Jacob Smulian: Hello and welcome to another episode
of the Jacob Shapiro podcast.
I am your editor and producer, other Jacob.
Today we have Tobias Harris, the starting forward on the Detroit Pistons.
He's gonna talk to us about the geopolitics of Japan.
That's all I got.
We're gonna dive in.
Um, go tell your loved ones that you love them.
Go touch some grass.
And, uh, we'll see you out there.
Jacob Shapiro: Uh, really pleased to welcome the, uh, starting
forward on the Detroit Piston.
Oh, oh wait.
Sorry, I got the wrong, can somebody get me the right bio over here?
I, I thought about doing a Zach AKAs between two Ferns and just treating
you like the Detroit Pistons, Tobias Harris, the whole time.
I thought that would've been funny.
It's good to see you, man.
Thanks for making the time to come on.
No, it's great to be back.
Thanks, Jacob.
Uh, we will throw this in the show notes.
Um, uh, the last time Tobias came on, I was not yet a subscriber to,
uh, his substack observing Japan.
I am now.
And I can attest it's as good as you might expect it to be
from the last time he was on.
So I appreciate, um, uh, Tobias making the time.
Uh, we could start in a lot of different places, but we should probably start
in the obvious place, which is, um.
Liberation Day, uh, United States tariffs, not just on enemies,
but on allies, including Japan.
Uh, and it wasn't, I, I see.
If I characterize this correctly, it seems to me that in some sense the biggest
negative reaction to us tariffs and the.
The protectionist impulse in US trade policy in some ways
has not been China or Europe.
It has been Japan, which has basically said we're not signing on
to anti-China provisions and we expect the rollback of all of these tariffs.
Uh, you've had what, five trade meetings now between the United States and Japan?
Um, seemed like the last one didn't go anywhere, that there's
no agreement on just about.
Anything between the two sides.
Um, so, um, where, where are Japan US relations at?
Because from somebody who is not focused on Japan all the time, it seems like Japan
is basically saying to the United States like, we're not going along with you.
And that's pretty shocking because there's arguably no country in the world
that is more dependent on US security that is closer to the United States,
outside of the five eyes in Japan.
And it looks like relations are not particularly good.
So am I overcharacterizing it?
Tobias Harris: Well, it's, I mean, the situation in some ways is a
worst nightmare for Japan because of course, you, as you noted that,
I mean, they depend on the, on the United States for its security.
And, and more than that, they want, you know, the goal of Japanese foreign
PO central goal of Japanese foreign policy for a long time now has been
keeping the United States engaged, uh, in what, I guess what we now call the
Indo-Pacific, you know, economically, politically, militarily, you know, that.
If the US is not engaged and committed that Japan's security will be, uh,
will be detriment, it'll be extremely detrimental for Japan's security.
So, uh, on all those scores, that is, that has been Japan's main goal.
And the fact that you now have, uh, you know, a US administration,
uh, you have to not only, uh.
Is reconsidering that longstanding commitment, but, you know, now is
essentially asking a, a, a higher price to be paid by Japan and
other US allies to, to keep doing things, uh, that it was doing.
I mean, it just puts Japan in, in such an uncomfortable situation.
And of course, you know, for Japanese companies, the United States is, you
know, an exceedingly important market.
Uh, you, Japan invests a lot in the United States.
I mean, it's just, it's, it's.
Something that frankly they just would prefer not to have to deal with.
Uh, but they do have red lines, so they can't just say, well, we need
to keep, we're gonna do anything to keep the US happy because ultimately,
uh, there are prices that Japan does not feel comfortable paying.
And so that's really where things are stuck right now.
Jacob Shapiro: Yeah, that makes sense.
And there's also some level, I think, of consternation on the Japanese side
because if you believe the US reporting on this, like the US doesn't even
really know what it wants from Japan.
I thought you laid out really well.
Like, you know, there's the Stephen Miran approach and then there's what
the United States is actually doing.
And then there's the reporting on that meeting where Greer and Lutnick.
Cent are all in the meeting and have to pause the meeting because
they don't agree on what they're asking from the Japanese side.
So maybe like some, some of this is just like Japan not quite understanding
what it is the United States wants.
Um, what do you think the United States wants, like what, what do you think
the United States is trying to get out of this and what would be like, are
there any, are there any concessions that Japan is gonna be willing to make?
Because I sort of read their current position as like, you guys are
crazy, so come to us with a real.
Ask and sure we can talk.
But right now, like, does it, like this is, this is bonkers.
Like we have nothing to work with.
Tobias Harris: Well, just as an aside on, so the reporting about,
you know, the US negotiators arguing with each other, um, that I believe,
I believe came from Nikkei, um, you know, which tells you it's, I know
clearly saying the Japanese government.
Wanted out there.
Like, this is, this is what we're dealing with in these talks.
But, and the article, at least, at least the Japanese version
of the article mentioned this.
And I, and I, I mean, I thought it was, uh, you know, that was the first
thing that came to mind was that, you know, back in the, the eighties,
nineties when, you know, you had.
Serious, longstanding friction between the US and Japan.
Uh, you know, Japan didn't really have the equivalent of A-U-S-T-R at that point.
And so you, you had Japanese negotiators from different parts of
the Japanese government doing that.
Essentially.
I, I mean, you know, almost the exact same scenes where, you know, you'd
have the, the, the Mitzi guy arguing with the Ministry of Finance guy and
the foreign ministry and, you know, they'd be, um, having arguments in
front of the United States where the US actually did have a unified, uh.
Position in the course, you know, represented by the USTR.
And so it's just, it's a little funny to see the situation reversed where,
uh, actually heading into the TPP negotiations, one of the innovations
Japan made, uh, this was the, uh, you know, under Abe was, you know,
we actually can't enter these talks and do it the way we used to do.
We actually have to have our own sort of answer to USTR.
Um.
Part of the reason why, you know, the US and Japan were actually able to overcome
a lot of longstanding hurdles in those talks was that, uh, you did essentially
have a US trade representative negotiating with the Japan trade representative.
Uh, and, and instead of having, um.
You know, one side or the other are arguing amongst themselves
on the other side of the table.
And so now here we are full circle and Japan is like, we wish we were
negotiating with a single negotiator instead of, you know, watching
them negotiate amongst themselves.
But that, I mean, in some ways that really is the fundamental problem because
it does seem that there are some really irreconcilable goals within the Trump
administration where you have, um.
You know, what sounds like, you know, the, the Lunik position?
The Navarro position where the goal really is we, the United States just
needs to buy less stuff from foreigners.
Right?
That, that is the goal.
In which case, um.
There doesn't seem to be a whole lot of room to negotiate, um, on a lot of
these tariffs where, you know, we're not, you know, this is not like, you
know, we're gonna, you know, raise our tariffs and then we're gonna
negotiate with you for concessions.
And ultimately the goal is to remove, you know, most of the tariffs so that
you know, but ultimately get some, some.
Some concessions out of view to give our producers more market access.
That, you know, does not seem to be the thinking of a lot of people in the
administration, um, versus someone like bein who does, you know, certainly at
different times has suggested that the goal is to negotiate and ultimately
to get better terms of access for, uh, US producers in a foreign market.
And so, you know.
One of those positions Japan can work with, you know, Japan, you know, if
the goal is, you know, okay, we'll give you some concessions and then you'll,
you'll remove, you know, you know, some of these tariffs you're imposed.
And then we say, you know, great, we made a deal.
We have a, you know, stronger economic, um, economic ties between
our countries and we go forward.
But if that's not the situation, um.
There's, there's not a lot, I mean, Japan's not gonna just accept, you
know, 25% tariffs on, uh, its largest, its single largest, uh, category
of exports to the United States.
I mean, it's, it's, you know, that, that is just such a red line.
And now of course, today, you know, Trump comes out and says that auto
tariffs are gonna go even higher.
Um, I mean, and, and, and I mean, I think that the important thing too,
to note, and, and this is, I think.
Something that I, I have been, uh, personally frustrated with watching
the Trump administration do trade policy is that, uh, they either don't
realize or don't care that other countries have domestic politics too.
And so what we've seen over the course of these negotiations, uh, as you know,
we've had successive rounds of usan talks, has been UBA saying, uh, you know, these
auto tariffs are absolutely unacceptable.
You know, you know, we cannot sign on to an agreement.
Does that, does not, uh.
I mean the, the, the demand has been eliminate, I think now they're
now getting to a point where at least they have to be reduced.
Um, but the point is that if, if.
The Trump administration's not even willing to discuss them, and now
they're talking about raising them even further, then there's no real
basis for an agreement because frankly, an agreement that doesn't have some
concessions from the US on automobile tariffs is not something that Japan
is going to be able to sign onto.
And it's certainly not something that, uh, Ishiba can sign onto, uh, without really,
you know, paying a price domestically.
And he has, he has positioned himself so that he can't, uh, sign on to that
without paying some price domestically.
Jacob Shapiro: Mm-hmm.
Um.
Do you think that this has done fundamental and even irrevocable
damage to US Japan relations?
And if so, what does that look like three years from now, five years from now?
Or is Japan in the category of countries like Canada, which okay, like yes, it's
rude and it's heavy handed and everything else, but you don't really have a choice
but to go along because you're too exposed either from a trade perspective or a
security perspective or, or anything else.
So take that one however you want.
Tobias Harris: Well, I mean, I guess maybe it's worth stepping
back and saying for the moment that.
You know, things did not start on Liberation Day, right?
I mean, Japan was very frustrated with, with, I mean, even before
Trump was elected with the politics of TPP in the United States.
And the fact that, you know, okay, you, we negotiated this thing and you
can't even get it through Congress.
You know?
So, you know, there's been frustration with rising protectionism in the
United States now for, you know.
At least a decade, you know, you know what exactly, you know, what exactly are
you prepared to do has been the question I think from, uh, you know, from Japan
as far as the United States concerned.
So they've already been living in a world where, uh, the reliability of the
United States, at least as an economic partner, uh, has been in serious doubt
in Tokyo for a while, and they've already been thinking about how do we, uh.
Design and protect a, you know, a rules-based international economic order,
uh, on the basis of the United States.
Is it best going to be, uh, an inconsistent partner?
Uh.
And, and you also, that was during the Biden years, right?
Where, you know, I think there was a lot of frustration that on the one,
you know, from one side of the mouth, they talked about French shoring.
And now on the other side of the mouth you had, you know, Biden opposing, you
know, DuPont Steel buying US steel.
So, I mean, there's, you know, this, this, this is not just about Trump.
This is not something that began, you know, in April.
This is, you know, really, uh, a longer term, uh, disenchantment, uh, and
frustration with the United States really stepping back and pulling back from, uh.
Playing, you know, a, a, a rulemaking role both within Asia and also within
the global, uh, the global economy.
And so, uh, you know, Japan's already been thinking about its plan Bs on that front.
You know, it's already, uh, viewed, uh, you know, brought TPP back to life.
Um, as part of that effort, it has drawn closer to the EU as part of that effort.
Uh, you know, deepening ties with various, um, you know, various
countries in Southeast Asia, even, you know, viewing China as, um.
Find, you know, finding a way to, uh, live with China and continue to have
an economic relationship with China, you know, navigating US China frictions
and the impact that has on Japan.
And so Japan's already in this mindset of thinking about, okay, how do we, um.
How do we navigate a world where the United States basically is
sitting out a lot of, uh, efforts to integrate the global economy.
So we're gonna see that continue.
You know, there's already talk about how do you bring, uh,
TPP and the EU closer together.
So you're, you're almost creating this kind of advanced set
of, of global economic rules.
Um, kind of sidestepping the log jam at the WTO sidestepping, uh,
you know, the US setting things out.
So we're already seeing that.
Um, the bigger.
Question when it comes to the reliability of the United States is more on the
security side and you know, do things, you know, do you see the kind of
spillovers or do you see the kind of actions from the Trump administration
where Japan really says, you know, we really don't feel like, you know,
the US security guarantee, uh, is.
Is, is viable, is alive, you know, you know, there's been things, you know,
whether it's, you know, uh, actions undertaken, uh, or that could be
undertaken by Trump or, uh, rhetoric.
I mean, you know, and at this point, uh, you know, a lot of
that now is, is speculative.
It's been on the back burner.
I mean, clearly, you know, trade is, is, uh, front of
mind, and that's the main focus.
Uh.
But if there is reason down the road to really question, uh, the credibility of
the US security guarantee, then you're really gonna see, uh, you know, real
change in Japan's approach, you know, to its relationship in the United States.
Uh, and, and really with it then it's approached the world.
But for the moment, you know, it does seem that the trade issues
are somewhat insulated from
Jacob Shapiro: those broader questions.
All right.
Well, I'm gonna do the bane of, of all analysts existence.
I know this 'cause I am one.
I'm gonna ask you two different hypotheticals.
The first is, um, okay, well let's say the United States hypothetically
says we're not gonna defend Taiwan from China in the future.
I. Like, what, what options does Japan have at that point?
Or does that, does that not even matter to them?
Does the hypothetical have to be that the United States says we're not gonna
defend, uh, contested islands in the East China Sea or something like that, that
are contested between Japan and China?
Like, China can have those, like what, what happens in that scenario?
Like what, what options does Japan have?
Tobias Harris: Well, I mean, just to, to poke at that a little bit.
I mean, I think the, I mean the Taiwan.
The first part of the, the, the Taiwan, uh, issue in particular.
I mean, presumably if that's part of some sort of grand bargain with China,
I mean, presumably it's not gonna just be a unilateral declaration, but it's
gonna be, you know, some sort of deal with Xi Jinping that says, you know,
we're drawing, we're dividing up the world and it spheres of influence and
Taiwan is on your side of the line.
So, um, you know, so good luck.
Um, the, you know, of course.
You know, in theory, um, Japan's still not gonna say, okay, us go home.
I mean, if, if, if part of that is, you know, the US is gonna keep bases in Japan
and you know, like we're, you know, the line just happens to, you know, mm-hmm.
Be, um, just east of Taiwan.
Um.
That's one thing.
I mean, I think Japan will be very unhappy about that because, you know,
the sort of, the geo, the geo strategist, you know, look at the map and they say,
you know, if, if, um, you know, Taiwan is, you know, integrated into mainland
China, um, you know, it gives, it just, I mean, is is a physical threat to Japan.
Just, you know, where it mo you know, moving, uh, China's naval
presence, you know, that much further east, you know, and, and having
access to the Western Pacific.
Um.
That is just something that I think Japan is, is concerned about and,
um, you know, so just, you know, from a sheer recognition of, uh,
geography is, is concerned about.
Um, but I mean, if it does mean grand bargain with China and therefore we
don't even need our alliance system in Asia, then clearly that's, you
know, that's a major wake up call and, and, and a crisis for Japan.
Um, and it's not.
You know, it's, it's uncomfortable for Japan because it's not something
that, you know, if it happens without, with little warning, you
know, you get sort of a Trump shock.
You know, Nixon, Nixon in 1971, style shock.
Then, um, you know, almost overnight, you know you're gonna get, um.
You know, a feeling of panic in Tokyo, but maybe not a lot
of good options and mm-hmm.
You know, even for the discuss, you know, all the discussion about, you
know, Japan is a latent nuclear power.
Uh, you know, as soon as you start looking at the details of, in the
complexity of that, you know, that is not something that, uh, you know,
even, you know, you know, you hear sometimes like cavalier suggestions
that it could be done in six months.
I mean, um.
I mean, it is not, uh, not something that can happen easily.
And in the meantime, what happens?
Um, you know, you know, when, you know during however many months it takes
to, to have your own nuclear deterrent.
Um, you know, what sort of, what sort of coercion are you vulnerable to?
So, um, you know, it's, it's such a, a.
Drastic hypothetical that it's really hard, you know, it's really hard to know.
How does the Japanese public respond?
How do Japanese elites respond?
I mean it's, you know, certainly from the moment it's very hard to imagine,
you know, Japan wanting to reach some sort of accommodation with China or
some sort of, you know, finlandization.
You know, like, will, you know, you leave us alone and you know,
we won't make any trouble for you.
Um, in foreign policy.
I mean, that's.
That's also hard to imagine.
Um, but, you know, in a, in a shock situation, United States
decides that it's, it's pulling out, um, a lot of things that seem
unthinkable now could become possible.
And, you know, there certainly will be people domestically in
Japan arguing, uh, you know, you know, do we wanna really, um.
You know, lift, you pick up the sword essentially that the US would be dropping
down and, and you know, that that's gonna be a really tough, uh, debate domestically
Jacob Shapiro: in Japan.
Hmm.
All right.
Well, second hypothetical, uh, Shinzo Abe and Donald Trump
had a very close relationship.
Donald Trump thought very highly of him.
If he's still alive, does this look diff completely different or do you think that
the way that Japan, US relations have played out here in the first six months
of the Trump administration would be.
Fundamentally different if he had not been assassinated.
Tobias Harris: It's, you know, it's a question I've, I've, you know, obviously
thought a lot about, uh, over the last, you know, three or six months,
um, you know, I tend to be skeptical though, or at least tend to caution
people not to have an a rose colored.
Spectacles when it comes to looking back to Trump won, where I think there
was a period of time where, uh, you know, Trump Abe's investments in a
relationship with Trump, paid dividends.
You know, the fact that he went to meet him right after, uh, right after
he was elected, when, you know, no one else really knew what to do.
And, you know, Abe got on a plane and went very quickly and
met with him at Trump Tower.
Um, you know, that I think won him a lot of credit.
You know, they, uh.
Early visit to Mar-a-Lago after inauguration I think
got him a lot of credit.
And so, um, that in some ways maybe, uh, certainly delayed some things.
It certainly may be avoided.
Uh.
More severe outcomes, but I, I, I would argue that you really
got diminishing returns from that personal relationship as well.
That by, you know, 2018 when Trump starts, uh, talking with North Korea, you know,
you get Abe calling up Trump constantly, you know, please don't forget Japan.
Please don't forget Japan.
Um, and I don't think that worked with Trump personally.
I think to the extent that Trump's or that Abe's sort of efforts to, um.
Kind of prevent a bad deal with North Korea that would harm Japan.
Uh, I, I think he had help inside the Trump administration.
Uh, you know, I think there's, you know, been reporting about, you know,
John Bolton basically, um, working with Abe to, to help, um, prevent, uh, you
know, a, a deal that would basically let North Korea, uh, keep it to nuclear
weapons and basically get, you know, uh, you know, a, like a steal of approval
for its, you know, for its arsenal.
Um, mm-hmm.
You know, if that hap, you know, if you saw similar talks happen
now, would would it look like that?
Probably not.
Um, even with Abe around and, you know, also, you know, Abe, you know,
really, you know, was not eager to get into a situation of doing us Japan,
you know, by an federal trade talks.
And, you know, Trump threatens automobile tariffs and what happens,
Japan has to come to the table.
So, um.
Things weren't always as, uh, pleasant and cheerful, uh, and
and friendly as people remember.
Um, you know, and, and Trump, of course, is perfectly capable of
talk, you know, like is happy to talk about how much he likes this place
or is friendly towards that place.
Um, but then we'll turn around and, and, you know.
Slap tariffs on a country, right?
I mean, you know, right before Liberation Day, what was it?
Israel was saying, you know, we'll take all US tariffs, you know, all US codes,
you know, due to free and did it matter?
No, it didn't matter.
And um, you know, so there's clearly a limit, you know, to
how far personal diplomacy.
What would Trump even during the first term, and clearly I think during this
term, you know, he feels more confident.
You know, he won the popular vote last year, feels stronger.
He's been there before.
You know that this is not, um, you know, he's not as, I think, susceptible
to flattery maybe as he once was or, or certainly, um, also maybe
is wier and is, is willing to let.
Those engaging in flattery, think they're, they're getting something from him.
And, um, you know, ultimately, you know, he, you know, is happy to let
them think that, but is ultimately not giving up anything, um, in return.
So, I, I'm, I am not.
Necessarily convinced that things would look different.
Right.
You know, that would, would the Liberation Day tariff, would, would
Abe have been able to convince Trump to exempt Japan from those?
I don't, I don't think so.
Um, would the kind of, you know, would Abe have been able to, um,
kind of navigate, you know, the, the internal divisions, you
know, on trade that we've talked about, um, in this conversation?
Not necessarily.
I mean, um.
You know, the people within, um, you know, the, the Navarros and the Latinxs.
I mean, you know, would Abe be able to, um, kind of, you know, lean on
the scale so that, um, kind of they're overpowered and, and have to kind of
make a, make up friendlier deal with Japan just because, you know, Abe, um,
could get Trump on the phone easily.
I, I'm not convinced, I, I'm really not convinced.
Things seem just very different this time around.
Jacob Shapiro: Yeah, I mean, the recent Musk, uh, Trump drama shows you how
quickly some of these things can change no matter how much, uh, Trump seems
to be having to bromance with someone.
Um, which I think, I think the, the, the Trump Abe things felt a little bromance.
All right.
Let, let's move away from, uh, the United States.
Let's talk a little bit of about, um, Japanese relations with China.
Um, in late December, you had Japan's foreign minister visit China.
A couple interesting meetings.
Also met China's foreign minister.
You had.
Some follow up in March about, you know, consensus points and pledging
economic co collaboration and things like that at the same time.
I mean, if you look just at, uh, I looked at the South China
morning post this morning.
China's military saying Japan is breaching its pacifist constitution
with long range missile tests.
So it's not like everything is perfect.
Um.
You also, I mean, I don't know if these reports were ever confirmed, but about,
you know, South Korea, Japan and China coordinating some kind of response
to us tariffs like that was sort of denied by one side, maybe by one side.
And no, this has, you know, sort of all over the place there.
So where, where do us, uh, excuse me, where do Japan China relations
stand from your point of view?
Have they gotten better?
Is it basically still the same?
Are they in flux?
Like where, where are they?
Um,
Tobias Harris: that, when, when everyone kind of freaked out about the, uh, that.
Japan, China, South Korea, based on, you know, Chinese state media reporting.
I mean, that was, that was really ridiculous.
But, um, anyway, it's, you know, this, this predates Trump.
I mean, you really have had efforts, uh, really going back a year now
by the Japanese government, uh, to try to repair some of the damage.
Um, you know, things were, uh.
You know, it's, it's been this rollercoaster, right?
You know, under second Abe things started out really poorly and, you
know, out of military tensions and wars of words and battles over history.
Uh, and then by, you know, by 20 16, 20 17, not coincidentally after, after Trump
takes office, I mean, you did have, uh, Abe really investing in trying to improve
the economic relationship with China.
Uh.
You know, get on the same page, find opportunities for cooperation.
And, you know, to the point where the, you know, in 2020 had COVID not happened,
Xi Jinping was supposed to visit, you know, to, to visit Japan on a state visit.
So that, you know, that was sort of where things were.
And then COVID happened and, you know, trying to, uh, you know,
what came down heavy on Hong Kong.
And, and there's a real backlash to that in, uh, in Japan.
And that really, um.
Sour things, and you know, you've had worse, you know, trade friction with,
uh, with the United States and, you know, the Biden administration's approach
and, and Japan tagging along with that.
And so, I mean, so you, I mean, you've just had this, um, decline now for the
last five, you know, four or five years.
And now they're at this point now of, okay, how do we undo some of that damage?
Which, you know, not only is it, you know, you know.
You know, this export control and, and, you know, you know, foregoing this, uh,
this visit and announcing this military, you know, exercise with this country.
You know, just like the series of, uh.
Steps that really have, um, heightened tensions.
I mean, it's also just trying to restore, uh, channels of communication.
I mean, that, that really is, I think the, the most important thing
we've seen over the last year.
It's been less about, you know, tangible improvement, um, which has
been very halting and has been more about, you know, how do you get, uh.
You know, getting Japanese political leaders back to China, you know, who used
to have these kinda regular delegations going over and, and having communication.
How do you get business delegations going back?
How do you then have, uh, you know, communist party officials coming on,
on visits to Japan, Chinese government officials back to Japan, um, just
restarting some of these exchanges.
So, you know, the exchange of views are there.
And I mean, and that really, I. I think that that has been
the most important thing.
You know, really going back to basically roughly September of last year,
you've now had a series of exchanges.
Things seem much more routinized.
Um, you know, the communication is happening.
Um, even if, uh, you know, just getting over some of the, the real challenges
is, is proving very difficult.
They're at least talking to each other.
Jacob Shapiro: Um, well let, let's sort of stay in the same vein, um, and say,
um, also there's been a big election in South Korea over the last couple of weeks.
We've got.
Uh, is progressive too strong?
I mean, you've got a South Korean leader now who you would think is
gonna maybe revamp some of the previous South Korean administration's approach.
So that administration basically tried to put to bed conflict with Japan, tried
to deepen, uh, relations with both the United States and Japan, TR laterally.
Um, uh, I think.
I think President Biden, one of the things he got the least amount of
credit for was the way that he really ironed out some of those disagreements
between Japan and South Korea.
Now, he had a favorable South Korean government to do it, but
hey, he knew it was an issue.
He tried.
It was sort of a major, I think, a major success story for him.
Does all that go away?
Early returns from the South Korean government suggest that,
uh, maybe a little more pragmatic than the progressive label looks.
Maybe they want to continue to deepen or at least keep relations with Japan, um,
and with the United States fairly good.
Do you see any imminent.
Change there.
I mean, there's been also some things about maybe South Korea and North
Korea relaxing things a little bit.
And you can imagine if we return to Fire and Fury and Rocket Man, we'll put
that, we'll put that VHS back in and start replaying some of the Trump won,
um, episodes from that sort of thing.
So, and any, is this a source of optimism for Japan?
Is this a Oh no, not this too, like the sky is falling.
Is it somewhere in between?
Um, how do we think about it?
Tobias Harris: For the moment.
I mean, president Lee has, uh, been saying the right things and on the
campaign trail, you know, was saying the right things and, um, you know, but in
general, when you have, um, you know, a, you know, in, in some ways, in some
ways, I mean, the situ, it's not quite like, you know, when Moon, uh, uh, moon
Jian was president, but the last time.
Progressive Korean president, right?
Because then you had a progressive Korean president and a pretty right wing Japanese
Prime Minister in Prime Minister Abe.
And, um, the, you know, this, you essentially got this sort
of escalatory spiral on history issues as a result of that.
Um, you know, in part because you had, um, kind of the, the, the
each, each leader's domestic base was essentially pushing them.
Um.
Yeah, away from, you know, the pushing the two countries apart.
And so the question is, um, you know, circumstances are a little different
now, and in part also 'cause I think, you know, views in, in, uh, South Korea
have changed, maybe even less about Japan and more about, you know, fears of
China I think are pretty well ingrained.
Um, you know, I think one of the things that, uh.
Japanese, uh, elites and particularly, you know, more right wing Japanese
elites have been convinced of is, you know, China, you know, South Korea,
you know, they're too close to China.
Uh, they're not reli, they're not a reliable partner when it
comes to security in the region.
You know, we can't trust them, and so therefore it's not worth investing
any, you know, real effort in trying to get along with them anyway.
And.
I think the mood in Tokyo maybe has changed a little bit on that.
There's a little more willingness to see that okay, maybe the South Korean
people as a whole are, you know, are, you know, skeptical of China.
They are, you know, that there is the material for uh, kind of broader
security cooperation, um, on that.
Um.
So that might be in the backdrop of, of the kind of new tone that we've
heard from, from President Lee.
I mean, the, the question, you know, in all of this is, I mean, it's easy
to say it on the campaign trail.
It's easy to say it now after you've been, you know, elected and inaugurated.
Uh, the question is, when, when something happens, the test, the
relationship, what that, you know, do you grandstand for your, for
your core supporters or, you know.
Do you do shuttle diplomacy?
You know, and try to, you know, try to get to a situation where cooler
heads can prevail and you can say the relationship is bigger than this.
You know, we have to, you know, we can't let, um, you know, sort of, uh,
you know, a legal case about history, you know, something historical or, you
know, historical claims, uh, derail, you know, cooperation about other issues
or, you know, more kind of tangible future looking, uh, cooperation and.
You know, it's, you know, until we actually see something like that
happen, um, that remains to be seen.
I mean, in some ways it's not bad that, um, um, prime Minister Ishiba,
uh, is in power in that, you know, he is a, he is, you know, in a Japan.
Context on, you know, as far as relations with Korea go, I mean,
he's relatively progressive about it.
I mean, he's been, um, you know, he has called for much more reckoning by Japanese
with what Japan actually did in Korea.
Um, you know, it's something that makes him not particularly especially popular
with the, the right wing of his own party.
Um, you know, it'll be interesting to see, you know, this is of
course a big, um, anniversary year.
Um.
Both, uh, for the, um, you being the, uh, uh, 60th anniversary of normalization
or establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and South Korea.
Of course, it's also the, um, the 80th anniversary of the end of World War ii,
and, and Yeshiva has made noise about wanting to put out some sort of statement.
It's not clear what sort of legal status that statement will have.
I mean, and there's debate, you know, con, that's been a pretty, uh.
Length debate, uh, in Japan about what kind of statement
Ishiba will be able to make.
But, um, you know, there's some opportunity there for, you know,
a prime minister like Ishiba to maybe, um, say some things on these
occasions that, you know, um, to maybe disarm some South Korean, uh,
skepticism or hostility towards Japan.
You know, having a, a prime minister say that, um, I mean the, the problem.
Um, Farba of course, is that as long as his, uh, political situation is a little
weak, um, he may be limited in what he can say for fear of backlash from his right.
And so, so that's something to consider.
I mean, and, and, you know, he might be the right person, but is not
necessarily in a position where he can just say whatever he wants with,
you know, without fearing for, uh.
Political, you know, political consequences.
So, um, you know, maybe, and maybe ultimately for the long-term stability
of the bio relationship, the best thing would've been if, if someone like
Abe could have, um, made some sort of more kind of deeper heartfelt gesture
with a Korean progressive in power.
Um, and that might have maybe resulted in, in some sort of more durable, uh.
Kind of settlement.
But, um, you know, so the potential for friction is there, you know,
even with, uh, with me saying the right things, um, there's, you know,
there's still, you know, there's still plenty of hostility in both
countries, uh, waiting to be inflamed.
Um, so yeah, it's, that's really the thing to watch for,
you know, is, is there a, uh.
You know, a catalyst at some point that really undoes some
of the work that we've seen.
Hmm.
Jacob Shapiro: That's, that's, uh, cautiously hopeful.
Uh, if I'm, if I'm reading your tone correctly, um, let's, let's pivot
a little bit now to, to Japanese domestic politics, um, at your advice.
Uh, I started, I'm slowly working my way through the nobility
of failure by Ivan Morris.
Uh, loving it, by the way.
And the last time we talked, you mentioned that maybe, uh.
Ishiba would, would be, would be a chapter in this book in the future.
Uh, and things weren't, did not seem to be going particularly well at the beginning.
We could talk about rice prices, we could talk about terrible approval
ratings, potential votes of no confidence, but he seems to have turned
the ship around a little bit, like his approval ratings starting to inch up.
You've got some pretty good pushes on, on trying to lower rise.
You've got some deals with the opposition about pension reform.
So where, where are you at with Yeshiva?
Do you think it's fundamentally the deck is stacked against him?
Is he turning it around?
Is he still gonna be the tragic hero?
Like how are we feeling a couple months in?
Um, yeah,
Tobias Harris: it's, um, you know, things really have changed week to
week, you know, that there've been moments, you know, in the last few
months where things were looking better.
Um.
Then, you know, just when things start looking up, that's when the rug
seems to get pulled out under him.
So we'll see if, if this is really a, uh, a true, uh, new beginning for him or if
it's just a, you know, another false dawn.
Um, but I. The, you know, the story really for Ishiba.
I mean, his, you know, his premiership now has been, you know, fundamentally
shaped by the fact that he is at the head of a minority government
and everything has to be negotiated.
Uh, every, you know.
Everything requires, you know, consulting with multiple opposition
parties, trying to convince at least one of them to support something
that his government wants to do.
And predictably what that has done has forced him to scale
back, back his ambitions.
And, you know, the criticism, you know, you know, even, and especially from
within the LDP has been, well, you know, we don't know what he wants to do.
You know, he has not really, uh, you know, laid out a vision, you know,
and, and I mean, and some of that is just, he's kind of a different sort of.
Politician, you know, for doing like the kind of fox and hedgehog dichotomy.
You know, Abe in, in a lot of ways was something of a hedgehog in that, you
know, was like absolutely fixated on, on this idea of kind of national greatness
and, you know, make Japan great again.
Perhaps we might call it, you know, that, you know that, that, you
know, all out effort to make Japan stronger, to make Japan wealthier,
to to leave behind, uh, the.
You know, the, the frustrations and the difficulties of the lost decades
to make Japan powerful and relevant.
Uh, that's, that's not kind of how Ishiba is.
Ishiba is much more Fox like, you know, much less animated by this
sort of big, obsessive vision.
Um, much more, uh, adapting responsive.
He's not really, he's not terribly ideological ultimately.
Um.
So, um, you know, it's, it's just a reason.
You know, in some ways it makes him well suited to the situation where he has to
negotiate and he has to be willing to compromise and, you know, be extremely
flexible on, uh, what he's willing to concede on when it comes to negotiating
on, on policies with the opposition.
Um, but it does mean that we just don't know, um.
There's not, there's not a huge vision that he's, you know, gonna put all
of his effort into trying to achieve.
I mean, there really is just a sense of he's just trying to survive here
as long as he can and sort of walk this tightrope, um, and, and hope
it, uh, just hope it works out.
And I. You know, for people who are used to watching, you know, you know,
expecting a leader to be like Abe and to lay out this grand vision and you know,
this, this is what we're working towards.
Even if there's gonna be momentary zigs and zags, that's not what
you're getting with Ishiba.
And, um, and so that's, I mean, that's just, that's just the difference.
Um, you know, he's got his big test in about a month when
there'll be upper house elections.
Um, and I. Basically, I mean, it really will be make or break for his
government because if, um, if they can, if the LDP cannot hold, or if the
ruling coalition cannot hold the upper house majority they have now, it's very
hard to see how Ishiba survives that.
So, um, you know, talk, we'll have to, we'll have to revisit things in
a few weeks and see if he's still, uh, if he, if he's still around,
because every, everything for him is going to be writing on that.
Jacob Shapiro: Talk to us a little bit to close out about rice.
'cause probably most listeners don't realize like, what a big story this is in
sort of the Japanese political context.
Also, a place where Yeshiva has some sort of interesting, like,
like you said, not ideological, but.
It seems to me he's always had agriculture in the back of his mind,
something that he's soft on, and obviously has experience there too.
So tell the listeners what's going on in Japanese rice politics
and why it's so important.
And maybe it'll, maybe it'll determine his fate in, in those
elections that you just talked.
Uh,
Tobias Harris: it could, uh, it certainly, um, it, I mean it certainly
I think is now an important determinant of his, uh, of his approval ratings.
Um, so, you know, we've seen over the last, uh, year, I mean
really it started with, um.
Shortages that, uh, you know, appeared last summer where you and
you had some bare shelves and stores were getting cleaned out of rice.
There was a lot of different factors.
Some of it was, uh, you know, climate change resulting in sort
of a poor than expected crop.
Um, you know, there has been, uh, a long-term secular decline in Japanese.
Rice consumption that, you know, people just are not
eating as much as they used to.
I mean, it's still, you know, an absolute staple of the Japanese diet, but it's,
you know, what Japanese people eat now is more diversified than in the past.
So, relatively speaking, they're just consuming less rice.
And so, um, you know, you, you've had that and you know of, as a
result, you know, the farmers are kinda factoring that into their, um.
Each of their calculations when it comes to, to acreage.
And of course, the Japanese government is still, uh, despite reforms in the past,
is still, uh, paying farmers not to grow.
So, you know, there's, there's just, there's not a lot of, uh,
flexibility in the production system.
Uh, another factor that's been cited is that just with the
tourism boom, um, you have lots of foreigners coming and even if, uh.
The Japanese people are eating less rice.
Well, you have all these foreigners come who want to come and eat sushi
and want to eat all this, uh, you know, they want to eat the rice.
So, um, so you had shortages last year and then, uh, and then you just have
prices, you know, steadily start rising.
And, you know, we saw, um.
Prices in April doubled 98% year over year.
And that was, you know, sort of now like the peak.
And that really put this at the center of the agenda, you know, it's
been sort of rising in importance.
And, and with that it was, you know, wow, okay.
Like this is, you know, people really, um, are, are struggling with this.
And also because it's such an important component in a lot of other food, um,
it was, you know, fueling higher than, you know, over, you know, higher, um.
Higher than the 2% inflation target, uh, inflation steadily because, um,
you have this expensive input now that is, that is making other things more
expensive or at least you know, among, you know, depending on which, uh,
type of inflation you're looking at.
Um.
So, you know, clearly a problem, clearly contributing to, uh,
cost of living increases that, uh, new households are feeling.
And, uh, somewhat fortuitously for Ishiba.
His, uh, his agricultural minister, uh, had a, a Marie, I mean, literally
people were calling him, uh, Marie Antoinette for saying this.
You're saying that, uh.
You know, I get so much rice for free for my supporters, uh, that,
um, I don't have to buy any rice and not, not something that went
over terribly well with the public.
And so after a couple days, he was asked and the popular kojiro was
brought in to be agriculture minister.
Uh, and with that, uh, the government basically announced an entirely
new approach to this problem of.
Rising rice prices.
They've been releasing rice from government stockpiles
for, uh, several months now.
But the system that they were using to do that was auctions.
And basically what was happening was that you would be having these, you
know, you, you'd have the auctions to buy government stockpiled rice, uh, and
people would be buying, you know, they basically wholesalers or, or suppliers
rebuying it and then holding onto it, you know, with the ex, you know,
assuming that, okay, well if we just hold onto it the way prices are going,
we'll just sell it, you know, for more.
Um, in, you know, in a month or two.
And so, um, they recognized that that approach wasn't working.
And so what Kazumi announced, basically the day he took office, was that they
were gonna start, uh, making deals with major retailers directly and
start selling, uh, from the government stockpiles directly to the retailers.
And there was a, basically a stampede of major retailers to sign up for this.
Um.
And it, I mean, it's polled very well and the rice is now starting
to arrive in stores and, and overall rice prices are starting to tick down.
So, so far that looks like they've maybe turned a corner.
I mean, it looks like a, a really successful reboot
of their Rice Pro policy.
Uh, there are now bigger structural questions because, uh, lower rice prices,
well, who doesn't like lower rice prices?
The rice producers that are also an important LDP constituents.
So, um.
We're starting to see the beginnings of a bigger debate about.
Japanese agricultural policy.
How do you, you know, how should you subsidize farmers?
How you should protect farmers?
You know, should they just stop discouraging them from
planting rice altogether?
Let them plant more, um, but really do export promotion and really start
trying to sell Japanese rice overseas.
Uh, have other sort of subsidies and so that, that debate is to come
and will be, I think, a major issue, uh, after the upper house election.
Uh, but for now.
You know, the focus really is how do you get more rice into stores and
bring prices down and, uh, you know, so far so good for ishiba and zumi.
Jacob Shapiro: I think sometimes people operate under the
misapprehension that geopolitics is all about great powers in the US
and Japan and China and South Korea.
When I actually think it's really more about.
Rice prices.
I think if you really wanna understand things about politics, it's all local.
And probably the more local and the more it hurts like local interests,
the more you're actually gonna understand what's happening next.
Um, Tobias, thanks man.
I, I find Japan I are, are you finding you're getting more
interest in people in Japan?
Because for a long time I feel like Japan has been this, I don't know, not
a black box, but it's like I understand China better than I understand.
Japan.
'cause there's just more access to information readily in English about it.
And it's like less, I, I don't know.
It's, it's easier to read.
Have have you noticed a significant uptick in interest in what you're
doing, or is it still, still relatively quiet when it comes to Japan?
Tobias Harris: No, I, I, I think there is, um, I think, you know,
and probably that'll probably only continue to grow, just as you know,
the, the shape and the patterns of the global economy continue to change.
I mean, I think Japan is, uh.
Well positioned in that, in important ways.
You know, I, I think, uh, you know, for better or worse too, you know,
just as, uh, money flows shift and as the, the global bond market shifts,
we're seeing maybe interest, you know, maybe concern about Japan.
I mean, all of that I think is now weighing on, on people's minds.
So, uh, no, definitely I have noticed.
You know, for my business, Japan foresight, you've definitely
noticed more, uh, more interest, more inquiries about it.
And I welcome those inquiries of course.
But, uh, yeah, no, it feel, it feels like a good time to be watching Japan.
Jacob Shapiro: Yeah.
Alright, well hopefully we'll have you back on soon.
Thanks, man.