1 00:00:14,611 --> 00:00:17,541 Justin Norris: So a few weeks ago, there was a dust up on LinkedIn 2 00:00:17,581 --> 00:00:22,361 about a new intent tool that enables marketers to de anonymize specific 3 00:00:22,361 --> 00:00:24,541 individuals that visit your website. 4 00:00:24,541 --> 00:00:28,971 So not just companies, but specific individuals, which tool it is and the 5 00:00:28,971 --> 00:00:33,375 people involved aren't really the point of the story, the incident stuck in my mind. 6 00:00:33,546 --> 00:00:37,706 Though, because of how it reflected our attitudes towards privacy in the 7 00:00:37,706 --> 00:00:42,072 marketing world, so many commonplace marketing practices do very similar 8 00:00:42,072 --> 00:00:46,062 things, like when we drop a marketing automation cookie that lets us see all 9 00:00:46,062 --> 00:00:47,822 of a user's activity on our website. 10 00:00:48,282 --> 00:00:52,572 Or when we de anonymize a company and get a location that lets us triangulate 11 00:00:52,602 --> 00:00:56,862 a user's identity, or when we give money to massive corporations like Google and 12 00:00:56,862 --> 00:01:01,912 Facebook, there's entire business models essentially predicated on various forms. 13 00:01:02,312 --> 00:01:03,622 Of identity profiling. 14 00:01:03,802 --> 00:01:07,932 So the relationship of marketing to privacy is complicated to say the least. 15 00:01:08,502 --> 00:01:12,252 Never totally sat well with me, although it is something I've accepted kind of 16 00:01:12,252 --> 00:01:14,292 as a cost of being in this industry. 17 00:01:14,772 --> 00:01:18,092 However, the whole incident really made me want to dig deeper into the current 18 00:01:18,092 --> 00:01:19,962 state of privacy in marketing today. 19 00:01:20,622 --> 00:01:24,402 And so I could think of no better person to reach out to than Stefan Amel. 20 00:01:24,672 --> 00:01:29,142 He is a legendary practitioner and thought leader in the digital analytics space and 21 00:01:29,142 --> 00:01:31,322 one of the foremost advocates for privacy. 22 00:01:31,662 --> 00:01:33,162 And ethics and marketing. 23 00:01:33,432 --> 00:01:36,602 I first met Stefan incidentally about 12 years ago when he was 24 00:01:36,612 --> 00:01:39,452 my instructor for a web analytics certificate that I was taking. 25 00:01:39,852 --> 00:01:41,722 And I have followed his work ever since. 26 00:01:42,122 --> 00:01:44,652 So Stefan, I really appreciate you being here today. 27 00:01:44,712 --> 00:01:45,562 Stephane Hamel: Thank you for having me. 28 00:01:45,562 --> 00:01:48,202 It's a really a pleasure even after 12 years. 29 00:01:48,202 --> 00:01:48,832 That's amazing. 30 00:01:48,957 --> 00:01:53,646 Justin Norris: Let's dive in and maybe as a first step, just to understand from your 31 00:01:53,646 --> 00:01:55,417 point of view, you think about this a lot. 32 00:01:55,762 --> 00:01:58,752 A lot of marketers go about their day without giving too much thought 33 00:01:58,752 --> 00:02:00,232 necessarily to the privacy piece. 34 00:02:00,672 --> 00:02:04,582 From your perspective, where are we in terms of our attitudes, our 35 00:02:04,582 --> 00:02:06,702 practices with respect to privacy? 36 00:02:06,732 --> 00:02:07,322 Have we gotten better? 37 00:02:07,332 --> 00:02:08,082 Have we gotten worse? 38 00:02:08,082 --> 00:02:09,842 Or is it kind of a mess all in all? 39 00:02:10,613 --> 00:02:11,793 Stephane Hamel: that's a really good question. 40 00:02:11,793 --> 00:02:12,963 Is it better or worse? 41 00:02:13,053 --> 00:02:16,343 better in a sense that there is more consumer awareness. 42 00:02:16,753 --> 00:02:20,613 Sadly, maybe because of all the data leaks stories that we hear in the 43 00:02:20,613 --> 00:02:23,603 press and so on marketers are more. 44 00:02:23,963 --> 00:02:29,066 Aware and conscious about the legal frameworks be at the GDPR in Europe or 45 00:02:29,066 --> 00:02:34,536 the new law 25 in Quebec or even what's happening in the States and so on. 46 00:02:35,036 --> 00:02:40,376 The negative side of things is that I see that the. 47 00:02:40,821 --> 00:02:47,691 Ad network ecosystem or all the ad tech industry is basically saying, Oh, with the 48 00:02:48,131 --> 00:02:53,911 death of third party cookies organizations are enticed to collect more first party 49 00:02:53,911 --> 00:03:01,292 data one end and the marketing and ad tech industry is trying to find other ways of. 50 00:03:01,842 --> 00:03:04,512 Continuing to collect as much information as before, if not 51 00:03:04,522 --> 00:03:05,992 more information than before. 52 00:03:06,372 --> 00:03:10,472 So the net result is that from a privacy perspective, I'm not sure 53 00:03:10,482 --> 00:03:13,762 the end result is going to be better than using, let's say, third 54 00:03:13,762 --> 00:03:15,092 party cookies and stuff like that. 55 00:03:15,419 --> 00:03:16,859 It's evolving very quickly. 56 00:03:17,089 --> 00:03:19,239 there are positive and negative sides to it. 57 00:03:19,579 --> 00:03:24,719 But generally speaking, I think we're aiming into a more privacy friendly 58 00:03:24,769 --> 00:03:27,199 marketing ecosystem on the net. 59 00:03:27,289 --> 00:03:27,519 So. 60 00:03:27,799 --> 00:03:29,209 That's cross our fingers. 61 00:03:29,751 --> 00:03:32,401 Justin Norris: your example that you just gave, you kind of alluded to it. 62 00:03:32,441 --> 00:03:36,180 A lot of marketers and a lot of companies approach privacy 63 00:03:36,180 --> 00:03:38,301 kind of like a set of rules. 64 00:03:38,661 --> 00:03:42,061 That they have to comply with, but they can also get around 65 00:03:42,711 --> 00:03:44,311 in legitimate ways if they can. 66 00:03:44,341 --> 00:03:47,561 So, you know, we set up one loophole and then, so we go around it. 67 00:03:47,561 --> 00:03:51,141 Instead of using cookies, we use, some other form of tracking users. 68 00:03:51,141 --> 00:03:56,122 So it's kind of complying with the letter of things, but not necessarily the spirit. 69 00:03:56,172 --> 00:04:00,042 And you recently wrote about this distinction between legal compliance 70 00:04:00,052 --> 00:04:02,762 and having a true privacy orientation. 71 00:04:02,762 --> 00:04:05,982 What would it mean for a company to actually be privacy oriented? 72 00:04:06,853 --> 00:04:10,263 Stephane Hamel: For me, the huge difference between, especially if 73 00:04:10,313 --> 00:04:14,683 you look at the GDPR in Europe it wasn't, enacted several years ago. 74 00:04:14,993 --> 00:04:19,738 So they went through all of the steps and still are, dealing with you know, 75 00:04:19,868 --> 00:04:26,668 clarifications of the legal text and having specific cases where they can say, 76 00:04:26,668 --> 00:04:31,748 okay, this is a good example, or this is a bad example with bill 25 in Quebec, 77 00:04:31,778 --> 00:04:34,957 we see that the same thing is going on. 78 00:04:34,957 --> 00:04:42,328 So the law is there companies are trying to comply, but mostly from what I've seen 79 00:04:42,328 --> 00:04:45,288 is that for now, at least it's more like. 80 00:04:46,123 --> 00:04:47,163 Legal compliance. 81 00:04:47,413 --> 00:04:47,723 Okay. 82 00:04:47,843 --> 00:04:52,633 I need to do whatever I need to do the minimum amount of things 83 00:04:52,993 --> 00:04:54,881 in order not to get a slap on 84 00:04:54,881 --> 00:04:58,159 my wrist need to check the box that says, Oh, yes, I've 85 00:04:58,159 --> 00:04:59,589 done this and that and so on. 86 00:05:00,129 --> 00:05:02,008 And this creates a scenario where. 87 00:05:02,719 --> 00:05:08,259 You comply from a legal standpoint, but you don't necessarily comply from 88 00:05:08,669 --> 00:05:14,057 the principles of privacy from, basics of marketing, which is listening to 89 00:05:14,057 --> 00:05:18,911 your customers and being aware that if you have a banner on your website. 90 00:05:19,151 --> 00:05:23,834 And you offer them the choice to opt in not. 91 00:05:25,064 --> 00:05:30,366 If they say no, I reject all cookies and I don't want to be tracked, then why do 92 00:05:30,366 --> 00:05:34,936 you try to find ways to circumvent that and say, Oh yeah, okay, I'm going to use 93 00:05:34,936 --> 00:05:37,231 this tool that, It doesn't use cookies. 94 00:05:37,241 --> 00:05:38,111 So it must be right. 95 00:05:38,431 --> 00:05:43,558 Or I can still use Google analytics because Google tells us there's a consent 96 00:05:43,568 --> 00:05:48,928 mode that we should trust Google that when they say, Oh yeah, that's privacy aware. 97 00:05:49,258 --> 00:05:49,728 Trust us. 98 00:05:50,088 --> 00:05:50,988 You can use that. 99 00:05:50,998 --> 00:05:51,798 There was no problem. 100 00:05:51,838 --> 00:05:55,655 So, my hope is that we're going to go from legal compliance 101 00:05:55,665 --> 00:05:57,089 where really, it's a pain. 102 00:05:57,269 --> 00:05:58,089 It's an expense. 103 00:05:58,374 --> 00:06:00,104 And you need resources. 104 00:06:00,244 --> 00:06:01,404 It's a distraction. 105 00:06:01,404 --> 00:06:05,734 It's a barrier to innovation and so on and shift the mindset so 106 00:06:05,744 --> 00:06:13,534 that being privacy aware from the principles respective the ethics of it. 107 00:06:13,934 --> 00:06:16,074 It means that now it's not an expense. 108 00:06:16,084 --> 00:06:16,934 It's an investment. 109 00:06:17,214 --> 00:06:19,954 It means that it becomes a brand value. 110 00:06:20,169 --> 00:06:24,004 In the long term, and that financially it's worth something. 111 00:06:24,354 --> 00:06:25,984 It's an opportunity for innovation. 112 00:06:25,984 --> 00:06:29,194 It's an opportunity to say, okay, I've been using all of those 113 00:06:29,204 --> 00:06:31,154 marketing tools for so many years. 114 00:06:31,324 --> 00:06:33,074 Do I really need all of those? 115 00:06:33,144 --> 00:06:35,264 all of those tools that are collecting data? 116 00:06:36,024 --> 00:06:41,534 Each one trying to pull more data into whatever their system is. 117 00:06:41,874 --> 00:06:43,631 So shifting the mindset a little bit. 118 00:06:44,145 --> 00:06:46,534 Justin Norris: Are there any companies that are actually doing 119 00:06:46,534 --> 00:06:50,005 this today or does it remain aspirational from your point of view? 120 00:06:50,551 --> 00:06:54,471 Stephane Hamel: Sadly I guess I have to admit that it's more aspirational than, 121 00:06:54,891 --> 00:07:01,601 really seeing companies that are really embracing the whole principles of privacy. 122 00:07:01,651 --> 00:07:04,441 But I think that's going to change slowly, gradually. 123 00:07:04,441 --> 00:07:08,955 We're going to see changes where one example that I like to mention, 124 00:07:09,255 --> 00:07:14,518 which I find absolutely absurd is when you look at a privacy policy. 125 00:07:14,893 --> 00:07:19,653 Oftentimes the first statement is your privacy is really important to us. 126 00:07:20,733 --> 00:07:23,843 should be a value proposition from that brand, right? 127 00:07:24,953 --> 00:07:29,623 But then you realize that if you are in Europe, you get a banner. 128 00:07:29,703 --> 00:07:34,193 If you are in Quebec, you get a banner because the law forces you to put a 129 00:07:34,193 --> 00:07:38,133 banner and say, okay we want to collect such and such information and so on. 130 00:07:38,133 --> 00:07:43,713 But if you're anywhere in the rest of Canada, for example, there's no banner. 131 00:07:43,783 --> 00:07:44,903 If you are in the States. 132 00:07:45,558 --> 00:07:47,948 There is no banner and it's open bar. 133 00:07:48,598 --> 00:07:52,268 So it's like, okay, your privacy from a brand perspective, your 134 00:07:52,278 --> 00:07:56,288 privacy is important to us, but it depends where you live. 135 00:07:56,568 --> 00:07:57,808 to me, it doesn't make sense. 136 00:07:57,998 --> 00:08:03,618 Either the privacy is important to the brand as a whole, or it's not. 137 00:08:04,114 --> 00:08:06,904 Justin Norris: And obviously I smiled when you said, you know, 138 00:08:06,904 --> 00:08:10,144 that line, your privacy importance cause they all start with that. 139 00:08:10,144 --> 00:08:14,004 So it's a little bit of like a fig leaf or in a marketing speak. 140 00:08:14,197 --> 00:08:15,517 Is privacy actually important? 141 00:08:15,517 --> 00:08:20,377 So let's think about a potential company that really did value privacy. 142 00:08:20,587 --> 00:08:24,807 And you have this hashtag you often use in your posts, no consent, no tracking. 143 00:08:25,017 --> 00:08:29,037 So a hundred percent consent based model, maybe just walk us through what 144 00:08:29,057 --> 00:08:32,077 it would look like for a company to be using that model, what they would 145 00:08:32,077 --> 00:08:34,717 collect, not collect, how they would interact with customers and so on. 146 00:08:35,222 --> 00:08:39,402 Stephane Hamel: So I guess I came up with the no consent, no tracking hashtag 147 00:08:39,432 --> 00:08:43,602 just because It's an opportunity to step back and think about it as a marketer, 148 00:08:43,692 --> 00:08:45,442 before you actually do something. 149 00:08:45,442 --> 00:08:48,192 So, I didn't want it to be like an absolute. 150 00:08:48,797 --> 00:08:53,077 I want it to be an opportunity for really thinking about your 151 00:08:53,087 --> 00:08:57,497 marketing tactics and being proud about your marketing tactics also. 152 00:08:57,803 --> 00:09:02,443 one of the things I often mention is that we should be proud of what we do 153 00:09:02,463 --> 00:09:06,713 from a marketing standpoint and not wake up in the morning, being afraid 154 00:09:06,713 --> 00:09:14,062 that, Oh, it the day where someone will tweet something or post something What 155 00:09:14,062 --> 00:09:18,622 we're doing in our marketing tactics and we'll say, Oh yeah this company says 156 00:09:18,622 --> 00:09:23,392 they do this, but in reality they do something else or they are creepy and 157 00:09:23,392 --> 00:09:25,922 they are using tools that are arvested. 158 00:09:26,302 --> 00:09:27,772 Too much information, stuff like that. 159 00:09:28,182 --> 00:09:31,462 So really, basically no constant, no tracking is just an invitation to 160 00:09:31,462 --> 00:09:36,392 think about the principles of privacy, of data minimization, of consent 161 00:09:36,432 --> 00:09:38,614 of control and things like that. 162 00:09:38,944 --> 00:09:42,904 so a company could do that fairly easily by looking at. 163 00:09:43,254 --> 00:09:48,874 The Martek stack that they use right now and seeing if any of 164 00:09:48,874 --> 00:09:53,984 those tools are absolutely necessary in the first step, what data they 165 00:09:53,984 --> 00:09:55,724 are collecting for which purpose. 166 00:09:55,784 --> 00:09:57,294 So basically doing an audit. 167 00:09:57,729 --> 00:10:02,825 Of your martech stack and seeing if it's all relevant using a consent 168 00:10:02,835 --> 00:10:07,335 banner on your website where there's no tricks you know, you have the 169 00:10:07,335 --> 00:10:12,181 same types of buttons for agree and reject, for example, no dark pattern 170 00:10:12,181 --> 00:10:15,121 anywhere and respect the user choice. 171 00:10:15,371 --> 00:10:16,771 I don't want to be tracked, then. 172 00:10:18,166 --> 00:10:18,876 Don't track them. 173 00:10:19,136 --> 00:10:22,817 Actually, one of the mistake, is that most banners that we 174 00:10:22,817 --> 00:10:24,427 see are talking about cookies. 175 00:10:25,492 --> 00:10:27,162 But it doesn't really matter. 176 00:10:27,392 --> 00:10:29,850 And I'm not talking from a legal standpoint, but from a 177 00:10:29,860 --> 00:10:32,850 principle standpoint, it doesn't matter if it's cookies or not. 178 00:10:33,100 --> 00:10:35,860 What matter is, are you collecting personal information? 179 00:10:36,720 --> 00:10:38,390 I don't care how you do it. 180 00:10:38,412 --> 00:10:42,532 Whether you use cookies or fingerprinting or any other method. 181 00:10:43,062 --> 00:10:46,692 If I say I don't want to be tracked, then respect my choice. 182 00:10:46,932 --> 00:10:50,162 Otherwise what happened is that consumers are taking control 183 00:10:50,592 --> 00:10:52,452 and they are using ad blockers. 184 00:10:52,792 --> 00:10:53,682 And stuff like that. 185 00:10:53,812 --> 00:10:57,712 So at the end of the day, the marketers are not in any better situation. 186 00:10:58,693 --> 00:11:04,593 Justin Norris: if we model through mentally what that consent respecting 187 00:11:04,593 --> 00:11:05,953 mode of marketing would look like? 188 00:11:06,233 --> 00:11:10,523 I guess one thing that comes to mind is less gating, less trading 189 00:11:10,573 --> 00:11:12,353 contact information for content. 190 00:11:12,893 --> 00:11:17,166 And Lo and behold, a lot of people now are coming around to the notion that that's 191 00:11:17,166 --> 00:11:21,556 actually just a better customer experience and actually better marketing in general. 192 00:11:22,066 --> 00:11:26,897 Do you think that respecting the principles of privacy leads us to better 193 00:11:26,897 --> 00:11:31,347 marketing in all cases, in some cases, or is it sort of an, it depends scenario? 194 00:11:32,037 --> 00:11:34,747 Stephane Hamel: Well, I guess I have to say, you know, I've done so much 195 00:11:34,747 --> 00:11:36,777 consulting that I have to say, it depends. 196 00:11:37,462 --> 00:11:37,812 Justin Norris: Of course. 197 00:11:37,997 --> 00:11:40,407 Stephane Hamel: That's the universal question to everything. 198 00:11:40,727 --> 00:11:44,847 But seriously, I think there are so many scenarios where marketing could 199 00:11:44,857 --> 00:11:50,837 be improved if we only went back to the roots of marketing there were marketing 200 00:11:50,837 --> 00:11:56,047 campaigns before the web and before the internet and the world worked. 201 00:11:56,309 --> 00:11:59,309 existed, There was TV, radio, print and so on. 202 00:11:59,599 --> 00:12:01,089 Now everything is digitized. 203 00:12:01,399 --> 00:12:04,589 But the concepts of marketing remain the same. 204 00:12:04,589 --> 00:12:05,729 It's building trust. 205 00:12:06,009 --> 00:12:07,579 It's listening to your customers. 206 00:12:07,589 --> 00:12:09,259 It's offering value. 207 00:12:09,859 --> 00:12:15,597 And I think it's been too easy for people to simply, okay, 208 00:12:15,657 --> 00:12:19,387 I'm going to spend X amount of dollars on Google or on Facebook. 209 00:12:19,467 --> 00:12:24,122 So it's, Kind of reassuring to say, Oh I'm spending a couple of thousands of dollars. 210 00:12:24,312 --> 00:12:27,674 I see how much traffic I get and I see the net result of that. 211 00:12:27,794 --> 00:12:32,824 Well, as much as possible, given the data that I can collect, it's kind 212 00:12:32,824 --> 00:12:35,144 of reassuring to work in this way. 213 00:12:35,144 --> 00:12:37,934 And that's how it's been for the past, maybe 20 years. 214 00:12:38,344 --> 00:12:42,538 Can you imagine how the internet would be if from the start. 215 00:12:43,629 --> 00:12:48,438 The consumer had retained control over the data they want to share instead of 216 00:12:49,198 --> 00:12:53,195 the evolution that we've seen, where Oh, there's a new trick and there's 217 00:12:53,195 --> 00:12:57,555 a new technology that allows you to, you know, use geolocation and, collect 218 00:12:57,555 --> 00:13:02,426 so much information from different, browser behavior, navigation and so on. 219 00:13:02,616 --> 00:13:03,716 And then, Oh yeah. 220 00:13:03,716 --> 00:13:04,066 Okay. 221 00:13:04,066 --> 00:13:06,026 We can be data brokers and. 222 00:13:06,161 --> 00:13:09,517 Merge the data in one place or several places merged that 223 00:13:09,537 --> 00:13:10,937 with other sources of data. 224 00:13:10,967 --> 00:13:12,707 Oh, that's the only rail. 225 00:13:12,767 --> 00:13:16,667 That's a gold mine, except that the person that benefits the most. 226 00:13:17,067 --> 00:13:19,817 I would say probably the least is the consumer themselves. 227 00:13:20,257 --> 00:13:26,740 So I think we need to change that, prior bang and think differently, just like, you 228 00:13:26,740 --> 00:13:31,040 know, in, in the courses that I'm teaching I'm talking about the evolution of the 229 00:13:31,110 --> 00:13:36,800 seatbelts in cars where initially it was, you know, consumers didn't want it. 230 00:13:37,225 --> 00:13:41,165 And car manufacturers said, Oh, that's an additional cost. 231 00:13:41,425 --> 00:13:43,045 And it's going to be more expensive. 232 00:13:43,095 --> 00:13:45,285 It's a barrier to innovation and so on. 233 00:13:45,495 --> 00:13:47,055 And look at where we are today. 234 00:13:47,055 --> 00:13:52,975 We have super efficient cars, very secure very safe because we don't only 235 00:13:52,975 --> 00:13:58,155 have seatbelts, but we have airbags and we have the frame of the car. 236 00:13:58,155 --> 00:14:02,865 So all that innovation came because security was an important aspect. 237 00:14:03,445 --> 00:14:08,925 And consumers can choose between cars that are reputed to be more secure than others. 238 00:14:09,135 --> 00:14:10,885 So privacy is going to be the same. 239 00:14:10,885 --> 00:14:16,075 We, consumers will pick, will choose brands that they trust because they 240 00:14:16,195 --> 00:14:20,655 see that privacy is part of the value proposition of that brand. 241 00:14:21,196 --> 00:14:23,416 In the long run, I think that's how we're going to win. 242 00:14:23,796 --> 00:14:25,186 I would say the privacy battle. 243 00:14:25,412 --> 00:14:31,792 Justin Norris: taking the seat belt as an analogy, you think perhaps that, you 244 00:14:31,792 --> 00:14:35,232 know, our attitudes towards privacy will evolve from something that's let's pay lip 245 00:14:35,232 --> 00:14:38,322 service to it, but get around it to more like, no it's really going to be baked 246 00:14:38,322 --> 00:14:40,652 into the model and people are going to 247 00:14:40,652 --> 00:14:41,112 respect it. 248 00:14:41,972 --> 00:14:42,232 Stephane Hamel: Yeah. 249 00:14:42,252 --> 00:14:42,722 I think so. 250 00:14:42,722 --> 00:14:49,072 Because going back to that seatbelt analogy, it took regulations and laws 251 00:14:49,072 --> 00:14:51,665 to impose that people wear a seatbelt. 252 00:14:51,696 --> 00:14:56,165 And it also took about 20, 25 years of. 253 00:14:56,636 --> 00:15:01,766 marketing campaign in education so that people realize that when you get in 254 00:15:01,766 --> 00:15:04,046 a car you know, put on your seatbelt. 255 00:15:04,556 --> 00:15:07,856 So it has become a security by default in a way. 256 00:15:09,231 --> 00:15:13,921 I hope it won't take 20, 25 years to educate people so that privacy 257 00:15:13,921 --> 00:15:16,131 by default becomes the norm. 258 00:15:16,491 --> 00:15:20,171 That it becomes automatic that when you purchase something new, the default 259 00:15:20,201 --> 00:15:22,871 password is not password, for example. 260 00:15:23,070 --> 00:15:24,110 that's so obvious. 261 00:15:24,490 --> 00:15:29,520 But how many internet devices and IOTs and, things like that were 262 00:15:29,630 --> 00:15:31,485 shipped with default passwords? 263 00:15:31,705 --> 00:15:33,755 That's not privacy and security by default. 264 00:15:34,175 --> 00:15:39,741 When I do audits, I see the consent banner, I reject all, and I see there's 265 00:15:39,751 --> 00:15:45,642 still tracking going on not just one by mistake, it's almost like a deliberate 266 00:15:46,752 --> 00:15:51,672 facade so that you, okay, yeah, we have a consent banner, we have the nice 267 00:15:51,672 --> 00:15:57,192 legal text from a technical standpoint, it simply doesn't work because the 268 00:15:57,472 --> 00:16:02,365 privacy engineer which is a basically a new role that we see emerging. 269 00:16:02,715 --> 00:16:07,113 You need to have someone from an engineering standpoint that understands 270 00:16:07,123 --> 00:16:13,625 how to, enable that banner and make sure that they're tracking doesn't fire anyway. 271 00:16:14,485 --> 00:16:20,896 So there's a whole set of roles and new job functions that are emerging, 272 00:16:21,126 --> 00:16:25,976 be it from a legal standpoint or from a privacy engineering standpoint that 273 00:16:26,006 --> 00:16:30,446 are becoming like more important that didn't exist just a few years ago. 274 00:16:30,551 --> 00:16:32,241 Justin Norris: What you just described with the cookie 275 00:16:32,241 --> 00:16:34,081 banner, I've seen that too. 276 00:16:34,481 --> 00:16:38,071 Do you think that's often just incompetence or do you think it's malice, 277 00:16:38,121 --> 00:16:40,481 like deliberate flouting the user's 278 00:16:40,606 --> 00:16:43,923 Stephane Hamel: No, I I hope that most of the time it's simply because 279 00:16:45,156 --> 00:16:48,126 getting very difficult to merge. 280 00:16:49,076 --> 00:16:53,686 The profiles of someone who understand the legal perspective, who understand 281 00:16:53,686 --> 00:16:57,136 the marketing perspective, and also understand how technology 282 00:16:57,236 --> 00:16:59,386 works to do all of those things. 283 00:16:59,906 --> 00:17:04,036 Having a profile that merged the three areas is virtually impossible. 284 00:17:04,056 --> 00:17:05,316 So that's why it's a teamwork. 285 00:17:05,366 --> 00:17:11,217 And maybe now more than ever, because I feel like we're in a enabling 286 00:17:11,217 --> 00:17:14,077 phase, a transformation phase. 287 00:17:14,497 --> 00:17:18,767 And we need the skills and the people who have the right skills 288 00:17:18,817 --> 00:17:19,887 to do those kinds of things. 289 00:17:19,896 --> 00:17:22,152 So I think, You don't know what you don't know. 290 00:17:22,152 --> 00:17:25,673 So do your best, but it doesn't mean it's fully 291 00:17:25,673 --> 00:17:26,143 compliant. 292 00:17:26,453 --> 00:17:28,042 Justin Norris: that clicking the reject button doesn't 293 00:17:28,042 --> 00:17:30,243 magically disable all the scripts 294 00:17:30,493 --> 00:17:31,718 their, on their website. 295 00:17:31,903 --> 00:17:32,763 I want to pull on this 296 00:17:32,763 --> 00:17:36,003 thread of the seatbelt analogy a bit more, cause I find it actually really 297 00:17:36,003 --> 00:17:38,853 interesting, but I want to pull on And one of the things you could say 298 00:17:38,853 --> 00:17:43,903 about seatbelts is that the impact of not wearing one is very dramatic 299 00:17:43,913 --> 00:17:47,743 if something goes wrong and it's very visible and obviously very horrible. 300 00:17:47,809 --> 00:17:52,209 With privacy, and that debate I mentioned around this particular 301 00:17:52,209 --> 00:17:55,319 tool at the beginning is kind of interesting from that perspective. 302 00:17:55,769 --> 00:17:59,319 There were the people that were like, this is wrong, you're a bad person if you do 303 00:17:59,319 --> 00:18:00,399 this, you know, it's that point of view. 304 00:18:00,399 --> 00:18:03,229 And then there were people that were like, I don't care. 305 00:18:03,239 --> 00:18:05,529 Like whatever, de anonymize me. 306 00:18:05,529 --> 00:18:06,469 What's the big deal. 307 00:18:06,499 --> 00:18:08,049 And it's like, okay, yes, I can see that. 308 00:18:08,049 --> 00:18:11,019 It's not the same thing as shooting through your windshield at a hundred 309 00:18:11,019 --> 00:18:15,489 kilometers an hour, but there's this sort of cavalier attitude. 310 00:18:15,489 --> 00:18:18,929 And do you think that the lack of kind of visible impact or people like, Hey, 311 00:18:18,929 --> 00:18:22,349 I don't care if Google knows what I'm doing, or I don't care if my iPhone 312 00:18:22,349 --> 00:18:23,359 is listening to me or, you know. 313 00:18:23,511 --> 00:18:26,961 think it was one of the founders of Google that was like, if you're not 314 00:18:26,961 --> 00:18:30,411 doing anything bad, like, why would you, you know, would you want to 315 00:18:30,451 --> 00:18:30,911 Stephane Hamel: Oh yeah. 316 00:18:31,031 --> 00:18:31,441 I hear 317 00:18:31,641 --> 00:18:35,585 Justin Norris: Um, do you fight that sort of cavalier attitude towards privacy? 318 00:18:36,155 --> 00:18:36,565 Stephane Hamel: Yeah. 319 00:18:37,206 --> 00:18:37,226 Yeah. 320 00:18:37,246 --> 00:18:40,106 Either, you know, things like I have nothing to hide. 321 00:18:40,516 --> 00:18:42,286 They know everything anyway. 322 00:18:42,286 --> 00:18:44,976 And they is who exactly we don't know. 323 00:18:45,256 --> 00:18:46,766 But they know everything anyway. 324 00:18:47,106 --> 00:18:53,416 And also if I'm going to be exposed to some advertising, I would prefer 325 00:18:53,416 --> 00:18:57,276 to get something that is customized and tailored to my interests. 326 00:18:57,916 --> 00:18:59,076 And yeah, okay. 327 00:18:59,826 --> 00:19:05,040 I guess, you know, like the seatbelts people were saying What if I 328 00:19:05,080 --> 00:19:10,000 crash, you know, in a lake and I don't have enough time to get out 329 00:19:10,000 --> 00:19:11,350 of the car, I'm going to drown. 330 00:19:11,496 --> 00:19:14,126 so all kinds of saying, yeah, but what if. 331 00:19:15,091 --> 00:19:21,027 Exceptions, things that in reality have a very small chance of actually happening. 332 00:19:22,067 --> 00:19:26,397 But when you realize that your data has been leaked a couple of times, 333 00:19:26,567 --> 00:19:30,327 and that suddenly you see a credit card happening on your credit report. 334 00:19:30,717 --> 00:19:35,567 You see some credit cards popping up that you have no clue where it comes from. 335 00:19:36,217 --> 00:19:40,357 When you see that you can get in trouble because your identity is 336 00:19:40,357 --> 00:19:41,877 being stolen and stuff like that. 337 00:19:42,697 --> 00:19:44,387 Maybe it's like a crash. 338 00:19:44,431 --> 00:19:48,941 it creates such a situation of frustration, lack of control. 339 00:19:49,311 --> 00:19:54,277 You feel like you have that, possibility always over your head you're going 340 00:19:54,277 --> 00:19:57,867 to have issues the next time you want to purchase a car because your credit 341 00:19:57,927 --> 00:20:02,297 report is going to be so bad or issues with the government or issues crossing 342 00:20:02,307 --> 00:20:06,447 the border at the customs because someone else has stolen your identity. 343 00:20:06,657 --> 00:20:08,507 So those are pretty serious things. 344 00:20:08,897 --> 00:20:14,227 So I think people will care more and maybe that personally, that's one of 345 00:20:14,237 --> 00:20:20,747 the reasons why I went from being an advocate for analytics, and I'm still an 346 00:20:20,747 --> 00:20:25,637 advocate for analytics, of course, but more privacy aware because my identity 347 00:20:25,637 --> 00:20:28,997 was my data was leaked several times. 348 00:20:29,222 --> 00:20:35,432 Over the years and just recently I had an attempt of someone in Europe trying 349 00:20:35,432 --> 00:20:40,852 to purchase something using a credit card that I never ordered, So getting 350 00:20:40,872 --> 00:20:45,022 through the trouble of stopping the transaction, the stress that it creates 351 00:20:45,072 --> 00:20:49,122 you don't want to live that just like you don't want to live a crash in a car. 352 00:20:49,447 --> 00:20:51,007 Justin Norris: Well, no, that is serious. 353 00:20:51,117 --> 00:20:56,077 I wonder again, just thinking about consent and tracking, if given the choice. 354 00:20:56,892 --> 00:21:00,372 I usually say no, unless I'm in a hurry and they use a dark pattern. 355 00:21:00,372 --> 00:21:02,042 Like you said, it's hard to find the reject button. 356 00:21:02,042 --> 00:21:02,362 I'm like, ah, 357 00:21:02,362 --> 00:21:04,072 whatever, I just need to get on. 358 00:21:04,482 --> 00:21:05,312 But I do say no. 359 00:21:05,382 --> 00:21:07,462 I use an ad blocker. 360 00:21:07,792 --> 00:21:11,602 I try to use more privacy aware, you know, browsers and technology. 361 00:21:11,872 --> 00:21:15,622 Which again, I'm To some extent conflicts with you know, attempting to use those 362 00:21:15,622 --> 00:21:20,182 technologies as an advertiser in my work as a go to market professional But all 363 00:21:20,182 --> 00:21:25,102 that is to say if the choice is really clear and really respected And enough 364 00:21:25,102 --> 00:21:29,222 people say no eventually those marketing tactics lose their efficacy because 365 00:21:29,492 --> 00:21:33,682 they're no longer there So do you feel like those things maybe just die and we 366 00:21:33,692 --> 00:21:37,312 have different ways of reaching people and like what would those ways look like? 367 00:21:37,512 --> 00:21:38,252 Stephane Hamel: That's a good point. 368 00:21:38,452 --> 00:21:39,222 Two things on that. 369 00:21:39,242 --> 00:21:43,562 One is just yesterday I had a conversation where the concept that 370 00:21:43,642 --> 00:21:48,642 the internet or the web exists because it's subsidized by advertising, right? 371 00:21:49,102 --> 00:21:52,172 And that's why we get so many things for free because it's 372 00:21:52,172 --> 00:21:53,602 supported by advertising. 373 00:21:53,602 --> 00:21:58,492 And if there's too many people who are blocking those ads or saying no, then 374 00:21:58,692 --> 00:22:01,062 the whole system is going to fall apart. 375 00:22:02,172 --> 00:22:05,262 But at the same time, when I look at media websites. 376 00:22:05,803 --> 00:22:09,443 That are often complaining about you know, the big, bad, the Google 377 00:22:09,443 --> 00:22:13,483 and Facebook that are stealing their advertising revenue on media websites. 378 00:22:14,063 --> 00:22:18,343 Yet I go there and what I realize is that if I use an ad 379 00:22:18,343 --> 00:22:20,373 blocker, I don't see the ads. 380 00:22:20,728 --> 00:22:23,318 But there is no contextual ads either. 381 00:22:24,198 --> 00:22:30,198 And contextual ads doesn't require any, no collection of personal data. 382 00:22:30,408 --> 00:22:35,688 It's like, if I'm on a news website and I'm in the car section. 383 00:22:36,573 --> 00:22:37,483 Well, guess what? 384 00:22:37,513 --> 00:22:41,716 Maybe it's the right place to put ads about, the cars and 385 00:22:41,726 --> 00:22:43,236 all things related to cars. 386 00:22:43,236 --> 00:22:46,506 And even beyond that, because you know that if people are 387 00:22:46,506 --> 00:22:49,136 interested in cars, they might be interested in something else. 388 00:22:49,806 --> 00:22:51,786 You don't need to track everyone to do that. 389 00:22:52,142 --> 00:22:52,902 just makes sense. 390 00:22:52,962 --> 00:22:57,062 And at one point in the early days of the web, that's how it was. 391 00:22:57,857 --> 00:23:03,187 So there's that misconception that in order for ads to be effective, it 392 00:23:03,227 --> 00:23:07,263 absolutely needs to collect personal data to do it because you need to know 393 00:23:07,273 --> 00:23:09,239 what are the interests of your audience. 394 00:23:09,924 --> 00:23:13,394 To some extent, it's true, but collecting personal data is not the 395 00:23:13,404 --> 00:23:17,264 only way to know about your audience, And for that matter, if you go into 396 00:23:17,274 --> 00:23:22,344 your Google profile and your Facebook profile and go deep, because you need 397 00:23:22,344 --> 00:23:29,034 to find it, and look at what Google and Facebook think are your interests, 398 00:23:29,354 --> 00:23:30,904 and you're going to be in for a shock. 399 00:23:31,624 --> 00:23:38,344 Because they might say that I'm a woman, that I'm 35 years old, and that I'm 400 00:23:38,344 --> 00:23:40,544 interested in Pokemon and stuff like that. 401 00:23:40,554 --> 00:23:43,204 Well, when it's actually totally wrong. 402 00:23:43,674 --> 00:23:45,974 But I have very little control over that. 403 00:23:46,674 --> 00:23:51,905 So all those interest based advertising, and there's so much fraud also. 404 00:23:51,915 --> 00:23:52,845 That's the other issue. 405 00:23:53,315 --> 00:23:56,265 That maybe contextual ads are going to be. 406 00:23:56,860 --> 00:24:00,240 Maybe a good alternative, much more privacy friendly 407 00:24:00,620 --> 00:24:01,867 you don't need as much data. 408 00:24:01,867 --> 00:24:03,377 it can be much simpler. 409 00:24:03,777 --> 00:24:04,337 So why not? 410 00:24:04,347 --> 00:24:04,667 Why not 411 00:24:04,942 --> 00:24:05,182 Justin Norris: That's 412 00:24:05,182 --> 00:24:05,822 very interesting. 413 00:24:05,852 --> 00:24:06,142 It 414 00:24:06,202 --> 00:24:09,559 reminds me of magazines, you know, I haven't read like a real magazine 415 00:24:09,559 --> 00:24:12,339 in a while, but like back in the day you get like car and driver and it 416 00:24:12,349 --> 00:24:15,419 had a certain type of ad in it and you'd get, another type of magazine 417 00:24:15,419 --> 00:24:17,699 and you kind of know who the audience 418 00:24:17,699 --> 00:24:20,759 is and who's interested in that and you advertise accordingly. 419 00:24:21,355 --> 00:24:25,542 Thinking about, you know, the central issue here, the central conflict 420 00:24:25,562 --> 00:24:29,792 from my point of view is that at least on a level of perception. 421 00:24:30,302 --> 00:24:35,762 Companies are seeing a conflict between Respecting privacy and 422 00:24:35,762 --> 00:24:38,112 their own commercial interests, and I'm sure you've seen this as a 423 00:24:38,112 --> 00:24:41,992 consultant going in making Recommendations like the de anonymization tool is 424 00:24:41,992 --> 00:24:44,542 a perfect example Oh, we can see who exactly is on our website. 425 00:24:44,542 --> 00:24:45,612 We can reach out to them. 426 00:24:45,882 --> 00:24:49,839 It's a great play But is it okay in terms of privacy, but it could make 427 00:24:49,839 --> 00:24:54,339 us money, that's tough particularly, being somebody in house and having to 428 00:24:54,339 --> 00:24:58,196 stand up for that and say like let's make less money potentially for this 429 00:24:58,216 --> 00:25:01,996 abstract principle of privacy which feels like a victimless crime because nobody 430 00:25:01,996 --> 00:25:07,086 really sees Or is aware of the extent to which they're being tracked Like how do 431 00:25:07,086 --> 00:25:11,226 you make that case of like you need to sacrifice your tracking do less profiling 432 00:25:11,236 --> 00:25:15,856 have less effective potentially cold outreach less personalization I think 433 00:25:15,856 --> 00:25:18,649 the contextual advertising that you mentioned is one, effective potential 434 00:25:18,649 --> 00:25:20,179 way of thinking about that differently. 435 00:25:20,589 --> 00:25:21,649 How else, do you make that case? 436 00:25:22,114 --> 00:25:25,284 Stephane Hamel: I'm not saying not to track anything because if you 437 00:25:25,294 --> 00:25:29,204 have a, let's say a consent banner on your website and the person says, 438 00:25:29,694 --> 00:25:32,447 yes, I want to get your advertising. 439 00:25:32,647 --> 00:25:37,097 interested, And if it's done in a respectful way, you build additional 440 00:25:37,097 --> 00:25:41,444 trust, from a marketing standpoint, Do you prefer to have like a thousand 441 00:25:41,884 --> 00:25:46,584 prospects that are, not really qualified, or do you want to have maybe 442 00:25:46,584 --> 00:25:49,424 a hundred that really said, yes, I want. 443 00:25:49,969 --> 00:25:55,579 I think I would much rather go with the fewer that are much more qualified 444 00:25:55,869 --> 00:26:02,659 and not waste my daughter and my time on the 900 others that maybe I 445 00:26:02,669 --> 00:26:06,253 have a slight chance of converting them into, you know, clients. 446 00:26:07,119 --> 00:26:11,369 there was that obsession about data as if it would solve everything. 447 00:26:11,712 --> 00:26:16,142 discourse that was let's collect everything, dump it into a big data 448 00:26:16,142 --> 00:26:19,822 lake, and eventually we're going to figure out what we want to do with it. 449 00:26:19,952 --> 00:26:21,322 That doesn't work anymore. 450 00:26:21,612 --> 00:26:25,956 Even if the data is It's cheap to collect, cheap to store, but pretty 451 00:26:25,956 --> 00:26:28,306 expensive to actually leverage. 452 00:26:28,816 --> 00:26:33,696 So we need to change that and maybe, small data is pretty good too. 453 00:26:33,726 --> 00:26:39,802 You can make very good decisions on less data, but much better data. 454 00:26:40,482 --> 00:26:44,119 Hopefully that's, one of the aspects that we don't have a choice. 455 00:26:44,119 --> 00:26:46,899 We're going to see it anyway, because if we don't. 456 00:26:47,719 --> 00:26:49,294 Embrace concepts. 457 00:26:49,714 --> 00:26:51,354 We're going to be forced anyway. 458 00:26:51,614 --> 00:26:57,436 One clear example of that is if you look at the you mentioned you are 459 00:26:57,436 --> 00:26:59,246 using an ad blocker and I do too. 460 00:26:59,646 --> 00:27:03,416 If you look at the general population depending on the source, it might be 461 00:27:03,436 --> 00:27:07,116 30 percent of the general population that use ad blockers recently, I 462 00:27:07,196 --> 00:27:11,546 saw 50 percent in the States I think that would be pretty high, but let's 463 00:27:11,546 --> 00:27:15,821 say between 30 and 50 percent of the General population use an ad blocker. 464 00:27:16,551 --> 00:27:18,121 Maybe sometimes they don't even know. 465 00:27:18,121 --> 00:27:22,031 It's just part of their system or they use a browser that, blocks third party 466 00:27:22,031 --> 00:27:23,981 cookies already and stuff like that. 467 00:27:24,888 --> 00:27:29,091 When I do conferences and I remember once I had about a thousand people in 468 00:27:29,091 --> 00:27:32,321 the room and they were largely marketers. 469 00:27:32,526 --> 00:27:34,966 And people in analytics and stuff like that. 470 00:27:35,596 --> 00:27:40,866 And I asked them if they were using an ad blocker, it's not super scientific. 471 00:27:40,946 --> 00:27:45,296 I didn't count them, but I can tell you 70 to 80 percent of their hands went up. 472 00:27:45,806 --> 00:27:48,926 So right there to me, there's something broken. 473 00:27:49,306 --> 00:27:53,106 If the general population use, let's say 30 percent of them use. 474 00:27:53,471 --> 00:27:57,601 And that blocker, but when you ask marketers, 70 percent of them use an ad 475 00:27:57,601 --> 00:28:00,367 blocker, what's wrong, does it make sense? 476 00:28:00,737 --> 00:28:05,027 And we are in this industry and we both use an ad blocker. 477 00:28:05,847 --> 00:28:10,320 So to me it's a really good example of something is broken. 478 00:28:10,555 --> 00:28:11,455 We need to fix that. 479 00:28:11,965 --> 00:28:14,745 Justin Norris: So knowing what we know, we choose not to be tracked. 480 00:28:14,965 --> 00:28:16,245 There is a hypocrisy 481 00:28:16,275 --> 00:28:19,382 in, in continuing to try to do that to other people. 482 00:28:19,392 --> 00:28:25,572 So your point of view is that through permission based models and through 483 00:28:25,572 --> 00:28:31,572 alternative models, you ultimately could have, let's say an equal, if not greater 484 00:28:31,572 --> 00:28:33,512 level of efficacy of your marketing. 485 00:28:33,772 --> 00:28:34,662 Or do you think there is a 486 00:28:34,662 --> 00:28:36,872 hard point at which there is that sort of. 487 00:28:37,367 --> 00:28:40,037 devil on one shoulder angel on the other shoulder where it's like 488 00:28:40,047 --> 00:28:42,717 am I going to make more money or am I going To do the right thing? 489 00:28:43,097 --> 00:28:45,277 Do you feel that marketers have to make that choice or can they have 490 00:28:45,277 --> 00:28:46,877 their cake and eat it too ultimately? 491 00:28:47,812 --> 00:28:48,194 Stephane Hamel: Yeah. 492 00:28:48,194 --> 00:28:51,494 one of the argument I hear very often is if, as a company, if 493 00:28:51,494 --> 00:28:54,454 I don't do it, my competitors will, so I don't have a choice. 494 00:28:54,454 --> 00:28:56,634 I need to continue to, you know, play the game. 495 00:28:57,054 --> 00:29:00,894 But as I mentioned, we're in a transition phase in the long run. 496 00:29:01,244 --> 00:29:04,520 If I have, as a consumer, I have a choice to do business with a company 497 00:29:04,520 --> 00:29:08,950 that is reputed to have, three data leaks over the past two years. 498 00:29:09,775 --> 00:29:13,685 And then the alternative is another company that has a really strong 499 00:29:13,685 --> 00:29:17,395 reputation in terms of privacy and their, and how they do marketing. 500 00:29:18,235 --> 00:29:21,975 Eventually a consumer is going to win and they will go with 501 00:29:21,975 --> 00:29:23,515 the one they trust the most. 502 00:29:23,786 --> 00:29:25,126 There is no way around that. 503 00:29:25,501 --> 00:29:28,329 I won't mention the company, but I saw a company that they had a 504 00:29:28,329 --> 00:29:29,809 data leak twice in the same year. 505 00:29:30,112 --> 00:29:30,902 not small ones. 506 00:29:31,712 --> 00:29:35,891 if I'm just a general consumer, maybe I'm not super educated, but 507 00:29:35,891 --> 00:29:37,961 I understand what is a data leak. 508 00:29:37,961 --> 00:29:42,241 I understand that, okay, they didn't take care of the data about their customers. 509 00:29:43,441 --> 00:29:46,371 Am I going to go with them or maybe the other alternative? 510 00:29:46,371 --> 00:29:50,796 Just like, There are consumers that really don't care that the company is, 511 00:29:50,852 --> 00:29:55,762 polluting the environment and they don't have good practice and stuff like that. 512 00:29:56,012 --> 00:29:59,612 And there are consumers who will be very conscious about selecting the 513 00:29:59,612 --> 00:30:04,192 products that are more environmentally friendly and stuff like that. 514 00:30:04,392 --> 00:30:05,572 The same thing is going to happen. 515 00:30:05,662 --> 00:30:06,762 It's a value proposition. 516 00:30:07,707 --> 00:30:10,947 Justin Norris: Almost like another branch of corporate social responsibility 517 00:30:11,007 --> 00:30:16,632 and we do see, environmentalism or even in the fashion industry Just 518 00:30:16,632 --> 00:30:20,312 noticed, for example, like at H and M saw someone who had bought something 519 00:30:20,322 --> 00:30:21,873 and they were promoting like that. 520 00:30:21,873 --> 00:30:25,643 It was like no sweatshop labor or something like these issues companies do 521 00:30:25,943 --> 00:30:28,253 not necessarily because they care deeply. 522 00:30:28,253 --> 00:30:32,023 Maybe they don't, but at least they see it as profitable to align 523 00:30:32,023 --> 00:30:33,683 themselves with those issues. 524 00:30:34,238 --> 00:30:36,978 Stephane Hamel: In the long run, we see the difference 525 00:30:36,978 --> 00:30:39,221 between, the fast fashion where. 526 00:30:39,581 --> 00:30:42,907 It's so cheap they are exploiting people and stuff like that. 527 00:30:43,517 --> 00:30:48,197 It's still sell, but you see in Europe, they actually enacted a law that goes 528 00:30:48,207 --> 00:30:52,597 against the fast fashion trend to limit the impact of those things. 529 00:30:52,887 --> 00:30:57,128 So right now for example, in Canada, we see that PIPEDA is 530 00:30:57,338 --> 00:31:00,238 over 20 years old and, Bill C 27. 531 00:31:01,258 --> 00:31:06,764 Is gradually and slowly coming back to which would be basically the new version 532 00:31:06,764 --> 00:31:10,223 of the privacy law in in the States. 533 00:31:10,446 --> 00:31:13,516 There is a lot of action going on in each of the states and 534 00:31:13,526 --> 00:31:15,273 even at the federal level to. 535 00:31:15,601 --> 00:31:18,121 have better privacy regulation. 536 00:31:18,684 --> 00:31:23,684 we're at that stage where there's a lot of lobbying, of course, also. 537 00:31:24,084 --> 00:31:28,205 So we'll see how it goes, but I think for sure it cannot go backward where. 538 00:31:28,520 --> 00:31:31,860 It's going to be the open bar and free for all, where you do anything you 539 00:31:31,860 --> 00:31:36,080 want, you collect everything you want and you sell it, share it and merge it 540 00:31:36,220 --> 00:31:38,770 with anything else that won't come back. 541 00:31:39,130 --> 00:31:40,320 And I think that's a good thing. 542 00:31:41,050 --> 00:31:45,870 Justin Norris: If we think about the major players in this industry, like. 543 00:31:46,350 --> 00:31:50,110 used the term in my post the other day the advertising industrial complex 544 00:31:50,110 --> 00:31:54,010 like sort of half tongue in cheek But we look at google ad revenue last 545 00:31:54,010 --> 00:31:59,990 year over 237 billion dollars facebook ad revenue over 100 billion dollars. 546 00:32:00,420 --> 00:32:07,220 These are not small numbers Will those sorts of you know corporate 547 00:32:07,220 --> 00:32:09,120 and institutional forces do they? 548 00:32:09,955 --> 00:32:14,185 have a role in, in terms of stopping progress or taking apparent progress 549 00:32:14,185 --> 00:32:18,345 and kind of redirecting it in ways that ultimately still allow them to do what 550 00:32:18,345 --> 00:32:20,255 they do and that they will benefit from 551 00:32:20,990 --> 00:32:21,440 Stephane Hamel: Yeah. 552 00:32:21,880 --> 00:32:26,674 if we look at Google, for example, it's funny because they postponed it again the 553 00:32:26,674 --> 00:32:31,864 famous death of third party cookies, or some people call it the cookie apocalypse. 554 00:32:32,254 --> 00:32:37,834 But it's essentially what the ad network industry has been relying on to, track 555 00:32:37,854 --> 00:32:39,244 people across different websites. 556 00:32:40,084 --> 00:32:44,484 And if you cannot use third party cookies, then it's much harder to do that. 557 00:32:45,044 --> 00:32:48,234 So Google say, oh, we care about your privacy and so on. 558 00:32:48,284 --> 00:32:53,894 Yet they've postponed the limiting of third party cookies for so long. 559 00:32:54,124 --> 00:32:56,264 When you look at other browsers. 560 00:32:56,549 --> 00:33:00,959 be it, you know, Firefox, be it Safari I'm using Brave. 561 00:33:01,419 --> 00:33:04,709 They all block third party cookies anyway, right now. 562 00:33:05,289 --> 00:33:08,369 And Chrome the browser from Google, is one of the last to do it. 563 00:33:08,369 --> 00:33:11,939 And Google still continues to say, Oh, we care about your privacy. 564 00:33:11,939 --> 00:33:15,079 We're going to stop trying, enabling third party cookies. 565 00:33:15,659 --> 00:33:18,839 But they postponed it again because their alternative. 566 00:33:19,194 --> 00:33:23,734 Either didn't pass the test of privacy or is already being challenged in 567 00:33:23,734 --> 00:33:28,144 court or, you know, risk of being challenged in court in Europe because 568 00:33:28,154 --> 00:33:32,324 the alternative to third party cookies is actually potentially more invasive. 569 00:33:33,168 --> 00:33:36,430 so again, it's a discourse where we care about your privacy, but we're 570 00:33:36,530 --> 00:33:40,700 going to hold back until we find another way that will pass the legal test. 571 00:33:41,515 --> 00:33:44,145 And then we're going to block the third party cookies. 572 00:33:44,485 --> 00:33:47,955 Why don't they do it right away if they really believe in privacy? 573 00:33:47,955 --> 00:33:52,305 Because most of the other browsers are already limiting the third party cookies. 574 00:33:52,625 --> 00:33:58,192 So, won't sacrifice, hundreds of millions or billions of dollars in revenue, by 575 00:33:58,212 --> 00:34:03,437 doing something that would basically, Just, cut that stream of revenue. 576 00:34:03,797 --> 00:34:07,937 They want to find another alternative and sadly the other alternative might 577 00:34:07,967 --> 00:34:13,897 involve hashing your email or your phone number and combining it, fingerprinting. 578 00:34:13,917 --> 00:34:18,187 So being able to identify the unique characteristics of your device. 579 00:34:18,967 --> 00:34:24,246 While people got used to clearing their cookies, changing your email 580 00:34:24,246 --> 00:34:26,167 address, your phone or your device. 581 00:34:27,532 --> 00:34:29,581 It's much more difficult. 582 00:34:29,882 --> 00:34:33,202 So that's why I'm saying the alternative to third party cookies, it might 583 00:34:33,202 --> 00:34:36,992 be actually worse because you won't change your email all the time. 584 00:34:37,042 --> 00:34:39,382 Justin Norris: the cure worse than the disease in that case. 585 00:34:39,391 --> 00:34:39,911 So, 586 00:34:40,452 --> 00:34:44,827 so the whole debate in essence then It's kind of moot because it's like, coming 587 00:34:44,827 --> 00:34:48,487 back to the idea of the letter of the law and the spirit of the law, it's like, 588 00:34:48,487 --> 00:34:52,277 all right, we'll not do this one thing, but then we'll use local storage or we'll 589 00:34:52,277 --> 00:34:56,693 use, like you said, some hash of the device does this whole cookie apocalypse 590 00:34:56,693 --> 00:35:00,063 then just kind of a Tempest in a teapot, like do marketers even really need to 591 00:35:00,063 --> 00:35:03,073 think about this because ultimately they're not going to be affected. 592 00:35:03,543 --> 00:35:04,043 Stephane Hamel: Yeah. 593 00:35:04,273 --> 00:35:08,112 I said for, let's look at each of the perspective for the consumer, 594 00:35:08,502 --> 00:35:09,562 it doesn't change anything. 595 00:35:10,122 --> 00:35:10,967 the web is. 596 00:35:11,287 --> 00:35:11,987 Still going to work. 597 00:35:12,021 --> 00:35:13,091 for a marketer. 598 00:35:13,691 --> 00:35:17,801 It will change the ability to do a retargeting, for example. 599 00:35:18,141 --> 00:35:22,686 But it's an opportunity to look at, as I mentioned, your market stack and 600 00:35:22,806 --> 00:35:26,776 see which are more effective and do you really need all of those tools 601 00:35:26,786 --> 00:35:30,676 that you subscribe at 19 bucks a month and you forgot about it, right? 602 00:35:31,126 --> 00:35:33,496 So that's for marketers for agencies. 603 00:35:33,780 --> 00:35:38,000 it's pretty sad to say that there are some agencies that are playing the card 604 00:35:38,050 --> 00:35:42,160 of talking about the cookie apocalypse as if it was absolutely terrible 605 00:35:42,210 --> 00:35:46,760 and, you know, your business won't survive if you don't pay us to fix it. 606 00:35:47,158 --> 00:35:52,538 So, I've seen agencies using this kind of language almost to maybe 607 00:35:52,668 --> 00:35:57,168 spread some you know, FUD, a fear, uncertainty and doubt to their clients 608 00:35:57,168 --> 00:35:59,268 who really are not expert in that. 609 00:35:59,578 --> 00:36:05,038 And then the last layer are the ad tech and martech industry itself that are, 610 00:36:05,058 --> 00:36:10,168 you know, some of them are probably going to probably not survive, but 611 00:36:10,218 --> 00:36:13,698 others are going to try to circumvent. 612 00:36:14,018 --> 00:36:16,768 The third party cookies by using something else, as I mentioned, like 613 00:36:16,768 --> 00:36:18,058 fingerprinting and stuff like that. 614 00:36:18,538 --> 00:36:25,048 And then there's others that will really innovate and find better ways of offering 615 00:36:25,058 --> 00:36:27,118 their services and their solution. 616 00:36:27,818 --> 00:36:31,268 And just like we've seen the seatbelts going from, just one. 617 00:36:31,673 --> 00:36:36,323 Strap and now we have like a strap on the chest that's innovation. 618 00:36:36,703 --> 00:36:40,923 So hopefully we're going to see some of the players embracing more 619 00:36:40,933 --> 00:36:43,363 privacy and improving their products. 620 00:36:43,363 --> 00:36:46,123 It's an opportunity to innovate or die. 621 00:36:47,254 --> 00:36:52,284 Justin Norris: Let's talk a little bit about AI, obviously a huge sea change in 622 00:36:52,284 --> 00:36:58,935 the last year and a half with privacy, risks and perils that really haven't even 623 00:36:58,935 --> 00:37:03,335 been fully identified, or most people aren't aware of from, companies maybe 624 00:37:03,335 --> 00:37:06,675 dumping their whole corporate strategy into chat GPT without really thinking, 625 00:37:07,015 --> 00:37:12,145 but where that goes to maybe the ability of AI to profile us in different ways. 626 00:37:12,805 --> 00:37:13,075 I don't know. 627 00:37:13,075 --> 00:37:13,975 There's all sorts of things. 628 00:37:14,305 --> 00:37:15,665 How are you thinking about this? 629 00:37:15,715 --> 00:37:16,675 What worries you? 630 00:37:16,685 --> 00:37:19,215 What maybe there are benefits that I haven't considered? 631 00:37:19,295 --> 00:37:20,045 What's your point of view? 632 00:37:20,840 --> 00:37:21,230 Stephane Hamel: Yeah. 633 00:37:21,320 --> 00:37:26,730 I think there's a distinction to make between the general publicly available. 634 00:37:27,295 --> 00:37:31,625 Gen AI, like a chat GPT, for example, where, as you mentioned, you know, don't 635 00:37:31,625 --> 00:37:33,625 go there and put all your strategy. 636 00:37:33,995 --> 00:37:37,425 there's now an option that you can say, don't use what I'm telling you 637 00:37:37,425 --> 00:37:39,345 to continue to train your model. 638 00:37:39,625 --> 00:37:44,440 But still, there's the availability of other AI models that you can actually 639 00:37:44,450 --> 00:37:46,040 enable within your environment. 640 00:37:46,260 --> 00:37:50,280 And in a secure way, and it can be amazingly powerful. 641 00:37:50,280 --> 00:37:51,330 It can be useful. 642 00:37:51,740 --> 00:37:54,570 And again, that's another thing where there's no way back. 643 00:37:54,840 --> 00:37:56,350 The genie is out of the bottle. 644 00:37:56,350 --> 00:37:56,990 That's for sure. 645 00:37:57,210 --> 00:37:59,190 And it's interesting because. 646 00:37:59,910 --> 00:38:07,111 When chat GPD came out I was teaching a marketing class to uh, executive MBA, 647 00:38:07,161 --> 00:38:12,191 basically, and I had about 30 managers in the class and that was in December, 648 00:38:12,201 --> 00:38:17,128 2022 and we started talking about it and we said, well, you know, let's 649 00:38:17,168 --> 00:38:21,078 give it a try and let's ask marketing questions and see if we could use 650 00:38:21,078 --> 00:38:25,508 it to not do basic stuff like, okay you know, improve my text and stuff 651 00:38:25,508 --> 00:38:30,008 like that, but do market research and generate new ideas and stuff like that. 652 00:38:30,238 --> 00:38:35,608 And those 30 managers, they had never touched chat GPT before, and they 653 00:38:35,608 --> 00:38:37,138 were like kids in a candy store. 654 00:38:37,138 --> 00:38:40,968 They were so amazed and excited and seeing the possibility. 655 00:38:40,998 --> 00:38:44,148 So following that in January, 2023. 656 00:38:44,778 --> 00:38:50,018 I said in my class, okay, use it, go ahead, it won't be one of those 657 00:38:50,018 --> 00:38:54,268 classes or school where, you know, universities are saying, don't use it 658 00:38:54,288 --> 00:38:58,558 it's cheating, it's plagiarism and stuff like that, I said, no, go the other way. 659 00:38:58,968 --> 00:39:01,324 Use it just let me know how you use it. 660 00:39:01,334 --> 00:39:05,294 That's the only thing I ask is just be transparent about it. 661 00:39:05,714 --> 00:39:10,024 And what I see is there are students who are afraid of that 662 00:39:10,394 --> 00:39:12,574 and they don't know how to use it. 663 00:39:13,304 --> 00:39:17,510 And others that are embracing it and the distinction is very clear. 664 00:39:17,678 --> 00:39:22,508 I'm afraid there's going to be a literacy gap between those who know 665 00:39:22,608 --> 00:39:24,548 how to leverage those tools, be it. 666 00:39:27,303 --> 00:39:31,403 So those who know how to use them and those who don't, and that's going to 667 00:39:31,403 --> 00:39:34,193 make a difference in the workforce, that's for sure, because the quality 668 00:39:34,193 --> 00:39:35,323 of the result is not the same. 669 00:39:35,993 --> 00:39:40,363 On the other hand, my expectations from the students have increased. 670 00:39:40,703 --> 00:39:45,103 My exam questions are more difficult because I know they 671 00:39:45,103 --> 00:39:47,273 can use ChatGPT to answer. 672 00:39:48,383 --> 00:39:52,500 And sometimes, I will ask questions that I know cannot be answered by Google. 673 00:39:52,775 --> 00:39:54,745 GPT or any other tool. 674 00:39:55,095 --> 00:40:00,475 So my job is a little bit more difficult, but I use chat GPT to make my job a 675 00:40:00,475 --> 00:40:02,275 little bit easier also at the same time. 676 00:40:02,785 --> 00:40:07,485 So that's true of my role as a teacher, but it's true also in 677 00:40:07,485 --> 00:40:09,465 consulting it's true for marketers. 678 00:40:09,465 --> 00:40:14,415 It's I'm also giving a short course on data science and marketing and 679 00:40:14,755 --> 00:40:16,725 I use it to generate Python code. 680 00:40:17,085 --> 00:40:18,465 I do just so many things with it. 681 00:40:18,495 --> 00:40:18,695 So. 682 00:40:19,670 --> 00:40:20,280 It's amazing. 683 00:40:20,280 --> 00:40:22,640 It's I wish I had those tools when I was younger. 684 00:40:23,520 --> 00:40:26,180 Justin Norris: I know what you mean though, about it being a skillset, 685 00:40:26,280 --> 00:40:32,100 because I had another interview recently with someone using using an automation 686 00:40:32,100 --> 00:40:36,600 tool that allowed you to leverage AI within it for an outbound sales use case. 687 00:40:37,040 --> 00:40:42,090 And Yes, you can use it to do a lot of things, but the amount of thinking 688 00:40:42,100 --> 00:40:45,540 that had to go into saying like now go to this website and look at this 689 00:40:45,540 --> 00:40:48,520 and give me this specific question and you actually have to deconstruct 690 00:40:48,520 --> 00:40:52,610 a thought process and then encode it, and that is a skill that, person had 691 00:40:52,610 --> 00:40:53,440 developed to a very high 692 00:40:53,690 --> 00:40:54,993 Stephane Hamel: if, but that's the point. 693 00:40:54,993 --> 00:40:57,063 If you don't know what you're talking about, you won't be 694 00:40:57,063 --> 00:40:59,103 able to leverage those tools. 695 00:40:59,293 --> 00:41:03,613 You will ask very basic questions and you will get crappy answers and you will 696 00:41:03,613 --> 00:41:06,093 end up saying, Oh, Gen AI doesn't work. 697 00:41:07,168 --> 00:41:08,238 But that's not true. 698 00:41:08,278 --> 00:41:13,775 It works, but you need to first know which questions you want to ask. 699 00:41:14,035 --> 00:41:17,015 And in order to know that, you need to understand the discipline. 700 00:41:17,690 --> 00:41:20,950 Or the domain, the expertise of what you're talking about. 701 00:41:20,980 --> 00:41:22,450 Otherwise it doesn't work. 702 00:41:22,784 --> 00:41:28,424 and we're going to see either people using it to save time or people 703 00:41:28,424 --> 00:41:30,674 using it to increase the quality. 704 00:41:31,209 --> 00:41:34,702 Hopefully we're going to see more people using it to improve the quality of 705 00:41:34,702 --> 00:41:36,452 the end result, not just to save time. 706 00:41:37,002 --> 00:41:39,392 Because you can save time, but get crappy results. 707 00:41:40,777 --> 00:41:42,187 Justin Norris: Do bad stuff faster. 708 00:41:42,707 --> 00:41:43,597 Bad word faster. 709 00:41:44,243 --> 00:41:47,593 maybe the last question, Stefan, I'm just curious from a personal basis. 710 00:41:47,593 --> 00:41:51,483 You've been transparent and have written on a few occasions on LinkedIn 711 00:41:51,513 --> 00:41:55,953 about kind of the career impact that you've seen about being privacy first. 712 00:41:56,263 --> 00:41:59,703 Which in some cases has maybe limited some of your professional prospects. 713 00:41:59,763 --> 00:42:03,653 Can you talk about that a little bit and just how would you advise Other marketers 714 00:42:03,653 --> 00:42:07,023 who are out there maybe a bit earlier in their career and can even less sort 715 00:42:07,023 --> 00:42:08,763 of afford to have those impacts I guess 716 00:42:09,658 --> 00:42:13,437 Stephane Hamel: Yeah, was a combination of multiple things at the same time. 717 00:42:13,437 --> 00:42:17,737 One was having been a freelance for so long and on the consulting side, 718 00:42:18,071 --> 00:42:22,721 and I'm over 55 now and having that crazy idea that maybe with the amount 719 00:42:22,721 --> 00:42:27,886 of expertise and experience that I have, I could go and offer my expertise 720 00:42:27,916 --> 00:42:32,111 to, you know, Maybe a startup in privacy tech or something like that. 721 00:42:32,681 --> 00:42:39,351 So I faced multiple issues including ageism, including the fact that working 722 00:42:39,351 --> 00:42:44,611 remote is a barrier sometimes the fact that going from the consulting world 723 00:42:45,495 --> 00:42:49,305 actual client side is a challenge when you've done it for so many years. 724 00:42:49,685 --> 00:42:55,765 And then on top of that there's the aspect of being, more privacy conscious 725 00:42:56,185 --> 00:43:00,971 what I realized is that for example, while I was super, super busy with. 726 00:43:01,401 --> 00:43:05,411 Coaching agencies, for example, and working with clients directly. 727 00:43:05,721 --> 00:43:10,411 What happened is that if you take an agency, maybe they're a little bit shy 728 00:43:10,411 --> 00:43:16,671 of working with me because once I open the engine and I look behind what is 729 00:43:16,671 --> 00:43:22,441 going on, I might reveal some stuff that maybe they would rather not see. 730 00:43:22,731 --> 00:43:24,711 the same is true for companies also. 731 00:43:25,081 --> 00:43:28,481 So maybe I've cornered myself a little bit. 732 00:43:29,206 --> 00:43:32,777 But at the same time I see that's starting to change now. 733 00:43:32,927 --> 00:43:37,537 I see that I'm working with clients where they want to embrace. 734 00:43:38,152 --> 00:43:42,639 A more privacy aware privacy conscious, not just because of 735 00:43:42,639 --> 00:43:46,239 the legal aspect, but because they feel that's the right thing to do. 736 00:43:46,679 --> 00:43:47,839 It's a strategy, right? 737 00:43:48,269 --> 00:43:49,604 So this is starting to change. 738 00:43:49,724 --> 00:43:55,274 And even if I have I think a fair amount of credibility, I hope in the field I 739 00:43:55,274 --> 00:43:59,844 enrolled myself into New York University certificate in information privacy. 740 00:44:00,254 --> 00:44:04,760 Just to confirm my knowledge first and also to get that kind 741 00:44:04,760 --> 00:44:09,087 of stamp of credential that I felt that I needed to get. 742 00:44:09,327 --> 00:44:14,227 And in those courses, I see that people are coming from all kinds of background. 743 00:44:14,647 --> 00:44:18,546 So I expect there's going to be an increase in demand in the market 744 00:44:18,626 --> 00:44:22,926 for people who are in the field of information privacy, which is 745 00:44:22,926 --> 00:44:24,656 different from security standpoint. 746 00:44:24,996 --> 00:44:28,136 You know, security being really hardware network you know, the 747 00:44:28,136 --> 00:44:32,926 security aspect but with more knowledge into information privacy. 748 00:44:32,926 --> 00:44:36,116 So I think there's a great opportunities if you combine. 749 00:44:36,471 --> 00:44:41,511 Marketing, if you combine legal and you combine the technical aspect, at 750 00:44:41,511 --> 00:44:43,191 least a minimum understanding of it. 751 00:44:43,561 --> 00:44:44,941 I think there is a great future. 752 00:44:45,808 --> 00:44:46,428 Justin Norris: That's amazing. 753 00:44:46,468 --> 00:44:51,698 Well, I think we have to wrap now, but I just want to say I really appreciate 754 00:44:51,698 --> 00:44:55,458 how outspoken you are on this issue, your commitment to it, even when 755 00:44:55,458 --> 00:44:57,898 it's not necessarily easy or popular. 756 00:44:57,898 --> 00:45:00,568 I think it's an important discussion that has to be had. 757 00:45:00,638 --> 00:45:04,448 And just really interesting digging into this and exploring it with you. 758 00:45:04,478 --> 00:45:05,948 So thank you so much for being on the show. 759 00:45:06,746 --> 00:45:07,886 Stephane Hamel: Thank you, Justin, for having me.