Dear listener, if you're a true aficionado of this podcast, then you

would know that over the years we have talked about submarines a heck of a lot

and in particular Australia's decision to purchase the submarines from the

French group and what a, what is just a crazily stupid incomprehensible

decision it was from the very beginning and of course the news has come

out that Australia has cancelled.

The contract and decided to go with, a submarine, the details of which we don't

quite know much of, other than it will be nuclear and it'll be some sort of,

combination of technology from the U.

S.

and the U.

K.

And why we don't just buy another off the shelf submarine, why we have

to invent something, I don't know.

This is still the wrong decision, dear listener.

in my view, the nuclear submarine, a large submarine, It's still

the wrong decision, but, we'll get onto that in another episode.

But the purpose of this episode, dear listener, is a little bonus for

you, because I was just interested in what we'd said over the years

on the submarine issues, and I've cobbled together a, package from

the various episodes where we've had something to say about submarines.

And it's a little bit of a, I told you so type of episode, because between

Scott and myself, we talked a lot about submarines and A lot of the issues we

identified and the problems have, come to pass, and some of our predictions as well.

So, this is a bit of a bonus one.

It's all about submarines and what we've said over the years.

It's nice to hear Scott's voice in there as well.

Hello Scott, if you're out there.

And yeah, the normal episode will happen on Tuesday.

There's a bit of a bonus.

Sit back if you're interested in submarines and the history of it in

Australia over the last six years and sit back and relax and enjoy.

And we'll talk to you in a regular episode coming up soon.

From episode 43 on the 4th of May 2016.

Scott, submarines, I That's exactly right.

That is exactly right.

Have we discussed this?

Have we discussed the submarines before?

No, we haven't.

No, we haven't talked about the submarines before.

I was talking to my friend, who's ex Air Force, about the submarines.

And he's, he's pro submarines and, and equipment and stuff.

But he said The way it works in these sorts of things, and you can just

imagine it, is, imagine the Defence Department really wanted six submarines.

What they do is they ask for twelve and hope they get given six.

And if they only get three, well they'll probably live with it.

Like, that's how, that's how these things work.

It's, it's It's, it's like Life of Brian and Hagling.

Like, you don't start with your true position.

And I, I'd be, I'm quietly confident, Scott, that, that

they wanted six submarines.

They asked for 12 and got the shock of their lives when the answer came back from

Tony Abbott saying, yeah, you can have 12.

Like, they would have gone, gosh.

So, like, There's a defence whitepaper, Scott.

It's 180 pages outlining Australia's position and policies on defence.

And there's 8 paragraphs dealing with submarines.

And those paragraphs say nothing of any consequence or

detail as to why we need 12.

Like, I'm, here's my view, is we should have 3.

Like, sure we can need a submarine, but If China or someone like that is

thinking of invading Australia and gets together a convoy of naval vessels

and heads our way, you know, having 12 submarines, the idea is it's a deterrent

that they think, geez, we better not go because we might get sunk on the way.

And with three of them lurking around, the deterrent's still the same.

So, I just think 12 is a good number.

You know, I think if you're going to spend that sort of money, then they need

to justify tactically why you need 12.

What sort of attack are you anticipating?

Why would three be not enough?

And why would you need 12 and a real justification?

Like it's an enormous amount of money to spend on just a gut feel of,

Oh, 12 seems like the right number.

Yeah, and that is exactly right.

I mean, you know, if we go to that, drum article from the ABC in February,

just the white, the, just as the white paper was being put to bed, it was

reported the, that RAN Submariners will be given annual lump sum

payments of up to 50, 000 and other inducements just for staying on board.

Now, you know, if you've got problems filling the bloody things anyway.

Yep.

It then becomes even worse if you're trying to, if you're then

going to try and fill new ones.

Yep.

You know, it seems to me ridiculous.

There's a certain type of person who'd be prepared to, you know, live underwater

for months on end and away from home and, you know, we're not a big country

and and finding enough people to fill 12 submarines, would be enormously expensive

and, and, and Progressively harder and harder to fill those submarines the

more you have so So we're having dear listener a bit of an internal discussion

within the secular party about our policy towards submarines and one member was

saying That you know, there's economies of scale in having more submarines,

but I would argue that They don't apply in terms of manning a submarine.

It actually gets more and more difficult to find guys or girls willing to do it.

So, so yeah, not happy about submarines, Scott.

I reckon our best defense would be a better educated public, and spending the

money on Gonski rather than submarines.

Well, either that or a, you know, better, better sophisticated Air Force, maybe?

Yeah!

But, you know, it's Or a, or a missile system?

Like, surely you can Yeah.

Launch a missile from somewhere and Like all sorts of

possibilities for other things.

So, so Scott, the other thing, sorry, go ahead.

You can spend an awful lot of money for 50 billion and you can buy an awful lot

of missiles, an awful lot of aircraft and that sort of stuff with that money.

Yeah.

So Scott, 1.

2 billion for education rather than the 4.

5 billion that's required for Gonski.

Ah yeah, but that 1.

2 was over and above their initial offer of 0.

Yeah.

See, that's how the game's played.

You see, we're not going to give you anything.

Oh, okay, we'll give you 1.

2, you know.

Yeah.

You know, you want 12 submarines?

We'll give you six.

Exactly.

Tiny Abbott just didn't understand that deal.

I think it was Abbott.

It must have been Abbott who made the decision.

Is that right?

I keep saying Abbott.

It was, Abbott, Abbott was Prime Minister at the time when they started, when they

started the whole acquisition thing, yeah.

When they made the commitment, they must have 12, I think.

And then it went into tender process, so yeah.

So I can blame Abbott for that.

But, Yes, you can.

From episode 44 on the 11th of May 2016.

Submarines.

Yes.

Who would have thought 12 months ago that we'd know so much about

submarines, or think we know so much.

But I read this, it was Don Menehue, wasn't it, his, Pearls and Irritations.

Yes.

And, I don't know, maybe I'm, it struck me, and you tell me if I've got it wrong,

it struck me that he was arguing that we would have been better off just buying

them off the shelves from the French.

Is that correct?

Exactly.

Like, here's the point that he makes.

Like, this submarine that we're buying is actually designed

to have nuclear propulsion.

Yes.

Yes.

Yes.

And we, for some reason that has not been explained to me, Scott, are

actually paying more money so that instead of nuclear, it's diesel.

So it's going to operate, you know, they're not even sure they can do it.

And we're going to pay more for that.

It's undoubtedly going to be a lesser quality submarine and

it's going to cost us more money.

Why did we knock nuclear power on the head for a submarine?

I don't know that.

I mean, I suspect it's because the Australian electorate has a problem

with nuclear power full stop.

And that, you know, cause it's not secular party policy is to pursue nuclear

power for a civilian nuclear industry.

but.

It's crazy that people are absolutely opposed to nuclear energy.

You know, it's, it is ridiculous.

I don't think people would be in this case.

Well, one would hope not, because I mean, you've, you're talking about very small

reactors that you'd have 12 reactors.

If you, excuse me, if you bought the fleet of 12 subs, you'd only have 12 reactors.

They could.

Go back to France to, you know, change out the fuel rods and all that sort of

stuff every however often you change fuel rods, you know, it's not, ridiculously.

No, and he makes the point that we'll get them like 10 years earlier, something like

that, because they're off the shelf and, and, you know, they'll have far greater

capacity to travel distance at speed and, and, you know, I can just see that you try

and convert a nuclear submarine to diesel and all of the power hungry electronics

in the submarine, will overpower the poor old diesel, you know, generators and, you

know, they won't be able to motor along anywhere near what people hope they will.

Like, you can just see it happening, so it's a crazy Here's my proposal, Scott,

and We should just have, you know how we said, well the Navy probably asked

for six, wanted six, asked for twelve, and would have settled for three, well

I reckon we give the Navy three nuclear submarines, and have them nice and

early and nice and cheap, and, and you know Adelaide shipbuilders can learn a

skill which can be useful in the future.

Some other thing, like the Greens talk about them manufacturing clean energy

type things like solar panels or wind farm stuff or whatever, like stuff

that's ongoing, like just creating a few subs of a very specific design

for Australia is not going to create ongoing jobs for those guys selling

stuff around the world, like we won't be exporting submarines to other countries,

so we should have them doing something.

No, we won't be.

We should have them doing something where there's a capacity that they

could actually make stuff that we could sell around the world of some sort, so.

So there we go, Scott.

That's, Submarines, and great article by this guy, who is he?

It's, it's John, it's by John Stanford and Michael Keating.

Directors of Insight Economics.

Previously they worked together in the Prime Minister's Department

where Dr Keating was Secretary.

So they've been involved in government, these guys, and they make the point

that it's not too late to amend the decision and deliver a better outcome.

The submarines have not yet been designed, commercial terms have not been agreed,

and contracts have not yet been signed.

So, you know, all of this stuff, you know, changing our

minds, we can easily do, Scott.

Well we could easily, we could easily change our minds, yes, and it really

wouldn't surprise me if after the election that, minds are changed.

So, dear listener, we had a bit of an internal discussion in the secular party

about submarines, because I posed, let's have a policy, instead of 12 and, A

little bit of division within the party, and one member was sort of saying, well

what about Indonesia, you know, when the threat of, you know, military action

by Indonesia, and I've got a very good friend in, Defence Force, who spent a lot

of time in Indonesia, and I said to, I said to Noel, Noel, tell me, you know, an

Indonesian story about submarines, and he came up with a great one, and I mentioned

it on Facebook, but for those who haven't, Did you see the Facebook story or not?

I don't recall it, but it didn't surprise me.

So when he was in Indonesia, this would have been in the nineties and,

the Indonesians had acquired, some old Russian submarines, whiskey class

submarines, and once a year, they would, go down to the jetty where

the submarines were and they would.

While still at the jetty, they would submerge the submarines, but they were

so scared of something going wrong and not being able to surface again that

they had like a crane on the jetty ready and attached to the submarine, ready

to haul it up if something went wrong.

So they'd submerge it for five minutes, come up, and you know.

Wipe the nervous sweat from their brow and pat each other on the

back for a successful mission.

And then they were able to claim, then they were able to claim that

they were seaworthy and operational and could claim all of their, you

know, extra bonuses because of that.

So, they had to do that once a year.

So, yeah.

The point was that, we don't have to worry too much about the

Indonesian Navy at this stage.

Because they've got a hopeless capacity to, look after high technology equipment

and places like Vietnam and others have got much smaller countries, which are

much better military and Indonesia's military is all spent looking inwards

on internal matters, getting ready for, you know, coups and things

like that, rather than externally.

Getting ready to invade Australia.

So, so that was an Indonesian submarine story from episode

45 on the 18th of May 2016.

And in this article Scott, he also mentioned a really interesting

thing during the Whitlam government period Blah blah blah blah and it

says about the Whitlam government Both sides were at fault.

The Whitlam Government did however set Australia on the path to

freer trade with a 25 percent across the board cut in tariffs.

It, being the Whitlam Government, refused to bow to the Department of Defence and

knocked back the Navy's plan for locally designed and built light destroyers.

It chose instead to buy off the shelf frigates from the US.

The Department of Defence went into quite a sulk.

There you go.

Well, you've done it before.

We should do it again.

If we knock back these subs and get an off the shelf nuclear trio of subs,

we'll simply be replicating one of the dissidents of the Whitlam government.

There you go.

Exactly.

So there's a bit of, potentially, history repeating itself.

and, what else did he say?

Just about the cost of, actually he does mention the cost of the subs, I think.

Yeah, for a government that, for a government that presumably has some

regard for markets and free trade, its decision on a 50 billion submarine and

naval build in Adelaide is remarkable.

Christopher Pyne must be really a national treasurer if the government

needs to spend so much money to help keeping him public life.

He makes the assertion that it's potentially, it's going to cost

4 million for every job created.

Oh my god.

Yeah, yeah, it's, it's It's absolutely phenomenal how much

money is being spent per job.

It is phenomenal.

Oh dear.

From episode 48 on the 8th of June 2016.

Scott, submarines.

Yes, I saw that you said that you had an update on submarines, so go for it.

I've changed my position slightly.

Oh you have?

So, we, I think we previously said, instead of 12 nuclear submarines,

instead of 12 conventionally powered submarines, let's get three

nuclear ones, be done with it.

Yeah.

Hmm.

Well, I did a bit more reading, Scott, and here's the view that I've come to,

is that, if we just want submarines to be hanging around our northern border,

waiting for the Come in with troop ships so that we can torpedo them and sink them.

Then what we really need are relatively small submarines that are quiet

and can just sit there and And they don't have to travel huge distances

in with fast speed They just need to sit and wait quietly and shoot.

Yep.

So that's that's the primary task that I'd like a submarine to do.

Yeah, that makes sense.

Yeah.

The other thing that a submarine could do would be to go out into the

South China Sea and attack China,

or engage with, you know, troop movements with U.

S.

forces or, like, be involved in superpower games, you know, out there.

And if you're going to do that, then you need a really big sub that's fast moving.

And, can travel large distances and that's where you'd need, a nuclear, a nuclear

powered version of the sort of thing that we're currently signing up for.

Yeah.

And I don't think we've got any business being in the South China Sea playing war

games and potentially either invading China or meeting China out there.

we should just be.

Defensive with our Defence Force and so Scott, we, a little, a little tiny

sub that is just going to sit there and wait, we can get a Japanese version

for less than a billion dollars.

That's how cheap they are.

Yeah.

Off the shelf, 720 million dollars, you can get yourself a sub.

So I reckon, Scott, rather than three nuclear subs, which are going to be

a bit big and a bit noisy and a bit cumbersome in the shallow waters of

our northern boundary, we should have half a dozen little ones, which is

going to be the price of, one and a half nuclear subs, and be done with it.

And, and he ended up buying half a dozen of them for less than 6 billion in total.

So that's down from 50 billion.

Yeah, that sounds, sounds quite reasonable to me.

Yeah, that's my, that's my sub position at the moment.

You happy with that?

Oh, I am.

Okay, good.

From episode 57.

On the 10th of August, 2016.

So there's a, there's a right wing, no, well, there's a, there's a think

tank, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, who's heavily involved and

got links with the Defence Department.

And all of a sudden they're starting to say, hmm, maybe we need nuclear

powered submarines instead of, instead of conventionally powered.

I don't think it's anything, it's, I don't think it's, Anything

out of the blue, I think they've been listening to our podcast.

Oh, I think that's right.

So, And they've taken what you've said on board and they've looked into it and

said, yeah, nukes are the way to go.

Yeah.

See, and I've stolen it all from John Lennergy's blog.

I think they're probably more likely been reading his blog.

But, but that's where we're, that's where we're headed.

I'll make a prediction, Scott.

In 20, you know, within 20 years time, the decision, if we're still

going for big subs like them.

They'll be nuclear powered, or they'll be wanting to make them nuclear powered.

Well, in 20 years time, isn't that when the this next generation of

subs are due to be rolled out?

Yeah, so at some point they're going to have to switch to

nuclear propulsion for them.

If you're going to have a big sub, it's going to have to be nuclear powered.

Well, that would make sense, wouldn't it?

Yeah, I just wish they'd have, you know, half a dozen small

subs instead, but anyway.

Hmm.

From Episode 62, on the 14th of September, 2016.

Scott, we get an opportunity to talk about submarines this week.

Saw this article.

I bet you were very happy when you saw this one, weren't you?

Yeah, you know, dear listener, just a little insight into my life, but

you know, scouring news feeds and blogs and whatever, and And when

this one popped out about submarines, I was just jumping for joy.

So this one, got a link to it from ABC News website.

Dick Smith says we're being conned.

A group of prominent businessmen, including Dick Smith and John

Singleton, have taken out a full page ad in the Australian newspaper

suggesting the public is being conned over the submarine project.

The Australian government stipulated the winning contract would need to

use conventional power, ruling out larger nuclear powered submarines.

Mr Smith said the redesigned version of the submarine would have to be converted

to a diesel engine, but he told ABC Adelaide it was a ludicrous plan and

he believed it would never happen.

Quoting Dick Smith here.

So the plan is for us to buy a nuclear submarine design, and then

convert it to a piston submarine.

Now no one has ever done that in the world, and in fact, when I talk to

submarine experts, they say it is so ridiculous, so we're being conned.

Mr Smith said, if the government's real agenda was to use nuclear technology,

it should be up front about it.

The world's coming round to my view, at least Dick Smith and John Singleton

are coming round to it, Scott.

Well yeah, I mean they are coming round to it because it makes perfect

sense that you don't buy something that's designed to run with a nuclear

propulsion system and convert it to run on diesel piston engines.

It's crazy.

It's a pretty fundamental design change.

It is a very fundamental design change.

It's absolutely crazy that they would consider doing it.

Yes.

Nick Xenophon said more detail about the submarines project

was needed but he questioned the motives behind Mr Smith's campaign.

Xenophon South Australian Defence Industries Minister Martin Hamilton

Smith said he trusted the decision.

I think the Navy chose that rather than the Government, and you have to trust

their judgement, Mr Hamilton Smith said.

Cause, gee, it's not like any, you know, armed forces have ever got us into trouble

with bad mistakes in the past, have they?

No, that's exactly it.

You know, you can't, you can't ever question anything the armed

forces have done, have you?

Yep.

Yep.

So, so that's good.

I did like the South Australian Premier Jay Weatherall hit out

at Mr Smith on Twitter calling the businessman a sad old man.

Looked like it, the advert, was scribbled on the back of a

serviette after a long lunch.

Sad old man.

Yeah.

Scott, I mean, up until now, objection to the submarines has

only appeared in two obscure places.

One is John Mead's blog and the other one is the Iron Fist of Velvet Glove Podcast.

Like, yes, that is the only two places that there's been negative comment about

these submarines in the last 12 months.

And finally it started to hit mainstream media because someone

like Dick Smith and, and Singleton.

Actually, put their money in their pockets and put a big ad in a newspaper.

Like, that's the only way it could happen.

Yeah, and it's crazy to, it's crazy to ignore them.

It really would be crazy.

Well, dear listener, if you've been listening to the last 61 episodes,

you are ahead of the game on the submarine score and fully informed.

So from episode 71 on the 16th of November, 2016.

Scott's, Submarines, I get to mention.

A friend of mine sent me a link and, it's to a website devoted to

the submarine issue in Australia and it's operated by a guy, Gary

Johnston, Submarines for Australia.

And, he says he, the Weekend Australian reported, Rear Admiral Stephen Johnson,

US Navy retired, claimed that anyone who says you can't put a diesel engine

into a nuclear submarine design doesn't know what they're talking about.

Of course he'd say that.

So, um, Yeah, because he's got a job as the GM of submarines in the Australian

Defence Force, Defence Department's capability and sustain, sustainment group.

Yes.

So, you know.

With our problem with, well, not our problem, our issues with Donald Trump

as highlighting that we don't know what our relationship is with the U.

S.

and how our alliance is.

And you know, if we've got a problem, whether they'd come to help, who knows?

And one of the things about submarines is that this proposed solution, we're

not going to get submarines for 15 years.

Our current fleet are just going to be rusted hulks in a

matter of a couple of years.

We've got a long time where we'll be actually operating without any submarines

because of this stupid decision.

Not only are we getting the wrong ones that won't actually work, but we've

got to wait 15 years to find that out.

And in the meantime, we are potentially defenseless when we could be buying an

off the shelf cheap submarine from Japan.

From Japan.

And have it virtually next week.

So, anyway.

It really is very maddening.

I mean, like the Australian government would have been better off

continuing to throw money at the car industry rather than this nonsense

here of propping up submarines.

So, this article makes the point that, basically the management,

in charge of this project, ex boat drivers, and, they've got no actual

expertise in project management.

But they get the job anyway, and they are hopelessly out of their depth, and

they're tasked with spending 50 billion dollars, and, Who knows, Scott, maybe

50 billion dollars, that's, that's, it's gonna end up being higher than that.

Yes.

Yeah, so, eh, maybe with Donald Trump, that'll cause us to re

evaluate things, but unlikely.

From episode 102 on the 28th of June, 2017.

Scott.

It's been a while, but I get to say submarines.

Dear, dear listener, if you're only a recent For those of you

playing drinking game at home, yes.

If you're only a recent convert to the podcast, I've got a thing

about our submarine contract.

In summary, we're spending 50 billion on 12 massive submarines that are normally

nuclear powered, and we're paying extra to have them converted to diesel.

So why do you have a big submarine?

Because you're going to make a big expedition into the South China Sea and

potentially attack China or somebody.

That's why you need a big one.

But if your intention is just to be defensive And to shoot troop ships

that are coming our way, then you just need a small submarine that

just sits down and waits for the enemy to come and is extremely quiet.

And you can pick those up for under a billion dollars each.

You could have 12 of them for about 10 billion.

We could save ourselves, dear listener, 40 billion dollars if we

just took off the shelf submarines from Japan, rather than converting

nuclear submarines by the French.

One of the arguments put forward for this ridiculous idea was, oh,

well, you know, they'll be doing a lot of the work in South Australia

and that's going to save some jobs.

Well, surprise, surprise, dear listener, article came out, which

basically says that You know the CEO of, that French company that's

building the submarines, who said DCNS?

Yeah, that 90 percent of the build would occur in Australia.

Well, he doesn't work for us anymore and funny, you know, we can't really commit to

that figure anymore It's all a bit rubbery and I just don't know what's gonna happen.

That's where we stand now with our 50 billion dollar contract that we guaranteed

nothing in terms of It was outrageously expensive what was gonna cost to employ

1, 200 shipbuilders in South Australia But when we could have We could have continued

to subsidize the car manufacturing industry for decades to come yet.

Yeah.

So that's, you know, that's a disaster that somebody at some point has to stop.

And there's another disaster, Scott, with F 35 fighters

that we're getting from the U.

S.

military.

From episode 113 on the 13th of September, 2017.

One thing I said to her, Scott was, please, you know, if you get a chance

to talk about policies, can, can you please raise this one particular

issue that nobody talks about?

And she said, what's that?

Scott, what do you reckon the issue was?

What's a favorite hobby horse of mine that nobody talks about, but

I like to talk about all the time.

The nodding politician?

No, not that one.

Okay.

Okay.

Submarines?

I said, Submarines, Meredith!

Nobody talks about it.

She said, What do you mean about submarines?

What's there to know about submarines?

So I just gave a very quick two minute Submarine 101 and promised

to send her some more information.

So fingers crossed, Scott, that Reason, as a major part of their platform,

will look at the submarine issue.

That'd be great.

Yeah.

That'll do it.

From episode 117, October 2017.

While I was on the John Menardieu blog, I looked across to the right hand menu, and

to my delight, Scott, I saw an article.

And what topic do you think it could be that could possibly give me delight?

submarines?

Yes.

Trust that John's going to do a vlog.

I've not read this one.

No, you haven't.

that's right.

I was testing you, see.

great piece by, John Stanford, about the submarines.

He's a director of Inside Economics.

In a former life, he was head of the Industries Division in the Department

of Prime Minister and Cabinet.

I mean, he knows a bit about how politics works and government.

Uh, basically, he's put the subs at 4.

6 billion.

Because we'd worked it out at 4.

18, but he's got a 4.

6 billion figure.

Calls it an eye watering price for a conventionally powered submarine.

You know, most conventionally powered ones cost less than 1

billion, and we're paying 4.

6 billion for each one.

Yeah.

He said here that, the proposal involves major technical challenges.

Nobody has ever converted a nuclear submarine to conventional power before.

Many submarine experts doubt that it can be done.

The hull forms are different.

The use of pump jet propulsion, which is a breakthrough technology

in nuclear submarines may not work in a conventionally powered

one because of the lower speeds.

And it's got this other thing here, which I hadn't heard of before,

air independent propulsion, Scott.

So if you're in a conventionally powered submarine, you've got batteries in there

and you can charge those batteries and you can, Swim around underwater for about

five days, but then you've got to surface, and that's a really short time frame.

And of course, when you surface, you become exposed to the enemy.

So what conventionally powered submarines have is this air independent

propulsion, which allows them to propel the submarine without surfacing.

And there's types of things, but they're enclosed systems where they might have

oxygen in compressed tanks that they can use in a closed, system to fire up,

a motor, if you like, and, and expel the, fumes or whatever into the water.

So, so, and yeah, and there's various different types of these things.

So when your battery's running low, you can then resort to that.

And.

The thing is, in nuclear subs, you don't have those systems.

But in a conventional sub, you really need those systems.

It's completely useless without it.

He says that an air independent propulsion is sin qua non, without which nothing.

For an advanced, conventionally powered sub in the 21st century.

If you don't have it, you're just crazy in your words, Scott.

And the, the proposal for these submarines does not include,

air independent propulsion.

Joking.

So we're paying four times the price for a sub that doesn't

even have one of the basics.

Yeah.

Yep.

so it'll be surfacing every four days rather than every three weeks.

And every time it bobs up, you know, there you go.

It's going to be exposed to the enemy.

Yeah.

It's just, why are they doing this?

He says one theory is that, it's just a way of eventually getting a

nuclear version of a submarine that.

You know, a couple of years down the track, we're just going to go,

Oh, it's too hard to do all these conversions because of these things.

We'll just have to make them nuclear.

And it's a way of sort of getting a nuclear sub without having to go

through the public debate over it.

And he was speaking to a senior defence official who he quotes as saying,

If you ask someone to devise a new submarine program with the highest

risk factors at every stage you could not have done a much better job.

It will almost certainly end in tears and possibly a catastrophe.

Yeah, it's starting to look like we should have bought them from the Japanese.

Yep, they bought a nice, quiet, small, conventionally powered subs.

12 of them for about 600, 000 each and they could sit along the coastline.

600 million each.

Sit along the northern coastline and, you know, pop off any convoy of

troops headed our way, and oh gee, we wouldn't be able to participate in

naval manoeuvres in the South China Sea.

What a shame.

Well, yeah, I was listening to a podcast this afternoon, and I'm not convinced we

should be involved in the South China Sea.

Of course we shouldn't be.

We've got no business being in the South China Sea.

We're not a superpower.

America would want us there anyway.

The Americans really could, the Americans could do whatever they

wanted there anyway, without us.

What we could do with, the money we're going to be wasting on those submarines.

And they're not going to work.

We're going to be actually worse off because they're just not going to work.

They're going to be noisy.

They're going to be coming up and burping for air.

They're not going to be able to lie in wait and effectively Shoot a convoy of

troops coming from China or whatever.

We're actually going to be left undefended because we're going to have these rusting

hulks in some Workshop in South Australia and you can see it now South Australia's

getting in it with an industry From episode 130 on the 18th of January 2018.

I get a chance to talk about submarines, Scott Did you did you know that India has

a three billion dollar nuclear Submarine?

No, I didn't know.

Okay, just here's a quiz for you Scott You've got a three billion

dollar submarine, okay, and you're going to submerge your submarine.

What's the number one thing you should make sure before you submerge?

That it can filter out the carbon dioxide, I suppose.

No, a bit more basic than that.

Okay, that it doesn't leak?

Well, close.

You know, as you're about to submerge, dear listener, the number

one thing To make sure, is that you've actually closed the hatch.

Oh, no!

Yes.

Oh, good God.

Yes, an article here.

Their sub is out of commission, because when they, went to submerge, they

didn't check that all of the hatches were closed, and funnily enough, got

inundated with the water and knocked out a whole lot of Really expensive things.

So, bloody hell.

So that's, that's a major stuff up that is, isn't it?

Yeah, it's only a, look, they had a cheap one, you know, their

submarine was three billion, 2.

9 billion.

Ours are going to be 4.

16.

So, so that was a cheap one in the scheme of things.

Could have been worse.

Hopefully our sailors will be taught to close the hatch when

our, when ours eventually arrives.

One would have thought so.

Yes.

From episode 131 on the 24th of January 2018.

Hey, just on submarines.

So last week, dear listener, you might remember the story of the Indian

submarine where the hatch was left open and causing enormous damage.

And we at the same time had a story about the secret.

How if you wish for something, then according to the

secret, it would come true.

And funnily enough, dear listeners, on our website we have a, an ability

to leave a voicemail message.

And, and it's great when people ring through with a voicemail message.

And we've been fortunate enough to receive a voicemail which explains

the Indian submarine incident.

So just sit back and listen to this.

Goodness gracious me, it is always dive, dive, dive on this submarine.

Oh, I want the sun on my skin and the wind in my hair.

Why can't I have this?

What's this book?

The Secret?

If I just wish, I can have?

I, Raju Singh, wish!

For an outdoor life, for the sun, for the wind in my hair.

Fist, I think you should expect, communication from the Indian

embassy in Canberra for that.

That's extremely offensive.

Oh, Raji Singh.

You have excelled yourself.

Yeah, thank you very much.

Is it Raji Singh, was it?

Raji Singh.

Raji Singh, thank you so much.

That's really brought a warm feeling to my heart.

Thank you.

Oh, Raji.

I listened to that about three times and really wet myself every time.

That was fantastic.

Yeah.

And finally, from episode 134.

As the topic is, you know, should we be concerned about Indonesia invading

us and for that matter should we be concerned about China invading us?

And dear listener, a special treat for you, a new contributor

to the podcast, Han Tu.

I recorded an interview with Han just yesterday, during a

massive Brisbane thunderstorm.

And, so here it is.

I'll play it for you now and it's everything you needed to

know about Australia's military.

and our capacity to deal with Indonesia and China in a nutshell.

Dear listener, we've got a new character to introduce to you, to the podcast.

His pseudonym is Han Tu, and he's one of my mates and he's a bit of an expert on

Indonesia and given our discussion last week about our alliance with America and

how we needed to foster that, because at any minute now, the Indonesians

could invade us, I thought I'd get.

on to talk about Indonesia because he's a bit of an expert.

So, Han, welcome to the podcast.

Thanks a lot.

it's nice to be here.

Lovely to be, invited to, discuss a little bit about Indonesia.

A very important part of my life.

Yes, well, just give the listener, what background you can, because I

understand, you know, certain parts are sensitive and you can't say them,

but what can you say that would give the listener some confidence that you

actually know what you're talking about?

Okay, you know, that's all fair enough.

the bottom line, I suppose, with all this is that, I was, teaching in Indonesia,

in Indonesian language, to Indonesian students, at a master's level, and talking

to them about, military science and, a few other topics related to military science.

Yep.

And, and you're actually considering a PhD of some sort at the moment?

That's right.

Yeah.

I've been accepted to do a PhD.

I have a, a number of master's degrees and, do a PhD, in, Indonesian military

history and Indonesian military politics.

Yep.

So by way of background, last week, I read an article that was talking

about Malcolm Turnbull and how.

Our relationship with America was fantastic, as close as it could

be, and we're a rock solid ally.

And I was suggesting maybe that wasn't the best thing because with friends like

America at times, who needs enemies?

Because they get us into a lot of trouble.

And my colleagues on the podcast were saying, well, we really

need America because what if Indonesia decides to invade us?

And I put forward that the chances of that were fairly slim, and that

wasn't an issue to worry about.

But am I right or am I wrong, or is there a different answer, Huntoo?

Yeah, I, I, I think that, in, in some ways that you're both right.

You are absolutely, absolutely right as far as Indonesia

being a threat to Australia.

There's no, there's no doubt that in the, foreseeable future That Indonesia

poses no threat to Australia whatsoever.

if we look at, how you decide whether something is a threat or

not, there's two parts that you need to look at and consider.

The first part is, does the one party have, intent, towards another party?

And the second part is, do they have the capability?

And, we can look at Indonesia in that light.

We can say, do they have, at the present moment, any intent to, attack Australia,

and the answer to that is absolutely not.

There's no, no reason why Indonesia would attack Australia.

No reason, through domestic politics.

No reason through international politics.

In fact, Indonesia being the largest economy in Southeast Asia is very

keen to maintain its relationship with Australia because Australia

provides a lot of goods and a lot of services that Indonesia doesn't have

and can't provide for themselves.

And if you think about the food, that Australia provides to Indonesia, beef

in particular, without that, they would, indeed find it very difficult

to, feed their, feed their people.

So there's no way that they're going to stop that.

And, to think that Indonesia would Attack Australia over food is just,

in, in terms of old English or old Australia's malarkey, there's just no

chance that that's going to happen.

If you look at domestic politics, there's no reason why Australia would be

put forward as a target for Indonesia.

So in, in terms of intent, there's no intent for Indonesia to attack Australia.

Then if we look at capability, Indonesia has a very large standing army, but

its Navy Really, a number of old rust buckets and a couple of, perhaps, ships

that, would hardly pose any sort of threat to anybody except themselves.

How's their submarine going?

Well, I used to laugh because some of the guys I knew, Over there, would,

collect their submarine every, every year.

They had a, an old Russian whiskey class submarine and it was tied up to the dock.

And every year they'd all climb aboard and the, the submarine would

be submerged at the dock and they had a crane there just in case the

thing couldn't make its way up again.

and, but doing that, they all, you know, gee, that's over for another year

where I can collect my submariners pay.

And, that's, that's about their capability with, submarines.

So really.

are not, able to, operate in, what we would call blue water.

They, they would, they are capable perhaps in white water, but, white water, if

you look on a, on a naval map, you'll see that, there's white water, which is

shallow and blue water, which is deep.

And it's unlikely that they would operate very successfully outside archipelago.

So for them to mount some sort of a martyr, let's go back one step.

And look at what you would need militarily to, have a beachhead on Australia.

In 1942, the Japanese did a very large study, of what they would require to form

a beachhead in the north of Australia.

And they found that when they did their, all their estimates, that they

would need a minimum of nine divisions.

Nine Divisions means, something in order of a hundred thousand supported soldiers,

landed in the one place at the one time.

So somehow you've got to get all those people from one place to another.

How many people could you put on a troop ship?

Like, if you're having, how many?

Well, if, you know, how long is a piece of string, how big's the troop ship?

You know, if you look at something like the Canberra that was used

in the Falklands, you might get, something in the order of three

or four thousand onto each ship.

if you look at, a big luxury cru cru cruise liner that you might want to

convert into a troop ship, you could probably think about putting a division

on that without equipment, because they are able to take, the people, but then

you've got to have all the equipment, you've got to think about the support

equipment, the vehicles, the tanks, the artillery, and on and on it goes.

And all this stuff has to be, transported on cargo ships.

So you're having a martyr of, civilian vessels that would be escorted.

because they don't have the military vessels to take any sort,

anything like that number of people.

you have to have, civilian ships that have been converted and then, the

difficulty is getting these, these are not roll on roll off type ships and so

it'd be quite difficult to land all this equipment, in a very short period of time.

Specialized military ships even find it difficult to do this sort of

thing and in fact, American Navy in Australia, every two years, operate.

in, off the Queensland coast, Rockhampton, we're all aware of

the exercises that take place off there to actually do this and land.

You know, some few hundred, a few thousand troops in an exercise,

whereas we're talking now trying to land a hundred thousand troops

to be really quite effective.

And that's just not possible for the Indonesians.

They don't have the shipping, they don't have the naval vessels to support that.

That type of, a martyr that would have to be formed.

They don't have the air support.

They don't have surveillance.

They don't have any submarine warfare.

And order to develop all those sort of capabilities takes a very, very long time.

It's not a matter of just going out and buying the ships.

For us, in Australia, we have long We've been looking at anti submarine warfare,

anti surface warfare, we've looked at submarines and as we've seen, we're

going to spend another 50 billion on submarines to support our capability

north of Australia to stop somebody from actually landing on Australia.

It's a bit of a sore point with me, Hunter, the 50 billion on

those submarines, but we'll bypass that for the moment.

Keep going.

Yeah, I mean, all right, all right.

Necessarily support the spending of that sort of money on submarines, but, that is

what the government's decided to do, and, they've decided that submarines are the

best deterrent at this point in time to stop people coming across the air sea gap.

So, if you think about, aircraft, if you say, okay, well, we won't do it by

ship, we'll do it by aircraft, and we'll have paratroopers come to Australia and

we'll transport them in, in aircraft.

Now, if you look at a normal, sort of aircraft like a C 130, which would

be, capable of, dropping paratroopers, something like that, will carry probably

80 to 100 fully armed, men that are going to drop out of the aircraft and,

so you can do the math as well as I can.

If you want to do 100, 000, you need 1, 000 aircraft.

And, they've got, um You know, a very small number of aircraft that are

capable of dropping off paratroops.

And most of those are old B model Hercules aircraft, and they're pretty much beyond

their Capability at this point in time.

So, the Indonesians neither have intent, nor do they have capability, and the

capability, we would see them building the capability, they would be, giving us some

sort of indication of their intent a long time before they would even be capable

of doing anything against Australia.

So, you really need to be thinking, 10 years, advanced lead time

from when you start developing these sort of capabilities.

You're probably even thinking more like 20 years, particularly against, you

know, an angry, uh Um, Western, well developed society like ours that has,

quite a lot of high technology capable, you know, high technology available

to us in, in, in the military sense.

So you've gotta then try and counter the technology that the opposition has, and

the Indonesians would take a very, very long time to develop any sort of level of

capability, skills to counter Australia.

Okay.

You know.

So, so let's accept then that Indonesia is such a long way off that we could see

it coming a mile away and do something about it if, if it was going to happen.

What about China?

If China decided to, you know, attack us?

This is when, this is when you start looking at who your friends are.

And, and that's why, at the very start, I go back to the comment that

I said that you're both right in many ways, and you're right as far as

Indonesia is concerned, but, you know, your, your colleague is also right

as far as having America as a friend.

Think about China at the moment, have some experimental aircraft

of one aircraft carrier.

They could probably mount a couple of squadrons of, of aircraft and they

have not even a full carrier group available to them at the present time.

America usually around the place operates for full carrier groups.

So when you look at American capability versus Chinese capability, it's

cheese and chalk for power projection.

Yeah, and so the Chinese attempting to project power through the

Indonesian archipelago would also find it very difficult.

This is why we need to keep Indonesia as a friend, because A, the Indonesians would

want to stop them from projecting power through their archipelago in the first

instance, and they, they would need to do that, because to get to Australia, there's

really three Roots through Indonesia or around New Guinea, or you're going

to have to come a very long way around.

And to do that, our capability with, our submarines, our anti surface capability

and our anti subsurface capability would make it very difficult for even the

Chinese to bring an Armada large enough to actually land on Australian soil.

Now it's, it's, it's well and good to say, Oh, they've got a million soldiers, but

you know, how are they going to get here?

They're going to swim.

You know, that's.

That's the bottom line, and that's why our White Papers have always

focused on the air sea gap to the North of Australia and have always

said that any threat to Australia would be through, not necessarily

from, the Indonesian archipelago.

And that's a big distinction between those two things.

And even China at this point in time, there is no way that they

could threaten Australia in that way.

Right.

Yep.

Okay.

Let's assume that China, ramps up and gets enough equipment.

Can we trust the Americans to help us?

If, Oh, well, that's, that's a question that you've got to ask.

So when, when you look at spending on, on, on military, on arms and all that

sort of stuff, and the actual money that's spent around the world, America,

outspends everyone else combined.

And so you look at, you look at that and you go, If you look

at all the wars that have been fought since Vietnam, who has won?

And which side do you think it's best to be on, whether they are

likely to support you or not, and the answer is that if you're on the

American side, you're gonna win.

if you're on the American side, you're not likely to lose.

let's put it that way because Unless you're in Afghanistan, maybe?

Or I mean, it's interesting you talk about these places,

you know, who wins, who loses.

if you want to go back to the 1970s and talk about Vietnam,

everyone Talks about, you know, how America lost the war in Vietnam.

American Has America really lost the war?

If you're, you know, you know, living in middle class America,

you've got a pretty nice life.

If you're living in Vietnam, until very recently, you were

still living in the Stone Age.

Who won and who lost?

You know, that's, that's a, it's a moot point.

Yeah, but had they never, had they never entered Vietnam, the people

still would have a very comfortable life in North America, irrespective.

But I guess that, that one doesn't matter so much.

But, It's, it's, it's where you've got to look at, history and about the insurance

policies that Australia has taken over the last, you know, 50 years, in order

to think that we are safe from, you know, threats of a, of a more global nature.

You know, you, you look at Russia and, and, and again, Is

Russia a threat to Australia?

Do they have the capability?

Yeah, they probably could if they focused all of their military capability and all

their transport capability on coming to Australia, but it's a hell of a long way.

And, you know, if you've got friends like America, you know, the Russians

showed in World War II how you need to fight these sort of wars and, it's

to, it's to burn behind, as you go.

As you, Fight all the way from point A to point B, you just have a scorched

earth policy, so that their lines of communication, their lines of supply

get longer and longer and longer and more difficult, more difficult, and your

lines of supply get shorter and shorter.

You know, Kokoda's a very good example of that.

we could have done much better in Malaysia, before the fall of Singapore,

had the Australian High Command had its way, because Australia wanted to

use a scorched earth policy against the Japanese, but the Brits thought that

Fortress Singapore was, was impregnable.

And so they said, no, we don't need to add that sort of policy.

of course, as we know now, in retrospect, the Brits were wrong.

and the Scorched Earth policy would have worked, much better than their plan.

Yep.

So when I'm talking minor countries, you know, like Indonesia, they

just don't have the capability.

When we're talking major countries like China or Russia, we could assume

the Americans would be interested enough to stop them dominating this

part of the world and would would step in Just in terms of protecting

their own patch if if nothing else That's an interesting assumption.

You know, yeah, I like the word used.

We can assume.

I, I tend to think more like a question.

So we can hope that that's what's going to happen.

again, you know, China would have to, we would see the threat coming, at the

moment, there is no intent from China, let alone do they have the capability.

There is no intent.

And so the threat doesn't exist.

do they have the capability in the future?

Should they change their intent?

that's another good question.

And, I would have to sit down and carefully look at what

the Chinese capability is.

But even the capability Australia has today would probably be enough.

To counter a, you know, an attack from China, because the distances that are

involved, the capability, the amount of equipment, the amount of people

that you need to land is enormous to actually try and form that beachhead.

And, it's, you know, you're talking superpower stuff to get to

this point, and China's not yet.

in the realms of a military superpower and Russia is probably past its prime.

And, the Americans could do it, but, you know, staying on the right side

of America, no intent, capability.

Do the Americans have the capability?

Yes, they do, but they don't have intent.

So America doesn't form a threat.

So you stay on the right side of the Americans, which I think is a

very good policy and the insurance that we've taken out by going into

Afghanistan, by, supporting them in Iraq and these other places.

That has, given us the insurance policy that we need, I think,

to Do you think it does, though?

Do you think that, do you think, like, the present administration, with Trump,

do you think that cuts anything with him?

Like, if, if somebody did decide to invade us, somebody like Trump, I just have the

feeling, wouldn't Wouldn't pay heed to any of that history and would just decide in

the moment whether it was worth him, worth America's interests getting involved or

not and wouldn't care about the history.

It's interesting that you raise that point and, and the point that I would raise,

it was actually, I was watching Question Time today, for the Federal Parliament

and Peter Dutton got out, to answer a question, concerning, Mattis and Nauru.

And, he quoted some facts, I think that another 135 had gone from Manus and

Nauru to the United States and they had actually departed and, the United

States had accepted these people.

Now, that, agreement had been made between Turnbull and Obama and Trump said that

he would not honour that and finally came around to honouring that agreement

and that agreement has been honoured.

And it's totally against what he personally wanted to do, however The

administration, in the United States had enough power to convince him that he

needed to honor his, America's commitments to Australia and to anybody else.

And so I think you can take that as a, an indicator as to which way it would go.

And I believe because of the history and because of the way we have

acted over the past, you know, it's getting on towards 80 or 90 years.

I think that, we would be able to count on the Americans for a lot of support.

Okay, well, Hantu, I think you covered the Indonesian issue for the dear

listener and, and I'll call on you again in the future as issues crop up.

Yep, I'm willing and pleased to be part of such a wonderful podcast.

All right, Hantu, I'll let you get back to whatever you, you were doing

and, I'll see you Thursday night.

All right, mate.

All good.

All right.

Thanks, mate.

See ya.

Catch you then.

Bye.

Bye bye.

Thank you for coming in at such short notice, I thought the best way to proceed

was to get everyone in the one room.

Good thinking.

Okay?

You're alright.

I'll come straight to the point.

This white paper is recommending we spend close to 400 billion

dollars over the forward estimates.

Now at some point the PM is going to be asked a very simple question.

In order to protect us from which enemy?

It's so hard to say.

400 billion, pick one.

A regional player.

Specifically, Colonel.

An Indo Pacific regional player.

More specifically?

Indo Asia Pacific.

That's broader.

So who are you leaving out?

Europe?

Yeah, I sort of need a country.

Or an unaligned player.

No, a country.

One that might threaten us.

Just one.

Yeah.

I wouldn't want to raise tensions.

Where?

In this room.

You know what?

I'll name one and you just nod.

China.

Yep.

Okay.

And what exactly are we protecting?

Strategic interests.

Specifically, Colonel?

Indo Pacific strategic interests.

Again, Brigadier, really specifically.

Indo Asia Pacific strategic interests.

You know what?

I'll say it and then you nod.

Our trade routes.

Yep.

Okay.

And who is our number one trading partner?

Shall we use an odd system?

Sure.

China?

Yeah.

So under this scenario, we're spending close to 30 billion a year to protect

our trade with China from China.

And that doesn't strike anyone at this table as odd?