Hello Geopolitical cousin Land.

It is producer Jacob, Marco and Jacob Shapiro.

Only have time for a short pod today, and so they squeeze in

some hot takes on the Middle East.

They talk about Burkina Faso's social media presence.

And then take a deep dive into Marco's new concept of geopolitical tightening.

And then try to figure out if multipolarity is a good thing or

a bad thing for global stability.

That's it.

Let's get into it.

All right, listeners, uh, Marco and I usually have the luxury of

relaxing for a two hour conversation, but we've got, we've got a tight

57 minutes 'cause I've gotta run.

So we are gonna absolutely blow your minds.

There's no time for foreplay, there's no time for jokes, there's

no time for basketball, even though the Knicks are up two oh oh my God.

We, we've gotta get straight into it.

I will integrate Jason Tatum metaphors throughout this though.

'cause you might remember Marco last year on a podcast with you.

I said there was no chance that Jason Tatum.

Was good enough to lead a team to the NBA championship.

I think in retrospect, that was the correct call.

It was just everybody else was so shitty.

Anyway, we're not supposed to do that.

So anyway, why don't we start here.

Um, there's been a lot of weird stuff in the Middle East the past couple of days.

Um, I. Kind of started with actually something you sent me with RFK Junior

and Nancy Pelosi, both raging at King Abdullah the second of Jordan.

Also, star Trek's most famous Extra, made an appearance in

the Star Trek Voyager for you.

Star Trek nerds out there.

And apparently the, the issue is that King Abdullah said that he would

accept 2000 till children from Gaza who had cancer and other illnesses.

Um, he's only taken in 44 now.

He's slow playing it.

And Jordan says that the king is slow playing it because he is not sure

they're gonna be able to return to Gaza.

I don't know who would wanna return to Gaza.

There's nothing left of it, but we can get into that later.

And Kennedy and Pelosi are taking this as a personal affront and a betrayal.

We can get into that, um, later.

Then earlier this week.

The Houthis struck Israel with a missile.

Um, this was not your garden variety missile.

It got past missile defense.

It made a huge crater near the Tel Aviv airport, shut down flights

in and out of Israel for a while.

So it got the Israeli's attention.

Israel went back and hit them.

In the meantime, uh, apparently Donald Trump had a call.

With the Houthis and agreed that the United States would stop bombing them

as long as the Houthis stopped bombing shipping to which the Houthis, and I

mean, we're, we're, we have to take this, you know, at face value from the source.

But according to Mr.

Trump, the Houthis said, cool, we're just gonna keep bombing Israel.

And Trump was cool with that.

Uh, there was no objection from the United States that the Houthis

were gonna keep on with Israel as long as they stopped bombing ships.

Um, I, some of the quotes here about the Houthis are also incredible.

Trump's saying that he had a good outcome, they had a great capacity,

withstand punishment, uh, quote.

You could say there's a lot of bravery there.

It's amazing what they took.

End quote, um, Israeli Prime Minister of Benjamin Netanyahu has come out and said,

fine, the Israelis will defend themselves alone against the Houthis, if they must,

if the United States is not on their side.

Um, and then amidst all of this, Israel also in the last week

or two, has been talking about.

Basically just annexing the Gaza Strip.

There have also been rumors and various reports that the United States has

agreed to administer the region on a temporary basis until the Israelis

or some other group of countries or whatever else can take it over.

Like there's a lot that is unclear here and in the background.

Iran and the United States continue to have negotiations, and Marco

Papich has been running around the Middle East briefing clients and

learning things from the ground up.

Marco, where should we start?

Uh, well, I mean, I, I thought that was, uh, you know, I, I

think one of the interesting things that Trump does is that he actually gives

props to, you know, America's rivals.

And it's very old school.

It's medieval.

You know, um, and I think that he had, this isn't the first time he's done it.

He actually did that to Iran after the, uh, killing of general

Soleimani Iran retaliated.

And President Trump said, okay, I respect that.

I consider this matter over actually Vice President Harris is, you know, brought

that up in the debates, if you remember.

And she actually accused him of being callous and glib about,

uh, American servicemen being, you know, put in harms ma away.

Um.

You know, I think it's appropriate given that the world is multipolar

and you can't, uh, enforce some sort of a unipolar normative hegemony.

So you've got to, you know, recognize the reality.

But what's interesting to me is just how quickly apparently the deal was

struck between the US and the Houthis, and what's not clear to me, but I lean

towards the view that President Trump.

And the Houthis actually agreed that they would not target American

vessels and American shipping.

It didn't seem to me like the Houthis said that they would like

stop targeting all shipping, but I.

You know, I guess that's yet to be confirmed or, you know, seen in reality.

So, um, it does seem to me like the US is, you know, effectively

just pursuing its own interests.

And I think that, uh, most countries in the Middle East, uh, already knew that.

In fact, one of the interesting things that I did found out while

I was in, uh, Saudi Arabia was that for many Saudis, it was really after.

Various drones attacked their infrastructure, energy, infrastructure,

um, that Saudi Arabia took seriously.

Uh, this idea that Americans wouldn't be there to actually prevent any conflict

with Iran, and therefore they went ahead.

And made their own detant, I don't wanna call it a peace deal 'cause it's

not Iran and Saudi Arabia are always gonna be rivals and they're all always

gonna look at each other as skew.

But, uh, it was interesting that that was, that was the narrative that, uh,

was very prevalent in Saudi Arabia.

It was like an obvious thing, like Yes.

I mean, once we realized that Iran can strike in inside Saudi Arabia,

you know, relatively, uh, with little costs from the American perspective, we

decided to make our own deal with them.

Huh?

You, you were right.

Uh, so President Trump himself, he, here's the quote from him.

They said, please don't bomb us anymore, and we're not going to attack your ships.

End quote.

Um, but then most of the media is covering it as the houthis agreeing to stop

interrupting important shipping lanes.

So I don't know how we got to that leap.

Um, sort of in the media there, I'm also fairly certain that, uh,

the Houthis did not call President Trump and say, please don't bomb us.

But, but that's neither here.

And nor there.

Um, well, let me just, let me cook on Israel for a second, uh, for

all three of our Israeli listeners and Yes, yes, I'm gonna do that.

The thing I hate the most in the world, a guy with the last name Shapiro, is

gonna tell you about Israeli geopolitics.

Um,

but, and I, and the guy with the name Papi, is just

going to sidestep that land bind.

Elegantly.

Yeah.

And let you fall right on it.

No,

I jump on it.

Oh, by the way though, I mean, you know, in our last podcast, Marco, it was the

Jew who read the Vatican correctly.

You thought the next Pope was coming from Asia.

I said, no, I think he's coming from somewhere more traditional.

You nailed

it.

The Jew.

The Jew won.

Nile is zero.

But here I'm probably gonna give up the victory right here.

Oof.

Yes.

Well, you know what?

That's just gonna launch a, a steady stream of new conspiracies

that Jews also run the Vatican.

Uh,

what's, that's a conspiracy.

Conspiracy implies lack of truth.

Um, so,

oh, I'm gonna get in trouble.

So when it comes to Israel, though, I think Benjamin Netanyahu.

Um, is an incredible domestic politician and he has survived for as long as he

has by creating this Iranian boogeyman.

And I think long term in Israel's grand strategy, it's the exact wrong thing to

do because the long term threat to Israel is not from Iran, from a Shiite Persian

country that is many thousands of miles or however much it is away from Israel.

It's from.

Local Sunni Arabs and from Turkey, and those forces have been sort of gaining

in power, gaining in wealth around Israel, even as some of them, like the

Saudis are batting their eyelashes at it.

And Netanyahu continues to hammer on the Houthis.

The other thing that Netanyahu did was he completely tripled down in

his relationship with Donald Trump.

Thought that Donald Trump was gonna look out for Israeli interests, thought

that, you know, he had the measure of the man, and that was a miscalculation.

Huge.

He didn't have the measure of the man.

I have been saying for years that the United States would jettison

Israeli interest just as soon it was as it was in US interest to do so.

And that would've been Biden, it would've been Harris, it would've been Trump.

It would've been anybody.

There was nobody who was gonna have that ironclad commitment.

I. With Israel, and I don't care that Jared Kushner's in the background, like

it's just, it's just not gonna work.

And Israel long term, if it's thinking about its future, it really needs to start

thinking about a world in which it doesn't have, um, sort of unqualified US support.

It needs to think about threats that are much closer to home, whether that's

Turkey, in its navy, in its backyard, or going after their natural gas

interests or, uh, you know, the breaking up of trees with Egypt and Jordan

or real insurgency in the West Bank.

Because the Palestinians realize they have nothing less left to lose.

Like it's a very difficult position that Israel has put itself in.

And I, I think from just a grand strategy point of view, it's short-term

politics is affecting Israel's long-term strategic interests.

And this should be a big warning sign to Israeli strategic decision

makers, security officials, they probably won't listen to it 'cause

they're all obsessed with, you know, the Iranian nuclear weapon.

And I get it, I get why you're obsessed with that.

But there are much bigger fish to fry closer to home, and I don't

think anything's gonna change.

And, and that's just the way that it's.

And, and ramp.

No.

I mean, I wish there was something to disagree with you on, but I think

you're a hundred percent I, I don't know whether I said it on the podcast

or whether I said it to my clients in meetings, but I think that it's incredibly

naive to triple down on Donald Trump.

I. So he moved the embassy to Jerusalem.

Whoop d Do you know, like, okay, that means nothing.

I, I would disagree with one thing.

I think it would be very difficult for Joe Biden or Vice President

Harris, uh, to turn on Israel.

I. I think that they would've been accused immediately by

the Republicans of being weak.

Donald Trump can do it in a second.

And by the way, Donald Trump can pretty much do anything he wants,

and there's very little criticism he will receive, um, from I would

argue a majority of Americans.

And so this is, this is a big one.

This is, this is where I think, um, you know, president

Trump has a mix, I think of.

Pretty solid instinct on us.

Interest at times.

At times, particularly tactically, maybe long term no.

But tactically, yes.

And second of all, you know, Donald Trump's interests are what's good for

Donald Trump and continued conflict in the Middle East is not, I. He

has branded himself very powerfully.

This is important.

Part of his brand is someone who can get deals done and more importantly,

create geopolitical, equilibrium, equilibrium around the world.

And I think Israel is making a, a, you know, a very big mistake

by continuing the Gaza operation.

Uh, and I don't mean that from a operational perspective or

tactical perspective of like, let's find hostages and destroy Hamas.

You know, that's all fine and good, and Israel could do whatever they want.

I understand that, but it's more from a perspective of like, is that aligned

with President Trump's interests?

And they should probably fall in that line.

I. If they want to continue to receive his support.

And I think this Houthis deal is a great example of that.

I mean, like the Houthis attacked Tel Aviv airport either right after the deal

was struck, or while President Trump was, you know, phoning the Houthis.

And uh, and there was no, and there has been like no comment

from the United States on that.

And that should be a really, that should send very cold sweat down the spine

of anyone in Netanyahu's government.

Yeah.

What about, what about, uh, king Abdullah and, and Jordan and RFK

Jr? I'll, I'll let you cook on that.

Well, no, I mean, that's, that's also aligned with

your view, which is, I mean, again, maybe where I would disagree with

you is a little bit on Turkey.

You know, I, I don't see why.

You know, I think Turkey has interest in designs on Iraq and Syria and Lebanon, but

I also don't think that Turkey in any way, shape, or form has ever, you know, um,

considered or thought or even fantasized or dreamed or had a nightmare about, uh,

Israel not having the right to exist.

So that's where I think I disagree with you.

I think Turkey and Israel can coexist.

They can be rivals, they can be even enemies, but it's not an existential risk.

I I, I don't see why Turkey would have that kind of a, you

know, confrontation with Israel.

May, maybe it's not an existential risk, and maybe that's like

the outlier scenario, but it is certainly a geopolitical imperative for Turkey.

Once it, it has to have control of the Levant first and of,

you know, uh, Iraq and all.

And it has to subdue, uh, any threat from Persia or whatever.

But eventually, um, the Neo Ottomans.

Have to have, what is today, Israel, like Ottoman Palestine was taken, like, it

wasn't a Palestinian state that the, the Jews took, uh, Ottoman Palestine from it.

It was the Ottoman Empire that they, they inserted themselves and then the

British Empire that held it afterwards.

And if you are, if you have imperial ambitions in the region, that the

area that is Israel or Palestine or whatever you wanna call it, based on

your politics, has always been important for those types of regional powers that

are thinking about connecting Middle East, Eurasia, all these other things.

So.

I think it's tough.

I think it's tough for them to repeat.

You know, I, I don't think water will flow down the same channels, you

know, 200 years later, but it's okay.

We can disagree on that.

I mean, ultimately, uh, it doesn't to, to me that's like step two, step three,

and we can debate it at some other time.

But to me, I would say the biggest threat is, um, collapse

of states that have treaties.

You, you framed it like Egypt and Jordan one day decide they

don't want to tear up the.

Treaties that they have with Israel.

Um, and I would say that that could happen because those states

collapse due to Israeli actions.

Now, that's less likely to happen with Egypt because it's such a large country

and an influx of Palestinian refugees into Egypt I think is relatively manageable.

And it's uh, you know, it's basically run by the military and so on and so on.

But what's happening in Jordan is I think, very concerning.

And this is, uh, this is where the west can really be callous.

Like if we had a TikTok camera, I would ask for you to like, shine

it on me, because here's a country that's done nothing but like

right by the west, by its allies.

It's, uh, it's stable monarchy, uh, you know, king Abdullah is

doing the best job he can do.

Um, it's a country where Palestinian, uh, Palestinians either descendants

of refugees or refugees themselves, uh, form a very large majority.

It's a country where the PLO.

At one time in its, uh, in its sort of rambunctious youth when

they had their hair down and they were smoking cigarettes and.

Running around hijacking planes, tried to overtake King Abdullah's

father King, uh, in, uh, 1971, where the United States effectively had to

bring in the pa, uh, the Pakistanis to save the Hashemite kingdom.

So this is a country with a history of problems between the

monarchy and the Palestinians.

I think King Gah has really, uh, worked on fixing that.

He is married to a very eloquent, very, uh, I think, uh, you know.

Well-spoken Palestinian himself.

Um, so he's tried to create this kind of syncretic culture, but

the, that makes it more difficult for him to ignore what's going on.

And over the past, you know, 18 months, I would say.

Did the delta, the change in tone.

From the monarchy of Jordan is probably the most severe when it comes to

Israel out of any country in the world.

You know, people talk about Europeans not sending weapons to Israel anymore.

Like that's, that's neither here nor there.

The real change in attitude and tone is from Jordan, and I think

King Abdullah is basically telling the world like, Hey guys, like.

I can't hold back the dam any longer.

And if, uh, you know, if Israel Annexes Gaza, I think that's, you know, uh,

perhaps neither here nor there, but I think the biggest problem is what

happens to the Po Palestinians, the West Bank, and if they start coming

across the border to Jordan, I think that Israeli threat perception

is going to diametrically change.

Israel has not had to guard its eastern borders, which are massive.

It hasn't had to deal with them in over.

You know, 30 years, it hasn't had to really worry about them at all.

And so I think that this is an existential risk to Israel.

I believe that the pers, the preservation of the Hashemite monarchy dynasty in

Aman is more important to, honestly, Israeli continued existence then.

I mean, anything in the world.

And yet they're treating it so callously because you're completely right.

Benjamin Netanyahu is perhaps one of the greatest domestic politicians in

the world, but I think that he has absolutely no interest in what happens

to his own country 24 months after today.

Can't argue there.

All right, let, let's move on from that.

I'm sorry, I'm,

I know we're short on time, but I just wanna say Nancy Pelosi and RFK.

What the hell do they even know about this region?

I mean, they're blaming king of this is the hypocrisy that I, I just, I, I'm

like 2000 children in Amman hospitals.

The third richest country on the planet has the gall I.

To criticize Jordan for not taking 2006 kids from Gaza.

What?

There's no space in American hospitals like, are you kidding me?

This is a country of like 12 million people.

You know, I mean, like it is shocking that they would've publicly voiced this.

And anyone who's watching this and hates Trump and the Republicans or

hates Democrats, uh, and you know, Joe Biden, please for the love of God,

realize they're kind of all morons.

You know, the Nancy Pelosi and RFK can be on the same page.

And that page is quite frankly, like.

I mean it, it's embarrassing for the United States of America to be

putting that kind of pressure on a country that's trying to balance.

I. Incredibly difficult politics and geopolitics.

So, you know, God bless Jordan.

Obviously I'm biased.

I spent four years of my life there as a kid, and I think it's an awesome

country and I think that, uh, they're doing the best in a very, very

difficult region to balance all sorts of different, very difficult landmines.

Um, so.

I think it's embarrassing what, uh, Nancy Pelosi and RFK said, they're

basically accusing, you know, king Abdullah of reneging on his promise

to bring sick children into Ahman.

But it's not that simple, you know?

And if, and if, if they understood that, they would just, you know, swallow

the bullet and say, you know what?

United States of America will take them, because it's become a very

difficult thing for King Abdullah too.

To, to act on.

Yeah.

It's, it's tone deaf and I, I also appreciate Jordan, just from an

intellectual perspective, because on paper, if you just look at all the things

that like make up Jordan and all the challenges they've had, that country

should not exist geopolitically, I.

Like it doesn't make sense.

The fact that the hash mites have held on as long as they

have doesn't make any sense.

It's actually a, a nice piece, a nice slice of humble pie for geopolitical

analysts, because everything that I know about geopolitics

tells me that Jordan should have collapsed during the Arab Spring.

And the fact that they're still, they're still alive and kicking after taking

all the Syrian refugees after everything with the Palestinians, after Isis on

his borders with the rock, Saudi, all these things, sorry, lemme go further.

Can I interrupt you and go further that country?

Please, please, please.

In

that country may very well in some sort of parallel

universe be a bastion of terrorism.

I mean, you have all these refugees from all these conflicts, uh, vast

majority of them with a bone to pick with Israel, and yet it's been nothing

but an absolute oasis of stability.

And there's many reasons for that.

I think that obviously the Hashemite Marky has done a great job and King Abdullah

has followed in the footsteps of his dad.

But I would also say that it has to do a lot with the Bedwin

culture that they've adopted.

The ability to sort of, you know, listen to everyone, you know, try to be.

Try to take a cold shower before making any big decisions.

So there's a lot of reasons for that.

And obviously the support of the United States has helped, uh, support

of Saudi Arabia as well at times.

Although King Hussein kind of made some mistakes, specifically with

supporting Saddam a little bit during the Gulf, the first Gulf War.

But the point that I'm making is you're absolutely right, and it could

be even worse, not just not exist.

Israel cannot ask for an, honestly, a better neighbor.

And, and yet the actions of Israelis are in the long term imperiling.

That.

So if you are pro-Israeli, if you care about Israel and its existence

in the long term, cast your eye across the river Jordan, and take a moment

to consider what would happen if Jordan, um, you know, destabilized.

What's gonna happen then?

Israel's gonna take the East Bank, you know, I mean, I mean, yeah.

So anyways, that's, I'm, I'm, that's a ran today.

Yeah.

Yeah.

I, I'm sure there are, uh, Zionist zealots who think that, but yeah,

let, let's not get too far down the

rabbit hole.

Now we, uh, do our, uh, first commercial read.

Uh, this, uh, podcast is sponsored by, uh, Royal Jordanian visit Jordan.

I'm just kidding.

It's not at all.

But this was, but, but if anybody from Royal Jordanian

would like to talk about that, please, please email the podcast.

We would love to talk to you Flights to New York

from Aman three times a week.

I actually have no idea.

Uh, it's from what I understand from friends who, uh, it might

be the worst airline in No, come on.

One.

One of the worst.

One of the worst.

Worst.

I'm sure you have

clearly not flown Sub-Saharan air lights.

Yeah, I was just gonna say, which is a great segue to the

second thing I wanted to talk about.

I know you wanna talk about social media and branding.

But you were the one who sent me that you've been getting.

Pro Ibrahim Chore, I don't think I'm pronouncing that correctly.

Videos, um, on your YouTube algorithm, uh, this is the leader, dictator,

president General, whatever he wants to call himself of Burkina Fasu.

Uh, probably most of our listeners, uh, I don't know, we have a lot

of nerds here, but so Burkina Fasu, landlock country in Africa.

Uh, borders on places like Mali.

Uh, yeah, Mali to the north, Ghana to the south.

Um, doesn't quite touch Nigeria has some Niger, um, that's in there.

Um, also to the south is, um, ivory Coast.

Um, it's about in terms of population, the size of Florida, so landlocked

Florida in the middle of Africa.

Um, over 40% of the population below the poverty line.

Um, agriculture is the primary sector.

It employs 80% of the workforce producing 35% of GDP.

So we're basically in the middle ages here.

Basically, peasants, uh, gold is their biggest export, roughly 70% of exports.

They also export some cottons, some zinc, some phosphates, some livestock.

I hope you're getting the picture of what kind of country this is.

Um, they have a penant for coups.

Um, gosh, how many coups have they had in recent years?

Uh, it's, uh.

19 66, 19 80, 19 82, 19 83, 19 87. Twice in 2000, 2020, uh, 2022.

They also had failed coups in 19 89, 20 15, 20 23.

Um, so, I mean, not exactly the most stable place.

They actually did have a very famous leader named Thomas Sakara.

I was reading about him.

I didn't know about him until I was, uh, doing the background on this.

Marco, who was the 1983 successful coup guy, he got assassinated a

couple years later in coup of 1987.

Um, but was a really interesting guy.

Um, embarked on a nationwide literacy campaign, land re redistribution

to peasants, vaccinating Burkina Faso's children, outlawing, polygamy,

and, uh, female general mutilation.

I mean, was a really, really interesting guy and talked about

Burkina Fosso being the vanguard of the Third world again, assassinated

after like three or four years by his friend in the Burkina Fa military.

Amidst all that Ibrahim chore is now the dictator.

Uh, it seems to me that he has none of.

Those classically liberal, uh, policies of Thomas Sankara.

Uh, but he fancies himself a dictator.

He is cozying up with Russia.

He, uh, went to, I forget which country he was going to for an inauguration,

but he came with a sidearm strapped and like gloves on, like has a whole like

thing for theatrics and things like that.

And Margo, you're getting pro videos of this guy on your YouTube algorithm.

So I hand it over to you.

What have you been watching that?

This is what you get on YouTube my friend.

So, uh, hopefully we can get smooth to, uh, plug some of them,

you know, just to, uh, to have some of our listeners, uh, sample these.

So basically, I don't really wanna talk about Burkina Faso.

Um, you know, it, it is a large gold producer in the world.

Gold prices are shooting up, so, you know, good for them.

That's, uh, drawing a lot of interest and chore has, uh, kicked out the French.

He's kind of cozied up with the Russians, the Wagner group.

So there's geopolitical sort of side issue here, but I wouldn't overstate it.

No one's gonna fight over Burkina Faso in his gold mines.

Like I bet you anything geopolitical YouTubers are

like all up in arms about that.

No, that's not gonna happen to me.

What's interesting about it is that basically I'm sitting out, I'm sitting,

uh, I think like, I don't know, somewhere trying to watch some NBA highlights.

You know, and one of these YouTube shorts pops up and it's about,

it's a pro like video, so I click on it 'cause I'm like, what?

Burkina Faso.

I haven't heard that country in a long time.

And it's basically some, you know, chill dude who keeps pronouncing

the country's name as Burkina Facia.

Well, I mean, and he just goes, I'm not an

expert.

May.

Maybe that's the right way to pronounce it.

I don't actually, I don't think so,

but like he goes off about how it's awesome and I'm like, whatever.

I don't understand where this person came from, but sure.

Going back to watching my Lakers get shredded by the Timberwolves

and then a couple of days later, boom, another one this time.

It's a cute girl.

You know, young Hip, like it would be one of those videos for like how

to put on nice foundation before the makeup goes on and boom, she's

staring at a camera and talking about Burkina Faso and how TRO is awesome.

And then I realized like, wait a minute, this guy is literally.

Like paying people around the world to make these videos.

Like can we just stop for a second and acknowledge that Ibrahim tra dude with

a sidearm and white gloves and like he's actually paying people around the world

or some PR agency to create these poorly engineered yet organic videos about how

he's an awesome revolutionary leader.

I'm just like, wow, geopolitics is gone.

Like, no.

All I'm thinking about like, Jacob, you and I are gonna become like

absolute millionaires and here's why geopolitics is gone like mainstream.

You know, just this guy tr he's, he's on our side.

He's on our corner.

God bless him.

In fact, let me tell you something.

He has shown perseverance.

Fighting off the colonial French who wanted his minds.

I, I'm just kidding.

He actually hasn't paid me yet, so I can't really do the whole bit.

But the point is, it's insane.

Like social media has become a geopolitical battleground now.

I know a lot of people are gonna say, dude, that's always been the case.

Like, you know, Russia has stole the election.

Like, no, no, no, no.

This is much more organic, much more low key, much more lowbrow,

and it's kind of awesome.

You know, um, he is the exact same age that

I am, so he's younger than you.

In some sense, we should view him as a competitor.

And maybe Marco, it shouldn't be you and I talking.

Maybe we should get some cute girl putting on her foundation and then looking in

the camera and being like Multipolarity and Royal Jordanian Airlines.

What is the combination of these things and why should you listen

to Marco Papich and Jacob Shapiro?

Um.

But so, so, so he is younger than you?

Yes.

And I, I will say, I'll, I take that, I'll take a little bit of the other side, which

is to say, this is obviously Russia is pushing this like the, like this has the

Kremlin's propaganda fingers all over it.

And why they're, maybe they're testing something out.

I don't know.

Like I don't think that Chori was sitting there and was like,

haha, I will use you YouTube.

No disagree.

In order to

I disagree.

You disagree, Aaron?

Fine.

Go.

I disagree.

I think you nailed it.

And actually I noted his age.

I looked him up.

Yes.

He's like 37.

Right.

He is 37.

There you go.

So

I noted that and I was like, no man.

I bet you, I bet you he's doing this himself.

Actually, he may not even like this.

There is a department right in his like communication administrator or something,

and he has literally hired the person to do this because he's 37, because he's

tech savvy, because he probably spends like seven hours a day on YouTube.

This guy is literally paying people to do his branding and pr.

To what end?

I'm not really sure, but I, I for sure hope that he listens to us.

I will do a live show out of Burkina Faso, like bring it.

Do you know what the capital, Burkina Faso?

Yes, it's

uga.

Uh, wait.

Wow.

Something like that.

Okay.

I, yeah, I, I wasn't even gonna try to pronounce it, but I see that.

I see that you have it there.

He also Is that, what is this?

Wait, wait.

How do you, you got

it, pronounce it.

I don't know how to pronounce it.

It's spelled O-O-U-A-G-A-D-O-U-G-O-U.

I think it's wa, yes.

Wagu.

It's got some French stuff in there.

Um, he's also got not an, not on an interesting past.

He studied geology and university.

He was part of an association of association of Muslim students and a

Marxist association when he was in school.

Oh.

At the same time,

this guy is just hedging, hedging, Islamist and Marxist.

You know, like he doesn't care.

I mean, no, this guy, well, his biggest challenge

is the Jihadists, like Burkina, FASU, Niger,

all these different countries.

I mean, this is like smuggling Central and the Jihadists and all these others

are moving weapons and drugs and people through all these different things.

And the reason that he's in the position that he is and that you've had coups

in all of these different countries, and why they're also mad at the French

is because nobody could stop this and they're dealing with massive insecurity.

And you're probably gonna have a population that is willing to trade.

You know, whatever the heck he wants to do, wearing gloves with his side arm.

If he gives them security, I don't know if he's gonna be able to give them security.

This is a tall task.

This is not, uh, this is not like bouquet le where he can just lock

them all up and then start, you know, uh, uh, harvest, uh, mining Bitcoin

with the powers from the volcano.

Like Burino FSU doesn't really have much that it can really go with, and

he's gonna have to really defeat the GI and listen and he's gonna survive.

So,

listen, listen.

So what if the gold bugs are right and gold goes to 5,000, right?

Like, look, I just, I just wanna say right away, uh, I Raheem, uh, sorry.

President Tro I, Marco Poppi, I was pretty much the first to notice what you're doing

on social media and call it brilliant.

Uh, when you set up your Sovereign Wealth fund, I. You got your CIO right here.

Boom.

There you go.

I don't think gold going to 5,000 is gonna

make enough of a difference here.

I think you're overstating it.

It

probably, it probably won't.

It's actually, uh, look, it's a large country, as you said, the size of Florida.

Uh, lots of people.

Um, I think it's like 38 million or something like that.

Um, and, uh, so yeah, uh, lots of challenges.

This isn't, uh.

This isn't an easy country to run, actually.

What is the population?

Let's see here.

I don't think I got that

right.

Think's like 0.3 23 million.

It is 23.

My bad.

Yeah, I just doubled.

Well, you know what?

I'm already thinking and I already took Ghana, uh, for my future,

uh, president, so there you go.

I just combined it with Ghana.

But anyways, look, the point is, joking aside, I think that it's fascinating.

Like I should not, my, my YouTube algorithm obviously

is trying to figure me out.

Knows I'm a basketball fan and I guess love geopolitics,

so he just like targeted me.

But I wonder if any other of our listeners were targeted with these

random videos of a random president.

Like, and, and to what end?

I don't know, but I do know that geopolitics is becoming far more

mainstream than just a bunch of nerds.

You know, IR nerds who like went to model United Nations in high school.

Maybe one of our listeners will tell us that there's

much a do here about nothing.

But there, you're not the first one to notice it.

I hate to burst your bubble, like in just the last month.

Oh.

The, the Economist had a profile of him.

The Council on Foreign Relations had a negative profile, like most of these

things being anti his policies and talking about him as a pro-Russian

Force, anti French, anti the west.

That's not the point.

But did talk

about social media.

Uh, they all, uh, not as much that you, you have the social media

thing, but I'm just saying that like, they got in the economists' algorithm

and they got in the CFRs algorithm so that they're like focusing on this

guy, which there are tons of different places all around the world where you

probably have leaders who would love to have a profile in the Economist, even

if it's a negative one and they don't.

And this guy does.

So something is happening where he is like, he's winning, getting on

the radar of, of Western states and of English press to, to what end?

Like, like with you?

I'm not quite sure, but it's happening.

It's, it's interesting that it's happening.

So, um, okay.

Um, that is segment number two.

Segment number three.

You wanted to talk about geopolitical quantitative.

Quantitative titan.

Yeah, I have no idea where you're going with this.

Why don't you lead us off?

Alright.

Well, the, you know what, uh, two, so I've been traveling the world,

um, over the last three weeks.

So I did an around the world trip to visit my clients and give some speeches.

It started with Hong Kong, Singapore, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, musket, Riyadh.

I'm actually recording this out of Vadu in Liechtenstein, um,

where I had some great fun with clients and, and, and good friends.

And, uh, it's interesting to me that nobody's really panicking.

You know, Americans are kind of panicking about President Trump and the tariffs.

The rest of the world is not, they're not happy about it.

But I didn't get a sense of, you know, that the rest of the world

thinks that the world is collapsing.

So that was, that was interesting.

I did not get asked about a recession at all.

No, I got asked about

because we're already in one.

Sorry.

Yeah, no, and that's fine.

Like we, we, we might be already in one, but you know, it's like whatever.

Sure.

Whatever.

It'll be fine.

Uh, and maybe that's a sign that it won't be fine by the

way, and that's perfectly fine.

Um, I understand that.

But what was interesting to me was, first of all, everyone's already kind

of comfortable with this world, and I mentioned earlier Saudi Arabia.

You know, and I uh, mentioned basically how after the up cake cur attack in 2019.

Saudi Arabia realized that it was, you know, it, it was kind of on its own,

and so it had to make the deal with Iran without American participation.

And then two things happened over the past week or so.

First of all, we have India, Pakistan exchanging fires.

We talked about that last podcast.

And Vice President Shady Vance said very similar to President

Trump's comments in the Houthis.

He basically said like, look.

America wishes that these two countries would settle their differences peacefully,

and we certainly would hope that they do so, but it's not our fight.

So you've got JD Vance basically saying like, look, India and

Pakistan, like, God bless you both.

We hope that you figure it out.

And then President Trump saying like, well, we made a deal with the

Houthis, like everyone else have fun.

And so there are two ways to interpret this one.

Is this hegemonic stability thesis, you know?

This is why Unipolarity is so good.

Charles Kindleberger famous economic historian, wrote

about this in various books.

Um, this idea that the Hegemon provides, uh, it solves the collective

action dilemma of the world by providing global public goods such as

literally the freedom of navigation.

So the Houthis ex, uh, example being very important because the US has effectively

just announced that it will no longer.

Provide a very expensive global public good, which is

free seaborne transportation.

Like they, they will do so for their own ships and so.

So the, the consensus view is basically that without hegemonic stability, you

have, you know, multipolar instability.

There is no more America ensuring that the rest of the world is going to be safe.

This is effectively the beginning of the end of the world as our former,

uh, colleague and, and good friend Peter Zion, you know, wrote his book.

But then.

I have a different way to interpret this, especially when I look at what's

happened with Iran and Saudi Arabia making a, a, a very stable detant,

which has ensured that the Israeli Palestinian conflict doesn't actually

spill over the rest of the Middle East.

I mean, yes, Iran and Israel Exchange missile fire, but it hasn't spread

to the rest of the Middle East.

And in fact, the rest of the Middle East is quite.

Quite stable.

I just visited three countries in the Persian Gulf and they're awesome.

There's absolutely nothing.

No, I mean, there's absolutely nothing going on there.

That's wrong.

It would be like saying West Germany and Denmark are unstable because the Iron

Curtain is next door during the Cold War.

Well, that wasn't the case.

Yes, iron Curtain countries behind it.

Were in a bad shape, but West Germany was freaking awesome.

So what I'm saying is that.

Iran and Saudi Arabia actually came to an agreement.

They had to sit down like adults.

They had to, they had to talk, they had to delineate their interests

and they had to resolve their differences in, in a very frosty way.

No one's saying there's peace between them.

What I'm getting at is this, yes, you can view American hegemony and provision

of all these public goods as a very.

Very stable, but at some point it can also become like quantitative easing qe and,

and many people in finance know that with a central bank flooded the economy with

effectively cheap money with qe, it's.

It saved us from the great financial crisis and it's aftermath.

Absolutely.

I'm definitely not one of those people who shaked their little fist and angrily,

you know, because I was short for the next four years and got my face ripped off.

But at the same time, we all know that it created distortions in the economy.

So, in other words, when, when a hegemon provides stability, it does so in a way

that distorts reality and often countries and regions and entire geographies

become addicted to that provision of, you know, cheap geopolitical.

Um, stability.

You have vassal states that effectively act with impunity because

they are supported by the hegemon.

You have rivals that feel slighted, that feel normatively and ideologically

opposed in an existential way where they cannot come to an agreement

and that creates instability.

So the Withdrawal Withdrawal of American support or American oversight or American

Geopolitical qe, so that you know, in financial terms would be quantitative

tightening, which by the way, the Fed has been doing for several years and

everybody thought it would end humanity.

It hasn't at all.

Similarly.

The United States of America withdrawing its overarching

support may not create instability.

In fact, it may create stability because countries have to act

with each other, like adults.

They no longer, you know, countries that are American allies like Israel

or Ukraine or Taiwan, may not have the blank check that they once had.

Which is not a bad thing.

It may force them to actually consider their security and threat environment

and say, look, we don't have America at their back all the time, so we

should actually sit down with our neighbors, with our rivals and create

a geopolitical equilibrium that is effectively, you know, uh, more durable.

They can, they can withstand a Donald Trump, they can withstand

in the future a president, a OC.

And so that's, that's kind of my lesson over the last couple of weeks

that that's gotten me thinking that maybe we overstate how beneficial.

Hegemonic stability is,

yeah, I think I would, I think I would push

back or, or caveat in two ways.

I think you're right that I think you're right for strong and developed

powers, because now stable balances of power have to emerge rather than a

hegemon being responsible for everything else and people pushing against

the hegemon and things like that.

But as you can see in places like Burkina Fasu or in Congo or with Indian

Pakistan, like places on the periphery.

Those places get worse because those places become the proxy wars

that the Olympians use to fight their battles because they're

not gonna fight their battles.

So sort of to your point with real wars, Russia tried to do that and

look where Russia is right now.

Nobody else is gonna do that, China included with Taiwan in my opinion.

But it's in those like forgotten places of the world that nobody really cares about.

I think that actually the lack of hegemonic power, and it's not even

hegemonic power, the lack of international order, like those are the places

that I think it shows up the most.

And the second is, um.

I think you're right for, for the snapshot in history where.

Countries are all trying to take advantage of the multipolar system.

But previous area eras of multipolarity eventually go to the point where you

have countries that get strong enough in their own backyards where they think

they can be the global hegemon, or they have an imperative, say like Japan in

the early 19 hundreds to become a hegemon because otherwise they can't continue to

grow or can't continue to do the things that geopolitics is forcing them to do.

So you have this.

Period.

I think you're right of like stable dynamism where you have

balancing against each other.

But if you get to the point where say, uh, and we're not there,

people have been calling this about China for example, for decades.

The moment where China really can't feed itself or can't power itself and

it has to go out and get those things from other places, and it needs, you

know, a Blue Water Navy to do that.

It needs to fight the Americans or the Russians or anybody else, wherever

they are, in order to secure access to those resources, and they think

that they're strong enough to do it.

Well, suddenly you can get sort of global war.

So I, the caveat there is, I think you're right in the short term, I just think

that if you go too far in that direction and you get countries that begin to

drink the Kool-Aid and believe that they are themselves, regional hegemons,

then you get the, the possibility of some of these global conflicts.

And I think the hardest thing for countries in

navigating the multipolar era.

We'll be 20 years from now that we're not in World War ii because I think if

things go unchecked and if you get the US on one side and China on one side, and

Europe and all of these mutually exclusive interests and countries that think they

are strong enough or deserve different things, like then you can get into the

situation that we were in in the early 19 hundreds and, and mid 19 hundreds.

But I, I think broadly speaking, like that's the reason I am so

like optimistic from an investment perspective over the next 10 to 15 years.

This should be a time of booming, not of, to your point, like constraint.

Well, I mean, uh, but let's, let's put ourselves

back in 1914, you know?

Mm-hmm.

I may have done this with the podcast before, so stop me if I have, but

you know, I don't think, I don't remember this.

Okay, so let's, let's say the go of Princip,

you know, shut out to my people.

Serbs original terrorists since 1914, uh, started World War I, right.

Um, shot.

The, uh, crown Prince of basically Aster Hungary in Sarajevo, and

that launches World War I. Now, let's imagine, let's create a

scenario, a game where that happens.

But every great power is a nuclear power.

Mm-hmm.

So Serbia is not a great power.

So no nukes for Serbia, but also Hungary is, they have nukes, Russia has nukes.

Uh.

German Empire has nukes, France has nus, have

nukes,

uh, let's say no.

Oh, okay.

That's, that's, uh, throwing some shade at the Ottomans, but, okay.

What, let's throw some shade.

I mean, like, they, they had the Janice series.

They were ahead of most people and, but fine.

No, no nukes for the Turks.

Yeah.

Well put Turkey.

Turkey.

Please remember that I was sticking up for you in this conversation.

You can have Burkina Fasu, uh, to, to our listeners in Istanbul and Ra with

you.

Yeah, well, I mean, Janice series were mostly serves in Albanians, first of all.

But, uh, let's, let's not forget that.

Also, also, uh, United Kingdom has nukes, but here's what happens in that scenario.

I think in that scenario, what happens is Austria-Hungary attack Serbia as

they did, they get their asses kicked, which, which happened in real life.

They, they, they're shockingly loose.

Then they invade Serbia again, and as in real life, they get their asses kicked.

So it was only with a third attempt that the Austrians actually won,

and it was because the Germans came along this third time.

And so I think what happens in.

The world, if everybody has nukes, is that basically Austria-Hungary versus

Serbia becomes a Russia versus Ukraine conflict, United Kingdom, France.

Then Russia supports Serbia with weapons, um, and Germany supports

Austria-Hungary with weapons.

And it's basically, you know, like these two blocks fighting a proxy

war such as the Korean warp, such as Vietnam warp to an extent.

And ultimately what's happening right now, uh, in other words,

we don't get to World War I.

We get to an Austria-Hungary versus Serbia conflict over effectively Bosnia

here, governor, which Austrians lose.

Yeah.

And, and to your point, I mean, and maybe, maybe not a lot of people even die

because both sides at this point also have drones and artificial intelligence, and

it's just a battle of who has the best drones and robots and things like that.

And then whoever wins gets to conquer the social media, blah, blah,

blah, blah, blah, of that country.

And you go forward.

But, and obviously,

yeah.

Sorry, go ahead.

No, I just, the, the, the devil's advocate is.

Um, at the time when World War I broke out, like the, I, the prevailing

conventional theory was that economies were so interconnected that no country

would choose to go to war because it would be catastrophic for their

economies, and therefore they wouldn't.

Um, I think we've already, like that was proven wrong, like

countries were willing to do that.

Um, and we, I think we've seen that with the trade war.

Now, the extent to which the trade war has already gone shows you that

economic interconnectedness does not stop countries when they think their

geopolitical interests are at stake.

The, the way I'm gonna push back against you though, is that.

The notion that nukes will prevent great power conflict from breaking out feels

a little bit to me, like, oh, economic interconnectedness will obviously prevent

countries from going to war with each other because it would destroy them

like it has worked that way thus far.

But I, I don't know.

I'm not so saying when that, that is always gonna be the case.

Well, look, there's two ways to look at this Jacob.

Number one is that I'm right.

Because people,

wait, wait.

Just lay.

Let,

let, let.

I know it was, it was just funny the way you phrased it.

There are two ways to look at this.

First of all, I'm right.

First of all, I'm right.

Second of all, you're wrong.

No, that would be the same thing.

No.

First of all, I'm right, and the reason I would be right is because it's much

easier for a mere pleb to understand.

Being incinerated by thermonuclear device.

Then like how the web of interconnected finance and economy prevents conflict.

In other words, like there is a, there's a real challenge in accepting nuclear war.

Even amongst the dumbest of us.

Right?

So that's, that would be the first.

The second way to think about it is that you are correct.

I'll be wrong.

There'll be the nuclear war and then we'll all die.

But I'm gonna stick to my view because, and I'll tell you why.

If there is a thermonuclear war and you are correct.

The entire listening base of geopolitical cousins will, for a split second,

think that Marco Pop is a moron, and that will be the last thought they

have as they're incinerated, and I'm just comfortable with that view.

I'm comfortable with being wrong for three seconds, so I'm gonna

say that I'll be correct the

best, the best three seconds of my life.

Um, well, I I I don't, I don't wanna make it, I don't wanna get too grim

and too dystopian here, but Ha have you read, um, Mustafa Suleiman's book,

the Coming Wave Technology Power?

21st Century's greatest dilemma.

It's about like the sort of artificial intelligence and there's a chapter about

the intersection with biotechnology where the point that like some kid

in his garage with CRISPR could like create a virus that could go after

a particular family or a particular ethnicity, ethnic group you can.

Um, so like, you're, you're probably right, like in the outlier, thermonuclear

war, like, probably not gonna happen.

The nuclear powers aren't gonna do battle against each other.

Maybe Austria-Hungary, nukes, uh, Serbia in your, in your

metaphor or something like that.

But nobody's gonna nuke Austria-Hungary.

'cause then Austria-Hungary is gonna nuke them.

But could you have some radical in Austria-Hungary?

He was like, okay, I have now created a weapon that will wipe out the Serbians.

And then like, you know, what's gonna happen next is somebody gonna create

a virus that tries to wipe out the leaders of the, of Austria-Hungary

or the Austro-Hungarian themselves.

Like I, I think it starts to take us down these paths where maybe things

get really dark and, and really twisty.

So, so maybe it's not nukes that we should be worried about.

Maybe there are other ways that, that conflict and other weapons that,

that make that conflict less safer.

That's fair.

That's very dark, very fair.

Um, I think to me thus far, look, I mean, the problem with nukes is

that I. 99 out of a hundred times.

Marco may be right, but the one time he's wrong.

I mean, obviously it will be very bad.

Um, and yet here we are, India and Pakistan have a clear

security dilemma be between them.

Uh, Pakistan used to be equivalent to India in terms of military strength.

In the past, that hasn't been the case for like 50, 60 years.

I mean, I, I don't even know.

Uh, and yet there's a balance of power.

And yet there's this very choreographed, you know, conflict every time.

Like nuclear weapons.

Clearly.

I think clearly like if, if, if the, if the, if the South Asia subcontinent

didn't have nuclear weapons, I mean, don't you think that India,

given its massively overwhelming now advantage over the last at least 50

years, would have at some point just said like, what are we doing here?

Like, these guys can't fight us.

No, I think, I think you're actually making my point for me, which

is I think neither e Indian nor Pakistan believes it can conquer the other.

And that the noster there, to your point, is a defensive fail safe.

But we have not reached a point where either side can confidently

say to itself that we can conquer them and our government can survive

the political consequences or the pain that would come from doing this.

Like, sure, there's a billion Indians and there's 300 million Pakistanis.

How many Indians would have to die and a conventional war to number, wait a

minute, number one, conquer Pakistan, and then to actually govern it, like

it's just not realistic, but you could.

You could get to a scenario.

I don't think China's gonna do this, but let's, so let me say that now, right?

This is absolutely fantastical.

But let's say United States continues to decline.

We don't make ships anymore.

We only have 200 ships in the Navy.

We're having measles outbreaks everywhere.

China has become a true blue water Navy.

It's the everything else, and they decide.

Um, you know what?

We're gonna sail up the Mississippi and, and take the United States like

we think we can do this and we're tired of this Western power, whatever.

And it does.

The United States at that moment say, oh, the only thing we have

is nukes, like existentially.

We have to survive.

We fire the nukes back.

Like it has to be some type of scenario where a great power thinks

it can off another great power and then they have to resort to nuke.

'cause it's like a last.

Sort of ditch effort that,

but I, I actually, I think you're creating a straw man

and way too much of a high threshold because, you know, India and

Pakistan could have a conventional war where a lot of people die.

But overall limited.

I mean, because I, I just don't see what would be the point of India conquering

Pakistan for what end to what end?

I don't think they would ever contemplate that, but Kashmir like

taking all of it like that is a reasonable goal for a country to.

Decide to start a conventional war over, and even that conflict has been prevented.

And by the way, India has, has genuine, genuinely an overwhelming

conventional military superiority.

So clearly the reason it hasn't decided to do that is because of

the Pakistani nuclear deterrent.

So even a smaller conflict has been prevented.

Or, or because it doesn't have the imperative to do it

and the capability to do it, you're right that India is the, is a bad

example from that point of view.

The good example is the one I brought up earlier, which is early

19 hundreds Japan, which is to continue to survive and to grow.

Japan was forced to become imperialistic and like, you

know, dominant and militarily aggressive, and so they had to take.

C the, the East Indies, they had to take parts of China.

They had to take parts of Russia.

They had to continue to expand until they had enough control to actually maintain

their economy the way that was gonna be.

So you'd have to have a, a, a country with that kind of imperative that says, no, I

will go after the great powers, because if I don't, then the United States can just

cut off my oil and I'm done in six months.

Or, you know, China can just say something, great example, and I'm done.

That's a, so, um, I think that's a very, a very good

example.

That's how Ity fails.

Yep.

Yeah, exactly.

And it's why China's maybe the scariest of, of all the countries,

because China has echoes of that.

Like China in its, in its vast history, usually can do things itself.

It's the middle kingdom.

It looks inwards, it thinks everybody else is barbarians.

But if you get to the point where China does truly have to look outward and has

to secure its interest by being a global hegemon, and if it starts to believe

that it can do that or must do that, like then you then multipolarity starts

to shift into a sort of darker place.

And there, there are two.

You know, we should probably dedicate a whole hour to China at some point,

but I think there's two, there's two views on this, including in

China, including with mainland China strategists and scholars and academics.

And one is that no, China is genuinely different civilization.

And then there's the other view which says no.

Uh, you know, since the end of the last basically dynasty and

the collapse of the SEN temporary regime, China has effectively

adopted the operating software.

I. From, you know, Europe of a nation state.

And that does mean that they will eventually think like Japan did, like

the United States does, thinking in terms of spheres of influence, regional

hegemony, global hegemony, and so on.

And so, uh, you know, I guess, I guess given your example, the world

better hope that the Chinese do think there are different civilization,

that they won't fall down the same path as every other regional and, uh.

Global Hegemon.

I think they do, and I think they are.

But the United States one thought that it was too and

like history and defend it too.

To your point, of all the countries that decided to wholeheartedly

just adopt the operating system of European nation state, I mean,

I think Japan is a great example.

And so studying that early 20th century Japan and why it embarked on.

The decisions it did, I think is very interesting.

Of course, at the time imperialism was on mode, you know, so like the,

you know, Japanese models at the time, their, their example were the

expanding German empire talking about its place in the sun, the Russian empire

next door, um, you know, Europeans.

And so I can see how they.

They thought that they were behind on imperialism, but nonetheless,

I think your point is valid.

Imperialism's back,

baby.

Uh, we, we've got pictures of William McKinley in the White House.

Remember?

Like, it's, it's back.

Yes, it's, it's, it's here to stay.

All right.

I gotta go pick up my kit.

That was a good 55 minutes.

We'll get back to y'all next week.