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You found the backup wrap up your go-to podcast for all things

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backup recovery and cyber recovery.

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In this episode, we get into something that should terrify every IT and security

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professional polymorphic malware.

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This is the kind of malware that literally changes its own code.

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Its signature, its behavior.

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Even the IP addresses it talks to just so your antivirus can't catch it.

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Dr. Mike Saylor joined persona in me to break down how polymorphic malware

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works, why it's been so effective at, uh, evading detection and what the, it's

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scarier cousin metamorphic malware can do.

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That's even worse.

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Well, we also cover waterhole attacks and what behavioral detection

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actually looks like in practice.

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If you thought your antivirus or anti-malware had it covered this episode.

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Hopefully will change your mind and probably scare you a little bit.

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If you don't know who I am.

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I'm w Curtis Preston, AKA, Mr. Backup, and I've been passionate about backup

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and recovery for over 30 years.

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That's right.

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30 years ever since, uh, there were no backups of the production

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database that we just lost.

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So that's why I do this because I don't want you to do that.

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On this podcast.

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We turn unappreciated backup admins into Cyber Recovery Heroes.

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This is the backup wrap up.

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Welcome to the backup wrap up.

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I'm your host, w Curtis Preston, AKA, Mr. Backup.

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And with me, I have a guy that's starting to remind me of

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my wife Prasanna, Malaiyandi.

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How's it going?

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Prasanna.

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So basically I'm awesome because your wife is amazing, is what you're saying.

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Yeah, that's what it was.

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That was what it was.

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I was just like, you were saying something.

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I was like, man, you're starting to sound like my wife, becoming

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very predictable and how

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But in fairness, but yes, because the last episode, I was judgy mc

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Yeah.

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this time though, but be honest, right?

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You knew I was going to ask

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Yeah.

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That's what I'm

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So you did it, but you didn't actually complete it.

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whatever,

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So you failed.

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blah, blah, blah.

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Anyway, hi.

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we have also with us to watch our bickering, we have Dr. Mike Sailor,

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CEO of Black Swan Cybersecurity and co-author with me of this lovely book.

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Learning ransomware response and recovery.

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That should ship any day now for anyone who wants to order it.

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and I believe the, the electronic version is already on its way out.

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Doctor Mike Saylor.

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How's it going,

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Mike?

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everybody.

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Thank you.

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All right,

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like a married couple?

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I think we need a third party to.

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Make

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It Ha it happens

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sometimes.

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so Mike, there's a phrase that you brought up a lot in the book.

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and so I. I wanted to give you an opportunity to talk about it, to talk

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about what it is, why it matters, and is there anything we can do about it?

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And of course, what we're talking about today is polymorphic

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ransomware, AKA, the shapeshifter.

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Do you wanna start this out by talking about VeriLock?

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what was VeriLock or is VeriLock and, how does that factor into

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the, into this whole thing?

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Sure.

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Yeah, it was one of the most, talked about, polymorphic, malware, it

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functioned by compromising your computer with malware that had yet

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to be defined in a, anti-malware antivirus signature base, or heuristics.

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so it, it was designed to, to look different, to behave different, so

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that it could survive the filters.

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and it was usually delivered in a, in an attachment that.

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That you would expect.

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so if you worked in accounting, maybe it was an invoice if you worked

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in, the warehouse, maybe it was a shipping label, if you worked in, the

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computer room or the mail room, maybe it was a PO or something like that.

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So it was designed so that, you, you wouldn't suspect that attachment was,

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malware or something unsolicited.

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But yeah, when you open that attachment, the, it triggered the payload.

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The payload would drop, and start to slowly or, unsu suspiciously, deploy

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itself within the computer and start to, to, to then progress into the, the Mitre

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attack, phases of reconnaissance and.

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asset value identification spreading and those kind of things.

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So the polymorphic part of that was really designed so that, and backing up too.

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So a lot of antivirus software works on a schedule.

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So you could have the latest and greatest, antimalware in a

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ransomware software on your computer.

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Yeah, there is a period of time between infection and detection and some of that

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is analyzing how the software is behaving.

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Some of that is sending snippets of code or heuristics to the vendor and they're

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gonna sandbox it and do their analysis and then it pushes that back out as an update.

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until recently, those updates took about seven to 10 days.

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So you could be infected with something that the antivirus has

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never seen before that could maintain, persistence on that device for seven

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to 10 days before update comes.

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And that's why updates are important.

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The update comes and now your antivirus says, Hey, I found out that

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there's this thing on this computer.

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I need to clean it or quarantine it.

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So that's how it used to work.

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So now polymorphic code says, all right, now I know that on some

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periodic basis I need to change the way I look and the way I behave,

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so that even if, and I, this antivirus anti malware detected how I was

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looking and behaving yesterday, the update that comes in isn't gonna

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catch the way I look and behave today.

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Yeah, interesting.

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So hence the term polymorphic, right?

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So we morphic meaning changing and poly meaning many.

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So not only is it changing, it's changing multiple times, in a single deployment.

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Would that be the right term,

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We would call it a life

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so that, that payload has a lifespan and it would do these, these changes and.

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And I think we're gonna get into it in a little bit, but polymorphic

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code, it's coded, it's hard coded in the malware, how often to change

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the way it looks and behaves.

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could you go over what you mean by looks and behaves?

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is it, oh, I'm just changing my extension or my location where I'm running.

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Maybe it's the footprint of the malware itself, or is there like significant

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parts of the malware that change

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while it's

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changing it, it doesn't, the changing the extension or the

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file type or, or even some of the.

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The consumable content, is somewhat irrelevant to antivirus, antimalware.

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those tools are looking for, file type headers, the flags that say,

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even though it says it's a text file, it's an executable file.

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really what the polymorphic code is doing is changing the signature of

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the malware, and it doesn't take much.

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for example, If I install malware and it's hard coded to communicate back

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to a command and control server at a particular IP address, that is part

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of the signature now of that malware.

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And so when the update comes anti-malware gonna go, Hey, that file contains that

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IP address for a known bad command and control, and we're gonna quarantine it.

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So what the malware is hard coded to do is say, use that IP

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address for the first 72 hours.

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And then change it to this other IP address, increment

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by one or 10, or, some math.

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and that will coincide with the threat actors changing their

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lease on the command and control server, or they build a new one.

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and so that's an example of how that antivirus update is gonna miss the change

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that this malware made, to how it behaves.

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Gotcha.

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So it isn't necessarily as an example, changing out the underlying, say

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on a window system DLLs that it's leveraging or other things like

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Oh, it could for sure.

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Notepad Plus is in the news, and so maybe it's using Notepad plus.

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and some of the related, file structures and support files that are associated

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with Notepad puts plus, and that helps it do, the first day or two

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worth of activity and then it changes its behavior to start using, the

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DLLs, in Microsoft calculator or, or, maybe from the command and control.

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It downloads additional modules.

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And so now the file structure or the file, the malware itself has changed.

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It's no longer a 150 kilowatt file.

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Now it's a megabyte file, and because we've added stuff

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to it, it's been rewritten.

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So now, all the metadata's changed.

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and there's any number of examples.

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just get creative on how you can modify how a file looks and behaves.

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And bad guys are doing that because.

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Antivirus.

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In a lot of cases, most cases, those signatures are point in time things.

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And so you've got a, you've got a period of oper, of time to operate as malware

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before those signatures get updated.

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There's even malware that detects based on it.

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It'll detect what antivirus you're using and behave differently based on that.

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So if you've got trend micro versus eset versus.

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McAfee or some CrowdStrike.

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it will just, it will identify that first and then behave

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accordingly, based on the antivirus capabilities and update schedules.

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Let's go back to, when we, you were talking about Viralock.

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one of the things I read about it was that it would send a document that

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you were expecting, but change it so that it was actually an executable.

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And this is, this is going, this is gonna happen a lot, but that

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seems like something that, that the average person wouldn't fall for.

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You're changing invoice dot doc to invoice doc exe.

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And then people gonna click on that anyway.

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some people just don't realize it and some people are just very busy, right?

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So I've gotta get through a hundred invoices today, and

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there's another invoice, right?

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So they're just trying to do their job.

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and so yeah, very often bad guys, again are taking advantage of human

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nature, Right, We're just, we're too busy to be diligent.

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when you're like, Hey, I expected that sort of document to come here

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I'm gonna ask a dumb question

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in Windows it does, it, does it have to have, do XE to be an executable?

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I know there's DLLs, but don't, doesn't it have to have XE to

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actually be an executable, or can it just run with anything?

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So there are a few file types like, self-expanding, containers,

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like a zip or a tar ball.

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so there's a couple, and it doesn't have to say EXE in order to execute

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like an EXE because again, I can call a file, whatever, I can call

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it A DLL, and it'll look like a DLL.

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Because Windows is associating the file extension with what it thinks

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is necessary to open that file.

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So that's why that icon changes.

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But if you double click on it, windows goes, Hey, wait, I thought it was a

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DLL or a text file, and I'm opening what I think is associated with

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that file type and it's not working.

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So file corrupted, file not readable, whatever.

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Because I just changed the extension.

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But if you look at the file itself in the binary, there's actually

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file type flags and headers that identify it as an executable.

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So you just have to know how to address that file as an

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executable without double

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clicking on

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What I'm hearing you say is if you double click on it,

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it's got the wrong, extension.

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It's not gonna do the thing you want it to do, but there is a way to run it.

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Okay.

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All right.

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So if I think though about polymorphic ransomware.

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Isn't a lot of ransomware implementations where you're downloading modules from

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command and control servers, wouldn't all of those fall under this classification?

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No.

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so traditional, or we would call it static.

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and correct me if I misunderstood your question, but, all of the

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additional, so there is a, the point of polymorphic or metamorphic, which

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I think we'll get to in a minute, is to, evade detection and built in.

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There is also sometimes a capability of disabling antivirus because we're

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now resident on the machine and, we can escalate privileges and.

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Issue commands especially.

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And there's vulnerabilities disclosed recently, of pretty elementary ways of

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disabling windows Defender as an example.

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so there's that.

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then all the other files I call down, are just adding to, my base, executable.

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And so it's not my executable plus five other files.

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It is my base executable that's creating a new executable and in

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a lot of cases, cleaning up after my, cleaning up after myself.

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Gotcha.

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it's always evolving, if

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yep.

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And one other thing to add about, vi lock is, that made it a little

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different is that as it infected other files, it replicated itself.

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So it wasn't just ransomware, it was also a virus.

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And so you could.

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Let's say you, you paid the ransom and you decrypted all your files.

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now all those files still have the virus in them and could very well just

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become reinfected or communicable now,

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Oh.

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others that you might share those files

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Communicable.

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now you brought up the term metamorphic code.

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how is metamorphic versus polymorphic?

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So polymorphic is primarily hard-coded changes.

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this is going to happen in 24 hours.

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This is gonna change from this to that.

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Metamorphic does its own like almost AI analysis of what needs to change and it

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does it when it thinks it's necessary.

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So metamorphic is actually a lot more scary than polymorphic.

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Interesting.

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and is there.

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An understanding of like how common either of those two types are.

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Polymorphic iss probably pretty common 'cause that's just easy to do.

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Metamorphic is like nation state, CIA scary stuff, so probably pretty prevalent.

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You just, we just don't know about it.

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Do you have an example of a metamorphic ransomware attack out there?

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And it's okay if you don't off the top of your head.

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I don't.

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Okay.

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Okay.

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When, like nothing like VE lock, like not a tool like VE lock.

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I'll keep thinking about it as we

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talk, but, I, I've got scenarios in mind without necessarily

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any identifiable names to put

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on it.

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With the stuck net.

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which?

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Which is the

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one

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Stuck Stucks nut was hard coded.

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Okay.

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so that was polymorphic.

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even, Like some of the other ransomware, like the hit target, it was hard coded

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to look for point of sale systems it would move from one asset to the other.

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Cleanup after itself behave a little different, hard coded.

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Yep.

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Yeah, I could just see, I could just see the malware like

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crawling through the thing.

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Are you a point of sale system?

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Nope.

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I have I have a conceptual example of metamorphic code and it was

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called the Frankenstein virus.

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It was developed, I'm having trouble remembering his name, but it was developed

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out of the University of Texas at Dallas.

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Oh.

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And essentially what it would do is a framework would be downloaded that

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completely harmless, like nothing would think this framework was an

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issue at all, but as this framework executed, it would look for resources.

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it would feed off the land.

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So what software, what applications, what DLLs do you have on this computer?

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And it would assemble its malware based on what's available to it.

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That's crazy.

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be an example of metamorphic, but I don't think that made it out of the lab.

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Yeah, and I'm guessing with a lot of the AI stuff, we might

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see more of this in the future.

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Yep.

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making, making mean people smarter, but being stupid.

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something in the research that came up something called a waterhole attack.

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Mike, is this, does that, is that relevant in this discussion?

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It is.

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And so it, it's similar to that one,

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to many strategy that bad guys have.

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what's my least, level of effort that results in the largest possible gain?

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And looking for opportunities to attack victims in, in how they collaborate.

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So Microsoft Teams, zoom, WebEx, slack, SharePoint, all of those are

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what we would consider Waterholes.

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We, we go to those things to, interact with coworkers, update documents,

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share documents, store documents.

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So if I can compromise that water hole, then I've got a, I've got a

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larger pool of potential victims.

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if I can infect that one, that one file in SharePoint, that everybody like

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time, here's the time sheet template or the expense template, right?

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I'm gonna go infect that.

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So now everybody downloads that to do their time sheets in their

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expenses, and I'm infecting everybody that opens that template.

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Is that because they're, there are, they're using like macros?

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Is that what you're talking about there?

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It could be macros, it could be, you know, uh, polymorphic code.

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It could be viralocker on your time sheet template.

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It's just something that a whole bunch of people are accessing.

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right?

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That's a, that's an interesting, you want to talk about the things that

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a polymorphic, piece of code does to make sure that it continues to live.

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Yeah, so well, the life of polymorphic is somewhat known depending

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on the antivirus that you use.

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And so some of the older, traditional ones that code is only gonna live for,

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a couple of weeks, if you're using

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while malware is running wild in

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a couple of weeks.

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and I'll add to that, that single deployment of that code is a couple

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of weeks, but really what happens in the real world is that code will

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likely establish access that then can be multiplied into different threads.

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And so this is, here's another example of a red teaming exercise that we did.

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and this is a, an example of that coordinated effort among

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different attack skill sets.

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So one of the guy on our team, our chief engineer, knew how to write malware.

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I know how to break into buildings and social engineer people.

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another guy is on our team.

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we call him the ghost 'cause no one ever remembers seeing him.

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so very good social engineer, but also very technical.

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So he and I together infiltrated a physical building, social engineered

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employees as if we were from it.

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So I was dressed like this with a certain tie, and so I was the IT manager.

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And he just had a polo shirt on and, with, slacks.

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And so he was the IT engineer and together we, I had my cup of coffee and

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my clipboard and together we presented a level of legitimacy and confidence

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and we just started asking people, Hey, before you leave today, it looks

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like you're getting ready to leave.

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We just need to run an inventory application on your machine

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because we're doing some upgrades to make things work better.

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We all want things to work better.

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I don't need your password or anything.

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I just don't log off yet.

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with their current session, active, plug in a self deploying USB drive, that would

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create a shell, a reverse shell from that workstation all the way back to our chief

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engineer sitting at the hotel saying, all right, got one, move to the next desk.

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And so that malware and that thread lived on that computer for a week.

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But we would do that, 20 to 50 times.

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And.

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The reason you do that persistence, that multi-threaded persistence is because

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antivirus and most computers don't all do the same thing at the same time.

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So a week from now when antivirus signatures update to catch our

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malware, we would see those persistent threads start to drop, right?

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But because we have access to that computer, we've already got the next

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payload ready, and so we deploy our next.

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Payload to one of those active threads, and then it spreads backwards to the other

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machines that were previously compromised.

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So now we get our threads back because we managed to change

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the signature of our malware.

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And so even though the

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malware may only last a week or two, because I have access to the environment,

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I just need to deploy a new, a fresh copy that the antivirus hasn't seen before and

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restart the clock on another week or two.

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So it's basically like trying to play whack-a-mole.

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So as someone who's trying to defend against this, what do you do?

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Like it seems like you're never going to stay ahead of them.

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So

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I.

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but all of those things, are identifiable if you have a baseline.

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the way that malware works.

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If you have a baseline, you can start to look for deviations from that baseline.

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So that's your perimeter IP addresses.

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You're connected to data volume, network protocols being used,

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File access patterns.

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ingress, egress, ingress egress, file integrity.

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So who touched it?

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What did they do?

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network and endpoint behavior.

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User behavior.

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All of those things you can baseline and start to track deviations

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if you have the right tools.

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And bad guys know, a lot of people don't have the tools.

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And even if you did, there's a subset of people that do that's that, that,

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that don't look at it 24 hours a day.

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Yeah, so

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what's interesting about that, that, engagement I was describing where we

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deployed all that ransomware, we did.

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We did a ton of different things.

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We had thir 12 objectives to achieve, and they gave us like

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180 days to achieve 12 objectives.

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We achieved 11 objectives in seven days,

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Wow.

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and then we spent the rest of the time helping them, identify the

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problems and fix the problems.

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But one of the problems, and this goes back to the behavior, is because we

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had access and one of our objectives was to exfiltrate a lot of data.

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And we decided to do a little bit to achieve the objective and then do a lot to

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see how much it would take to get caught.

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And in the debrief, we were talking to the firewall admin and

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said, look, do you review your firewall logs and your bandwidth?

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And he is yeah, every morning I come in, I said, okay, the other

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day we pegged your bandwidth.

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what did you think about that?

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He said, I thought it was weird.

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But then the next day when I came in and it was still pegged,

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I just thought it was normal.

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yeah, you're can't help you buddy.

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so what you're talking about there is shifting from pattern, like file pattern

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recognition to behavioral, recognition.

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I'm not shifting to it.

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But adding, so

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security's all about layers.

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What, how many things can I put between me and the bad guys so that I can

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identify things faster and respond faster before they get to what they

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want or they spread and so yeah.

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It's like when I build a house, do I just need a yard?

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it'd be nice to have a sidewalk and a curb.

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It may be a fence, right?

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So it's all those things that are gonna help me determine when someone

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comes off the street towards my house.

Speaker:

So it can detect things like the, the, it can detect just weird stuff

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like you talked about a mass upload tra, a mass upload of traffic.

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It could also obviously detect, a lot of encryption going on.

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what other

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But it could, it could,

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might it notice?

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it could also be, over the last six months, Curtis

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does not work after 6:00 PM.

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He does not log in, or if he does, he, this is what he does.

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he has this behavior during this period of

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time and this behavior during another period of time.

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And that could be during the day, it could be the weekends.

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you open Microsoft Word, you open the internet.

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but today you opened Excel and Notepad and you went to 50 websites, and those

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could

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Notepad.

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Those could all be harmless activities, but they'll be flagged

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as a deviation from normal behavior,

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and that's

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how you get ahead malware, not because

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it's identified as truly suspect.

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It's identified as a deviation.

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I don't work after four, by the way, just for the record,

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but.

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That's five o'clock.

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I know in one of the previous points you discussed sort of these

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tools, Curtis, I think at some point we're gonna have a podcast episode,

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maybe talking about some of these

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yeah, Of the various tools.

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Yeah.

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Yeah.

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Can't cover everything in one episode or even 10 episodes.

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It's a lot.

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It's a lot to cover.

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so in this topic of polymorphic ransomware and also metamorphic ransomware, can

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you think of anything that we haven't covered that you think is important?

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So one of the things that.

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It is important to security cybersecurity specifically.

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'cause cybersecurity impacts everything.

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if it turns on and has value it, cybersecurity has a, there's a risk to it.

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So we're also limited.

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from a defense perspective, by our resources.

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So that's time, money, tech people,

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right?

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And so one of the things that's very important to an organization or even

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individuals is identify those things that are really valuable, where they are, and

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invest more in protecting that thing.

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and then start to, pull away from that to add layers as resources become available.

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But if you don't, if you don't identify or you don't know where the important things

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are and you just decide to blanket, cover everything, if you had a hundred computers

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and your budget's, a thousand dollars and that's $10 a computer, nine out of

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10 of those aren't as important and you could have invested more, in capabilities

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and recoverability in that one computer.

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Uh, and, do the kind of, the bare minimum good hygiene on the others.

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But then, segmentation, hardening, good policy, good monitoring, good response.

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Have a response plan, uh, good backups.

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what I'm hearing though is just like in, in backup and recovery,

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we talk about not everything is the same from a recovery perspective.

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there are applications that have a much.

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A higher business value and much higher business criticality.

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And so you're not gonna back up Joe's laptop the same way you buy, you

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back up the primary database server.

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And it sounds like the same is true of, cybersecurity.

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It is.

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And so yeah, your retention, classification, or even identification,

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that's all risk-based, value-based approach to applying resources to protect

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what you think is the most valuable.

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What's gonna keep your organization running, and how fast can we

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recover if something bad happens?

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All right.

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Mike, thank you for continuing to contribute to my cyber depression.

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Hey, don't pull your hair

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Yeah.

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too late.

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Too

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late.

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Yeah.

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Prasanna.

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Oh, too, that was hurtful right there at the end.

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Anyway, thanks Prasanna.

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You're welcome.

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And thank you to the listeners.

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That is a wrap.