00:16:26,040 --> 00:16:30,200 It would be completely unreasonable to have asked someone 239 00:16:30,440 --> 00:16:34,760 in the middle of the 1950s to predict any of this. Right. Explain 240 00:16:34,760 --> 00:16:38,200 to me the economic geography of the early 21st century would have 241 00:16:38,200 --> 00:16:42,280 been a ludicrous thing to ask. You know, even entrepreneurs and 242 00:16:42,760 --> 00:16:46,720 you know, the smartest lenders don't understand these things with 243 00:16:46,720 --> 00:16:50,240 that sort of distance. But when land is the biggest part of 244 00:16:50,240 --> 00:16:54,060 a household balance sheet, the biggest household asset, that is 245 00:16:54,060 --> 00:16:58,060 effectively what you're asking people to guess, and it exposes them 246 00:16:58,060 --> 00:17:01,620 to that one area. So, you know, if you grew up in, in Detroit, 247 00:17:01,780 --> 00:17:06,820 you're locked into what is both a terrible labor market and 248 00:17:07,780 --> 00:17:11,260 your wealth is all locked away in something that's massively exposed 249 00:17:11,260 --> 00:17:15,060 to that local economy. So yeah, when we talk about it not depreciating, 250 00:17:15,060 --> 00:17:18,980 I really mean in, you know, absolute, it doesn't decay terms, 251 00:17:19,609 --> 00:17:22,489 but the value will change enormously based on the economic 252 00:17:22,569 --> 00:17:25,489 activity around It. I think the important thing is that it's 253 00:17:25,489 --> 00:17:28,369 nothing other than the economic activity around it. You 254 00:17:28,369 --> 00:17:31,289 know, I can't really make that. That land in Detroit much more 255 00:17:31,289 --> 00:17:34,529 valuable on my own. There's nothing entrepreneurial or innovative 256 00:17:34,529 --> 00:17:36,729 I can do. It's either there or it's not. 257 00:17:38,360 --> 00:17:42,800 I understand that. And I want to also ask about this second feature 258 00:17:42,800 --> 00:17:46,760 that you said. Land is immovable. Obviously it is. And that 259 00:17:46,760 --> 00:17:50,120 means it's not substitutable. You can't swap an acre of land and 260 00:17:50,541 --> 00:17:54,621 Manhattan for an acre of land in North Dakota. I wondered, you 261 00:17:54,621 --> 00:17:59,501 know, is technology kind of changing that feature to some extent? 262 00:17:59,501 --> 00:18:02,981 Right. I mean, we did see that in Covid. Right. You could all sudden 263 00:18:02,981 --> 00:18:07,501 move from the Bay Area to somewhere else and, you know, essentially 264 00:18:07,501 --> 00:18:11,901 do your job for the most part. Do you. Do you see, foresee that 265 00:18:11,901 --> 00:18:15,741 kind of second feature changing in any way? Or do you. 266 00:18:16,321 --> 00:18:16,641 Or not? 267 00:18:16,641 --> 00:18:17,281 I'm curious. 268 00:18:18,241 --> 00:18:21,601 It's a really great question and it's very difficult to answer. 269 00:18:22,721 --> 00:18:31,521 One of the examples I looked at in the book was the rise of communications 270 00:18:31,521 --> 00:18:34,961 technology in the 20th century, particularly the second 271 00:18:34,961 --> 00:18:39,081 half of the 20th century. A really, really interesting guy, Arthur 272 00:18:39,081 --> 00:18:43,861 C. Clarke, who's a futuristic. It's a great job title. But he, you 273 00:18:43,861 --> 00:18:48,381 know, he was a public intellectual and he. He wrote and 274 00:18:48,541 --> 00:18:54,221 thought about the future. He also co wrote 2001 A Space Odyssey. 275 00:18:54,221 --> 00:18:58,501 So he had a pretty nice life now. He had these incredibly prophetic 276 00:18:58,501 --> 00:19:03,421 thoughts in the early mid-1960s about the future of communications 277 00:19:03,421 --> 00:19:09,481 technology. And he basically nailed the phenomenon that the invention 278 00:19:09,561 --> 00:19:12,841 and dissemination of transistors and semiconductors would 279 00:19:12,841 --> 00:19:16,921 cause for communications. And he said things like, we're going 280 00:19:16,921 --> 00:19:20,681 to be able to communicate cheaply and easily and seamlessly 281 00:19:20,681 --> 00:19:23,241 on different sides of the world. And, you know, you're going 282 00:19:23,241 --> 00:19:28,081 to have someone doing their job in Tahiti who's able to communicate 283 00:19:28,081 --> 00:19:32,001 with someone in New York seamlessly. And it was very, very 284 00:19:32,001 --> 00:19:36,401 early for someone to be saying things like this is really profoundly 285 00:19:36,401 --> 00:19:42,721 excellent forecast. And what he also said was, of course, this 286 00:19:42,721 --> 00:19:46,041 is also going to make the city obsolete. Right. There won't be any 287 00:19:46,041 --> 00:19:50,281 cities. And he worried that we'd all live in sort of giant suburbs, 288 00:19:50,681 --> 00:19:54,121 but there'd be no city center, because why would you need it? Now, 289 00:19:54,761 --> 00:19:58,721 that obviously didn't happen in the latter half of the 20th century 290 00:19:58,721 --> 00:20:01,961 or the early part of the 21st century. And in fact, what you saw 291 00:20:02,141 --> 00:20:07,131 was, was this exaggeration of the benefits of city life. You saw 292 00:20:07,131 --> 00:20:09,971 the emergence of these superstar cities. So exactly what 293 00:20:09,971 --> 00:20:13,131 we're talking about in terms of the flip side of what happened 294 00:20:13,131 --> 00:20:17,451 in Detroit was a handful of extraordinarily expensive global 295 00:20:17,451 --> 00:20:21,091 cities becoming even more expensive. London became dramatically 296 00:20:21,091 --> 00:20:24,971 more expensive. New York, San Francisco, Louisiana. A number of 297 00:20:24,971 --> 00:20:31,081 cities in Asia as well. So I'm always a little bit nervous about 298 00:20:31,081 --> 00:20:35,041 thinking that technological change for communications or information 299 00:20:35,761 --> 00:20:41,241 will change that much. I think there's probably a big part of the 300 00:20:41,241 --> 00:20:46,641 sort of knowledge worker world that wants to live near other similar 301 00:20:46,641 --> 00:20:50,121 people, and we've seen that sort of repeat itself. What I'd say 302 00:20:50,121 --> 00:20:53,041 is slightly different and I don't have any predictions on this, 303 00:20:53,041 --> 00:20:58,201 but transportation technology is very different. So the times in 304 00:20:58,201 --> 00:21:03,481 which we've seen the sort of grip of land and the reduction of 305 00:21:03,481 --> 00:21:08,521 its importance as an asset have often been when major technological 306 00:21:08,761 --> 00:21:13,081 transformations for transport have occurred. I'm thinking if you 307 00:21:13,081 --> 00:21:20,801 look at New York from the sort of 1910s, 1920s, it was transformed 308 00:21:20,801 --> 00:21:24,881 from a place where land was supremely important and the conditions 309 00:21:24,881 --> 00:21:28,161 in lower Manhattan were absolutely squalid and terrible. 310 00:21:28,481 --> 00:21:32,641 And then the rollout of the subway changed things dramatically. 311 00:21:32,641 --> 00:21:35,401 Suddenly you could work in Manhattan, but you could live in 312 00:21:35,401 --> 00:21:38,561 a, in a three bedroom house in the Bronx. Right. It changed things 313 00:21:38,561 --> 00:21:41,361 completely and it really changed the relationship that people 314 00:21:41,361 --> 00:21:44,401 have with land and the financial importance of land for 315 00:21:44,401 --> 00:21:47,601 quite a long time. So those sort of transformations, you know, 316 00:21:47,601 --> 00:21:51,521 same with the car, with la, and a lot of the western cities of 317 00:21:51,521 --> 00:21:55,651 the United States where you just expanded really what was the 318 00:21:55,651 --> 00:22:01,451 reasonable reach of the city, the sort of commutable land. It sort 319 00:22:01,451 --> 00:22:05,811 of opened a second American frontier, basically. So transport 320 00:22:05,811 --> 00:22:09,051 technology can change it. I'm a little bit cautious about information 321 00:22:09,211 --> 00:22:12,411 technology changing it, but you never know. And I think during 322 00:22:13,291 --> 00:22:20,431 COVID you could use it as an example of either the sort of the 323 00:22:20,431 --> 00:22:25,911 weakness of land as an asset in that you don't know where the 324 00:22:25,911 --> 00:22:30,271 economic activity is going to be sustained or how robust it is. 325 00:22:31,311 --> 00:22:34,231 If you look at the cities we really think about as the really 326 00:22:34,231 --> 00:22:38,031 expensive ones, it's changed at the margin, but they're not cheap. 327 00:22:38,351 --> 00:22:41,431 They're not cheap. San Francisco real house prices have 328 00:22:41,431 --> 00:22:44,351 gone down. I don't know anyone who thinks that's cheap. And often 329 00:22:44,351 --> 00:22:48,511 what has happened is the prices have really been reallocated 330 00:22:48,671 --> 00:22:55,241 into very nearby leafier areas. So you might see certain suburbs 331 00:22:55,401 --> 00:22:59,561 and really nice outlying areas that have gone up dramatically in 332 00:22:59,561 --> 00:23:03,481 price. Nick Bloom, an economist, has a paper about this 333 00:23:03,481 --> 00:23:06,801 where he calls it the donor effect. The inner city centers in 334 00:23:06,801 --> 00:23:10,001 places have changed in value. Often that's, you know, central business 335 00:23:10,001 --> 00:23:13,601 districts, offices have Dropped in value. But a lot of the 336 00:23:13,601 --> 00:23:16,521 residential areas with a little bit more space, a little bit 337 00:23:16,521 --> 00:23:20,551 more family oriented, have gone up dramatically in the price 338 00:23:20,631 --> 00:23:24,911 in the same cities. So it's a tough one. I don't know where I fall 339 00:23:24,911 --> 00:23:27,191 on it. I think that the best thing I can say about it is it's 340 00:23:27,191 --> 00:23:28,391 very, very hard to predict. 341 00:23:30,711 --> 00:23:35,271 So these three features that we've just talked about, fixed supply, 342 00:23:35,671 --> 00:23:41,511 immovability and lack of depreciation, make land an ideal 343 00:23:41,511 --> 00:23:47,131 form of collateral for lending. And you say at one point 344 00:23:47,211 --> 00:23:51,051 it essentially is the beating heart of the current system of credit. 345 00:23:51,531 --> 00:23:56,491 And I wonder if you could just kind of give us a sense for just 346 00:23:56,491 --> 00:24:00,731 how important land is in terms of the banking system, in terms of 347 00:24:00,731 --> 00:24:02,811 creating credit right now. 348 00:24:03,851 --> 00:24:07,931 Absolutely. So I think this is something that people often miss 349 00:24:09,611 --> 00:24:13,011 when we talk about land. I think there's a portion of people 350 00:24:13,011 --> 00:24:16,731 who know, a very large portion of people know that most countries, 351 00:24:16,971 --> 00:24:19,931 especially the advanced economies of the world, don't build 352 00:24:19,931 --> 00:24:23,251 enough homes. I think that's a fairly common sentiment. It's fairly 353 00:24:23,251 --> 00:24:27,851 well understood. Then there's a discussion about how we use land. 354 00:24:27,851 --> 00:24:31,211 Who's able to build the regulation around it, the politics 355 00:24:31,211 --> 00:24:33,891 around it, which is a little bit less well known. And this is 356 00:24:33,891 --> 00:24:36,291 the side of things that I think is least well known, which 357 00:24:36,291 --> 00:24:42,321 is land as an asset. Its importance in finance and the historical 358 00:24:42,321 --> 00:24:46,641 angle of the book, I think, I hope, helps to sort of develop this. 359 00:24:46,641 --> 00:24:49,761 You have lots of people throughout the last three or four 360 00:24:49,761 --> 00:24:54,161 hundred years of history sort of independently discovering that 361 00:24:54,161 --> 00:24:57,561 you can use land as a financial asset and create really 362 00:24:57,561 --> 00:25:02,641 enormous amounts of money. You had this discovery among the colonists 363 00:25:02,721 --> 00:25:06,431 that arrived in 19 North America, English speaking colonists, 364 00:25:06,431 --> 00:25:11,751 mostly arriving in North America in the 1600s and 1700s because 365 00:25:11,751 --> 00:25:15,751 they arrived in this place that was absolutely enormously wealthy 366 00:25:15,751 --> 00:25:22,111 in land, had no tight social structure as you did at home in England, 367 00:25:22,991 --> 00:25:26,951 and was also enormously short on cash. So you had all of these 368 00:25:26,951 --> 00:25:30,391 efforts, these public and private land banks where people tried 369 00:25:30,391 --> 00:25:34,011 to invent new currencies, really where the currency would be 370 00:25:34,011 --> 00:25:38,931 based on landowners mortgaging their property. An institution would 371 00:25:39,011 --> 00:25:42,291 issue bills of credit, effectively banknotes, and you'd 372 00:25:42,291 --> 00:25:45,251 be able to transact in these things. People like Benjamin Franklin 373 00:25:45,491 --> 00:25:48,571 thought about this and they were basically inventing a version 374 00:25:48,571 --> 00:25:51,971 of the modern banking system. Because what has happened in the 375 00:25:51,971 --> 00:25:58,011 20th and 21st centuries is banks in particular have become enormously 376 00:25:58,571 --> 00:26:06,051 mortgage oriented. So 1900, you look at 14 economies that then 377 00:26:06,051 --> 00:26:09,051 were sort of the leading industrializing economies. This is 378 00:26:09,211 --> 00:26:14,131 some of The European economies, Japan, America, Britain, 379 00:26:14,131 --> 00:26:19,771 Germany, France. About 32% of total bank lending was mortgages. 380 00:26:20,091 --> 00:26:23,291 I think in Britain at one point it was actually less than 10%. 381 00:26:23,581 --> 00:26:27,341 In the early 20th centuries. In the early 20th century. And then 382 00:26:28,621 --> 00:26:32,541 at the end of the 20th century or even now, you're talking about 383 00:26:33,181 --> 00:26:38,381 more like 60%, a little bit higher than 60%. So there has been 384 00:26:38,541 --> 00:26:42,901 this significant change. You would expect perhaps that banks are 385 00:26:42,901 --> 00:26:45,861 sort of less dependent on something as simple as land collateral 386 00:26:45,861 --> 00:26:49,581 in the past, but in fact they become more so. This is partly because 387 00:26:49,581 --> 00:26:55,251 of bank regulation. The Basel accords have made it relatively easy 388 00:26:55,251 --> 00:26:59,771 for banks to lend mortgages, to lend anything that's collateralized 389 00:26:59,771 --> 00:27:04,971 by residential real estate. There's a group of economists who 390 00:27:04,971 --> 00:27:08,451 call it the great mortgaging. This phenomenon of banks becoming 391 00:27:08,451 --> 00:27:13,891 much more engaged in mortgage lending, much less involved in unsecured 392 00:27:14,051 --> 00:27:17,071 or even secured business lending. It's just more risky, whether 393 00:27:17,071 --> 00:27:20,231 that's for regulatory reasons or not. So you've seen this enormous 394 00:27:20,231 --> 00:27:23,991 expansion. Banks in particular have become much more mortgage oriented 395 00:27:23,991 --> 00:27:24,871 than they used to be. 396 00:27:26,551 --> 00:27:31,391 Yeah, that's something that I keep bumping up against in a lot 397 00:27:31,391 --> 00:27:33,991 of books that I read. And it is kind of extraordinary because 398 00:27:33,991 --> 00:27:37,551 I guess if you study economics, the standard explanation 399 00:27:37,551 --> 00:27:43,511 of the banking system is, hey, banks channel savings to businesses 400 00:27:43,511 --> 00:27:46,711 so they can invest. And really that's not what they do. Banks create 401 00:27:46,711 --> 00:27:49,531 money when they make loans, loans. And most of their loans, as 402 00:27:49,531 --> 00:27:52,331 you said, are against real estate. So really what's happening 403 00:27:52,331 --> 00:27:57,131 is the money supply that, you know, the credit out there is essentially 404 00:27:57,131 --> 00:28:01,891 a function of the future. You know, land rent, surpluses. It's 405 00:28:01,891 --> 00:28:05,491 a, it's a very odd thing and it doesn't map at all into the way, 406 00:28:05,491 --> 00:28:08,651 the way we're taught. And I wondered, you know, I was thinking 407 00:28:08,651 --> 00:28:13,331 about that, wouldn't that create an opportunity for like a 408 00:28:13,331 --> 00:28:16,451 fintech type of lender, a new lender that could come in and say, 409 00:28:16,451 --> 00:28:22,871 hey, we can, you know, we can apply technology to, to lend against 410 00:28:23,191 --> 00:28:29,231 non tangible, non real estate collateral. And it seemed to me that 411 00:28:29,231 --> 00:28:31,031 there would be an opportunity there. 412 00:28:32,391 --> 00:28:37,231 That's, that's not only true, but you have seen sort of attempts 413 00:28:37,231 --> 00:28:41,591 to do this. There are fintechs that are interested in doing these 414 00:28:41,591 --> 00:28:48,711 things. Anything you can get a better idea of. I think where I start 415 00:28:48,711 --> 00:28:53,551 with this is there's a concept in economics literature about lazy 416 00:28:53,551 --> 00:28:59,190 banking. And I don't mean to disparage the bankers who are listening 417 00:28:59,190 --> 00:29:02,911 to this, but collateral is just a great way of lending. If you 418 00:29:02,911 --> 00:29:06,871 don't know and don't care to know anything about the person you're 419 00:29:06,871 --> 00:29:10,761 lending to, it's really, really much easier. And it especially 420 00:29:10,841 --> 00:29:13,441 makes sense because when you're lending money, if you're not 421 00:29:13,441 --> 00:29:17,481 taking an equity stake, your upside is capped, right? You've got 422 00:29:17,561 --> 00:29:22,041 unlimited downside up to the amount that you lend someone, but 423 00:29:22,041 --> 00:29:25,841 your upside is kept, right? They may have the best idea, the 424 00:29:25,841 --> 00:29:29,841 best company in the world, but you don't make any more money lending 425 00:29:29,841 --> 00:29:34,281 to them than you do to just an old company that's stumbling along 426 00:29:35,061 --> 00:29:40,141 like, like the millions of companies out there. So that is enormously 427 00:29:40,141 --> 00:29:46,581 important. So I think there is a gap for fintechs there. And I would 428 00:29:46,581 --> 00:29:49,661 note a part of the later part of the book talks about the fact 429 00:29:49,661 --> 00:29:53,781 that because the U.S. financial system is much more capital 430 00:29:53,861 --> 00:29:58,301 market oriented than most financial systems, especially in 431 00:29:58,301 --> 00:30:02,591 Europe and Asia, it's actually a little bit better on this front 432 00:30:02,991 --> 00:30:10,271 because the sources of more risky business oriented lending, 433 00:30:10,271 --> 00:30:12,711 especially for companies that have some sort of growth story to 434 00:30:12,711 --> 00:30:16,951 tell, is just infinitely better in the US this is why Asian 435 00:30:16,951 --> 00:30:19,991 and European companies, British companies wherever, come 436 00:30:19,991 --> 00:30:24,111 to the US when they want that sort of investment. And that's for 437 00:30:24,511 --> 00:30:28,021 sort of a number of reasons, including institutional ones. You 438 00:30:28,021 --> 00:30:33,221 know, large part of the US pension asset system is able to invest 439 00:30:33,861 --> 00:30:38,741 in these sort of things which that they're just not in Europe and 440 00:30:38,741 --> 00:30:42,421 Asia. So those are much more bank oriented systems that I think 441 00:30:42,421 --> 00:30:45,861 are much more connected to land. I think the difficulty is always 442 00:30:45,861 --> 00:30:52,581 going to be that that sort of capital, the potential collateral, 443 00:30:52,831 --> 00:30:57,871 the intangible assets that we're talking about are heterogeneous. 444 00:30:58,111 --> 00:31:01,551 They're really, really dissimilar to one another. And working 445 00:31:01,551 --> 00:31:06,591 out how much you value, you know, the network effect of a new 446 00:31:06,831 --> 00:31:11,231 social media site or the intellectual property around a piece 447 00:31:11,231 --> 00:31:16,711 of interesting software or any number of other intangible intellectual 448 00:31:16,711 --> 00:31:19,961 property assets is always going to be really, really difficult. 449 00:31:20,361 --> 00:31:24,561 Whereas valuing the piece of real estate, the land usually isn't 450 00:31:24,561 --> 00:31:28,961 that difficult, you know where it is, nobody can run away with the 451 00:31:28,961 --> 00:31:31,321 land beneath the real estate. You know, they would struggle to 452 00:31:31,321 --> 00:31:33,321 run away with the real estate. They'll definitely struggle to run 453 00:31:33,321 --> 00:31:38,161 away with the land. There's so much more security in doing it that 454 00:31:38,161 --> 00:31:42,841 you can see why it's slowly become so important. But what that 455 00:31:42,841 --> 00:31:48,851 does is, is it binds the financial system just completely 456 00:31:48,931 --> 00:31:55,371 to what's happening to land prices and it also amplifies the 457 00:31:55,371 --> 00:31:58,851 sort of regional disparities that we were talking about before. 458 00:32:00,131 --> 00:32:04,411 I think I have a figure in the book Unincorporated businesses. So 459 00:32:04,411 --> 00:32:08,971 this is basically the bucket that contains the vast majority of 460 00:32:08,971 --> 00:32:13,331 America's very small firms, single proprietors and partnerships 461 00:32:13,831 --> 00:32:18,791 have $5.6 trillion in loans pledged against real estate collateral. 462 00:32:18,791 --> 00:32:24,071 That's the end of 2024. It's 72% of their borrowing. Okay, now, 463 00:32:24,151 --> 00:32:28,871 again, for the borrowers, this all makes sense to some degree, right? 464 00:32:29,111 --> 00:32:32,871 I can live in my house while I use it as collateral, right? I don't 465 00:32:32,871 --> 00:32:36,871 have to pawn it, I don't have to pledge it. It's relatively stable. 466 00:32:36,951 --> 00:32:41,351 I probably won't lose it, especially if it's not loan. That's 467 00:32:41,351 --> 00:32:44,831 the entire value of the property. But what that means is 468 00:32:44,831 --> 00:32:49,271 that again, if I'm in Detroit or Cleveland or somewhere where house 469 00:32:49,271 --> 00:32:53,991 prices haven't gone up in the same way, I'm much less able to borrow 470 00:32:54,311 --> 00:32:58,671 against property. I have a much smaller margin, which I could 471 00:32:58,671 --> 00:33:01,991 do that if I own property at all. Whereas if you're living in 472 00:33:01,991 --> 00:33:05,151 a place where the value of the property, the land behind it has 473 00:33:05,151 --> 00:33:09,041 gone up significantly, you're much more able to tap into that credit. 474 00:33:09,041 --> 00:33:12,281 I think everyone knows to some degree, you know, that house prices 475 00:33:12,281 --> 00:33:15,841 are higher in some places than others, but that ability to access 476 00:33:15,841 --> 00:33:21,081 credit when you want to set up a business is a huge thing. You know, 477 00:33:21,081 --> 00:33:23,481 among the very smallest businesses, again, especially the 478 00:33:23,481 --> 00:33:27,641 ones that aren't just immediately going to go to Silicon 479 00:33:27,641 --> 00:33:29,841 Valley, they're not really businesses. You know, you want to 480 00:33:29,841 --> 00:33:35,251 set up anything, any sort of small business. Realistically, venture 481 00:33:35,251 --> 00:33:39,331 capital and private equity aren't for everyone. This is still 482 00:33:39,331 --> 00:33:42,251 a major way of borrowing. It's an even bigger way of borrowing in, 483 00:33:42,251 --> 00:33:46,771 in Europe and again, large parts of Asia. So it's enormously 484 00:33:46,771 --> 00:33:51,931 important from that perspective. And yeah, it, it has 485 00:33:51,931 --> 00:33:56,131 these huge effects and, and in the developing world, you have the 486 00:33:56,131 --> 00:34:01,461 issue of the difficulty of proving your property rights to something. 487 00:34:01,861 --> 00:34:05,821 The Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto, who wrote extensively 488 00:34:05,821 --> 00:34:09,301 about this, and he called it dead capital, you know, a business 489 00:34:09,301 --> 00:34:12,541 or someone might own an asset in every meaningful sense. You know, 490 00:34:12,541 --> 00:34:15,341 everyone around them accepts that they own it. They use it for 491 00:34:15,341 --> 00:34:19,581 its sort of standard economic purpose. They might have a machine 492 00:34:19,581 --> 00:34:23,501 shop on it or a store or a farm. They can use it for the normal 493 00:34:23,501 --> 00:34:27,090 economic purpose. What they can't use it for is its ultimate 494 00:34:27,410 --> 00:34:31,890 financial sort of purpose. They can't borrow against it. They 495 00:34:31,890 --> 00:34:36,170 can't use it in the financial system. And it limits them to an 496 00:34:36,170 --> 00:34:39,530 extraordinary degree. But this is true all over the place to some 497 00:34:39,530 --> 00:34:42,810 degree or another. So what you own in terms of property does give 498 00:34:42,810 --> 00:34:46,290 you huge access to credit when it comes to the formation of small 499 00:34:46,290 --> 00:34:51,170 businesses. Relatively low level financial activity, but often 500 00:34:51,170 --> 00:34:54,480 the sort of financial activity that is the first step that someone 501 00:34:54,480 --> 00:34:58,160 has on the way to something much bigger. You might access all 502 00:34:58,160 --> 00:35:01,160 sorts of different financial products down the line. You might 503 00:35:01,240 --> 00:35:03,560 get a venture capital investment down the line. But for 504 00:35:03,560 --> 00:35:07,440 a lot of people, they start with this form and lacking it might 505 00:35:07,440 --> 00:35:11,640 mean you go off and do something else. That a sort of salaryman 506 00:35:11,640 --> 00:35:15,600 type job is a better bet for you. It has all sorts of effects 507 00:35:15,600 --> 00:35:17,160 that people don't think about very often. 508 00:35:18,280 --> 00:35:21,160 Yeah, that's interesting and I'm glad you brought that up about 509 00:35:21,400 --> 00:35:26,001 the concept of dead capital, because I was thinking about that 510 00:35:26,001 --> 00:35:29,081 section of the book. We had Diane Coyle on the show a couple 511 00:35:29,081 --> 00:35:35,561 months ago and she's written a fascinating book about updating financial 512 00:35:35,721 --> 00:35:39,201 statistics and expanding essentially the range of balance 513 00:35:39,201 --> 00:35:45,721 sheets we produce to include not just the physical capital, but 514 00:35:45,721 --> 00:35:50,361 also natural capital, human capital. And it made me think that, 515 00:35:51,121 --> 00:35:56,361 you know, in her world, you know, the value of human capital 516 00:35:56,361 --> 00:36:01,201 is many times that of physical capital. And, you know, your notion 517 00:36:01,201 --> 00:36:04,881 of dead capital made me think, well, there's actually a lot of human 518 00:36:04,881 --> 00:36:07,961 capital that's kind of dead capital in some sense. If you, if 519 00:36:07,961 --> 00:36:12,441 you have these kind of ideas and you can't get financing to back 520 00:36:12,441 --> 00:36:16,681 them because you don't own land, then you're really not making 521 00:36:16,681 --> 00:36:20,301 the most of your human capital in the same way that you were talking 522 00:36:20,301 --> 00:36:23,421 about those businesses in Peru who have these kind of debt assets 523 00:36:23,421 --> 00:36:24,981 that they can't make the most of. 524 00:36:26,021 --> 00:36:31,061 I think that's absolutely true. And I think that there is a 525 00:36:31,061 --> 00:36:37,701 possibility. There's a really good couple of books by Stan Westlake 526 00:36:37,861 --> 00:36:47,221 and Jonathan Haskell about intangibles. Capitalism without capital 527 00:36:47,301 --> 00:36:50,321 is one of them. They're really, really good and they're all 528 00:36:50,321 --> 00:36:53,641 about the sort of boom in intangible assets in the world. And 529 00:36:53,641 --> 00:36:58,921 I always think of intangible assets as a sort of version of trying 530 00:36:58,921 --> 00:37:03,201 to make a balance sheet out of human capital in one way or another. 531 00:37:03,201 --> 00:37:06,481 You're trying to sort of condense what is often a sort of 532 00:37:06,721 --> 00:37:11,281 direct reflection of human capital into an asset because those 533 00:37:11,281 --> 00:37:15,041 are very, very difficult to finance and borrow against because 534 00:37:15,041 --> 00:37:19,511 they're very heterogeneous. I do think people rely on land, and 535 00:37:19,511 --> 00:37:24,391 you're quite right that it's a limit to human capital as well. One 536 00:37:24,391 --> 00:37:29,071 of the big things in the discussion in the middle of the 20th 537 00:37:29,071 --> 00:37:34,431 century, during the land reform movements in various parts 538 00:37:34,431 --> 00:37:37,991 of the world, Especially in Asia. One of the big elements of 539 00:37:37,991 --> 00:37:42,791 discussion was that once you get more widespread land ownership, 540 00:37:42,791 --> 00:37:48,191 the idea at least was that people invest more in not to be their 541 00:37:48,191 --> 00:37:51,591 own human capital, but their children's human capital. That the 542 00:37:51,591 --> 00:37:54,951 boom in education in various parts of Asia in the middle of the 543 00:37:54,951 --> 00:37:58,711 20th century was down to precisely this. Once people could 544 00:37:58,951 --> 00:38:02,431 invest directly in their own land, they received the return on 545 00:38:02,431 --> 00:38:05,631 that. Rather than some landlord, often an absentee landlord, 546 00:38:05,631 --> 00:38:09,631 receiving the benefit of that, they would use the returns they made 547 00:38:09,631 --> 00:38:14,161 to send their children to school. So there is a sort of. Yeah, 548 00:38:14,161 --> 00:38:17,561 there is a feedback loop there between the human capital side and 549 00:38:17,561 --> 00:38:20,681 the financial capital side. And I would say especially true through 550 00:38:20,681 --> 00:38:21,241 land as well. 551 00:38:21,241 --> 00:38:25,961 Yeah, that's interesting. There's the whole. You have multiple 552 00:38:25,961 --> 00:38:29,401 sections in the book on land reform around the world, in particular 553 00:38:29,401 --> 00:38:33,361 in Asia, but I hadn't thought about it from that perspective. That's 554 00:38:33,361 --> 00:38:36,321 kind of unlocking human capital before. That makes a lot 555 00:38:36,321 --> 00:38:44,681 of sense. Foreign, you know, in the Last sort of 15 minutes here 556 00:38:44,681 --> 00:38:48,721 since you, since you mentioned Asia, I'd like to talk about China. 557 00:38:50,001 --> 00:38:52,960 That's, you know, you have chapter on the role of land in the 558 00:38:52,960 --> 00:38:56,201 Chinese financial system and it's called the Biggest Bubble in 559 00:38:56,201 --> 00:38:59,601 History. That's the chapter title, I believe. And you say that 560 00:38:59,601 --> 00:39:03,361 no country is caught in a bigger land trap than China. So I 561 00:39:03,361 --> 00:39:09,821 want to talk about that. And it seemed in your explanation to 562 00:39:10,701 --> 00:39:15,661 maybe not have completely stemmed from a kind of change in 563 00:39:15,661 --> 00:39:21,061 the tax system, but was driven substantially by that. And that was 564 00:39:21,061 --> 00:39:23,581 really interesting to me. And I thought you did a great job of 565 00:39:23,581 --> 00:39:26,741 kind of making clear how that works. I thought perhaps you could 566 00:39:26,741 --> 00:39:32,401 kind of start with that early 1990s change in the way the tax system 567 00:39:32,401 --> 00:39:36,241 worked in China and then talk us through how that's led to the 568 00:39:36,241 --> 00:39:37,801 kind of land trap that they're in. 569 00:39:38,761 --> 00:39:44,841 Absolutely. So in the 1980s and 1990s in China in particular, 570 00:39:45,641 --> 00:39:50,601 there was a huge amount of work to be done transitioning from 571 00:39:51,321 --> 00:39:56,521 a command economy in which price signals played an extremely 572 00:39:56,521 --> 00:40:04,861 limited role, into a sort of, if not capitalist, then sort of capitalism 573 00:40:04,861 --> 00:40:09,581 adjacent economy. And there were a number of things that were 574 00:40:10,141 --> 00:40:16,101 normal in the People's Republic after its foundation and 575 00:40:16,101 --> 00:40:22,781 up until Deng Xiaoping became paramount leader. That wouldn't really 576 00:40:22,781 --> 00:40:26,971 work afterwards. And one of them was that most Chinese sort of 577 00:40:26,971 --> 00:40:30,611 fiscal activity was done through local and provincial level 578 00:40:30,771 --> 00:40:33,691 governments. They raised most of the money and they spent most 579 00:40:33,691 --> 00:40:37,731 of the money. They were responsible for the administration 580 00:40:38,051 --> 00:40:44,251 of local agricultural collectives and local state owned 581 00:40:44,251 --> 00:40:48,931 organizations and all Sorts of other things. So Chinese local governments 582 00:40:48,931 --> 00:40:54,531 experiment in the 1990s with a variety of, should we say, semi legal 583 00:40:54,531 --> 00:40:59,411 ways of raising money, administrative fees, all sorts of 584 00:40:59,411 --> 00:41:04,371 charges. These are wildly unpopular and basically they all 585 00:41:04,371 --> 00:41:10,851 land back on something that had been imported to China from Hong 586 00:41:10,851 --> 00:41:15,051 Kong in the late 1980s as a relatively small experiment then 587 00:41:15,051 --> 00:41:19,251 in Shenzhen. Basically, leaders of the Chinese government 588 00:41:19,251 --> 00:41:22,811 in the 1980s had become interested in, in the way that Hong 589 00:41:22,811 --> 00:41:28,971 Kong financed itself, which was through land sales. So you had 590 00:41:28,971 --> 00:41:33,851 this amazing situation in that a system that originated in Hong 591 00:41:33,851 --> 00:41:37,811 Kong because it was a useful financing model for the British Empire, 592 00:41:38,051 --> 00:41:42,411 running a very, very distant colony that it didn't want to subsidize 593 00:41:42,411 --> 00:41:49,491 from London, ends up as the emergent system of government financing 594 00:41:49,811 --> 00:41:53,171 in a post communist transitioning, enormous economy. 595 00:41:54,051 --> 00:41:57,491 I don't think that sort of handover was particularly well understood 596 00:41:57,491 --> 00:42:01,251 where this had all come from, but that was how the system went 597 00:42:01,331 --> 00:42:06,051 so very, very rapidly. Land sales become by far the predominant 598 00:42:06,131 --> 00:42:10,291 method of financing for Chinese local governments. And essentially 599 00:42:10,611 --> 00:42:13,451 it means that if you're a provincial government, you have an 600 00:42:13,451 --> 00:42:17,361 interest in land prices being as high as they can possibly be. 601 00:42:17,681 --> 00:42:22,841 Now that in itself isn't necessarily always a bad thing. You 602 00:42:22,841 --> 00:42:26,641 know, high land prices, if the land's sort of well distributed and 603 00:42:26,641 --> 00:42:30,921 everything and very efficiently run, can be a really, 604 00:42:30,921 --> 00:42:35,241 really useful financing tool. And it has been in many other different 605 00:42:35,241 --> 00:42:38,761 parts of the world. You know, property taxes work in all sorts 606 00:42:38,761 --> 00:42:43,401 of useful ways. The main problem in China, I think is twofold. 607 00:42:44,361 --> 00:42:47,481 One, there's a political problem in that the provincial government, 608 00:42:48,201 --> 00:42:51,521 the leaders rotate around, they might be very keen to boost 609 00:42:51,521 --> 00:42:54,601 land prices very, very rapidly while they're in office, because 610 00:42:54,601 --> 00:42:57,121 what happens 10 years down the line is really none of their business. 611 00:42:57,121 --> 00:43:02,441 They'll be long gone. And the second thing is that in China, unlike 612 00:43:02,521 --> 00:43:08,341 in the vast majority of more open economies in the world, Chinese 613 00:43:08,341 --> 00:43:11,901 households don't have much else to invest in, or certainly not 614 00:43:11,901 --> 00:43:17,461 much else that gives them a decent return. Having access to real 615 00:43:17,461 --> 00:43:22,461 estate. To some it's a land lease, but an extended long term 616 00:43:22,461 --> 00:43:26,901 land lease is a way of benefiting from the very, very rapid 617 00:43:26,901 --> 00:43:29,981 growth of the Chinese economy in a way that nothing else really 618 00:43:30,141 --> 00:43:36,091 gave them. Bank accounts had steeply negative real returns for 619 00:43:36,091 --> 00:43:39,731 a long period of time because of the financial repression. The 620 00:43:39,731 --> 00:43:43,331 Chinese stock market's been an absolutely abysmal long term investment 621 00:43:44,371 --> 00:43:47,411 and it was only just getting started then anyway. The financial 622 00:43:47,411 --> 00:43:52,171 products on offer have often sort of blown up or they've secretly 623 00:43:52,171 --> 00:43:54,211 been attached to real estate loans in some way or another. And 624 00:43:54,211 --> 00:43:57,331 they've been a terrible bet. Housing and land has been a great 625 00:43:57,331 --> 00:44:01,051 bet. It's gone up absolutely massively in price. So you have these 626 00:44:01,051 --> 00:44:04,761 two, I would say, push, pull effects, the push coming from the 627 00:44:04,761 --> 00:44:09,041 local governments who suddenly need finance and they need it now 628 00:44:09,041 --> 00:44:11,921 and they're massively incentivized to drive land prices 629 00:44:11,921 --> 00:44:15,401 higher and higher. And the households who have nothing else 630 00:44:15,401 --> 00:44:20,441 to invest in, who will buy land hand over fist, often in ways 631 00:44:20,441 --> 00:44:27,041 that is completely, I would say, separated from the real sort 632 00:44:27,041 --> 00:44:30,671 of economic use of the land. You have Chinese households who, 633 00:44:30,911 --> 00:44:35,511 if they have the savings to do it or buy a second flat and a third 634 00:44:35,511 --> 00:44:39,351 flat or fourth flat. These aren't to rent out, they're not rental 635 00:44:39,351 --> 00:44:43,591 properties. The rental yield is often, you know, sub 2%. Tiny, 636 00:44:43,591 --> 00:44:47,551 tiny returns to be made through these. It's just in the expectation 637 00:44:47,951 --> 00:44:53,471 of capital appreciation and the expectation of security. So this 638 00:44:54,111 --> 00:44:59,131 dynamic, that push and pull has led to what I think is, yeah, 639 00:44:59,131 --> 00:45:01,851 I would call it. I don't know whether it's going to pop and I get 640 00:45:01,851 --> 00:45:04,331 into in the book a little bit about what the consequences are if 641 00:45:04,331 --> 00:45:09,171 it doesn't pop. But this enormous housing problem in China 642 00:45:09,251 --> 00:45:14,291 that comes from this land sale issue, where China has both some 643 00:45:14,291 --> 00:45:20,211 of the symptoms of a massive housing shortage in the prices and 644 00:45:20,211 --> 00:45:24,761 also some of the symptoms of an enormous glut in housing, in that 645 00:45:24,761 --> 00:45:28,721 there is a huge portion of Chinese urban housing that is unoccupied. 646 00:45:29,361 --> 00:45:31,921 There are very few places that manage to do these both at once. 647 00:45:31,921 --> 00:45:36,041 They're both problems. But modern China has managed it. The 648 00:45:36,041 --> 00:45:41,241 government has tried to jump off this roller coaster to one degree 649 00:45:41,241 --> 00:45:45,561 or another. But as I discussed at the beginning, this sort of thing 650 00:45:45,561 --> 00:45:49,781 is extraordinarily difficult. Once you've set the wheels and trainers, 651 00:45:49,931 --> 00:45:54,371 you can either tell every middle class Chinese household that 652 00:45:54,371 --> 00:45:57,571 actually they're being functionally expropriated. You were 653 00:45:57,571 --> 00:46:00,091 told that housing would always go up in value and now it's not. 654 00:46:00,331 --> 00:46:06,411 Sucks to be you. Or you can have a situation in which the sort 655 00:46:06,411 --> 00:46:10,171 of, the house prices go through the roof. The inequality 656 00:46:10,171 --> 00:46:13,851 is exacerbated. And also the financial system and entrepreneurial 657 00:46:13,851 --> 00:46:17,521 activity is warped by the fact that, that this is the only thing 658 00:46:17,521 --> 00:46:20,961 you can invest in and make money in. Why would you set up a 659 00:46:20,961 --> 00:46:24,921 company? Why would you fund a young entrepreneurial company if 660 00:46:24,921 --> 00:46:27,801 you can do this instead? And for a lot of Chinese people, they've 661 00:46:27,801 --> 00:46:31,121 come to what I think for a very long time was the rational decision 662 00:46:31,521 --> 00:46:35,761 that housing was the right asset to invest in. Regardless of 663 00:46:35,841 --> 00:46:37,521 whether you were going to leave it empty or not. 664 00:46:39,392 --> 00:46:45,332 That's just an exceptionally clear explanation. And you know, 665 00:46:45,332 --> 00:46:48,612 you talk about the property developers Evergrand being the, the 666 00:46:48,612 --> 00:46:51,492 most important, essentially stepping into the middle between 667 00:46:51,492 --> 00:46:55,212 those two and that, that really crystallized in my mind how, 668 00:46:55,212 --> 00:46:58,612 you know, you, they were essentially the intermediary that's 669 00:46:58,612 --> 00:47:02,092 going to solve that problem. Government needs to sell land, individual 670 00:47:02,092 --> 00:47:04,932 savers need to buy land. Okay, we're going to step in and we're 671 00:47:04,932 --> 00:47:08,492 just going to, you know, we're going to buy land from the government 672 00:47:08,652 --> 00:47:12,662 and we're going to sell it to, we're going to sell it to individuals 673 00:47:12,742 --> 00:47:16,862 and they essentially filling a need. And of course now, you know, 674 00:47:16,862 --> 00:47:19,942 they're, they, they went bankrupt. And when they did go bankrupt, 675 00:47:19,942 --> 00:47:22,582 there was a lot of people saying, hey, this is China's quote 676 00:47:22,582 --> 00:47:29,262 unquote Lehman moment. Right? And you know, I don't think it's 677 00:47:29,262 --> 00:47:32,502 what hasn't worked out that way, at least as far as I understand. 678 00:47:32,662 --> 00:47:36,702 But like where, what is happening there? Like what is, how 679 00:47:36,702 --> 00:47:39,702 is this being resolved or do we not know? 680 00:47:41,152 --> 00:47:44,192 It's a great question and I think there's a natural instinct 681 00:47:44,272 --> 00:47:51,672 to see this that way from a sort of Western perspective, or not 682 00:47:51,672 --> 00:47:54,872 even a Western perspective, but the sort of, if you think about 683 00:47:54,872 --> 00:47:58,952 this in terms of mainstream finance, how a sort of capitalist 684 00:47:58,952 --> 00:48:03,032 ish system would work, that would be the answer, right? The debt 685 00:48:03,032 --> 00:48:06,432 has become excessive, the returns are too low to service the 686 00:48:06,432 --> 00:48:09,592 debt. In the case the real estate developers, it all goes bust. 687 00:48:09,672 --> 00:48:12,232 The people who've lent to the real estate developers, whether that 688 00:48:12,232 --> 00:48:16,832 be bondholders, banks, whether it be the people that have bought 689 00:48:16,832 --> 00:48:20,072 houses in pre sales, which became absolutely enormous in China, 690 00:48:20,072 --> 00:48:22,992 that was one of the biggest sources of leverage for the real 691 00:48:22,992 --> 00:48:27,232 estate developers go bust. There's a sort of downturn, ripples 692 00:48:27,232 --> 00:48:29,912 through the banking system. It was all quite large enough for this 693 00:48:29,912 --> 00:48:35,192 to work. I think what that misses is that finance is still by 694 00:48:35,192 --> 00:48:39,312 far in my view, the most tightly centrally controlled part 695 00:48:39,312 --> 00:48:43,492 of the Chinese economy. You know, the state banks are still absolutely 696 00:48:43,492 --> 00:48:48,052 enormous. There are still lending targets sent down from the 697 00:48:48,052 --> 00:48:51,892 central government to provinces. This is not something 698 00:48:51,892 --> 00:48:56,052 that the Chinese government has ever intended nor currently intends 699 00:48:56,052 --> 00:49:01,412 to loosen up its grip on. Right. This is extraordinarily important 700 00:49:01,492 --> 00:49:06,732 as a sort of political tool and it will never have quite the 701 00:49:06,732 --> 00:49:10,212 dynamics that you have in the west where you see people go bust 702 00:49:10,372 --> 00:49:14,692 and defaults and bankruptcies and resources being reallocated. 703 00:49:15,252 --> 00:49:19,172 But that's the crux of it for me. It's the reallocation of resources, 704 00:49:19,172 --> 00:49:22,612 which is enormously important. Now, I'm not. I'm not a sort of. 705 00:49:23,332 --> 00:49:26,012 Not an Austrian economist. I don't think you need to sort of flush 706 00:49:26,012 --> 00:49:31,812 out or liquidate an economy to purify it in any way. But there is, 707 00:49:31,972 --> 00:49:35,332 you know, you do need some form of reallocation to allow for 708 00:49:35,812 --> 00:49:39,572 creative destruction of any type. And what's happened in China 709 00:49:39,652 --> 00:49:44,252 is you've prevented a lot of that activity. And you see this misallocation, 710 00:49:44,252 --> 00:49:49,172 this absolutely gargantuan investment into the real estate market. 711 00:49:49,252 --> 00:49:52,732 And basically, I would say, the refusal by the Chinese government, 712 00:49:52,732 --> 00:49:56,692 they pulled the sort of rug out, but they didn't put anything 713 00:49:56,692 --> 00:50:02,472 else there in its place. If you look at house price indexes in 714 00:50:02,472 --> 00:50:04,872 China, they're all astonishingly stable. You haven't 715 00:50:04,872 --> 00:50:09,352 seen, you know, 20%, 30%, 40%, whatever, decline in actual house 716 00:50:09,352 --> 00:50:13,952 prices. What you see is a sort of frozen market, and it's prevented 717 00:50:13,952 --> 00:50:17,311 that sort of reallocation. And I think it's a large part of why 718 00:50:17,311 --> 00:50:24,672 you see the capital efficiency of investment in China declining 719 00:50:24,672 --> 00:50:28,932 and declining and declining over time. It's a huge problem. I 720 00:50:28,932 --> 00:50:31,652 think it's one that's not discussed enough. And it's a huge 721 00:50:31,652 --> 00:50:36,492 benefit of a somewhat more volatile American or Western system 722 00:50:36,892 --> 00:50:41,092 that it does this. And as I say, the Chinese government has tried 723 00:50:41,092 --> 00:50:46,572 to address this. It tried to address it in 2021 by essentially 724 00:50:46,572 --> 00:50:50,532 cutting off the party for the property developers, but it didn't 725 00:50:50,532 --> 00:50:53,932 replace it with anything. Chinese households don't have anything 726 00:50:53,932 --> 00:50:57,252 better to invest in now than they did then. The capital controls 727 00:50:57,252 --> 00:51:00,852 are still in place. Local governments have a huge problem that 728 00:51:00,852 --> 00:51:05,372 they don't really have a better way of raising money. And 729 00:51:05,372 --> 00:51:10,012 so the last sort of four years have been static. They've been really, 730 00:51:10,012 --> 00:51:17,572 really a form of stasis rather than a sort of significant bust, 731 00:51:17,572 --> 00:51:21,092 a reallocation, a depression, anything like that in the real estate 732 00:51:21,092 --> 00:51:24,752 market. But it means there's still something to be done, unless 733 00:51:24,752 --> 00:51:28,952 it just remains in this period of stagnation. I wish I had a better 734 00:51:28,952 --> 00:51:34,072 answer to that, because if I did, they wouldn't be in this problem. 735 00:51:35,032 --> 00:51:38,712 But once you're in this position, I don't know how you resolve 736 00:51:38,712 --> 00:51:41,112 it. It's a sort of I wouldn't start from here problem. 737 00:51:41,192 --> 00:51:46,072 Right, yeah. Well, thanks for that. I appreciate it. There's so 738 00:51:46,072 --> 00:51:50,182 many more things I'd like to ask. You have a. You have a really 739 00:51:50,262 --> 00:51:53,262 fascinating chapter on Singapore as well, as kind of the 740 00:51:53,262 --> 00:51:58,062 one country that seems to have avoided the land trap. I mean, you 741 00:51:58,062 --> 00:52:01,302 say they've got very high ownership rates, something like 90%, 742 00:52:01,942 --> 00:52:07,142 but housing is still affordable. And maybe we could just 743 00:52:07,142 --> 00:52:10,622 kind of just explain to people, because I think it's a model 744 00:52:10,622 --> 00:52:13,902 that certainly I wasn't familiar with. It'd be interesting 745 00:52:13,902 --> 00:52:16,702 for people to hear what Singapore has done that the kind 746 00:52:16,702 --> 00:52:21,612 of the rest of us haven't. And then maybe just we can finish with 747 00:52:21,612 --> 00:52:24,972 you saying is, you know, are there lessons in Singapore that we 748 00:52:24,972 --> 00:52:29,492 can apply elsewhere or is that just kind of a one off exception? 749 00:52:30,932 --> 00:52:35,252 Absolutely. So I lived in Singapore for three years. I was 750 00:52:35,252 --> 00:52:37,892 sort of really interested in this system even before then, but 751 00:52:37,892 --> 00:52:46,912 I lived there 2022-2024, the end of the year. And the system of 752 00:52:46,912 --> 00:52:49,672 housing I think is, it's fascinating, it does have a lot of 753 00:52:50,232 --> 00:52:54,952 online fanboys, but I don't think it's extraordinarily well known, 754 00:52:55,432 --> 00:52:58,832 effectively. Singapore becomes independent. In the middle of the 755 00:52:58,832 --> 00:53:03,552 1960s, Lee Kuan Yew, then the Prime Minister of Singapore, had 756 00:53:03,552 --> 00:53:09,272 a very, very strong view that he wanted to invest in Singapore. 757 00:53:09,352 --> 00:53:11,992 He wanted the government to invest, he wanted private investors 758 00:53:11,992 --> 00:53:14,752 to invest. But he was very, very keen that the benefits of the 759 00:53:14,752 --> 00:53:19,542 investment in didn't simply spill over into privately owned land. 760 00:53:19,622 --> 00:53:23,142 He didn't want the existing landlord class in Singapore to simply 761 00:53:23,462 --> 00:53:26,142 mop all of this up. Most people didn't own homes. He thought 762 00:53:26,142 --> 00:53:29,822 this would be a sort of unjust way of doing things. And there was 763 00:53:29,822 --> 00:53:33,662 a moment effectively in the reset of how Singapore is governed 764 00:53:33,662 --> 00:53:36,942 as it became independent, where this became possible. They 765 00:53:36,942 --> 00:53:41,952 passed something called the Land Acquisition act, which by Western 766 00:53:41,952 --> 00:53:46,112 standards is an extraordinarily punitive regime. 767 00:53:47,152 --> 00:53:51,112 For a long time, for several decades, it allowed the Singaporean 768 00:53:51,112 --> 00:53:55,312 government to buy land from its owners. Compulsory purchases 769 00:53:55,392 --> 00:53:59,592 at extraordinarily cut down prices. The system is considerably 770 00:53:59,592 --> 00:54:02,352 more generous today. But it allowed the Singaporean government 771 00:54:02,352 --> 00:54:05,432 to accumulate a very large portion of the country's land. It 772 00:54:05,432 --> 00:54:09,472 owns some before it now owns something in the region of 90% of. 773 00:54:09,472 --> 00:54:16,952 The country somewhere allowed it to socialize the land stock. 774 00:54:16,952 --> 00:54:21,152 Is that right? Indeed. Indeed. I would say that Singapore is in 775 00:54:21,152 --> 00:54:26,152 general a very capitalistic country. But when it comes to land, 776 00:54:26,712 --> 00:54:31,072 the Singaporean government takes a very, very sort of collective 777 00:54:31,072 --> 00:54:35,832 attitude. And essentially the target as such as it exists is to 778 00:54:35,832 --> 00:54:40,832 make as many Singaporeans as homeowners as is possible. So there's 779 00:54:40,832 --> 00:54:46,432 a, a organization called the Housing and Development Board. It 780 00:54:46,432 --> 00:54:51,512 is essentially responsible for housing Singaporeans and building 781 00:54:52,152 --> 00:54:58,512 the estates that most of them live in, a HDB, as it's known Are 782 00:54:58,512 --> 00:55:01,632 these sort of quasi public private flats that they're like social 783 00:55:01,632 --> 00:55:04,452 housing, but you purchase them. They're not, they're not just 784 00:55:04,452 --> 00:55:07,252 handed out and they're not generally rented. There are some 785 00:55:07,252 --> 00:55:10,772 rented ones, but they're generally owned. The restrictions 786 00:55:10,772 --> 00:55:15,452 on that are. As a Singaporean, as a Singaporean family, a household, 787 00:55:15,612 --> 00:55:20,652 you can own one, you can't own two and rent the other one out. Owning 788 00:55:21,052 --> 00:55:25,612 one property is made relatively easy. The city has a sort 789 00:55:25,612 --> 00:55:30,812 of semi socialized social insurance system, which means that 790 00:55:31,112 --> 00:55:35,352 the mortgage loans you're able to access to do that very cheap. 791 00:55:35,512 --> 00:55:38,112 If you have a low income, you're able to access a grant to 792 00:55:38,112 --> 00:55:40,992 do it. You know, the HDB's in different parts of the city vary 793 00:55:40,992 --> 00:55:45,072 in price, but they're all extraordinarily cheap really, relative 794 00:55:45,072 --> 00:55:49,792 to any other sort of big international financial center. And 795 00:55:49,792 --> 00:55:55,032 the homeownership rate is approaching 90%. So I think I describe 796 00:55:55,032 --> 00:55:59,082 it as a city that's made home ownership easier than it is almost 797 00:55:59,082 --> 00:56:03,602 anywhere else. But a city that's made being a landlord or making 798 00:56:03,602 --> 00:56:06,322 a lot of money from being a landlord much more difficult than 799 00:56:06,322 --> 00:56:10,042 it is in most parts of the world. It's trimmed that line in 800 00:56:10,042 --> 00:56:15,002 a very interesting way. I think the lessons, the rest of the 801 00:56:15,002 --> 00:56:22,282 world from Singapore, again, it's a tough one. I became more pessimistic 802 00:56:22,282 --> 00:56:24,922 as I was writing the book about our ability to fix these things, 803 00:56:24,922 --> 00:56:29,322 which I wish I hadn't, but I did. And I think Singapore went through 804 00:56:29,882 --> 00:56:34,242 a very sharp change in the middle of the 1960s. And I think 805 00:56:34,242 --> 00:56:39,042 those periods of very sudden political and technological transformation 806 00:56:39,042 --> 00:56:41,962 come up again and again through the book as these moments 807 00:56:41,962 --> 00:56:45,642 in flux where something is released, the ball comes loose from 808 00:56:45,642 --> 00:56:50,362 the scrum and the action starts again. You can have a resetting 809 00:56:50,362 --> 00:56:53,732 for better or worse, when you have these moments of transformation. 810 00:56:54,452 --> 00:56:57,092 Unless you do have the moment of transformation, it's quite difficult. 811 00:56:57,092 --> 00:57:00,932 I don't know how you jump from a system where, say, take Britain, 812 00:57:00,932 --> 00:57:05,292 sort of 60% ish, households own their own homes much lower in 813 00:57:05,292 --> 00:57:09,452 the most expensive part of the country in, in London. You can't 814 00:57:09,452 --> 00:57:11,932 expropriate those people because they vote. It wouldn't be 815 00:57:11,932 --> 00:57:14,932 right to do it anyway because, you know, you're abusing property 816 00:57:14,932 --> 00:57:18,012 rights that they, they believe that they had. But it's very difficult 817 00:57:18,012 --> 00:57:20,532 to make everything more affordable if you don't do some version 818 00:57:20,532 --> 00:57:24,062 of that. It's a really, really tough problem. And it's, yeah, I 819 00:57:24,062 --> 00:57:27,102 think no surprise that Singapore managed to do it when it 820 00:57:27,102 --> 00:57:32,302 did. The Only exception to that is the countries that we talked 821 00:57:32,302 --> 00:57:35,862 about earlier when we talked about dead capital. If you are talking 822 00:57:35,862 --> 00:57:40,582 about a country that doesn't have secure land and property rights 823 00:57:40,582 --> 00:57:45,142 already, you have a problem if you're one of those countries. But 824 00:57:45,142 --> 00:57:48,712 you also have this huge opportunity to put in state a system 825 00:57:49,032 --> 00:57:52,992 that's much more stable, much more egalitarian, and you can have 826 00:57:52,992 --> 00:57:57,792 a very dynamic, capitalist, relatively low tax economy on top 827 00:57:57,792 --> 00:58:01,232 of that. But you don't get these sort of iniquities that you 828 00:58:01,232 --> 00:58:04,952 see in a land system. So, yeah, I think there's a lot of opportunities 829 00:58:04,952 --> 00:58:08,752 there for developing countries to look at the model and say, what 830 00:58:08,752 --> 00:58:12,912 can we take from this? It's much, much more difficult for developed 831 00:58:12,912 --> 00:58:18,232 economies, slower growing, less political transformation to 832 00:58:18,232 --> 00:58:19,632 learn something from Singapore, I think. 833 00:58:19,632 --> 00:58:24,752 Yeah, yeah, well, thanks for that. And I think that's a good place 834 00:58:24,752 --> 00:58:29,192 to end. I mean, that basically means that the Land Trap, as you 835 00:58:29,192 --> 00:58:34,072 have written about, is going to be with us for a long time. And 836 00:58:34,072 --> 00:58:38,992 so it's important, I think, for all of us to understand just 837 00:58:38,992 --> 00:58:43,302 what the implications of that are. So, Mike, I know it's an incredibly 838 00:58:43,302 --> 00:58:47,582 busy time for you with the book launch and your day job as well. 839 00:58:47,582 --> 00:58:50,542 So we appreciate you taking the time to join us today and sharing 840 00:58:50,542 --> 00:58:52,782 your ideas and we wish you all the best. 841 00:58:53,182 --> 00:58:55,862 No, thank you very much. I hope someone can either tell me that 842 00:58:55,862 --> 00:59:00,342 I'm completely wrong or that they have the solution to this. I 843 00:59:00,342 --> 00:59:01,022 wish I did. 844 00:59:01,982 --> 00:59:03,182 You'll probably get both. 845 00:59:04,942 --> 00:59:06,142 Hopefully. Hopefully. 846 00:59:06,142 --> 00:59:10,152 Fingers crossed. Okay, so the book is called the Land Trap, A New 847 00:59:10,152 --> 00:59:13,032 History of the World's Oldest Asset. Please make sure to get a 848 00:59:13,032 --> 00:59:16,352 copy. I can guarantee you that we've only just scratched the surface 849 00:59:16,352 --> 00:59:19,952 of the ideas in the book. And make sure to follow Mike's work because 850 00:59:19,952 --> 00:59:23,112 I think you can tell from our conversation that not only are the 851 00:59:23,112 --> 00:59:27,672 ideas important, but they're not yet being discussed enough on 852 00:59:27,832 --> 00:59:32,152 mainstream media. So for all of us here at Top Traders Unplugged, 853 00:59:32,232 --> 00:59:34,452 thanks for listening and we'll see you next time. 854 00:59:35,562 --> 00:59:38,762 Thanks for listening to Top Traders Unplugged. If you feel you 855 00:59:38,762 --> 00:59:41,842 learnt something of value from today's episode, the best way to 856 00:59:41,842 --> 00:59:45,322 stay updated is to go on over to itunes and subscribe to the show 857 00:59:45,482 --> 00:59:48,922 so that you'll be sure to get all the new episodes as they're released. 858 00:59:49,002 --> 00:59:52,282 We have some amazing guests lined up for you. And to ensure our 859 00:59:52,282 --> 00:59:55,402 show continues to grow, please leave us an honest rating and review 860 00:59:55,402 --> 00:59:58,642 in itunes. It only takes a minute and it's the best way to show 861 00:59:58,642 --> 01:00:02,012 us you love the podcast. We'll see you next time on Top Traders 862 01:00:02,012 --> 01:00:02,612 Unplugged.